Running Head: the STRATEGIC and GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS of CANALS
Running head: THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS
The Strategic and Geopolitical Implications of Canals
Robert Parra Sanchez
California Maritime Academy
THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 1
Abstract
This thesis examines the geopolitical implications of large international shipping canals in the summation to the conclusion that canals are constructed out of a nation’s strategic necessity and are then considered by nations as strategic assets due to their altering of maritime dynamics through the physical change to geography. This thesis employs four regional case studies to highlight the geopolitical effects that canal construction brings as well as how their implementation and usage is intertwined with the economic and strategic goals of various states.
Specifically, this thesis uses historical and contemporary contexts to showcase the Suez Canal in
Egypt and the Panama Canal in Panama, as well as the proposed Nicaragua Canal in Nicaragua, the Kra Canal in Thailand, and the Salwa Canal in Saudi Arabia. This thesis will relate its explanations of state behavior to the concepts of geography, seapower, and strategy, in order to meet their established economic and martial goals via interaction with canals.
THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 2
Introduction
Man-made international shipping canals are not just simply artificial waterways that vessels use to easily traverse regions but are strategically constructed agents of world powers and contested assets that bring geopolitical attention to a region. The mechanisms of globalization that generate the construction of new canals are phenomena that stem from shifting interests of trade, logistics, security, and regional dynamics over time.
In global maritime studies, focus is directed often to a chokepoint, which is a point of limited transit due to geological features. As shipping is bottlenecked into a strait, the area is prone to being blockaded by a state to advance military or political goals. By using force to stop all trade or that of ships of a certain flag, the chokepoint becomes a strategic asset, thus making its ownership and control equate to power. If geography naturally provides chokepoints, then the cutting of land for the sake of maritime transportation establishes a breathing point, where spheres of trade that were previously suffocated by long journeys around continents become united by new shipping lanes. Therefore, having control over a canal, or a strong presence in a region that has a canal, adds to the power of a state. Like a chokepoint, a canal can be blockaded for strategic regions, but what makes a canal different is that it is built on purpose. Tolls can be imposed, naval responses can be hastened, and other shipping routes can become undesirable due to shorter courses or lesser tolls. Canals add to the narratives of regional politics for at times their construction and control were the causes of armed conflict.
Case studies of major canals provide examples of power projection by the construction and ownership of canals from years past, as well as to provide insight to proposed canals and how they can affect international and regional dynamics today. Canal case studies will initially be organized by region, including the history of that region’s canal, disputes over the canal, the THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 3 usage of the canal today, and then how it plays into international affairs today. Regional case studies will also explain proposed canals, and the affairs of its construction, opposition, and objectives. Accounts of history, government reports, scholarly articles, and local news accounts are the sources from which this thesis pulls its conclusions.
The first region covered will be Central America. The Panama Canal largely shaped the founding of Panama as a country and continues to add much to the national GDP. The Panama
Canal’s monopoly of passage between the Americas has been periodically threatened by a possible canal project through Nicaragua. In contemporary times, this is a proposed link in
China’s One Belt-One Road Initiative, a worldwide infrastructure project with the aim to develop logistical infrastructure to facilitate Chinese engagement of foreign markets. Studying the recent attempt of dredging a canal through Nicaragua and its failure reveals how East Asian diplomatic issues made their way across the Pacific. The next region will be that surrounding the Suez Canal in Egypt, which connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Completed in 1869, it was the first canal of its kind; one that was made possible by the difficult process of digging and dredging across a long stretch of land. Over the decades it has been a vital passage for Afro-
Eurasia. In both 20th century World Wars, the Suez Canal was a strategic objective desired by the participating belligerents and was a contested asset during the multiple Cold War-era conflicts endured by Egypt. Its analysis will provide a solid base for understanding a canal’s importance to warfare and commerce. Then, the Kra Canal in Thailand has considerable momentum to be constructed, which would reroute trade away from the congested and pirate-infested Strait of
Malacca by splitting Thailand at its thinnest point. This project is also part of China’s interests and is funded as such, and would change the status quo of regional dynamics, including negatively affecting prosperity in Singapore which profits on Malaccan sea traffic, as well as THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 4 further fuel domestic unrest in southern Thailand. Finally, the proposed case of a Saudi Arabian canal to literally turn its neighbor Qatar into an island should be analyzed as a purely strategic operation, as it would project strength in the Saudi-Iranian power vacuum in the Middle East.
Qatar has lost many diplomatic ties due to allegedly sponsoring terrorism and being allied with
Iran, and permanently being isolating from land-based commerce navigation by Saudi Arabia caries economic and strategic losses. These case studies will provide the conclusions of the research questions presented if they are looked at with multiple perspectives and consider all implications of their existence to all involved parties. The maps included at this thesis’s conclusion highlight the regions analyzed and mark the general areas of canal development
(Wind Surf Addicts, 2018).
Literature Review
This thesis will be referring to a variety of sources to express its themes and convey its resolution. In its efforts to prove that policymakers and strategists should see shipping canals as strategic assets and dynamic mechanisms of geopolitics, this thesis will be focusing on the crossroads of the field’s theories, historic examples, and current events. In all case studies and further analysis, this thesis will employ government sources, journal articles, historical references, theses, and statements from relevant individuals or entities. Finding links between the local, national and international implications of canals will help illustrate this thesis’s goal, so therefore news and sources of multiple levels of outlook must be procured and analyzed. The case study of canals in Central America depicts rivaling global agendas, repercussions of strategies, and how seemingly unrelated cases of international relations become intertwined.
References to overarching themes THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 5
Before looking at certain case studies, some themes should be explained to augment understanding of findings. “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime
Strategy” highlights a baseline of why nations take to the sea to conquest territory. As canals are as much about trade and transportation as they are about strategy, it is convenient to invite a source that lays out both military and commercial factors (Brooks, 1986). A mechanism common throughout many topics of global studies, and especially this thesis, is the People’s Republic of
China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative. The initiative lays out an integrated national strategy to develop logistical infrastructure throughout the world, facilitating trade with all roads and sea lanes leading back to China. Along with railways, roads, and bridges, canals have been factored in the initiative. This global infrastructure project is well defined in the report
“Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, which highlights China’s role in the canals of
Central America as well as other regions (Cai, 2017). Maritime trade is often dependent on the freedom of passage through chokepoints, and Basil Gemond’s Maritime Policy journal article
“The geopolitical dimension of maritime security” illustrates how canals are man-made chokepoints and add a new aspect of importance to a region (Germond, 2015).
Central American case references
Central America is a well-rounded case study region because it includes a past associated with canal-based geopolitics, a potential competing canal, and both regional and extra-regional bodies lobbying for their interests. Sabonge and Sanchez (2014) in The Panama Canal turns
100: history and possible future scenarios highlights Panama’s inception as a state propped up by American interests in trans-oceanic travel and explains how that its economics as a nation are defined by its canal to this day. Fortify the Panama Canal by 20th century naval strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan gives insight to the original thought of the United States and their intentions of THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 6 building and owning the Panama Canal strictly in strategic terms (Mahan, 1911). This first-hand account from over a century ago helps build on the narrative of why canals are being rivaled and bolstered today. The article “Panama as Palimpsest: The Reformulation of the ‘Transit Corridor’ in a Global Economy” helps illustrates how Panama is considerably reliant on its canal to define its national economy and internal politics, and goes to show how disruptive a rival, such as a canal in Nicaragua, could be (Sigler, 2014).
“The Nicaragua Interoceanic Grand Canal in the Central American Regional
Development Context: Considerations for the Debate” explains the concept of a Chinese funded canal bypassing the Panama Canal and touches on the multiple implications it possibly could have brought, such as some detriment to the Panamanian economy, potential environmental harms to Lake Nicaragua and the surrounding rainforests, the displacement of many local peoples, and the lack of confidence of an improved economic situation by Nicaraguans.
Regardless of agreement between the governments of China and Nicaragua, the Nicaragua Canal faced a contradiction of foreign policies, and this source covers the shortcomings of the canal as well as the socio-political climate in Nicaragua that both invited construction and turned it away
(Márquez Domínguez & Díaz-Diego, 2016). Panama, Taiwan, China, and the U.S.: Responding to an Increasingly Hardline China is representative to why China let up its efforts on the
Nicaragua Canal, due to the Panamanian recognition of Beijing as the only Chinese republic over
Taiwan’s Taipei. This is a standard defining narrative in China’s foreign policy (Cheng &
Lohman, 2018). This Heritage Foundation source does carry pro-Taiwanese sentiment but does explain recent exchanges of diplomacy. This information is also formally touched on by the
Chinese press release Wang Yi: China and Panama Are Both Old Acquaintances and New
Friends (PRC Foreign Ministry, 2017). THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 7
Kra Canal case references
The case study of Thailand and its long history of proposed canals requires the employment of sources that both speak to accounts from the past as well as modern analysis of quantitative realities and strategic theory. An important part of the Thai case is the example of how both the
Soviet Union and the United States tried to establish a canal through the Kra Isthmus in the 1970s.
The USSR Academy of Science in 1976 published “Atomic science and Technology in the national economy of the USSR” (Kruglov, 1976), a detailed analysis of their ideas of peaceful use for atomic weapons for infrastructure purposes, and how Thailand would be an ideal place to do this internationally. In the prior year of 1975, US Navy officer Alan Stevens Graham wrote his thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School. Titled “The Kra Canal : an analysis of a foreign policy alternative for the United States Navy in the Indian Ocean” (Graham, 1975), the thesis analyses the strategic nature of both the Soviet desire to dredge a Thai canal as well as the American desire to counter any action the Soviets attempted.
An important source of quantitative data for expressing strategic circumstances was the US
Energy Information Administration (EIA). An EIA report titled “The Strait of Malacca, a key oil trade chokepoint, links the Indian and Pacific Oceans” (US EIA, 2018), provides data illustrating the cluttered sea traffic and total cargo passing through the Strait of Malacca, and how its current conditions draw support for a Thai canal. Qualitative content essential to providing analysis of this case study has been pulled from Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power by Robert Kaplan (Kaplan, 2011). This book does well in explaining the geopolitical agendas of the parties involved in Indian Ocean affairs, a topic that would surely be affected by a new canal in Thailand.
Suez Canal case references THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 8
The Suez Canal case study relies much on the explanation of several historical events from the canal’s construction to the present. The Suez Canal Authority Official Website (SCA,
2018) provides a historical rundown of the different events and conflicts that occurred at and because of the Suez Canal, in addition the statistics of the contemporary international usage of the waterway. This thesis also employs additional sources to augment that the history of the Suez
Canal has on its implications of strategic concepts. One such source would be the text of the
1888 Convention of Constantinople (COC), which was a treaty that was referred to by many groups in multiple time periods to determine the international provisions set forth rules for the openness of the Suez Canal. Over multiple armed conflicts, the details of battles illustrate how the Suez Canal served as a militarily strategic asset. This called for the use of sources that analyses those conflicts, with examples being the Encyclopedia Britannica entry titled “World
War Two: Other fronts, 1940–41, Egypt and Cyrenaica” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018), which explains the British efforts to defend the Suez Canal from the forces of Nazi Germany, or the
BBC documentary 20th Century Battlefields episode titled “1973 Middle East” (McGuigan,
2007), which describes how the Suez Canal was a strategic objective of the participating belligerents.
Salwa Canal case references
Due to the Salwa Canal case study being intertwined with the ongoing and unresolved
Qatar Crisis, much of the information on the project coming out of the Arabian Peninsula region is delivered through news outlets, which often cite government statements that originate on the social media platform Twitter. The continuing diplomatic crisis also involves the heavy diplomatic and economic sanctions on Qatar in part because of Qatar’s refusal to shut down the
Al Jazeera news network, an independent international news outlet in a region where news is THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 9 mostly state-run. Due to the reality that news outlets and the content they publish contribute to the diplomatic feud insuring on the Arabian Peninsula, it is important that analysis of the situation relies on undisputed facts, such as dates, official government statements, quotes, and actions, with the omitting of potentially biased views or speculation. Acknowledging this, this thesis describes the narratives of the Qatar Crisis and the proposed Salwa Canal project by employing information obtained from articles published by the Qatar-based Al Jazeera news network, as well as news sources from nations on the other side of the sanctions, such as Gulf
Business, a state-owned publication of the United Arab Emirates.
The autonomous, non-profit Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad’s issue brief “Saudi
Salwa Canal Project” (Siddiqa, Nisar, & Rafique, 2018) considers the Salwa Canal in relation to the Qatar Crisis in terms of strategy and regional dynamics in contrast to the likely geopolitically-motivated content from the involved Arab nations. Content published by involved nations is employed in efforts of understanding their motives, such as the economic outline of
Saudi Vision 2030, a Saudi Arabian socio-economic strategy that highlights the concept that canals are constructed in part to fulfil national economic strategies (“Foreword | Saudi Vision
2030,” 2018)
Strategic nature of canal development
Article 34 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) discloses the provisions that international law has in regard for straits. The naturally occurring geographical phenomena bottlenecks maritime navigation into close quarters of a state’s internal waters, where all passing through are subject to its laws. Although canals are not naturally occurring, the waterways that make them up are classified as straits and are held to same legality. Some notable provisions include that it is unlawful to pass through a strait or canal with weapons ready to fire THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 10 or gunner personnel mounted; it is unlawful to stop any ships from passing through a waterway based on flag; and that it is the right of all vessels to pass through straits or canals as long as they follow the rules of the host state (United Nations, 2018). With laws like these, it would seem that straits and canals cannot be militaristic assets or used in any strategic capacity, but the fact is that often the ownership of a canal and limiting its usage is not where power is derived. Strategic advantages of canals are drawn from their very construction and existence (Germond, 2015).
Waterways, natural or artificial, are vital to the globalized and containerized world of today.
Blockages to these corridors would suffocate multiple regional markets depending on the arrival of resources, even if the threat occurs for a matter of days. It is this reality that concludes that states primarily use force on the water for the protection of commerce (Brooks, 1986).
To understand how canals produce strategic advantages, the concept sea power in geopolitics and strategy in general must be understood. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines strategy as “the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war” (Merriam-Webster, 2018). Geopolitics in this case are effected by the physical altering of geography, opening up the opportunity for a state to employ the strategy of canal construction to use geography in favor of their interests. The concept of sea power was first introduced by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in his 1890 work titled “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783”. Mahan was able to draw several conclusions from historic examples and was determined to have the United States implement his findings in its naval and commercial strategy in the coming twentieth century.
Mahan stated that all of histories great powers had control of the seas, and that a state would have to have seapower to become a superpower. His findings were a required “six conditions” THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 11 for a nation to have sea power, which were “[that a nation would have] (1) an advantageous geographical position, (2) serviceable coastlines, abundant natural resources, and a favorable climate, (3) extent of territory, (4) a population large enough to defend its territory (5) A society with an aptitude for the sea and commercial enterprise, and (6) a government with the influence to dominate the sea.”
During the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, Mahan, who was a friend of Roosevelt, urged the president to adopt three policies to ensure the United States had formidable seapower.
These policies were to heavily bolster the United States Navy to be able to project power, establish colonies and coaling stations to use for resources and for harboring American merchant and naval ships, and to construct a canal through the Americas to hasten naval movement between the continents (Parker, 2003).
Mahan’s mark on US naval strategy in the early 1900s was not only instrumental in helping the United States become a global power but has been adopted by other nations who wish to stake claim over the waves. The case studies of Central America and Thailand represent how the People’s Republic of China meets or strives to meet the six conditions laid out by
Mahan to become a global power, and that Mahan’s three recommendations to Roosevelt have modern parallels in china’s national strategy.
Chinese adoption of Mahanian thought and practices
A clear sign of China having adopted Mahan’s doctrine would be the efforts of the late
Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commander Liu Huaqing. Liu was considered in the strategy community as “China’s Mahan”, as his efforts to modernize the PLAN and his strategic portfolio were drawn from “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History”. Under his command from 1982 to 1988, the PLAN’s modernization model had a two-phase sequence: (1) to be able THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 12 to project power in a “near-shore” regional capacity, and (2) integrate the capabilities of the
PLAN to collaborate with China’s commercial interests. In tandem with Mahan’s belief that seapower serves a nation’s commercial needs, Liu stated that “nautical aims must be enfolded within China’s national strategy”. The second phase of Liu’s strategy is at the center of China’s maritime efforts as a part of its One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR). The goal of OBOR according to Chairman Xi Jinping is to improve relations between China and its neighbors, strengthen economic ties, and deepen security cooperation. The “One Belt” pertains to the initiative’s maritime aspect, as the national strategy to develop a “21st Century Maritime Silk
Road” would entail infrastructure projects along far-stretching maritime lanes to facilitate trade
(Cai, 2018). It is here where national economic strategy meets seapower. China desires to move its merchant fleet and naval fleet across the oceans with as much haste and ease as possible, and canals as OBOR projects augment that end (Sun & Payette, 2017). The case studies of Central
American canals and of Thailand’s Kra Canal are intertwined with China’s strategic maritime narrative.
Central America case study
Geopolitics in the case study of Central American canals are found in the inception of the state of Panama itself. The isthmus that makes up Panama was sovereign territory of
Colombia and became a place of interest to the French government in the late nineteenth century, as France started dredging a trans-American canal through the swamps and jungles to create a sea lane to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The French eventually failed due to widespread malaria outbreaks on their laborers, which opened the opportunity for the United
States, under President Theodore Roosevelt and Mahanian doctrine, to take over the project.
When the United States purchased the rights of the canal project, the isthmus rebelled against THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 13
Colombia and declared independence in 1903. When Colombia tried to retake the isthmus, the new state of Panama, in coordination with the United States, was shielded by a fleet of US Navy ships. Seapower had ensured that a commercial and strategic location was procured, as American construction of the canal soon followed independence (Sigler, 2014).
In 1911, Alfred Thayer Mahan published his work “Fortify the Panama Canal”. In this essay, Mahan explained his ardent belief that it is not enough for the Panama Canal to have been built, but that it had to be defended as if it were a military asset. Although construction had already started in 1903, Mahan rationalizes the United States’ role in creating the right geostrategic climate to construct the canal, as well as stresses the importance for the United
States to have a route through the Americas. He found that it was invaluable to have a unified
Atlantic and Pacific navy, instead of having ships having to navigate around Cape Horn whenever naval reinforcements were needed (Mahan, 1911).
The Panama Canal was under control of the United States from its completion in 1914 until 1999 when its authority was transferred to the Panamanian government. Being the fastest way to traverse the Americas by ship, Panama has seen economic benefits from the tolls that it collected and from the international attention and development from worldwide stakeholders. Its monopoly was mostly unrivaled, until the robust push for a modern Nicaragua Canal in the last decade.
The Nicaragua Interoceanic Grand Canal project is not currently underway yet tells a geostrategic narrative that involves many players and global contexts. The master plan was to create the worlds longest shipping canal through Nicaragua’s interior while industrializing the path of the corridor to make a faster route through the Americas. Being farther north than
Panama, the Nicaraguan canal would be faster for ships bound for the northern hemisphere and THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 14 would be able to serve ships too large to fit through the Panama Canal. The project was to be organized by the Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company, a Chinese firm that was to be funded by Chinese billionaire Wang Jing. Its construction would effectively alter the regional dynamics that had been in place for a century (Márquez Domínguez & Díaz-
Diego, 2016).
Why the Nicaragua Canal was never dredged
The industrially ambitious
The largest nail in the canal’s coffin has little to do with Central American issues but can be traced back to the Chinese Civil War (1927-1950). The mainland-based People’s Republic of
China (PRC) has been at odds with its long foe, the Republic of China, or Taiwan, which is the survived state in exile on the island of Taiwan. It has been a long-term goal of the PRC to one day reclaim Taiwan. In the meantime, the PRC has refused to recognize it as a sovereign nation and has placed various sanctions on nations that do recognize it (Cheng & Lohman, 2018). These sanctions played an important role in the case of Central American canals and the countries they are in.
In 2013, a concession was signed between Wang Jing and Nicaraguan president Daniel
Ortega, essentially giving the Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company
(HKND) a 100-year contract of management over the Nicaraguan Canal Authority. Early stages of construction began the following year (Lakhani, 2014).
Since 1990, Nicaragua has recognized Taiwan as a sovereign nation, yet China’s interest in a project was not totally deterred by this fact. However, over the course of the project’s beginning to today, there have been dynamic geopolitical events that eventually drew Chinese interests further into Central America and then away from the Nicaragua Canal project. Central THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 15
America, with or without a Nicaraguan Canal, is still a chokepoint of world trade, making it an area of importance with China’s maritime trade outlook, and is more so important as it is in the geographic domain the opposing superpower: the United States.
Significant development of a canal or supporting infrastructure was scarce within the first two years the project’s beginning. A significant blow to both the canal’s prospect of success and its public faith was the 85% loss of wealth of the project’s promoter, Wang Jing. A stock market crash in 2015 sent his net worth of $10.2 billion dollars down to $1.1 billion dollars. This dramatic loss raised concerns that the canal project would not survive, to which the HKND responded with statements of reassurance that the project would proceed as planned. It has often been speculated that the HKND, aside from being funded by Wang Jing, directly receives funds from the Chinese government. Both the Chinese Government and Wang Jing deny this, however the steep loss in personal funds coupled with the company’s optimism moving forward fueled further suspicion that the entire project is a Chinese state-led enterprise in disguise (Phillips,
2015). Arturo Cruz, the former ambassador of Nicaragua to the United States has said that “[if] the canal goes ahead ... it will be because the Chinese government wants it to, and the financing will come from China’s various state firms (Stargardter, 2014)”. On the issue of China distancing itself from the project, a member of Taiwan’s diplomatic team in Nicaragua stated “If the
Chinese government is behind this project, it has to be responsible for everything. If it fails, that’s a bad image. They have to maintain their distance (Stargardter, 2014)”.
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega stated that the Nicaragua Grand Canal Project was to be part of the second-phase of the Nicaraguan Revolution, implying that the canal perpetuates economic sovereignty in line with the Sandinista Party economic ideology that guided
Sandinistas in the late 20th century. It was Ortega’s strong belief that if Nicaragua could break THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 16 the Panamanian canal monopoly and compete for maritime traffic, Nicaragua could develop its maritime domain and become a shipping power like Panama, thus lifting the nation out of poverty (Márquez Domínguez & Díaz-Diego, 2016). Canal development dependent on the
People’s Republic of China is, however, obstructed by another bastion of the Ortega government’s political platform, which is ardent support for the government of Taiwan. On
January 12th, 2017, President Ortega hosted Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, whom was on a trip to the Americas to bolster dwindling international diplomatic support for Taiwan. During
Tsai’s visit, Ortega stated: “We’re still engaged in this battle, which is a just battle, one of principles, so that the people of Taiwan continue to be incorporated in international
[organizations] attached to the United Nations” (Sweet, 2017). This was a direct contradiction of the One-China policy and China’s strategic objectives in their own region, and it is clear that this position by Ortega would undermine some if not all Chinese enthusiasm for having Nicaragua as a strategic partner in Central America. To further illustrate a Taiwanese – Nicaraguan connection, on April 9th, 2018, a Taiwanese Navy “Friendship Flotilla” dropped anchor in
Nicaragua in the hopes of showing the strength of the alliance shared between the two nations.
On the topic of the visit, the People’s Republic of China reaffirmed that there is global consensus of only one China and didn’t acknowledge the visit’s legitimacy or it being a diplomatic action
(Jim, 2018).
On June 12, 2017, Panama cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of only recognizing the government of Beijing (Bacon, 2017.). Panama is only one of the countries that China’s
“One-China” agenda has flipped, as Taiwan has gone from once being a member of the United
Nations Security Council to only having 17 considerably small countries as diplomatic allies
(MOFA). Considering that Panama is a canal state, and that the establishment of a Nicaraguan THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 17 canal could seriously disrupt the economy of Panama, it was a strategic choice to break ties with its ally in exchange for economic favor from the Chinese. It is very likely that the Panamanian choice of recognizing Beijing over Taipei gave enough net benefits to the PRC to withdraw resources and support for an competing Nicaraguan canal (PRC Foreign Ministry, 2017) . As of now, progress on the canal has stopped and many consider the project to be abandoned.
Thailand Case Study
Thailand’s geography is comprised of its heartland in the north and the Malay Peninsula in the south, sharing its southern border is with Malaysia. The narrow neck of the peninsula is known as the Kra isthmus, a low-lying rural region in Thailand that separates the Andaman Sea to its west from the Gulf of Thailand to its east. At the end of the Malay Peninsula lies the Strait of Malacca, a waterway between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, which has long been the primary route between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In the past and present, several factors have made the strait hazardous to traverse, which has prompted seafaring powers to look to the
Kra isthmus as an alternative.
Historical efforts of canal construction
The attempts to construct a canal across the Kra Isthmus of Thailand throughout history have been intertwined with geopolitical strategy just as the modern project is. In the mid to late
19th century, the Kingdom of Thailand was then known as the Kingdom of Siam. During this time, Siam was surrounded by colonies of European powers. To its west laid Burma (Myanmar) and to its south laid Malaya, which were occupied by the British, and to the east laid French
Indochina. It was the desire of the Siamese monarchs to remain sovereign and unoccupied as the kingdom served as a buffer between the two powers. Siam ceded outlaying lands to the
Europeans in efforts to appease their imperial appetites for land. The subject of canals to Siam THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 18 was also approached with the goal of resisting foreign influence. In the early 1870’s, the French, motivated by the lingering confidence of the completion of the Suez Canal in Egypt in 1869, held dialogue with King Rama IV about funding and dredging a canal through the Kra isthmus.
King Rama IV refused the offer for two reasons. The first was because he was concerned that a physical divide would isolate and assist in the separation of the Muslim-Malay demographic south of the proposed canal. The second was because if there was a French-built canal through
Thailand, this logistical solution would openly compete with the Strait of Malacca, and would take away traffic and patronage from the ports of Johor and Singapore, which at that time were
British possessions. This would have brought about a commercial conflict between the rivaling empires, threating the sovereignty of Siam. The next monarch, King Rama V, was visited by
Ferdinand de Lesseps in 1882. Lesseps was the architect and engineer of the Suez Canal, and pleaded with the Siamese king to allow a Kra canal to be constructed for the sake of progress and prosperity for Siam. Although Rama V agreed that a canal would be in many ways beneficial, he strategically refused for the same reason of avoiding the attention of western powers (TCA,
2018).
In the 20th century, the concept of a Thai canal was again an interest between conflicting powers. Southeast Asia was a heated theater of conflict during the Cold War. By the 1970’s, the
British had vacated Burma, the French had lost their territories in Indochina, and the United
States was entrenched in Vietnam per its goal of worldwide containment communism. Thailand participated in the Vietnam war as an ally to the United States and remained an anti-communist state after the conflict’s resolution. During this decade, the Soviet Union’s USSR Academy of
Science proposed to the Thai government a canal project that would involve the controlled detonation of atomic weapons underground to quickly blast out a canal (Bangkok Post, 2018). At THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 19 that time, Soviet power projection in the Eastern hemisphere was partially dependent on the ability to deploy naval vessels between the Pacific and Indian Ocean. If a canal was operated by the Soviet Union, or at least was managed with sympathy to Soviet interests, it could have shaved off valuable days of naval movement. In concord with their adversary the United States, effectiveness in the Cold War was contingent on constantly outdoing the other in strategic or technological manners.
In the year 1900, Alfred Thayer Mahan published “The Problem of Asia”, (Dennett,
1935) an analysis of the geographic realities of Asia and how they affected international relations and conflict. When addressing then Imperial Russia, he stated that it was geopolitical objective of Russia to gain warm-water ports to engage with the rest of the world in trade, and that this was often opposed by other powers, suffocating Russian maritime commerce (Dennett, 1935).
Russia’s natural condition of having icy northern ports that are unusable for a significant time during the year has spurred strategic actions throughout its history and in contemporary times. If the Soviets were able to construct a canal in Thailand and in return hold some domain over it, they would have had a warm water position in a contested Cold-War theatre.
Consequent with the Soviet proposition, the United States Atomic Energy Commission offered a similar atomic dredging project to the Thai government. In March 1975, Alan Stevens
Graham analyzed Soviet and American interests in a Kra Canal project in his Naval Postgraduate
School thesis “The Kra Canal: an analysis of a foreign policy alternative for the United States
Navy in the Indian Ocean”. He stated that the US interest in constructing the canal would be mainly rooted in not having the Soviets build one. He noted that whoever built the canal would have considerable influence over its management, and that having control over a maritime shortcut that you can deny an enemy access to would be of considerable value (Graham, 1975). THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 20
In this case, the Cold War arms race for naval power drove both the USSR and the US to lobby for what they knew would be a purely strategic asset: a canal.
Thailand denied both superpowers permission to construct a canal. Although allied with the United States, Thailand did not want either power having such a strategic asset in its territory, for it could become a flashpoint for conflict if the Cold War became hot. Be they British, French,
Soviet, or American, foreign powers have sought canal construction with hesitancy from
Thailand. In the context of today, however, there is much domestic support for a Thai canal, with
China playing the role of the foreign benefactor.
Chinese interest in a Kra Canal
Thirty percent of maritime trade passes through the strait of Malacca. Over 16 million barrels of oil pass through the Malacca Straight in one day (US EIA, 2018). In 2003, then
Chinese President Hu Jintao termed China’s “Malacca Dilemma”, describing China’s heavy dependence on the strait for a significant amount of its energy and commercial needs. Eighty percent of Chinese energy is routed through the strait. One goal of the One Belt One Road
Initiative is to solve this dilemma. China has invested in developing land routes and pipelines that avoid Malacca while transporting energy from the Middle East and Central Asia into China.
These corridors are to take shape in Pakistan and Myanmar as OBOR projects; however, China has considerable attention still focused on sea routes (Hamzah, 2017).
For China, a Kra Canal is a necessity in line with their adopted Mahanian maritime strategy. Like the United States and its reasons for developing the Panama Canal, Chinese interest in developing a canal is a strategic necessity for bolstering power and commerce. For the double-coasted United States, the South American continent was an obstacle that had to be circumvented by naval and commercial vessels alike, taking away from the nation’s commercial THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 21 efficiency and security prospects. China’s ‘South America’ to deal with is Malacca, but instead of simply added distance, Malacca has dynamic issues that negatively affect maritime logistics.
The strait has historically and contemporarily been known for high prevalence of piracy, outdone only by the Gulf of Aden off of Somalia. Although local navies and coast guards have coordinated their efforts to eradicate piracy, the problem is still present with recorded attacks increasing form two in 2016 to nine in 2017. It is the most concentrated area of pirate activity in
Asia, and concerns are shared by all nations that use the strait, both in Asia and beyond
(Hermesauto, 2018).
In addition to piracy, the narrowness of the strait and the amount of traffic it sees on a daily basis is of concern to all stakeholders, including China. The strait serves around 225 ships per day, and around 100,000 ships per year. A study from the Maritime Institute of Malaysia has found that the Malacca Strait can only accommodate 122,000 ships in a year and, based on rising shipping trends, the World Bank has indicated that by the year 2020, approximately 122,640 ships will be commuting through the strait yearly (BCCT, 2018). The Singapore Strait is the shallowest and narrowest point of the greater Malacca Strait. Off the coast of Singapore, the entire sea lane is only 1.5 nautical miles wide and is at its shallowest 82 feet deep. These conditions coupled with the immense amount of sea traffic have led to many collisions, including the 2017 collision between the US Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain and the oil tanker Alnic
MC (Calamur, 2017). These realities create international desires to find solutions to alleviate the traffic.
In addition to safety of commerce, a canal is essential to China’s naval success in reaching its integrated strategic goals. Adhering to Mahan, China has linked its naval strategy with its OBOR Initiative, ensuring that wherever infrastructure development projects take place THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 22 in the Pacific or Indian Ocean Rim, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is not far behind. The
Indian Ocean is of great importance to China as the highway in which its commerce with Africa,
Europe, and the Middle East takes place, as well as the area where many OBOR projects have taken root. The Indian Ocean is also the naval domain of China’s geopolitical rivals. In addition to competing with the United States 7th fleet based out of Japan, the PLAN must compete with the United State’s 5th fleet tasked with projecting US naval power in the Indian Ocean. China is also rivaled by India’s Navy, which has two fleets in the Indian Ocean. The PLAN has taken strides by developing naval outposts in Djibouti and Sri Lanka, but does not have a permanent regional fleet tasked with protecting its overseas assets and merchant ships. In Monsoon: The
Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, Robert Kaplan highlights the Chinese acknowledgement of this situation and the development of a “PLAN Two-Ocean Strategy”.
Kaplan writes “A one-ocean navy in the western Pacific makes China a regional power, but a two-ocean navy in both the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean makes China a great power, able to project force around the whole navigable Eurasian rimland” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 289). The
Strait of Malacca is a natural chokepoint, susceptible to blockade by either the Americans or
Indians. In order to compete in the Indian Ocean, as well as not be vulnerable to such maritime suffocation, the Chinese must have geography play in their favor, and can alter geography with constructing a canal in Thailand.
Thai interest in a Kra Canal
A significant concern for the Prime Minister of Thailand, Prayut Chan-o-cha, is that a geographical split on the Kra Isthmus would further induce cultural and social disparity between
Thailand’s northern heartland and the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.
Thailand has a majority Thai Buddhist population with a minority Muslim-Malay population THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 23 found at the southern tip of Thailand in the region bordering Malaysia (Menon, 2018). In recent years, Thailand’s south has seen the resurgence of militant groups that wish to establish a new
Malay-Muslim state in the historical region of Patani, which Thailand annexed in 1902. These groups carry out violent attacks in southern Thailand and are suspected to have increasing ties to the Islamic State (Rajakumar, 2016). It is Prime Minister Chan-o-cha’s concern that construction of a canal along the socio-cultural divide of the Kra Isthmus would only further the southern sentiment of division from the developed and populous Buddhist north, thus sparking more violence and efforts for separation. This reality is an existential concern of Thailand and is stoked by the geographic alterations that a canal would bring.
On October 30th, 2018, Prime Minister Chan-o-cha authorized the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and Office of the National Security Council (NSC) to assess the Kra Canal project put forth by the Thai Canal Association for Study and Development
(TCA). Before this authorization, Thailand’s government had not openly seriously entertained going ahead with such a project, as it had mostly been in the hands of the Thai private sector and foreign benefactors. This has been the most recent action of the Thai government as the results of the study are pending.
The Thai Canal Association for Study and Development is a non-governmental group made up of Thai business leaders, industrialists, and retired military officials who share in the vision of dredging a canal to benefit the strategic and commercial goals of Thailand. It is this group that drew the conceptual blueprint of the “9A Route”, the most favored route for a canal that is now being reviewed by the Thai government. The activities and overseas supporters of the
TCA give insight to the extent and resolve of the multiple stakeholders that wish to see a canal built. A conference was hosted by the TCA in September of 2017, “Thai Canal: Comprehensive THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 24
Study of Alternative Logistics Systems for the Maritime Silk Road”, which reflected the four focus points of the TCA: (1) applying lessons learned from other international canals, (2) integrating a Thai canal with regional and international logistic networks, (3) mitigating the maritime risks of the Malacca Strait, and (4) addressing security benefits that a canal would bring. The TCA is partnered with the British Chamber of Commerce Thailand (BCCT) and the
European Association for Business and Commerce (EABC), which are the enfranchised business venture organizations representing the UK and European Union respectively (TUTG, 2018).
European support for the canal is relatively commercial compared to the Chinese strategic intention, which is also geopolitical because the canal would be in a sense a shared route that could benefit European commerce in Asia. Because such a canal wouldn’t directly threaten any
European strategic interests, it is beneficial for Europe to support its construction.
The TCA is in fact organized under the Thai-Chinese Cultural and Economic
Association, highlighting the Chinese connection. As of now, the Chinese government has not officially sponsored or pledged efforts to a Thai canal, but linkages such as these pertain to the
Chinese national interest. Considering the many implications that the Kra Canal would have in maritime Asia and the presence of Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects around the
Indo-Pacific region, the lack of official endorsement does not mean that the Chinese are removed from the potential construction, but rather means that China may be publicly keeping its distance to avoid international attention being redirected to Beijing when it can be directed at Bangkok.
Suez Canal Case Study
The Suez Canal was the first intercontinental waterway project of its kind. From the late nineteenth century and to the present, the Suez Canal in Egypt has had profound effects on regional and global affairs. The examination of its origin and history illustrates how the world’s THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 25 first major canal was dredged out of strategic intentions, and how it’s ownership and functionality have contributed to the strategic capabilities of different countries in several conflicts.
In the 1850’s, what is now considered Egypt was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. In
1854, French engineering entrepreneur Ferdinand de Lesseps was granted approval by the
Egyptian Khedive (viceroy) to form the Suez Canal Company for the development of a shipping canal on the Suez Isthmus. The Suez Isthmus linked the Sinai Peninsula with mainland Egypt and separated the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The Suez Canal project aimed to dredge a waterway from the port city of Suez on the Red Sea to Port Said on the Mediterranean, serving as a navigable alternative to sailing around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern end of the
African continent. Construction took place from 1859 to 1869, with ownership of the Suez Canal
Company being held in shares owned mostly by France and Egypt. When the Egyptian economy took a downturn in 1875, Egyptian shares of the Suez Canal Company were sold to Great
Britain. In 1882, a nationalist uprising in Egypt threatened the stability of the canal zone, offering the United Kingdom an opportunity to invade and conquer Egypt and fully occupy the
Suez Canal at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, which did not retaliate. This ensured that the
British had secured maritime access to their extensive empire. The Suez Canal provided quick access for commercial ships to the British Commonwealth in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, as well as provided the Royal Navy with the mobility to protect shipping and project seapower
(SCA, 2018).
British control of the Suez Canal
The 1888 Convention of Constantinople brought together the powers of the United
Kingdom, France, the Russian Empire, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 26 and the Ottoman Empire to agreement on the internationalization of the Suez Canal in the face of
British occupation. The treaty achieved that the canal was to be open to all nations in times of both war and peace, with the condition that the British would be able to continue their militarization of the canal. The convention permitted that the canal may only be closed by the
British-appointed Sultan of Egypt on the condition that it was necessary for "the defense of
Egypt and the maintenance of public order” (Constantinople Convention, 1888).
This agreement was essentially ignored by the British during the First World War, which was the canal’s debut as a strategic flashpoint. The British denied commercial and naval canal access to the Central Powers; the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, and the
Ottoman Empire. Wartime logistics for the British Empire relied on the Suez Canal for the movement of resources and troops from dominions like India and Australia. Recognizing this, the Ottomans under the command of German tacticians desired to seize the Suez Canal and stop the flow between Britain and her colonies and open the waterway for Central Power ships. In
1915, the Ottomans attacked the British along the canal but were unsuccessful in their effort, and the canal would continue to be a vital British asset for the rest of the war (Fielding, 2018).
During the Second World War, a similar strategic narrative took place. The United
Kingdom still occupied Egypt at the beginning of the war, and again used the canal for commercial and naval sealift purposes. Early in the war, Italy launched an offensive from its protectorate Libya to expel the British from Egypt. This attempt fell short and was renewed by an offensive launched by Nazi Germany. Although Germany pushed considerably far into Egypt, the Allies eventually repelled the Axis out of Northern Africa, having kept the Suez open to aid the Allied war effort and out of the playbook of the Axis Powers (Encyclopedia Britannica,
2018). THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 27
Strategic control of the Suez Canal benefited Britain during the World Wars and in peacetime. The canal undoubtedly assisted the British Empire in exerting control over its multiple territories. The double-edged sword of denying an enemy the ability to use an expedient shipping route while using the same route to improve efforts against that enemy is the prime example of the concept that canals should be considered by tacticians as strategic assets. As the post-colonial era dawned on the British Empire, the vital asset of Suez would eventually become the tool of Egypt itself.
Egyptian control of the Suez Canal
The Suez Crisis was a defining event that illustrates how canals as flashpoints can quickly lay the foundations for a potential global conflict when a power’s ownership of a canal is jeopardized. In 1952, a revolution took place in the Kingdom of Egypt, the British protectorate state. The nationalist coup led by Egyptian military officer Gamal Abdel Nasser led to the end of the British occupation of Egypt and the creation of the independent Republic of Egypt. The
British did maintain control of the Suez Canal and continued to have a military presence there per the 1888 Convention of Constantinople, although to a lesser extent than before the Egyptian revolution. Nasser, as the President of Egypt, ordered the nationalization of the Suez Canal on
July 26th, 1956. Egypt seized all the assets of the Suez Canal Company and financed the compensation for all of its shareholders. Nasser ordered that the Suez Canal be closed to all
Israeli ships, as well as blockade Israeli ships from using the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba, violating the 1888 Convention of Constantinople. The United Kingdom saw nationalization of the canal as a direct threat to their commerce, their connection with the rest of the British
Empire, and their interests in the Middle East, while France saw it as the illegal seizure of highly valuable property held by French citizens. These realities led to a coalition of the United THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 28
Kingdom, France, and Israel against Nasser’s Egypt, with the goal of re-internationalization of the Suez Canal.
In October 1956, Israel military forces pushed into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, soon followed by a reinforcement of British and French forces that were tasked with retaking the Suez
Canal. The Soviet Union, dismayed by the eastward colonialist foreign policies of the two
NATO members and Israel, threatened to militarily intervene in the Suez Crisis and attack the coalition nations with missile strikes if they did not withdraw their forces from Egypt. The
United States, a NATO member itself, would have had no choice but to retaliate against the
Soviet Union if it had attacked the United Kingdom or France. In attempt to prevent the Cold
War from turning into a heated conflict, the United States applied heavy economic sanctions on the coalition nations. Due to the pressure from both East and West, the coalition withdrew from
Egypt, ending the presence of British troops in the canal zone and leaving Egypt with sole control over the canal (US Office of the Historian, 2016).
The Suez Canal was again open to all sea traffic by 1957 and would remain unrestricted for a further ten years. On June 5th, 1967, Israel preemptively launched air attacks against
Egyptian airfields, and started an invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in response to rising tensions from its Arab neighbors and a newly imposed Egyptian blockade on the Gulf of Aqaba at the
Strait of Tiran. This sparked the Six-Day War, which resulted in territorial changes including the
Israeli seizure of the Sinai Peninsula and occupation all the way westward to the bank of the
Suez Canal. During the War, the Egyptians had purposefully sunk multiple ships at the northern and southern entrances to the canal, making it unusable to all vessels. The global shipping community had to revert to sailing around the entire African continent. THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 29
From October 6th to 25th, 1973, Egypt and Israel engaged in the Yom Kippur War.
Again, the Suez Canal was a strategic objective of both sides. As the war began, Egyptian forces pushed across the canal to regain territory in the Sinai Peninsula that had been occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War. Israel retaliated with a counter-offensive that pushed the southern Egyptian lines back to the canal, leaving both side’s lines at the waterway by the end of the conflict. In
1975, Israel and Egypt agreed to the Sinai Interim Agreement, allowing for the demilitarization of the canal zone, the clearing of the scuttled vessels that blocked the Suez Canal for eight years, and the freedom of navigation for Israeli ships to pass through the canal. Israeli presence in the
Sinai Peninsula was maintained until 1979 when a US-facilitated peace treaty had the peninsula returned to Egypt (McGuigan, 2007).
The Suez Canal Today
Today, the Suez Canal serves as a route for 10% of the world’s maritime commerce
(SCA, 2015). It is projected that the 2018 annual income brought into Egypt by Suez Canal traffic will have been $6 billion dollars, which is a $500 million dollar increase from the canal annual income of 2017. Rises in canal income are attributed to the “New Suez Canal” expansion project that was completed in 2015. The new waterway capable of handling larger ships now runs parallel to the original Suez Canal, which allows for certain vessels that would circumnavigate Africa the opportunity to use the shortcut provided by Suez (Ahram Online,
2018). Investment Minister Ashraf Salman projected in 2015 that the improved canal zone would eventually bring in $13 billion dollars annually, and account for thirty to thirty-five percent of the Egyptian economy (Farouk & Bushra, 2015). The new logistical capabilities of the Suez
Canal are well received by China, as the expansion compliments the strategy of the One Belt
One Road Initiative in facilitating trade between China and Mediterranean Europe. China, THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 30 through various state-owned companies, has invested in the development of new container terminals in Port Said at the northern end of the canal, and new cargo terminals at Port of
Adabiya at the southern end (Sari, 2017). The state-owned China Harbor Engineering Company has begun construction of a new terminal in the Egyptian Red Sea port of Sokhna (Xinhua,
2018). These infrastructure projects aim to increase the capacity of cargo the canal zone can handle as a hub between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, therefore making the Suez
Canal a vital link on China’s maritime Silk Road.
The United States, as a large participant in global maritime trade and as a seapower that strives to protect that trade, has a strategic interest in the security and availability of the Suez
Canal chokepoint. The United States African Command (AFRICOM) stated in 2016 that the
United States enjoys a strategic partnership with Egypt in protecting the Suez Canal and in actions against the Islamic State, of which has an affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula known as ISIL-
Sinai or ISIL-S. The US strategic interests in the Middle East, including the armed conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the combatting of piracy around the Horn of Africa, and the free flow of shipping through the region, make the Suez Canal and its openness an important factor in
American seapower (US Africa Command, 2016).
The Suez Canal as the world’s first large man-made waterway has seen much conflict, profit, and attention from large powers due to its strategic positioning between three major continents. Egypt has seen how the altering of geography can reshape regional dynamics, and along with several other nations wish to see another potential canal in the Middle East achieve the same results.
Salwa Canal Case Study THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 31
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s proposed Salwa Canal project is conceptually the most pronounced use of a canal for blunt power projection. Unlike the canals previously mentioned, its strategic value does not lie in its facilitation of naval or commercial mobility. It rather lies in the permanent altering of physical geography to fulfill multiple aspects of a national strategy.
The Salwa Canal project has been designed to advance the kingdom’s strategic, economic, and geopolitical goals as it ties in with contemporary Saudi efforts to project power in the Middle
East region.
Geographically, the State of Qatar is a peninsula that extends into the Persian Gulf with its only connection to the mainland Arabian Peninsula being its southern border with Saudi
Arabia. To the east of Qatar is the Salwa Bay, separating Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and to the west is the open Persian Gulf, where Saudi Arabia also has sea access to. The layout of the Salwa
Canal project would be the construction of a waterway from the Saudi town of Salwa to the
Qatari inland sea of Khor al-Udeid, and would exist entirely within Saudi territory, with both banks belonging to Saudi Arabia. The canal would be 200 meters wide and would be dredged 15 to 20 meters deep, allowing for the passage of merchant ships. The project will add sixty kilometers to the Saudi mainland coastline (Kuwait Times, 2018). The canal is expected to cost
$750 million dollars and is projected to take twelve months to build form start to finish (Al
Jazeera, 2018).
On June 18th, 2018, Saud al-Qahtani, an advisor to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman bin Abdulaziz, tweeted the statement: “Starting [to dig] the Salwa Canal.
Congratulations to the Saudi people for this wonderful project that will transform the small terrorist state of Qatar into an island” (Zayat, 2018). This was the first announcement put forward by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pertaining to the construction of a canal in a manner THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 32 that clearly connotates punishment toward its neighbor, Qatar. The use of the canal in part to geographically banish Qatar from the Arabian Peninsula is part of the larger regional narrative of the ongoing Qatar Crisis.
The Qatar Crisis
The Qatar Crisis is the situation created by the continuing diplomatic and commercial sanctions on the State of Qatar by a multinational bloc led by Saudi Arabia, including Egypt, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Senegal, Comoros, Jordan, Maldives, Mauritania,
Djibouti, the eastern government of Libya, Chad, Niger, and Yemen. These nations cut their diplomatic ties with Qatar in the summer of 2017. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain also imposed air, land, and sea blockades on all forms of Qatari traffic (Al Jazeera, 2017b). Due to Article 34 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty, Egypt was unable to deny
Qatari ships passage through the Suez Canal, yet was able to forbid Qatari flagged vessels from using any of its ports or economic zones (Maritime Executive, 2017). These four nations expressed several grievances with Qatar, including Qatar’s close diplomatic ties with the competing regional power of Iran, Qatar’s close ties and relationships with opposition groups within the sanctioning nations, and for being the host nation of news outlets that have often been a platform for criticism of the sanctioning nations, among other complaints. These sanctioning nations issued thirteen demands for Qatar to meet in order to lift the blockades and restore relations. The demands highlighted the concerns of these nations, especially those of Saudi
Arabia, and the strategic, geopolitical, and economic nature of the demands allude to the enthusiasm of Saudi Arabia to construct a Salwa canal.
The first two demands issued were strategic in their relation to Saudi Arabia’s defense and resolve to project power on their peninsula and in the region. The first demand was for Qatar THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 33 to end its military and intelligence cooperation efforts with Iran, to scale down diplomatic ties with Iran, and to expel all members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard in Qatar. In past decades, the alliance between Iran and Qatar has benefited due to the continual competition between Saudi
Arabia and Iran for regional dominance. As Saudi Arabia has led the Arab world in opposing
Iran in multiple aspects, Qatar has served as an Arab ally by sharing economic relations with Iran and by facilitating diplomatic dialogue between Iran and Arab states as well as extra-regional nations. The alliance has benefited the defense of Qatar with joint military exercises and the sharing of military intelligence with Iran, to the dismay of Saudi Arabia (Kamrava, 2015).
Iranian support for Qatar increased with the beginning of the Qatar Crisis, as Iran called on the sanctioning nations to find resolution through dialogue instead of sanctions. Due to the blockade imposed on Qatar, economic dependency on Iran has increased, and much humanitarian aid, commodities, and resources are shipped or flown in to Qatar from across the Persian Gulf (RT,
2017).
The second demand was that Qatar cease its alliance with Turkey and close Tariq bin
Ziyad base, a Turkish military base south of the Qatari capital Doha. This is Turkey’s first overseas military base, to which it periodically increases its troop count with the objective of having a 3,000-troop permanent garrison in the Gulf state. The Turkish-Qatari military alliance and the presence of Turkish troops in Qatar is publicized as a tool of deterrence and strategic balance in the Middle East. Turkey having a shared defense pact and a permanent presence would escalate any offensive measures toward Qatar into a regional conflict. Like Iran, Turkey has also condemned the sanctions imposed on Qatar and has sent humanitarian aid to offset the effects of the blockade (Al Jazeera, 2017b). THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 34
Eight of the demands were to change social and geopolitical realities that Qatar generates in the Middle East. To start, the four nations called for an end of Qatari foreign involvement.
They demanded that Qatar; sever all ties with terrorist organizations and formally declare them as terrorists, stop all forms of funding for groups considered terrorists by the sanctioning nations, extradite fugitives and declared terrorists that are wanted in the sanctioning nations, end all forms of interference in the domestic affairs of foreign countries, and to end any forms of dialogue with political opposition groups of the sanctioning nations. It was also mandated that
Qatar adopt the military, political, social and economic policies of the other Gulf and Arab countries (Al Jazeera, 2017a).
A notably profound demand made by the Saudi-led bloc was that Qatar must shut down the Al Jazeera news outlet and all affiliated media outlets. The news network is headquartered in the Qatari capital of Doha and covers both Middle Eastern and world news topics. Al Jazeera has been known to be critical of regimes in the region, and in the case of the sanctioning nations, has assisted in the dissemination of opinions challenging the governments in Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Bahrain, and the UAE (ISISA, 2018).Another demand was that Qatar had to shut down the
Qatari sponsored news outlets Arabi21, Rassd, Al Araby Al Jadeed, Mekameleen and Middle
East Eye. If carried out, the censorship of these news outlets would eliminate press that at times speaks out against authoritarianism in the region, as well as create a news culture in Qatar that instills a relationship where the press is guided by the government, as it is in the sanctioning nations. It is important to note that Al Jazeera’s host country Qatar has been criticized of being an authoritarian state and suppresses opposition in its own way by blocking some independent news sites and at times removing online content that opposes the Qatari government or the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) (Katzman, 2018). THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 35
An economic demand called for Qatar to “pay reparations and compensation for loss of life and other financial losses caused by Qatar's policies in recent years” (Al Jazeera, 2017a). It was demanded that all of these conditions be met by Qatar within 10 days of their issuing on July
11th, 2017. Lastly, it was demanded that Qatar submit to monthly compliance audits over the following ten years conducted by the sanctioning nations to oversee the meeting of the demands.
In response to the grievances put forward by the sanctioning bloc, Qatar expressed disappointment in the sudden cutting of diplomatic ties and closure of borders and airspace. The
Qatari Foreign Ministry in their response to the crisis stated that the measures and demands put forth to Qatar “are unjustified and based on false claims and assumptions”. The statement went on to say that “Qatar respects the sovereignty of other nations and does not interfere in their internal affairs, and it has fulfilled its role in fighting terrorism and extremism. It is clear that the media campaign of fabrications has failed to sway public opinion in the region, and among Gulf countries in particular, and this explains the continued escalation against Qatar.” (AJ 5) Turkey has expressed that it has no intention of vacating it’s base south of Doha (Al Jazeera, 2017c).
Due to Qatar’s refusal to meet the demands, Saudi Arabia has not restored relations with its neighbor. Saudi Arabia’s Salwa Canal conceptually should be considered as a means of punishing Qatar for its noncompliance, as an asset to mitigate some of its regional strategic concerns, and as a way to add to Saudi prosperity, all with the implementation of one project.
The demands highlighted Saudi Arabian concerns of strategy, geopolitics, and economy, all of which the Salwa Canal would attempt to resolve.
On April 9th, 2019, the Saudi state media outlet Sabq reported that “[the] project is to be funded entirely by Saudi and Emirati private sector investment - under full Saudi authority”. As of now, it has been indicated by the Saudi government that an unspecified Egyptian company THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 36 will dredge the canal due to Egyptian experience in expanding and managing the Suez Canal
(Kuwait Times, 2018). During the crisis, Qatar has considered the proposed canal as a mere bluff by Saudi Arabia to intimidate Qatar into submitting to the thirteen demands. On October 31st,
2018, as the most recent official word from Saudi Arabia, Saud al-Qahtani stated “As a citizen, I am impatiently waiting for the details of the implementation of the East Salwa island project,
[the] great historic project that will change the region’s geography”, further reinforcing Saudi
Arabia’s resolve and determination to build the canal (Gulf Business, 2018).
Geopolitically, the Salwa Canal would be a permanent symbol of Saudi sentiments against the policies of Qatar. The canal, however, cannot solve for the opposing opinions that are published by Al Jazeera and other Qatari-based news outlets. It would not physically stop Qatar from interacting with foreign groups or actors, nor would it be the means to get Qatar to align its political or social agenda with the four sanctioning nations. This calls to question how a physical change to geography can be a solution to social affairs, and also why, if Saudi Arabia has already closed its border and blockaded all commerce and travel from Qatar, would a canal be necessary as a physical obstacle to keep out Qatari individuals or commercial traffic? The canal does however display the will of Saudi Arabia to do whatever is necessary to push its regional agenda and the use of sizable and costly projects to do it. Diplomatically, the canal, publicized as a punishment, would serve as an irreversible scar on future relations between Qatar and Saudi
Arabia.
Economically, the Salwa Canal project fits perfectly with Saudi commercial goals. Saudi
Arabia has initiated Saudi Vision 2030, a nationwide social and economic plan to develop the
Saudi public sector, diversify the economy, improve infrastructure, and create employment opportunities (“Foreword | Saudi Vision 2030,” 2018). The Salwa Canal as a development THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 37 project would create jobs during its creation and would then transform what is essentially a desert into a diversified maritime economic area. Port development is drafted for sites at both ends of the canal’s route, as the canal would be a new ideal route for ships that with to sail between Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (Siddiqa et al., 2018). The new canal zone would also be developed for tourism, another valued aspect of Vision 2030. Saudi Arabia has also indicated that the Salwa Canal zone would partially be developed as a center for tourism, with the construction of resorts, harbors for yachts, private beaches, and water sport areas. Qatar, which is scheduled to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022, is concerned that a developed Salwa
Canal and eliminated land border would negatively affect tourism and income from the international event. Qatar does not have the infrastructure to accommodate the projected amount of World Cup guests and was depending on Saudi hotels to host some spectators that would cross the border into Qatar to view the matches ((Kuwait Times, 2018). With a land connection gone, coupled with closed borders and airspace, Qatar might fail to host all its guests, potentially losing some of the returns on its investment of hosting the games.
Strategically, a canal would help Saudi Arabia project power and mitigate some of its
Persian Gulf military concerns. A sea lane would allow for Saudi Arabia to deploy naval ships entirely around Qatar, granting the ability to impose a full naval blockade around the island if desired. The Salwa Canal project includes provisions to construct a Saudi military base on the land strip of Saudi territory between Qatar and the Salwa waterway (Siddiqa et al., 2018). The canal would put a physical obstacle between the Saudi heartland and any force stationed in
Qatar. Tactically, the Salwa Canal would act as a moat, which militarily and commercially isolates an ally of Saudi Arabia’s regional rivals of Turkey and Iran. THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 38
As of November 2018, there have been no recent press releases on the construction or progress of the Salwa Canal. As Qatar has not submitted to the demands of the sanctioning nations, the Qatar Crisis continues with blockades still imposed and diplomacy still not restored, despite international diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. What is certain is that Saudi Arabia has acknowledged the concept that a canal can reshape regional geopolitics and be used to gain strategic leverage by the altering of geography.
Analysis
When considering all the implications brought fourth by the case studies, nuanced conclusions can be drawn by identifying the overarching themes that highlight how the significance of shipping canals is found in their relation to geopolitical strategy.
The first finding is that large shipping canals are financed and built under the management of global or regional powers to advance their strategic objectives, instead of being constructed by the nations that the canals traverse or avoid. With the exception of the
Salwa Canal, the world’s major established or proposed canals are built in nations with relatively less industrial or economic means than the foreign nations that conduct the management and financing of its actual construction. The promoters of canals observe their national strategy with a geographically wide perspective, and thus look to other regions for opportunities to invest time and resources to improve their strategic capabilities.
The second finding is that canals are constructed as tools of the larger economic strategies of their founding countries. The Kra and Nicaraguan canal projects and port development around the Suez Canal are cogs in the larger portfolio of China’s One Belt One
Road initiative. The Nicaragua canal was also the centerpiece for Daniel Ortega’s promotion of THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 39 the economic second phase of the Nicaraguan Revolution. The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia sees the Salwa Canal as an important project to achieve the goals of Saudi Vision 2030.
President Theodore Roosevelt ordered the completion of the Panama Canal to meet Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s standards for the United States to become a strong commercial and naval power. In addition to this concept, the procurement of an existing canal can yield economic achievement. The United Kingdom saw their occupation of the Suez Canal as a necessity to project power over their empire and protect the supply chain between their dominions in Africa,
Asia, and Oceana. Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal was done so to utilize a valuable asset that could add to the republic’s economic prosperity. The organizing principle of the nations in these examples is their economic potential though changes to the status quo. Canals, whether built or seized, help achieve this end.
The third finding is that canals are inherently valuable for defensive and offensive military operations. Through their altering of geography, their ownership by a power, and their attraction of attention to their region, canals introduce a new asset of power, and can invite the use of force as well as be used to augment the use of force. When the Panamanian Isthmus seceded from Colombia in efforts to create a smaller state centered around the developing canal zone in 1903, Colombia employed the use of force to try and retake the area that would become highly strategic upon the canal’s completion. This was met by an American show of force, which cancelled out their ability to retake the isthmus, illustrating that canals are important enough to national interests that nations are willing to escalate tensions to secure them. The multiple conflicts involving the Suez Canal display the duality of how canals can be the desired objectives of military campaigns as well as tools of their owners used in military campaigns. The concept of canals being used in security contexts is also applicable to the mitigation of potential threats or THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 40 factors that would limit military capabilities. For example, the conditions of heavy sea traffic, piracy, and narrowness of the Malacca strait present threats and risks to Chinese and Thai maritime interests, and with the construction of a Kra Canal, these realities would be bypassed.
The inverse of this, being the addition of threats due to canal construction, may also occur, such as the increased risk of separatist sentiment in Thailand’s southern provinces implied with canal construction.
In order to fully understand the relationship between the use of the maritime sphere and advancing strategic or economic interests, strategists must understand that canals are not simply convenient waterways for navigation but are strategically implemented and have several geopolitical implications that are vigilantly studied and acted on.
THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 41
THE STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS 42
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