NASA Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight (RTF)
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NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond A periodically updated document demonstrating our progress toward safe return to flight and implementation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations June 3, 2005 Volume 1, Tenth Edition An electronic version of this implementation plan is available at www.nasa.gov NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond June 3, 2005 Tenth Edition Summary June 3, 2005 This edition of NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight (RTF) and Beyond marks significant progress in our efforts to return safely to flight. NASA’s focus on safety was reinforced with the decision to delay the planned return to flight launch (STS-114) to the July 2005 launch window when it was determined during the Design Verification Review for Debris that additional analysis was required prior to return to flight. The delay of the launch window will allow adequate time to perform the additional work. NASA’s new Administrator, Dr. Michael Griffin, appointed in April 2005, supported the Space Shuttle Program’s decision to delay the launch based on sound engineering rationale. This edition provides updates to all of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Return to Flight Recommendations and Observations that remain open. In this edition, all open Raising the Bar Space Shuttle Program Actions have been updated, and five of the nine open actions were closed. NASA’s “Integrated Accepted Risk Approach” has been updated to reflect the steps NASA has taken to respond to the CAIB recommendations, to improve the Space Shuttle system, and to address the resulting impacts on our flight rationale. The CAIB Recommendations involving the External Tank (3.2-1) and Orbiter Thermal Protection System (6.4-1 and 3.3-2) are key to NASA’s return to flight rationale. The updates in this edition reflect the progress made to address the recommendations and the residual risk that NASA will accept when we return the Space Shuttle to flight. NASA’s return to flight rationale for these crucial elements involves materials and processes that can only be fully tested and verified in the combined environments of space. As a result, the first two Space Shuttle missions will provide data necessary to support further development and refinement in these areas. NASA has continued to meet the milestones leading to the STS-114 Space Shuttle return to flight mission including the Space Shuttle Program Design Certification Reviews, Design Verification Review for Debris, Mission Management Team Simulation for a Contingency Shuttle Crew Support decision, rollout of the STS-114 vehicle to the launch pad, tanking test of the External Tank, and Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test with the crew. These milestones and ongoing testing and analysis have helped us to identify some previously unknown issues, including the potential for critical ice debris and two issues identified during the tanking test that need to be resolved to ensure a safe return to flight. The fact that we have identified and responded to these issues by delaying the STS-114 launch date to allow time to resolve them is a demonstration of the improved engineering rigor and decision-making processes that have been implemented since the loss of the Columbia and her crew. NASA continues to work with the Stafford-Covey Return to Flight Task Force toward closure of the remaining CAIB return to flight actions. The next meeting of the Task Force will take place in June 2005, prior to the return to flight mission STS-114. NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond June 3, 2005 NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond June 3, 2005 Message From Michael Griffin NASA is working hard to return the Space Shuttle safely to flight, a vital step in advancing our Nation’s Vision for Space Exploration. With this 10th revision of NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond, our Shuttle Program team presents the culmination of 27 months of intensive effort to make the Space Shuttle system, and NASA as a whole, stronger and safer. As a result of this work, we are now very close to the time when we can make an informed decision about launching the Space Shuttle Discovery on the STS-114 mission, a flight that will test and validate the hardware and procedures developed since the tragic loss of Columbia and its valiant crew. Return to Flight has been a massive effort, focusing the energies of every technical discipline across all the NASA centers and Space Shuttle contractors on a very specific objective. I am proud of this Agency for its hard work, diligence, and professionalism during these difficult times. As you will see in this update, NASA has made significant progress in improving the Shuttle system. As I stated when I came on board as NASA’s Administrator, we will return to flight very deliberately and carefully with the utmost concern for the safety of the brave people we send on missions into space. We will not rush to flight. Human space exploration is not and will never be without risk. However, I am convinced that this Nation and this Agency can execute the bold exploration agenda set forth by the President as safely as humanly possible. Michael D. Griffin NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond June 3, 2005 NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond June 3, 2005 Return to Flight Message from the Space Flight Leadership Council With this tenth revision to NASA’s Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond, NASA continues to make certain that we are as safe as we know how to be before we launch Space Shuttle Discovery and its crew on the Return to Flight mission, STS-114. On April 29, 2005, after several reviews of status and test results, NASA concluded that it was prudent to conduct additional verification and validation of the extensive engineering work to ensure a safe Return to Flight. This decision moved the target launch window for the STS-114 mission to the July 2005 opportunity. This Implementation Plan demonstrates that the NASA approach to returning to flight is based on a rigorous risk reduction approach that has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement employed by NASA since the earliest days of the human space flight program. Through this approach, NASA has taken appropriate and extensive actions to eliminate, reduce, control, and/or mitigate potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle system. Since the release of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Final Report on September 26, 2003, NASA has addressed, and in many cases exceeded, the Board’s Return to Flight recommend- ations. NASA has also conducted a number of related, self-generated “raise the bar” actions with the intent of driving down risks in key Space Shuttle systems. NASA has worked closely with the independent Stafford-Covey Return to Flight Task Group to reach agreement on closure of seven of the Board’s fifteen Return to Flight recommendations (R4.2-3, R3.3-1, R4.2-5, R3.4-2, R4.2-1, R10.3-1, and R6.3-2) and conditional closure of Recommendation R3.4-1. Closure packages for the remaining open Return to Flight actions have been provided to the Task Group for review, and updates are scheduled for three of these packages prior to the launch of STS-114. By its very nature, space flight is a high-risk endeavor. Despite our best efforts, it is not possible to totally eliminate that risk. However, during these past 27 months, we have done everything possible to reduce those risks. We will return to flight because the completion of the International Space Station and taking the first steps in implementing the Vision for Space Exploration depend upon a safe and expeditious launch schedule. But we will not rush to flight, and we will not launch until we are ready. As NASA prepares to return the Nation to flight, the crew of STS-107—Rick Husband, Willie McCool, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Mike Anderson, Laurel Clark, and Ilan Ramon—remains foremost in our hearts and minds. Their legacy will continue to inspire us on the road ahead. For them, and for all the explorers who will follow and for whom we are ultimately responsible, we rededicate ourselves to upholding our core values of Safety, NASA Family, Excellence, and Integrity in all that we do. Walter H. Cantrell William F. Readdy Deputy Chief Engineer Associate Administrator for Independent Technical Authority for Space Operations NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond June 3, 2005 NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond June 3, 2005 Contents The Integrated Accepted Risk Approach for Return to Flight ........................................................... xiii NASA Space Shuttle Return to Flight Suggestions ............................................................... xix CAIB Recommendations Implementation Schedule..................................................................... xxiii Return to Flight Cost Summary................................ xxix Part 1 – NASA’s Response to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s Recommendations 3.2-1 External Tank Thermal Protection System Modifications [RTF]............................................... 1-1 3.3-2 Orbiter Hardening and Thermal Protection System Impact Tolerance [RTF] ........................... 1-15 3.3-1 Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Nondestructive Inspection [RTF] ................................................... 1-21 6.4-1 Thermal Protection System On-Orbit Inspect and Repair [RTF]...................................... 1-25 3.3-3 Entry with Minor Damage ..................................... 1-35 3.3-4 Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Database .................. 1-37 3.3-5 Minimizing Zinc Primer Leaching.......................... 1-39 3.8-1 Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Spares .....................