A Conditional Theory of the 'Political Resource Curse:' Oil, Autocrats, and Strategic Contexts
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A Conditional Theory of the ‘Political Resource Curse:’ Oil, Autocrats, and Strategic Contexts by Anar Kamil Ahmadov A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government in the DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT of the LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE London, United Kingdom September 2011 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 88,508 words. 2 Abstract A burgeoning literature argues that the abundance of oil in developing countries strengthens autocratic rule and erodes democracy. However, extant studies either show the average cross-national correlation between oil and political regime or develop particularistic accounts that do not easily lend themselves to theorizing. Consequently, we know little of the causal mechanisms that potentially link oil wealth to undemocratic outcomes and the conditions that would help explain the ultimate, not average, effect of oil on political regime. This study develops a conditional theory of the “political resource curse.” It does so by undertaking a statistical reassessment of the relationship between oil wealth and political regime and a nuanced qualitative examination of a set of carefully selected cases in order to contribute to developing an adequate account of causal mechanisms that transmit and conditions that shape the relationship between oil abundance and autocracy. It draws on qualitative and quantitative evidence collected over eighteen months of fieldwork in oil-rich former Soviet countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, and the ‘counterfactual’ oil-poor Kyrgyzstan. Employing a theoretical framework that draws on insights from the rentier state theory, historical institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism, I trace, compare, and contrast the processes that potentially link oil wealth to regime outcomes in these countries between 1989 and 2010. The findings strongly suggest that political regime differences can be better explained by the interaction of oil wealth with several structural and institutional variables rather than by oil abundance or another single factor alone. A thorough qualitative analysis of the post-Soviet cases shows that the causal mechanisms hypothesized in the ‘resource curse’ literature were neither necessarily present, nor uniform across these cases and throughout the post-Soviet period. This was because a particular interaction of exogenous variables and oil wealth affected the causal mechanisms differently, ultimately entailing different regime outcomes. The spread of alternative political elites, relative size of the ethnic minority with ties to a powerful kin state, and oil production geography were key exogenous factors that consistently interacted with oil in affecting the political regimes. 3 Acknowledgements W. Somerset Maugham once likened humans to prisoners, each in their own solitary tower, who try to communicate with the other prisoners through conventional signs that do not have quite the same meaning for the others. From this perspective, doctoral project is a solitary confinement. Or so it seems, until you engage in the rewarding activity of compiling the list of people (“the other prisoners”) who communicated, supported, tolerated, and even understood you along the way. This list can end up being quite long, suggesting that your “confinement” may not have been that solitary after all and that it helped you acquire new meaningful friendships and refine existing ones. This realization doubles the joy of finishing the project. First and foremost, I owe a particular debt of gratitude to my supervisor Professor Jim Hughes. His unwavering rigour raised the bar on a regular basis; his insights helped to both see the large, complex picture and discern the perspectives of individual actors; and his generosity with his time, energy, resources, and patience was inspiring. Long thought-provoking discussions in his office and short, focused “fire- fighting” e-mail exchanges will be remembered fondly. I thank my advisor Professor Torun Dewan for sharp feedback and for encouraging me to make my theoretical framework as explicit and logically “waterproof” as possible. Other members of the LSE community also helped to hone my research tools and write in a way that is relevant both for the scholarship and for addressing concrete public problems. Criticism, comments, suggestions and other support from Professor Ed Page, Dr Bill Kissane, Dr Vesselin Dimitrov, Dr Rafael Hortala-Vallve and the Political Science and Political Economy (PSPE) group are highly appreciated. I was fortunate to be able to draw on the expertise and support of a number of scholars outside the LSE before and during this project. Professor Kent Moors is responsible for introducing me to the intricacies of the international oil markets and politics that permeates them. Professor Charles King helped me to embark on my doctorate in the first place and his scholarship provided a model to emulate. Professor James Scott’s insightful advice on seeing my "ideas walk on the ground" proved very helpful in my field research and connecting abstract theory with the way “real people” do things in “real settings.” Professor Michael L. Ross kindly shared his dataset and his thoughts on repression; more importantly, I owe an intellectual debt to his work for influencing my thinking about oil wealth and political regime outcomes. Dr Henry E. Hale provided a stimulating perspective on my project and shared his contacts in Central Asia. My friend and former colleague Dr Hans Gutbrod’s occasional visits to 4 London supplied me with encouragement and invaluable tips on pursuing a doctoral project. Finally, Dr Gwendolyn Sasse shared her insights on post-Soviet politics and constantly provided kind support and encouragement throughout my last year of PhD. My research was funded or supported otherwise by the Department of Government at the LSE, Open Society Institute’s Global Supplementary Grant Program, University of London Central Research Fund, LSE Financial Support Office, and Economic and Social Research Council. Many people in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Turkmenistan assisted me during my field work. Special thanks go to Nermin Afandiyeva, Ingilab Ahmadov, Nazli Ahmadova, Zardusht Alizade, Sabit Baghirov, Zohrab Ismayil, Khadija Ismayilova, Ismayil Mammadov, Azer Mehtiyev, and Sabina Rustamova in Azerbaijan; Naubet Bisenov, Tolganai Dinzhanova, Adil Nurmakov, and Safkhan Shahmammadli in Kazakhstan; Aijan Abdesova, Baktygul Akkoziyeva, Bakyt Dubashev, Sandro Henschel and David Trilling in Kyrgyzstan; and Maral Meredova in Turkmenistan. I thank my friends and colleagues at the LSE for numerous constructive deconstruction exercises, disgruntled conversations on methodological divides, and ample encouragement (the latter was quite surprising, given their state as “fellow prisoners” locked in solitary confinements of their bright minds). The list is inspiringly long: Jose Olivas Osuna, Mike Seiferling, Eric Woods, Outi Ruusuvirta, Natalie Beinisch, Stefan Bauchowitz, Ashikur Rahman, Ninfa Fuentes, Ignazio De Ferrari, Ursula Durand- Ochoa, Marianna Escobar Arango, Johannes Wolff, Baldwin Wong, James Wong, Micheal O'keeffe, David Marshall, Max Hanska-Ahy, Fredrik Sjoberg, Matthew Whiting, Lila Caballero-Sosa, Marta Wojciechowska, Daniel Grizer, and others. Outside the LSE, Gursel Aliyev, Mushfiq Aliyev, Sadig Aliyev, Metin Asgar, Dr Anar Baghirov, Dr Charles Davidson, Sakhya Ghosh, Dr Bill and Maryl Levines, Siraj Mahmudov, Ilyas Nabiyev, Shekar Panchami, Senan Qambar, and other former students, colleagues and friends were generous with their advice and resources. Particularly thought-provoking, illuminating, and heartening were the e-mail exchanges with my former students and now friends and fellow doctoral researchers Farid Guliyev and Rashad Ibadov, and regular tea ceremonies with my friend Orkhan Sultanov. Finally, my family has been a constant source of inspiration and support, especially my sister Aynur and my brother-in-law Vugar. My niece Sarah served, enthusiastically and creatively, as my muse. Oxford, UK September 2011 5 Contents List of Tables .......................................................................................................... 8 List of Figures ......................................................................................................... 9 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 11 1.1 Three puzzles ................................................................................................. 12 1.2 Why is this important? .................................................................................. 14 1.3 Conceptual framework .................................................................................. 14 1.4 The model in brief ........................................................................................