Turkey's Kurdish Confict: 2015-Present BACKGROUNDER - December 2016

Summary Introduction to ’s Kurd- ish confict • The Suruç bombing in July 2016 fared up Turkey’s most signifcant Turkey’s Kurdish confict has dominated the intra-state confict. headlines of Europe throughout 2016. In- creasingly, Turkey, has turned into an author- • Since July 2015, more than 2,300 itarian state by suppressing critical voices people have been killed in violent and crushing an elected opposition party. The detention of high-ranking ofcials of the clashes. People’s Democratic Party (HDP) at the start of November 2016 atracted international • Western Turkish cities such as Istan- atention. Over time, the political situation of bul and Ankara have been hit hard Turkey’s has deteriorated into military by terror atacks allegedly conduct- confrontations between the Turkish central ed by the PKK and its afliates. state and Kurdish nationalist groups.

• The confict feeds from the Syrian Origins of the confict war where both belligerents are The origins of this confict can be traced back involved and fght intensely with to the fragmentation of Kurdish populations each other. into several states at the breakup of the Ot- toman Empire. The Kurdish fragmentation • This ISDP Backgrounder gives an into the states of Turkey, , , and overview to the confict, identifes took its course afer the Treaties of Sèvres the actors involved, details a time- and Lausanne established new boundaries line of events, the casualties of the between Middle Eastern states. However, confict so far and identifes trends despite the promises of major Colonial pow- ers, no separate nation-state emerged for the in warfare. Kurds. Kemal Atatürk’s vision of a unitary Turkish national state laid the foundation for the so-called “Kurdish question” which

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 1 remains one of the most divisive political unprecedented expressions of public anger issues within Turkish politics. and protests by Turkey’s Kurds. This could be seen as a herald for the confict that was The armed confict triggered not a year later with the Suruç Throughout the decades following the proc- bombing, which marks the turning point in lamation of the Turkish republic, the Kurds recent Turkish-Kurdish relations. The terror were torn between integration, assimilation, atack of Suruç on July 20th 2015, allegedly or rejection by the Turkish republic. In spite conducted by IS terrorists, killed 34 people, of considerable Kurdish integration into the most of them young Kurds. Kurdish and Turkish majority society, there remained lefist groups in Turkey blamed the state for complaints of state repression, discrimina- having secretly supported radical Islamists tion and economic disregard of Kurdish and for having the utmost disregard for regions. The Workers’ Party (PKK) Kurdish civilians. emerged in the late 1970s, and turned into Following the Suruç atack, growing mutu- the most conspicuous Kurdish political al distrust and diverging political interests interest group. In 1984, this Marxist-Leninist put an end to the 2013 cease-fre. Subse- group embarked on a campaign of armed quently, a massive spiral of violence broke resistance. As a consequence, over the fol- out again. Between the summer of 2015 lowing ffeen years, more than 40,000 people and late November 2016, 2,360 people were approximately have been killed in clashes. killed. Large-scale military operations in the south-eastern provinces of Diyarbakır, The “Kurdish opening” , Şırnak, and Hakkari destroyed a considerable amount of infrastructure. Con- From 2002, the governing Justice and De- versely, PKK terrorists have targeted places velopment Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip of symbolic value in and Ankara in Erdoğan embarked on new reform initia- atacks that have killed dozens of Turkish tives that dealt directly with the Kurdish state ofcials and civilians. Yet, the main 1 question. The Turkish approach towards fghting zones that have caused the majority its Kurdish population was not solely in- of casualties are in the Kurdish regions of tended to provide more minority rights, but south-eastern Turkey.³ also to achieve a gradual disarmament of PKK rebels. It is widely assumed that this “opening” to Kurds had electoral purposes, trying to embrace more Conservative voters with Kurdish-background and oppose to the views of competing national parties such as the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).2 Sim- ilarly, the re-intensifcation of confict with Kurdish representatives appears also a prod- uct of domestic political calculations. The return to weapons The recent renewed outbreak of confict stems from a combination of domestic and regional developments. When the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobanî came under siege by the Islamic State (IS) in September 2014, the Turkish policy of non-intervention led to Figure 1: Kurdish protest against Turkish Government

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 2 Actors

Turkish state forces Armed Kurdish groups

Turkish Armed Forces (TSK): Regular Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK): political state forces with (1), organization with wide military structures, Turkish Naval Forces (2), and Turkish Air main actor in the confict and mother organi- Forces (3). zation for other belligerents.

Special Forces: Special operation units People’s Defence Forces (HPG): paramil- of the TSK, supporting combatant and itary group, military wing of the PKK, main non-combatant forces. PKK sub-group.

Gendarmerie Special Operations Com- Free Women’s Unit (YJA STAR): para- mand (JÖH): combat and intelligence military group, special female military wing services such as search, infltration, destroy, of the PKK. and reconnaissance; counter- force as part of the TSK. Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK): polit- ical and militant organization based in the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Count- Kurdish part of Iran, supporter of the PKK er-Terrorism, Gendarmerie Intelligence in Turkey. Organization (JITEM, JIT): Special in- paramili- telligence unit, entitled to conduct discrete (YPS): tary group, mostly operating in conventional counter-terrorist actions. warfare against Turkish state forces, founded in 2015, part of the Kurdish-Syrian YPG and Turkish National Police (TPT): Regular strongly afliated to the PKK. police forces, underlying the command of the Ministry of the Interior, and conducting large-scale anti-PKK actions with growing Civil Protection Units female brigade competences. (YPS-Jin): paramilitary group, female branch of the YPS, founded in 2016. Police Special Operations Department Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK): Para- (PÖH): Special Forces for counter-terrorism military group with strong Separatist charac- and law enforcement, underlying the com- ter, afliated to the PKK but autonomously mand of the Ministry of the Interior. operating via bomb atacks, e.g. Village Guards: Group of “mercenaries”, mostly ethnic Kurds but hired and armed by Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK): the Turkish state to provide special knowl- Umbrella organization for various Kurd- edge about the Kurdish opponent, combat ish-rooted political and militant organiza- and non-combat services. tions in the region such as the Syrian Demo- cratic Union Party (PYD). Grey Wolves: ultra-Nationalist organiza- tion, part of the MHP, quasi-paramilitary counter-force to lef-wing and Kurdish groups, part of the so-called “Turkish deep state”.

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 3 Timeline - (July 2015 – Novem- and burnt down by enraged National- ist demonstrators. HDP election rallies ber 2016) experience massive disturbance. • On 20 July 2015, a bombing atack in • On 10 October 2015, a suicide bomber Suruç, allegedly perpetrated by the IS, kills 103 people and leaves more than kills 34 people and leaves 76 injured, 500 injured in the deadliest terror atack most of them of Kurdish origin. of modern Turkey, mainly hiting activ- • Between 21 and 23 July 2015, the PKK ists of a lef-wing and pro-Kurdish peace kills 3 Turkish policemen in the provinces rally. Suspicions about a possible links to of Adıyaman and Şanlıurfa in retaliation Turkish intelligence arise. acts. This is commonly perceived as the • On 1 November 2015, General Elections decisive moment for the Turkish govern- bring the ruling AKP a clear victory and ment to take action. weakens the pro-Kurdish HDP tremen- • On 24 and 25 July 2015, the Turkish dously. military ofensive (“Operation Martyr • On 28 November 2015, the Kurdish law- Yalçın”) on IS terrorists and PKK-linked yer and activist Tahir Elçi is murdered groups in Northern Syria and Northern in Diyarbakır. Afer his death protests of Iraq respectively is carried out. state involvement arise, still no suspect • Between 27 September 2015 and 5 No- has ever been identifed. vember 2015, • Between November 2015 and February (TSK) destroy PKK mountain force struc- 2015, clashes between state forces and tures in the province of Hakkari with Kurdish militias intensify through large- about 120 people lef dead (“Hakkari-as- scale airstrikes, troop invasion, bombing sault”). atacks via Improvised Explosive Devic- • In September 2015, numerous HDP of- es (IEDs) in the Southeast, causing 466 fces all over the country, also the party’s deaths in the corresponding time period. headquarters, are atacked, destroyed,

Figure 2: Some of the aftermath of Turkish government military operations in

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 4 • On 17 February 2016, the Kurdistan Free- shif of operational strategies from urban dom Falcons (TAK) kill 30 people in the to rural areas. capital Ankara in a car bomb atack, most • On 7 June 2016, 11 people are killed, of them Turkish state security staf. among them 7 police men when in • On 13 March 2016, a car bomb, allegedly Istanbul a car bomb close to a police installed by the TAK, kills 37 people in bus convoy detonates, the TAK claims the centre of Ankara, the second severe responsibility the atack. terror atack in the Turkish capital within • In June 2016, various Kurdish-majority four weeks. cities in south-eastern Turkey are kept • On 14 March 2016, a Turkish military under curfew when PM Yıldırım and operations and police units raid and kill President Erdoğan announce that combat about 50 Kurdish militants in Northern operations against PKK positions have Iraq as reaction. been completed. • On 28 March 2016, reports emerge that • On 15 June 2016, a military coup by parts the Turkish government is confscating of the TSK is conducted but eventually the property of Kurdish people. fails to overthrow the AKP government and President Erdoğan. The failed coup • Between April and May 2016, Turkish atempt leaves up to 300 people dead. As security personnel, PKK militants, and a consequence, a strict state of emergen- even Kurdish-Turkish village guards cy and martial law are imposed. are killed in larger numbers afer heavy clashes. • On 25 August 2016, an assassination at- tempt on CHP leader Kemal Kılıcdaroğlu • On 20 May 2016, the Turkish Grand in the province of Artvin, North-eastern National Assembly lifs the immunity of Turkey, fails. Allegedly it was conducted almost all MPs of the pro-Kurdish HDP by PKK militants. whilst at the same time opening litigation against them. • On 25 August 2016, the so-called “Opera- tion Euphrates Shield”, the ofcial entry • On 25 May 2016, the PKK’s militant of TSK into the Syrian war, target IS-po- youth organization the Civil Protection sitions and in particular kills dozens of Unit YPS claims to have retreated from the PKK-afliated YPG members. the district. End of August 2016, the confict has • On 5 June 2016, the TSK announces a •

Figure 3: 12 September 2016 Justice and Development Party building after PKK car bombing.

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 5 reached the approximately 2000 deaths Casualties and damage since its outbreak in July 2015. The ffeen months of continuous clashes be- • In September 2016, the proclaimed state tween state security forces and Kurdish mil- of emergency afer the July 2016 coup itants means that a reliable list of casualties atempt and the ongoing war in Syria and is hard to fnd. Nonetheless, organizations Iraq sustain the clashes between Ankara such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Kurdish forces have collated casualty numbers provided by • In October 2016, Turkish authorities shut the state, Kurdish militias, and independent down more than a dozen Kurdish media sources to establish as closely as possible outlets. the death toll of this confict. By the end of November 2016, the death toll is estimated • On 25 October 2016, the two elected at 2,360. In total, since 1984, the confict has mayors of Diyarbakır, Gültan Kışanak caused more than 40,000 deaths; it is estimat- and Firat Anlı, are arrested for their al- ed that about 350,000 people at least have leged links to the PKK and replaced by a been displaced.⁴ By the end of August 2016, government trustee. more than 2,000 people with suspected links • From 4 November 2016 on, various local to the banned PKK had been detained, and and national politicians of the HDP are 250 were reportedly remanded in pre-trial detained and put into prison, among detention.⁵ Approximately, up to 500 billion them the party leaders Selahetin Demir- US Dollar in the last two decades have spent taş and Figen Yüksekdağ. by Turkish governments for counter-terrorist policies⁶, while the term “counter-terrorism” In November 2016, the death toll in about • remains highly debatable in the light of to- 15 months of confict rose to an estimated day’s developments. minimum of 2360, afer the confronta- tions intensifed in the course of the latest events. Categorizing the Casualties The ICG’s statistics distinguish among four diferent groups of victims, fgure 4. This provides a more detailed picture of the suf- fering. The highest numbers of casualties are, not surprisingly, PKK militants, 965 of which are estimated to have been killed, followed by Turkish security force members at 808. Presumably, the rate of killed PKK fghters could be much higher. However, as is cus- tomary in civil wars, there is considerable variance in casualties reported, as both sides claim to have killed much greater numbers of enemies. While the TSK reports almost 5,000 killed PKK militants, the PKK claims to have killed about 1,500 Turkish security forces.⁷ A trend that has emerged over the confict is in a growth in the group that the ICG identi- fes as, “youth of unknown afliation”. This illustrates the urban character of the recent Figure 4 conficts, as it comprises young people aged

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 6 between 16 and 35 who mostly died in the tions of Kurdish politicians and the ongoing curfew zones during clashes, and cannot fghting with Kurds beyond Turkish national be classifed either as civilians or PKK mil- borders. itants. This number is approximately 219. Meanwhile, those classifed as civilians are victims that lack any clear afliation to one Damage to infrastructure of the combatant groups, can be identifed by Even though there has been a slight shif name, and belong either to casualties in the from urban to rural warfare from the Kurd- Kurdish-dominated Southeast or those from ish side has become more visible, the infra- bomb atacks in Western Turkey. The number structural damages have mostly impacted of civilian casualties is estimated to be 368 as upon urban areas. The city of Şırnak along of November 2016.⁸ the border with Syria and Iraq was heavily afected by airstrikes. Reports show that about 70 percent of the provincial capital Casualties over Time centre was destroyed, with similar fg- Figure 5 shows the overall development of ures for historic centres of Nusaybin, Sur, the death toll from July 2015 to December and Cizre, where considerable areas were 2015 whilst fgure 6 shows the same develop- bombed into rubble.⁹ Prime Minister Bina- ment from January 2016 to October 2016. As li Yıldırım announced that governmental can be seen, this number rarely drops below projects will be developed in the near future 100 deaths per month. In February 2016, it to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure in the peaked at 228 casualties, followed by March seven most afected provinces in eastern and with 210 deaths. February was also the south-eastern Anatolia. These would include month in which the largest number of secu- schools, factories, police ofces, stadiums, rity staf and PKK militants were killed. As and hospitals.¹⁰ the statistics show, there is no indication that the death toll is about to decline. The domes- tic political situation remains irreconcilable, mostly resulting from the more repressive post-coup measures such as mass deten-

Figure 5 Figure 6

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 7 War arenas have clearly shown the spill over of the confict far from the Kurdish southeast. Even The Kurdish southeast though Istanbul is actually the city with the Over time, the confict has partly spread largest Kurdish population, in the past it from the Southeast to Turkish metropolis- has usually been spared from violence. This es such as Istanbul and Ankara. This also changed when the TAK struck the city in corresponds to the ICG’s observation about June 2016, hiting a police bus and killing a slight change of strategy within the type eleven people. Out of 23 deaths in Istanbul, of warfare. However, the confict is clear- the majority were categorized either as state ly concentrated in the Kurdish-dominated security forces or as civilians.¹¹ Indeed, the provinces of Diyarbakır, Mardin, Şırnak, and heavy civilian death toll is indicative of the Hakkari. More than one-third of all casual- country’s deteriorating security situation. ties have been recorded in these very prov- For the Kurdish armed groups there is inces, whereas the districts of Sur (province hardly a more symbolic place to atack than Diyarbakır), Nusaybin (Mardin), and Cizre the capital, Ankara. Within a relatively short (Şırnak) have experienced by far the highest time period, the capital sufered 64 deaths, numbers of casualties since July 2015. Cizre most of whom were civilians. Similar to the had the highest casualty tolls, followed by previously mentioned case in Istanbul, the Sur and Nusaybin. Many neighboring prov- terror atacks of February and March 2016 inces were afected, accordingly, almost all were presumably conducted by the TAK. provinces in Eastern Anatolia can be includ- The question of who is responsible for the ed into the list. suicide atack on a mosque in Bursa in April 2016 is not clear, despite the TAK claiming responsibility. Turkish authorities suspected both Kurdish organizations as well as the IS Central and Western Turkish cities as possible perpetrators. The same applies to The confict also saw, in parallel, a rise in vi- the case of a heavy bombing atack in Di- olence in Western Turkey from January 2016 yarbakır on November 3rd with nine deaths onwards. Typically, the PKK and its sub- where various claimed responsibility.¹² groups launch actions from their main bases in the Southeast, yet recent developments

Figure 7: Destroyed building in aftermath of military operations in Yüksekova, Hakkari

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 8 Warfare medical care.¹³ Despite the proclaimed cur- fews in the end of 2015, casualties kept rising Shift in warfare strategies both in urban and rural areas, also due to Observers have confrmed the tendency heavy artillery fre. Afer the coup atempt, of Kurdish militias to withdraw gradually the Turkish state’s curfews, martial law, and from urban spots to rural areas. Since the state of emergency have allowed Kurdish beginning of 2016, their strategy appears to forces to be targeted more efectively, all in have shifed to focusing on targeting security the framework of justifying the re-establish- forces, and thus increasing the pressure on ment of order. the government to engage. As a result, the number of casualties among security forces grew steadily from February 2016 onwards. Warfare - the political level From that point on until summer of 2016, In addition to actual fghting, the confict has the PKK and its militant allies shifed their also acquired a political character. Through a tactics to more high-profle atacks by using parliamentary decision in the Turkish Grand IEDs, which tend to increase casualty rates National Assembly, 50 out of 59 HDP MPs signifcantly. In several bombing atacks were stripped of their parliamentary im- in Istanbul and Ankara, TAK took respon- munity. The HDP’s exclusion, and the sub- sibility for roadside bombs to target state sequent legal proceedings, have meant that representatives. Since then, both belligerent the most important legal representative of groups have upped the stakes signifcantly. Kurdish aspirations has been excluded from The strategy of the Turkish state now targets political participation. HDP party ofces Kurdish military insurgents and political have been repeatedly atacked and looted proponents more harshly. Actions have been by demonstrators; especially in the run-up taken to decisively dismantle the Kurdish to the November 2015 elections, the HDP political structure, and by that, increase the complained about assaults on their rallies. capabilities to control more the rural areas In parallel, the state’s restrictions on Kurdish PKK militants had retreated to. Accordingly, media stations multiplied and intensifed retaliation atacks against Turkish state force following the imposition of the post-coup members have been carried out more fre- state of emergency. Finally, the state further quently. escalated the political confict when it arrest- ed elected politicians of Kurdish origin were arrested, including leading HDP fgures Warfare - the administrative level such as Selahetin Demirtaş, Figen Yüksek- In this confict there is a distinction between dağ, and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, one of the urban and rural casualties, resulting from the leading persons behind the Kurdish dia- divergent forms of warfare. The Turkish gov- logue with Ankara.¹⁴ This refects not only a ernment has been widely criticized for using major setback for the Kurds’ integration into heavy-handed and disproportionate force, the Turkish political system but at least for in particular the killing of civilians in curfew the time being the end of Kurdish participa- zones. Through the extensive imposition of tion in the political decision-making process curfews on large Kurdish-dominated areas, by legal means. the Turkish government envisaged a more ef- fcient way to push through counter-actions on militants in urban surroundings, where the risk of being targeted by Turkish artillery is high. This also had huge efects on the civil population, which subsequently sufered massively from shortages of water, food, and

InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 9 Endnotes Image credits: 1 Halil Karaveli, "Reconciling Statism with Freedom. Turkey’s Kurdish Opening", Silk Road Paper, October 2010, htp://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2010_ Cover: “Kurdish PKK Guerillas” by Kurdishstruggle is karaveli_reconciling-statism-with-freedom.pdf licensed under CC BY 2.0

2 Figure 1: , “Stop Turkey's War on the Kurd's protest - B. B. Özpek & Mutluer, O, "Turkey and the Kurdish London 6th March 2016,” by Ron F. is licensed under Question: Last Exit before the Bridge", Iran & the Cauca- CC BY 2.0 sus 20, no. 1, May 2016, 127-141. Figure 2: “Besuch in Cizre (Türkei),” by Rebecca 3, 4 International Crisis Group, "Turkey’s PKK Confict: Harms is licensed under CC BY 2.0 The Rising Toll", 2016, htp://www.crisisgroup.be/ Figure 3: “12 September 2016 Justice and Development interactives/turkey/ Party building in Van afer PKK atack with bombing 5 , "Annual Report, Turkey car,” by Nedim Yılmaz is licensed under CC BY 2.0 2015/2016", htps://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/eu- Figure 4: is based on fgures provided by the Intern- rope-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/ tional Crisis Group report "Turkey’s PKK Confict: The Rising Toll". 6 Yilmaz Ensaroğlu, "Turkey’s Kurdish Question and the Peace Process", Insight Turkey 15, vol. 2. (2013): 7-17. Figure 5: is based on fgures provided by the Intern- tional Crisis Group report "Turkey’s PKK Confict: The 7, 8 International Crisis Group, "Turkey’s PKK Confict: Rising Toll". The Rising Toll", (2016), htp://www.crisisgroup.be/ Figure 6: is based on fgures provided by the Intern- interactives/turkey/ tional Crisis Group report "Turkey’s PKK Confict: The 9 Tom Stevenson, “Unprecedented destruction' of Rising Toll". Kurdish city of Cizre”, Deutsche Welle (DW), May 18, Figure 7: “Hakkari, Yüksekova. Afer military opera- 2016, htp://www.dw.com/en/unprecedented-destruc- tion,” by Nedim Yılmaz is licensed under CC BY 2.0 tion-of-kurdish-city-of-cizre/a-19265927 10 Daily Sabah, “PM Yıldırım announces projects to accelerate growth in Turkey’s east, southeast”, Daily Sabah Economy, June 21, 2016 htp://www.dailysabah. com/economy/2016/06/22/pm-yildirim-announces-proj- ects-to-accelerate-growth-turkeys-east-southeast 11 Seyhmus Cakan and Humeyra Pamuk, “Kurdish mil- itant group says it was behind the Istanbul bombing”, , June 10, 2016, htp://www.reuters.com/article/ us-turkey-blast-tak-idUSKCN0YW0LL 12 Mahmut Bozarslan,”One bomb, three suspects. Who was behind the latest Diyarbakır atack?” Al Monitor, November 13, 2016, htp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2016/11/turkey-diyarbakir-bombing-who-did- it-isis-pkk.html 13 Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (Mazlumder), “Cizre Investigation and Monitoring Report on Developments During the Round-Clock-Curfew Imposed on the Town between December 14, 2015 and March 2, 2016”, Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (Mazlum- der), March 4-6, 2016, htp://www.mazlumder.org/ fotograf/yayinresimleri/dokuman/MAZLUMDER_CIZ- RE_REPORT_20162.pdf 14 Human Rights Watch, “Turkey: Opposition Party leaders, MPs jailed. Government Widens Crackdown on Independent Media, pro-Kurdish Opposition”, No- vember 7, 2016, htps://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/07/ turkey-opposition-party-leaders-mps-jailed

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