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Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: 2015-Present

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Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: 2015-Present Turkey's Kurdish Confict: 2015-Present BACKGROUNDER - December 2016 Summary Introduction to Turkey’s Kurd- ish confict • The Suruç bombing in July 2016 fared up Turkey’s most signifcant Turkey’s Kurdish confict has dominated the intra-state confict. headlines of Europe throughout 2016. In- creasingly, Turkey, has turned into an author- • Since July 2015, more than 2,300 itarian state by suppressing critical voices people have been killed in violent and crushing an elected opposition party. The detention of high-ranking ofcials of the clashes. People’s Democratic Party (HDP) at the start of November 2016 atracted international • Western Turkish cities such as Istan- atention. Over time, the political situation of bul and Ankara have been hit hard Turkey’s Kurds has deteriorated into military by terror atacks allegedly conduct- confrontations between the Turkish central ed by the PKK and its afliates. state and Kurdish nationalist groups. • The confict feeds from the Syrian Origins of the confict war where both belligerents are The origins of this confict can be traced back involved and fght intensely with to the fragmentation of Kurdish populations each other. into several states at the breakup of the Ot- toman Empire. The Kurdish fragmentation • This ISDP Backgrounder gives an into the states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran overview to the confict, identifes took its course afer the Treaties of Sèvres the actors involved, details a time- and Lausanne established new boundaries line of events, the casualties of the between Middle Eastern states. However, confict so far and identifes trends despite the promises of major Colonial pow- ers, no separate nation-state emerged for the in warfare. Kurds. Kemal Atatürk’s vision of a unitary Turkish national state laid the foundation for the so-called “Kurdish question” which InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 1 remains one of the most divisive political unprecedented expressions of public anger issues within Turkish politics. and protests by Turkey’s Kurds. This could be seen as a herald for the confict that was The armed confict triggered not a year later with the Suruç Throughout the decades following the proc- bombing, which marks the turning point in lamation of the Turkish republic, the Kurds recent Turkish-Kurdish relations. The terror were torn between integration, assimilation, atack of Suruç on July 20th 2015, allegedly or rejection by the Turkish republic. In spite conducted by IS terrorists, killed 34 people, of considerable Kurdish integration into the most of them young Kurds. Kurdish and Turkish majority society, there remained lefist groups in Turkey blamed the state for complaints of state repression, discrimina- having secretly supported radical Islamists tion and economic disregard of Kurdish and for having the utmost disregard for regions. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Kurdish civilians. emerged in the late 1970s, and turned into Following the Suruç atack, growing mutu- the most conspicuous Kurdish political al distrust and diverging political interests interest group. In 1984, this Marxist-Leninist put an end to the 2013 cease-fre. Subse- group embarked on a campaign of armed quently, a massive spiral of violence broke resistance. As a consequence, over the fol- out again. Between the summer of 2015 lowing ffeen years, more than 40,000 people and late November 2016, 2,360 people were approximately have been killed in clashes. killed. Large-scale military operations in the south-eastern provinces of Diyarbakır, The “Kurdish opening” Mardin, Şırnak, and Hakkari destroyed a considerable amount of infrastructure. Con- From 2002, the governing Justice and De- versely, PKK terrorists have targeted places velopment Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip of symbolic value in Istanbul and Ankara in Erdoğan embarked on new reform initia- atacks that have killed dozens of Turkish tives that dealt directly with the Kurdish state ofcials and civilians. Yet, the main 1 question. The Turkish approach towards fghting zones that have caused the majority its Kurdish population was not solely in- of casualties are in the Kurdish regions of tended to provide more minority rights, but south-eastern Turkey.³ also to achieve a gradual disarmament of PKK rebels. It is widely assumed that this “opening” to Kurds had electoral purposes, trying to embrace more Conservative voters with Kurdish-background and oppose to the views of competing national parties such as the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).2 Sim- ilarly, the re-intensifcation of confict with Kurdish representatives appears also a prod- uct of domestic political calculations. The return to weapons The recent renewed outbreak of confict stems from a combination of domestic and regional developments. When the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobanî came under siege by the Islamic State (IS) in September 2014, the Turkish policy of non-intervention led to Figure 1: Kurdish protest against Turkish Government InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 2 Actors Turkish state forces Armed Kurdish groups Turkish Armed Forces (TSK): Regular Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK): political state forces with Turkish Land Forces (1), organization with wide military structures, Turkish Naval Forces (2), and Turkish Air main actor in the confict and mother organi- Forces (3). zation for other belligerents. Special Forces: Special operation units People’s Defence Forces (HPG): paramil- of the TSK, supporting combatant and itary group, military wing of the PKK, main non-combatant forces. PKK sub-group. Gendarmerie Special Operations Com- Free Women’s Unit (YJA STAR): para- mand (JÖH): combat and intelligence military group, special female military wing services such as search, infltration, destroy, of the PKK. and reconnaissance; counter-terrorism force as part of the TSK. Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK): polit- ical and militant organization based in the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Count- Kurdish part of Iran, supporter of the PKK er-Terrorism, Gendarmerie Intelligence in Turkey. Organization (JITEM, JIT): Special in- paramili- telligence unit, entitled to conduct discrete Civil Protection Units (YPS): tary group, mostly operating in conventional counter-terrorist actions. warfare against Turkish state forces, founded in 2015, part of the Kurdish-Syrian YPG and Turkish National Police (TPT): Regular strongly afliated to the PKK. police forces, underlying the command of the Ministry of the Interior, and conducting large-scale anti-PKK actions with growing Civil Protection Units female brigade competences. (YPS-Jin): paramilitary group, female branch of the YPS, founded in 2016. Police Special Operations Department Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK): Para- (PÖH): Special Forces for counter-terrorism military group with strong Separatist charac- and law enforcement, underlying the com- ter, afliated to the PKK but autonomously mand of the Ministry of the Interior. operating via bomb atacks, e.g. Village Guards: Group of “mercenaries”, mostly ethnic Kurds but hired and armed by Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK): the Turkish state to provide special knowl- Umbrella organization for various Kurd- edge about the Kurdish opponent, combat ish-rooted political and militant organiza- and non-combat services. tions in the region such as the Syrian Demo- cratic Union Party (PYD). Grey Wolves: ultra-Nationalist organiza- tion, part of the MHP, quasi-paramilitary counter-force to lef-wing and Kurdish groups, part of the so-called “Turkish deep state”. InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 3 Timeline - (July 2015 – Novem- and burnt down by enraged National- ist demonstrators. HDP election rallies ber 2016) experience massive disturbance. • On 20 July 2015, a bombing atack in • On 10 October 2015, a suicide bomber Suruç, allegedly perpetrated by the IS, kills 103 people and leaves more than kills 34 people and leaves 76 injured, 500 injured in the deadliest terror atack most of them of Kurdish origin. of modern Turkey, mainly hiting activ- • Between 21 and 23 July 2015, the PKK ists of a lef-wing and pro-Kurdish peace kills 3 Turkish policemen in the provinces rally. Suspicions about a possible links to of Adıyaman and Şanlıurfa in retaliation Turkish intelligence arise. acts. This is commonly perceived as the • On 1 November 2015, General Elections decisive moment for the Turkish govern- bring the ruling AKP a clear victory and ment to take action. weakens the pro-Kurdish HDP tremen- • On 24 and 25 July 2015, the Turkish dously. military ofensive (“Operation Martyr • On 28 November 2015, the Kurdish law- Yalçın”) on IS terrorists and PKK-linked yer and activist Tahir Elçi is murdered groups in Northern Syria and Northern in Diyarbakır. Afer his death protests of Iraq respectively is carried out. state involvement arise, still no suspect • Between 27 September 2015 and 5 No- has ever been identifed. vember 2015, Turkish Armed Forces • Between November 2015 and February (TSK) destroy PKK mountain force struc- 2015, clashes between state forces and tures in the province of Hakkari with Kurdish militias intensify through large- about 120 people lef dead (“Hakkari-as- scale airstrikes, troop invasion, bombing sault”). atacks via Improvised Explosive Devic- • In September 2015, numerous HDP of- es (IEDs) in the Southeast, causing 466 fces all over the country, also the party’s deaths in the corresponding time period. headquarters, are atacked, destroyed, Figure 2: Some of the aftermath of Turkish government military operations in Cizre InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 4 • On 17 February 2016, the Kurdistan Free- shif of operational strategies from urban dom Falcons (TAK) kill 30 people in the to rural areas. capital Ankara in a car bomb atack, most • On 7 June 2016, 11 people are killed, of them Turkish state security staf. among them 7 police men when in • On 13 March 2016, a car bomb, allegedly Istanbul a car bomb close to a police installed by the TAK, kills 37 people in bus convoy detonates, the TAK claims the centre of Ankara, the second severe responsibility the atack.
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