Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ Columbia University MATTO MILDENBERGER University of California Santa Barbara LEAH C
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American Political Science Review, Page 1 of 18 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000606 © American Political Science Association 2018 Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ Columbia University MATTO MILDENBERGER University of California Santa Barbara LEAH C. STOKES University of California Santa Barbara egislative staff link Members of Congress and their constituents, theoretically facilitating democratic representation. Yet, little research has examined whether Congressional staff actually recognize the Lpreferences of their Members’ constituents. Using an original survey of senior U.S. Congressional staffers, we show that staff systematically mis-estimate constituent opinions. We then evaluate the sources of these misperceptions, using observational analyses and two survey experiments. Staffers who rely more heavily on conservative and business interest groups for policy information have more skewed perceptions of constituent opinion. Egocentric biases also shape staff perceptions. Our findings complicate assumptions that Congress represents constituent opinion, and help to explain why Congress often appears so unre- sponsive to ordinary citizens. We conclude that scholars should focus more closely on legislative aides as key actors in the policymaking process, both in the United States and across other advanced democracies. INTRODUCTION electedofficials,thepublic,andinterestgroups.Aswewill document, despite their best efforts to estimate the epresentative democracy rests on the idea that fi preferences of their Members’ constituents, senior leg- elected of cials understand and act on their islative staff have very skewed perceptions of public ’ Rcitizens opinions. Yet research has struggled to attitudes. We also find that egocentric bias and interest demonstrate the link between representatives and their group contact, especially with conservative groups and constituents, especially in the United States. Instead, fi businesses, may drive some of the mismatch between there is growing evidence that elected of cials are more staffer perceptions and actual public opinion. responsive to interest groups and wealthier individuals We reach these conclusions using an original survey than to average citizens (Bartels 2008; Druckman and of senior legislative staffers in Congress merged with Jacobs 2015; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014) and mass public opinion data on five policies: gun control, that state politicians from both parties systematically carbon pollution restrictions, repeal of the Affordable overestimate the conservatism of their constituents 1 Care Act, infrastructure spending, and raising the (Broockman and Skovron 2018). Still, political scien- minimum wage. This approach allows us to examine tists do not have a clear picture of why legislators how well senior Congressional aides can characterize misperceive constituent preferences and respond so the public’s policy preferences. Across all five issues, we unequally to the mass public. In this paper, we examine find that staffers do not accurately identify their district one important and previously underappreciated mech- or state’s preferences and often overestimate their anism propagating inequalities in legislative responsive- constituents’ conservatism. We examine four explan- ’ ness: senior legislativestaffers perceptions, attitudes, and ations for the mismatch in staffers’ perceptions: electoral behaviors. Legislative staff act as a bridge between competitiveness; staffers’ personal policy preferences; staffers’ experience in Congress; and staffers’ inter- Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Assistant Professor, School of Inter- actions with interest groups. We find that staffers’ per- national and Public Affairs, Columbia Universty, alexander.hertel@ sonal policy preferences and their interest group contact gmail.com. correlate most strongly with the opinion-representation Matto Mildenberger, Assistant Professor, Department of Political AU1 Science, University of California Santa Barbara. gap. Staffers whose personal opinions deviated from Leah Stokes, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, their constituents’ opinions were less accurate in their University of California Santa Barbara, [email protected]. estimates of district and state preferences. In addition, Authors listed alphabetically and contributed equally to the project staffers who reported greater contact with corporate and AU2 design and manuscript. ideologically conservative interest groups over liberal fi The authors thank Geoffrey Henderson for terri c research support and mass-based citizen groups—whether measured and are grateful to Raymond O’Mara III, Lee Drutman, and Kevin Kosar for aid in drafting and disseminating the survey. Thanks to Tim through staffers’ own reports or campaign contributions LaPira, Robert Shapiro, Kent Jennings, and participants at the UC to that staffer’s Member—were less likely to get their Santa Barbara Psychology, Environment and Public Policy (PEPP) constituents’ preferences right. Seminar and the Columbia Sustainable Development Workshop and We present results from two survey experiments the MPSA Political Institutions and Elite Behavior 4 mini-conference embedded in the legislative staffer survey that provide for feedback on earlier drafts. The Dirksen Congressional Center credible causal evidence for interest groups’ role in provided funding for the project through its Congressional Research fi explaining the opinion-representation gap. Using a list Grant program. Replication les are available at the American Political fi Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OWQNVF. experiment, we nd that about 45% of senior legislative staffers report having changed their opinion about Received: February 4, 2017; revised: March 27, 2018; accepted: 15 August 2018. First published online: nnn legislation after a group gave their Member a campaign contribution. In a second experiment, we show that 1 But see Enns 2015; Erikson 2015 for opposing perspectives. staffers are more likely to interpret correspondence Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Matto Mildenberger, and Leah C. Stokes from businesses as being more representative of their still act as the heads of large “legislative enterprises,” constituents’ preferences than correspondence from with up to 18 full-time staff in US House offices and ordinary constituents. These findings provide evidence potentially dozens more in US Senate offices and that donor and interest group contact can shape how Congressional committees (cf. Salisbury and Shepsle staffers perceive policies, leading to constituent opinion 1981).3 mis-estimates. While some authors have argued that Congressional These results contribute to our understanding of staff ought to merely reflect Members’ preferences given Congress, legislative responsiveness, and political staffers’ career incentives for loyalty (DeGregorio 1988; inequality. Despite the fact that 80% of senior legislative Kingdon 1984, 1989), other research suggests that aides reported that constituent opinion was “extremely” staff exert a strong, independent effect on Member or “very” important in their recommendations to their behavior. Afterconducting extensive fieldwork in the bosses, most had only a limited ability to characterize 1970s, Malbin (1980)concludedthatwhilesome what their constituents actually preferred. Moreover, the Congressional staffers acted as effective surrogates prospect of more competitive elections—long thought to for their Members and constituents, in many other be an incentive for democratic representation—does not cases they were entrepreneurial, shaping legislation appear to spur greater congruence between senior on their own in meaningful ways. More recent staffers and their constituents. Instead, our observational analysis backs up this conclusion. Using a longi- and experimental evidence points to interest group tudinal dataset of staffers, Montgomery and Nyhan contact and egocentric bias as sources of the staffer- (2016)showthatMemberswhoexchangemore constituent representation gap. One reason why Con- senior staff behave more similarly than would oth- gress may seem so unresponsive to ordinary citizens is erwise be expected, even after taking into account that interest group lobbying and campaign contributions Member characteristics. skew staffers’ perceptions of their constituents. Since Given this evidence on staffers’ importance, this Congress, including staffers, hears muchmorefrequently paper poses three questions: To what extent do staffers from businesses, donors, and organized interest groups rely on their constituents’ preferences when crafting than individual citizens (Schlozman et al. 2012), staff may recommendations about policy for their Members? Are substitute interest groups’ and donors’ positions for staffers able to accurately assess those constituents’ constituent preferences. Our results highlight the need preferences? And, if not, why? These are similar for scholars of legislatures, lobbying, and public policy to questions to those long asked about Members of focusgreaterattentiononlegislativeaidesaskeyactorsin Congress (Erikson et al. 1975; Hedlund and Friesema the policymaking process, both in the United States and 1972; Miller and Stokes 1963); we instead place the focus other advanced democracies. on staffers (see also Broockman and Skovron 2018 for a similar approach to ours). Of course, staff may not possess the same incentives as politicians, and so it is worth reflecting on their LEGISLATIVE STAFF AND 4 POLITICAL