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Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons

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Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons UNIDIR Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons the Effects of Explosive from Civilians Protecting The use of explosive weapons (shells, bombs, etc.) in populated areas causes grave humanitarian harm. This study analyses how explosive weapons are regulated in international law and policy, what constraints are placed on the use of explosive weapons, and how civilians are protected against the effects of explosive weapons. It concludes that the dominant legal and policy discourse fails to articulate the serious risk of harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in a manner that adequately protects civilians. Systematic characterization of the humanitarian harm, and a detailed assessment of the risk of harm and the measures taken to reduce that risk, could further the elaboration of legal and policy standards that enhance the protection of civilians. UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons UNITED NATIONS An Analysis of International Legal and Policy Standards Designed and printed by the Publishing Service, United Nations, Geneva Maya Brehm GE.12-02003 — November 2012 — 1,640 — UNIDIR/2012/8 UNIDIR/2012/8 Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons An Analysis of International Legal and Policy Standards Maya Brehm UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Geneva, Switzerland New York and Geneva, 2012 About the cover Detail of Libya Hurra (from the series) © 2011 Mauricio Lima. Image courtesy of Mauricio Lima. See the full image opposite. The photograph was taken in Sirte, Libya, on 25 October 2011. It shows an elderly man standing in front of his destroyed compound after returning back home only five days after Col. Qaddafi’s capture and death. The man was followed by another (not in frame) trying to clean up the area the day he returned home. A print of this photo is included in the Friends of Anton auction hosted by Christie’s (<www.friendsofanton.org>) to raise funds for the children of freelance photojournalist Anton Hammerl who was killed in Libya on 5 April 2011. Note The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. * * * The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors. Unless otherwise noted, all translations provided in this text are unofficial and should not be considered definitive. UNIDIR/2012/8 Copyright © United Nations, 2012 All rights reserved UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations. www.unidir.org v CONTENTS Acknowledgements ........................................................................ viii About the author .......................................................................... ix Summary of findings and recommendations .............................. x Introduction ................................................................................ 1 Background ............................................................................. 1 Rationale ................................................................................. 8 Outline .................................................................................... 10 1. Scope and method ................................................................... 11 1.1. Explosive weapons and how they function ........................ 11 1.2. A study of formal standards reflected in regulatory texts .... 18 1.2.1. Issue areas ................................................................ 20 1.2.2. Standards on the protection of civilians ..................... 25 1.2.3. Standards on the use of weapons .............................. 28 2. The regulation of explosive weapons ...................................... 30 2.1. Safety ............................................................................... 31 2.1.1. Dangerous goods: Hazard Class 1—Explosives .......... 31 2.1.2. Ammunition and explosive ordnance ........................ 37 2.1.3. Explosive remnants of war ........................................ 42 2.2. Arms control ..................................................................... 44 2.2.1. Major conventional weapons .................................... 45 2.2.2. Firearms, small arms and light weapons .................... 49 2.2.3. Military and other weapons prohibited to civilians .... 54 2.3. Terrorism .......................................................................... 60 2.3.1. Terrorist bombings .................................................... 60 2.3.2. Man-portable air defence systems ............................. 66 2.4. Law enforcement and human rights .................................. 67 2.4.1. Use of force and firearms .......................................... 67 2.4.1.1. What weapons for law enforcement ? ............... 69 2.4.2. Explosive weapons in cases before regional human rights bodies ...................................................... 73 2.5. Protection of civilians and the conduct of hostilities .......... 75 2.5.1. Bombardments ......................................................... 76 2.5.2. Explosive projectiles, mines and cluster munitions .... 77 vi 2.5.2.1. Blast and fragmentation weapons ..................... 80 2.5.3. Indirect fire and precision guided munitions ............. 83 2.6. Explosive weapons regulation: Incoherent and fragmentary ................................................................. 86 3. Protecting civilians in populated areas from the effects of explosive weapons ............................................................. 93 3.1. Protecting traffic routes, inhabited and vulnerable buildings from “unplanned explosive events” ..... 94 3.2. Protecting places of public use and infrastructure facilities from terrorist bombings ...................................................... 98 3.3. Use of explosive weapons in a law enforcement context ... 100 3.3.1. Policing assemblies ................................................... 104 3.3.2. Use of explosive weapons in populated areas ........... 107 3.3.3. Explosive weapons for law enforcement? Crossing a threshold... ................................................... 115 3.4. Use of explosive weapons for the conduct of hostilities ..... 120 3.4.1. General protection of civilians against the effects of hostilities .................................................. 121 3.4.2. Populated areas and other locations containing concentrations of civilians .............................................. 125 3.4.3. The prohibition on area bombardment in cities, towns or villages ............................................................ 130 3.4.4. Use, in populated areas, of explosive weapons with wide area effects .................................................... 133 3.4.4.1. Use of heavy weapons in population centers .... 143 4. Conclusion: Placing greater constraints on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas ............ 147 4.1. Categorical and specific rules on explosive weapons ......... 147 4.2. Recognizing the particular protection concerns in populated areas .............................................................. 150 4.3. Establishing a strong barrier to this pattern of violence ....... 154 Annex: International texts by issue area ......................................... 160 Abbreviations ................................................................................ 168 vii Figures and tables Figure 1. Number of international texts by document type ........... 20 Figure 2. Number of international texts by issue area ................... 24 Figure 3. Cumulative numbers of international texts by date of adoption or year of decision/judgement, and issue area ........................... 25 Figure 4. Inclusion of a standard on the protection of civilians by issue area shown in percentage ............................. 27 Figure 5. Number of texts with and without a standard on the use of weapons and with and without a standard on the protection of civilians ..................... 29 Figure 6. Word cloud based on the IATG’s Glossary ..................... 40 Figure 7. Word cloud based on the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Munitions List ................... 46 Figure 8. Percentage of texts by approach to risk of civilian harm from explosive effects, by issue area ...... 155 Table 1. Explicit reference to explosive characteristics in international texts by issue area ............................
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