,._~ .. -1:5- .September l986
--··-.- . e .. ··.-··:r·--··c··-··-:'•-Jmc:r'llle ponce ··eft,'~-: ni:: 10 000-strong wiiilo..-- ;:·1'he·familywas'latertoldto"h~i . ~;-·~·wm: PicJced up by ttie fun~! the peace sign, then :moved to th~ '- --.•· I up and get-out" as-more bodies·were! -· undertakerS and taken to the Protca ' ; Mundi Church in RI:>Ckville, they were -Ipelegeng Centre and ·St Paul's bcintbmugbtlli•.. _. _ . ; - Police Station, Divisional ' ... -ordered out of the Church. · . Church. ·After negotiations between a •::_. - An Emdeai tami1Y.~wld 1-ow they' HeadquancsoftheSowetoPolic:e. . Several mini-buses and cars were : delegation led by Dr Nthato Motlana - wee infonned by r.n:llftclerutlccr that ; A~ the police Slalion they w=-asked turned lfway at the entrance and : and a Captain Fischmer had failed to he could not find ·It~ boe:· .of their · to stgn a document declaril)g they . mourners ~ told no funeral would agree on the crowd holding a $011, only to leatn ~~-thi~ he had would not hold a mass funezaJ. . be bcld unless written~ was , memorial service, the crowd was been buried. · ·· ' · ·.. - "We n:fused to do that aod stormed · obtained - ordered out of the premises of St . TbC Sibisl family· ·ra'eCc: to the - out of the police station,~ said The crowd then moved to the . Paul's Cburch. cemt:tcty and fou,id ·the-..,::-;,;.,:· AngelineMxotwa, r.lotherof19-year- ... u~,.·;• )~~!!''U Stadium. but were A meeting of more than a dozen • Abednego Sibisi I) ;ng m an unfilled , old Lucky_ Mxotwa. ~~~. - pricsu and the funcnl committee;."·: grave: ·- · . · · The police then ' .-ent to the owners At .one ·stage while the authOrities agreed to postpone the. funeral ;; Other bodies b• .;~~ = th•• of of funeral parlour., aod recorded on · w=-negotiating ,....;th llisbop Simeon indefinitely. _- l':· Joseph KgOISe :md Mlltlin Mthelltwa. , tape assurances .fr< m them that they · Nkoane, the Anglican Suffragcn e According to the. Bureau of .''· The funeral dfm.a started early on ; . would not release the bodies for burial . Bisbop of Johannesburg West, '"3Jid · Information no deaths or injuries bad 1 Wednesday even!~g when police ; • yesterday. ~er priests, a blaclc policeman fll'ed been reponed ·due to the unrest in visited the families with copies of the.! At a m~ng held at the Ipelegeng two teargas canistets into the crowd. Soweto yesterday. But there had been Government Gazet:e that effectively : Com~untty ~cr.;rc on Wednesday He was harshly rebuked by his a number of ilj_egal gatherings which banned the funerals eventng, restdcolts resolved they commanding officer. had been broken up by _police using. · - _,.. would go ancad with the funeral. teargas. In one incident some 300 But yesterday morning when about youths were eli~ in this manner, theBurezuszid. Angola's war drifts iJ;lto ·deadlock as both sides dig in. From IODathall Friedland Following the adviee of its ; the planes were. used onlY to railway, wblch stretches firom :, llati~ income, according to In Luanda Soviet and Cuban backers, ferry Unita fighters to the the port of Lobito to the vanol!s estimates-to meet Emboldened by Washing. the !Marxist Government here ton's decision earlier this THE war between the Ango. south end were not invcllvecl c:opper mines of Zambia and , the liquidity . crisis It faces year to send them covert ald. Jan Governmf•'!lt and rebels has apparently decided not , in combat. . Zaire. The rattway has been ·because of the collapse in oll to !Jauridt another oll'enslve the rebels have increaseii backed bf. Sot th &Africa and " The! offensive deiiJlon. sabotaged repeatedly since prices Th f 11 • th · · their attacks on isolated vii· the Uruted States hK this dey season against Unita strared that if the "'-·uvv.,.u AngA••...., won i....._~ce....., . of oJ!,. ·' which e a providesm e aboutpnce readied stalemate, bases lin the sparsely popu· la!leS and stepped up the a accord· ment libows 6UClCeSS against from Portuga{ In 19 5. 90 per eent of Angola's ex· mining of fields and feeder ing to army oflleers and for· l
Financial Times Saturday September 6 1986 OVERSEAS NEWS
.!.. Anthony Robinson reports on the background to the enthronement of Desmond Tutu Churches' front-line role in South Africa iN SOUTH AFRICA no govern· It Ia the local priests In ment speech of any COD· Soweto who bave been support RQuence is complete without Ing the families of lut week'• reference to the will of the eviction riot victims In their Alml&hty. Bltlllcal justification demands to hold a mass funeral austalna both the battle for and challenging the refusal of blaclt liberation and the defence the Government to allow it. It of apartheid. was also a black Catholic It was always thus, right from priest, Father SmangaliiO the beginning when refugees Mkhatsbwa who laat week drew from 17th century religiOWI world attention to torture in penecutlon In Europe-mainly detention and the role of the C&lvinlsts or Lutherans from clergy In " the struggle " when the Low Countries and Hugenota a court heard his allegations of . li'Om France-41nt arrived at humllialtlng and painful torture the tip of Africa. Imposed by the aecurity forces. The task of enlightening the lleath'n aDd bringing Christl· It Ia all deeply frustrating anlty to the black tribes has for the God-fearing Afrikaners also aiwaya ezerted a powerful In power who see ·themselves · &ttraction on foreign mission· · as guardians and defenders of aries Utd · Units with mother true Christian princiPles, acting ehurchea in EuroJM= remain JD good faith to defend South atrong, as wltneaaed by the Africa and themselves from a lal'le contingent Of foreign "total onslau1ht" by iodlelll churchmen at tomorrow's Communist totalitarianlam. ell1hronement of Blahop Afrikaners are now split ~,.~ ~~1 Tutu as Anglican politically and these division& ~~~'·OP ol Cape Town. are mirrored in the soul aearch· ': "l'odli,, the overwhelming lng which In recent Y84n ~ ;r.:Joril:, of blacks, Including wraclted the NGK. · leaderi .·,: the African National As the NGK w.J'jl&tles with tl'ie C~~~~~Us•, sUch as llfr Nelson coDIIdence, and the Indignity of Mandel• aJlCi :::. "'lve' Tambo, Tomorrow Deunond Tutu, pictured above South Africa and overseas, Including Ute Arch having Its lingering abtachment profeaa allegiance to une or !eliding a protetlt a~:ainBt the detention of a bishop of Canterbury, Dr Robert Runde and to apartheid denounced • ~•~t.~=;;:- u1 Mt: :.WalL.. ~rild:iao priellt, · will be eDthroned as the Allgllcan a gllttertng cast of Invited ~:uests ranging heretical by the world Alliance churches or sects such u the from Mrs Winnie Mandela, wife of jailed ANC Df Reformed Churches three Zionist Christian Church. Arehbilltop of Cape Town and leader of over leader Nelson Mandela, prominent elvll rlghta years ago, other prominent lMadtl form a majority in 1.6m South African members of the church of activists from home and abroad, indudlng Mrs former. inembers like Dr Beyers wi.oa• •liatious of all leading the province of South Africa. His enthrone Roretta King, wife of alaln US civil rlghta Naude, the outgoing chairman churcbe1 ezcept the Dutch ment In St George's Allgllean Cathednl will leader Martin Luther Kin!:, to American of the South Afric1111 Council of Reformed Church, to which be attended by prominent churchmen from tennis player Arthur Ash. Chun:hes and Dr Nico Smith, over 2m Afrikaners belong. who lllves and works in the Evu since the historic 1857 In words which reBeet an With leaders of the African strong World Alliance of black township of Mamelodl Cape ~YDOd of the Nederduitse National Congress (ANC) in Reformed Churches, have near Pretoria represent those Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) the almost uncaooy resemblence to the attitudes towards the outside jail or exile and thousands more brought the Churches ·into the Afrikaners who passionately .Reformed Church has been in detention under the state of front line ol the &trUggle support the campallln against divided racially with separate world and tbreat of sanctions emergency, Including many against pa.rtheld and wbite apartbeid. with all the fervour "&later churches" for Coloureds ezpressed by President P. W. chiurchmen, the ·role of the domination. of converts. and blacks. Botha and other government Churches as grass roots organi· While men like these have As world attention focuses on Aa far back as 1837 resent· leaders 150 years later, Point sations with charismatic leaders toured the world, won Nobel the enthronement of Archbishop ment at the over-zealous Four of Ret;ief's statement and other prizes, wowed the Tutu In Cape Town tomorrow, defence of blaclt righta and read: "We complain of the has grown. media, wrong-footed the the moral preuure on the . IUPport for the abolition of Wljustlflable odium which has Overseas there is hardly a Government and argued pas- South African Government slavery by loreign missionaries, been cast upon us by interested church in Christendom without sionately for sanctions and dis· grows stronger, but in its pre. ...c1t as Dr John Philip of the a.nd dishonest persons, under lts•appeal fund for South Africa Investment, lowlier priests back sent mood there is little ldkell· London Missionary Society, led the cloak of religion, whose and the financial and moral home In the dusty townships hood of any dramatic conver to the Great Trel< out ot the testimony is believed In support from foreign churches have been burying the victims sion on the road to Damascus Cape by disalfect~d Afrikaners, England, to the exclusion of all together with the oratorical of repression and political In· on the part of a government Piet Retief, one of the Trek evidence In our favour, and we skills and public relations fighting, Intervening to prevent whose members will also be leaders, justified tt in a 10 point can see, as the l!ll!lllllll!fl!!.... _.AI'\!I.I'!IUIR.AIII!II ______..,¥!4_U.,..~.~ ~ Jack Spence evaluates South Africa's strategic hold on the West · 'Twenty years ago. the debate the world's; reserve base in four about South Africa·~ strategic key minerals is high: the platinum importance to the West was group of metals (81 per cent). conducted almost exclusively in Does Pretoria manganese (71 per cent). chrome .terms of the republic's value as a (84 per cent). vanadium (47 per military "bastion of the free cent). In addition, South Africa is. world". astride the Cape route by the second largest producer of which oil and other strategic mjlnganese, platinum and commodities were shipped to have a Cape chrome. and leads the field in gold . Europe and the United States. and vanadium. . The protection of this rouie was The degree of dependence of ·.invariably cited by those' who Western . countries on South wished to engage South Africa's Africa's supplies varies. The military and economic resources card to play? United States imports 41 per cent in the contest with Moscow. Their ' • I t of its chrome from the republic; case appeared even stronger with the EEC 48 per cent: Japan 44 per the deplo)·ment of Soviet ships in cent. For manganese the figures the Indian Ocean after 1968. are 41 per cent, 48 per centand 42 · There were angry exchanges in per cent respectively. ; Parliamentaboutthe morality and Three questions are posed by usefulness of resuming arms sales this dependence: how serious is to the republic. and the precise ' the_Soviet threat to disrupt sup meaning of British obligations · ply? Would a black successor arising from the agreement by regime in Pretoria threaten con which Britain had access to South tinuity of supply to the West? Africa's Simonstown naval base. Would South Africa deny mineral The "spirit" of the agreement was resources to the West in the event invoked by Conservative and of sanctions? South African politicians alike to Answers to the first two are justify giving South Africa status sometimes related on the apoca . as a quasi-member of Nato. lyptic assumption that a black In the 1970s. after Britain's government in Pretoria. in debt to withdrawal from Simonstown. the the Soviet Union for military debate petered out. Whatever support in a war of liberation, 1 private reservations were held by would cut ofT supplies. Supporters II admirals. politicians and .,enta- i! of this thesis claim it holds good gon planners. Western policy was · · even if black rule .i~' achieved i based on the assumption that through a· negotiated settlement. conferring military respectability Yet both scenarios are inher on the republic would incur ently implausible: even a radical political costs in terms of the black regime is likely - if the West's relations with the Third precedents of Angola and Zim World. and hand a propaganda babwe are any guide - to have advantage to the Soviet Union. little alternative but to sell min Diplomatic caution was re erals to the West to earn revenue inforced by strategic arguments for the task of reconstruction. which. I believe, hold good today. Yet another ground for scep Nobody disputes the im ticism is the reasonable assump portance of the Cape route as a tion that South Africa is not high vital trade artery: in 1981. for on the list of Soviet priorities. The example. some 2.300 ships sailed present stalemate between black it. delivering 57 per cent of The Simonsto"n base: last overt symbol of interdependence and white gives ample propaganda western Europe's oil and 20 per advantage: and Moscow is inhib-. cent of the United States' oil. In . which it believes its military Latin American states. South Af ited from any direct military addition. 70 per cent of the West's capabilities and strategic position rica was unable to do more than involvement for fear of confronta strategic raw materials were-trans deserve. Despite occasional rum observe a posture of strict neutral tion - whether by accident or ported by this route. blings over the years from within ity (accusations of arms sales to design - at the superpower level. Yet the Cape seems an improb the Nato hierarchy to incorporate Argentina remain unproven). The Second. the threat in the me able choice on strategic grounds these capabilities. the argument cost of commitment to the Ar dium term is not cataclysmic for a Soviet blockade. The stretch that the republic. given its fierce gentine cause - blatantly aban upheaval. it is the risk of sporadic of sea between the Cape and anti-communist posture. would doning the British (and- the disruption. a state of "unstable Antarctica - unlike. by contrast. never refuse to make its facilities Western) connection -"Simply equilibrium". It is to cope with the Straits of Hormuz - could available in an emergency has proved too high. · this possibility that Western gov hardly be described as an effective been accepted as decisive. Nor did the Sato prospeccfare ernments have been encouraged to chokepoint from which to harass The West. therefore. has had the anv better: Brazil has never been b;;:ld stockpiles. develop a na and sink Western oil tankers and best of both worlds: a near-cenain cnihusiastic. preferring to ..cul tional (and cross-national) min merchant ships. · guarantee of South African tivate relations with a seleci 6•'0up eral strategy and diversify sources. Nor does one have to take a availability without the political of Third World states: and in any Finally. what prospect of South benign view of Soviet policy to costs incurred by closer and public case doubt exists whethe1 there is African counter-sanctions using believe that such action- whether military cooperation. South Africa sutlicient naval capability to make the mineral weapon to inhibit or in the Gulf or around the Cape - has not taken kindly to Western Sa to credible. blunt Western action? Faced with would entail enormous political rejection of its overtures for The parameters of the debate selective sanctions of the kind and military costs for Moscow. greater recognition of its claims to about South Africa ·s strategic proposed by the Commonwealth amounting to a declaration of war be a lvnchpin in Western defences. value changed following the 1973 and the EEC. it is improbable that on ·the West which could hardly be Threats to go it alone. to adopt a oil crisis. Pretoria has ever since Pretoria would retaliate. limited to the southern oceans. neutral position. have alternated attempted to improve its bargain Minerals. after all. constitute Indeed. in 1980 Joseph Luns. with efforts to revive the idea of a ing posture by stressing its role as a over half the export trade and Nato's secretary-general. stated South Atlantic Treaty Organiza supplier of materials vital to even in the event of extreme categorically that contingency tion (Sato) embracing South Af Western industrial and defence provocation the republic would plans exist "to defend the Cape rica. Brazil and Argentina. production. These. it is claimed. make every effort to find sur route in time of war". Both strategies were tested tlur are threatened by a long-term reptitious outlets for its products. This. no doubt. is a source of ing the Falklands war: both were Soviet strategy of resource denial Even now. businessmen are some comfort to South Africa. but found wanting. - Despite its to the West. dusting ofT contingency plans to it is. in effect. a second-best serious effort during the 1970s to The importance of South Africa cope with that prospect. solution and one that has denied reduce dependence on the West by as a mineral supplier is not in The author is professor of politics its government the recognition establishing ties with half a dozen doubt. Its share. for e>.ample. of at Leicester University. lesse')acksOTi: .' ;: r i' ~·' ·. ~ ,, .•. '!: 'J ~ ::: • J. 1 • . 1 .;:_ ~I> • -~·· ,. \ ... An:lnvitatiori for· the President The~ of~~~ ~riont..Jine stateS" . ically, ~Santos invited Pre&id~nt Re;~gaij. .ca. and .theie are nearly 100 American !inns .. tion 435. Thus.. AngOla's new~ repre-· bordering South ~rica nave. isSued a joint to VisitrAngola to see·fll'St4tand the effectS . doini! bUsiness there. When I visited the Chev- sents a sig~Uficant c:bange oi policy; . invitation to President Rcagim to Visif the of American policy in·tne'regi~ 'flieimpor-' ron-Culf operathln in Cabinda C!l1 Aut 17. l . l believe that the Jeitde:S oi our nation WOuld regionforanurgent'aiunmitmeeting;The ·tance:of•lhis turnabout should be under· met with some of our citizei!S from Texas,·. bebetterableto~atsouildpolicyreeom-· invitation, issued on Aug.· 24: during my visit · ·scored, since right up until this summer, Louisiana and Arkansas who are working there meodations by actUal contact with tbe leaders to Zambia by Zambian President Kenneth ·Angolans had refused to _lll!gOtiate with the under constant threat of attack from Savimbi and peq11e, oi the re8ion to ~ oi their Kalinda, the chairman. of the group, marks United_ States, believing it to be supprirtive and. his South· African ames. By thiowing fuel problems. firsthand. It -is significant that the an important tuniing:point in U.S ...SOuthem_ . of a South Africa-based opj)()Sition groiJp in on the fire of South Africa's undeclared war president oi the United States has tra'.'eled to African relatioos and should be viewed very . ·(\ngola. President Dos Santos saw the im· against Angola, our gavernment is defYing its Europe, Asia and Latiil America. but has never seriously _by White House and State Depart· portance of presenting the true situation of own interests, both in Angola and in Namibia." ment QffJcials. . -· his .cowitry-and tbat of oth~r front·line where no solution can be rQUilli IDitil Angola is: . traveled to Aftica.Jet.'feels c:atain oi apJiiq The purpose of the Invitation is to help states-to President Reagan and therefore .· .. · ensured security against South AfriGiil attaCks.. based on military destabiliZatiOn. 3lld coojlera- Pre&ident Reagan understand South Africa'il reverSed tliis policy and issued the invita· The Angolan goverrurient has made an im- · tion with 3part}ieid; Aien't we. entitled to aggressive role, which Kalinda describes as tion. portant gesture of operiness to the American expect the Simie ·sbndanl .oi. interest and bringing the region close to a racial "explc·. _ I talked' with· Dos Santos, a thoughtful, government and to President Reagan. in an . ~o-bc:e meetings· for Afrii:m states that sion."l ru~ree with Kalinda'sassessmimt an(t genUe man, and agreed with his thinking. . effort to sigual the possibility of a new initiative we have for· Europe, Asia.and Latin America. have now seen with myown eyes the impact Why, he ilsked; should the United States toward· peace. This g(.sture is aD the more since aD are vital to world peace? Thus; our of Pretoria's economic and military strategy provide Jimas Savimbi, leader of ON!TA, important because, in so many i:esj>ects; it President should. not ClOiiduct an inaJDsistent of destabilizing :the.. r~ion, and how U.S. · with Sti.nger misSiles· that would W..eak-fur· - reprerents some fwtdarnental reassessmentS in · -~ incoherent tegiona1 foreign,J)Oiiq-boun- policy toward South Afriea 3ffects this re- -ther death and destruction on innocent peo- Angolan foreign policy. lt is weD known 'that ties to some regions ..and ~ to others. gion...... · ple,·and potentially..on American oil compa- the foreign minister of Angola appeared at the respect to some:: regions and destabolimion oi My trip to the fr_Ont;line states began with ny personnel? ShOuldn't President Reagan· · United Nations several. moi!ths ago to an, others. aid am trade to 8DIIIIi and drastic cuts i r;neeting with Angolali' Presideiit Jose Eci- seek to prevent the destabilizin~of Angola, I!OUnce that aD negotiatiolls on ·Narilibian inde- . in foreign aSslstiuire,tO ~ We llllist ~a unrdo Dos Santos, who offered a strilricg both for_ ~Angola's sake, and in the best pendence with.the United Staes were severed sin~ stariilaid,ofjUStice iri foreign poiicf; just overture to the United States and Preside<•t interests of America? because of America's aid to Savimbi, and that as m the dOniestlc arena. Let's play by ooe set Reagan aimed at improving relationS .b7 America. is Angola's NO. 1 trading partner. i\ngala would henceforthdeal with the U.N, of rules. . - . tween Angola-and the United States. Specif- Angola_ expo• rts 60 """cen_ t of its oil to Ameri- ·· onlv .relative to the iinplementa.tion of ResOiu- · ~ our goVernment f3ils to lespond to this ,.... ' _new initla,tiVe ~ peace £toni the front lines, a - precious ·cijJportunity -wiD have been lost to . achieve foreign.· policy objectives consistellt wi'-.h the higbest WlueB· of the American peo- ple. . . · We stiR c:an adlievdamrable ielatinns with Angola; but. not through Savimbi and SoUih Africa's .sabotage and ·Sllbven1on. . Human rights is still the ethical imperative that iS the key to beneficial foreigli reJatioDs in Africa. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBeR 11,198E' THE CHRISTiAN SCIENCE MONil'OR ---~---~----~------~~~~~~~~~~~~- ~nft -- • _.-'7,• . .. L~-·b i Bea___ __ ·~UP--On ~111br4: rwe .. A.- ~- .. L$ US.£ .. t .. :-.Q--Ai$!- -~ ... ~~~:·<>~· ~.·.·- "):·~~~ / . \' . -~ i ·-:;2-"t~~"..,, . ...;;· :·· lm:ar;:~~{ltin;,. ,T&..... ~!;;!Soii ;t:).TABUSflEO 1891 ' ~-· . HARARE. SA.TUWYi AUGUST 9 1986 .. ·. .. · --.· . ... ~:..-. ... •t~.ceQ'~::~"'l:'...... wJ..'•'. · ::: ... ,. ·.:-: •. ~.: ,.·. P..o.~_ao" ~96, H,~;,.,~· ~t;t· J.9 ~7 ~ ~·. . Tei~x No~':it"f~~.. ~.\-:,.: .. Price 17c ,PREPAltE 'EQft;J~~t~~ ::: ;· ~~:~-:~-r.::,?,·i;J, /:St:'l~:~::.·ti ·naE· M.._ Iv f ...... -.·;.;_<'.-.:.-:·~::·_,,," .,;·; ..',:.· --r .. . r...R.~~: uld be-defended ...-ruue ifUIIlSter, e! · ·-·~---·' e · &'Om. ll!e Cde. Mugabe salil he a.galnst you. you accept It to tlfe 1ast man, pledged iUugahe 'd te I the -aituut!OD In Sout,• loVIIalmpreased by the Arm· as such. You d011't go Cde Mugabe, ...,d other a ' sal yes r• l The :p;oiJp wa8 charg;;d Anica waa not aa bad aa attitude adopted bv crawling to thoee who de- -poaelble routes were the day. ·· ·. i .. \ ·• with t.JidiDg out through It wa'! now and. so 'the Cs.nada. Australia, India clare it. All thoughts nt Ta.zara to Dar e.s Salaam The Herald; Saturday August./i) 1986 -:· 1 LOSS OF .. SA .. TRADE WEATHERED' 'CAN.trft/zd.tl- BEIf~- 'f'. . . WITH South Africa uow buying less than ll· percent of Zimbabwe's export&, the loss of that market will not be crippling and Zimbabwe could in fact thrive if alternative tnmsport routes are upgraded or re-opened quickly to take exports Business Editor routea would cost the re- 7..DffiABWE'B EXPO,RTS TO SOUTH AFRICA to other markelt, ac· glme dearly In tel'lllll of 198S 19M •-· -Mugu.be, that :lllmbabwe lost railage and port eordi~g to etat ....let on would Impose tbe Oom· charges, which amount to Export" to Sontb Afrlcs 191,8m !52,1m 172,8m·~· 1451,8m 11177,6m export& monwealth: package of. well over $100 million. Total export. . 1150~m ZIJnbabwe b8l5 been sancUoD.II by tha end oC U such measures were SA ellports aa pereentaa"e lte the yeer. extended to the whole of total expol'k 18,'1%' 18% w:elldlly Jeaen!Dg But even before Cdr BA:DCC region, lost trans· :.:'":'a.;'et~~~~ :Mugabe'a aunouncement, port revenue would total ZHffiABWE'S 11\IPORTS FROJII soum AFRICA ...... ,_...".. -~ between the regime had imposed · more than $tOO mlilllion. '"'~'-~~ "'"' South Africa IWia refies 1983 198l 19811 January . and November a variety of measures beavUv on· lbo trade with ·~ast year the weak rand designed to a.ftect the ADCC. ••• d th Imports from Sontb Africa !59,9m 281,8m !111m and the receas!On It<:• trade of Zimbabwe aud S ollta..,., an e Total lmpol'ta 1081,8m 1198,7m 1 BSS,Sm South Africa:, coupled zambia through and to loas of this trade would SA Import& aa a pereent~ . wlth greater tdlvett'BIIlca· that country, and mo~ be a blow to many of tts of total.lmport8 J 111,!% tJoll by elq)Orlers, reduced such measures could prob· tndUBtrles, which are al· aur exporta :to South ably be lmpoed soon. ready hard-hit by reces· •laailllll')' to Nll\'l!Dlllllr, 111 A.frllea as a percentage It will, however, have to . ogpln1ons vary gTeatiY Bewee: Standard Obutereo! Blulk ~ 0 ~f.;:~"':J: ::',9 t;.:'.:t earefullyd :wcenslgh ofupln::. as to bow · badly the sanctions agaiD.IIt South ers and cutting off trans· MNR and Un!ta. have pros an ° SADCC states wm be af· . .Afrlca.·woUid ·hltve nttl~ rt llnkll · an~~ a. ~P~~ duclng further .. measuzls feeted by South African effect on S.WOC states 'po . =~~d r.:;_m~l~ :e::, .J: ~!:j ~e}:!~~~ E:::t~t ~ :'!:.>uld, In fact, benefit :~;t~=::::~l :~Jth! U.:W:~'to~~a~~f:S to 18,2 percent Of total Jli!Ckage to, for example, bad 1111 predicted by some , In biB recently released impoBSible Impact on tlie would not need or want lmpol't8 dw1Dg the 118.11'119 tnclude a ban on dividend - notatay t1weeo whO book, Apartheid's &!t!ond other states. Cutung. to use South ·'..friea." perlod. ami pension remittances, · · oppose sancltocl!l because Front, he said that "the transport could 18olnto . ..F1nclbig • :tematlve By yesterday there· bali .which total about •70 mil· Gf the effect tt would have real price 6f sancUona will several states and cause ·transport. rou';es bas ·been no omclal reactiOn Jlon a year. l:>n their OIVIl ~no~ rome from South ,African aom" problems - but therefore becom' a major frOm ibe South African In addition, any move tutereste...... retallatlon. ~ sorts th""" states are o:uly u.slng ·priority for BADCC regime to the anDOunce- to further !n::>edo or even A!!cordlng to one have already been threat· South African ports anii . !,la_!es. Work l1 already ment on Friday by tbe halt Zlmbal>we'IJ use. of SOU'them African expert eed by .South Atrl~- ra.llways becaue South .· •. '11o PL .. A a' • Prime :MJrJati.!-, ~..:_. .. South . African tran.port :Mr >lO!IeiPh Hanlon, m011t pulalon Of migrant '\Writ· African comatl82ldoa, the ,.. a: e From Page 1 , opening ~'' -~~~t\.\iitt?e--,-B.;t e,q,orts to South SADCC states tq '7ra.k ~----· - routes will take· too l!'it![ ,\frl~n have been steadily with each other, '· 1 under way on upgrading and. tt o...... ~ -~:- . t·\ der.llntn~ ~,..,.. ~'!!"! ~!!.~!: :.:.::-: ::l...nb.;:.:.. ...-.:e's ma.jm" !~- '\oo· ··-••···-·· •u-- ...... B..;.'· •taKe action now, trade,. years because of Govern· ports from South Africa ~~d ·u;~ "'Port--Itself "io would: come to a total ment-led eltorts to find are motor splrlte, gas r_arry more SADCC trnf· halt with disastrous ef· alternative markete In oils, steel plate, chemlcal8 fie and Cde Mugabe In· reets. Africa and abroad and. and spare parts· - an dicnted on Friday that But Belra 18 not being , · over the last y<;ar In pat'· eBSentlal to keep ·the wo:rk mlight soon start on used to Its present full tlcular, because of the wheels of lnduatry, agrl· the Maputo line. even If capacity and past ex- recession In South Africa, culture and mining tum· It has to be guarded every pcrlence shows thot. In which depressed demand lng. . .. Inch of the waY. ~imes of crlsls, the seem· and the weak rand, which But It has been pointed Several ~rogresslve na· lngly" Impossible can be made Zimba·bwean goods out that many of these Uons have already como· achieved. When the Smith uncompelltlve. · can be sourced, often at forwlll'd with tha techni· regime faced the possl· It bas been suggested lower prices on the world cal and (lnanclal help bllity that an Independent that progr.,.slve nations market. Mo;e barter deals nPeded to secure alterna 'Mozambique would lm· could help lessen the blow to obtnln these .. Inputs 'tlve routes, which will not P?•e UN -sponsored sonc· of lost exports to South could nlso be arranged only lessen dependence on bons, the 145 km R\ltenga Africa by providing· spe· and progressive countri('S . South Africa 'bUt also railway line to Beitbrldge clol eonccsslons fGr Zl· could help by providing provide n welcome Injec was bullt In n record 93 mbabwe exports In their more commodity Import days. The aame could be own countries. Thill 15, tion of proy hPip far the neighbour by opening up nP.w. mar nod vital sourc('o!l of rnw established with the ·help lng stnte• to help them kets In that country, materials o.nd spare of the international rl?qlst South Afrlrnn re- h Some might argue that pnrts. 'comn1unltv to ,..nr.ot•rar.-P. t:tll:llion. ,- ' " . ! ...... ,.. . - I Incorporating :Yhe Nation· • _--~-"0. HARA.U, SATUROAY AUCUSTil Jt86.:_._" ·-·'-•· ... - ~ . ---~---~--·-~--····-~----- ,.. WORI( WELL UNDER WAY.\ _. 1-t.A..i-L .. ON .BEIRA CORRIDOR J>/~1¥~.- ... ~lORE than 70 percent RDd IIOIIie European COUD• ·.·,million tollnetl & yeU:< after all USed 'to be one recently anJUiiJI:tced ""b- 8U$1NES$ EDITOR tries had al8o madP The . second phiUie. wtll u~;~ rna_ jor transpor-t ~atat~lla:_J~~~ tht~ I of the US$28G miUlon · Pledges. Jnvolve tmprovtng nn THE BIGGEST THREAT to these two MACHO strategies was not the ANC's guertilla war, but the development ofalternative government in the townships. Just a5 Pretoria cannot tolerate LEADERS successful black states to its north which threaten its own ideological justification, so it was finally unable to tolerate the emergence of · alternative models of government in the UNITE townships. .. However, this too was not self~dent in May. Perhaps the extent to which PreSident Botha's reformist rhetoric in September last DEFIANT year and again in January opened up spa<:e;~ ' which were being exploited '!"llS not appreciated enough at the time •. While the ·wHITES African National Congress remained outlawed · and vilified, local government ""'--ials were meeti.n£ and talking to the Talking to the ANC would . representatives of organisations wmch llew have been far more heinous · the ANC and South African communist flags a crime, in the eyes ofBotha's at funerals. In the militant stronghold of voters, than inveigling _ popular ANC support, the eastern Cape, a sanctions upon the regiine. In new culture of negotiations was staning to emerge. It was based on grassroots support, in fact, says PIDLLIP VAN panicular street and area committees which NIEKERK, at this stage were an attempt to turn the high level of they're positively revelling mobilisation at mass funerals, rallies ·and in thumbing their noses at . marches into solidly based organisation. the rest of the world The old community and town councils were . swept aside and local white officials and businessmen, under pressure from strikes and Cape Tofll1i Apan from a small minority oi radicals and Yet the extent to wluch !-'rete ia has been consumer and schools boycotts, found that if 'UNITE', said President Botha to the liberals, whites have little conception of the prepared to thumb its nose at d. ' rest of the they wanted to communicate with blacks in the delegates of his National Party last week, repression. It is mostly played out in the world was not as starkly evi< ent at the townships they had to talk to the authentic 'Unite in our resistance against prescriptions, ghettoes where few whites ever venture and is beginning of May as it is -now. Then, the leaders. These included grassroots black interference and threats from abroad'. His call kept furt.ller out of sight by the tough government stood a~ a cr~road!., facing t~e l~ders such as Gugile Nkwinti in Port Alfred, has not gone unheeded. South Africa's wrutes restrictions on news reporting and a steady diet choice of either dealing With the r :s1Sta11ce m Mkhuseli Jack in Port Elizabeth and Moses are uniting. of disinforrnation from state-controlled the ghettoes by entering a nt-w -~_of Mayekiso in Alexandra. While lacking the This in face ofan economy in such dramatic television and radio. Even if they did know neg"l>tiation with black lead~! or •f Wielding media profile of the Tutus,-the Boesaks or the decline that it had to call a moratorium on its what was going on, there has nev•r been a very the big stick to stamp out diss1der. :e, thereby Winnie Mandelas they were forging debts last September and cannot reschedule large 'conscience' vote among white South inviting punitive sanctions. organisations which- judging by the fact that them; ·because of international hostility Africans. The Afrikaners in p•. rticular like In reuospect it was a false crossroads, one they were the state's prime targets in the running at an all-time high; and in face of a macho government, and many vote for the which was both unnecessary and pr< :mature. It emergency - posed a far greater threat than was precipitated by the Eminen · Persons' state ofemergency which seen security of their families again: t the feared mere rhetoric. They used not 'the substance of ~ent has Group (EPG) who were trying to p :t together more than detained and a censored black hordes. the government's reforms, which iri global 10,000 a deal in which South Africa wcr ild release press and broadcast· media. After all this, Indications that the revolt in the ghettoes has terms - remained meagre, but the political prisoners and legalise tl e African. Botha's calculation that he should soon call been silenced for the time being by the State of contradictions which the reformist rhetoric National Congress in exchange fo: the ANC either a general election or a in Emergency are causing a drift back from the threw up. ~eferendum la~e suspending violent opposition to t 1e regime.· aurumn this year or spnng next year IS far right into National Party ra lks. While a · . However, the emergence of street . After this, the EPG proposed, the wo parties probably soundly based: this is the moment little under a third of ·Afrikane.-s, the most ~ committees was still at an early and brittle would proceed to the negotiatin; . table. It when white unity can best be demonstrated, hardline, have probably been lost to the stage. Unlike the factory-based shop steward have been clear that neither the ANC, and his opponents on the far right outflanked. government for all time, about mother fifth · should committees, which had a decade of growth who had not been properly consult• ~, -~- the· In his speech to the faithful, Botha- spoke were wavering in the heady da: •s before the before the Emergency, th~eet coDltnittees South African government were read~ for throuilb them to his would-be tormentors, to Emergency was declared, when l:ugene Terre were only a few months' old by mid-1986. warn tha' 'those who want to force us into 'Blanche's neo-nazi Afrikaner Weerstands- " Lancaster House-style negotiations They needed time and space to grow. beweging (A WB) was in full cry. '. ~ In some important respects the g< · -~; n ."lent Le Grange told a delegation ofMPs from the negotiations with radical elements by stood to gain more from such talks. l"heR was eastern Capeearlier this year that he would not demanding unacceptable concessions through SINCE MAY, South Africa's .vhite rulers hope of luring the ANC to cc ntrol the surrender one inch of South Africa to blackmail and.a manipulated world opinion have displayed a determination o hold onto · resistance in the ghettoes and lay < ~WT! •e··~ alternative government. Afrer the Emergency should not underestimate us'. So far, it's no poWer which has surprised many Jftheir foes, arms, while locking ihem in .o .terile hemadegoodhispromise. The eastern Cape's idle statement. For, ironic as it is, the National though it really should not ha\e. There is 'negotiations': then stalling the ne ~otiations. briefspring of 1986 has died behind the metre Party has so far been the greatest beneficiary of evidence of a massive i.uernational But not even that prospect could ):ove h•red high barbed wire that encircles the ghetto of the international sanctions campaign against miscalculation ofSouth Africa's stubbornness Pretoria to the negotiating table in May. In a New Brighton, permitting people to enter or South Africa. The , prospecr of punitive and arrogance by those whom Pret~ria regards choice between talks with the . ~C and leave at only one heavily guarded entrance.. sanctions, far from denting white morale, has as interfering foreigners. This rni: calculation alienation ofwhite voters on the on< hand, and The implications ofPretoria's belligerent and unified most whites, Afrikaner and English was seen at its most ludicto\ll' when Sir sanctions and repression on the Jther, the unconciliatory mood are that the stakes, both speaking, in a mood of defiance and righteous Geoffrey Howe was sent packing '>y President government did not believe it : .ad much in terms ofinternal and external pressure, are indignation. . • [> · Botha to cheers from Bor :lll's white _choice. not nearly high enough yet and that, short ofan SuP.J"'~~- internal collapse of will which is unlikely' - . 14 because_o~~~ m~ofthe whites, the struggle ... ,Sanctions-busters riot so .sanguine ' ' . .'· ' ;• . ~ .- .. ' . .. . WHEN Mr Pik Botha, the South bouring states is comparatively economy can ill-afford. The of imported components. 'Oil African Foreign Minister met easy for South Africa, the- implication is ·clear: if Zambia companies have been encour- his Japanese· counterpart Mr dominant regional power. drops her calls for sanctions, aged to stay in South Africa by Tadashi Kuranari in Tokyo yes- Mozanbique suffered for years South Africa will drop the receiving guaranteed profits on terday:-he pUlled out all1 the· from a -local insurgency backed deposit rule. petrol sales. · stops in an effort to persuade· by South Africa. Zambia and· . Countries such as Australia In export markets, subterfuge Japan not to join other countries Zimbabwe,. which rely. on South could well feel the ind-irect pres-. will largely involve disguising h imposing sanctions. . . . .Africa· for two thirds of their sure of · sanctions if · South the provenance of South Mr Botha's trip; ·which will foreign trade shipments, . were African· coai exporters cut African goods. Last year- Bloom- also include Taiwan and South· both given a· taste· of their. prices to retain markets ingdales, the New- York depart- Korea,,· underlines the growing neighbour's. abi,lity to disrupt_ threatened· by boycotts. South ment. store, carried a range of j v.•orry:within._the•.South African their trade·:.Iast month;· when -.African .. coal is distinctive· and beachwear labelled ''made in, Covernment about the. gradually South African customs· in5pec· cannot be sold as ·coming from Ciskei." Most anti-apartheid j tightening sanctions noose> Pre- 'tors delayed exports by making elsewhere. It is' considerably New Yorkers. are probably not 1 to>ria's .. ability to b·eat'8anctions·is detailed examinations. of cross-. cheaper>· to produce than coal . aware . .that• Ciskei is one of j probably more.dependent on .. the ·oorde:t" consignments~ ..· · · ·. from most other countries, how- South Africa's black homelands. j r.greement of_the customer than•. _· -: The;·.·south Africans disin;: .·ever, providing considerable l~e- . That is · legitimate .. Less ·j on S<;>u~A.frican,ti'aders'ability_ genuotisly ·insisted .that· the .way on. PFices. . . ·.· ·<' honest, 'however, ds the atti· l to h1de We prov~nance _of, ~h~:.· delays ·were. not. retaliation ,for-. ·· Afnca~·<;&~ds-.1~to··· •Afr1cap··· :· .:_~esident'·'\P;,:JF~;-·7\~otlia. ~\'In- so~~~casn,tftough, she~ould Mauntlus. hopmg .• to _persuade J "u_e____}ltly -_·. :(ecently.;' s_et ·:o__ ut::t __ o. emti_arr_· _I_ f_ ',she __ wa!lte.d. J_o_ ·_·._.Ra_ ther, ,th. e South. Afncan, to .·j.l r7!sortC.JUntrieljy,;·:_·Y;F~_'_eq. :~9;.'~lJ1~l~OUS. l~oel~l~g;~~y Zimbabwe 'by ·.4isclosing :(!oin--~ss. . raw .material U~·.lD gl!ISS and . set .up 'plants~- . .Jll~.-. u_f~~turers.tfie •mdl~n,._ 1n ~l~··'WCk: I~;·th~ ~c.tionst; .. lllil'~tively 'triv;iai;~detai~l!'))f ' Rt~:;tk'k_;~:·~~J\i~$-~JIl4~:~~~~t~~~:-~~;rfl!~~e~:,-~_· nti;re~c_. ~ii./;1\:il':r_.~-ftE_I~~-e~J~:'e'i!:::.nia,:,~~~.~r ... ~~~~~~i~'rr~~:J:E_.s~-:!m_P__ lfi_~_ i,~J<; disclo8edi::stratett.oi!'f6r: beating ' · a-·. ~e~ • o. ave., · ,.,;tme .: \ : South ·,Africa . ------'-";~~ - ..• 1 . , ECSA . · I 339 Lafayette Street \ New York, N.Y. 10012-2725 ~.}