What Does a NATO Secretary General Do? NATO: How to Keep in Shape At
What does a NATO NATO: how to keep NATO's 60 years How much do you really Secretary General do? in shape at 60 in photos know about NATO? 10 16 20 20 questions to test you 30 It's still around. At www.nato.int/review
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Published under the authority of the Secretary Articles may be reproduced, after permission General, NATO Review is intended to has been obtained from the editor, provided contribute to a constructive discussion of mention is made of NATO Review and signed Publisher: Jean-François Bureau Atlantic issues. Articles, therefore, do not articles are reproduced with the author’s Editorial Director: Gerlinde Niehus necessarily represent offi cial opinion or policy name. Editor: Paul King of member governments or NATO. Production Assistant: Emmanuel Maduike Every mention in this publication of the former Tel: +32 2 707 4283 NATO Review is an online magazine which Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked Fax: +32 2 707 4579 comes out 10 times a year at www.nato.int/ by an asterisk (*). This refers to the following E-mail: [email protected] review. It is available in 22 NATO country footnote: Turkey recognises the Republic of [email protected] languages (soon to be 24), as well as Arabic, Macedonia with its constitutional name. Web address: www.nato.int/review Hebrew, Russian and Ukrainian. 2 NATO at 60: Deep roots, new branches
NATO at 60 4 NATO: facing changes, Introduction by NATO Secretary General making changes Security, our common mission 7 1949, the year that NATO was established, Germany's Chancellor Merkel and France's President Sarkozy set out was dripping with reminders of the past their vision of how security can best be achieved and signs of the future. A valued Alliance of values The world was still awakening from the 9 Kurt Volker, US Ambassador to NATO, outlines the Obama nightmare of the Second World War. Administration's outlook on NATO at 60. Rationing of clothes in the UK, a wartime necessity, came to an end. Berlin, the NATO Secretary General: a changing job description? heart of the Third Reich four years earlier, 10 Th e NATO Secretary General role is much like NATO: it has evolved was now torn in half, with the West part greatly over the years. Ryan Hendrickson tells the tale of the people who being blockaded by the USSR. made those changes. Growing disagreements with the Soviets took on a new hue, with the explosion of Voices from history 14 their fi rst atomic bomb in 1949. It was also Many politicians, experts and academics have used the pages the year that Communists won the Chinese of NATO Review over the years to predict the future. Here, civil war. Fears over growing totalitarianism we print a selection of their quotes. were embodied in George Orwell’s book published that year, entitled ‘1984’. Keeping in shape at 60 16 Daniel Korski outlines what he thinks the Alliance's main challenges But as well as fears, there were also signs are in the coming years. And off ers some advice. of progress. The fi rst computer with a memory was made in 1949. The fi rst non- 60 years in photos stop fl ight around the globe was made by 20 Th is photostory off ers snapshots of NATO's history, from its people a US Air Force plane. to its operations, from its fi rst years to this year. In the midst of this, NATO was formed. It was in part a response to two strong Decision time: NATO’s hard choices for the future 28 emotions at the time: fear and hope. The Charles Kupchan, Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, fear of an uncertain, and rapidly changing, highlights three areas crucial to NATO's future. world order was tangible. But so was the hope that the worst was behind us. NATO, Are you a NATO expert? 30 a defensive force, became a major player Th ink you know about NATO? Th ese 20 questions will test almost immediately in this context. whether you're right. The intervening years, up to 2009, have From AMF to NRF seen a breadth and pace of change un- 32 Th e debate over NATO's rapid reaction forces is never over. Here matched in human civilisation. Space ex- Diego Ruiz Palmer describes the developments up to the present day. ploration, digital communication and mass international travel have made the world Don’t forget the science bit… smaller and more interconnected. 38 Knowledge is power – and science is a key provider of knowledge. But despite these advances, the emotions Professor Sir Brian Heap explains how science came to be a NATO activity. of fear and hope remain strong today. And so does NATO. NATO's new Strategic Concept: a parliamentary view 40 Paul King As NATO prepares its new Strategic Concept, former Norwegian Editor, NATO Review Foreign Minister Jan Petersen outlines what he feels needs including.
Cover photo: fotolia.fr
3 Jaap de Hoop Scheff er, NATO's Secretary General, outlines the three major challenges he sees facing the NATO Alliance.
As NATO celebrates its 60th anniversary, it is in greater achievements. Indeed, the Summit venue itself demand than ever before. The Alliance is keeping the testifi es to NATO’s success in facilitating Europe’s peace in Kosovo, it is engaged in both stabilisation post-war reconciliation. But while past achievements tasks and combat operations in Afghanistan, runs an may inspire confi dence for the future, they cannot anti-terrorist naval operation in the Mediterranean, substitute for new thinking and new policies. As NATO assists defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, enters its seventh decade, it needs to overcome trains Iraqi security forces, and provides support to a series of challenges that are more diffi cult and the African Union. NATO is at the heart of a vast and complex than anything it has ever faced before. expanding network of partnerships with countries from The Strasbourg/Kehl Summit must therefore not be across the globe and is developing closer cooperation confi ned to self-congratulatory statements. On the with key civilian institutions. And the Alliance’s contrary, this Summit is a key opportunity to move enlargement process remains a strong incentive for NATO’s evolution another major step forward. aspirant countries to get their house in order. Three challenges stand out. In short, at age 60, NATO has become such an indispensable part of the international security The fi rst challenge is Afghanistan. To make a success environment that it is hard to imagine that it ever of our engagement there, we need to better match could have been otherwise. And yet it was. The initial our ambitions with the means that we are willing to duration of the 1949 Washington Treaty was modestly deploy. I sincerely hope that all Allies would be able to set at 20 years, by which time, it was assumed, the step up their contributions. We have had considerable post-war recovery of Western Europe would have success in training and equipping the Afghan National been completed and the transatlantic defence pact Army, and we must build on that progress. The ability become obsolete. Few of the people who were of the Afghan Police to play its role in providing present at NATO’s creation would have dared to hope security and stability is essential. There is a lot more that this Alliance would not only outlast the Cold War that we – and the international community as a conditions that brought it into being, but indeed thrive whole – can do on the civilian side – in helping the in a radically different security environment. Afghans to build functioning institutions, to fi ght crime and corruption, and get a better grip of the narcotics The reason why NATO turned from a temporary problem. What we must guard against at all cost is project into a permanent one is not diffi cult to fathom. individual nations taking a narrow view of their specifi c It is because the logic of transatlantic security role in a particular geographical or functional area. It cooperation is timeless. The need for Europe and is vital that we all keep our eyes on the overall picture, North America to tackle security challenges together and continue our engagement in Afghanistan as a remains as pressing today as it was 60 years ago. common, transatlantic endeavour. So does the need for a transatlantic institutional framework which allows for political consultation, The overall picture stretches well beyond Afghanistan. joint decisions, and common action. Only NATO can It includes the wider region, and especially Pakistan, provide this framework. with which we must deepen our engagement. Moreover, we must get our military and civilian When our Heads of State and Government meet institutions to co-operate much more closely and at NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in Strasbourg, more effectively. In other words, we need to further France, and Kehl, Germany, on 3 and 4 April, instrumentalise a truly comprehensive approach – they will no doubt highlight the Alliance’s historic and not just in Afghanistan, but also in response to
4 next NATO Summit offers an excellent opportunity for the Allies to underline their commitment in this regard.
The third challenge is dealing with new threats. We have seen these past few years that cyber attacks or the interruption of energy supplies can devastate a country without a single shot being fi red. We are also witnessing the return of piracy as a serious security challenge, as well as the fi rst “hard” security implications of climate change, notably in the High North. At the same time, Iran’s nuclear programme highlights the pressing challenge of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We need to better defi ne NATO’s role in meeting these challenges. NATO may not provide all the answers, but that should not serve as excuse for inaction. We must make the best possible use of the Alliance’s unique value as a forum for transatlantic political dialogue, and as an instrument for translating political decisions into concrete action. After all, threats don’t wait until we feel that we are ready for them.
The Strasbourg/Kehl Summit is an opportunity to demonstrate that the Allies are able to muster the necessary political will, imagination and solidarity to other urgent, transnational challenges. The UN-NATO meet these various challenges. But the Summit must Joint Declaration which UN Secretary General Ban Ki do even more. With a new US Administration settling Moon and I signed last September should help us to in offi ce, and with the prospect of France taking its move in that direction. full place in NATO’s integrated military structures, the Summit is also the perfect moment to launch an The second major challenge is our relationship update of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. with Russia. The confl ict in Georgia last August has invited many different interpretations. It has Based on the “Declaration on Alliance Security” also raised some serious questions about Russia’s which is to be agreed at the Summit, a new Strategic commitment to a positive relationship not only with Concept will need to reconcile the Alliance’s its own neighbours, but also with our Alliance. core purpose of collective defence with the many Clearly, we are not going to let Russia derail NATO requirements associated with out-of-area operations. enlargement. That process is central to our aim of It will need to emphasise NATO’s role as a unique consolidating Europe as an undivided and democratic community of common values and interests, and avoid security space and, hence, it is not negotiable. But the temptation to push regional or national agendas at the NATO-Russia relationship is too valuable to be the expense of our common purpose and objectives. stuck in arguments over enlargement or, for that And it will need to make clear NATO’s strong desire matter, over missile defence or Kosovo. to engage with the UN, the EU and other international actors, as partners, in a comprehensive approach to We need a positive agenda that befi ts the great the security challenges of our time. importance of both Russia and NATO to European and indeed global security. Afghanistan is one key These challenges are fundamentally different from area where we have obvious common interests and those that brought NATO into being 60 years ago. But a greater chance of meeting those interests when as long a there is a solid transatlantic relationship, and we work together. But there other areas as well, like as long as this relationship rests on strong institutional the fi ght against terrorism and piracy, and the need foundations such as NATO, we will be able to shape to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass events and not be their victims. The Alliance’s 60th destruction. In other words, the time has clearly come Anniversary Summit is a perfect opportunity to to give a fresh impetus to our relationship, and our reaffi rm this timeless logic.
5 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel argue that, in the face of global uncertainties, joined up policies are essential
Developments in the last few months have This fi rm belief forms the basis of our raised concerns. War in the Caucasus security policy, the one we are developing was this century’s fi rst military confl ict through ever closer Franco-German in Europe. At the beginning of this year, cooperation, and within the European clashes between Israel and Hamas Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Those reminded us of Middle Eastern instability. three dimensions are mutually reinforcing. There is still no progress towards solving We are convinced that it is in our best the Iranian nuclear crisis. Terrorist attacks interest to make European construction go on, as does violence in Afghanistan and Atlantic partnership two facets of the and Pakistan, or clashes in Africa, such as same security policy. in the Congo and Sudan. And this comes against a background of turmoil generated Western Europe has been enjoying by the fi nancial markets’ and the world peace and freedom for 60 years – and economy’s crises, as well as the climate this is now the case over almost all of change challenge. Europe. We of course owe this to our “To respond own determination, but also to the United to crises and A joined up security policy is vital. States: it has remained by our side and has committed itself to a free and democratic confl icts, we need It is clear to us that our security policy Europe. Given the dangers we face in the a comprehensive must be interpreted in a broader way. 21st century, the transatlantic security and Beyond strictly military issues, the defence partnership has to be strengthened approach, international fi nancial situation must be and tailored to new challenges. increasingly taken into account, along with energy supplies and migration issues. This involves analysing situations jointly, solid and stable making joint decisions and implementing partnerships, and Our concepts must be adapted. To them in the same spirit of partnership. respond to crises and confl icts, we need a Unilateral decision-making would be at fl e x i b l e t o o l s . ” comprehensive approach, increasingly solid odds with the new spirit of our relationship. and stable partnerships, and fl exible tools. For the fi rst time in the Atlantic Alliance’s Nowadays, no single nation can solve history, two nations – our two nations – the world’s problems. Alliances based are inviting their Allies to a Summit, the on shared values, such as the European 60th anniversary Summit, on 3 and 4 April Union and NATO, are becoming 2009. This is a strong symbol of a Franco- increasingly important. The more our German friendship promoting peace and partnership network develops and security. It is also the token of a henceforth our political, economic, development united and free Europe. assistance and military capabilities are joined together, the better our security will We want the forthcoming Alliance Summit be guaranteed, as well as our capacity for to be an opportunity for strategic debates, resolving crises. bringing political choices. Our aim is not
6 to reinvent the Alliance’s fundamental principles, which were enshrined in the Alliance missions Treaty of Washington, nor the shared Today, for the sake of our common values and solidarity uniting us. Our aim security, the Alliance is conducting several is, as we already did successfully in the out-of-area operations, in particular in the past, to have open-minded debates with a Balkans – Bosnia and Kosovo – and in view to giving new guidelines and credibly Afghanistan. transforming the Alliance. This is what we did in 1991 and 1999 when we redefi ned Some 60 years after NATO’s founding, “We expect the our Strategic Concepts. the commitment to give assistance to an Strasbourg-Kehl ally under attack, enshrined in Article 5 We must reconsider our approach to of the Washington Treaty of Washington, Summit to send new threats, our partnerships and our still constitutes the very essence of the the signal that structures. Germany and France expect Alliance. And we drew one additional the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit to launch consequence from this after the 9/11 the Alliance will work on a new ‘Strategic Concept’. terrorist attacks. To combat terrorism, we continue to stand are engaged with our Allies in Afghanistan, To address the demands for the future, we because this is one of the new threats in up for its security think progress has to be made in several the 21st century. and its values.” of the following key areas. Our soldiers are exposed to major risks NATO-EU Cooperation in those operations, in particular in To our great regret, the ‘strategic Afghanistan. Other young men and women partnership’ between NATO and the EU who take part in the reconstruction effort is not living up to our expectations due are also victims of terrorism, which shuns to disagreements which persist between any respect for human life. Be that as certain nations. We think that this must it may, we expect the Strasbourg-Kehl change. We must move towards genuine Summit to send the signal that the Alliance cooperation, based on a necessary will continue to stand up for its security complementarity. and its values.
7 Our goal remains to establish a security must fi rst and level allowing the country’s reconstruction, foremost be able to in accordance with the Afghans’ wishes, take on its heavy so that global terrorism will no longer responsibilities of develop its bases there. We are also it, making a real aware that democracy strengthening must contribution to the go along with military action. Political Allies' security approaches also have to be discussed and sharing the with our Alliance partners. same values. By the same token, Russia: rebuild a partnership enlargement must The war in Georgia, during the summer contribute to the of 2008, marked a turning point. The continent’s stability European Union was able to stop and security, which the violence spiralling and create the benefi ts Russia too. conditions for a settlement process. But In this framework, the use of military force and the unilateral cooperation within the NATO-Russia recognition, against international law, of Council plays an essential part. Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia created a Merkel and Sarkozy: confi dence problem with Russia. The military nature of the Atlantic Alliance The challenges ahead can implies that members have to make sure only be met by working Russia remains our neighbour and a very that their military capabilities accurately hand in hand important partner. We are not back to match their security requirements the Cold War era. Those who claim this and the missions they take on. The are wrong because the USSR no longer Strasbourg-Kehl Summit will also provide exists. We intend to restore and develop an opportunity to discuss this. We need, trustful and fruitful relations with Russia. particularly in Europe, more modern, Our alliance is a defensive alliance whose effi cient and interoperable military assets. sole ambition is to guarantee our common security against global threats. But we In addition, we will discuss issues related are also entitled to expect Russia to to the deployment of missile defence “Russia remains demonstrate its respect for the standards systems in the face of the limited ballistic our neighbour and and rules it contributed to establish, threats emanating from the Middle through the Helsinki Final Act and the East. So we think that Russia has to be a very important Paris Charter in 1990: territorial integrity, involved in these discussions in a spirit partner. We are border inviolability, respect and equality of cooperation and transparency, as the within the Euro-Atlantic space. United States has proposed. This dialogue not back to the will also have to continue in the NATO- Cold War era.” It is on that basis that the vast majority of Russia Council. European nations wanted to join NATO and EU. This enlargement is central to The Barack Obama presidency is already the continent’s security and stability. characterised by new foreign and security Admittedly without euphoria, Russia, policy priorities. A great many Europeans though not enthused, has nonetheless are expecting a lot from this change; gone along with this process in a Barack Obama certainly expects as constructive way for a long time. much from us. We are looking forward to cooperating with him and are convinced The Strasbourg-Kehl Summit will provide that, thanks to the Euro-Atlantic security an opportunity to discuss this again. partnership, we will be able to confront the Wanting to join NATO is the free choice risks and threats we face together. of European nations, of independent and free democracies. There is a trust in us It is by working in a spirit of confi dence, Th is article is drawn from that we cannot let down. However we acting proactively and together, that we will a piece which was want to stress once more that Alliance build a world bringing greater peace and originally printed in membership criteria have to be met; nations security for everyone. ‘Le Monde’.
8 That space is growing in Europe, but our Kurt Volker, US Ambassador to NATO, outlines the Obama work is not done. People in the Balkans, Administration's outlook on NATO at 60. Georgia, Ukraine or elsewhere have as much right to build democratic, prosperous and secure societies as the rest of Europe – and NATO has reached a resolute age – they need our help. NATO is also helping 60 – and we are about to celebrate the promote security in other regions of the anniversary in Kehl and Strasbourg at world. The reason NATO has forces in distant a time of profound global uncertainty. places is to protect its citizens at home. Yet I am confi dent that this will be a Summit of renewal. President Obama At the heart of this Alliance is a simple and his Administration are determined pledge: We stand together. An attack on one to revitalize our transatlantic community will be met as an attack on all. and rebuild a strong and effective NATO. We are opening new dialogues, exploring Ever since the Cold War, collective security fresh opportunities, and working to come has been our core mission – and will remain together as an Alliance that rises to the so. Nearly one billion people feel safe challenges of the 21st century. because of Article 5 and all that it promises. By protecting our nations, we protect our This Summit, co-hosted by France and values: freedom, democracy, human rights, Germany, is symbolic of NATO today – we the rule of law, economic opportunity. are a quilt of nations stitched together, from Vancouver to Vilnius, from the Arctic At the Summit, we can study many aspects to the Aegean, because of our shared of NATO. Our history: we never fi red a shot democratic values. And although we have during the Cold War; European peace: huge challenges confronting us, we also NATO helped create a wide space in Europe have the solidarity of purpose and political where a war has not happened in 60 years; will that will help us overcome them. and fi nally, our most important current operation: NATO forces in Afghanistan are As President-elect Obama said in his working to exorcise the threat of terrorism – letter to the North Atlantic Council in a direct threat to both Europeans and North January, “Our nations share more than a Americans. commitment to our common security – we share a set of common democratic values. But none of these speaks of NATO’s That is why the bond that links us together enduring legacy – as the most important cannot be broken, and why NATO is a defence alliance in the world that has never unique alliance in the history of the world. wavered from its core message of collective Now it falls to us to work together to face security. Now, in the new world of the 21st down the perils of this moment in history, century, we face a more complex security while seizing its promise.” environment.
Certainly, NATO’s history should guide us NATO is ready. I sense a positive energy along a hopeful path. and confi dence among the members as we head towards the Summit. Our allies want to NATO was born out of hope. The hope that contribute, both in terms of revitalizing NATO, by joining together, democratic nations – and in operations like Afghanistan. As NATO on both sides of the Atlantic – could protect enters its seventh decade, there is no other their freedom, and create the space for a Alliance or institution that can do what NATO peaceful and prosperous future. does best: protecting our common future.
9 By Ryan C. Hendrickson
As NATO reaches 60, its fi rst Secretary General, Lord Hastings Ismay, would undoubtedly have been amazed to see the transformation of the NATO Secretary General role. From a position that was essentially managerial in nature, designed to advance intra- Alliance consultation, the modern Secretary General has evolved into a position with much wider responsibilities in shaping NATO’s operational and strategic role in the world.
At its birth in 1949, NATO did not have a Secretary General. With the onset of the Korean War, the Allies created the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in an effort to increase military integration across the Alliance. The fi rst SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), American General Dwight Eisenhower, brought new prestige and respect to key strategic concepts as the Alliance NATO. But it was soon clear that the adapted to new security circumstances. offi ce of the SACEUR was not enough to promote the necessary political dialogue While many within NATO Headquarters and cooperation among the Allies. understand the importance of this offi ce, many histories and past analyses of In response, the offi ce of the Secretary NATO have devoted very little to the roles General was created at NATO’s three- played by the 11 Secretaries General. year anniversary in 1952. At its core, the This absence is unfortunate given the Secretary General is there to help the profoundly important infl uence NATO’s Allies fi nd consensus. The Secretary political leader can and has exercised. General has no vote in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and thus in many respects, For example, among the past Secretaries is simply a servant of the Allies, trying General, Lord Peter Carrington has to build cooperation and meaningful received almost no historical attention or consultation. The powers of this offi ce credit for his leadership at NATO, which Lord Hastings Ismay, the are then quite limited in scope. In his fi rst ran from 1984 to 1988. Carrington himself man who started it all years as Secretary General, Lord Ismay admits in his memoirs the frustration he was kept in the background, was not felt during his service at NATO, due in part permitted to speak without approval from to the absence of any real formal power the Allies, and did not even chair Council or authority provided to the Secretary meetings until 1955. General—a condition that Ismay and other predecessors most certainly understood. Yet since then, NATO’s political leader has evolved into a key, and at times, central Yet upon his selection as Secretary decision-maker among the Allies. He has General, former assistant Secretary shaped how the Alliance evolved, defi ning General to NATO, Robin Beard noted
10 Negotiation skills have proved to be one of the key qualities needed in the role of Secretary General, as illustrated by Manlio Brosio (below) and Javier Solana (right)
that Carrington “projected honour” and generated a new level of respect for the Alliance. Former American Ambassador to NATO, David M. Abshire said that invitations to the Czech Republic, Carrington led the Alliance using his Hungary and Poland. skill, good humour and grace in dealing with the many different personalities Solana’s quiet diplomacy and skills with across the Alliance. Carrington’s personal language also came into play in 1998, diplomatic skills were critical in helping to when debate within Brussels ensued fi nd consensus during some very diffi cult over how to respond to the violence and moments among the Allies. aggression in the Balkans. Again, it was Solana who identifi ed that all the Allies NATO’s ninth Secretary General, Javier could agree that a “suffi cient legal basis” Solana, also demonstrated the potential existed for NATO to authorise the use of infl uence that this offi ce can wield. His force in the Balkans, which eventually legacy as NATO’s political leader is resulted in Operation Allied Force in 1999. especially signifi cant. At the onset of military action in 1999, At the Madrid Summit in 1997, when the Solana again played a key role in advising Lord Carrington (above) was debate over NATO’s expansion became the SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, on a skilled diplomat, but felt contentious among the Allies, author the kinds of military targets that the Allies that the Secretary General Ronald D. Asmus noted that the Allies would support. Again, Solana played a needed more power turned to Solana to fi nd a way out of key role in allowing the operation to move this contentious political environment. forward as rapidly as possible, while After consultation with the Allies, Solana maintaining political consensus among succeeded in fi nding the eventual the then 19 members of the Alliance for compromise that resulted in membership military action.
11 Lord Robertson (centre) was a former UK Defence Minister and brought a good understanding of defence issues during troubled times
Manfred Wörner (above) Certainly, among NATO’s most infl uential Summits. Wörner’s early vision helped to brought a strong Secretaries General, Manfred Wörner’s establish the political groundwork for NATO personality and dedication legacy merits special consideration. to move east, and later to assist in the as Secretary General Wörner, NATO’s fi rst and only German modernisation and democratisation of many Secretary General, brought a special set of these formerly communist militaries. of skills to the Alliance, which in many ways shaped what the Alliance is able to Wörner’s infl uence was also felt in achieve today. the NAC, such that a number of his contemporaries believed that consensus First, Wörner had the extraordinary was not going to be reached unless he intellect to frame issues and questions also approved of the policy in question. into the broader strategic interests of The informal authority that he exercised the Alliance. In part, his ability to think came due to his wide diplomatic contacts strategically helped move the Alliance among the Allies, his command of the toward its new Strategic Concept, which specifi c issues in question, and the force was agreed at the Rome Summit in 1991. of his personality. This set the stage for NATO to begin peacekeeping and crisis management Among his most memorable occasions in operations, which have in many ways the NAC was his attendance at a critical defi ned NATO’s role in the world today. April 1994 Council session. He was suffering from cancer, which eventually In addition, Wörner saw, much earlier than took his life in August 1994. With evident some, the advantages of extending NATO’s weight loss, his physician at his side, and “At its core, the outreach to the Soviet Union and later to intravenous feeding tubes visible from his Secretary General is the newly formed democracies of Eastern shirt collar, Wörner successfully lobbied Europe, all in an effort to integrate them the Allies for a NATO military response to there to help the into the rest of democratic Europe. Through the repeated attacks on Bosnian civilians. Allies fi nd consensus.” his own initiative, he used the infl uence of As has been documented, after rising his offi ce to foster new relationships across from his sick bed in Aachen, Germany and Eastern Europe, which set the foundation traveling to Brussels for this meeting, his for the major membership expansions that presence was instrumental in producing the came at the Madrid, Prague, and Bucharest necessary consensus for military action.
12 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer leaves the role of Secretary General in July 2009 having pressed hard for progress in Afghanistan
Leading in a new security climate, when the Alliance has taken on new roles in fi ghting terrorism in Afghanistan, and conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian support activities in Kosovo, Sudan, and Pakistan, Jaap de Hoop From his fi rst day as Secretary General Scheffer has also produced his own legacy through to 2009, de Hoop Scheffer has as NATO’s political leader. used his offi ce to ensure that he did everything possible to increase NATO’s Like Wörner, de Hoop Scheffer has chances for success in Afghanistan. In stretched NATO in directions beyond doing so, he has often called for more “As the Alliance what some thought was possible prior resources, both civilian and military, moves into a to his selection as Secretary General. In to promote democracy and peace in his efforts to generate new partnerships Afghanistan. While NATO still has many new era with to fi ght terrorism, de Hoop Scheffer has challenges to face in Afghanistan, which de new leadership, carried NATO’s message across the globe, Hoop Scheffer has readily acknowledged, including trips to Asia, the Middle East and his focus and commitment to the mission’s it is clear that Australia, all of which was unprecedented. success will be among his most signifi cant the individual legacies as Secretary General. Much like his predecessor Lord who holds this Robertson’s mantra for more “capabilities, The Alliance is about to move into a new position can capabilities, capabilities,” de Hoop era with new leadership. The individual who Scheffer has often stressed the need for holds this position can make a profound make a profound additional and more cooperative defence difference in NATO’s ability to act, evolve, diff erence.” spending efforts across the Alliance. His and respond to new circumstances. And goal, much like Robertson’s, is for an the trend, from Ismay to de Hoop Scheffer, alliance that can rapidly respond to new is that the Secretary General’s role has and immediate security challenges and continued to grow in stature. crises. De Hoop Scheffer has continued to push for these investments, which nearly all military analysts concur is in the Ryan C. Hendrickson is professor of political Alliance’s best interest. science at Eastern Illinois University, and author of Diplomacy and War at NATO: Th e Secretary But de Hoop Scheffer’s clearest priority General and Military Action After the Cold War was NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan. (University of Missouri Press, 2006).
13 Voices from history NATO Review celebrated its 50th anniversary recently. Over the years, many predictions, warnings and hopes have been expressed in its pages. Here, we reproduce a selection.
“… past experience suggests… that “I have great ambitions because I become daily more convinced the danger of new crises is never past, of two things; that the fate of Europe depends on the unity of and that they will always be largely the European peoples; and that the fate of the West depends on unforeseen and take unexpected the unity and cooperation of the Atlantic peoples.” shape. It is almost certain therefore that, in the future, there will again be – NATO Letter, Vol. 6, No. 12, December 1958, from a speech by M. Paul- occasions when many people will be Henri Spaak before the Fourth Annual Conference of NATO Parliamentarians grateful for the increased feeling of confi dence which membership of the Alliance gives.” “…terrorism is just one of many, non-traditional security challenges. Examples include ethnic and religious confl ict, NATO Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1974, drug traffi cking, mass migration, environmental instability, Review editorial on the occasion of the 25th corruption, money laundering, militant activism and anniversary of the Alliance information theft. Such threats – where confl ict and crime often merge – respect no boundaries. All too often, there are no leaders or legions against which to focus attention or target “We cannot stand still in NATO. We a response.” must move forward or we will slide backwards. Moving forward means NATO Review, Vol. 49, No. 4, Winter 2001, from “Rethinking Security” by bringing the NATO members – or Robert Hall and Carl Fox those of them who are willing – closer together politically and economically. Nothing else makes any sense in the “What has to be prevented at all costs in tomorrow’s Europe is little world of 1959.” the rekindling of nationalism as a result of a renaissance of the nation-state.” NATO Letter, Vol. 7, No. 5, May 1959, by Lester B. Pearson, from an article published NATO Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, June 1990, from “The history of the future” by in the Spring issue of “International Journal,” Mark Eyskens, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium CIIA, and in “World Review”, United Nations AssociationAssAsAssssociococ atiatt onon inn CanadaCanCanada
“Th e key individual player [in security in 2009] could well be the person – perhaps a business traveller, a migratory worker, a tourist – who carries the pathogen that results in a devastating global pandemic.”
NATO Review, January 2009, by Dr Ian Goldin, former advisor to Nelson Mandela and former Vice President of the World Bank
14 “…developments in Europe over “If it is true that in 40 or 50 years’ time there will be between eight and ten billion the past 12 months have played out inhabitants on Earth, we have to start as if according to an ideal plan. So deciding right now how they are to be fed, and how they are to be found work… spectacular indeed has been our But if we fi nd no solution, the problems progress that inevitably questions have we have been facing for the last fi ve years been asked about the Alliance’s future. will later be considered child’s play and our period regarded as a golden age.” What is there left for a politico- military alliance such as NATO to do NATO Review Vol. 26, No. 5, October 1978, by François de Rose, Ambassadeur de France, now that the threat that dominated “Scientifi c and Technological Progress: Problems our daily lives and our planning for the West”, as part of the 20th anniversary of the assumptions for nearly half a century founding of NATO’s Science Committee has all but disappeared?” “Partnership,“P“P along with crisis management,m has become a fundamental NATO Review Vol. 39, No. 1, February 1991, essay by securityses task of the Alliance… Allies anda Partners are together building NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner mechanismsm for future ‘coalitions of the able’a not only for joint operations, but alsoa for confl ict prevention and post- conflc ict rehabilitation.” “Th e feeling of euphoria that was prevalent in most industrialised countries since the last war was based on a NATO Review Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1999, essay boundless confi dence in economic growth to resolve the by Charles J. Daly thousand and one problems facing our type of society…
It was not until the end of the 1960s that the general public “Th ere has repeatedly been cause for came to appreciate the senselessness of indiscriminately concern about the Alliance. However, wasting land and natural resources because, although they nostalgia for the ‘good old times’ of NATO might be vast, they were fi nite… does not get us anywhere… Th e discussions which led to the defi nition, in 1967, of Japan and Western Europe and even the United States have the future tasks of the Alliance and the suddenly come to realise just how much their dependence unanimity with which the Allies reacted on oil as the main source of energy has made their moderately, but with determination, to the economies vulnerable… events in Czechoslovakia, have proved… that NATO is able to work out the basic … there is every reason to suppose that this era of reckless lines of its policy.” and conspicuous waste may soon be over.” NATO Letter, Vol. 17, No. 4, April 1969, from “Facing NATO Review Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1974, quoted from the report, “NATO new challenges,” by Willy Brandt, Minister of Foreign Science Committee Conference on Technology of Effi cient Energy Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and Utilisation” President of the North Atlantic Council
15 NATO has accomplished a lot more in the Some Allies noww want to returnretu to a post-Cold War period than anyone imagined static,stat defensive posture, whicwhich is when the Berlinn Wall came down and it lost focusedfo primarily onn traditional territorial its ostensible raisonon d’etre. Its accomplish- threats; others want to focus mainly ments include the Alliance’se’s expansioexpansion and on expeditionary operations likeike ISAF its Bosnian and Kosovo operations. (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. This is likely to be the But as NATO leaders prepare to meet in biggest strategic dilemma facing NATO. Strasbourg/Kehl – in what will be President The right choice is obviously to see the Daniel Korski, Senior Policy Obama’s fi rst NATO Summit and should two missions as reinforcing each other and Fellow at the European mark France's full reintegration into NATO's continue the agreed-upon transformation Council on Foreign Relations, standing military structures and the defence of Allied armies lest it becomes even sets out the Alliance’s planning mechanisms of the Alliance – harder for NATO to gin up the necessary challenges at 60 – and how considerable challenges remain. These fi ghting forces. they could be addressed. include NATO’s expansion, its Afghan operation and its transformation to a leaner But convincing many Allies to make this organisation. “and/and” commitment will not be easy.
Hiding beneath those items lies an even In light of this, the Afghan mission may in bigger question: what is NATO for in the 21st fact be the least contentious of NATO’s century? assignments. Everyone knows the
16 mission has to go on. Few believe it is their defence structures actually mean succeeding. And everyone knows that something. From experiences in the President Obama will want a signifi cant Balkans, it is clear that overseeing politically enhancement of European effort. The sensitive defence reforms is more diffi cult question is how to deliver it. If Europeans than technical assistance or just serving as cannot give more troops, then they need to an umbrella for allied reform assistance. make their troops better at the key task – building up Afghan forces. It has to be different this time if NATO’s offer is to mean anything to Kiev and Tbilisi To this end, a standing NATO Military (and Moscow). NATO’s staff will need to be Advisory Corps could be unveiled at the beefed up to work on the reform processes, next Summit. It will not solve all of ISAF’s high level appointees are needed as NATO problems, but it will enhance the European Senior Civilian Representatives in Kiev and effort and boost ISAF’s capacities. As Tbilisi and the Allies need to come together such, it may ensure that, as the Obama to deliver a serious reform package. administration gradually takes over all NATO operations in the south and east Then NATO will have to fi nd ways to It's not just a question of Afghanistan, US Allies do not actually assuage the likes of Poland, Estonia and of more troops: it's also withdraw and the US continues to see Lithuania who feel threatened by Russia. a question of how to NATO as a useful instrument. To do so, the Alliance should offer to use them establish a non-military NATO facility in the More problematic will be NATO’s region, for example a research institute or relationship with Georgia and Ukraine. a training centre. This would give the new Russia has made it clear that it opposes NATO members a sense that their Allies enlargement. But reaching out to Georgia care about their predicament without being and Ukraine is worthwhile. Even though provocative to Moscow. The cyber defence Europe needs to rebalance its relationship centre in Estonia is a good fi rst step. with Russia, giving Moscow a veto over NATO’s decisions is unlikely to encourage Western leaders should also give JFC better behaviour by the Kremlin. Though Brunssum – one of its military commands – the Obama administration will, I’m sure, be a watching brief over military developments keen not to create a confl ict at the 2009 in northern Europe. During the Cold War, Summit, it will probably also not want to go each NATO command had a regional back on NATO’s ‘open door’ policy. focus. Countries could call these up and get an update of military developments, The key is therefore to make sure the e.g. Soviet Navy movements. As military two commissions NATO has established tasks have changed, the commands to help Ukraine and Georgia reform have become more functionally focused;
17 Few doubt that mission success depends on working in cooperation with others
Brunssum is now in the ISAF chain are required. Only by NATO and the EU of command and calls the mission its working together can these be brought to ‘highest priority’. But given Russia’s bear. So both organisations must move behaviour, it is worth tasking JFC also beyond a preoccupation with process over to keep an eye out for developments in substance and fi nd a new modus operandi, “Experiences northern Europe. starting at Strasbourg/Kehl. in the Balkans
JFC Naples should also be given a task As long as the Cyprus confl ict remains and Afghanistan to look out for developments on Europe’s unsolved, it may be best to eschew large have shown that southern fl ank, so as to avoid giving NATO scale initiatives, which might be vetoed by too anti-Russian a slant. Consideration Turkey. But it should be possible to create military capability should also be given to undertaking a working-level basis for an EU/NATO is not enough to limited military exercises for a defensive, rapprochement. One idea would be for Article 5 scenario. the EU to take charge of reconstruction guarantee success.” in Afghanistan’s largest cities, with NATO When US President Truman inaugurated providing security inside and US forces the Alliance six decades ago, little could operating in the provincial hinterland. A he have imagined the world we now “Kabul security and development plan” live in. Today, however, the Alliance’s could be a fi rst step; another could be for strength will come not only from building European gendarmerie forces – either up NATO’s capabilities and enlarging through NATO or the EU – to help build up its membership, but also strengthening the Afghan police. the NATO-EU ties. Experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan have shown The two organisations should consider that military capability is not enough to other areas for cooperation including guarantee success. A more complex in-theatre ISAF support to EUPOL mix of political and development tools (European Union Police Mission), joint
18 training and predeployment preparation partner for security assistance and work for PRT (Provincial reconstruction team) to prevent confl ict. staff and joined up civil-military exercises. Even better, a NATO/EU School on Reforms are also needed to improve both Post-Confl ict could be set up where each current and future operations, including organisation can bring their respective adjustments to NATO’s command strengths to bear to the benefi t of missions structures, so that greater authority can where both are present. Where better be delegated to military commanders and than at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit to in-theatre integration with partners like the unveil such an idea? United Nations (UN) can be improved. “Changes in the way NATO Outside ongoing commitments, and Changes in the way NATO missions are EU-NATO relations, two long term fi nanced should also be explored, perhaps missions are challenges for NATO are likely to emerge. through a commonly fi nanced NATO fi n a n c e d s h o u l d The fi rst is NATO’s potential role in any operations budget. Israeli-Palestinian settlement, including also be explored, peacekeeping tasks and assistance in Then there is the question of leadership. perhaps through building Palestine’s security institutions. The mandate of the current NATO The second, longer term challenge is how Secretary-General expires this year; it a commonly to deal with Africa. I believe that, although will be crucial fi nd an equally-respected fi n a n c e d N A T O there have been some requests from the replacement. AU to NATO to help build up the AU's operations budget.” capabilities, the efforts made have not yet If the new Obama administration helps been completely effective. NATO to take advantage of a strongly Atlanticist French President, and strike a The new Obama administration should balance between defence and strength, help NATO examine how it might operate then the Alliance will remain relevant to with Africom and the AU. It could also the European public, and accepted as a help explore the possibilities for a new full spectrum military operator by all its hybrid construct, such as an AU/NATO members. set-up – perhaps even involving the UN or EU – which could have a permanent And that may be the best 60th anniversary presence in Africa, become a long term gift NATO could wish for.
19 NATO was born well before the age of 24 hour news cycles and digital communication. Nonetheless, there was often a photographer around at key moments in NATO's development. Here, we show some of their work.
General Alexander Haig (left) discusses the strength of the Warsaw Pact at a Defence Planning Committee meeting in 1976
20 NATO opens its new headquarters in Brussels, 1967
Greek and Turkish soldiers carry out their fi rst joint NATO exercise in 1953
Berlin in the 1950s still showed the scars of the devastating war in Europe – out of which NATO was born
21 President Richard Nixon (centre) welcomes NATO ministers in Washington, April 1969 back to the room where the NATO Treaty had been signed 20 years previously
NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner walks across Moscow's Red Square as he prepares for talks with the Soviet leadership, 1990
22 NATO Ambassadors and staff observe three minutes' silence on 14 September 2001, as a mark of respect for the victims of the attacks in the US three days earlier
President John F Kennedy visits NATO Headquarters in Paris, 1961
23 A peacekeeper from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force walks on the former front line in Sarajevo
An ethnic Albanian woman feeds her baby as she and another 2,000 refugees fl ee Kosovo on March 30, 1999
24 An Italian soldier of the NATO peacekeeping forces stands near Sarajevo's Lion cemetery
The Bosnian confl ict was also a media war, with communication channels becoming targets
General Wesley Clark outlines NATO's Allied Force operation in Kosovo at a press briefi ng on April 13, 1999
25 Afghanistan has lived through the tyranny of the Taliban, evidenced by their destruction of Buddhas of Bamyan in 2001 (right). The fi ght against drugs (far right), and the revenue it provides to the insurgents, goes on today. But elections (below) have shown the Afghans steadily taking control of their own country. NATO has been one of the central players in trying to help Afghanistan's transformation from bullets to ballots.
Photo by Darko Zeljkovic
Photo by Darko Zeljkovic
26 Photo by Darko Zeljkovic
Photo by Darko Zeljkovic
27 Charles Kupchan of the Council of Foreign Relations outlines where NATO has to make some diffi cult decisions that will be essential to its future
NATO’s anniversary summit is likely to Whatever the merits of NATO enlargement be dominated by the ongoing mission in – and they are many – the expansion of Afghanistan. And rightly so. NATO’s ability the alliance has unquestionably come to forge a coherent strategy, allocate at the expense of its relationship with burdens among members, and shore up Russia. To be sure, Russians themselves domestic support for the mission are vital bear primary responsibility for the recent “With Russia, to the alliance’s ability to enhance security backsliding on democracy as well as their NATO must seek to and stability in Afghanistan – a goal that bouts of foreign policy excess – the war in will serve as a litmus test of NATO’s Georgia most notable among them. avert the continu- effectiveness. ation of zero-sum But the perception among Russia’s But even as the alliance confronts this leadership and its public alike that NATO’s competition, in- immediate challenge, it must also open a eastward expansion impinges on their stead mapping out searching debate about three over-the- country’s security and prestige has horizon issues that it can no longer afford certainly not helped matters. Appropriately, a practical vision of to push off: its relationship to Russia; its NATO seems prepared to put on hold programmatic decision-making rules; and the scope of its for now its commitment, agreed upon global ambitions. at last year’s Bucharest summit, to offer cooperation.” membership to Georgia and Ukraine. On all three issues, NATO members But the mere prospect of Ukrainian and should be guided by realism and sobriety. Georgian membership continues to contaminate NATO’s dialogue with Russia. With Russia, NATO must seek to avert the continuation of zero-sum competition, The way out of this bind is to fi nd a formula instead mapping out a practical vision of for encouraging Moscow to become a programmatic cooperation. stakeholder in Europe’s security order, making Russia a participant in rather than On decision-making, NATO must an object of NATO’s evolution. The Cold acknowledge that its growing membership War has been over for two decades; it makes reliance on consensus ever more is high time for NATO to make a serious Charles A. Kupchan is unwieldy, necessitating adoption of a more effort to bring Russia into the post-war professor of international fl exible approach to governance. settlement. Moscow may well decline the aff airs at Georgetown offer in favor of estrangement with the University and Senior As for its global aspirations, NATO must West. But at least NATO will have done its Fellow at the Council on nip such ambitions in the bud, realizing best to avert that outcome. Foreign Relations that efforts to turn the body into a worldwide alliance of democracies promise At this point, the immediate goal is not to speed its demise, not its renewal. fi nding the precise formula for reaching
28 out to Moscow, but beginning a strategic Finally, members would be wise to begin conversation that makes clear that NATO addressing the calls – coming primarily members are sincerely committed to from American voices – to extend NATO’s anchoring Russia within the Euro-Atlantic reach beyond Europe and transform the community. The conversation can begin body into a global alliance of democracies. by exploring ways to make more of the Recasting NATO’s relationship with Russia NATO-Russia Council. NATO members and reforming decision-making require should pick up on Moscow’s call for careful deliberation. The proposal for fresh thinking about a “new European NATO to go global does not; it should be security architecture.” This dialogue must readily dismissed. be backstopped with concrete strategic cooperation on issues such as missile NATO has its hands full in Afghanistan; defense, access to Afghanistan, and indeed, its ability to prevail remains open diplomacy with Iran. to question. With the Afghan mission so straining NATO’s resources and cohesion, Ongoing enlargement also forces the issue it is hard to imagine that the alliance is of the need to reform decision-making ready to take on additional commitments in an alliance that has 26 members and further afi eld. NATO should by all means counting. As its ranks grow in number and forge strategic partnerships with countries diversity, continued reliance on consensus and regional groupings willing to contribute may well become a recipe for paralysis. to the common cause; the help of non- Reinforcing the need for reform is the members in Afghanistan is more than changed strategic landscape in which welcome. But making NATO the institution NATO operates – one whose complexity of choice for dealing with confl icts around has attenuated the solidarity that NATO the world is a bridge too far. enjoyed during Cold War. In the Balkans, Caucasus, and Europe’s far The sharp disagreements that have east – as well as in Afghanistan – NATO arisen over Afghanistan, over the urgency has much unfi nished business. It had better of offering membership to Georgia, and focus on completing these tasks before over relations between NATO and Russia packing up for new missions in Kashmir or are not fl eeting differences that will soon the Gaza strip. Moreover, extending NATO disappear. Rather, they are by-products of membership to the likes of Japan, Australia, the inevitable divergence of interest and and Israel would not only prove uniquely threat perception that has accompanied contentious for the alliance but also saddle NATO’s adaptation to the post-Cold War it with commitments likely to go unmet. world. To be sure, NATO has an important The key question for the alliance is role to play beyond Europe; it is already not whether such differences can be developing linkages in the Mediterranean. overcome, but whether they can be But prudence requires that NATO focus tolerated. Like it or not, NATO is growing primarily on helping others help themselves “NATO’s sixtieth more unwieldy and a consensus more – providing assistance and training, serving anniversary elusive. as an institutional model, on occasion partnering with local states in limited comes at a time of Such divergence of perspective among missions – all to the service of standing challenge and strain member states hardly spells NATO’s up other security organizations around the fracture, but it does mean the alliance globe that can be as successful in their own for the Alliance.” must adjust accordingly how it reaches regions as NATO has been in Europe. decisions. Members are unlikely to give up the consensus rule on matters of war and NATO’s sixtieth anniversary comes at peace. However, on most other issues, it is a time of challenge and strain for the time for the alliance to forge a more fl exible alliance. Against the backdrop of the approach to decision-making. NATO mission in Afghanistan, NATO would be should also consider various forms of opt wise to consolidate its gains by reaching outs to ensure that the intransigence of out to Russia, updating its decision-making individual members on specifi c issues does to refl ect its broader membership, and not stand in the way of effective action. recognizing the limits of its own success.
29 So you know what NATO stands for. But how much more do you know about the Alliance? Th ese 20 questions will test your knowledge on what it is and what it does. To be an expert, score more than 15 correct answers.
1. Which NATO member country does not 6. Which of the following threats is mentioned in possess armed forces? NATO’s present Strategic Concept? a. Norway a. The Israel-Palestinian confl ict b. Iceland b. Iran’s nuclear programme c. Luxembourg c. Ethnic confl icts d. Bulgaria d. Axis of evil
2. Who was the fi rst NATO Secretary General to 7. Where did EUFOR take over the tasks of walk across the Red Square in Moscow? NATO’s Stabilisation Force? a. Dirk Stikker a. Bosnia and Herzegovina b. Hastings Ismay b. Montenegro c. Manfred Wörner c. Croatia d. Willy Claes d. Kosovo
3. Which of the following non-NATO countries 8. Which of the following NATO countries does contribute with troops to the NATO-led not possess nuclear weapons? KFOR operation? a. France a. Morocco, Austria, Armenia b. United States b. Lebanon, Iran, Israel c. Germany c. Brasilia, China, India d. UK d. Australia, New Zealand, Japan 9. Where did NATO have its fi rst headquarters? 4. When did NATO start to engage in scientifi c a. Paris cooperation? b. Luxembourg a. 1958 c. London b. 2001 d. New York c. 1945 d. 1985 10. Under which UN Security Council Resolution is KFOR operating in Kosovo? 5. How many members does the Euro-Atlantic a. 1093 Partnership Council have? b. 1598 a. 28 c. 1244 b. 26 d. 1178 c. 50 d. 10
30 11.11. WWhereheree ddididd NATO fi rst engage in a crisis management operation out of its territory? a. Democratic Republic of Congo b. Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina) c. Haiti d. East Timor
12. Which of the following groups of countries joined NATO in 2004? 17. Which country is not a founding member a. Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia of NATO? b. Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland a. Canada c. Croatia, Albania, Montenegro b. Iceland d. Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova c. Portugal d. Spain 13. Which non NATO country contributes troops to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan? 18. Through which body does NATO organise a. New Zealand its humanitarian responses to natural or b. Japan man-made disasters? c. China a. Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination d. Pakistan Centre b. NATO Multilateral and Regional Affairs Section 14. Which two countries joined NATO in 1952? c. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council a. Belgium and Luxembourg d. Istanbul Co-operation Initiative b. UK and Iceland c. Greece and Turkey 19. Which of the following countries does not d. Portugal and Italy participate in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue? a. Morocco 15. How is NATO present in Iraq? b. Israel a. The biggest NATO mission is deployed here with c. Mauritania more than 40 000 troops d. Syria b. NATO provides assistance to the development of the security sector and the training of Iraqi soldiers 20. What is mentioned as an emerging threat in c. It operates PRTs NATO's Bucharest Summit Declaration? d. It has no mission nor activities in Iraq at all a. Ballistic missile proliferation b. Terrorism 16. Which of the following four cooperative c. Proliferation of WMD's frameworks does not belong to a NATO d. Energy Security partnership initiative? a. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative b. Mediterranean Dialogue RIGHT ANSWERS c. Partnership for Peace 1b, 2c, 3a, 4a, 5c, 6c, 7a, 8c, 9c, 10c, 11b, 12a, d. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 13a, 14c, 15b, 16d, 17d, 18a, 19d, 20d
31 From AMF to NRF: the roles of NATO’s rapid reaction forces in deterrence, defence and crisis-response, 1960-2009
Today’s uncertain international security Enduring characteristics of NATO’s rapid environment has prompted renewed reaction forces are: high readiness; attention to the roles which rapid reaction responsiveness; deployability; and forces play in protecting core NATO multinationality. These features make rapid security interests and in underpinning the reaction forces relevant to expeditionary By Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, Alliance’s contributions to the preservation operations at a strategic distance from the Head of the Planning of international peace and security. Europe and North America, as well as to Section in NATO’s reinforcement inside of the North Atlantic Operations Division. Here Historically, NATO’s rapid reaction forces – Treaty area. he writes in a personal starting with the Allied Command Europe capacity. Mobile Force (AMF) established in 1960 Rapid reaction and deterrence and extending to today’s NATO Response on Europe’s fl anks Force (NRF) – have performed a spectrum of roles, covering deterrence, defence, NATO’s fi rst foray into rapid reaction can and reassurance, complemented since the be traced back to proposals in 1960 by end of the Cold War with the increasingly the then Supreme Allied Commander, important mission of crisis-response. Europe (SACEUR), General Lauris While each of these roles has a specifi c Norstad, to create a rapidly deployable political and operational purpose, which mobile force for his command – Allied necessarily refl ects the evolving real- Command Europe (ACE)1 – to help deter world context in which they are performed, intimidation, coercion or aggression, short in many ways these roles overlap and of general war, against allied nations mutually reinforce each other. located on ACE’s northern and southern fl anks. In peacetime, these nations hosted no or a very small allied military presence, and the concept of the AMF aimed at projecting a multinational deterrent capability on short notice.
National contributions to the AMF (see Box 1) were organised into various pre- planned, multinational force packages optimised for deployment to the fi ve AMF contingency areas – northern Norway; the Zealand islands of Denmark; northeast Italy; northern Greece and Greek and Turkish Thrace; and eastern Turkey. Planning and exercising were overseen by a small multinational staff located in the Federal Republic of Germany, but, in an actual contingency, command and control of the deployed AMF components would have been the responsibility of the local
1 Allied Command Europe was renamed Allied Command Operations (ACO) in 2002.
32 The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) NATO land and air commanders, to ensure was established in 1960 and disbanded in 2002. seamless integration between indigenous It was structured into separate, rapidly deployable and reinforcing forces and present a single land and air components, – AMF (Land) and (Air) – comprised of NATO “face”. infantry battalions, artillery batteries, transport helicopter fl ights, and air force fi ghter and reconnaissance squadrons, contributed by Equipment pre-positioning Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg (land component and forward defence in the only), The Netherlands (air component only), the United Kingdom Central Region and the United States. Contingents contributed by Canada, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom were trained and equipped While the impetus behind the AMF’s for operations in Arctic weather conditions. creation in 1960 had been prompted by concerns related to deterrence in ACE’s While slightly larger than a brigade-size force, the AMF was northern and southern regions, the not meant to deploy as a self-contained, stand-alone formation; Berlin crisis of 1961 refocused NATO’s instead, AMF contingents were trained to deploy and operate as attention on defence of the Central part of the host nation’s forces. The AMF’s readiness, combat Region. Following the construction of the capability and deployability were regularly tested by means of fi eld Berlin Wall, the United States massively training (Express series) and command post (Exchange series) reinforced its forces stationed in Western exercises, as well as live fi ring evaluations (Ardent Ground). Europe. The Herculean scale of this Transportation from home locations was the responsibility of effort underscored the diffi culties of rapid the individual nations, but NATO provided an airlift coordination reinforcement inherent in the transatlantic element and funded collectively the deployment costs. lift of thousands of vehicles and led to the fi rst instance of large-scale equipment The AMF was never deployed in a crisis situation during the Cold pre-positioning, whereby the United States War, but it was engaged twice in crisis-response operations in the stored in southern Germany materiel for 1990s. In 1991, at the request of Turkey, fi ghter and reconnaissance two divisions. squadrons from Belgium, Germany and Italy belonging to the AMF (Air) were deployed to airbases in southeastern Turkey as a In 1963, the ability of the United States deterrent force (Operation ACE Guard), to deter any possible Iraqi to rapidly reinforce the Central Region act of aggression in the context of the Gulf War. And in 1999, the was tested during exercise Big Lift, AMF (Land) provided the nucleus of NATO’s Albania Force (AFOR), which demonstrated the United States’ which was deployed into Albania in the framework of Operation ever growing strategic airlift capacity, Allied Harbour to help provide humanitarian assistance to several the wisdom of the concept of equipment hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanian refugees who had pre-positioning, and the feasibility of rapid crossed into Albania from Kosovo. reinforcement on a grand scale.
33 In 1968, following the United States’ deci- for three additional divisions at sites in sion to relocate some US Army units from northern Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg Europe to the continental United States, and The Netherlands. to help sustain the United States’ engage- ment in Southeast Asia, a third divisional An essential aim of the RRP – one that set of equipment was stored in southern underpinned the political credibility and “...rapid reaction Germany. And from 1969 onwards, until military effectiveness of NATO’s Cold War forces and the end of the Cold War, the United States rapid reaction forces and reinforcement exercised annually its ability to “REturn planning – was reassurance. There reinforcement FORces to GERmany” during the RE- could be no stronger motivation for Allies planning were the FORGER strategic mobility exercise. located along Europe’s dividing line to commit to a strong forward defence, embodiment of the Rapid reinforcement and to be prepared to resist intimidation, Alliance’s collective and reassurance coercion or aggression, than the pledge of “off-shore” Allies, such as Canada, defence motto – In 1975, upon becoming SACEUR, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the ‘One for All, General Alexander Haig decided to United States, through the RRP, to come harmonise disparate NATO and national to their assistance in times of crisis or All for One’.” reinforcement plans into a single SACEUR war. In that way, rapid reaction forces Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) and to and reinforcement planning were the embed the REFORGER exercises into embodiment of the Alliance’s collective a broader set of coordinated exercises, defence motto – “One for All, All for One”. labelled Autumn Forge, designed to test and demonstrate NATO’s ability to Naturally, the end of the Cold War made reinforce and defend all three regions of all of these arrangements unnecessary. ACE at once. REFORGER exercises were terminated, most storage sites in Europe were closed- At the core of the RRP was an down and long-standing as well as more unprecedented United States’ recent reinforcement commitments commitment to NATO to have 10 division brought to an end (see Box 2). The RRP equivalents deployed and ready to had achieved its purpose of deterrence defend West Germany within 10 days of and reassurance, but had now outlived a reinforcement decision (the so-called the circumstances that had prompted its “10-in-10” concept), which required the development. storage of pre-positioned equipment
34 The NATO Composite Force
For a short while in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a small multinational formation – the NATO Composite Force (NCF) – dedicated to the reinforcement of northern Norway, in replacement of a larger Canadian, brigade- size formation, joined NATO’s family of rapid reaction forces, but, following the end of the Cold War, it was eventually disbanded. The NCF was composed After the Cold War: crisis Force (IRF) and of land force contingents from Canada, response beyond the NATO area Rapid Reaction Germany and the United States, as well as Force (RRF), Norway. The NCF had no permanent staff With Europe evolving steadily towards a respectively. but, like the AMF, it exercised periodically continent united, free and at peace, but in northern Norway. with the growing spectre of unpredictable During the 1990s, crises on NATO’s periphery escalating building upon rapidly into confl icts, such as in the the experience of the Gulf War, Allies Balkans, the focus of rapid reaction shifted transformed their forces for expeditionary from reinforcement inside of, to crisis- operations at a strategic distance from response beyond, the North Atlantic Treaty Europe and North America on short notice. area. For a while, consideration was given The ARRC’s model was emulated in the to expanding the size of the AMF force form of eight other multinational corps pool from a brigade to a division to make it stationed across Europe, six of them more robust, but the AMF’s time had come like the ARRC at high readiness. Rapid and gone. reaction was no longer a specialised “...building upon military capability; it had become the heart the experience As early as 1991, the 1st British Corps, of NATO’s new Force Structure. Eventually, which had been the United Kingdom’s the IRF and RRF categories were of the Gulf War, key contribution to the defence of abandoned in favour of new categories of Allies transformed West Germany for four decades, was High Readiness Forces (HRF) and Forces transformed into the multinational Allied at Lower Readiness (FLR). their forces for Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Rapid expeditionary reaction now required a larger, more A new focus: rapid reaction and operations at a capable military force – for instance, in the expeditionary operations context of demanding peace-enforcement strategic distance operations such as IFOR in Bosnia-and- Without a unifying employment concept, Herzegovina in 1995 and KFOR in Kosovo however, the HRF multinational corps from Europe and in 1999, where the ARRC was in both (HRF(L)) and their sister HRF maritime North America on cases the initial entry force. formations (HRF(M)) were isolated “islands” of capability. The skill behind short notice.” The AMF soldiered on until its the concept of a multinational NATO disbandment in 2002. In NATO’s post-Cold Response Force, agreed upon by Heads of War vocabulary, the AMF and the ARRC State and Government at NATO’s Prague were categorised as Immediate Reaction Summit in 2002 (see Box 3), was to link
35 The NATO Response Force
The NATO Response Force (NRF) was formally created at NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002 and activated in 2003. It is a highly capable, highly trained, 25,000 men- strong, multi-service (joint) and multinational (combined), high readiness, rapidly deployable force. All Allies contribute forces and capabilities to the NRF on a rotational basis, including France, which did not participate in the AMF, but is one of the NRF’s largest contributors.
The NRF must be capable of performing a wide array of missions, from operating as a potent initial entry force in a hostile environment, ahead of a larger, follow-on force, to conducting disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. Planning foresees that the NRF force package that is standing alert at the time of the NRF’s potential engagement in an emerging crisis situation would be tailored to the mission at hand in terms of its size the HRFs through a common rotational and mix of forces and capabilities. scheme and the adoption of standardised tactics, techniques and procedures. In Provided that strategic airlift and sealift are made available to NATO essence, the NRF provided the backbone by member nations when required, the NRF can be projected at a of NATO’s rapid reaction capability and strategic distance from Europe and North America. This capability the HRFs provided the fl esh. This was a was demonstrated in the context of the disaster relief assistance “marriage made in heaven” between a extended by NATO to Pakistan following the earthquake of October growing expeditionary capability and an 2005 and in June 2006 during exercise Steadfast Jaguar carried innovative employment concept. out in Cape Verde, off Africa’s western coast – whereas the AMF could only deploy within Western Europe. Starting in 2003, the NRF has provided the Alliance with a stand-by rapid reaction The NRF includes land, air and maritime components, as well capability of some 20,000 men per rotation, as special operations and psychological operations task forces unlike anything NATO had had during the and a joint logistic support group. Components and task forces Cold War and unlike anything available are generated on a rotational basis for successive 6 month-long today anywhere around the world, with the preparation and stand-by periods from the NATO pool of High exception of the United States. Experience Readiness Force (HRF) land and maritime headquarters and gained from successive rotations has affi liated formations and Joint Force Air Component Commander demonstrated that the NRF concept (JFACC) staffs and units. Command of the Force is vested, on is sound and that the transformational a rotational basis, in the three Allied Joint Force Commands dynamic created by the establishment of (JFC) subordinated to SACEUR and located at Brunssum, The the NRF is reaching deep and wide across Netherlands; Naples, Italy; and Lisbon, Portugal. Force preparation the Alliance’s military establishments. is assisted by an Operational Preparation Directorate co-located with the JFC headquartered in Lisbon. NRF formations and staffs Furthermore, the successive deployment participate regularly in joint and component-level live exercises and to Afghanistan between 2004 and 2007 of battle staff training, designed to prepare and certify forces before four HRF(L) headquarters, to provide the they assume their alert duty during the stand-by period. core headquarters of the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assist- In addition to its signifi cant contribution to the enhancement of ance Force (ISAF), meant that these head- NATO’s operational responsiveness, the NRF has had a benefi cial quarters could put their NRF skills to good transformational infl uence on Alliance forces, by prompting use in a demanding, real-world operation, important improvements in doctrine, capability, deployability and while bringing the experience of deploying interoperability. into a distant theatre into the NRF.
36 Admittedly, enduring shortfalls in key • An excessively rigid segregation of NRF capabilities, particularly operational Alliance forces into various categories, enablers whose availability is critical for which prevents a more fl exible use by the deployment and employment of the NATO of all available capabilities and NRF, as well as the persisting failure from complicates the employment of the NRF; rotation to rotation to fi ll them, have cast a and shadow on the NRF and raised doubts on • An approach to estimating the capability its operational effectiveness and long-term of individual NRF rotations that has viability. Proposals were aired that could focused excessively on shortfalls versus result in a lowering of the level of ambition a generic requirement, rather than on for the NRF which the Alliance agreed leveraging the actual contributions made “Since 2003, the upon its creation. available by member nations. NRF has provided
But while a genuine cause for concern, There is widespread recognition of the the Alliance with the persistence of these shortfalls does adverse impact of these shortcomings on a stand-by rapid not call into question the soundness of the the NRF’s credibility and usability, and original NRF concept. Rather, it refl ects setting work in train to address and resolve reaction capability the challenge that many Allies face in them will be a priority for the Alliance at of some 20,000 attempting to keep a segment of their best the Strasbourg and Kehl Summit. forces on stand-by while they are engaged men per rotation, in multiple expeditionary operations Rapid reaction’s diverse horizons unlike anything simultaneously. Against the background of NATO’s NATO had during Those shortfalls are also symptomatic of engagement in Afghanistan, the priority the Cold War.” wider, systemic weaknesses in the way mission of the NRF and associated HRFs NATO generates forces for operations in is crisis response, which could take place the early 21st century, namely: at a strategic distance from Europe and North America, to protect core Alliance • The failure to leverage NATO’s proven security interests, help prevent crises from defence planning process and the escalating into open warfare, or resolve creation of the HRFs to make force a confl ict and help build the peace. At generation more predictable, effi cient the same time, in an enlarged Alliance, and sustainable over time; rapid reaction forces with enhanced • An insuffi cient reliance on common deployability retain their relevance for funding to underwrite part of the costs of deterrence, defence and reassurance. unforeseen, contingency deployments of the NRF, a practice which acts as a In all cases, the Alliance’s distinct and disincentive for Allies who otherwise unrivalled ability to plan and conduct would be prepared to contribute forces multinational, expeditionary operations and to NRF rotations but are concerned meld together disparate capabilities into that they could face large, unbudgeted a coherent force will help ensure that the expenditures if these forces were actually legacy of the AMF is sustained in the NRF deployed in a crisis situation; into NATO’s seventh decade and beyond.
37 Don’t forget the science bit…
Professor Sir Brian Heap, former UK Representative on the NATO Science Committee, outlines the role science has played in NATO – and where it goes from here.
In the heavily divided post-World War II environment in which NATO was established, its science programme was designed to show practical cooperation across barriers of nationality, language and culture through scientifi c exchanges.
Initially, NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme drew a clear Professor Sir Brian Heap distinction between supporting civilian science and NATO defence cooperation. Its work concentrated on the physical sciences. Later it took in biological, environmental and social sciences.
Following the end of the Cold War, the The NATO Science programme has had to emphasis changed towards solidarity, be fl exible in responding to the demands of stability and peace, using scientifi c the times. Today, its mission is to address research increasingly in diplomacy. the new threat of international terrorism, as well as modern threats. The programme reinvented itself in the 1990s, focusing on partnership with the The SPS Programme is overseen by Commonwealth of Independent States. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) with an SPS Committee of “Th e NATO After 9/11, the objectives changed senior scientists who advise PDD. The again, due to the proliferation of new programme has a unique network of 57 Science programme technologies, the growing gap between states: 26 member States, 24 Partner has had to the rich and poor, and the information nations and 7 Mediterranean nations. revolution. be fl exible in In terms of results, the construction of the responding to the At its peak, some 10,000 scientists Virtual Silk Highway is a highly successful were involved, with over 6,000 scientists satellite-based regional system. It allows demands of the participating in over 100 NATO scientifi c Internet connections for the fi rst time in times.” meetings, and about 100 volumes of three Caucasian and fi ve Central Asian scientifi c papers were published annually. new independent states, with one earth Recently, over 2,500 Fellowships have station per country. Afghanistan is now been funded for partner country scientists, part of the network, which is managed and an annual prize has been established by support from Germany and the EU. for the most prestigious and relevant The SPS Committee has agreed to research. continue funding this important initiative
38 and the success of this venture has solutions to new challenges primarily Scientifi c programmes been unanimously endorsed by all NATO through non-military means. in NATO have spent the countries and their partners. last 50 years adapting to However, more is needed to support relevant security threats The NATO-SPS Programme has had to scientifi c work in NATO. The science evolve from its early beginnings to the budget represents only around 5% of present day threats. But does it have a the total civil NATO budget. This limited future? I would say – yes it does! funding could be used more effectively to counter international terrorism Why? First, because ‘security’ includes through greater collaborative efforts. But non-military threats arising from collaboration with the EU still has a low incompetent governance, corruption, profi le. So too does science in NATO organised crime, insecure borders, ethnic – mention of it is largely missing from and religious confl ict, proliferation of NATO’s key statements. weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources and, of course, With the shift in the NATO Science terrorism: areas where science has a key Committee’s priorities towards military role to play. and defence strategies, there is a strong case for looking into how integrated public Second, science has become central to diplomacy and research/technology many policies, including the demand for organisations are. new assessments of the environmental impact of climate change, the need for It is well over a decade since NATO’s civil better models of disease spread, and the science programme was reviewed by a provision of food security, particularly in high level team. Hopefully a new review less developed nations. will recognise the key role of science and technology in global security and stability, Third, the current SPS Programme and acknowledge that fresh instruments Th is issue will be provides a unique opportunity to contribute and organisations may be needed for the further debated in the to world peace by enhancing science and twenty fi rst century. forthcoming 'Role of innovation cooperation with all partners. independent scientists in It has a ‘horizon-scanning’ role raising Further details of the programme can be assessing the threats of NATO’s awareness of new challenges accessed at WMD' by John Finney and opportunities, and is tasked to fi nd www.nato.int/science/index.html. and Ivo Slaus
39 As NATO prepares to draft a new Strategic Concept, Jan Petersen highlights the issues he feels it needs to address.
The strategic environment and NATO itself NATO is an alliance of democracies, and “NATO is has changed a lot since the current Strate- the parliaments of its members are primary gic Concept was approved 10 years ago. communication channels between NATO an alliance of member country citizens and NATO’s democracies, and In 1999, terrorism barely warranted a leadership. It is parliamentarians who must mention, NATO had not even conceived often explain to their constituents why the parliaments of an out-of-area mission as ambitious as devoting scarce resources to security and of its members Afghanistan, and our enlargement process risking lives of soldiers in distant operations is are primary was only beginning. so important. communication But by 2001, the Alliance had invoked For those reasons, I believe the new Strategic Article 5 for the fi rst time, in response to the Concept should address some of the concerns channels between terrorist attacks of 11 September. By 2003, of parliamentarians of NATO states. The NATO member it had embarked on its most challenging NATO Parliamentary Assembly is preparing out-of-area mission in Afghanistan. its commentary on the new Strategic Concept country citizens and I have the privilege of serving as the and NATO’s NATO has gone on to admit ten new Special Rapporteur for this project. members, create new structures, leadership.” partnerships, and initiatives such as the The new Strategic Concept will be a NATO-Russia Council. NATO keeps an fundamental document that will guide the ‘open door’ to new members and partners, Alliance. At the same time, however, it must and its relationships with neighbours and also be readable and express the values of other international organisations continue the Alliance and the threats posed in clear to evolve. language.
40 There is also a solid consensus that the strategic challenges we face do not lend themselves to purely military solutions. We see this in Afghanistan, where military aspects are a necessary but insuffi cient component of a comprehensive solution.
The new Strategic Concept should confi rm the close link between security and development and draw the necessary consequences for planning and deployment of Alliance armed forces. This link calls for the closest possible cooperation between political and military authorities in planning and execution of overseas missions. It also means encouraging closer contacts and involvement with non-governmental organisations.
Yet, ultimately NATO is a political and military alliance; we should carefully assess what NATO’s role should be in addressing specifi c challenges. International terrorism, for example, is a major security concern – especially the potential for the combination of extremist organisations and weapons of mass destruction. It is not clear, however, that NATO is the proper organisation to address this threat.
But as an alliance composed of It must also set out concepts that will make democracies, we should be willing to state the Alliance a more fl exible organisation, openly that we will protect our citizens better able to cope with emerging against those who violently oppose the challenges. My comments here do not principles and values of our societies. necessarily refl ect the views of all of the We should also use NATO as a forum for members of the Assembly, but I believe exchanging information and coordinating that many, if not most, of my colleagues responses in the event of an attack. would share them. It is easy to list all of the challenges that can “We need to Clarity of Purpose impact on our mutual security. It is not easy, appreciate that however, to determine the key areas where We cannot ask our citizens to support NATO should play a signifi cant role. NATO cannot be all Alliance missions unless we are clear things to all people, about the purpose of the Alliance. We owe But this is something a new Strategic it to the general public and especially our Concept must do. but rather serve national militaries to be clear about the as an important challenges we face and how we plan to If we defi ne everything as a security mitigate the risks they pose. challenge that NATO should address, cornerstone.” we risk spreading the resources of the Any survey of literature on strategic affairs Alliance too thinly across a wide range of will show that there is a wide array of issues. Security challenges are potentially issues that fall under the rubric of security. boundless, but resources are fi nite. Environmental concerns, terrorism, proliferation, information security, energy Parliamentarians are all too familiar security and others are all cited. with the limits on resources. Therefore,
41 focusing NATO on what it can do well – planning, training and conducting military operations, as well as performing humanitarian and civil emergency response missions – will be an important task of the new Strategic Concept.
We need to appreciate that NATO cannot be all things to all people, but rather serve as an important cornerstone.
Flexibility and Growth
One area where there should be no controversy is the development of military capabilities for the missions we face as an alliance. The growth of the Alliance also deserves Welcome board at some consideration. In the near future we the entry of the Kabul Some analysts have presented this as will welcome two new members: Albania Military Training Centre, a trade-off between territorial defence and Croatia. At the Bucharest summit we where thousands of and expeditionary capability. Yet, it is not collectively declared that Georgia and soldiers are trained necessarily true that being prepared to Ukraine would become members at some every year to join the deter the use of military force in Europe time in the future. The NATO Parliamentary Afghan National Army. and being prepared to manage security Assembly has offered strong support for the challenges in distant locations are missions rapid and broad enlargement of the Alliance. in direct competition with each another. Nevertheless, we must soon face the fact Regardless of whether our forces are that the Alliance has treaty-based limits. deployed 100 or 5,000 kilometres from Article 10 clearly states that any European their home base, they still need all of state may join the Alliance, but there are the most effective communications, increasingly few European states that are surveillance and other equipment. They not members of the Alliance. At some point, need the ability to move quickly and be we must decide if that geographic limit is protected against hostile fi re. Perhaps still appropriate and, if not, what implications most importantly, they must receive the that has for the future of the Alliance. training to cope with a wide variety of potential situations. Looking to the Future “Th e strategic
We should also consider making NATO The strategic environment has changed environment has decision making structures more fl exible dramatically. It is time for a new Strategic changed dramatically. and responsive. The North Atlantic Council Concept. and the Military Committee are separate It is time for a new entities, but a merger could signifi cantly The key to NATO’s longevity is precisely Strategic Concept.” streamline the decision making process. that it has proven to be an adaptable organisation that maintains its relevance. At the same time, consensus is central To ensure that this continues, a new in the Alliance decision making process, Strategic Concept needs to clearly state and it should remain at the core of how the purpose of the Alliance and guide it into it makes big decisions. But is consensus the coming decades. necessary at every level and could we benefi t from an alternate process on less signifi cant matters? This issue will only become more salient as the Alliance Jan Petersen is a former Foreign Minister of grows, and as our interaction grows with Norway and is currently Special Rapporteur other international actors such as the for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s European Union and the United Nations. contribution to the Strategic Concept
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