Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria Mitchell Hoffman Gianmarco León Maria Lombardi This version: September 2016 August 2015 Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series Working Paper nº 856 Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria∗ Mitchell Hoffman Gianmarco Le´on Mar´ıaLombardi University of Toronto UPF and Barcelona GSE UPF September 2016 Abstract We study a unique quasi-experiment in Austria, where compulsory voting laws are changed across Austria's nine states at different times. Analyzing state and national elections from 1949-2010, we show that compulsory voting laws with weakly enforced fines increase turnout by roughly 10 percentage points. However, we find no evidence that this change in turnout affected government spending patterns (in levels or composition) or electoral outcomes. Individual-level data on turnout and political preferences suggest these results occur because the impacts of compulsory voting on turnout are larger among those who are non-partisan, who have low interest in politics, and who are uninformed. JEL Classifications: H10, D72, P16 Keywords: Compulsory voting, Fiscal policy, Incentives to vote ∗Contact: Hoffman mitchell.hoff
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[email protected]. We thank Sandro Ambuehl, Heski Bar-Isaac, Rene Boeheim, Kevin Bryan, Flo- rian Ederer, Jeremy Ferwerda, Rui de Figueiredo, Fred Finan, Max Kasy, John Morgan, Gerard Roland, Peter Rosner, Francesco Trebbi, and seminar participants for helpful comments. Faisal Ibrahim, Melina Mat- tos, Nicholas Roth, and Dijana Zejcirovic provided outstanding research assistance. Hoffman acknowledges support from the Kauffman Foundation, the National Science Foundation IGERT Fellowship, and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.