Outlook for the Coming Elections in Indonesia

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Outlook for the Coming Elections in Indonesia VIEWS FROM ASIA Outlook for the Coming Elections in Indonesia By Shiraishi Takashi N Indonesia, elections are scheduled political system changed dramatically current democratic system and only 40% Ifor the national and local parliaments with the collapse of the Suharto regime of those polled said it was not desirable on April 5, the first-stage presidential in May 1998, changing from centralized for active military officers to hold election will be held July 5 and – in the authoritarian system to decentralized positions in the national government. event that the first-stage election is democracy. The legislature became a Taking all of this into consideration, inconclusive – the second-stage presi- new power center alongside the presi- we can make the following interpreta- dential election will be held on Sept. 20. dent and the military, and local govern- tions. The people support the current Over the past year, in the lead-up to ments were more able to exert their decentralization and democratization, these elections, various polling organiza- power than ever before. How do the however, approval rates are clearly slip- tions have been carrying out public- people view this new decentralized ping. In response to this, there is an opinion surveys. However, to date the democratic system? According to the increase in expressions of hope for a cen- majority of these polls have surveyed August 2003 poll, 65% of those polled tralized authoritarian system, like that of either the residents of the major cities or responded in the affirmative to the state- the Suharto regime. This is because the the residents of several provinces, and ment “Democracy is the most desirable current system would not seem to be there have been no nationwide surveys political system,” that is, approximately completely fulfilling the expectations of in the true sense of the word. From this two-thirds of respondents supported the the people. perspective, the survey carried out by current system. However, the rate of What exactly do the Indonesian peo- Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), which support for the existing political system ple expect of their government? Sixty was started with the support of the declined from 71% in the poll of 2001. percent of respondents pointed to the Japan International Cooperation Agency In this regard, there is one other highly need to successfully address the econom- (JICA), is deserving of special attention. significant result – the re-evaluation of ic crisis. They are probably referring to It is a full-scale survey carried out in 30 the Suharto regime. According to the the desire to see actual improvements in provinces – with the exception of Aceh – survey, 26% of pollees responded the economy, in such concrete terms as with the initial poll early last August sur- affirmatively to the statement “The an increase in employment and income. veying 2,240 people in 224 locations, Suharto regime was not a good one.” Under the Megawati administration, and with follow-up surveys every three This is a major decline from the 2001 Indonesia’s macroeconomic measures months. Let’s take a look at the results poll in which 60% were in agreement. over the past two and a half years have of these polls and examine the trends in Further, 53% reported that they were moved toward stability. However, eco- Indonesia’s political affairs. dissatisfied with the current democratic nomic growth, at 3.44% in 2001 and First we turn to the evaluation of the system, 56.4% said they thought the 3.66% in 2002, has remained low, and current political system. Indonesia’s Suharto system was better than the enough jobs have not been created to Table 1 Table 2 Note: The numbers in parentheses show the percentage of actual votes cast for that party in the 1999 elec- tions 40 JAPAN SPOTLIGHT • March / April 2004 VIEWS FROM ASIA Photo: REUTERS • SUN absorb the 2.5 million new job-seekers Megawati’s PDIP, who enter the market every year. In this choosing Megawati as situation, it should be quite apparent the presidential candi- what the dominant issue will be in the date and having one of upcoming legislative and presidential its own members as a elections. The issue will be whether it vice-presidential candi- will be possible to form a strong, stable date. If that is the case, government that can deal with the issues then it is possible that of economic growth. the PDIP could form an What is the outlook for this year’s leg- alliance with Islamic islative and presidential elections? forces and once again Pollees were asked which party they select Hamzah Haz, the would vote for if the national assembly current Vice President, elections were to be held immediately. as a running mate. The results are shown in Table 1. Is there a viable can- There are several conclusions to be didate for president drawn from these results. First, the cur- within the Golkar rent multi-party system is likely to con- party? To the degree tinue. Further, it is likely that there will that the polls reveal, be a continued three-way split between there seems to be no the Indonesian Democratic Party of single candidate who Struggle (PDIP), Golkar and the various could successfully stand Islamic political parties. Secondly, against Megawati. Golkar is likely to succeed the PDIP as Akbar Tanjung (Chair- the number-one party, and there is a man of the national high probability that most of the politi- assembly and head of cal parties such as the PDIP which advo- the Golkar party) is cated “reform” in the 1999 elections will accused of corruption lose support and seats in the assembly. charges, and 80% of Next, the pollees were asked who they the respondents in the would vote for in the presidential elec- survey indicated that tions if they were held immediately, and he could not be trust- Megawati Sukarnoputri, the President of Indonesia the results are shown in Table 2. ed. Other Golkar As can be seen, the rate of support for members who have announced their Megawati were reelected, the greatest the current president, Megawati candidacy include Yusuf Kalla (currently likelihood would be that the situation Sukarnoputri, is virtually the same as the coordinating minister), Wiranto (former would continue to drift along fairly support for the PDIP – it cannot be said military commander), Prabowo (former- much as it is now. One would not to be high. As a consequence, it seems ly commander of army strategic reserve) expect a strong, stable government to quite unlikely that Megawati will be able and Surya Paloh (owner of Media deliver economic growth. Also one can- to obtain a majority of the votes in the Indonesia). Except for Kalla, all of these not expect major progress from “reform” first-stage election. That is, the presi- names were not even raised in the polls. measures. Nor would it seem prudent dent will not be elected until the sec- With this in mind, one can get a fairly to anticipate a major turning point in ond-stage election in September. When good picture of what the administration Indonesian government for some time that time comes, it will be crucial who will look like after the 2004 presidential to come. Megawati selects as her running mate for and legislative elections. In the event the vice-presidency, and whether she that current trends continue, Golkar will form an alliance with Golkar or the would become the largest party in the Shiraishi Takashi is a professor at the Islamic parties. However, if Golkar parliament, but the tripartite struggle Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto becomes the number-one party, it is among the PDIP, Golkar and Islamic University. He specializes in Asian studies unlikely to be satisfied with allying with forces would not change, and if and international relations. JAPAN SPOTLIGHT • March / April 2004 41.
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