ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, pp 321± 361, 1997

Oldstate and new empire in Indonesia:debating the rise and declineof Suharto’ s NewOrder

MARKTBERGER

As theMarch 1998 presidential election (which was precededby a general electionin May 1997) approaches there is everyindication that President Suhartoof Indonesia will be elected to his seventh ® ve-yearterm. There was speculationthat the long-serving former general might retire after the death of hiswife in April 1996. 1 However,in June 1996 his commitment to continue as presidentof Indonesia into the next century was apparentlyhighlighted by his government’s blatantintervention in the affairs ofthe Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)tosuccessfully oust the party leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Since herelection to the top job in the PDI atthe end of 1993,Megawati (daughter of Indonesia’s ®rst president,Sukarno) had become a powerfulsymbol of demo- craticopposition. It was widelyexpected that she intendedto standfor president in1998, a postto which Suharto has previouslybeen elected unopposed by the People’s ConsultativeAssembly which meets every® veyears. Her popularity was con®rmed by the fact that her ouster precipitated one of the most violent urbanuprisings in the history of Indonesia’ s NewOrder. An armed assault by elementsof the Indonesian army on PDI headquartersin Jakarta on 27 July led toa dramaticoutpouring of opposition as Megawati’s youthfulsupporters took tothe streets. Although some observersand participants hoped that this was the beginningof a `peoplepower’ revolution similar to that which overthrew PresidentFerdinand Marcos ofthePhilippines in 1986, order was soonrestored, withthe Indonesian military taking advantage of theuprising to round up arange ofdissidents. At the same time,the cynicism and heavy-handedness of the governmenthighlighted the fact that there are cracks inthe edi® ce ofthe New Order.2 Morebroadly, although it continues to display considerable staying power,Suharto’ s NewOrder in Indonesia has beenin decline since the second halfof the1980s. Against the background of thegrowing debate about the future ofSuharto’ s regime,a re-examinationof the origins and rise ofthe New Order canilluminate the character and direction of the impending political transition in Indonesia.This is thesubject of the ® rst halfof this article. By contrast the secondhalf focuses directlyon the debate about the decline of the Suharto regimeand engages critically with the question of whether the New Order will eventuallybe followed by some formof capitalist democratic modernity.

MarkT Berger is atthe School of Humanities,Murdoch University, Perth,WA 6150,Australia.

0143-6597/97/020321-41$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 321 MARK TBERGER

Fromempire tonation? Debating the rise ofSuharto’ s NewOrder Themost widespread explanation for the rise andlongevity of the New Order focuses onthe patrimonial character of Indonesian politics and/ oron the sustainedcapitalist development which the archipelago has experiencedduring Suharto’s rule.Certainly New Order Indonesia has experiencedrapid economic growth,with an average annual economic growth rate of 6% for the past 30 years.3 Inhis recent book, Adam Schwarz has arguedthat the history of New OrderIndonesia has demonstratedthat a `patrimonialpolitical structure’ is not necessarily` fatalto capitalist economic development’ . 4 Atthe same time, becauseof decades of economic growth there is atendencyto assume thatthe colonialand early post-colonial periods have become irrelevant. Much recent analysisof Indonesia hopes, if not assumes, thatover time patrimonialism (whichis seen asalegacyof both the colonial and the pre-colonial era) willfade andthe process ofdemocratisation and the rationalisation of government± busi- ness relationswill take root as aresultof, or at least as aconcomitantto, the country’s spectacularcapitalist development. However, the emphasis here will beonthe way in which the colonial era casts alongshadow. This article begins witha surveyof the debate on the rise ofthe New Order and the dynamics of politicalchange in Indonesia. The early in¯ uence of classical modernisation theory,followed by revisionist approaches which emphasised the need for and eventhe inevitability of authoritarianism,will be discussed. The deployment and popularityof thenotion of patrimonialismwill also be outlinedin relationto the rise ofthe New Order. The in¯ uence of the concept of bureaucratic authoritari- anismon attemptsto explain the emergence and consolidation of theNew Order willthen be examined.This will be followedby adiscussionof the debate about thehistorical signi® cance and particular character of the state in the transition fromthe colonial era, to the early nationalist period and then to the New Order era.Building on thedebate about the origins of the New Order state, the ® rst part ofthis article will then provide an examination of the history of Dutch colonialism,the process ofdecolonisation and the ® rst 20years ofthe history ofthe new nation of Indonesia after 1945, which paved the way for the New Order.An analysis of the consolidation of the New Order in the 1960s and early1970s will then be provided, emphasising that an important part of the explanationfor the rise ofthe New Order, and its longevity and overall character,can be found in the powerful institutional and social legacy of the Dutchcolonial state. 5

Oldsocieties and new states: North American liberalism and the pursuit of modernityin Indonesia After1945, in the context of rising nationalism, decolonisation and the Cold War,the number of nation-states world-wide expanded dramatically. In a short periodof timecolonial boundaries, often built up over decades if not centuries, becamenational boundaries. State power was transferredto, or eventually seized by,nationalist elites and movements throughout much of Asia and Africa. The internationalrecognition of these new nations, and their incorporation into the 322 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA

UnitedNations± Cold War system quicklyserved to confer sovereignty and legitimacy. 6 Againstthe backdrop of thepost-1945 expansion of thenation-state system,the professional social science discourses worked to naturalise the new nationalboundaries. This was apparentin the case ofmodernisation theory, whichemerged in North America, and around the world, as oneof the most signi®cant trends in the social sciences afterWorld War II. After1945 it was widelyassumed inNorthAmerican government and area-studies circles that the povertyof the new nations facilitated the spread of international communism. It was alsoassumed thatNorth American-style modernisation would usher in economicprosperity and democracy, undercut the possibility of anti-capitalist revolution,and lead to theemergence of stable nations in Asia and elsewhere in theso-called Third World. 7 Althoughvarious revised versions of modernisation theoryremain predominant in the context of the continued international power ofAnglo-American liberalism, what is nowregarded as classicalmodernisation theoryreached its peak in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the context of the powerfulin¯ uence of classical modernization theory, a growingnumber of analystsof post-1945 politics in Southeast Asia and beyond perceived tradition andits constitutive elements (ethnicity and religion) as increasinglyirrelevant as thenew nations that emerged after WWII pursuedpolitical modernity. 8 In the case ofIndonesiait was hoped,if notcon® dently expected, that ethnic loyalties andso-called primordial sentiments would fade, and new loyalties to the modern nationof Indonesia would become the central aspect of everycitizen’ s identity. 9 Thisapproach is apparentin a bookedited by Clifford Geertz entitled Old Societiesand New States: The Quest for Modernityin Asia and Africa . Interestingly,although the book as awholeis clearlyworking from a classical modernisationframework, Geertz’ s analysisof Indonesia already re¯ ected a degreeof concernabout the success ofwhat he calledthe ` integrativerevolution’ (thiswas representedas aprocess bywhich primordial loyalties to region, ethnicity,religion and language were not so muchdone away with as subsumed intoa widernational consciousness) which he perceivedas underwayin thenew nationsof Asia and Africa. Writing at the time of the rebellions in the Outer Islandsand the trend towards authoritarianism under Sukarno in the late 1950s andearly 1960s, Geertz perceived Indonesia as `analmost classic case of integrativefailure’ . Helamented that ` everystep toward modernity’ had simply strengthenedthe tendency towards ` anunstable amalgam of military coercion andideological revivalism’ . 10 Theincreasing perception, by theearly 1960s, that Indonesiawas driftingfrom the modern democratic path was apparentin the detailedempirical work of HerbertFeith and Daniel Lev. Their analysis re¯ ected anemphasis on inter-elite politics which evaluated the Indonesian trajectory in terms ofitsinability to recapitulate an idealised version of theAnglo-American roadto modernity. 11 Anearly result of the perceived failure of classicalmodernisation theory was theemergence in the1960s of apolitics-of-orderapproach which coincided with thetrend towards military regimes in Asia and elsewhere. This work projected animage of the military as theonly force which had the administrative and technicalskills to facilitate political and economic modernisation. 12 Samuel Huntingtonwas themost prominent exponent of this shift from classical 323 MARK TBERGER modernisationtheory to the politics-of-order, and his 1968 book also played a rolein shifting the focus of theories of modernisation on to the state. 13 Furthermore,the importance and inevitability of democracy was increasingly subordinatedto a concernwith order and stability. The politics-of-order ap- proachtreated the emergence of authoritarian regimes, such as Suharto’s New Order,as anecessary responseto instability,and focused on theneed for and the abilityof centralised authoritarian states (althoughthe term state was not necessarilyused) to betterpursue capitalist development. 14 Thisunderstanding of theemergence of the New Order was apparentin an article in AsianSurvey by GuyPauker in the late 1960s. 15 Notsurprisingly, ideas about the functional need fora military-ledtechnocracy to oversee the process ofdevelopment was popularwith many New Order military ® gures.For example, the in¯ uence of Huntington’s ideas,as wellas thatof earlier North American modernisation theorists,is apparentin publications by Ali Moertopo, who served as Suharto’s intelligencechief for many years. 16 Theemphasis on the important stabilising role of the military and political orderwas increasinglypart of awiderrevision of classicalmodernisation theory. Whilestill assuming that change was anevolutionary process, these writers increasinglyargued that change was notsimply about the transition from traditionto modernity, but also involved the modernising and adapting of tradition.17 Oneof themost in¯ uential approaches to emerge out of therevision ofclassical modernisation theory was undoubtedlythe concept of patrimonial- ism.18 Amajorexample of thepatrimonial approach was anarticleon Indonesian politicswritten by Harold Crouch in which he argued that, while Indonesia had changeda greatdeal in the twentieth century, its political system underGuided Democracyand the New Order was stillcharacterised by ` importanttraditional features’which appeared to ` harkback to the patrimonial politics of earlier, precolonialJavanese empires’. Writingin the late 1970s (at a timewhen the NewOrder was generallyperceived to have embarked on a process ofauthori- tariandeepening) Crouch anticipated that the prospects for the New OrderÐ regardlessof whether it was `stillessentially patrimonial or already partially bureaucratic’Ð mightwell include ` large-scaleoutbreaks of mass opposition whichwould almost certainly become linked with intra-elite con¯ ict’ . Sucha situation` wouldforce the government to give greater emphasis to straight- forwardrepression and less tothe patrimonial buying off of dissidents’ . He concludedthat ` patrimonial-stylestability’ was `notlikely to endure’ . 19 Crouch’s analysisin the second half of the 1970s may also have been in¯uenced by the concept of bureaucratic± authoritarianism which ¯ owedfrom thework of GuillermoO’ Donnelland emphasised that the new authoritarianism oftheCold War re¯ ected the emergence of particularlymodern and bureaucratic forms ofauthoritarianism against the backdrop of the historical circumstances associatedwith late-industrialisation . 20 FromO’ Donnell’s perspective,a bureau- cratic±authoritarian state emerged when the limits of import-substitution indus- trialisationwere reached and the national bourgeoisieÐ allied with the military andthe technocratic elite and linked to transnational capitalÐ moved to protect theirinterests and guide the economy in a directioncommensurate with their needs.The concept of bureaucratic±authoritarianism clearly re¯ ected the way in 324 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA whichsome strandsof modernisation revisionism incorporated insights from Marxistand Marxist-derived theories. More speci® cally O’ Donnellbuilt criti- callyon both Huntington’ s politics-of-orderapproach and the early Marxist- derivedhistorical critique of classical modernisation theory articulated by BarringtonMoore. 21 Bythe end of the 1970s, the concept of bureaucratic± authoritarianismwas partof the wider trend towards a renewedinterest in the state.For example, while the Social Science Research Council’s ( SSRC) Committeeon Comparative Politics, which had been at the centre of post-1945 NorthAmerican efforts to make the concept of the state redundant, was shut downin 1972, the early 1980s saw theestablishment of the SSRC’sCommittee onStates and Social Structure co-chaired by Theda Skocpol and Peter Evans. 22 Bureaucratic±authoritarianism had a broadin¯ uence, and although its more deterministicelements had been challenged (by O’ Donnellhimself among others),by the end of the 1970s it was widelyused as arelativelyopen conceptualframework. 23 DwightKing’ s workon Indonesia, which emphasised the` historical±contextual sensitivity’ of the bureaucratic± authoritarian frame- workclearly re¯ ected the latter kind of usage. 24 Thetheory of bureaucratic± authoritarianismreached the peak of itsin¯ uence in theearly 1980s. A renewed trendtowards democracy, combined with the end of the Cold War, helped to underminethe use ofthebureaucratic± authoritarian model, particularly its more deterministicapplications, and encouraged academics to turn their focus of analysisfrom authoritarianism to democratisation. Although bureaucratic± authoritarianismcontinues to enjoy some currency,patrimonialism is stillthe conceptmost regularly deployed to explain Indonesian politics. Jamie Mackie explicitlyrejects the bureaucratic± authoritarianism label in favour of patrimoni- alismin his analysis of the rise ofthe New Order. 25 Otherwriters continue to emphasisethe utility of the concept of patrimonialism in understanding key aspects ofIndonesian politics. 26 Forexample, Andrew MacIntyre has empha- sised therelative retreat ` ofthe state from the marketplace’ , therise ofthe privatesector and signi® cant but still embryonic efforts by ` sectionsof private industryto organise themselves collectively for political action’ , buthe con- cludesthat ` patrimoniallinkages are stillthe norm’ in Indonesia. At the same time,he argues that, in the long term, the structural changes in Indonesia’ s economyand the related growth of the private sector indicate the possibility of the` rationalisation’of government± business relations. However, although the emergentexport industries may well generate the political basis forcontinued economicrationalisation, MacIntyre also emphasises thatIndonesia’ s lackof a `strongstate’ and a `developedsystem ofcorporatistarrangements for peak level consultationbetween government and business’ means thatthe chances of economicpolicy making becoming ` increasinglyensnared by patrimonial and collectiverent-seeking schemes is considerable’. 27 Morebroadly he has ques- tionedwhether the ` progress’which has occurredÐnot only in Indonesia but in therest ofSoutheast AsiaÐ can be sustained by the current institutions and politicalsystems. 28 MacIntyre’s workon Indonesia re¯ ects theway in which the dominant Anglo-Americannarratives continue to assume thatthe future is achoice betweenthe increasing rationalisation of government± business relations as a 325 MARK TBERGER politicallysigni® cant middle class emerges,or theresurgence of patrimonialism. Apartfrom its tendency to rely on an idealised Anglo-American model, this analysisis oftenframed around a sharpdichotomy between state and society (or civilsociety) which distorts analytical clarity and contributes to an ahistorical perspectiveon the state in Asia. For example, at the end of the 1980s, the understandingof political change as areformistproject, in which civil society, oftenunder middle class leadership,eventually regains control of the state (and authoritarianismis graduallyreplaced by democracy),was usedto frame aseries ofconference papers edited by Indonesian political scientist Arief Budiman entitled Stateand Civil Society in Indonesia .29 Muchof the work in this book andmore generally fails to locate an identi® able border between state and societywhich leads to ananalysisin whichthe state is situatedas removedfrom society.The liberal state± society approaches tend to deal with the uncertainty of wherethe actual edges of the state are byde® ning the state narrowly as some sortof a policy-generatingentity and/ ora coerciveapparatus. This allows the stateto emerge ` as aset oforiginal intentions or preferences’ . 30 The rise and consolidationof thepost-1965 Indonesian state is bestviewed as beinggrounded inthe history of the wider social formation. States are atonce products of, and embeddedin, wider social formations, and those states thatappear to beseparate, orhave considerable autonomy from, society re¯ ect a particularlocal and world-historicaljuncture.

Oldstates and new nations: Marxism and the historical political economy of Indonesia Effortsat conceptualising the state in Indonesia, as elsewhere,continue to ¯ ow outof, or remain based on Marxist analysis. While Marxism was marginalised withinAsian Studies generally during much of theCold War, the bloody rise of theSuharto dictatorship in Indonesia, and the escalation of the war in Vietnam, ensuredthat the study of Indonesia speci® cally, and of Southeast Asia more generally,helped produce a radicaltendency within Asian studies by thesecond halfof the 1960s. 31 ANewLeft-style Marxism gained some purchasein the USA(whichwas, and still is, the acknowledged centre of English-language studiesof Southeast Asia) at the same timeas Marxismexercised considerable in¯uence on the study of Southeast Asia in Australia and Britain. 32 More importantthan Marxism by the1970s was thein¯ uence of whatis nowregarded as classicaldependency theoryÐ derived from Marxism and Latin American historico-structuralism. 33 Thein¯ uence of dependency theory on the analysis of NewOrder Indonesia was readilyapparent in thework of writerssuch as David Ransomand Malcolm Caldwell. 34 Atthe same time,the work of Australian academicRex Mortimer is usuallyheld up as anexemplary synthesis of dependencytheory and Marxism in relation to Indonesia. 35 Inthe 1970s a Marxiststate and class-approach also began to emergeas anexplicit rejection of dependencytheory. 36 Thisapproach linked historical materialism to the insights ofthe dependency debate, but placed its major emphasis on state and class structuresin the periphery, pointing to the relative potential for autonomous 326 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA capitalistdevelopment, and emphasising that politics in Indonesia and elsewhere stillenjoyed a degreeof freedomfrom external pressures. Buildingon the debate overthe capitalist state, as re¯ected in the work of Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas,writers increasingly saw thestate as thelocation in which the local rulingclasses mightinitially have taken form, and through which they sought to consolidatetheir economic and sociopolitical dominance. 37 Themost well known example of this perspective in relation to Indonesia is thework of Australian academic Richard Robison. His writing has emphasised thehistoric role of the state in generating the context for the emergence of capitalismand the dominant classes inIndonesia. 38 Fromthis perspective a crucialaspect of therise andconsolidation of New Order Indonesia was theway inwhich` politicalpower’ ¯ owedfrom ` withinthe state apparatus’ . Atthesame time,he emphasised that the institutions and language of the New Order were corporatist:they placed considerable emphasis on the ` commonnational good’ andon the need to organise politics along consensual and functional rather than competitivelines. Writing in 1993 he locatedthe ` ideologicalbasis’ of theNew Orderstate in a formof culturalnationalism which juxtaposed Eastern harmony andconsensus with Western confrontation and individualism. He also empha- sised thatthe emergence of organicist state ideology in Indonesia was linkedto thethinking of in¯ uential Javanese aristocraticof® cials who held up authority andhierarchy, along with the concept of aristocratic obligation, as keyvalues. Robisonnoted that these ideas had also been ` extremelycompatible with the conservative,organic political theories of thedeclining aristocracy of Bismarck- ianGermany and other European authoritarian monarchies’ . Hisreference to BismarckianGermany is signi®cant insofar as heconcludes that contrary to the `liberaldemocratic model’ , whichis widelydeployed to explain the trajectory ofpost-Suharto Indonesia, a `morehelpful model’ can be found in ` post- BismarckianGermany’ . 39 However,while it is doubtfulthat the New Order is aboutto give way to liberal democracy as itis popularlyunderstood, it can be arguedthat there are seriouslimits to examiningthe rise andvicissitudes of New OrderIndonesia through the prism of late-19th century Germany. Nevertheless, Robison’s referenceto post-Bismarckian Germany serves tohighlight the resilienceand importance of an historically rooted, but changing, aristocratic elite,which continues to be central to New Order Indonesia. In Germany speci®cally, and in Europe more generally, aristocratic elites were not swept asideby capitalism, retaining far morereal political± economic and social power thanmany writers had assumed rightup to at least the First World War. 40 Furthermore,although in some Europeancountries the aristocracies were toppled during,or consumed by, the First World War, as was thecase inRussia and Britainrespectively, in other instances they were not overthrown until the SecondWorld War, as was thecase withthe Junkers in Germany. 41 Ultimately, theEuropean aristocracies were not brought low until Europe had passed through the GoÈtterdaÈmmerung ofthe First and the Second World Wars. AsRobison’s analysismakes clear,there are keydifferences between the way liberaland Marxist analysis understands the dynamics of therise andconsolida- tionof the New Order. At the same time,his analysis also points to the way in whichboth liberal and Marxist discourses often evaluate Indonesia in terms of 327 MARK TBERGER itsapparent success orfailure to follow a relativelylimited number of idealised NorthAmerican or Western European paths to modernity. Many liberal analyses makevirtually no effort to conceptualise power relations and still treat culture ina relativelystatic or deterministic fashion. At the same time,Marxist observersstill tend to view power in centralised terms as embeddedin class relationsand state structures, while representing culture as anunproblematic ideologicalfunction of the dominant elites. This type of approach fails to draw outthe historical particularity of capitalist integration and differentiation which tookshape in the colonial period and continues to contribute to the complexity ofthe national period in Indonesia. Furthermore it fails to even begin to problematisethe nation as aunitof analysis or put nationalism in an historical context.42 Interms ofnationalism,Benedict Anderson’ s workrepresents a major challengeto the universalism of liberal and Marxist discourses and is an importantpoint of departure for any attempt to come to grips with the social originsof the New Order in Indonesia. Anderson has emphasisedthe compli- cateddynamics of historicalchange which underpin the emergence of thenation as `animagined political community’ based on the recon® guration of the past, includingthe colonial past, by the emergent nationalist elite. 43 Anderson’ s analysisof Indonesian nationalism is complementedby hisapproach to thestate, whichhas beenat the centre of debates about how to explain the rise and transformationof the New Order in Indonesia. Flowing out of his earlier work, butbeginning particularly in theearly 1980s, Anderson’ s analysisbecame know as the` statequa state’ approach, or what I preferto call the historic state approach.44 Inan important 1983 article, Anderson observed that it has become easy tocon¯ ate ` nation’with ` nation-state’. However,they are mostemphati- callynot the same, andboth have particular histories, interests and constituen- cies.From his perspective the state should be seen as aninstitution, comparable tothe university, the church or themodern business ® rm.Like other bureaucra- cies,state institutions have their own ` memory’and perpetuate ` self-preserving andself-aggrandizing impulses’ which are articulatedby particular of® cials, but are notsimply a functionof ` passingpersonal ambitions’ . Andersongoes on to explainthe important continuity between the colonial state and the New Order statein terms ofthe social background of its of® cials and its overall territorial boundariesand administrative structures. 45 Someof Anderson’s sharpestcritics have been Marxists. 46 Forexample, in the mid-1980sRobison rejected Anderson’ s `statequa state’ formulation as `ahistor- ical’, arguingthat it represented the Indonesian state as a`universalJavanese statetranscending its speci® c historicaland social environment’ . Bycontrast Robisontook the view that ` theNew Order can only be understood and explainedwithin its speci® c historicaland social context in which class is a crucialfactor’ . 47 Thistends to con¯ ate class analysiswith historical analysis. However,there is moreto historicalanalysis than an emphasison class structure and/orclass struggle,insofar as adeterministicusage of class analysisoverlooks thecomplexities of social power. At the same timeclass remainsa relevant, althoughnot necessarily a foundationalcategory of analysis. 48 Morerecently, AlecGordon has criticisedAnderson for a perceivedfailure to give suf® cient weightto the wider economic imperatives shaping the political trajectory of the 328 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA colonialstate in the Netherlands East Indies and the post-colonial state in Indonesia.49 However,the critique by Gordon (who somewhat perversely argues thatAnderson’ s workis adirectattack on Marxism) is damagedby the way in whichhe represents Anderson’ s perspectiveas unchangingover time, and becausehe alsocon¯ ates Bendaand Anderson’ s approachesto thestate, glossing oversubstantive differences between the two approaches and between early and laterwork by Anderson. All this serves toerect a dubiousdichotomy between theimaginary history manifested by the so-called ` culturalism’of Anderson on theone hand, and the ` realhistory’ said to be embodied by Gordon’ s Marxism onthe other hand. While dismissing the cultural speci® city and bureaucratic logicimplied by Anderson’ s conceptualisationof the state, Gordon’ s approach ultimatelyascribes adeterministiceconomic rationality to the Dutch colonial stateand its Indonesian successor. ForAnderson the history of what is now Indonesiais possessed ofitsown dynamics that cannot necessarily be deciphered bythe mechanical application of Marxist theory. But, for Gordon the dynamics ofmetropolitan and local capital is the` realhistory’ of Indonesia, while Marxism,in hisview, continues to provideall the intellectual terms ofreference necessary tounderstand what is goingon in the region. Despite the alleged incompatibilitybetween Marxist political economy and the ` statequa state’ approach,the view taken here is thatthey provide important points of departure fromwhich to put the rise andvicissitudes of the New Order in perspective. Whatwill be highlighted here is thespeci® c trajectoryof thestate in thecontext ofthe history of the wider colonial and post-colonial social formation. At the broadestlevel, the origins and emergence of the New Order state have been contingenton, but not determined by, the history of the rise andfall of the NetherlandsEast Indies, an uneven process ofcapitalist development and the dynamicsof Indonesiannationalism. 50 WhileIndonesian nationalism represented themain site of anti-colonialresistance, the new nation which emerged from the nationaliststruggle has increasinglydemonstrated the ability of colonialism to reproduceitself. 51 Themany contradictions and tensions of the nationalist movementwere played out in the context of, and given a unityby, the new nation-stateof Indonesia which was builtsquarely on the foundations of Dutch colonialpower.

Theshadow of thecolonial state: the social origins of dictatorshipand the rise of Suharto’s NewOrder Fromthis perspective, Suharto’ s NewOrder state can be understoodin keyways as thesuccessor tothe complex historical amalgam which was theDutch colonialstate. East Timor aside, Indonesia continues to lay claim to the former Dutchcolonial boundaries as theywere consolidated by the beginning of the twentiethcentury. 52 Apartfrom the same boundaries,the historic connection betweenthe New Order and the colonial era is apparentin socio-ethnic terms, insofaras theJavanese priyayi (thehereditary petty aristocracy of Java) has continuedto reproduce itself and play a centralrole in the bureaucratic (and military)structures of the modern Indonesian state. This ¯ owsfrom the history ofDutch colonialism and the overall character of the archipelago’ s pre-colonial 329 MARK TBERGER socialformations. Even before the Dutch conquest Java was heavilypopulated, agriculturallysigni® cant and a regionalpower centre. In the context of Dutch colonialexpansion the petty aristocracy of Java was transformedinto a bureau- craticelite and incorporated into the colonial state apparatus. 53 Alreadywell entrenchedin the colonial system, the priyayi bene®ted the most from the expansionof thecolonial education system atthe end of the 19th century. As a resultthe Javanese elitetook up most of the administrative jobs in the growing colonialstate; anumberof the early Dutch-educated leaders of the Indonesian nationalistmovement also came from priyayi backgrounds.In this period the number of priyayi grewdramatically, through both birth and recruitment, as they reproducedand consolidated themselves as arelativelydistinctive social class at thecentre of the wider pangrehpradja .Theterm means `rulersof therealm’ and refers tothe indigenous administrative elite before 1945. In 1946 the post- colonialadministrative elite was renamed pamongpraja ,`guidesof the realm’ . Bytheend of thecolonial period there was alargeand variegated colonial state staffedby the pangrehpradja drawnparticularly from the petty aristocracy of Java.In the early nationalist period they were marginalised. However, with the supportof an increasingly powerful military, the pamongpraja enjoyed a resurgencein the late 1950s, which was re¯ected in the growing in¯ uence of organicistpolitical ideas and culminated in a virtualrestoration in 1965± 66. 54 While the priyayi dominatedthe lower and middle ranks of the Dutch colonial state,their in¯ uence was muchweaker in the emerging nationalist movement. Anti-colonialnationalism did not take hold in the Netherlands East Indies until the earlytwentieth century but, throughout the colonial period, local and regional rebellionsand acts ofresistance had shaped the wider historical trajectory in importantways. 55 However,they rarely threatened Dutch colonial rule as awhole. Eventhe emergent nationalist movement of the 1920s, over which the colony’ s nascentlabour movement and the Indonesian Communist Party ( PKI) exercised considerablein¯ uence, was unableto overcome the myriad forms ofaccommo- dationand co-optation or the repressive capacity, deployed by an increasingly powerfulcolonial state. 56 In1934, by which time the nationalist movement was dominatedby urban intellectuals, Sukarno (who would become independent In- donesia’s ®rst president)and many other major nationalist leaders were banished toremoteislands where they languished until the Japanese invasionin 1942. The Japanese advanceinto Southeast Asia dealt a blowto European colonialism in Asia generally,while their occupation of the Netherlands East Indies led to therelease andencouragement of the gaoled nationalist leaders. While, the pangrehpradja oftendid well during the Japanese Occupation(a sharedenthusiasm for organicist andtotalitarian political philosophy ensured common ground between many col- onialof® cials and the Japanese occupiers),the Japanese era alsomarked the beginningof widespread rivalry between the Javanese eliteand other social classes forcontrol of the emergent Indonesian state. An important element in thisstruggle was thestruggle between the conservative and organicist ideas of the pangreh pradja andthe more egalitarian, democratic and Islamic orientation of radical nationalists.The Japanese gaveSukarno and Hatta, as wellas otherIndonesian nationalists,important opportunities in the form of various mass-based political organisationsto reach out to thepeople in the rural areas. TheJapanese armyalso 330 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA set upauxiliary armies inSumatra, Java andBali, using local of® cers, thus providingthe nationalists with a futuresource of militarypower. They encouraged greateruse of` bahasaIndonesia’ as anationallanguage as wellas providingjobs inthe bureaucracy for an increased number of `Indonesians’(the use oftheterm `Indonesia’to describe the Dutch colony was ®rst takenup in the early 1920s by younglegal students in theNetherlands who derived the word from anthropology courses atLeiden University). On the eve of Japanese defeata planwas promul- gatedby Sukarno and Hatta and the Japanese highcommand for Southeast Asia whichlaid the groundwork for an independent republic of Indonesia. On 17 August 1945,just after the Japanese surrender,Indonesia declared its independence. While thenew government, with Sukamo as the® rst Presidentand Hatta as vice- president,received wide support from many important political sectors ofthe new nation,what followed was afour-yearbattle for control of the archipelago. 57 Between1945 and 1949 there were two states effectivelyoperating in what remainedof theDutch colony: the apparatus of the new republic and the old Dutch colonialadministration. 58 Bythe end of 1948 most of the former colonial administrationwas inDutch hands as wereall the main urban centres while Sukarno,Hatta and other leading nationalists had been detained. At the same time theDutch still faced highly localised popular military resistance, especially on Sumatraand Java. This, combined with strong US diplomaticand ® nancial pressure andDutch war-weariness, led to a breakthroughat the end of 1949, at whichtime the Netherlands formally transferred power to the independent United Statesof Indonesia. 59 By1950 the initial decentralised federal system hadbeen replacedby a unitaryrepublic which fell much more under direct Javanese control.Between 1950 and 1957 this fragile entity (fragile as astateand as a nation)was governedby a numberof elected administrations which sought to stabiliseand unify the archipelago and reintegrate a statestructure the ` collective memory’of whichkept the pre-1949 struggles alive. The overall coherence of the statewas alsoundermined by the way successive administrationsdramatically expandedthe size ofthe civil service along patronage lines. At the same time, between1950 and 1957, all governments were coalition administrations, further facilitatingdepartmental fragmentation. 60 From1950 to 1957 the Indonesian state sought(under the overall supervision of Sukarno) to escape theeconomic struc- turesof Dutchcolonial rule via the encouragement of pribumi (indigenous,that is non-Chinese)capitalists. By the second half of the 1950s, as therepublic lurched towardsthe populist authoritarianism which Sukarno called Guided Democracy, it was apparentthat Indonesian capitalists were unable to compete effectively with Dutchand other foreign corporations, not to mention the powerful Indonesian± Chinesebusiness groups. Many of the new pribumi capitalistsincreasingly cooperatedwith established Indonesian± Chinese businesses, with the former providingthe political linkages rather than anything resembling business acumen. As of1957 at least 70% of the plantation agriculture on Sumatra and Java remainedforeign-controlled, while another 19% was runby Indonesian± Chinese companies.In most instances where foreign capital had left Indonesia it was Indonesian±Chinese capital which had taken its place. At thesame time,very little expansionof theindustrial sector had occurred, and the share of GDP which ¯ owed frommanufacturing actually fell from 12% in 1953 to 11% in 1958. 61 Between 331 MARK TBERGER independenceand the late 1950s a series ofincreasingly weak coalition govern- mentsgrappled unsuccessfully with the new nation’ s economicproblems, while militaryand civilian of® cials increasingly sought to mesh theirpolitical domi- nancewith wider social and economic power. 62 By1957 Indonesia had clearly turned to an ` intensi®ed nationalist strategy’ whichinvolved increased state intervention to restructure the economy and the takeoverof agreatdeal of Dutch-owned property. At thispoint, more than 90% ofthe productive plantation sector, 60% of the previously foreign controlled exporttrade, along with almost 250 factories, numerous banks and mining companies,not to mention the shipping business and various service industries, came underthe direct control of the Indonesian state. By the second half of the 1950sthe central government was alsoconfronting serious rebellions in the OuterIslands, which were often coloured by ethno-religious opposition to Javanese dominance.By the early 1960s, although the Outer Islands rebellions hadbeen contained, they had resulted in further increases inpower for the IndonesianArmy ( ABRI)andthe enhancement of its ability to sti¯ e political oppositionunder the umbrella of Sukarno’s GuidedDemocracy. With important implicationsfor the emergence of the New Order in 1965, ABRI alsoassumed a dramaticallyexpanded economic role with direct control of large sectors ofthe economyafter 1957. Apart from the military, Sukarno’ s GuidedDemocracy restedon a complexweb of political alliances which revolved around the nationalistparty ( PNI), the PKI anda majorMuslim party. He playedthese parties offagainst each other, at the same timeas hepitted the mainly anti-communist militaryagainst the PKI.GuidedDemocracy (underpinned by Sukarno’ s strident anti-Westernnationalism and idiosyncratic socialism) represented an explicitly state-ledattempt at capitalist development. The Indonesian state directed earn- ingsfrom the primary export sector into the primarily state-owned and -operated manufacturingsector. Export earnings were also directed towards public works, health,food production, education and transportation, not to mention as payment onforeign debts. At the same timethe state sought to attract new foreign loans inaneffortto furtherexpand the country’ s industrialbase andits infrastructure. Bythe early 1960s, however, stagnation and decline in the sugar and rubber sectors,combined with falling commodity prices, had resulted in a shortageof fundsand a seriousbalance of paymentsproblem. Furthermore, the nationalisa- tionof large parts of the economy had done little to attract foreign investment. Bythe® rst halfof the1960s Indonesia’ s economywas onthebrink of collapse. In¯ation was hitting600% annually, foreign debt was climbingrapidly and statisticson income and food intake per capita rivalled those of some ofthe poorestcountries in the world. 63 Atthe same timeSukarno had become seriously ill by mid-1964.By early 1965 itwas increasinglyapparent that the country’ s fragilepower structure was incrisis andrumours of militarycoups and/ ora PKI-ledputsch became regular occurrences. Thesequence of events during the fateful years of1965 and 1966 are complexand manyaspects are hotlydebated. Contrary to the of® cial version, which lays the blameat the door of the PKI,itappearsthat an attempt by a generalin thePalace Guardto seize poweron 30September1965, ostensibly to pre-empt an expected coupagainst Sukarno, sparked off a series ofevents, driven by the splits in the 332 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA military,which led to the marginalisation of Sukarno and the effective elimination of the PKI.AlthoughSukarno was nominallystill in charge in late 1965, the Indonesianarmy, with US militaryaid and CIA support,and the direct participation ofa hostof paramilitary Muslim youth groups, turned on the PKI and its supporters,in what the US ambassadordescribed at the time as `wholesale killings’. Bymid-1966 the CIA andthe US StateDepartment were estimating that anywherebetween 250 000 and 500 000 alleged PKI members hadbeen killed (in mid-1965the PKI was reckonedto have three million members as wellas 12 millionpeople in associatedorganisations). Other estimates put the ® gureat over amillion,and some estimatesrange as highas oneand a halfmillion dead. The of®cial Indonesian ® guresreleased in the mid-1970s were 450 000 to 500 000 dead.At the same timeat least 200 000 people were imprisoned, with about 55000of them still in jail a decadelater. 64 Itwas outof the bloodshed, crisis and turmoilof the mid-1960s that the New Order emerged. Whilethe 1945 to 1965period in Indonesia was anera ofescalatingcrisis, in thecontext of the overall failure of a state-ledcapitalist development strategy, tootight a focuson the crisis ofimport-substitutionindustrialisation and the rise ofsome sortof bureaucratic± authoritarian regime on the one hand, or on the transitionfrom constitutional democracy to guided democracy in the context of theresurgence of patrimonial politics on the other hand, neglects another importantdynamic. The period between 1945 and 1965 can be seen as aperiod inwhich the Javanese-led bureaucratic-aristocratic elite (the pamongpraja ) eventuallyreconsolidated their position within the wider post-colonial social formation.While independence in 1949left the position of pamongpraja within thepost-colonial state more or less intact,up to the early 1960s various Indonesianpolitical parties and their leaders made serious efforts to displacethe pamongpraja as the bureaucraticclass. Theadministrative elite maintained its relativepredominance as aresultof its control over the new Indonesian Army set upin the early 1940s. Many army of® cers wereof priyayi origin,and up to the1960s, most were also products of the PETA,thearmed forces set upby the Japanese in1943± 45. Of® cers andsoldiers who had been trained by, and/ or servedthe Dutch in, the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army ( KNIL) were also integratedinto the Indonesian Army (of course many thousands also went into exilein the Netherlands after 1949). For example, the Army Chief of Staff by thelate 1950s, General AH Nasution,was aproductof KNIL (hehimself did not come from a priyayi backgroundalthough he was marriedto a priyayi). The of®cers whoentered PETA duringthe Japanese Occupationwere strongly in¯uenced by a Javanese culturalnationalism that emphasised the traditional stateover the modern state, at the same timeas theyarticulated a virulent anti-communismand a markedhostility to the political Islam whichwas particularlyprevalent outside of Java. The Indonesian army went on to preserve pamongpraja dominancein theIslamic revolts in the Outer Islands in 1958± 59. Inthespeci® c contextof theexpansion and deepening of itscommitment to the politico-economicmanagement of Indonesia under Sukarno, re¯ ected in the promulgationof dwifungsi in1958, by the early 1960s the Indonesian military hadbecome central to the process ofnational uni® cation and state-building. (Dwifungsi,dualfunction, is anexplicit enunciation that the military has a 333 MARK TBERGER sociopoliticalas wellas amilitarydefence role to play). In this context the IndonesianArmy eventually emerged to guarantee wider priyayi and pamong praja dominanceafter 1965. 65 Theevents of 1965 (which saw themassacre ofatleasta million PKI members andtheir supporters, 80% of whom were from the provinces of central and easternJava) havea particularcultural resonance and an important ideological function.From one perspective the massacres werethe culminating battle in an escalatingJavanese civilwar. The elite interpretation, which was offeredto the Javanese lowerclasses andthe peasantry, emphasised that the era ofcivil war onJava hadprecipitated social polarisation between classes, andby endingclass con¯ict and returning to their ` culturalheritage’ , thepeasants of Java could successfullyavoid a recurrenceof 1965. 66 Forthe country as awholethe violenceand bloodshed of 1965± 66, and the dominant interpretation of that violenceand bloodshed is akeyforce in shaping the limits and direction of post-1965politics. Ariel Heryanto has arguedthat the events 30 September1965 catalystand what followed, and the of® cial New Order interpretation of what happened,is evenmore important than Pancasila interms ofanchoringthe New Orderregime. ( Pancasila is the® veprinciplesof belief in one God, humanitar- ianism,nationalism, consensus and democracy and social justice which was ®rst promulgatedin 1945 as thephilosophical basis foran independent Indonesia.) Theof® cial interpretation of Pengkhianatan G-3-S/PKI (theTreachery of the 30 SeptemberMovement/ PKI)is centralto a widerstate-centred anti-communist discoursewhich has playedan important role in reorganising the entire Indone- siansocial formation. 67 Inthe of® cial interpretation Suharto and the military savedthe nation from a communisttakeover and have remained vigilant ever since.Against this backdrop the uprooting of the PKI was followedby the demonisationas communistsof virtually all perceived opponents of the New Order,a tacticthat has continuedinto the post-cold war era. 68 Thesuccessful impositionof a virulentlyanti-communist New Order after 1965 represents the victoryof the historic state which had emerged in theDutch colonial period. The consolidationof the New Order ¯ owedfrom the elimination of the PKI and its realand alleged supporters inside and outside the apparatus of the state, and fromSukarno’ s relativelyrapid passing from the political stage. The overall socialcharacter of the rise ofthe New Order is symbolisedby the way that Suharto’s career trajectory(unlike that of hispredecessor) had evolved inside the state,especially the security branch of the state. 69 Andafter 1965, priyayi-led of®cers, withSuharto at their head, represented the vanguard in the wider process ofbuilding the New Order state, while the pamongpraja oversaw the consolidationof a morecentralised bureaucratic administration. 70

Fromdictatorship todemocracy? Debating the decline ofSuharto’ s New Order Whilean understanding of therise ofSuharto’ s NewOrder remains relevant to anyattempt to gain an overall perspective on Indonesian politics, the debate aboutthe emergence of the New Order has beencompletely overshadowed by thedebate about its decline and what a post-Suhartoera willlook like. The 334 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA democratisingeffect of arisingmiddle class andthe causal connection between economicdevelopment and democratisation (which were central tenets of classicalmodernisation theory) remain standard journalistic devices and are oftendeployed to explain the overall Indonesian trajectory at the end of the twentiethcentury. For example, in a 1996cover story on Southeast Asia, a correspondentfor the FarEastern Economic Review arguedhopefully ` that economicgrowthÐ and the middle class itnurturesÐmay drum the soldiers back tobarracks’, however,he concededthat this would not take place ` over-night’.71 Quali®ed support for the argument that a gradualprocess ofdemocratisation, drivenin part by economic development, is underway,and is centredon an expandingmiddle class, alsocontinues to run through the academic literature. Forexample, John Bresnan, a long-timeJakarta-based employee of the Ford Foundationwho is nowat Columbia University, argues that, although much of SoutheastAsia ` has lostits traditional political institutions and has yetto ® nd stablemodern replacements’ the ` generaldirection’ in Indonesia (as wellas in anumberof other countries in the region) ` isthatof expanding the political elites,opening the contestation of public of® ce, widening the process of consultationand consensus-building, and in other ways increasing the transpar- encyof government’ . Heconcludes that in Southeast Asia the civilian and militarystructures of the state ` are onthe defensive’ and ` theurban middle- classes are onthe rise’ . 72 Thiskind of analysis, which is representativeof the dominantAnglo-American narrative on New Order Indonesia, rests onan elite-orientatedand evolutionary conception of history which, although it does notnecessarily embrace the overwhelming determinism of classical modernis- ationtheory, still assigns thecrucial role in politicaland social transformation to themiddle class. Whilethe emphasis, thus far, is oftenon the failure of the middleclass tobe more of a democratisingforce, explaining the lack of democracyin terms ofthe shortcomings or weakness of the middle class, this approachstill assumes thatit is themiddle class whichcan and should play a centralunifying and progressive role in democratisation.These types of analyses tendto de® ne democracy in minimalist terms (elections,universal suffrage and relativepress freedom)and emphasise the importance of leadershipand political parties. Bycontrast the remainder of thisarticle focuses onthevicissitudes and future demiseof the New Order with an emphasis on history and the structures of power.I beginwith a criticalsurvey of thedemocracy debate and its relationship tothe Indonesian trajectory in the context of the increasingly global trend towardsdemocracy which was perceivedto be underway by the 1980s. This is followedby an examination of the history of the New Order state and the way inwhich it combines a powerfulcoercive apparatus with potent state-centred narrativeson national unity, anti-communism, Pancasila andnational develop- ment.The hegemony of the New Order is constantlybolstered by the deploy- mentof apowerfuland shifting synthesis of symbols and ideas drawn from the Javanese andwider Indonesian past, and an eclectic mix of organicist and corporatistideas derived from continental European legal and political philoso- phy.Although the dominant New Order narratives have contributed dramatically tonational consciousness raising, conceptions of identity in Indonesia also 335 MARK TBERGER continueto be linked to, or overridden by, speci® c newand recon® gured religious,ethnic, generational, regional and class loyalties. 73 Againstthis back- dropa briefhistory of political opposition during the New Order, with a focus onthe rise ofpro-democracyforces sincethe mid-1980s, will be outlined. This is followedby a moredetailed examination of the dramatic growth in working class opposition,which is as importantto democratisation and progressive politicalchange as theoften celebrated middle class. Itwill be emphasised that despitethe apparent growth of a middleclass inIndonesia, it constitutes only a smallpercentage of the country’ s population.More importantly, the Indonesian middleclass is composedof many groups that reinforce the authoritarian characterof the overall polity as wellas thosethat provide the enlightened liberaldemocratic leadership of popular and academic imagination. 74 Thisarticle concludesthat any movement towards democracy is bestunderstood by looking attherole of agrowingurban working class inthecontext of therecon® guration ofoverall power relations which is partof the process ofcapitalist transform- ationin Indonesia. An expanding and organised working class, againstthe backdropof a varietyof contingencies related to the particular history of the NewOrder, rather than an emergent middle class, offers thegreatest promise for democracyin post-Suharto Indonesia. 75

AtHistory’ s end:the democracy debate and the Indonesia trajectory Bythe second half of the1980s, the perceived spread of democracy (beginning inSouthernEurope in themid-1970s, and then Latin America in the ® rst halfof the1980s) had generated renewed optimism about the passing of authoritarian- ism inSoutheast Asia and beyond. The transition to democracy in the Philip- pines,South Korea and Taiwan in the second half of the 1980s, followed by EasternEurope in 1989 and the former USSR itself in 1991,ensured a growing enthusiasmfor the study of democratisation and underpinned an increased optimismabout the global reach of democratic forms ofgovernment. 76 One of thebest known exponents of theview that the end of the Cold War represented avictoryfor liberal democracy was FrancisFukuyarna. In 1989 he argued that theworld had arrived at the ` endpoint of mankind’ s ideologicalevolution and theuniversalisation of Western liberal democracy as the® nalform of human government’. 77 Morerecently, in a surveyarticle in TheEconomist , Brian Beedhamtook the view that the 21st century ` couldsee, atlast, the full ¯ owering ofthe idea of democracy’ insofar as avarietyof obstacles have passed into historyand ` democracycan set aboutcompleting its growth’ . 78 Ofcourse, not all observers are convincedthat the end of history and the triumphof democracy are uponus. However, the point of departure for those whoare morecautious in their assessment ofthe ` globaltrend towards democ- racy’is stilla revisedform of liberal development theory shorn of both its deterministicassumptions about the relationship between economic development anddemocracy and its overweening unilinear conception of political change. Althoughelites in Asia have deployed the concept of ` Asiandemocracy’ , and arguedthat Western democracy is notrelevant to the East, to counter calls for politicalliberalisation and greater attention to individual rights, the dominant 336 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA internationalapproach to democracy continues to rest onthe assumption that a variationon Anglo-American-styl eliberaldemocracy is themost desirable or attainablegoal. 79 Thistrend was apparentin GuillermoO’ Donnell’s workin the 1980s.By the end of the 1970s, he was involvedwith a majorproject on `Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule’ at the Woodrow Wilson International Centerfor Scholars, which resulted in the publication in 1986 of Transitions from AuthoritarianRule ,co-authoredand co-edited by O’ Donnell.80 What has becomeknown as the` transitionsapproach’ retreated from the greater preoccu- pationwith general theory which characterised earlier debates in which O’Donnellwas amajorplayer. It also privileged reformist strategies over revolutionaryefforts at political change, lending legitimacy to an emphasis on transitionsto democracywhich are negotiatedwithin existing social and political structuresrather than efforts to bring about more comprehensive structural change.The approach laid out in muchof the work on transitions to democracy emphasiseda wholerange of non-systemic factors, including individual leaders ratherthan wider historical processes. Theyemphasised that a givenregime sometimesdisappears primarily as aresultof arangeof internalproblems which are notdirectly related to the wider historical and socioeconomic context, and paidconsiderable attention to the role of signi® cant individual actors. By the early1990s there was agrowingbody of revisionist modernisation work on transitionsto democracywhich focused its attention on leadershipand culture as keyfactors encouraging or obstructing democratisation. 81 Andlike the concept ofbureaucratic± authoritarianism before it, the ` transitionsapproach’ has pro- videda pointof departure for the work of many Indonesian specialists. 82 Their reactionagainst deterministic theoretical approaches has ledthe ` transitions approach’to an exaggerated reliance on voluntarist frameworks which pay insuf®cient attention to the trajectories of historically speci® c socialformations andtheir relationship to state power and social structures. 83 Whilethese analysts of democratisation eschewed the determinism of earlier approaches,some ofthem deployed deterministic cultural explanations to ex- plainthe prospects for democracy in particular regions and countries. For example,in the mid-1980s Lucien Pye emphasised that the cultural persistence ofanti-liberalism was anobstacle to democracy in many countries in Asia. 84 Meanwhile,Samuel Huntington argued that ` thesubstantial power of anti- democraticgovernments’ , the` resistanceto democracy’of anumberof themain `culturaltraditions’ , combinedwith widespread poverty in manyregions and the `highlevels of polarization and violence in many societies’ meant that in most cases the` limitsof democratic development in the world may well have been reached’ .85 Thevoluntarism of the new approaches to democratisation was particularlyapparent in Huntington’ s presidentialaddress tothe American PoliticalScience Association in late1987. He arguedthat the ` mostfundamental lesson’which could be extractedfrom ` thestudyof politics’was thatthere were `noshortcuts to political salvation’ . Huntingtonconcluded by emphasising that `ifthe world is tobe saved and stable democratic institutions created, it will be donethrough incremental politicalreform undertaken by moderate,realistic men andwomen in the spirit of one-soul-at-a-time’ . 86 Despitethe subsequent end of theCold War, and the widespread interpretation that this removed a major 337 MARK TBERGER obstacleto theglobalisation of democracy,Huntington continued to have doubts. Inthe early 1990s he reiterated that major ` obstaclesto the expansion of democracyexist in many societies’ . Fromhis perspective many of these were cultural.What he characterisedas the` thirdwave’ of democratisation(beginning inthe mid-1970s) would not ` lastforever’ and it might be followed ` byanew surgeof authoritarianism’ , althoughhe did not ` precludea fourthwave of democratizationdeveloping some timein the twenty-® rst century’. 87 More recently,Huntington’ s widelydebated argument that post-cold war international relationsare drivenprimarily by a `clashof civilizations’ re¯ ects thecontinued in¯uence if not predominance of cultural deterministic formulations on his analysisof political change. 88 EdwardFriedman has challengedcommentators such as Huntingtonwho continueto explain the relative failure of democracy in Asia and its perceived success inNorth America and Western Europe in cultural deterministic terms. Friedmanalso attempts to challenge triumphant liberal narratives which argue thatwe are athistory’ s endand Asia is inexorablytravelling down the same historicalroad as NorthAmerica and Western Europe. 89 Atthe same time, Friedman’s analysisremains elitist and voluntarist and is adamantin itsrejection ofhistorical and structural interpretations or even non-deterministic cultural explanations.In 1994 Friedman, and the contributors to ThePolitics of Demo- cratization:Generalizing East Asian Experiences ,eschewed` historicalprecondi- tions’in favour of a `universalpolitical approach’ which looks at leadership, programmes,alliances, political action and trade-offs. He sets upa dubious trichotomybetween culture, economics and politics. Friedman argues that the keyto democracyand the process ofdemocratisationdoes not lie with econom- ics orculture, but with politics, and once politics are `understoodas thekey to institutionalizingademocraticbreakthrough’ it becomes possible to ` treatthe vicissitudesof democratizationin Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China as integralto [the] universal human project [of] democracy’ . Friedmanargues that,not only does democratisation in East Asia ® t`generalrules’ , but` an examinationof the processes ofdemocratization in EastAsia leads to theoretical insightsabout democratization in general’. Hisbook provides what he regardsas `ageneralframework’ that ® ndsthe keys to the ` West’s greatdemocratic breakthrough’in ` generalizablepolitics, not in unique preconditions’ . From Friedman’s perspectivethe road to democracy in East Asia has beenvia `dominant-partysystems andnot by institutionalizing a competitivetwo-party system thatimmediately transfers powerto nonelite challengers’ . However,he andhis contributors argue that ` evenin the West, democracies tended to be consolidatedby something akin to a grandconservative consensus’ . Ultimately, theprocess ofdemocratisation, he says, is bestviewed in ` terms ofcrafting a nationalconsensus’ around ` agrandconservative coalition’ . Atthe same time, the` struggleto consolidate democracy does not end’ and the vicissitudes and universalsin theEast Asian experience therefore hold lessons forall humankind. Accordingto Friedman, because of the in¯ uence of both the Weberian and Marxistintellectual traditions ` agreatdeal’ has been` obscured’at the same time as `Eurocentrism’has `facilitatedmyths’ about the importance of ` unique culturalprerequisites’ for democracy. He concludes that the experience of East 338 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA

Asiademonstrates that the ` theoryof cultural preconditions’ is completely mistaken,while ` structuralexplanations obscure the realm of political possibil- ity’insofar as `democracyis acontingentproject’ . 90 Thistype of analysis constitutes a reinventionof elite-centred liberal demo- cratictheory, ostensibly shorn of cultural and economic determinism and of a unilinearconception of progress, in favour of an incremental voluntarism that deniesvirtually any role to history. The approach extracts ahistorical lessons froma varietyof historically particular democratic transitions in East Asia and beyond.Ultimately this approach still privileges an idealised liberal Anglo- Americanvision of democracy, narrowly de® ning democracy as aset of institutionalarrangements centred on regular elections and a parliamentary system ofgovernment, while the main agents of democracy are seen tobe particularleaders and a risingmiddle-class. Thus, although Friedman argues that hisapproach has transcendedEurocentrism, he demonstrateshow dif® cult, if not impossible,it is toovercome Eurocentrism. If Eurocentrismis de®ned as the implicitor explicitassumption that the overall historical trajectory which is seen tobe characteristicof Western Europe and North America represents the model againstwhich all peoples and social formations are tobe evaluated and understood,then Friedman’ s analysis,despite its explicit attempt to do other- wise,continues to rely on a conceptionof democracy and a visionof the ideal politicalsystem whichwas laiddown ® rst inWestern Europe and North America.The recon® gured culture(s) of East Asia and beyond have all been integratedinto a globalcapitalist order and the contemporary system ofnation- states ina fashionwhich has ensuredthat they remain implicated in various forms ofEurocentrism. While the material and discursive power of North Americaand Western Europe is indecline, and that of East Asia is rising, Eurocentrismas acomplexseries ofpopular and academic assumptions and practicesremains widespread. Individual and collective efforts to overcome Eurocentrismare contaminatedfrom the outset. At thesame time,the view taken hereis thatthe most problematic aspect of the dominant Anglo-American discourseson democratisationin Asia is notEurocentrism, but the way in which theycontinue to assume bothan exaggerated role for democratising elites, and aneasy commensurabilitybetween elite interests on the one hand and those of themajority of the peoples of the modern nation-states which have emerged in Asiaon the other hand. 91 Insharp contrast to the works of revised modernisation theory that explain democratisationin terms ofnon-structural variables, revised historical and structuralapproaches also gained strength in the 1980s and early 1990s. 92 A particularlysubstantive work by Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephensand John D Stephensnicely avoids the economic determinism of earlierwork without retreating into the elitist voluntarism and/ orthe cultural determinismof thedominant liberal narratives on democratisation. On the basis ofa widerange of historical cases drawnfrom Europe and the Americas, the authorsargue that it has beenthe emergence of an organised working class, in thecontext of the wider historical con® guration of political and social power, thathas mostconsistently been the key factor in democratisation. 93 Their frameworkhas beenexplicitly extended to Asia by David Potter and to 339 MARK TBERGER

Indonesiaby Vedi Hadiz. 94 Potter,following Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens,® rst distinguishesbetween formal and substantive democracy. The former,which is theconception of democracy that continues to be deployed by thedominant liberal narratives, focuses onelections, universal suffrage and the existenceof a multiplenumber of competing. political parties. By contrast substantivedemocracy implies the above, as wellas morethoroughgoing forms ofparticipation by the majority. 95 Second,from an historical and structural perspective,democratisation ¯ owsfrom the shifting dynamics of class relations, withthe emergence of an organised and uni® ed working class playinga potentiallycrucial role in the rise ofdemocracy. Third, the history and con®guration of state power in relation to the wider social formation remains centralto the timing and direction of political change. Fourth, processes of politicalchange at the national level continue to be in¯ uenced by wider transnationalrelations of power. Against the backdrop of this schematic sum- mary,Potter provides a comparativeanalysis of why South Korea had entered intoa democratictransition by the end of the 1980s, while Indonesia had not. Tobegin he emphasises thatat least 70% of the population of South Korea by 1990was concentratedin the urban areas, whilein Indonesia the ® gurewas 30%.In this context the South Korean labour movement has thusfar beenmuch betterpositioned to facilitate the wider process ofdemocratisation than its counterpartin Indonesia. At the same time,by the late 1980s US in¯uence in SouthKorea was increasinglydirected towards encouraging democratisation as ameans ofcontaining the more radical elements in the pro-democracy move- ment.Attention can also be drawnto the process inthe 1950s which, under US auspices,led to the virtual elimination of a powerfullandlord class inSouth Korea,a socialgrouping which has historicallyacted as anobstacleto, or atleast abrakeon, democratisation. While Indonesia does not have a powerfullandlord class andhas beenthe focus of pro-democracy pressure fromthe USA, the workingclass andlabour movement was notnearly as `powerful’or as `mobilised’as thatin SouthKorea by the second half of the1980s. Authoritarian statepower in Indonesia has alsobeen wielded with considerable ferocity and themassive bloodshedof 1965 has workedto anchor the New Order to a remarkableextent. By the same token,the capital-owning classes, urbanprofes- sionalsand public servants are politicallydivided and have a dubiousrecord on democratisationin Indonesia. 96 VediHadiz has alsoinvoked Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens’ approach inhis analysis of the rise ofthe contemporary Indonesian working class. While therehas beena greatdeal of analysisof thecapital-owning classes inIndonesia, andattention has nowturned to the new middle class andthe role it might play incontaining and rolling back the power of the New Order, the signi® cance of theworking class has beenneglected. Hadiz has arguedthat ` becausereforms havebeen both too piecemeal and too slow, it ishighlylikely that working class discontentwill grow’ , becomingan increasingly important factor in the wider process ofpoliticalchange. At thesame timehe does not assume thata powerful anduni® ed working class is inevitable,nor that it will necessarily carry the day.97 Morebroadly, Garry Rodan has emphasisedthat, while a risingand organisedworking class needsto bebroughtinto the picture far morethan it has 340 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA inthepast, the political effect of `newclasses’ is shapedby theirposition in the widercon® guration of socioeconomic power. He emphasises that,where middle class groupingssees theirinterests threatened by radical working class-based movements,they will continue to support authoritarian political systems. And thesuccess ofparticular types of political movements which are basedon a risingworking class is contingenton theoverall relations of power in which they operate.98 Thehistorical and structural analysis of political change outlined above, with itsemphasis on the dynamic interplay of new and recon® gured social forces in thecontext of theoverall character of state and socioeconomic power, provides analternativeto bothearlier more deterministic approaches and to the evolution- aryelitism, voluntarism and cultural determinism of the dominant Anglo- Americannarratives on democratisation.At thesame time,although an emphasis onhistory, social structure and power relations offers animportant point of departurefor the discussion of democratisationand political change in Indonesia, theview taken here is thathistorical and structural approaches fail to take suf® cientaccount of cultural dynamics and the historical speci® city of cultural change.Any attempt to understandthe processes ofpoliticalaccommodation and resistancein New Order Indonesia needs to focus on the historical and cultural speci®city of processes ofdomination, accommodation and resistance. For example,while coercion, surveillance, repression and the overall impact of state powerhave played an important role in eliminating or containing opposition in Indonesia,from the point of viewof many Indonesian political activists the most signi®cant and slippery obstacle to democratisation and political activism is to befound in the New Order’ s unrelentingdissemination of an ideology which deniesthe legitimacy of opposition. Oppositional activity and democracy are not justrepresented by theNew Order as politicallyunacceptable, but as beyondthe paleof the Indonesian national character. In important ways the survival and stayingpower of Suharto’ s NewOrder has ¯owedfrom the regime’ s reorien- tationof the nation’ s foundingideology, Pancasila.Atthe same time,the New Orderhas alsoreinstated and recon® gured organicist (and/ orintegralist) ideas whichview state and society as asingleorganic entity and the embodiment of aharmoniousvillage or family.Organicist ideas have a longhistory in Indonesia andare linkedto theanti-Enlightenmen tviewsof earlytwentieth century Dutch legalscholars and Indonesian intellectuals, who romanticised pre-colonial village lifein the Netherlands East Indies. Integralist ideas meshed with the concept of the` familystate’ which arrived with the Japanese occupation.In the 1950s organicistthought was in¯uential among conservative elites and the military, and organicistideas about the harmony and unity of the Indonesian nation, and the need for a negaraintegralistik (integraliststate) were eventually deployed as partof the wider reworking of the national ideology of Pancasila.99

Inventingthe integralist state: the political economy and ideological panoply of theNew Order Theevents of 1965± 66 and the foundation of Suharto’ s NewOrder marked a restorationof conservative social forces (suchas the pamongpraja ) which had 341 MARK TBERGER foundthemselves partially marginalised during the early national period. 100 Suharto’s rise topower also paved the way for the adaptation of organicistideas andthe eventual representation of New Order Indonesia as a negaraintegralis- tik.Atthe outset the dominant reading by the regime of the events of 1965± 66 servedas apowerfulpolitical and cultural anchor for Suharto’ s NewOrder and theimage of the bloody transition of 1965± 66 emerged as acrucialelement in theconsolidation of New Order hegemony. The of® cial interpretation of the abortivecoup of 1 October1965 became central to the state-centred discourse onthe communist threat and has beeninstrumental in the social reorganisation ofthe New Order around a versionof Indonesian nationalism grounded in anti-communism,Pancasila, pembangunan (development)and organicism (inte- gralism).Meanwhile, in geostrategic and political± economic terms, Suharto’ s eliminationof the PKI andhis regime’ s anti-communistcredentials were central tothe circumstances under which the USA andits allies quickly embarked on amajoreffort to reincorporateIndonesia into the world economy. This included generousquantities of aid and a considerableamount of debt re-scheduling. At thecentre of this new orientation in macroeconomic policy was agroupof US-trainedtechnocrats who were known, at least by some oftheircritics, as the `BerkeleyMa® a’. Undertheir guidance the New Order solicited foreign invest- ment,particularly from the USA andJapan. From the mid-1960s until at least theearly 1980s, the New Order regime pursued an import-substitution industri- alisationstrategy ® nancedby growing foreign investment, as wellas byforeign aidand some domesticinvestment. (Import-substitution industrialisation contin- ues tobe a focusof activity on the part of the Ministry of Research and Technologyright up to the present.) Between 1967 and 1985, 65% of Indone- sia’s totalmanufacturing investment came fromJapanese corporations,while 58%of investmentin the oil sector came fromUS-based corporations. Between 1967and 1975 the manufacturing sector grew at an average annual rate of 16.5% and,as inthecolonial period, the manufacturing sector remains concentrated on Java.Mining, oil, agriculture and timber all boomed in the1970s. 101 During the late1960s and early 1970s, in the context of a continuingcommitment to an import-substitutionindustrialisation strategy, an increasingly signi® cant pribumi (non-ChineseIndonesian) capitalist elite appeared, based on privileged access to thestate-controlled network of credit,contract distribution and trade monopolies, inthe context of strict regulations requiring that foreign investors work with localcapitalists, and a tightlycontrolled manufacturing licensing process. Many oftheserising capitalists, had close, often very close, links to of® cials ( pamong praja)whowere well placed in thestate, at the same timeas agrowingnumber ofstate of® cials emerged as capitalistsin their own right: the most famous `bureaucraticcapitalist families’ to emerge from the New Order have been the Suhartosand the Sutowos. However, the general cohesiveness of an emerging capitalistelite, based on preferential access tostate power, was stillrelatively narrow,because most key business people were Indonesian± Chinese whose growingeconomic power remained dependent on thesocio-political power of the stateof® cials. 102 Atthe same time,until the mid-1970s, Suharto was indebtedto the various US-backedinternational agencies particularly, and a rangeof foreign investors 342 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA moregenerally, for both the alacrity with which they had moved to support his regimeand the quantity of their assistance. And this meant adopting an economicstance that was receptiveto the interests of foreign capital. However, thedramatic increase in oil prices in the 1970s provided the New Order with the means toreturn to an even more state-centred capitalist model within a decade ofitsinception. In the ® rst years ofthe 1980s, gas andoil sales wereover 80% ofexport earnings and brought in 70% of the regime’ s totalrevenue. From the middleof the 1970s, surging oil prices, combined with increased state invest- mentin import-substitution under the direct control of themilitary and Suharto, servedto bring about a dwindlingof theregime’ s relianceon foreigncapital and foreignaid. At thesame timerenewed restrictions were placed on foreign capital andoverall foreign investment reached a plateauin the mid-1970s. By the early 1980sstate-guided industrialisation was ®nancedprimarily by oil money. 103 However,as oilprices dropped in the 1980s the whole system came under pressure.This resulted in increasing debt and a decreasedcapacity on the part ofthe state to facilitate local capital accumulation, while greater use offoreign loansand foreign aid led to greater leverage on the part of theWorld Bank, the IMF andforeign capital. By the late 1970s the World Bank was placing increasingemphasis on economicliberalisation, the kerbing of stateintervention andthe bene® ts ofexport-orientated industrialisation. By the second half of the 1980s,important liberalising reforms wereunderway in Indonesia and changes atthecabinet and ministerial level indicated the increasing in¯ uence of anumber ofof® cials more ` sympathetic’towards economic liberalisation. At the same timesigni® cant pockets of economic nationalism persisted, especially in the powerfulState Secretariat and the Ministry of Research andTechnology. 104 This shiftin economic policy facilitated an increase in the in¯ ux of foreigncapital in thelate 1980s, much of itfromJapan (as wellas SouthKorea and Taiwan), and therapid emergence of an export-industry sector, producing things like textiles andfootwear, strengthening Indonesia’ s connectionsto wider regional and global¯ owsof capital and manufactured goods. 105 Thesebroad shifts in Indonesian political economy (dictated in part by wider trendsin the global political economy) and the overall process ofuneven capitalistdevelopment, occurred in the context of the continued and growing emphasison loyaltyto, and the political and social centrality of, the New Order state.Apart from the ideological importance of 1965, in the second half of the 1970sthe New Order, in thecontext of thedeepening of authoritarianstructures, increasinglysought to rework and entrench Pancasila.106 Inearly 1974 the MalariRiots had clearly signalled both growing discontent among the populace andincreasing intra-elite con¯ ict. The New Order’ s response,which occurred againstthe backdrop of the dramatic in¯ ux of oil revenues, was toconsolidate andtighten the structures of controlof theNew Order. By 1975,the New Order was characterisedby a comprehensivesurveillance and security network, a narrowand tightly controlled political system whichhad eliminated or com- pletelyreorganised the country’ s politicalparties. This was complementedby a largeand growing state bureaucracy, linked from top to bottom to the military andcentred on President Suharto himself, who had an overwhelming range of patronageand control mechanisms at his disposal. While, in the immediate 343 MARK TBERGER post-1965period, the priorities of the New Order had been overwhelmingly economic,from 1975 until the middle of the 1980s, the regime focused on expandingthe state apparatus even more and backing that expansion up with a majorideological offensive. In 1978 the New Order embarked on acomprehen- siveprogramme of Pancasila indoctrination(which targeted all government employeesand all university students and school children); this was followedby arenewedemphasis on Pancasila as the` solebasis’ of Indonesian national identityin theearly 1980s. The major emphasis in the Pancasila campaignafter 1978was onorder,leadership, hierarchy and family. Pancasila was represented asbeinggrounded in Indonesiantradition and as offeringa completealternative topernicious foreign ideologies such as liberalismand Marxism. While the nationalideology of Pancasila is backedup by a powerfulstate apparatus, its success also¯ owsfrom the way the government was ableto identify the New Order and Pancasila withwhat it de® ned as nationalcharacter and national tradition.While the impact of Pancasila should not be exaggerated, insofar as manyIndonesians are clearlyaware of itscontradictions and shortcomings, it has actedas apowerfulcomplement to themore coercive aspects ofstatepower and has successfullyconstrained political debate in Indonesia. From the second half of the 1980s Pancasila was overlaidby an attempt to revive the idea of Indonesiaas a negaraintegralistik whichwas seen tohave its origins in Indonesia’s pre-colonialhistory and had informed the thinking of conservative members ofthe Indonesian elite for years. Integralist ideas enjoyed considerable currencyin military circles, and in the late 1980s they were promoted in an attemptto reshape Pancasila ina waywhich preserved the role of the military inthewider Indonesian polity and to provide scienti® c andscholarly legitimacy as wellas popularsupport for the New Order as awhole. 107 Whilethe importance of loyaltyto theNew Order was increasinglyarticulated inthe shifting mix of Pancasila andintegralism against the backdrop of an imageof the Indonesian nation as aunitedand harmonious family (with Suharto asthefather), a relatedaspect of thehegemony of theNew Order has alsobeen theproduction of apowerfulIndonesian development ( pembangunan )discourse, whichexhorts Indonesians to work together to develop the nation and bring abouteconomic takeoff, under the leadership of the ` fatherof development’ (BapakPembangunan ), Suharto.108 TheNew Order has alsoinvoked and appropriateda perceivedpre-colonial past in which the Javanese aristocracy playeda keyrole. These themes, along with the complexity and hybridity of the widerpost-colonial Indonesian social formation, are inevidence at ` Beautiful Indonesia’-in-Miniature Park (Taman Mini ª IndonesiaIndahº ), whichis akey sitefor the New Order’ s effortsto generate loyalty and national unity and also recon®gure the Javanese aristocraticpast to ® ttheNew Order present. 109 Taman Miniwas completedand opened in Jakarta in themid-1970s (coinciding with the perceiveddeepening of the New Order and the shift towards the increased and systematicpromotion of Pancasila)andhad apparently been ` inspired’by Mrs Suharto’s visitto Disneylandin 1971.Apart from the Borobudur and Yogyakarta pavilions,a keyaspect of the park was 26pavilions modelled on ` customary houses’and symbolising the country’ s 26provinces.There is nowan EastTimor pavilion,which unlike the other pavilions, is air-conditioned,has anIndonesian 344 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA

¯ag¯ yingmuch of the time, and an armed guard. The primary backers of `BeautifulIndonesia’ are theJakarta-based elite of central Java. And a key aspectof the theme park which re¯ ects theirdominant position is theGrand Place-of-ImportanceAudience Hall (Pendopo Agung Sasono Utomo). This hall, whichhas aJavanese ratherthan an Indonesian name, was constructedin astyle basedon the customary aristocratic dwellings of centralJava. More particularly, themodel for the Grand Audience Hall was theoldest existing palace of Central Java.This is thePalace of Surakarta(Kraton Surakarta), which was builtin 1745 underDutch East India Company auspices. Under the direct in¯ uence of the Dutch,this palace came toembody ` Javanese’ difference,which would retro- spectivelybe increasingly held up as typicallyJavanese. At the time of the foundingof thePalace of Surakartain 1745,royal banyan trees (thebanyan tree is usedas asymbolby the Javanese royaltyand is alsothe logo of Golkar, the rulingparty) were dug up andrelocated from the old palace grounds to the new. Andto ensure that the historical and aristocratic reverberations were not missed atthepark’ s openingin 1975,a ritualoffering, in whichImelda Marcos planted abanyantree, was organised.The Suharto regime also eventually built an importantmuseum at ` BeautifulIndonesia’ . Whileit was builtin a Balinese style,the actual contents and programme of the museum reinforced a Javanese- centrednational hierarchy. The central exhibit is a`dioramaof a traditional weddingceremony for central Javanese aristocrats’while the wedding’ s man- nequinguests are, according to the of® cial guide book, attired in ` traditional costumesfrom almost all areas ofIndonesia’ in order to ` demonstratethe spirit ofUnityin Diversity’. Threeyears afterthe opening of theIndonesian Museum, arealwedding was heldin the Audience Hall at ` BeautifulIndonesia’ . On8 May1983 Siti Hediati, the daughter of Presidentand Mrs Suhanomarried Major PrabowoSubianto (the son of Sumitro, a majoreconomic adviser to Suharto). Thewedding was wellattended and well publicised, and Javanese tradition meshedwith the contemporary administrative might and splendour of the New Orderstate. 110 Thepower of the Java-centred elite and the ideological panoply of the New Order,which are celebratedand reinforced at Taman Mini, have been trans- formedand mediated by thewider processes oftheglobal political economy and unevencapitalist development. While many priyayi,inkeepingwith the historic bureaucraticand administrative role of the Javanese aristocracy,continue to take partin private business only indirectly through Indonesian± Chinese capitalists, underthe New Order a growingnumber of priyayi,notleast the President’ s children,have taken up a directand dominant role in commerce. Suharto’ s two eldestchildren, Bambang Trihatmodjo and Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut) are thoughtto be worth US$3 billion and US$2 billion dollars respectively, while the¯ amboyantTommy (Hutomo Mandala Putra) is reckonedto control assets worthUS$600 million. His brother Sigit Harjojudanto is valuedat US$450 million,while Suharto’ s twoyoungest daughters (one of whom was marriedwith Javanese aristocraticsplendour, described above) are saidto be worth US$200 millionand US$100 million. There are some doubtsabout how well his children willdo in business once Suharto’ s patronagehas disappeared. 111 Morebroadly, inthecontext of theregime’ s politicaldecline from the second half of the1980s, 345 MARK TBERGER andthe shift towards increased foreign investment and export-orientated industrialisation(between 1980 and 1991 the share ofmanufactured goods as apercentageof Indonesia’ s totalexports rose from3% to 40%), it is doubtful thatthe New Order is goingto give birth to a cohesive pribumi commercial class.112 Whilethere are important pribumi capitalists,the economically power- fulIndonesian± Chinese business community has alsobeen able to move beyond itsexclusive dependence on pribumi civilianand military of® cials and establish linkswith the emerging tycoons and professionals of Javanese orother indige- nousbackgrounds. From this perspective a recon®gured and increasingly self- conscious` multi-ethniccapitalist class’ is emergingwithin the wider social formation.113 Thistrend, which ¯ owsfrom the relative retreat of the New Order statefrom its historically dominant role in the economy, is stillembryonic, but thereis clearlyan effort by some elementsof the private sector to establish politicalnetworks and a collectiveorganisational framework in a fashionwhich cutsacross olddivisions, and old New Order patterns are clearlyundergoing some formof transformation. 114 TheNew Order state appears to be somewhat less committedto the highly inef® cient import-substitution industrialisation sector,and transnational capital and domestic capital operating outside the Jakarta-centredstate patronage framework may have greater in¯ uence than previously. 115 Againstthe backdrop of an uneven and partial trend towards economicliberalisation, the New Order has alsobeen challenged by calls for politicalliberalisation and democratisation.

Asmoulderingvolcano?: Demokratisasi andthe decline of the ancientre Âgime Globalisationand the process ofunevencapitalist development bring with them formidablechallenges to Suharto’ s NewOrder. While capitalist development is oftenseen as thekey to political and social stability, historically it has alsobeen centralto social diversi® cation and the generation of con¯ ict. The very success ofcapitalist development under the New Order is centralto the crisis and politicaldecline of Suharto’ s regimesince the second half of the 1980s. 116 Capitalismin Indonesia, as elsewhere,has givenrise tobothnew or recon®gured elitesand new or recon®gured subaltern classes, insertingthem into a varietyof hierarchiesof production and accumulation, to which they accommodate them- selves andagainst which they resist. A growingnumber of Indonesians, led by secularand Islamic intellectuals, journalists and students, are increasingly mobilisingin various parliamentary and extra-parliamentary ways against Suharto’s NewOrder, under the banner of demokratisasi (democratisation)and aroundquestions of economic and social justice. 117 Sincethe late 1980s student protestshave been more frequent. Student activists have embraced populist issues relatedto rural disputes over land and the general questions of livelihood whichare ofcentral concern to the rural and urban poor. The response from the NewOrder authorities has varied,but there is some evidenceto suggest that, as inthemid-1960s, factions within the military have sought to establish links with studentswhile publicly emphasising the need for order and discipline. The still lowkey student unrest continues to occur in the context of a less vociferous 346 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA dissensionamong sections of the elite. 118 WhileSuharto’ s sixthterm as presi- dent,which began in 1993, did little to allay disgruntled members ofthe elite, thecomposition of his new cabinet was seen as aconcessionto a younger generation,at the same timeas italso reached out to Muslims. However, because ofits increased civilian character the military was marginalisedrelative to previouscabinets. 119 Bythe early 1990s Indonesia was inaperiodof transitioncharacterised by the declineof the New Order at the same timeas nouni® ed force was emergingto displacethe ancienre Âgime .Inlate 1993 and 1994 at least half a dozen signi®cant events pointed to themid-1990s as aturning-pointfor Suharto’ s New Order.In 1993 the token opposition offered by the PDI appearedto begivingway tosomething more genuine. Although the government intervened blatantly and vigorouslyin the PDI’s1993congress it failed to preventMegawati Sukarnoputri frombeing elected to the party leadership. This was ofconsiderable embarrass- mentto the regime, and given Megawati’ s popularity,as thedaughter of Sukarno,with the urban poor in particular, clearly symbolised growing popular dissatisfactionwith the regime. 120 (As mentionedat the outset, the government ¯agrantlymanipulated powerful factions of the PDI inthe ® rst halfof 1996in a waywhich led to the ouster of Megawati as partyleader.) After 1993 the possibilityof an electoral alliance between the Nahdlatul Ulama ( NU), the country’s largestMuslim organisation with 34 million members ledby Abdur- rahmanWahid, and the PDI underMegawati, increasingly concerned Golkar of®cials and pointed to thegrowing disaffection of varioussegments of the elite as wellas thelower classes. 121 Thiswas followedin November 1993 by the shutting down of the national lottery,which by that time was earningthe regime 995 000 million rupiahs a year(US$460 millionÐ the ® gurefor 1991 was 580000 million rupiahsÐ US$289million). Under the leadership of studentsthere had been two waves of popularprotest against the national lottery, in late 1991 and late 1993 respect- ively.At the outset, the movement against the lottery viewed it as extracting scarce moneyand resources fromthe country’ s poorwho bought the majority of thetickets. During the second wave of protestsprominent Islamic leaders began toplay a moreimportant role and opposition to the lottery was increasingly couchedin moral and religious terms. Only days after the government had reiteratedits commitment to continuing with the lotteries, it caved in to popular opposition,a turnof events that embarrassed theregime as muchas itsfailure topreventMegawati’ s rise tothe PDI leadershipearlier in the year. In early 1994 therewas astringof events which clearly signi® ed growing opposition to, and doubtsabout, the New Order. First the Indonesian Development Bank ( BAPINDO) scandalwhich erupted in May 1994 turned into the largest ® nancialand political scandalsince the state oil company ( PERTAMINA)affairin the mid-1970s. A numberof top BAPINDO executivesand Eddy Tansil, a wellknown Chinese± Indonesianbusinessman were sentenced to long prison terms as aresultof a doubtfulnon-performing bank loan worth approximately 1.3 trillion rupiahs (US$650million) dollars. The BAPINDO case eventuallyimplicated a numberof formergovernment ministers and raised dif® cult questions about other non- performingbank loans of equal or greater magnitude. The BAPINDO scandal is 347 MARK TBERGER seen tohave severely tarnished the New Order and seriously, albeit temporarily, destabilisedSuharto’ s rule. 122 Aroundthe same timeas the BAPINDO scandalwas takingplace, and in the contextof the run up to the APEC meetingin November 1994 (which was held inBogor, West Java), the New Order further opened up to foreign investment, eliminatinga numberof ownership restrictions and permitting joint ventures in areas ofthe economy that had previously been closed to foreign investment. 123 GovernmentRegulation No 20/ 1994,which ushered in this shift, has been interpretedby some observersas evidenceof the government’ s ®nancialand politicaldesperation. In ® nancialterms itsignalled the regime’ s needto attract moreforeign investment to maintain the country’ s economicgrowth rate at the same timeas itconfronted rapidly rising foreign debt and a numberof large non-performingbank loans as re¯ected in the BAPINDO scandal.It appears that thismove worked to undermine the public image of theNew Order in Indonesia insofaras GovernmentRegulation No. 20/ 1994ran contrary to historically powerfulnational discourses against free-market capitalism and in favour of socialwelfare. The promulgation of, and controversy around, this dramatic economicliberalisation initiative was shortlyfollowed by the government’ s banningof three major weekly newspapers. In late June the government shut downthe Jakarta-based tabloid DeÈ Tik,andthe news magazines TEMPO and Editor.Oppositionto the bans soon became a focusfor what appeared to be a groundswellof primarily middle class opposition.While the government was certainlynot about to collapse, by 1994 the urban middle class beganto appear morepolitically assertive and united than at previous times. 124 Thereis littledoubt that elements of the middle class haveplayed and will continueto play a rolein the process ofdemocratisation, in the context of the declineand eventual fall of Suharto’ s NewOrder. At the same time,there is plentyof evidence to suggest that the middle class is notnecessarily the key actorin political and social change in Indonesia and the emergence of an organisedworking class (inthe context of the overall con® guration of political andsocial power) in Indonesia could prove to be a crucialfactor in democrati- sationand the opening up ofthepolitical system. As eventsin the industrial city ofMedan in 1994, but also elsewhere, suggest, a particularlyserious challenge tothe New Order may be coming from the workers’ movements, born of the country’s surgingand globally integrated export-industrialisati onsector. The growinglabour unrest has burstthe boundaries of the framework of state± capital±labour relations laid down by the New Order in the 1960s and 1970s. 125 Bythe early 1990s there was evidenceof the emergence of a morecohesive workingclass, alongwith the growing signi® cance of culturally embedded discourseson class which¯ owedin part from the work of activists from urban middleclass backgroundsand the proliferation of labourtheatre groups. Even art exhibitionsand public poetry readings have become important sites forthe formationand articulation of consciousness about labour issues. 126 During the late1950s and early 1960s Indonesian workers were increasingly subordinated tothe state-capitalism of the late Sukarno era, while in the early New Order periodurban workers were even more thoroughly domesticated, while the Communist-ledunions were wiped off the political map. 127 Atthe beginning of 348 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA theNew Order period state labour policy was aimedat eliminating the instability andworker unrest of the pre-1965 period and was premisedon theview that the primary` threat’to order and stability came fromremnants of the pre-1965 `left-wingelements’ which had dominated the trade union movement up to that time.The solution was thesetting up of astate-sanctionedand corporatist trade unionbody, while the ideas on which it rested were increasingly infused with Pancasila ideologyand the integralist formulations of state corporatism. Along withthe denial of the right to independent organisation, workers in Indonesia havegenerally been denied the right to strike. 128 Between1965 and 1985 the New Order effectively contained independent labouractivity and ensured labour peace, apart from brief upsurges at theend of the1970s and in the ® rst partof the 1980s. In 1973 the establishment of the All-IndonesiaWorkers Federation ( FBSI-FederasiBuruh Seluruh Indonesia) as theonly legal organisation representing workers served to curtailthe emergence ofindependentlabour organisations. This was replacedby thehighly centralised All-IndonesiaWorkers Union ( SPSIÐSerikatPekerja Seluruh Indonesia) in the mid-1980s(and in 1995 it became the Federation of Indonesian WorkersÐ FSPSI).In1974 Pancasila Industrial Relations ( HIPÐHubunganIndustrial Pan- casila)was promulgated.This has servedto legitimate widespread state intervention,at the same timeas ithas nulli®ed the legitimacy of strike action becauseof its emphasis on familial and harmonious relations between labour, capitaland the state. Suharto has emphasisedthat, in the context of Pancasila, `thereis noplacefor confrontation’ . Otherproponents of HIP havecontrasted an Indonesian-stylepartnership between employees and employers with the con- frontationaltype of labour relations which are saidto prevail in ` liberal’North America,Western Europe and Australia. 129 Themilitary ( ABRI)has alsoplayed animportant role in the trade unions and labour relations (not least through the practiceof retired army of® cers takingup positions in the of® cial trade union movement).As Indonesianintellectual Vedi Hadiz has noted,the fact that AdmiralSudomo, the former chief of security, could serve as theManpower Minister(responsible for the management of labourrelations) from 1983 to 1988 is a`symbol’of the way in which military intervention in labour relations becamecentral to the overall system oflabour control under the New Order. 130 Bythe 1980s the New Order was havingto grapple with growing labour unrest,at the same timeas labourleaders and activists sought to articulate new visions.The latter sought to move beyond moral and instrumental criticisms of theNew Order in favour of a structuralanalysis of the exploitation of workers andpeasants. Greater priority was givento con¯ icts between workers and capitalists.Activists and commentators also sought to analyse the role of the statein industrialisationand, while nobody was arguingthat anything resembling acohesiveindustrial proletariat had appeared insofar as employerswere often stillable to ` divideand rule’ , bothtemporary and permanent workers were seen tobe gaining an awareness thatwhat interests they shared with management werefar less thanthose they had in commonwith each other. The need for trade unionindependence emerged as aparticularfocus of concern in this period. Whilethe highly centralised of® cial trade union movement remained at the centreof labourrelations in Indonesia, at the beginning of the1980s a majority 349 MARK TBERGER oftheactivists who sought some sortof progressive change felt that the potential existedfor successful informaland grassroots work within this framework. This resultedin arangeof independentorganisational initiatives which often operated formallyas localbranches within the approved union structure. 131 Theseorganisational efforts took on new signi® cance from the mid-1980s whenthe export manufacturing sector began to grow dramatically. In 1971 the manufacturingsector employed an estimated 2.7 million workers (6.5% of total labourforce), rising to around 4.5 million workers in 1980 (8.5% of workforce) and8.2 million by 1990 (11.6% of the work forceÐ 3.6 million women and 4.6 millionmen). 132 From1965 until the 1980s the number of strikeswas relatively lowbut rising. Until the late 1970s it never rose above35 annually and was oftenmuch lower. But in 1979the ® gurerose to72, and then to over100 a year in1980and 1981 and over 200 in 1982.By 1990the number of strikes per year hadreached pre-1965 levels and these strikes were centred on export-orientated manufacturingindustries which produce garments, textiles and footwear. 133 In 1991,74% of all strikes in West Java werein textile and garment factories. Althoughmuch of the unrest in the early 1990s has beencentred on the new industrialareas inandaround Jakarta, it has nowextended to otherparts of Java andSumatra. At the same timemany of the strikes re¯ ect the inability or unwillingnessof thegovernment to ensure that employers abide by the govern- ment’s ownregulationsÐ 90% of reportedstrikes in WestJava bythebeginning ofthe1990s centred on demandsthat companies pay their employees the of® cial minimumwage (according to theindependent union SBSI,wagescomprise about 8%of most companies’ operating costs, while an average of 30% is spenton `non-of®cial expenditures’ Ð thatis bribes).By the early 1990s there had been some tepidreforms, along with minimum wage rises. InSeptember 1992 the averageminimum wage in Jakartawas raisedfrom 2500 to 3000 rupiahs (about US$1.50)a day,while in West Java itwent from 2100 to 2600 rupiahs. 134 (As of1996 the of® cial daily minimum wage for East Java was 4000rupiahs per day,while in Jakarta and West Java itwas 4600rupiahsÐ the equivalent of aroundUS$2.00). Inearly February 1994 there were widespread strikes in Java whichagain focusedon demandsthat the new minimum wage actually be paidby employers. Atthe same timethe government threatened to prosecute employers who failed tocomply with the new minimum wage (the penalty was amaximumof three monthsin jail or 100 000 rupiahsÐ equal to about US$50). 135 The wave of strikesin February proved to be the lead-up to the violent labour unrest which beganwith a peacefuldemonstration on Friday 14 April by approximately 30000workers in Medan. Driven by concern about military involvement in labourdisputes, and the suspected involvement of military personnel in the assassinationof union organisers, the particular aim of the protest was alsoto increasethe regional minimum wage, which was 3100rupiahs (US$1.45± 1.55) perday at the time. The independent SBSI (SerikatBuruh Sejahtera Indonesia± IndonesianProsperity Trade Union), which helped to organise the protest was callingfor an increase to 7000 rupiahs (US$3.50) a day.At the time of the protestfewer than half of the factories in the Medan area paidtheir workers thelegal minimum wage. The protesters were also seeking to overturn laws 350 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA restrictingthe establishment of factory-level trade unions, to express their oppositionto the recent arbitrary dismissal of almost 400 workers from a local factoryand to demandthe government look into the disappearance and death of alabourorganiser named Rusli, whose body had been found ¯ oatingin the Deli riveronly two days after he had played a prominentleadership role in a strike. Theinitially peaceful demonstration escalated into a week-longseries ofviolent confrontationswith the military and the police, resulting in onedeath, at least 12 peopleinjured, as wellas 100arrests anddamage to 150factories and shops, not tomentionburnt and overturned automobiles. Between 14 Apriland 20 Aprilthe labourunrest and strike activity involved about 40 000workers and over seventy factorysites inand around Medan. 136 Inthe wake of the unrest in Medan there weresome minorimprovements. In August 1994 the minimum wage rose from 3100rupiahs to 3750 rupiahs (US$1.72) a day,while over 90% of the factories inthe area werebelieved (by some observers)to actually be paying the minimumwage, in contrast to widespread avoidance before April. Forced overtimehas alsoapparently been almost eliminated. At the same time,long- termindustrial peace is unlikely.Apart from a fewconcessions, the government andemployers have relied primarily on theheavy hand of themilitary, including sendingsoldiers in civilian clothes into factories. 137 Theunrest in Medan in April 1994 was possiblythe largest outpouring of labourfrustration and disaffection in thehistory of theNew Order. It may mark akeyjuncture in modern Indonesian history. By the middle of the 1990s the country’s newlabourers, many of whomhad grown up inthe burgeoning urban industrialareas inIndonesia, appear to becominginto their own. 138 At the same timemany workers now have more education than in an earlierera andthis often makes themmore aware of what rights they have. The reorganisation of the of®cial New Order union, giving more power to regional branches (which was accompaniedby a changein name to the Federation of Indonesian Workers, or FSPSI),alongwith efforts to refurbish its international reputation, and the resultingrelatively liberal industrial relations rhetoric, has alsocontributed to workerunrest. The new conceptions of labour rights which this rhetoric carries withit has notbeen lost on theworkers; however, when they attempt to takethis rhetoricseriously, the negative response from the FSPSI leadershipsimply leads togreater frustration and con¯ ict. A likelymedium-term reaction on the part of theNew Order state will not be asophisticatedstrategy of labourreform aimed atinstitutionalising industrial con¯ ict, but a continuedapproach to labour relationsin which freedom of association remains nonexistent, with attempts to controlthe increase in working class unrestusing minor labour reform, such as moderatechanges to minimum wage and exhortations for employers to comply withgovernment regulations, in the context of the continued reliance on the repressivetechnologies of FSPSI andlegal and extra-legal assaults onthe union leadership. 139 Recently,for example, Muchtar Pakpahan, who is headof the independent SBSI,was againin courtfacing subversion charges only months after havingbeen sentenced to four years inprison for allegedly playing a keyrole intheevents in Medan in 1994,even though he was inJakartaat the time. This comes inthe wake of an earlier Supreme Court decision which overturned the Medanrelated charges. Meanwhile a numberof members ofthe People’ s 351 MARK TBERGER

DemocraticParty ( PRD),whichwas allegedto be behind the 27 July 1996 uprisingin Jakarta, were also brought to trial in late 1996 on charges of subversionfor their role in recent labour protests in Jakarta. 140 Asthecase ofSouthKorea suggests, an incremental and authoritarian reaction togrowing working class unrestcan actually fuel militant activity. Minor changesin wages and conditions can often have a limitedeffect on workers’ circumstancesat the same timeas agrowingawareness developsthat what ever has beengained has beenbecause of working class militancyrather than the generosityof thebusiness or governingelites. In thissituation the possibility of theemergence of a collectiveidentity of resistanceincreases. 141 Atthisjuncture, neitherthe new labourers, concentrated in the export-orientated industries, nor theindependent union leadership is uni®ed. Some tendencies re¯ ect relatively contemporaryradical styles, while there is apowerfulmoderate wing. There is alsoa vocalelement of the independent union leadership which speaks inthe languageof the old PKI andlooks to the 1920s and the 1950s (when the labour movementand the Communist Party played a powerfulrole in colonial and post-colonialpolitics) for inspiration. However, the mechanical application of theidiom (and the categories and strategies) associated with 1950s-style Indone- sianMarxism, which is characteristicof the recently formed Centre for Indone- sianWorking Class Struggle( PPBI),linkedto the PRD,maycompound earlier failuresrather than facilitate future victories. The character of the present workingclass unrest,like the wider process ofsocial transformation, has its rootsin Indonesia’s particularhistorical trajectory, and that history, including the Marxismthat played such an important role at various points in the twentieth century,needs to be subjected to a concertedprocess ofcritical re-examination and,where relevant, recuperation. 142 AstheNew Order increasingly becomes the ancienre Âgime ,thereis everyindication that labour unrest and the various modes ofindependent organisation among workers will gain in signi® cance. 143 This is happeningagainst the background of a widerprocess ofgrowing dissatisfaction amongstthe rural and urban poor, as wellas segmentsof theelite and the middle class.144

Conclusion: oldstate andnew empire in Indonesia Thisarticle began by criticallyoutlining the shifting contours of the debate about politicaland social change and economic development in Indonesia, with a particularfocus on competing analyses of theorigins and rise ofSuharto’s New Order.It was arguedthat the dominant Anglo-American discourses on Indonesia continueto provide an ahistorical analysis which tends to assume asingleor limitednumber of paths to capitalist modernity, driven by the rise ofan urban middleclass andthe rationalisation of government± business relations. This was followedby a discussionof Marxist political economy and nationalism in relationto thehistorical origins and eventual rise oftheNew Order. Building on thisdiscussion, the article sketched out an analysis which located the origins of theNew Order state in the particular history of Dutch colonialism and in the socialcharacter of thetransition to the post-colonial nation of Indonesia. It was emphasisedthat the New Order state, which came intobeing in 1965, has been 352 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA centralto, and has alsobeen shaped profoundly by, the historical processes whichhave been characteristic of Indonesia’ s colonialand post-colonial trajec- tory.However, at thebroadest level, New Order Indonesia is increasinglybeing shapednot only by its colonial and cold war history, but by new trends associatedwith the end of theCold War and the process increasinglycharacter- isedby bothcelebrants and critics as globalisation.The second part of thearticle beganwith a discussionof the overall debate about democratisation in relation toIndonesia. This was followedby a speci®c challengeto the dominant discourseson political and social change which continue to see economic developmentand the rise ofa middleclass as carryingIndonesia slowly but moreor less inexorablytowards a post-Suhartoera ofdemocratic capitalist modernity.The need for an approach based on an emphasis on history and structuresof power,combined with attention to the particularity and strength of culturalprocesses, was emphasised,at the same timeas ananalysis of the New Ordersince the 1970s was provided.The way in which in¯ uential state-driven discourseson hierarchy, order, national unity and harmony were backed up by asubstantialauthoritarian political structure was outlinedand discussed. It was arguedthat, apart from the bureaucratic and military coercion on which the regimerelied, the overall power of the New Order derived from and was reinforcedby the sustained use ofa complexamalgam of corporatist and integralistconcepts and images. It was emphasisedthat the ideological aspects ofthe New Order needed to be taken seriously and they provide the immediate contextfor the formulation of counter-hegemonicideas. The shifting contours of politicalopposition was examinedand the growth from the mid-1980s of extra-parliamentaryforces pushingfor democratisation and economic and social justicewere emphasised. The article ended with a discussionof the rising Indonesianworking class oppositionwhile calling into question the widespread emphasison the middle class asthekey factor in facilitatingmovement towards democracy.It was emphasisedthat the New Order is nowbeing challenged by thedramatic shifts in the global political economy and the rise ofnew and recon®gured social forces throughoutthe archipelago, including the rise ofa growingworking class movementfor change. In early 1996 the Far Eastern EconomicReview askedwhether Suharto’ s NewOrder was `Asia’s smouldering volcano?’ .145 Theanswer may be aquali®ed yes. At thesame time,if thedecline ofSuharto’ s NewOrder is goingto lead to a politicalsystem whichcan be characterisedas democraticit may well depend more on therole of an emergent Indonesianworking class thanon the much celebrated middle class.

Notes GeorgeAditjondro, Arief Budiman,Paul Stange and Carol Warren commented onvarious parts of this article, whileDavid Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz read anddiscussed virtually all ofit. David and Vedi’ s work inparticular has in¯uenced mine inways thatare obvious;however, they will undoubtedly continue to take issue withsome ofmy conclusions. Any shortcomings are myresponsibility. 1 Thisspeculation was givenfurther encouragement by Suharto’ s visitto Germany fora medical checkup inearly July.M Cohen,` Indonesia:Ill at ease, FarEastern Economic Review ,18July 1996, p 16. 353 MARK TBERGER

2 JMcBeth& MCohen,` Indonesia:streets of® re’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,8August1996, pp 14±16; M Lane,` Suhartogets a glimpseof people power’ , Green LeftWeekly ,241,7 August1996, pp16± 17; ` If Indonesiaerupts’ , TheEconomist ,3August1996, p 13;and P Walter, `Authorities’heavy handundermines Suharto’ s platform’, WeekendAustralian ,28December 1996,p 8. 3 Thepercentage oftheIndonesian population living in ` absolutepoverty’ , accordingto the World Bank, has droppedto 15% today from 70% in 1970 (this is basedon the assumption that anyone receiving more than 2150calories adayis nolonger living in ` absolutepoverty’ ). In1993 Indonesia was recategorised as a `lower-middle’income country instead of a `low’income country. ` Indonesia:what price stability?’, The Economist,3August1996, pp 19± 21. For a goodeconomic overview see HHill, TheIndonesian Economy Since1966: Southeast Asia’ s EmergingGiant ,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996.For indicatorsof Indonesian economic growth and social change,see alsoAsian DevelopmentBank, Asian DevelopmentOutlook 1996 and 1997 ,Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp79± 84. 4 A Schwarz, ANationIn Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s ,Sydney:Allen and Unwin, 1994, pp 59± 60. 5 MTBerger,` Post-coldwar Indonesiaand the revenge of history:the colonial legacy, nationalist visions and globalcapitalism’ ,inMTBerger &DABorer(eds), TheRise ofEast Asia: Critical Visions of thePaci® c Century,London:Routledge, 1997; and R McVey,` Buildingbehemoth: Indonesian constructions of the nation-state’, inDS Lev& RMcVey (eds), MakingIndonesia: Essays onModern Indonesia in Honor of George McTKahin ,Ithaca, NY: SoutheastAsia Program,Cornell University, 1996. 6 RH Jackson, Quasi-States:Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World ,Cambridge:Cam- bridgeUniversity Press, 1990. 7 RAPackenham, LiberalAmerica andthe Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and SocialScience ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1973,pp 52± 53. 8 MTBerger,` SoutheastAsian trajectories: Eurocentrismand the history of the modern nation-state’ , Bulletinof Concerned Asian Scholars ,Vol28, No 3, 1996. 9 GeorgeMcT Kahin’ s classic early studyof theIndonesian national revolution, which ® rst appearedin the early 1950s,not surprisingly re¯ ects thisoptimism. See GMcTKahin, Nationalismand Revolution in Indonesia,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1952. 10 CGeertz, `Theintegrative revolution: primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states’ ,inC Geertz (ed), OldSocieties and New States:The Quest forModernity in Asia and Africa , London: Macmillan,1963, pp 153± 157, 130± 133. See alsoR Emerson, FromEmpire to Nation: The Rise to Self-assertionof Asian and African Peoples ,Boston:Beacon Press, 1962;and K Silvert(ed), Expectant Peoples:Nationalism and Development ,New York:Random House, 1963. Ironically, while North American social scientists were concernedwith the integration of the new nationof Indonesia, the US governmentwas playinga keyrole in supporting the rebellions of the late 1950sas partof its efforts to destabilisethe Sukarno government, which was seen as communist-in¯uenced. In 1957 and 1958 the US initiated a CIA-ledcovert operation, involving the US Navyand elements ofthe US airforce, whichwas larger inscale andscope than the much more well knowBay of Pigs operation against Cuba in the early 1960s.See ARKahinand G McTKahin, Subversionas ForeignPolicy: The Secret Eisenhowerand Dulles Debacle inIndonesia ,New York:New Press, 1995. 11 H Feith, TheDecline ofConstitutional Democracy inIndonesia ,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1962;and DS Lev, TheTransition to Guided Democracy: IndonesianPolitics 1957± 1959 ,Ithaca, NY: CornellModern Indonesia Project Monograph, 1966. 12 Gabriel Kolkohas characterised thisapproach as militarymodernisation theory. G Kolko, Confrontingthe ThirdWorld: United States Foreign Policy 1945± 1980 ,New York:Pantheon, 1988, pp 132± 133. For example, see GJPauker,` Therole of the military in Indonesia’ , inJJ Johnson(ed), TheRole of theMilitary inUnderdeveloped Countries ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1962. 13 SPHuntington, PoliticalOrder inChanging Societies ,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1968.See CLeys,` Samuel Huntingtonand the end of classical modernizationtheory’ , inLeys, TheRise andFall ofDevelopment Theory ,Bloomington,IN: IndianaUniversity Press, 1996. 14 BGlassburner,` Economicpolicy-making in Indonesia, 1950± 57’ and ` Indonesianeconomic policy after Sukarno’, inGlassburner (ed), TheEconomy of Indonesia: Selected Readings ,Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1971.B Glassburner,` Politicaleconomy and the Suharto regime’ , Bulletinof Indonesian EconomicStudies ,Vol14, No 3, 1978.This approach is discussedin Richard Robison, ` Class, capital and thestate inNew Order Indonesia’, inRichard Higgott & RichardRobison (eds), SoutheastAsia: Essays inthe Political Economy of Structural Change ,London:Routledge, 1985, p 296. 15 GJPauker,` Indonesia:the age ofreason?’ , AsianSurvey ,Vol8, No 2, 1968. Also see anarticle bythe former USambassador toIndonesia, John M Allison,who enthused that the ` greatest encouragementfor thefuture’ of Indonesia ` remains thecharacter andintelligence of the leaders ofthe New Order’ .JM Allison,` Indonesia:year ofthepragmatists’ , AsianSurvey ,Vol9, No2, 1969,p 137.Allison was hitting aless optimistic,but still very supportive, note a year later. See Allison,` Indonesia:the end of the beginning?’, AsianSurvey ,Vol10, No 2, 1969. 16 See AMoertopo, SomeBasic Thoughts on the Acceleration and Modernization of 25Years’Development , Jakarta Centre forStrategic and International Studies, 1972. See DBourchier,` Lineagesof organicist 354 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA

politicalthought in Indonesia’ , unpublishedPhD thesis, Melbourne: Monash University, 1996, pp 156, 176, 196±197, 294. (A revisedversion is tobe published, London: Routledge, 1997.) 17 See, forexample, KDJackson, TraditionalAuthority, Islam and Rebellion: A Studyof IndonesianPolitical Behavior,Berkeley:University of California Press, 1980. 18 SNEisenstadt,` Thein¯ uence ofcolonial and traditional political systems onthe development of post-traditionalsocial andpolitical orders’ , inHD Evers(ed), Modernizationin South-East Asia , 1973, reprintedin CE Black (ed), ComparativeModernization: A Reader ,New York:The Free Press, 1976. 19 HCrouch,` Patrimonialismand Military Rule in Indonesia’ , WorldPolitics ,Vol31, No 4, 1979, pp 571±573, 575, 579, 587, reprinted in A Kohli(ed), TheState and Development in the Third World , Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1986.See HCrouch, TheArmy andPolitics in Indonesia , Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1988. 20 GAO’Donnell,` Re¯ections on the patterns of change in the bureaucratic± authoritarian state’ , Latin AmericanResearch Review, Vol13, No 1, 1978. 21 B Moore, Jr, SocialOrigins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lordand Peasant in the Making of the ModernWorld ,Boston:Beacon Press, 1966. 22 PEvans,D Rueschemeyer &TSkocpol(eds), Bringingthe State Back In ,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1985,p vii. 23 DCollier,` Thebureaucratic± authoritarian model: synthesis and priorities for future research’ ,inCollier (ed), TheNew Authoritarianismin Latin America ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1979. 24 DYKing,` Indonesia’s New Order as abureaucratic polity,a neopatrimonialregime, ora bureaucratic± authoritarianregime: whatdifference doesit make?’ ,inB Anderson& AKahin(eds), Interpreting IndonesianPolitics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate ,Ithaca, NY: CornellModern Indonesia Project,1982, pp 110± 116. Some writers challengedthose interpretations in¯ uenced by bureaucratic± authoritarianismwhich represented the New Order state as relativelymonolithic, emphasising its still decentralised andeven pluralist aspects. Forexample, inthe early 1980s,Donald K Emmerson arguedthat thebest way tocharacterise theNew Order was thenotion of ` bureaucratic pluralism’. DKEmmerson, `Understandingthe New Order:bureaucratic pluralismin Indonesia’ , AsianSurvey ,Vol23, No 11, 1983. See alsoDK Emmerson, Indonesia’s Elite:Political Culture and Cultural Politics ,Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1976.R William Liddle’s approachto theNew Order inthe 1980s has beencharacterised as `restricted pluralism’. See Liddle,` Thepolitics of sharedgrowth: some Indonesiancases’ , Comparative Politics,Vol19, No 2, 1983; and Liddle, ` Suharto’s Indonesia:personal rule and political institutions’ , Paci®c Affairs ,Vol58, No 1, 1985. 25 JMackie,` Indonesia:economic growth and depoliticization’ , inJW Morley(ed), Driven By Growth: PoliticalChange in the Asia± Paci® c Region ,London:ME Sharpe,1993, p 69.The patrimonialism of the New Order is alsoemphasised inJ Mackie &AMacIntyre` Politics’, inH Hill(ed), Indonesia’s New Order: TheDynamics ofSocio-Economic Transformation ,Sydney:Allen and Unwin, 1994, pp 6± 7. 26 See AMacIntyre, Businessand Politics in Indonesia ,Sydney:Allen and Unwin, 1991; and D Brown, The Stateand Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia ,London:Routledge, 1994, pp 112± 157. 27 AMacIntyre,` Power,prosperity and patrimonialism’ , inMacIntyre (ed), Businessand Government in IndustrialisingAsia ,Sydney:Allen and Unwin, 1994, pp. 255± 257, 264. 28 AMacIntyre,` Business,government and development: Northeast and Southeast Asian comparisons’, in MacIntyre(ed), Businessand Government in Industrialising Asia , p 16. 29 ABudiman` Introduction’, inBudiman (ed), Stateand Civil Society in Indonesia ,Clayton:Centre for SoutheastAsian Studies,Monash University, 1994; pp 1± 14. 30 TMitchell,` Thelimits of the state: beyondstatist approachesand their critics’ , AmericanPolitical Science Review,Vol85, No 1, 1991, pp 81± 88. Also see GRodan,` Theorisingpolitical opposition in East and SoutheastAsia’ ,inG Rodan(ed), PoliticalOpposition in Industrialising Asia ,London:Routledge, 1996, pp 20±29. 31 DAllen,` AntiwarAsian scholarsand the Vietnam/ Indochinawar’ , Bulletinof ConcernedAsian Scholars , Vol21, Nos 2± 4, 1989. 32 InIndonesia itself, Marxist analysis has hadeven more limitedpurchase since the1960s. In the 1950s and early 1960s,in thecontext of anemerging alliance between Sukarnoand the PKI,mostIndonesian Marxists were committed nationalists.At thesame time, theMarxist theory which prevailed was basedon Stalinist andearly Maoisttheory. By the mid-1960s both the PKI andIndonesian Marxism had been more orless uprooted.B Anderson,` Radicalism after communismin Thailand and Indonesia’ , New LeftReview , No. 202,1993, pp 3± 6, 8; R Mortimer, IndonesianCommunism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959± 1965,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1974;and O ToÈrnquist, Dilemmas ofThird World Communism:The Destruction of the PKI inIndonesia ,London:Zed Press, 1984.But the radical nationalist ideas,including Indonesian variants of Marxism,could not be completelyeliminated among the intellectual elite oramongthe urban and rural subaltern classes. MLane,` Voices ofdissentin Indonesia’ , Arena, No 61,1982, pp 110± 128; and C Warren, Adatand Dinas: Balinese Communities in the Indonesian State , Kuala Lumpur:Oxford University Press, 1993,pp 271± 277. 355 MARK TBERGER

33 Onthe Latin American originsand the rise anddissemination of dependency theory, as well as its relationshipto Marxism and the dominant liberal discourses see MTBerger, UnderNorthern Eyes: Latin AmericanStudies and US Hegemonyin the Americas 1898±1990 ,Bloomington,IN: IndianaUniversity Press, 1995,pp 106± 121. 34 DRansom,` TheBerkeley Ma® aandthe Indonesian massacre’ , Ramparts,October1970; Ransom, ` Ford country:building an elite forIndonesia’ , inS Weissman, et al. (eds), TheTrojan Horse: ARadicalLook atForeign Aid ,PaloAlto, CA: Ramparts, 1974;and M Caldwell,` Oilimperialism inSoutheast Asia’ ,in MSelden(ed), Re-MakingAsia: Essays onthe American Uses ofPower ,New York:Pantheon, 1974. 35 RMortimer,` Indonesia:growth or development’ , inMortimer (ed), ShowcaseState: The Illusion of Indonesia’s `Accelerated Modernisation’ ,Sydney:Angus and Robertson, 1973. By the beginning of the 1980sIndonesian activists and intellectuals, such as Arief Srituaand Adi Sasono, had produced studies of Indonesianpolitical economy that clearly workedfrom a dependencyperspective. A Sritua& ASasono, Indonesia:Dependency and Underdevelopment ,Kuala LumpurMETA, 1981; ® rst publishedin Indonesian as Indonesia,ketergantungan dan keterbelakangan . 36 World-systemtheory, the main outgrowthof classic dependencytheory, emerged as themost in¯ uential singletrend in radical NorthAmerican social science bythe 1970s. P Buhle, Marxismin the USA: From 1870to the Present Day ,London:Verso, 1987, p 265. 37 VRandall& RTheobald, PoliticalChange and Underdevelopment: A CriticalIntroduction to Third World Politics,London:Macmillan, 1985, pp 137± 138, 148± 171. For a critical review oftheoriesof the capitalist state see BJessop, StateTheory: Putting Capitalist States in Their Place ,UniversityPark: Pennsylvania UniversityPress, 1990.Also building on debates withinMarxism, particularly British and French Marxism, themodes of production approach rose toprominence in the late 1960sand early 1970s.The modes of productionapproach represented, among other things, a responseto dependency theory and later world-systemtheory’ s privilegingof the market overrelations of production. This approach emphasised thatsome pre-capitalistmodes of productionin the periphery have proved highly resilient to theexpansion ofcapitalism andhave not disappeared as anticipated.The problem of underdevelopmentwas seen as the resultof a more protractedtransition, because theprocesses ofmodernisation and urban industrialisation inthe periphery are dependentfor a longtime onpre-capitalist modes of production in the countryside whichhave articulated with an externally imposed capitalist modeof production. Efforts to apply the modesof production approach to the history of Indonesia include A Gordon,` Stagesin the development ofJava’ ssocio-economicformations 1700± 1979’ , Journalof Contemporary Asia ,Vol7, No2, 1979. Also see FTichelman, TheSocial Evolution of Indonesia:The Asiatic Mode of Productionand Its Legacy , The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1980. For good discussions of the modes of production debate see A Foster-Carter,` Themodes of production controversy’ , New LeftReview ,No107, 1978; and E Wolf, Europeand the People Without History ,Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1982,pp 3±23, 73± 100. 38 R Robison, Indonesia:The Rise ofCapital ,Sydney:Allen and Unwin, 1986, especially pp118± 126. 39 RRobison,` Indonesia:tensions in state andregime’ inK Hewison,R Robison& GRodan(eds), Southeast Asiain the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy andCapitalism ,Sydney:Allen and Unwin, 1993, pp 41±43, 45, 49, 70± 72. Also see OToÈrnquist, What’s WrongWith Marxism?: On Capitalists and State in Indiaand Indonesia ,New Delhi:Manohar, 1989. For a recent andilluminating study of the European originsof organicistpolitical ideas inIndonesia see Bourchier,` Lineagesof organicistpolitical thought in Indonesia,1996. 40 Theclassic revisionistanalysis is AJMayer, ThePersistence oftheOld Regime: Europeto the Great War , New York:Pantheon, 1981. 41 DCannadine, TheDecline andFall of the British Aristocracy ,New York:Anchor Books, 1992; pp 698±709. 42 Sometentative steps towardproblematising the nation as anaturalunit of analysisare apparent,however, inJeffrey Winters’s recent workof structural political economy, which uses Indonesiaas acase studyof globalisation.Winters challenges conventional categories offoreignand domestic capital (internationaland national)in favour of anapproach which focuses onthe structural power of capital interms ofitsrelative mobilityrather thanits nationality. J AWinters, Powerin Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1996. 43 Andersondistinguishes his de® nition of anationas an` imaginedpolitical community’ from other writers, suchas GellnerÐwho view the nation as an` invention’Ð becausetheir approachall tooeasily `assimilates ªinventionºto ª fabricationºand ª falsityº’ .BAnderson, ImaginedCommunities: Re¯ ections on theOrigins andSpread of Nationalism ,London,Verso, 1991; pp 3± 7; and E Gellner, Nationsand Nationalism , Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1983.A goodexample oftheinvention approach in relation to Indonesiais David Kertzer’ scomment that` playingrather loosewith history, Indonesian political leaders speakof the three-hundred-and-®fty years ofcolonialism that Indonesia has enduredeven though the whole notion of Indonesiais atwentieth-centuryinvention, and much of what is nowincluded in the country was conquered bytheDutch colonialists only at theend of the last century’. DIKertzer, Ritual,Politics and Power , New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1988,p 179.The classic is stillE Hobsbawm,` Introduction:inventing 356 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA

traditions’, inE Hobsbawm& TRanger(eds), TheInvention of Tradition ,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1983.For a concise summary ofmany of thekey elements inthe nationalism debate see BAnderson,` Introduction’in G Balakrishnan(ed), Mappingthe Nation ,London:Verso, 1996. 44 Thisapproach is basedin part on Harry Benda’s emphasis onthe Dutch colonial state as a beamtenstaat . See HJBenda,` Thepattern of administrative reforms inthe closing years ofDutch rule in Indonesia’ (1966),in HJ Benda, Continuityand Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles ofHarry J. Benda,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversitySoutheast Asian Studies,1972. See AlsoRT McVey,` The Beamtenstaat inIndonesia’ (1977), in Anderson & Kahin(eds), InterpretingIndonesian Politics . This was followedby Heather Sutherland’s studyof the incorporation of the Javanese aristocracy intothe Dutch colonialstate. HSutherland, TheMaking of a BureaucraticElite: The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi ,Singapore:Heinemann, 1979. 45 BAnderson,` Oldstate, new society:Indonesia’ s New Order incomparative historicalperspective’ , Journalof AsianStudies ,Vol42, No 2, 1983, reprinted in B Anderson, Languageand Power: Exploring PoliticalCultures in Indonesia ,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1990,pp 94± 95. The notion of the historicstate has hadconsiderable in¯ uence. See, forexample, GHart, `Agrarianchange in the context of state patronage’, inG Hart, ATurton& BWhite(eds), AgrarianTransformations: Local Processes and theState in Southeast Asia ,Berkeley:University of California Press, 1992. 46 Fora briefoverview of the reception of Anderson’ s workinside and outside Indonesia see PStange, `Chroniclesof Javanese transition’, Journalof Southeast Asian Studies ,Vol24, No 2, 1993. 47 Robisonfocused primarily on BAnderson,` Nationalismand the state inmodern Indonesia’ , whichwas a paperpresented to the Japanese PoliticalScience AssociationRound Table Conference on NationalInterest andPolitical Leadership, Tokyo, March± April 1982 and his 1972 essay onpower. Robison, Indonesia, 1986,p 117.See alsoB Anderson,` Theidea ofpower in Javanese culture’, inC Holt(ed), Culture and Politicsin Indonesia ,Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1972,reprinted in Anderson, Languageand Power . See alsoAnderson’ s postscriptto the 1972 essay, `Furtheradventures of charisma’ (1985),in Anderson, Languageand Power . 48 A Dirlik, After theRevolution: Waking to Global Capitalism ,Hanover:Wesleyan University Press, 1994, pp81±82; and MT. Berger,` Post-coldwar capitalism: modernisationand modes of resistance after thefall’ , ThirdWorld Quarterly ,Vol16, No 4, 1995. 49 AGordon,` Imaginaryhistories and the real thing:a critiqueof Anderson and Benda on theª Autonomousº state inIndonesia’ , Journalof Contemporary Asia ,Vol23, No 4, 1993. 50 DEFHenley, ` Ethnogeographicintegration and exclusion in anticolonial nationalism: Indonesia and Indochina’, ComparativeStudies in Society and History ,Vol37, No 2, 1995; and CJ Christie, A Modern History ofSoutheast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism ,London:IB Tauris,1996, pp 140±159. 51 Chatterjee, NationalistThought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse ,London:Zed Press, 1986, p161;Chatterjee, TheNation and Its Fragments:Colonial and Postcolonial Histories ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993;N BDirks,` Introduction:colonialism and culture’ , inN BDirks(ed), Colonialismand Culture ,AnnArbor, MI: University of MichiganPress, 1992,pp 23±24; and G Prakash, `Introduction:after colonialism’, inPrakash (ed), After Colonialism:Imperial Histories andPostcolonial Displacements ,Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1995,p 16. 52 Anderson,` Oldstate, new society’, pp96± 99. 53 Sutherland, TheMaking of a BureaucraticElite . 54 Bourchier,Lineagesof organicist political thought in Indonesia ,pp111± 141. 55 Forexample, see ALStoler, Capitalismand Confrontation in Sumatra’s PlantationBelt 1870± 1979 , New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1985,pp 14± 92. 56 RvonAlbertini, Decolonization:The Administration and Future of the Colonies 1919± 1960 , New York: GreenwoodPress, 1982,pp. 487± 513. 57 Anderson,` Oldstate, new society’, pp99± 100. 58 Thiswas inpart a resultof the way theDutch colonial state apparatushad been fractured during the Japanese Occupation.From 1942 to 1945 Java was ruledby the 16th Army, Sumatra bythe 25th Army, whilethe eastern islandsfell underthe control of the Japanese navy. Ibid, p 100. 59 RJ McMahon, Colonialismand Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence 1945± 1949,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1981. 60 Anderson,` Oldstate, new society’, pp100± 103. 61 Robison, Indonesia,1986,pp 42± 44, 57; and C Dixon, SouthEast Asia in the World-Economy: A Regional Geography,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1991,pp 190± 191. 62 RRobison,` Structuresof power and the industrialization process inSoutheast Asia’ , Journal of ContemporaryAsia ,Vol19, No 4, 1989, pp 383± 384. 63 Dixon, SouthEast Asia in the World-Economy ,pp191± 192. 64 Kolko, Confrontingthe Third World ,pp173± 185. See alsoR Cribb(ed), TheIndonesian Killings 1965±1966: Studies from Java and Bali ,Clayton:Centre forSoutheast Asian Studies,Monash University, 357 MARK TBERGER

1990;H Fein,` Revolutionaryand antirevolutionary genocides: a comparisonof state murdersin democratic Kampuchea, 1975to 1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966’ , ComparativeStudies in Society and History , Vol35, No 4, 1993;and L Kuper, Genocide:Its PoliticalUse inthe Twentieth Century ,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1981,pp 150± 154. 65 BMagenda,` Ethnicityand state-building in Indonesia:the cultural base ofthe New Order’ ,inR Guidieri, FPellizzi &SJTambiah(eds), Ethnicitiesand Nations: Processes ofInterethnic Relations in Latin America,Southeast Asia and the Paci® c ,Austin:University of Texas Press, 1988,pp 350± 353. Bourchier, `Lineagesof organicist political thought in Indonesia, pp 111± 141. 66 Magenda,` Ethnicityand state-building in Indonesia’ , pp.354± 355. 67 AHeryanto,` Indonesianmiddle class oppositionin the 1990s’ , inG Rodan(ed), PoliticalOpposition in IndustrialisingAsia ,London:Routledge, 1996, pp 242, 259± 260. 68 JMcBeth,` Indonesia:ghosts of the past’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,15February 1996, p 23. 69 Anderson,Old state, new society’, pp109± 110, 116± 117, 119± 120. 70 Magenda,` Ethnicityand state-building in indonesia’ , pp352± 353; and Bourchier, ` Lineagesof organicist politicalthought in Indonesia’ , pp152± 157, 161± 162. 71 RTasker,` Thelast bastion’, FarEastern Economic Review ,18January 1996, p 21.This theme was con®rmed inthe Review’scoverageof Indonesia, in which it was arguedthat the Indonesian military remained `®rmlyin the mainstream ofpolitical life’ .Itquoted a politicalscientist from the National Defense Institutein Indonesia who argued that greater democracy anda diminishedrole for the military was still15 to 20 years off.John McBeth, ` Unifyingforce’ , FarEastern Economic Review , 18 January 1996, p 24. 72 J Bresnan, FromDominoes to Dynamos: The Transformation of Southeast Asia ,New York:Council on ForeignRelations Press, 1994,p 58. 73 Thebloody ® ghtingover land between Dayaks andMadurese in the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan inFebruary 1997 provides a relativelyspectacular example ofthe ethnic fracture lineswhich aboundin the nation of Indonesia. J McBethand M Cohen,` Murderand mayhem’ , FarEastern Economic Review,20February 1997, pp 26± 27. 74 USundhaussen,` Indonesia:past and present encounters with democracy’ ,inLDiamond,J Linz& SLipset (eds), Democracy inDeveloping Countries: Asia ,Boulder,CO: LynneRienner, 1989; R Robison, `Problemsof analysing the middle class as apoliticalforce inIndonesia’ , inR Tanter& KYoung(eds), ThePolitics of Middle Class Indonesia ,Clayton:Centre forSoutheast Asian Studies,Monash University, 1990;and R Robison,` Themiddle class andthe bourgeoisie in Indonesia’ , inR Robison& DSG Goodman (eds), TheNew Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, MacDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution , London: Routledge,1996. 75 Thevicissitudes of Indonesian politics and the rise ofnew social forces inIndonesia must also be set in theglobal context of theend of theCold War andthe apparent acceleration oftheongoing trend towards whatcelebrants andcritics increasinglycall globalisation.The centre ofgravity of the global political economyis shiftingaway fromUS-centred cold war hegemonytowards recon® gured relationships between themajor internationalpowers, an increased rolefor international ® nancialinstitutions and transnational corporations( TNCs) andthe dramatic globalisationof production and trade. This has beenaccompanied by shiftingpatterns of transnational ® nance andimportant changes to the position of, but not necessarily a diminishedrole for, territorial-states. Otherkey trends in the post-cold war era whichare ofparticular relevance are theemergence ofimportantnew `ideological’trends world-wide and an uneven shift towards exclusiveor inclusive regional economic blocs. B Stallings,` Introduction:global change, regional response’, inStallings (ed), GlobalChange, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development ,New York:Cambridge University Press, 1995,pp 2± 14; and MT Berger &DABorer, `IntroductionÐthe rise ofEast Asia: critical visionsof the Paci® ccentury’, inBerger &Borer, The Rise of East Asia. 76 JMuravchik, ExportingDemocracy: Ful®lling America’ sDestiny ,Washington,DC: American Enterprise Institute,1991; and T Smith, America’ sMission:The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy inthe Twentieth Century ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1994. 77 However,Fukuyama cautioned that the liberal ` victory’was stillun® nished, emphasising that it had occurredmainly ` intherealm ofideas orconsciousness’ and was `as yetincomplete in the real ormaterial world’. FFukuyama,` Theend of history?’, TheNational Interest ,Vol16, No 8, 1989,pp 3±4, 15. He has subsequentlyallowed that in Asia, forexample, anEast Asian-stylepolitical and economic model led by Japanmay embodya major challengeto rather thana recapitulationof, the Anglo-American model of capitalist liberaldemocracy. FFukuyama, TheEnd of History andthe Last Man ,London:Hamish Hamilton,1992, p 243. 78 BBeedham, `Fulldemocracy’ , TheEconomist ,21December 1996,p S3. 79 MTBerger,` Thenew millenniumand the mirage ofglobal modernity: the United Nations, the Commission onGlobal Governance and the new worlddisorder’ , CriticalArts: AJournalof Cultural Studies , Vol 10, No2, 1996. MT Berger,` Yellowmythologies: the East Asian miracle andpost-cold war capitalism’ , 358 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA

Positions:East Asia Cultures Critique ,Vol4, No 2, 1996, revised and reprinted as MTBerger,` The triumphof the East?: theEast Asian miracle andpost-cold war capitalism’ ,inBerger &Borer, The Rise of East Asia. 80 GAO’Donnell& PCSchmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions and Uncertain Democracies ,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.See alsoGA O’Donnell,PC Schmitter& LWhitehead(eds), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives ,Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, GAO’Donnell,PC Schmitter& LWhitehead(eds), Transitionsfrom AuthoritarianRule: Southern Europe ,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991;GA O’Donnell, PCSchmitter& LWhitehead(eds), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Latin America ,Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1991. 81 LDiamond,` Introduction:persistence, erosion,breakdown and renewal’ inDiamond, Linz & SMLipset (eds), Democracy inDeveloping Countries: Asia ;Diamond,` Theglobalization of democracy’ ,inR O Slater,B MSchutz& SRDorr(eds), GlobalTransformations and the Third World ,Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner,1993; Diamond ` Introduction’in Diamond(ed), PoliticalCulture and Democracy inDeveloping Countries,Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 1993; L Diamond& MFPlattner,` Introduction’, inL Diamond& MFPlattner(eds), TheGlobal Resurgence ofDemocracy ,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993;and Diamond, ` Theglobal imperative: building a democratic worldorder’ , CurrentHistory , Vol 93, No579, 1994. 82 Fora discussionof the` transitionsapproach’ in relation to Indonesia see HCrouch,` Democratic prospects inIndonesia’ , inD Bourchier& JLegge(eds), Democracy inIndonesia 1950s and 1990s ,Clayton:Centre forSoutheast Asian Studies,Monash University, 1994, pp 120± 123. 83 Fora discussionand critique of the ` transitionsapproach’ in relation to Asia see GRodan,` Theorising politicalopposition in East andSoutheast Asia’ ,inRodan, PoliticalOpposition in Industrialising Asia , pp 1±3, 13± 15. For Latin America see Berger, UnderNorthern Eyes ,pp198± 205. 84 L Pye, AsianPower and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority ,Cambridge:Belknap Press, 1985. 85 SPHuntington,` Willmore countriesbecome democratic?’ , PoliticalScience Quarterly ,Vol99, No 2, 1984, p 218. 86 SPHuntington,` One soulat atime: politicalscience andpolitical reform’ , AmericanPolitical Science Review,Vol82, No 1, 1988, p 9. 87 SPHuntington,` Democracy’ sthirdwave’ , Journalof Democracy ,Vol2, No 2, 1991, p 33.See also The ThirdWave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century ,Norman,OK: Universityof OklahomaPress, 1991. 88 SPHuntington,` Theclash ofcivilizations?’, ForeignAffairs ,Vol72, No 3, 1993;and S PHuntington, The Clashof Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order ,New York:Simon and Schuster, 1996. 89 EFriedman,` Conclusion’, inFriedman (ed), ThePolitics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1994,.pp 250± 252. 90 EFriedman,` Introduction’, inFriedman (ed), ThePolitics of Democratization ,pp2, 5± 7; Friedman, `GeneralizingEast Asian experiences’ ,inFriedman, ThePolitics of Democratization ,pp25,35± 37, 44± 45; andE Friedman,` Conclusion’, inFriedman, ThePolitics of Democratization ,pp257± 258. 91 MTBerger,` SoutheastAsian trajectories’ . 92 Anexample ofa state andclass approachto democratisation and political change with a focuson Southeast Asia is RRobison,K Hewison& GRodan,` Politicalpower in industrialising capitalist societies: theoreticalapproaches’ , inHewison, Robison & Rodan(eds), SoutheastAsia in the 1990s , pp 20±24. 93 DRueschemeyer, EHStephens& JDStephens, CapitalistDevelopment and Democracy , Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1992,pp 1± 39, 309± 316. See alsoRB Collier& DCollier, Shaping the PoliticalArena: Critical Junctures, The Labour Movement and Regime Dynamics inLatin America , Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1991;and ME Keck, TheWorkers Partyand Democratization in Brazil,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1992. 94 DPotter,` Democratization inAsia’ ,inD Held(ed), Prospectsfor Democracy: North,South, East, West, London: PolityPress, 1993.VR Hadiz,` Thepolitical signi® cance ofrecent workingclass actionin Indonesia’, inD Bourchier(ed), Indonesia’s EmergingProletariat: Workers andTheir Struggles , Clayton: Centre forSoutheast Asian Studies,Monash University, 1994; and Hadiz, `Contradictionsof corporatism: workersand the state inNew Order Indonesia,unpublished PhD thesis, Perth: Asia Research Centre, MurdochUniversity, 1996 (a revisedversion is tobe published, London: Routledge, 1997). 95 Anotherway ofmakingthis distinction is tospeak of politicaldemocracy andsocial democracy. Inthe case ofthe former (whichis thedominant international conception of democracy) democracy is perceivedto existwhen the necessary institutionswhich allow political decisions to be takenby individuals and parties competingfor the support of, and elected by,popular vote are inplace. Thusregular elections and the right tocompete inelections is takento be democracy. At theother end of thespectrum is anotionof democracy thatdoes not simply rest onpolitical rights, but also assumes social andeconomic rights, related tohealth care, education,employment, social services, individualautonomy and greater participation.G Sùrensen, Democracy andDemocratization: Processes andProspects in a ChangingWorld ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1993,pp 10± 11. 359 MARK TBERGER

96 Potter,` Democratization inAsia’ ,pp356± 360, 364± 366, 376. See alsoG Ogle, SouthKorea: Dissent Withinthe Economic Miracle ,London:Zed, 1990; and Bruce Cumings,` Theabortive abertura: South Korea inthe light of Latin American experience’ , New LeftReview ,No173, 1989. 97 VRHadiz,` Challengingstate corporatismon the labour front: working class politicsin the 1990s’ , in Bourchier& Legge, Democracy inIndonesia 1950s and 1990s ,pp201± 202. 98 Rodan,` Theorisingpolitical opposition in East andSoutheast Asia’ ,pp6± 7. 99 See Bourchier,` Lineagesof organicist political thought in Indonesia’ , pp2± 9. 100 The term pamongpraja (whichmeans `guidesof the realm’ )refers tothe indigenous administrative elite whichemerged as amajor bene®ciary andpillar of Dutch colonial rule. Prior to 1946 they were known as the pangrehpradja (`rulersof therealm’ ).At thecentre ofthe pangrehpradja was theJavanese priyayi, thehereditary petty aristocracy ofJava, whichhad been transformed into a bureaucraticelite and incorporatedinto the Dutch colonial state apparatus.Sutherland, TheMaking Of aBureaucraticElite ; and Bourchier,` Lineagesof organicist political thought in Indonesia’ , pp111± 141. 101 C Dixon, SouthEast Asia in the World-Economy ,pp193± 195; and J Bresnan, ManagingIndonesia: The ModernPolitical Economy ,New York:Columbia University Press, 1993,p 83.See alsoWinters, Power in Motion, pp 47±94. 102 RRobison,` Structuresof power and the industrialization process inSoutheast Asia’ , Journal of ContemporaryAsia ,Vol19, No 4, 1989, pp 384± 385. 103 Dixon, SoutheastAsia in the World Economy ,pp195± 200. 104 Robison,` Structuresof power and the industrialization process inSoutheast Asia’ ,pp.385± 387. 105 RStubbs,` Thepolitical economy of the Asia± Paci® cregion’, inR Stubbs& GRD Underhill(eds), PoliticalEconomy and the Changing Global Order ,London:Macmillan, 1994, p 372;and N Matsui,` New economicpatterns in East Asia directinvestments and competition between theUS andJapan’ , Journal of AsiaPaci® c Economy ,Vol1, No 1, 1996, pp 39± 58. 106 Onthe origins and rise of Pancasila see DERamage, Politicsin Indonesia: Democracy, Islamand the Ideologyof Tolerance ,London:Routledge, 1995, especially pp1± 44, 184± 202. 107 Whileorganicist and integralist ideas are representedas indigenoustheir lineage can betraced to continentalEurope and to a lesser extentJapan, combining conservative totalitarian and corporatist ideas withromantic visions of harmonious communities in pre-colonial Indonesia. Bourchier, ` Lineagesof organicistpolitical thought in Indonesia’ , pp80± 83, 212± 215, 222± 223, 234, 239± 241, 255± 257. 108 HAntloÈv,` Tracingthe roots of the contemporary Indonesian state’ ,inML HeikkilaÈ&JSeppaÈnen(eds), SoutheastAsia: Contemporary Perspectives ,Helsinki:Finnish Association of East Asian Studies1990, pp 66±67. 109 JPemberton, Onthe Subject of ª Javaº ,Ithaca, NC:Cornell University Press, 1994,pp 148± 235, 269± 318. 110 JPemberton,` Recollectionsfrom ª BeautifulIndonesiaº (somewhere beyondthe postmodern)’ , Public Culture,Vol6, No 2, 1994, pp 241, 246± 255. 111 HSender,` TheSuhartos: Bambang’ s challenge’, FarEastern Economic Review ,5September1996, pp. 56±57. 112 Onthe economic shift in the1980s see HHill,` TheEconomy’ , inHill Indonesia’s New Order pp 103±104; andWinters, Powerin Motion ,1996,pp 142± 191. 113 AHeryanto,` Aclass act’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,16June 1994, p 30;and Winters, Power in Motion,1996,pp 184± 185. 114 MacIntyre,` Power,prosperity and patrimonialism: business and government in Indonesia’ , inMacIntyre, Businessand Government in Industrialising Asia , p 264. 115 RRobison,` Industrializationand the economic and political development of capital:the case ofIndonesia’, inR McVey (ed), SoutheastAsian Capitalists ,Ithaca, NY: SoutheastAsia Program,Cornell University, 1992,pp 65, 88. See alsoWinters, Powerin Motion , 1996. 116 AHeryanto,` Indonesianmiddle class oppositionin the 1990s’ , inRodan, PoliticalOpposition in IndustrialisingAsia ,pp241, 247, 265. 117 AUhlin,` Transnationaldemocratic diffusionand Indonesian democracy discourses’, Third World Quarterly,Vol14, No 3, 1993; Chua B H,`Lookingfor democratization in post-Soeharto Indonesia’ , ContemporarySoutheast Asia ,Vol15, No 2, 1993,pp 144±145, 148± 157; and E Aspinall,` Thebroadening base ofpolitical opposition in Indonesia’ , inRodan, PoliticalOpposition in Industrialising Asia , pp217± 219, 228. 118 MVatikiotis, IndonesianPolitics Under Suharto: Order, Developmentand Pressure forChange , London: Routledge,1994; pp 114± 115. 119 SAzman, `Indonesia:civil power’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,1April1993, p 16.Liberal technocrats were alsoseen tohave been downgraded relative tothe economic nationalists led by BachruddinHabibie, Suharto’s ministerfor research andtechnology and a close adviser.H Sender,` New boys’challenge’ , Far EasternEconomic Review ,1April1993, pp 72± 75. See alsoS Azman, `New crew ondeck’, Far Eastern EconomicReview ,22April 1993, p 41. 120 Heryanto,` Indonesianmiddle class oppositionin the 1990s’ , inRodan, PoliticalOpposition in 360 OLD STATE AND NEW EMPIRE ININDONESIA

IndustrialisingAsia ,1996,pp 247,257± 258; and Aspinall, ` Thebroadening base ofpoliticalopposition in Indonesia’, p231. 121 JMcBeth,` Indonesia:power couple’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,16February 1995, pp 26± 27. 122 Heryanto,` Indonesianmiddle class oppositionin the 1990s’ , pp255± 256, 258± 259. On PERTAMINA see Bresnan, ManagingIndonesia ,pp164± 193; and Winters, Powerin Motion ,1996,pp 82± 91, 105± 106. 123 JMcBeth,` Theyear ofdoing business’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,1September1994, pp 70± 72. 124 Heryanto,` Indonesianmiddle class oppositionin the 1990s’ , pp245± 253. 125 VRHadiz,` Workersand working class politicsin the 1990s’ , inJ Hardjono& CManning(eds), Indonesia Assessment 1993 ,Canberra:Research Schoolof Paci® cStudies,Australian National University, 1993, pp 186±187. 126 Heryanto,` AClass Act’ ,p30. 127 OToÈrnquist, What’s WrongWith Marxism? ,pp176± 177. 128 Hadiz,` Challengingstate corporatismon the labour front’ , pp191± 192. 129 Suhartoquoted in ibid.,pp193± 194. 130 Hadiz,` Challengingstate corporatismon the labour front’ , p195. 131 ToÈrnquist, What’s WrongWith Marxism? ,pp,177± 182, 215. 132 Hadiz,` Workersand working class politicsin the 1990s’ , p190;and Hadiz, ` Challengingstate corporatism onthe labour front’ , p191. 133 R Lambert, AuthoritarianState Unionism in New Order Indonesia ,Perth:Asia Research Centre,Murdoch University,Working Paper no 25, October 1993, pp 4, 22. 134 Hadiz, `Workersand working class politicsin the 1990s’ , IndonesiaAssessment 1993 ,1993,pp 187± 188. 135 `Indonesia:minimum wage sought’, AsianLabour Update ,No14, 1994, pp 14± 15. 136 Indonesia:Medan awakes’ , AsianLabour Update ,No15, 1994, pp 1, 3; and ` Indonesia:crackdown in Medan’ , AsianLabour Update ,16,1994, pp 20± 21. 137 MCohen,` Indonesia:still hard labour’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,27October 1994, pp 20± 21. 138 Hadiz,` Workersand working class politicsin the 1990s’ , pp191± 193; and Hadiz, ` Thepolitical signi®cance ofrecent workingclass actionin Indonesia’ , inBourchier (ed), Indonesia’s Emerging Proletariat , pp 68±69. 139 Lambert, AuthoritarianState Unionism in New Order Indonesia , pp 22±25. 140 Interestingly,although the PRD activistsconcerned were regularlyrepresented as keyinstigators of the eventsof late July1996, their actual trialhas onlytouched on this issue, focusing instead on their involvementin labour-related activities. M Cohen,` Indonesia:driven by dissent’ , FarEastern Economic Review,2January1997, pp 14± 15. 141 Lambert, AuthoritarianState Unionism in New Order Indonesia , pp 22±25. 142 Anderson,` Radicalism after communismin Thailand and Indonesia’ , p14. 143 Hadiz,` Challengingstate corporatismon the labour front’ , pp195± 202. 144 JMcBeth,` Indonesia:social dynamite’, FarEastern Economic Review ,15February 1996, pp 20± 22; McBeth,` Indonesia:coming together’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,15February 1996, pp 24; and VR Hadiz,` Responseto riots signals new disorder’, Asiaview,Vol6, No 3, November 1996, pp 1, 4. 145 `Indonesia:Asia’ ssmoulderingvolcano?’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,15February 1996, p 7;and J Laber,` SmolderingIndonesia’ , TheNew York Review ofBooks ,Vol44, No 1, 9January1997, pp 40±45. See also` After Suharto,what?’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,30January 1997.

361