The Rise of Populism: an Examination Into the Conditions That

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The Rise of Populism: An Examination into the Conditions That Allow for the Rise of Populist Parties in Europe and the United States by SAM PETITT A THESIS Presented to the Department of Political Science and the Robert D. Clark Honors College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts June 2019 An Abstract of the Thesis of Sam Petitt for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in the Department of Political Science to be taken June 2019 Title: The Rise of Populism: An Examination into the Conditions That Allow for the Rise of Populist Parties in Europe and the United States Approved: _______________________________________ Priscilla Southwell This paper seeks to understand the conditions that have led to the rise of populism across Europe and in the United States. To that end, this paper sets about defining the term populism, which it concludes to be a mode of articulation that divides the political sphere between a construction of the people, pitted against a construction of some ‘other’ most often political elites. It will also be determined that populism today is largely a response to the dominant ideology of liberal democracy which encompasses most of western society. This paper then takes a look at what main issues are said to be most salient to the success of populism in its opposition to liberal democracy, and will identify immigration, economic issues, Euroscepticism, gatekeeping issues, and the use of media as the most relevant issues. Populist actors from the countries of Austria, France, Italy and the United States will then be examined in context of these issues to see which are most important in understanding their success. Ultimately, this paper will find immigration and gatekeeping issues to be the most important in understanding the success and failure of populist actors in these countries, and conclude that populism arises the strongest in areas where the decision making capabilities of national governments are constrained in some way ii Acknowledgements I would like to thank Professor Priscilla Southwell, Professor Joseph Lowndes and Professor Casey Shoop for helping me to fully examine the causes of populism and consider the various perspectives and contexts related to populism. I feel lucky to have the privilege to work with such excellent professors and am grateful for their guidance in helping me with this strenuous but rewarding process. I would also like to thank my parents for their continuous love and support, without which I would not be here now. iii Table of Contents 1: Introduction: 1 2. Methods: 3 3: Review of Existing Literature: 6 3.1: What Is Populism? 6 3.2: What Causes Populism? 20 4: Case Studies: 37 4.1: Italy 37 The Northern League (Lega Nord/LN/The League) 38 History 38 Rhetoric 44 Voter Composition 48 Immigration 50 The Economy 53 European Union 54 Gatekeeping Issues 56 Conclusions 57 The Five Star Movement: (M5S) 59 History 59 Rhetoric 60 Voter composition 62 Immigration 63 Economy 63 Gatekeeping 64 Media 65 Conclusions: 66 Overall conclusions on Italian populism 67 4.2: Austria 69 iv Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) 69 History 69 Rhetoric 73 Voter Composition 77 Immigration 79 The Economy 84 European Union 85 Gatekeeping Issues 87 Conclusions 91 4.3: France 93 The National Front (FN) 93 History 94 Rhetoric 100 Voter Composition 101 Immigration 102 The Economy 105 European Union 107 Gatekeeping Issues 108 Conclusions 111 4.4: The United States of America 114 History 114 Rhetoric 126 Voter Composition 136 Identity Issues 139 Economic Issues 143 Gatekeeping Issues 146 Media 151 Conclusions 153 5: Results and Conclusions 158 Bibliography 176 v 1: Introduction: Populism is a political term that has been around for over a century. In the 19th century, it was a term used to describe American and Russian agrarian movements. In the 20th century, it was mainly used to describe a certain brand of politics that had overtaken many countries in Latin America. However, the term was also used to describe radical American political figures in the 50’s and 60’s, such as Joseph McCarthy and George Wallace. Later in the 1980’s and 1990’s the term began to be applied to radical right European parties such as the Front National in France and the Austrian Freedom Party in Austria. Now, in the 21st century, the term has been used to describe a wide array of actors across the political spectrum. In the United States, both the Occupy Wall Street movement and the Tea Party movement have been described as populist, with both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump being described as populist candidates. In Europe, the term has been assigned to political parties on both the left (Syrizia, Podemos) and the right (UKIP, Forza Italia). Some countries, such as Italy and Greece, have multiple populist parties in power, leading some to say that those countries’ politics have now been defined by populism. Significant events in Europe, such as the decision by Britain to leave the EU, has also been attributed to the rise of populist sentiment. Populism then is a long enduring political concept, one that seems even more salient today if one wants to understand the current political climate. And yet this term can seem almost impossible to define. How can one label be used to describe different political actors who have seemingly contradictory views and positions from one another? And how has populism come to the forefront of politics in several different countries, all with their own political rules and culture? These are the questions this thesis will answer in depth, by looking through several ideas and definitions of what populism is and by analyzing several different populist parties across Europe and the United States. At the end, this paper hopes to explain what populism is and what conditions allow for the rise and strength of populist parties? 2 2. Methods: I will be taking a qualitative approach to my thesis question. This will start with a review of the existing literature on populism to analyze how other scholars have defined the term throughout time, and investigate whether there is a consensus or common points of agreement on what the term is, and what conditions allow for its rise. These sources will include what other scholars have said about the resurgence of populism, in order to get a grasp of the basic theories that already exist on the subject, but it will also be important to look at statements from populist parties themselves, to see if what scholars write about them matches up with their rhetoric. The specific kind of detail I will be looking for are the conditions that allow for the rise of populist parties. Existing literature has a wide variety of opinions on this matter, and I will be attempting to see which explanations best fit the political reality. For example, if one theory states that populist parties arise in countries with strong constitutional courts, and yet most countries with strong populist parties have weak court systems, then that theory will fail to hold water. It will also be important to look for why people claim to support populist parties, and what issues they say are most important to them. This information will be gathered from interviews with supporters of populist parties, as well as looking at the voter composition of populist parties to see if certain attributes (age, class, race) indicate a higher likelihood that a person will vote populist. Additionally, the issues that populist candidates highlight most frequently could also give important insight into what conditions spur the rise of populism. For example, if most populist candidates reference immigration as a key issue that needs resolving, then perhaps a perceived immigration crisis can be said to be one of the 3 fundamental conditions that create a political atmosphere in which populists can see success. To narrow my scope, I will be looking at the populist parties of four countries in particular, Austria, the United States, Italy, and France. The US was chosen because it is viewed to be one of the birth places of populism, and thus makes for a particularly interesting study to see how populism has evolved throughout time. Austria was chosen because it is said to have one of the most successful populist parties in Europe, the FPO. Italy was chosen as it is a country with several populist actors of importance, and thus makes an interesting case study for a country that has come to be dominated by populism. France was chosen because its populist party, the Front National, is one of the oldest populist parties in Europe, and set the template for many other populist parties to come. When analyzing these countries, I will be looking at both the rhetoric of populist actors, to see how they self-identify, and the potential causes that may have contributed to their success or failure. The impact of these populist actors can be measured in terms of electoral success and policy success. Electoral success is straightforwardly how successful the parties are in elections, what percentages of the vote they receive, and what positions of power they are able to obtain. Policy success will be measured by what degree populist parties and candidates are able to implement their policy outcomes, or sway other parties to adopt their positions. While electoral success can lead to policy success, it is not necessarily a required condition, as can be seen in the example of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Despite obtaining only 4 poor electoral results, UKIP was still able to obtain its main goal of getting Britain to leave the EU.
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