Loose, Patrice Koelsch All Rights Reserved ROGER BACON on PERCEPTION: a RECONSTRUCTION
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Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 8001775 L o o s e, P a t r ic e K o e l s c h ROGER BACON ON PERCEPTION: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY OF VISUAL PERCEPTION EXPOUNDED IN THE "OPUS MAJUS" The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1979 University Microfilms International300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 18 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4EJ, England Copyright 1979 by Loose, Patrice Koelsch All Rights Reserved ROGER BACON ON PERCEPTION: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE' THEORY OF VISUAL PERCEPTION EXPOUNDED IN THE OPUS MAJUS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Patrice Koelsch Loose, B.A., M.A. # # # * # The Ohio State University 1979 Reading Committee: proved By Ivan Boh Peter K. Machamer Robert G. Turnbull uo-Aavisers Department of Philosophy VITA September 12, 19^9 Born - Bronx, New York 1968-1971 .... Honors Program, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 197 1 .............. B.A. cum laude, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1972 .............. Phi Beta Kappa 1971-1975 .... University fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1972-1974 .... Teaching assistant, Depart ment of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 197 3.............. M.A. The Ohio State Univer sity , Columbus, Ohio 1975-1979 .... Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois ii TABLE OP CONTENTS Page VITA ................................................ ii INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1 PART I Chapter 1. The Platonic Theory of V i s i o n ............ 10 2. The Aristotelian Account of Perception. 30 3. Augustine on Sense-Perception and Divine Illumination ....................... 76 4. Robert Grosseteste and the Philosophy of Light..................................... 1*11 PART II Chapter 5. The Baconian Synthesis..................... 179 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 283 iii INTRODUCTION My purpose in this dissertation is to reconstruct and provide a critical analysis of the theory of perception developed by Roger Bacon in the Opus Majus. I will attempt to explicate the particular psychological, epistemic, and theological doctrines embedded in Bacon's theory of perception. I take it that Bacon's theory has two aspects. One aspect is developed in his theory of optics and the anatomy of the eye. Sight is explicated entirely in terms of geometrical figures and principles. I do not intend to lay out Bacon's theory of geometrical optics in detail in this dissertation. The significance of this aspect of perception for my purposes is the concept that sight can be geometrically characterized, and consequently, the formal causes of purely perspectival science can be known with mathematical certainty. My concern is with the other aspect of perception, namely the cognitive aspect. I shall first examine what I take to be the psychological Issues implicit in Bacon's discussion of the sensitive soul and its faculties. I will then turn to the epistemic implications of his treatment of the hierarchy of cognitive elements involved in perception. My ultimate aim is to show how the theory of perception derives from a 1 2 particular epistemic view that takes its own character and motivation from Augustinian theological concerns. I will be especially interested in the role of sensory perception as preliminary to obtaining spiritual knowledge. The scope of the Opus Majus is encyclopaedic, and Bacon’s genius is syncretic rather than innovative. Thus, in order to reconstruct and analyze Bacon's theory, it is necessary to isolate and evaluate the seminal historical antecedents that shape his work. Hence, in the first part of this dissertation I shall address myself to what I take to be the four major influences on Bacon’s theory of perception: (1) the Platonic theory of vision, (2) the Aristotel an account of sense perception, (3) the Neoplatonic theology of St. Augustine, and (4) the "light metaphysics" of Robert Grossteste. The Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of percep tion were of special significance to Medieval natural scientists. Both Plato and Aristotle consider seeing the superior sensory modality and thus concern themselves primarily with visual perception. The emphasis on vision as the epistemically privileged mode of perception carries over to the Thirteenth Century; consequently, my own emphasis throughout this dissertation will be on the sensory and cognitive mechanisms involved in visual perception. Again, my intent is not to provide a history of analysis of ancient theories of perception (I am not, for example, going to discuss the Epicurean account of vision) but rather, I want to focus on those aspects of these early perceptual theories that were seminal to the development of the Medieval perceptual theories of Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon. In the case of Bacon particularly, T will show that there is a very strong connection between the science of optics and the philosophical/theological concerns of the acquisition of knowledge. Chapter 1: In the first chapter I set out the account of perception given by Plato in the Timaeus and the Theatetus. Plato advocates an extramission theory of vision which can best be interpreted as requiring the motion of particles in place rather than the transfer of particles through space. I claim that the treatment of the processes of sensory perception must be understood as deriving from Plato’s metaphysics. The objects of sense perception are merely appearances in the unstable world of becoming, and are not objects of knowledge. This interpretation is based on arguments in the Theatetus and the Republic that perception is not knowledge. 1J Chapter 2_: In contrast to the predominantly metaphysical orientation of Plato, Aristotle approaches perception from the standpoint of the psychologist interested in the behavior of the organism interacting with its environ ment. My explication of the Aristotelian account of perception will follow Aristotle’s own discussion in De Anima beginning with the objects of the special sense and the common sensibles, and proceeding to the various faculties of the sensitive soul. I shall then turn to the cognitive processes, and I will discuss at length the role of the active intellect, paying particular attention to W. D. Ross’ interpretation of it as that by which one acquires knowledge of abstractions that are not presented in sense-experience. Whereas the passive aspect of nous acquires knowledge of universals exemplified by the objects apprehended by sense, the active intellect enables one to make purely theoretical inferences in metaphysics. (In the last chapter I will explain why Bacon mistakenly identifies the active Intellect with God.) Chapter 3.: I shall then proceed to the Augustinian theory of knowledge, which was to play a form&tive role in the development of medieval theology, particularly among the Franciscans. I shall discuss briefly Augustine's theory that all knowledge Is a function of the soul, and the role of memory in recognizing the objects of sensation. I will focus on Augustine’s attempt to explain the nature of sense-perception. Augustine grants that perception is not merely some modification of the sense-organ, but involves the mind's being in some significant way aware of the modification. My concern is with Augustine's attempt to explain the mind's awareness without supposing that it is somehow caused or initiated by the sense-organ, since this would violate the basic Augustinian tenet that,