DOCSLIB.ORG

We, the People State of the U.S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
We, the People State of the U.S We, The People State of the U.S. Constitution, Sept. 17, 2020 The U.S. Constitution is the oldest living constitution in the world to date; it was drafted in 1787 and ratified with the Bill of Rights four years later. The U.S. Constitution was designed by the founders to prevent monarchy and authoritarianism and to safeguard rights of we, the people. The U.S. Constitution is extended and supported by legislation, laws and statues (U.S. Code, Code of Federal Regulations), and court decisions ruling on their consitutionality. When the issues can not be resolved with the Constitution through the courts (Judicial branch) and other parts of government, there is a constiutitonal crisis. Included are many recent news stories and events. Which provisions of the U.S. Consitution are upheld or violated? What is the prognosis, and what are the solutions? Preamble: We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. Copies of the U.S. Constitution: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/index.html Larger type size, shows original text, but with links to updates to deleted sections https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/ Has clause nos., links to annotations, original text, current provisions for deleted clauses not clearly shown Current Events and News 1. The president of the United States stated that the Executive branch (Article II of the U.S. Constitution) gives him the right to do anything he wants to do with the U.S. government (BriceSaddler, 2019). Violated or not? https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-teens- constitution-gives-him-right-do-whatever-i-want/ (If there is a paywall in the link, CiAM students and faculty may find the Washington Post article in the online Lirn Library, in “Publicaton” tab of ProQuest Central datbase. Search for newspaper title in Washington Post Online edition only, then find the e-newspaper year and date, then search for title of article.) Art. II, Sec. 1 2. Corasaniti and Haberman (2016) note the undertones of violence, when then candidate Donald Trump declared that the 2nd amendment can be used to take care of the appointment of U.S. Supreme Court judges. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html (If there is a paywall, you may find New York Times (Online dition only) in the online Lirn Library, in “Publicaton” tab of ProQuest Central datbase. Search for the e-newspaper title, then search for the newspaper year and date, then finally search for part of article title. ) Art. 4. Sec. 4 2nd Amendment 3. The majority leader of the U.S. Senate refused to hold hearings on a candidate from the opposing political party for consideration on the U.S. Supreme court (Rupar, 2019). https://www.vox.com/2019/5/29/18644061/mitch-mcconnell-supreme-court-hearings-2020-merrick-garland Art. II, Sec. 2, clause 2 (Advise and consent by the Senate)) 4. The executive administration of the United States expounded (spent) money from the Pentagon (military) budget, in order to have funds to build part of a wall on the southern border of the Unted States, without appropriations (approval) from the U.S. House of Representatives (Brookton, 2020). https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13/805796618/trump-administration-diverts-3-8-billion-in-pentagon-funding- to-border-wall Art. I, Sec. 7 5. President Trump knew about the severity of Covid-19 in February, 2020. He admitted then that he wanted to keep downplaying it, to keep the people from panicking (Behrmann, 2020). The people panicked in March, 2020. Trump discounted the severity of the flu, refused to step up testing and protective supplies effectively, leaving it to the states. He encouraged people to violate advice of health experts, and promoted quack cures (Lopez, 2020). Six months later, nearly 190,000 Americans have died of Covid, due to the president’s deception, failure to faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States and ensure the public health and safety. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/09/09/heres-what-trump-told- public-versus-bob-woodward-covid-19/5764729002/ https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2020/9/9/21429166/trump-woodward-rage-coronavirus-covid-19- pandemic Preamble (…”promote the general welfare…) Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 8 (faithfully excecute, oath) 6. The current administration has failed to faithfully execute the duties of the presidency and ensure the welfare and security of the people of the United States. Regulations to protect the environment have been rolled back, unprecedented in modern times, and the needs to address climate change and the Covid pandemic have been ignored. Preamble (…”promote the general welfare…) Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 18 (make legislation necessary and proper) 7. Many police departments in many states have Police Bill of Rights, which are really labor agreements that give police officers wide discretion when faced with the extreme dangers encountered on their jobs. However, the police are most generally not held accountable (Tan, R. 2020) for killings of unarmed suspects on their beat, nor brought to trial, on account of these widely adopted Police Bill of Rights (Bernstein, 2020). https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/08/29/police-bill-of-rights-officers-discipline-maryland/ (CiAM students and faculty may find the Washington Post article in the online edition only in the online Lirn Library, in “Publicaton” tab of ProQuest Central datbase. Search for newspaper title, then find year and date of e-newspaper, then search for title of article.) https://wjla.com/news/nation-world/law-enforcement-officers-bill-of-rights Amendment 6 Amendment 14, Sec. 1 8. The president’s incendiary comments, and his statemnts expressing racism and encouraging rough behavior by police, violance, and tacit support of white nationalists and militia (Higgins, 2020) have threatened national secuirty. Hate crimes have increased markedly duirng the president’s watch (Koski; Bantley, 2020), , and killings and injuries to black and brown people by police have increased. https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/05/01/echoing-praise-charlottesville-neo-nazis-trump-calls- armed-anti-lockdown-fanatics https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1157&context=shlj Preamble (…insure domestic Tranquility… promote the general Welfare) Art. II, Sec. 4 (high crimes and misdemeaors) 9. The U.S Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Borders and Protection, and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agenices, took parts in one or more of the following activities: Arrest of asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants, denial of counsel or trial in many instances, separation of children from their parent(s), processing of chilren in cages, and indefinate detention (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2020) in camps in sub-standard, unsafe conditions. https://www.splcenter.org/news/2020/06/18/family-separation-policy-continues-two-years-after-trump- administration-claims-it-ended Amendments 5, 6, 8, and 14 10. The president received gifts (money from his hotel in Washington, D.C.) from foreign dignatories visiting his hotel property for diplomatic business. Gifts from foreign government officials can have undue influence on the president’s policies and actions in violation of the U.S. Constitution (Constitutional Accountability Center, 2020). The president refused to divest ownership in his Washington, D.C. hotel for approximately three years. https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/trump-and-foreign-emoluments-clause/ Art. I, Sec. 9, Clause 8 (emoluments, foreign influence) 11. The president attempted to coerce a president of a foreign country, Ukraine, to provide or make up damaging information on his apponent in the upcoing presidential election, in return for releasing funding for it’s military already appropriated (approved) by the U.S. Congress (Britsh Broadcasting Company, 2020). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49800181 Art. II, Sec. 4 12. President Trump blocked congressional subpoenas before (Courthouse News Service, 2019) and during the impeachment investigation (Cohen; Polantz, 2020), and directed his White House staff not to testify. A minority of staff testified anway, but congressional oversight and the investigation has been largely obstructed. https://www.courthousenews.com/%EF%BB%BFtrump-tells-aides-to-defy-subpoenas-from- congress/ https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/30/politics/trump-impeachment-subpoena-hearing/index.html Art. 2, Sec. 4 13. Articles of impeachment were brought by the U.S. House of Representatives against the sitting president of the United States, Donald J. Trump, citing alleged misconduct. The U.S. Senate, under majority leader Mitch McConnel cleared the president without reviewing the evidence or holding a real trial in the Senate (Duehren, A. 2020). Search “ Duehren, A. 2020, Feb 01 Senate rejects witnesses in trial “ in Lirn, ProQuest Central database. Art. I, Sec. 3, Causes. 6 & 7 Art. II, Sec. 4 14. In 2003, the president at that time. George W. Bush, convinced Congress (the House of Representatives) to allowa unilateral attack Iraq, based on secretly fabricated evidence through intelligence agencies that Iraq and Sadam Hussein, their leader, had weapons of mass destruction. It was later discovered the pretext for war was false. The president was never impeached; he was not held accountable. http://albionmonitor.com/0402a/iraqwarunconstitutional.html Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 11 Art. 2, Sec. 2, Clause 1 15. The U.S. House of Representatives for decades has ceded power to initiate military conflicts to the president. According to the U.S. Consitution, the president is the one who is the Commander In Chief of the armed forces, but it has given the power to declare war (and appropriate funds) to the U.S.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • Information Warfare, International Law, and the Changing Battlefield
    ARTICLE INFORMATION WARFARE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE CHANGING BATTLEFIELD Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi* ABSTRACT The advancement of technology in the contemporary era has facilitated the emergence of information warfare, which includes the deployment of information as a weapon against an adversary. This is done using a numBer of tactics such as the use of media and social media to spread propaganda and disinformation against an adversary as well as the adoption of software hacking techniques to spread viruses and malware into the strategically important computer systems of an adversary either to steal confidential data or to damage the adversary’s security system. Due to the intangible nature of the damage caused By the information warfare operations, it Becomes challenging for international law to regulate the information warfare operations. The unregulated nature of information operations allows information warfare to Be used effectively By states and nonstate actors to gain advantage over their adversaries. Information warfare also enhances the lethality of hyBrid warfare. Therefore, it is the need of the hour to arrange a new convention or devise a new set of rules to regulate the sphere of information warfare to avert the potential damage that it can cause to international peace and security. ABSTRACT ................................................................................................. 901 I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 903 II. WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? .............................
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World
    STUDY Requested by the DROI subcommittee The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world @Adobe Stock Authors: Carme COLOMINA, Héctor SÁNCHEZ MARGALEF, Richard YOUNGS European Parliament coordinator: Policy Department for External Relations EN Directorate General for External Policies of the Union PE 653.635 - April 2021 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT STUDY The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world ABSTRACT Around the world, disinformation is spreading and becoming a more complex phenomenon based on emerging techniques of deception. Disinformation undermines human rights and many elements of good quality democracy; but counter-disinformation measures can also have a prejudicial impact on human rights and democracy. COVID-19 compounds both these dynamics and has unleashed more intense waves of disinformation, allied to human rights and democracy setbacks. Effective responses to disinformation are needed at multiple levels, including formal laws and regulations, corporate measures and civil society action. While the EU has begun to tackle disinformation in its external actions, it has scope to place greater stress on the human rights dimension of this challenge. In doing so, the EU can draw upon best practice examples from around the world that tackle disinformation through a human rights lens. This study proposes steps the EU can take to build counter-disinformation more seamlessly into its global human rights and democracy policies.
    [Show full text]
  • Taming the Trolls: the Need for an International Legal Framework to Regulate State Use of Disinformation on Social Media
    Taming the Trolls: The Need for an International Legal Framework to Regulate State Use of Disinformation on Social Media * ASHLEY C. NICOLAS INTRODUCTION Consider a hypothetical scenario in which hundreds of agents of the Russian GRU arrive in the United States months prior to a presidential election.1 The Russian agents spend the weeks leading up to the election going door to door in vulnerable communities, spreading false stories intended to manipulate the population into electing a candidate with policies favorable to Russian positions. The agents set up television stations, use radio broadcasts, and usurp the resources of local newspapers to expand their reach and propagate falsehoods. The presence of GRU agents on U.S. soil is an incursion into territorial integrity⎯a clear invasion of sovereignty.2 At every step, Russia would be required to expend tremendous resources, overcome traditional media barriers, and risk exposure, making this hypothetical grossly unrealistic. Compare the hypothetical with the actual actions of the Russians during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Sitting behind computers in St. Petersburg, without ever setting foot in the United States, Russian agents were able to manipulate the U.S. population in the most sacred of domestic affairs⎯an election. Russian “trolls” targeted vulnerable populations through social media, reaching millions of users at a minimal cost and without reliance on established media institutions.3 Without using * Georgetown Law, J.D. expected 2019; United States Military Academy, B.S. 2009; Loyola Marymount University M.Ed. 2016. © 2018, Ashley C. Nicolas. The author is a former U.S. Army Intelligence Officer.
    [Show full text]
  • PERSUADE OR PERISH Addressing Gaps in the U.S
    PERSUADE OR PERISH Addressing Gaps in the U.S. Posture to Confront Propaganda and Disinformation Threats Dr. Haroro J. Ingram Program on Extremism Policy Paper February 2020 PERSUADE OR PERISH 1 INGRAM | PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM Abstract: The purpose of this policy paper is to assess the U.S. government’s posture to deal with malicious ‘influence activities’ (i.e. propaganda and disinformation) by state and nonstate actors. It argues that while the U.S. government has provided inconsistent support for its foreign policy and national security information sector for decades, since 2017 an effort has been made to lay the foundations for a rejuvenated U.S. posture to address propaganda and disinformation threats. However, significant gaps remain that will weaken those foundation building efforts if left unaddressed. This paper concludes with four recommendations focusing on (i.) the need to learn lessons from the institutions’ history, (ii.) the value of an overarching paradigm through which to understand a spectrum of threats, (iii.) the important role of overt attributed U.S government messaging, and (iv.) initiatives to strategically cohere interagency activities. The United States and its allies are facing a complex spectrum of propaganda and disinformation threats that are rapidly evolving strategically, operationally, and technologically. 1 The U.S. government’s ability to address these malicious ‘influence activities’ will depend on its adoption of an appropriately balanced, resourced, and legislatively empowered posture that will be as much a product of institutional history as contemporary strategic-policy decisions. This policy paper assesses the U.S. government’s posture to deal with these threats and outlines ways in which strategic-policy gaps, drawn from this analysis, can be tackled.
    [Show full text]
  • Active Measures: the Secret History of Disinformation & Political
    Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation & Political Warfare | Thomas Rid Philosophers have only interpreted the world. The point, May 25th, 2020 however, is to change it. — Karl Marx INTRODUCTION Thomas Rid is Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Rid’s latest book, Active Measures, a startling history of disinformation, was published in late April 2020 with Farrar, Straus and Giroux (also in Russian, Japanese, Polish). His most recent book, Rise of the Machines (2016), tells the sweeping story of how cybernetics, a late- 1940s theory of machines, came to incite anarchy and war (also in Chinese, Russian, German, Japanese, Turkish). His 2015 article “Attributing Cyber Attacks” was designed to explain, guide, and improve the identification of network breaches (Journal of Strategic Studies 2015). In 2013 he published the widely-read book Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Rid’s Ph.D. thesis, “War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq,” was the first academic analysis of the role of embedded media in the 2003 Iraq War, providing a concise history of US military public affairs management since Vietnam. Rid testified on information security in front of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as well as in the German Bundestag and the UK Parliament. From 2011 to 2016, Rid was a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Between 2003 and 2010, he worked at major think tanks in Berlin, Paris, Jerusalem, and Washington, DC. Rid holds a PhD from Humboldt University in Berlin.
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy and Disinformation (Glbl S343e)
    DEMOCRACY AND DISINFORMATION (GLBL S343E) Asha Rangappa Yale Jackson Institute for Global Affairs Summer 2020 Overview of Course This course explores the evolution of information warfare as a national security threat to the United States. Beginning with the KGB’s use of “active measures” during the Cold War, the course looks at how propaganda and disinformation campaigns became central to the Putin regime and how social media has facilitated their expansion and impact. Using Russia’s efforts in the 2016 election as an example, students will examine how the First Amendment places limitations on the U.S.’s ability to counter such operations in the United States and explore how strengthening critical thinking and American social capital might be effective prophylactics against these efforts. At the end of this course, students should be able to: 1. Understand the history, tactics, and goals of Russian disinformation operations in the United States and worldwide; 2. Analyze the ways in which propaganda and disinformation manipulates consumers’ cognitive biases; 3. Recognize self-created vulnerabilities in American society which have been magnified by social media platforms and exploited by Russian intelligence; 4. Develop policy solutions that address the multi-faceted nature of disinformation and its impact on American democracy. Required Texts (in order of reading for the course) 1. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone 2. Amy Chua, Political Tribes 3. Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not By Me) 4. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (chapters will be posted on Canvas) 5. Clint Watts, Messing with the Enemy You may use the link below to order your books at the Yale Bookstore: Yale Bookstore ordering site In addition to the books above, assigned articles, videos, and selected chapters of other books will be posted on Canvas for the weeks they are assigned.
    [Show full text]
  • Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis CONTENTS
    Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................... 1 What Techniques Do Media Manipulators Use? ....... 33 Understanding Media Manipulation ............................ 2 Participatory Culture ........................................... 33 Who is Manipulating the Media? ................................. 4 Networks ............................................................. 34 Internet Trolls ......................................................... 4 Memes ................................................................. 35 Gamergaters .......................................................... 7 Bots ...................................................................... 36 Hate Groups and Ideologues ............................... 9 Strategic Amplification and Framing ................. 38 The Alt-Right ................................................... 9 Why is the Media Vulnerable? .................................... 40 The Manosphere .......................................... 13 Lack of Trust in Media ......................................... 40 Conspiracy Theorists ........................................... 17 Decline of Local News ........................................ 41 Influencers............................................................ 20 The Attention Economy ...................................... 42 Hyper-Partisan News Outlets ............................. 21 What are the Outcomes? ..........................................
    [Show full text]
  • Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy
    E-PAPER A Companion to Democracy #3 Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy LEJLA TURCILO AND MLADEN OBRENOVIC A Publication of Heinrich Böll Foundation, August 2020 Preface to the e-paper series “A Companion to Democracy” Democracy is multifaceted, adaptable – and must constantly meet new challenges. Democratic systems are influenced by the historical and social context, by a country’s geopolitical circumstances, by the political climate and by the interaction between institutions and actors. But democracy cannot be taken for granted. It has to be fought for, revitalised and renewed. There are a number of trends and challenges that affect democracy and democratisation. Some, like autocratisation, corruption, the delegitimisation of democratic institutions, the shrinking space for civil society or the dissemination of misleading and erroneous information, such as fake news, can shake democracy to its core. Others like human rights, active civil society engagement and accountability strengthen its foundations and develop alongside it. The e-paper series “A Companion to Democracy” examines pressing trends and challenges facing the world and analyses how they impact democracy and democratisation. Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy 2/ 38 Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy 3 Lejla Turcilo and Mladen Obrenovic Contents 1. Introduction 4 2. Historical origins of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation 5 3. Information disorder – key concepts and definitions 7 3.1. Fake news – definitions, motives, forms 7 3.2. Disinformation, misinformation, malinformation 8 4. Distortion of truth and manipulation of consent 12 5. Democracy at risk in post-truth society – how misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation destroy democratic values 17 6.
    [Show full text]
  • POL211H1F: Intelligence, Disinformation, and Deception— Challenges of Global Governance in the Digital Age
    POL211H1F: Intelligence, Disinformation, and Deception— Challenges of Global Governance in The Digital Age University of Toronto, Department of Political Science Fall 2020 Online delivery (Quercus, Zoom) Instructors: ● Professor Jon R. Lindsay, [email protected] ○ Office hour: Thursday 2p, Zoom ● Professor Janice G. Stein, [email protected] ○ Office hour: Monday 4p, Zoom Teaching assistants: ● Head TA: Jasmine Chorley Foster, [email protected] ○ Office hour: Thursday 10-11am, Zoom ● Milan Ilnyckyj, [email protected] ● Steven Loleski, [email protected] ○ Office hour: Wednesday 6-7pm, Zoom Contents Description ................................................................................................................................. 2 Course Organization .................................................................................................................. 3 Assignments .............................................................................................................................. 4 Schedule .................................................................................................................................... 7 Introduction (Week 1 - Mon. 21 Sept.) .................................................................................... 7 1. Course organization ................................................................................................. 7 Part I: Intelligence ..................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Countering Russian Social Media Influence
    Countering Russian Social Media Influence Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Andrew Radin, Elina Treyger C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2740 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0182-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Combatting Russian Social Media Information Opera- tions in the United States. The purpose of this project was to formulate specific and actionable approaches and policies for countering Russian disinformation on social media inside the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic Resilience Against Disinformation And
    COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY (CDS) BOLSTERING THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF THE ALLIANCE AGAINST DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA Preliminary Draft Special Report by Linda SANCHEZ (United States) Special Rapporteur 013 CDS 21 E | Original: English | 31 March 2021 Founded in 1955, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly acts as a consultative interparliamentary organisation which is institutionally separate from NATO. This working document only represents the views of the Rapporteur until it has been adopted by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security. It is based on information from publicly available sources or NATO PA meetings – which are all unclassified. 013 CDS 21 E TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 II. A GROWING THREAT WITH A PERVASIVE IMPACT ON THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF ALLIED SOCIETIES............................................................................ 2 A. DEFINING DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA........................................................... 2 B. THE MISUSE OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND THE GROWING DISSEMINATION OF DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA ......................................... 2 C. THE IMPACT OF DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA ON THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF ALLIED SOCIETIES .................................................................................. 4 III. THE PROLIFERATION OF ACTORS DISSEMINATING DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA .............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]