The Idea of Popular Sovereignty

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The Idea of Popular Sovereignty The Sooner Magazine 199 in the Grundlagen of American de- mocracy ; yet his was an important ser- vice to the development of the demo- cratic ideal. By popularization of the state-of-nature speculation, he contribut- sovereignty theorists . It popular to later The idea of ed a methodology is not to be understood that Hobbes was the first to philosophize upon the prob- BY CORTEZ A. M. EWING able existence of a pre-social state, for the idea was in existence, though in a very vague and ill-defined form, prior to the Christian era . Moreover, Althusi- us, Grotius and others used it extensively God's wisdom or from the eternal verities Despite the fact that there is to explain the inception of political so- will-natural law . There- in America no visible alternative to de- of his express ciety. None, it must be admitted, had these men delved into the funda- mocracy, this form of government is fore, ascribed to it the importance that Hobbes political organization and subjected to a tremendous storm of crit- mentals of did in his Leviathan . constructed theses on the most probable icism. Already this animadversion has pre-historic man into or- As Hobbes had sought to develop a assumed the conceit and the integrity development of political society . Seeking dif- political philosophy in defense of the of "higher criticism ." It charges that ganized travelled different Stuart dogma of absolutism, John Locke, democracy has never had a really sound ferent ends, they Hobbes glorified monarchy ; his most eminent immediate successor, and substantial basis, that it never has, routes . motivated by an entirely different pur- will, work without Locke, Hooker, Milton and Sydney de- nor never attempted to rationalize the Puri- concommitantmitant chaos, andthat theplutocracy of fended Parliament ; and Rousseau raised pose, dignity of a human tan Revolution and the idea of Parlia- United States has practically purged common man to the the his pur- mentary supremacy . Though not origi- the American democracy of its theoretical being. That the latter achieved the image of nal-he having drawn materially from function in the sphere of popular gov- pose by creating man in not detract from the the works of Hooker, Milton, Sydney ernment . Sugar-coated legislation has an animal does contribution. For and Harrington-Locke showed manifest oftentimes effected popular acquiescence importance of his thereafter, man stood up, clothed with a ability as a synthesizer of preceding lib- in untoward alterations of democratic dignity . Theretofore, eral theories . He, too, postulated a state precedents. Norman Angell gloats over new and enduring had been humble, exceedingly of nature; yet, different from Hobbes, the admission of a prominent American man was regarded as impor- he contended that life in this primitive capitalist that the people must have their humble, for he might, by near society was not, on the whole, necessarily circuses, but that thereafter the persistent tant only because he qualify for the Augus- unbearable nor extremely hazardous to plutocratic leaders are left unrestrained faultless behavior, personal safety . In fact, Locke con- their efforts at securing special privi- tinian City of God . in ceived no impelling reasons for the erec- leges and profits . Many of the critics In his Leviathan (1651), Thomas tion of the political state except for more not taken the trouble to acquaint Hobbes describes his conception of the have adequate protection to property and for themselves with the fundamental phil- state of nature. For his own particular a greater uniformity in the administration osophic tenents of democracy . With that purposes, Hobbes visualized the state of of justice . Generally, however, man was information, they fabricate many and in- nature as a dangerous society, featured fairly well behaved and considerate of teresting, theses concerning the failure of by the continuous struggle of one against the rights of others . Besides, there were system to operate for the common all and all against one (bellum omnium the certain accepted rules (natural law), that good . Without particularly holding a contra omnes) . This persistent bellicos- operated in the state of nature. But, for democracy, I believe that these ity resulted naturally from the unlimit- brief since each inhabitant acted as judge, in political surgeons should know intimately ed discretion of individuals. Without sat so far as he was personally concerned, in the nature of the organism that they accepted rules of behavior, every man the interpretation of these common rules seek to destroy. Mere lack of cordiality as the judge of his own actions . Might of behavior, there existed, on account of for a particular institution is scarcely an constituted right, not in an ethical sense, the multiplicity of judges, a general lack adequate reason for seeking its abolish- but in the capacity to enforce will . More- of uniformity of justice . Therefore, to ment . The true reformist is he who pre- over, Hobbes regarded man as selfish, escape the irksomeness and the petty sents a practical alternative . Is there quarrelsome, mean, nasty, covetous, and peculations of this unorganized society, justification for attacking the theoretical unprincipled generally . Inhabited by in- the inhabitants mutually agreed, in the basis of democracy? Does the doctrine dividuals of this sort, the state of nature social compact, to surrender certain of of popular sovereignty represent a ra- was far from an ideal place to live . And their natural rights to the community, tional explanation of fundamental politi- thus, political society, and especially au- especially those regarding the protection cal inherencies of the human individual . thority as expressed in a governmental sole effective and possession of property . Unlike the The phenomenon of American democ- sovereignty, represented the intransigence and Hobbesian thesis, the political authority racy cannot be understood and interpreted means by which the of man remained under the loose control of the without a full knowledge of the rudiments the inherent natural selfishness controlled . With community . Hobbes had argued that of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth cen- could be successfully that the original social compact selected a tury social compact theories . These the- this viewpoint, it is not strange monarchy . ruler who exercised the entire authority orists-Hooker, Hobbes, Sydney, Locke, Hobbes defended absolute ignobility of the state. This ruler was not a party Harrington, Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, However, his belief in the utter to the contract and, therefore, for prac- Milton, Montesquieu and Rousseau-for of man may well have been embraced be- tical purposes, still existent in the state one purpose or another, sought to formu- cause of his desire to create a philosophic of nature, the ruler, in his complete late a rational development of the nation- system in support of his beloved absolu- wide powers could wreak his will against any al state. Utilitarianism was as yet un- tism. Indubitably, there exists a appreciation member of the citizenry, and without re- born, and not even anticipated . Truths chasm between the Hobbes exists sponsibility . Those who opposed him, sprung inevitably from the fulness of for human nature and that which 200 The Sooner Magazine and were killed in that disobedience, Though Montesquieu was probably constituted a perfect habitation for man. were deemed by Hobbes to have com- more influential in the development of Therein, in a daze of heavenly bliss, mitted suicide. For, if a subject refused the doctrine of American democracy, his glorious man lived in perfect content- to obey the command of the sovereign, contribution did not include an ennoble- ment. It was the blessed state of non- he was deemed to revert to the state of ment of the common man. Like his interference. Life was an end within nature and the sovereign, because of predecessors, Montesquieu dallied with itself . Hunger was easily dissipated, and that fact, could employ any means of the state of nature. Indeed, at this per- private property, and love and respect coercion that he desired. iod, it was highly fashionable to em- for the same, had not yet degraded man. Locke maintained that the state, and ploy that line of reasoning. Anyone who That 'this perfect life did not persist not the king, retained the whole au- was derelict enough to omit it could was not the fault of the system, but of thority created and pooled by the social scarcely lay claim to serious thinking, the few rascals who came to exploit their contract. Hence, under his interpreta- and no philosopher would have dared to innocent and naive neighbors. The po- tion, the legislature (Parliament), as di- omit the all-important state of nature litical state, .then, was brought into be- rectly representative of the whole body from his discussions. To ignore it, would ing to restrain these immoral few. And of citizens, expressed the will of the com- have, in itself, been regarded as suffi- in order to restrain them more effectively, munity through the enactment of general cient evidence of the intellectual mendac- and without fail, complete sovereignty laws. Thus, when there arose a dispute ity of the speculator . Montesquieu bowed was vested in the whole number of in- between the legislature and the executive, to the current demands on respectable habitants. Thus, each man was not only the former was supreme. Furthermore, philosophy, but did little more than obey a citizen of the state with definite re- regardless of any assumed independence, the letter of the law. He gave very sponsibilities to the government, but he the executive was subject to and restrain- little attention to it. His was not an was also a part of the sovereign. M'an ed by the laws. If the king violated interest in such ethereal phenomena. At being naturally noble, the state would of the contract, he could be deposed, and heart a, pragmatist, he reminds us some- necessity be noble, for it was only the those who dethroned him were not revo- what of Machiavelli, and especially in totality of the power; intelligence, and lutionists .
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