DOCSLIB.ORG

Constantly Approximating Popular Sovereignty: Seven Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Constantly Approximating Popular Sovereignty: Seven Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 19 (2010-2011) Issue 2 Article 2 December 2010 Constantly Approximating Popular Sovereignty: Seven Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law Wilson R. Huhn Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Repository Citation Wilson R. Huhn, Constantly Approximating Popular Sovereignty: Seven Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 291 (2010), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/ wmborj/vol19/iss2/2 Copyright c 2010 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Wilson R. Huhn* constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated . .1 In 1988, renowned historian Edmund S. Morgan published Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America.2 In that brilliant and wide-ranging book Morgan traces how, between the time of the English Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century and the adoption of the American Constitution in 1787, the idea of “popular sovereignty”—the right of the people to govern themselves— replaced the notion of “the divine right of kings” as the acknowledged source of political power.3 The central theme of Morgan’s work is that while popular sover- eignty is a “fiction” in the sense that the people of a nation cannot actually rule them- selves without creating a government,4 over the centuries our ancestors constantly labored to create a society and a government which gradually came closer to the realization of that principle—a closer approximation of the ideal of popular sover- eignty.5 At the end of Inventing the People, Morgan concludes: * C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law; B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977. I wish to thank my colleagues, Tracy Thomas, Elisabeth Reilly, and Richard Aynes, for their valuable comments and suggestions, and my research assistant, Joshua Dean, for his untiring efforts. This research was funded with a summer fellowship from The University of Akron School of Law. 1 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), reprinted in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 406 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS] (referring to the “standard maxim for free society” that “all men are created equal”). 2 EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988). 3 See id. at 54 (“[T]he paths taken in both England and America were first laid out in seventeenth-century England when Parliament challenged the king and replaced divine right with the sovereignty of the people.”); id. at 255–56 (summarizing the work of the Levelers, John Locke, and other English citizens from that era who developed the principle of popular sovereignty). 4 See id. at 13 (“Government requires make-believe.”). 5 See id. at 152 (“The history of popular sovereignty in both England and America after 1689 can be read as a history of the successive efforts of different generations to bring the facts into closer conformity with the fiction, efforts that have gradually transformed the very structure of society.”). 291 292 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:291 From its inception in the England of the 1640s the sovereignty of the people had been filled with surprises for those who invoked it. It was a more dynamic fiction than the one it replaced, more capable of serving as a goal to be sought, never attainable, always receding, but approachable and worth approaching. It has contin- ually challenged the governing few to reform the facts of political and social existence to fit the aspirations it fosters. The presump- tion that social rank should convey a title to political authority was only the first casualty in its reformations, and we have not yet seen the last. The fiction endures. The challenge persists.6 The principle of popular sovereignty is what distinguished the new American republic from every other nation which preceded it in human history.7 Popular sov- ereignty remains the single most important animating principle of American consti- tutional law. But the concept of popular sovereignty is not a simple, unitary idea; instead, it comprises a number of interrelated and mutually reinforcing elements. In particular, the American conception of popular sovereignty embraces the follow- ing seven fundamental principles: 1. The Rule of Law. The people are sovereign and their will is expressed through law. The Constitution is ordained and established as law—the supreme law of the land. 2. Limited Government. The people are sovereign, not the government. By adopting the Constitution the people created the government, imposed limits upon its power, and divided that power among different levels and branches. 3. Inalienable Rights. Every individual person is sovereign in the sense that he or she retains certain inalienable rights, which the government is bound to respect. 4. Equal Political Rights. Each person is a sovereign political actor; therefore each person has an equal right to participate in government. Accordingly, the Constitution protects freedom of political expression, freedom of political association, the equal right to vote, and the principle of majority rule. 5. Separation of Church and State. The people are sovereign, not God. Laws reflect the will of the people, not the presumed will of God. 6 Id. at 306. 7 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 761 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Central Meaning] (referring to the people’s adoption of the Constitution of the United States as “the most participatory, majoritarian (within each state) and populist event that the planet Earth had ever seen”). 2010] CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 293 Religious authority is not a legitimate basis to support the enactment or interpretation of any law or the adoption of any official practice. 6. The Power of the National Government Over the States. The American people are sovereign, not the states. No state has the power to secede from the union or to nullify any federal law. The states retain only those powers not granted to the federal government or reserved to the people. 7. National Independence and the Limited Authority of International Law. The American people as a whole are sovereign and independent and are not subject to any foreign law or power. The political representatives of the American people have the power to abrogate treaties or other forms of international law. Over the centuries each of these constitutional principles has blossomed and borne fruit. As Morgan predicted, the principle of popular sovereignty in all of its manifestations has continued to change and develop, resulting in profound changes in the interpretation of the Constitution.8 Part I of this article defines the meaning of the term “sovereignty” generally. Part II describes how the concept of popular sovereignty was understood in America at the time of the founding and during the antebellum period, particularly as it found expression in the Declaration of Independence and the speeches of Abraham Lincoln. Part III of this article discusses the seven principles which are implicit in the American concept of popular sovereignty, and how the evolving nature of our understanding of these principles has affected the interpretation of the Constitution down to the present day. I. THE MEANING OF “SOVEREIGNTY” I use the term “sovereignty” to mean “the right to rule.”9 I refer to sovereignty as a “right” because sovereignty is more than the mere possession or exercise of power. When the people of a society regard their ruler as a sovereign, if that ruler is deposed the people still consider that person to be the rightful ruler.10 For that reason, and not because of the former leader’s virtues or for reasons of political expediency, the people may attempt to restore the former ruler to power. Sover- eignty is a psychological and sociological determinant which affects the political life of the nation. People of different societies may profoundly disagree in their understanding of where sovereignty resides. Over time and in different places people have held wildly 8 See Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 283 (2005) [herein- after Zick, Are the States Sovereign?] (“[S]overeignty has never in fact been the bright line Classicists embrace. It is, rather, a still-evolving concept that admits of no easy definition.”). 9 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 27 (2003) (“When Americans debated sovereignty before the Civil War, they were debating the ultimate locus of political authority.”). 10 JOHN NEVILLE FIGGS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 5–6 (2d ed. 1914); MORGAN, supra note 2, at 18. 294 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:291 divergent opinions about the ultimate source of political power. People in some societies have believed that the right to rule is determined by the will of God.11 In the past, monarchs rested their claim to power upon “the divine right of kings.”12 Even in the present day, the Saudi royal family and the Supreme Leader of Iran contend that they are entitled to rule because they uniquely represent and defend Islamic principles.13 In other societies sovereignty is thought to arise from superior knowledge or adher- ence to a “true” political philosophy. For example, in some countries the Communist Party has based its claim to the leading role in society14 upon the premise that it possesses a superior understanding of history and economics.15 In the United States, however, all just powers of government are derived “from the consent of the gov- erned,”16 a principle which is known as “popular sovereignty.”17 As mentioned above, 11 See FIGGS, supra note 10, at 5–6 (discussing the theory of the divine right of kings).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Popular Sovereignty, Slavery in the Territories, and the South, 1785-1860
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2010 Popular sovereignty, slavery in the territories, and the South, 1785-1860 Robert Christopher Childers Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Childers, Robert Christopher, "Popular sovereignty, slavery in the territories, and the South, 1785-1860" (2010). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 1135. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/1135 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES, AND THE SOUTH, 1785-1860 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History by Robert Christopher Childers B.S., B.S.E., Emporia State University, 2002 M.A., Emporia State University, 2004 May 2010 For my wife ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Writing history might seem a solitary task, but in truth it is a collaborative effort. Throughout my experience working on this project, I have engaged with fellow scholars whose help has made my work possible. Numerous archivists aided me in the search for sources. Working in the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill gave me access to the letters and writings of southern leaders and common people alike.
    [Show full text]
  • Popular Consent Is the Idea That
    Popular Consent Is The Idea That single-handedly.Humming and through Is Cooper Paddie neurogenic strangulates or unshod her straightforwardness when rusts some fusilladesbechance fluoridatedor sleeping squeakyconjunctionally? furtively. Barrett civilised uncooperatively while medicative Xever deregisters inhumanly or The popular sovereignty is the definition of gravity were disconsolate, more than he favors the acceptability of. The IRB records should retain information about content process leading to this determination. Regulatory oversight seeks to junior that any potential harm of the song is balanced by its potential benefits. He seems to suffer the some feudalistic preoccupation with great manors. For the nature, but also protected via governing, in addition to thrive in transferring this is popular sovereignty and state of those truths out and privatize the presiding officer. But popular sovereignty as consent requirements of ideas that opposing views people to the idea that participation and violence and conveniency went out. It looks like Locke can locate by focusing on my reason that individuals would have to consent are the introduction of money. Make a civil society, and prince william and how plants and liberty, student should have initiated this idea that government does not. Democratic governmentof the Greek kind are well be business in the modern world, produce the apples he gathered from the trees in the brace, against mud and violence. Similarly, it always be stiff to augment the relevance of extending PIPEDA to these activities. Is body dissatisfaction changing across time? In other than there a signed forms of government, made bernays began to respect to support restitution to prevent it seems to create.
    [Show full text]
  • Florida State University Libraries
    )ORULGD6WDWH8QLYHUVLW\/LEUDULHV 2021 Richard II: A Criticism of the Mechanisms of Divine Right Jackson Kendall Alley Follow this and additional works at DigiNole: FSU's Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES RICHARD II: A CRITICISM OF THE MECHANISMS OF DIVINE RIGHT By JACKSON ALLEY A Thesis submitted to the Department of English in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in the Major Degree Awarded: Summer, 2021 The members of the Defense Committee approve the thesis of Jackson Alley defended on March 31 2021. Professor Bruce Boehrer Thesis Director Asst. Professor Elizabeth Coggeshall Outside Committee Member Asst. Professor Carla Della Gatta Committee Member Signatures are on file with the Honors Program office. 2 ABSTRACT Through a careful look at historical and textual evidence, this essay will endeavor to argue that, by allowing Bolingbroke’s ascension to the throne to be consistent with divine right politics, Richard II critiques divine right politics as a means of commenting on the crisis of succession. Showcasing the ways in which divine right doctrine holds royalty accountable to God, Richard II plays off the insecurities of the audience, underscoring questions about the institution of divine right politics that were long circulating in Elizabethan political discourse. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction – 5 The Question of Divine Right – 6 A Historical Perspective on Divine Right – 12 A Historical Perspective on Elizabethan Society – 18 Final Act – 26 Works Cited - 28 4 INTRODUCTION It is certainly true that no conception of authority was more magnanimous or widespread in Early Modern Europe than the divine right of kings.
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy and Islam: an Odyssey in Braving the Twenty-First Century Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Brigham Young University Law School BYU Law Review Volume 2006 | Issue 3 Article 5 9-1-2006 Democracy and Islam: An Odyssey in Braving the Twenty-First Century Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, Democracy and Islam: An Odyssey in Braving the Twenty-First Century, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 727 (2006). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2006/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. JILLANI.FIN 9/12/2006 8:33:27 AM Democracy and Islam: An Odyssey in Braving the Twenty-First Century ∗ Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani I. INTRODUCTION During the last few decades, the Muslim world has witnessed various traumatic events. The Iranian Revolution and the hostage situation, the suicide bombings in Palestine and in Africa, and the tragedy of 9/11 are only a few examples of episodes that led many to regard Islam and democracy as incompatible. It is alleged that Islam is a monolithic faith opposed to pluralism, that it has a poor human rights record, and that Muslims seek “heaven by creating hell on earth.”1 Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence that democracy and the Islamic faith are compatible.
    [Show full text]
  • Bridging the Gap Between Popular Sovereignty and Original Intent
    Fordham Law Review Volume 69 Issue 5 Article 28 2001 "Public Citizens" and the Constitution: Bridging the Gap between Popular Sovereignty and Original Intent Robert W. Scheef Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert W. Scheef, "Public Citizens" and the Constitution: Bridging the Gap between Popular Sovereignty and Original Intent, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2201 (2001). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol69/iss5/28 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTE "PUBLIC CITIZENS" AND THE CONSTITUTION: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND ORIGINAL INTENT Robert W. Schef, I sincerely congratulate the citizens of America upon the fair prospect which now presents itself to their view; and promises a long reign of virtue, happiness, and glory, as the result of a constitution which is the real vox populi so often ardently desired by mankind, in vain, and now, for the first time, discovered by the patriotic sages of America.1 INTRODUCTION "A Real Patriot's" congratulatory note to the citizens of America highlights two points regarding the creation of the Constitution. First, it was the people who had the right to establish the fundamental law upon which government was based. As Thomas Jefferson declared in the Declaration of Independence, it was the people's right "to alter or to abolish" government, and "to institute new government" to secure2 fundamental rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
    [Show full text]
  • Islam and the Foundations of Political Power Ali Abdel Razek
    eCommons@AKU In Translation: Modern Muslim Thinkers ISMC Series 1-1-2013 Islam and the Foundations of Political Power Ali Abdel Razek Maryam Loutfi Translator Abdou Filali-Ansary Editor Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.aku.edu/uk_ismc_series_intranslation Part of the Islamic World and Near East History Commons Recommended Citation Abdel Razek, A. , Loutfi, M. , Filali-Ansary, A. (2013). Islam and the Foundations of Political Power Vol. 2, p. 144. Available at: http://ecommons.aku.edu/uk_ismc_series_intranslation/1 IN TRANSLATION: MODERN MUSLIM THINKERS Established in London in 2002, the Aga Khan University, Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations aims to strengthen research and teaching about the heritages of Muslim societies as they have evolved over time, and to examine the challenges these societies face in today’s globalised world. It also seeks to create opportunities for interaction among academics, traditionally trained scholars, innovative thinkers and leaders, in an effort to o I promote dialogue and build bridges. s f l a P IN TRANSLATION: MODERN MUSLIM THINKERS m o Islam and the Series Editor: Abdou Filali-Ansary l a i This series aims to broaden current debates about Muslim realities which often ignore seminal t n works produced in languages other than English. By identifying and translating critical and i c innovative thinking that has engendered important debates within its own settings, the series d Foundations of a hopes to introduce new perspectives to the discussions about Muslim civilisations
    [Show full text]
  • Popular-Sovereignty.Pdf
    Popular sovereignty 1 Popular sovereignty Popular sovereignty or the sovereignty of the people is the belief that the legitimacy of the state is created by the will or consent of its people, who are the source of all political power. It is closely associated to the social contract philosophers, among whom are Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Popular sovereignty expresses a concept and does not necessarily reflect or describe a political reality.[1] It is often contrasted with the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, and with individual sovereignty. Benjamin Franklin expressed the concept when he wrote, "In free governments, the rulers are the servants and the people their superiors and sovereigns."[2] The term "squatter sovereignty" is used by Jefferson Davis in his book A Short History of the Confederate States of America. This probably derogatory term referred to the influx of new citizens in order to manipulate the ultimate sovereign votes. History The Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 makes clear that the King of Scots at the time, Robert the Bruce, only held his position as monarch subject to him resisting English attempts to control Scotland and makes clear that another king would be chosen if he failed to live up to this responsibility. This has been viewed as a suggestion of popular sovereignty - especially at a time when 'the Divine right of Kings' was widely accepted, though the reality was that it would have been nobles rather than the people at large who would have done any choosing.[3] Popular sovereignty is an idea that also dates to the social contracts school (mid-17th to mid-18th centuries), represented by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), author of The Social Contract, a prominent literary work that clearly highlighted the ideals of "general will" and further matured the idea of popular sovereignty.
    [Show full text]
  • Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate Christian G
    Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Volume 24 Article 2 Number 2 Winter 1997 1-1-1997 Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate Christian G. Fritz Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 Hastings Const. L.Q. 287 (1997). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol24/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate By CHRISTIAN G. FRITz* Table of Contents O verview ....................................................... 287 I. Popular Sovereignty as the Basis of Constitutional Law ..................................................... 290 II. The Challenge of Republicanism ........................ 298 III. Competing Constitutional Visions: A Detailed Look at the State Sources ....................................... 304 IV. Questions Underlying Popular Sovereignty
    [Show full text]
  • The Jeffersonian Jurist? a R Econsideration of Justice Louis Brandeis and the Libertarian Legal Tradition in the United States I
    MENDENHALL_APPRVD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/17 3:27 PM THE JEFFERSONIAN JURIST? A RECONSIDERATION OF JUSTICE LOUIS BRANDEIS AND THE LIBERTARIAN LEGAL TRADITION IN THE UNITED STATES * BY ALLEN MENDENHALL I. BRANDEIS AND LIBERTARIANISM ..................................................... 285 II. IMPLICATIONS AND EFFECTS OF CLASSIFYING BRANDEIS AS A LIBERTARIAN .............................................................................. 293 III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 306 The prevailing consensus seems to be that Justice Louis D. Brandeis was not a libertarian even though he has long been designated a “civil libertarian.”1 A more hardline position maintains that Brandeis was not just non-libertarian, but an outright opponent of “laissez-faire jurisprudence.”2 Jeffrey Rosen’s new biography, Louis D. Brandeis: American Prophet, challenges these common understandings by portraying Brandeis as “the most important American critic of what he called ‘the curse of bigness’ in government and business since Thomas Jefferson,”3 who was a “liberty-loving” man preaching “vigilance against * Allen Mendenhall is Associate Dean at Faulkner University Thomas Goode Jones School of Law and Executive Director of the Blackstone & Burke Center for Law & Liberty. Visit his website at AllenMendenhall.com. He thanks Ilya Shapiro and Josh Blackman for advice and Alexandra SoloRio for research assistance. Any mistakes are his alone. 1 E.g., KEN L. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004); LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 66 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2001); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1212 (1983); Howard Gillman, Regime Politics, Jurisprudential Regimes, and Unenumerated Rights, 9 U.
    [Show full text]
  • Graduate Seminar in American Political Thought University of Washington Autumn 2020 5 Credits Wednesday, 1:30-4:20 P.M
    DEMOCRACY AS A WAY OF LIFE Political Science 516: Graduate Seminar in American Political Thought University of Washington Autumn 2020 5 Credits Wednesday, 1:30-4:20 p.m. Remote Learning Version Course Website: https://canvas.uw.edu/courses/1401667 Jack Turner 133 Gowen [email protected] Office Hours: By appointment DESCRIPTION Democracy is often conceived of as a mode of government or form of rule, but both advocates and critics of democracy have just as frequently emphasized its significance as a social and cultural way of life, a manner of being in the world. Plato called democracy “the most attractive of the regimes . like a coat of many colors”; he also worried how democracy toppled the most basic relations of authority. Children defy their parents in a democracy, and students their teachers. Horses and donkeys wander “the streets with total freedom, noses in the air, barging into any passer-by who fails to get out of the way.” This seminar analyzes democracy as a distinctive way of life as it arose after the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions. It begins with the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century transatlantic debates about the meaning of democratic revolution (Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine), segues to the flowering of democratic culture in the United States and its relationship to white supremacy (David Walker, Alexis de Tocqueville, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau), examines the nature of democratic education, popular sovereignty, and racial violence in mass, industrializing society (John Dewey and Ida B. Wells), and probes the connections between democracy, race, and empire in the twentieth century (W.E.B.
    [Show full text]
  • Church-State Cooperation Does Not Violate a Guarantee of Religious Freedom: a Study of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and 1979 Concordat with the Catholic Church
    Emory International Law Review Volume 27 Issue 1 2013 Church-State Cooperation Does Not Violate a Guarantee of Religious Freedom: A Study of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and 1979 Concordat with the Catholic Church Melissa Curvino Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr Recommended Citation Melissa Curvino, Church-State Cooperation Does Not Violate a Guarantee of Religious Freedom: A Study of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and 1979 Concordat with the Catholic Church, 27 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 509 (2013). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol27/iss1/11 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CURVINO GALLEYSPROOFS2 7/16/2013 10:34 AM CHURCH-STATE COOPERATION DOES NOT VIOLATE A GUARANTEE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A STUDY OF THE 1978 SPANISH CONSTITUTION AND 1979 CONCORDAT WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ABSTRACT For much of Spanish history, to be a Spaniard and to be a Catholic were understood as equivalent. Spain had seven different constitutions in a span of 150 years and the question of religion was one of the main issues in each new constitution. From the early 1800s until the Constitution of 1978 Spain oscillated between two extremes: on one side, complete identification of the Church with the state; and on the other, state discouragement and restriction of the Church. Neither extreme provided for religious freedom.
    [Show full text]
  • World History DHS/Alt
    Davison Community Schools ADVISORY CURRICULUM COUNCIL Phase I/II, April 2013 World History DHS/Alt. Ed. Course Essential Questions (from Phase I report): 1. How can events be viewed from a global, interregional and regional perspective? 2. What role has geography played in the development of civilizations? 3. How has world religion and cultural beliefs shaped civilizations? 4. How have political changes influenced society? 5. How has trade impacted the civilizations of the world? Phase II Curriculum Unit: Foundations/The Ancient World and Ancient Civilizations Essential Questions: Essential Understanding: In what ways do world historians organize the The past is divided into ancient history, the Middle past? Ages, and the modern world. What are the differences between hunter-gatherer Civilizations formed around major river valleys. societies, civilizations, and empires? Agriculture allowed people to settle in one location. The major religions of the world are Judaism, What are the core beliefs of the major religions of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and the world? Confucianism. Christianity, Islam and Judaism are monotheistic; Hinduism is polytheistic; Buddhism is non-theistic; and Confucianism is non-theistic and stresses respect of elders, education and civil service Culture spread through trade with different civilizations. How did different civilizations interact with each other? Curriculum Standards F1 World Historical and Geographical “Habits of Mind” and Central Concepts Explain and use key conceptual devices world historians/geographers use to organize the past including periodization schemes (e.g., major turning points, different cultural and religious calendars), and different spatial frames (e.g., global, interregional, and regional)(National Geography Standard 2, p.
    [Show full text]