Asia Briefing, Nr. 16: Indonesia

INDONESIA Briefing Jakarta/Brussels, 8 May 2002 INDONESIA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE TIMOR TRIALS OVERVIEW little more than criminal negligence on the part of the accused. As East Timor moves toward independence on 20 In these circumstances, regardless of whether the May 2002, trials are proceeding in Jakarta against defendants are ultimately convicted, these trials Indonesian army and police officers and civilian may well produce the following consequences in officials accused of serious human rights violations Indonesia: in connection with the 1999 violence there. Within Indonesia, the trials have generated little interest, the near-universal image within Indonesia of nothing approaching the attention given to the the conflict as a civil war between two prosecution of Tommy Soeharto, the former equally matched factions of East Timorese president’s son. Abroad, the delays in getting the will be reinforced. With the prosecution trials underway, the high-ranking position of some failing to produce any evidence suggesting defendants, the inexperience of the judges in trying active involvement of high levels of the human rights crimes, and the government’s pointed Indonesian government in the 1999 violence, lack of interest in addressing military impunity the pro-independence victory is difficult to have raised doubts that any of the accused will be explain except in terms of ill will toward convicted. Indonesia on the part of the international community. Had the indictments been better The problem is not so much with the way the cases prepared, they not only might have helped are being judicially conducted. Inexperienced as illuminate the political dynamics in East they are, the judges have thus far exceeded Timor in 1999, but might have led to more expectations, rejecting military arguments and effective policies in Aceh and Papua; demonstrating a willingness to use international human rights law in a way that defies a common the United Nations in particular will perception of them as incompetents or political continue to be seen as a biased and hacks. Rather the problem, as revealed in court manipulative actor, further reducing the documents obtained by ICG, is with the limited already slim chance that it could be an mandate of the ad hoc court and the very weak way acceptable mediator or facilitator in future in which the indictments have been drawn up and conflicts; presented by the prosecution. In particular: the involvement of Indonesian military in the events of 1999 are portrayed as resulting creating, equipping, training, and funding the from civil conflict between two violent East pro-integration militia forces in East Timor Timorese factions in which Indonesian will remain unexamined, reducing the security forces were essentially bystanders; likelihood that there will be any deterrent to the continued or future use of such forces; there is a failure to address the way in which the military’s creation and use of militia efforts to curb human rights violations in forces contributed to human rights areas of separatist conflict will have been violations: the military role is presented as portrayed as anti-nationalist, to the extent the failing to prevent violence rather than role of the security forces is portrayed not actively orchestrating it; and just by the defence but more subtly by the prosecution as defenders of Indonesian though purporting to identify crimes against unity. The linkage in these trials between humanity, the indictments as drafted suggest pro-Indonesia violence and patriotism on the Indonesia: The Implications of the Timor Trials ICG Briefing Paper, 8 May 2002 Page 2 one hand, and human rights campaigning would be to reward an incompetent or and near-treason on the other may well obstructionist prosecution and a dissembling bolster resistance to demands for officer corps; it would also undermine those within accountability; and Indonesia’s political elite and civil society who have been pressing for accountability as an 2 the concept of crimes against humanity in essential aspect of military reform. Indonesia will have been trivialised. Because the truth of what happened in East Timor There are several policy implications for those in 1999 is so critical to Indonesian perceptions of inside and outside Indonesia interested in conflict more generally, however, every attempt accountability, military reform, and should be made to ensure that the kind of democratisation. information the prosecution should have collected, but did not, is made available to the Indonesian At least for the moment, no amount of public. international or domestic pressure is going to produce justice for serious human rights crimes by At one level, this means heightened pressure on military officers in East Timor. At the same time, it governments whose intelligence agencies were would send precisely the wrong signal to the actively monitoring events in East Timor in 1999 Indonesian government and, for that matter, to to release information they have on the role of supporters of military and judicial reform to ease Indonesian government agencies and individual existing restrictions on aid to the Indonesian officials in the violence. Information leaked to military, as exemplified by the Leahy amendment Australian journalists from Australian government in the United States.1 To waive those restrictions intercepts and published on 14 March 2002, the opening day of the Timor trials, give some indication of the extent of Indonesian state 1 Section 572 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations involvement, but a more systematic release of Act for fiscal year 2002 (HR 2506), otherwise known as information from the Australian, U.S., and other the Leahy amendment, reads: (a) Funds appropriated by governments is needed.3 this Act under the headings “International Military Education and Training”: and “Foreign Military Financing At another level, this means that funds should be Program” may be made available for assistance for Indonesian military personnel only if the President made available from foundations or donor determines and submits a report to the appropriate governments to ensure that Indonesian journalists congressional committees that the Government of and legal analysts have access to publicly available Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are: court documents from the crimes against humanity 1. taking effective measures to bring to justice members trials taking place in Dili, East Timor, although of the armed forces and militia groups against whom there have been serious shortcomings there as well. there is credible evidence of human rights violations (Among other things, the early trials did not have a in East Timor and Indonesia; 2. taking effective measures to bring to justice members court recorder present.) There may be more of the armed forces against whom there is credible information from Dili than from Jakarta about the evidence of aiding or abetting illegal militia groups in extent to which militia commanders operated on East Timor and Indonesia; the basis of orders from Indonesian officers. 3. allowing displaced persons and refugees to return home to East Timor, including providing safe passage The failure of the Timor trials in Jakarta to for refugees returning from West Timor and demonstrating a commitment to preventing incursions constitute a genuine domestic remedy for the 1999 into East Timor by members of militia groups in West crimes will inevitably generate new calls for an Timor; international tribunal on East Timor, similar to 4. demonstrating a commitment to accountability by those in place for the former Yugoslavia and cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of Rwanda. Establishing such a tribunal would be members of the armed forces and militia groups both desirable and appropriate but with no known responsible for human rights violations in East Timor support for such an option from members of the and Indonesia; 5. demonstrating a commitment to civilian control of the armed forces by reporting to civilian authorities audits 7. releasing political detainees. of receipts and expenditures of the armed forces; 2 See ICG Asia Report No. 24, Indonesia: Next Steps in 6. allowing United Nations and other international Military Reform. 11 October 2001, Jakarta/Brussels humanitarian organizations and representatives of 3 “Silence Over a Crime Against Humanity,” Sydney recognized human rights organizations access to West Morning Herald, 14 March 2002. Timor, Aceh, West Papua, and Maluka; and Indonesia: The Implications of the Timor Trials ICG Briefing Paper, 8 May 2002 Page 3 UN Security Council, or even from the political breakthroughs as long as Soeharto was in power.5 leadership of East Timor, the chances of a tribunal being created are close to nil. The slim prospects Within months after his resignation in May 1998, for justice make it more important to ensure that all however, the Indonesian foreign ministry produced available facts come to light while the memory of a new set of proposals that seemed to indicate a the 1999 destruction is still fresh, and before the much more flexible negotiating position, and a efforts of senior army officers to change the possibility of limited devolution of authority from historical record succeed. Jakarta. Indonesia continued to reject any discussion of independence. A still-murky combination of factors, including the post-Cold I. BACKGROUND War environment, the situation after the Asian economic crisis, and the hubris of President Habibie himself,

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