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15-Book1-Livre1-Eng.Pdf BOOKREVIEWS FIRE AND FURY In the opening chapter of Fire and Fury, entitled: THEALLIEDBOMBING ‘The day Hamburg died,’ Hansen describes in graphic OF GERMANY 1942-45 detail the destruction of Hamburg on 27 July 1943. by Randall Hansen Incorporating the personal accounts of civilian survivors, Toronto: Random House of Canada Ltd., 2008 Hansen paints a horrific and terrifying picture of the x + 353 pages, $34.95 death and destruction that the Allied bombing rained ISBN 978-0-385-66403-5 upon civilian property and the men, women, and Reviewed by Major M.T. ‘Skip’ Fawcett children of Hamburg. The RAF’s area bombing tactic, which called for a combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs, created, in Hansen’s words, a feuersturm he Allied strategic bombing campaign was (firestorm) that spared no one – while leaving acres of perhaps one of the most contentious strategies ruined buildings and heaps of charred corpses. Subsequent utilized to defeat Nazi Germany during the chapters entitled ‘Burn, Germany, Burn,’ ‘Killing the Second World War, the most controversial Boche,’ ‘Oil and baby killing,’ and ‘A crescendo of aspect of which was RAF Bomber Command’s destruction’ leave the reader in no doubt as to where Ttactic of area bombardment. In his new book, Fire and Hansen stands with respect to the effects of the campaign. Fury, The Allied Bombing of Germany Throughout these chapters, as well 1942-45, author Randall Hansen adds to as throughout the balance of his book, the debate surrounding the campaign by Hansen intersperses his discussion of providing an unconventional examination the personalities and flow of events of this issue. Fire and Fury purports to that comprise the Allied strategic bombing be a holistic look at the Allied bombing campaign with vivid details of the strategy, with a view to providing insight resultant death and destruction. into questions Hansen poses in the preface to the book: ‘How can we judge Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, the role that bombing played in the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Allied victory?’, and ‘What role does RAF Bomber Command, is a focal point morality play in the execution and of the book. Hansen definitively casts evaluation of war?’ If you are an ethical Harris as being ultimately responsible crusader who derides Sir Arthur Harris’s for the terrible losses suffered by role in Bomber Command, this book is German civilians and RAF bomber crews. definitely for you. If you are a Harris He argues throughout Fire and Fury apologist, proceed no further as Fire that Harris held firm to his belief and Fury will only infuriate you. For that the war could be won by the more neutral readers, Hansen – although bomber alone, despite evidence to the more than a tad one-sided in his argument – presents a contrary, as well as the advent of technology that would very well-written, well-documented, eminently readable, and allow for precision bombing. Harris’s stubbornness, engaging story of the Allied strategic bombing campaign. Hansen writes, resulted in the needless deaths of over 55,000 Bomber Command airmen and between 300,000 and Fire and Fury recounts the events of the campaign 600,000 civilians. from its inception in early 1942 through to the end of the war. Specifically, Hansen describes in detail the One of the major arguments Hansen makes against various operations and raids that comprised the overall Harris and the area bombing tactic, as demonstrated campaign, including: Operation Millennium (the thousand by his graphic descriptions of civilian deaths and death aircraft raid on Cologne); the Battle of the Ruhr; the Battle tolls, is that directly targeting civilians is immoral and of Berlin; the raids on Hamburg, Düsseldorf, and fundamentally wrong. Hansen underlines this argument Schweinfurt; and the 1943 ‘Dambuster’ raid on the Ruhr by proposing that the United States chose to pursue dams. Hansen also expands upon the roles and actions precision bombing, rather than the British tactic of of both RAF Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air area bombing, because, in Hansen’s words, the targeting Force, and appraises the political and military discussions of civilians was against the American people’s values. and debates that took place regarding the bombing He explains away occasions of American non-precision campaign. The author’s use of first-hand accounts, bombing – for example, when they blind-bombed through combined with historical documentation, augment the clouds, as they did against Berlin – by countering unfolding story of the campaign and make for a compelling that the American intent was to target military and exposé. Despite his emphasis upon creating a rich industrial targets rather than civilians. Despite his narrative, Hansen never loses sight of his primary theme, contention that civilian casualties resulting from American which is to suggest that the RAF’s area bombing strategy non-precision raids were an acceptable consequence was unprincipled and tragically flawed. of war because civilians were not directly targeted by 98 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 BOOKREVIEWS the bombing, Hansen argues that the opposite holds true Hansen makes a further argument that the prioritization with respect to Allied area bombing because the intent of bombing targets was also an issue throughout the to target civilians made the Allied tactic morally wrong. war. Although Allied priorities changed to some extent as the war progressed, German installations for the Hansen’s examination of the area bombing campaign production of fighter aircraft, ball bearings, and oil, as leads him to believe that this strategy failed to break well as transportation facilities, remained at the top of German civilian morale, and, more importantly, that their list of strategic targets. Hansen details the case for area bombing failed to dramatically reduce German targeting militarily significant ‘panacea’ targets by describ- wartime production. Hansen utilizes post-war data and ing at great length the various bombing campaigns against first-hand accounts to support his case against the Allied production facilities involving Luftwaffe fighter aircraft, strategic bombing campaign, and he quotes Albert Speer, oil, and ball bearings. And he specifically highlights the raids Germany’s Minister of Armaments and War Production, against the Schweinfurt ball bearings factories in August extensively in order to demonstrate the failure of the 1943, as well as raids conducted against transportation area bombing tactic to significantly impact German targets. Hansen also details Harris’s well-documented war production. Conversely, Hansen utilizes Speer’s objections to striking these so-called ‘panacea’ targets, comments to shore up his belief in the effectiveness and asserts that “...Harris made no secret of his contempt of the precision bombing campaign conducted by for oil and his support for bombing cities.” In describing the Americans. In the course of arguing that Allied this aspect of the bombing campaign, Hansen surmises bombing tactics did not impact German war production, that Harris simply reinterpreted Allied strategic directives Hansen proposes that the increased production resulting to suit his own purposes, and was not held to account from Germany’s diversion of resources to air defence by RAF leadership for his actions. Hansen further was negated by the Allied resources expended to proposes that Harris’s failure to support the campaign prosecute the area bombing and that, therefore, the to bomb ‘panacea’ targets meant that resources were area bombing campaign had no net effect upon the wasted upon area bombing when they could have been course of the war. The author concludes his argument used more effectively for precision bombing. Precision against Allied area bombing by stating that “...area bombing bombing, Hansen maintains, if used earlier in the not only failed to win the war, it probably prolonged it.” war, could have shortened the conflict and ultimately saved lives. Hansen’s condemnation of area bombing as having had no net impact on the war is followed by an examination In the conclusion to Fire and Fury, Hansen sums up of the tactics and technological aspects of precision his various arguments against Harris’s strategy and area bombing vice area bombing. Hansen acknowledges that bombardment. Although he implies that civilian deaths in the early days of the bomber offensive, the RAF caused by Allied area bombings could have been morally possessed neither the types of bombers nor the required justified if they had led directly to the defeat of bomb sights and navigational technology to conduct Nazi Germany, Hansen believes that the area bombing precision bombing. He argues that by early 1943, scientific of cities had little effect on the outcome of the war, advancements had significantly improved the technology and that Harris failed to appreciate this. He concludes required for precision bombing, and he describes in that “...after flattening dozens of cities and killing detail the ‘Dambuster Raid’ of May 1943 to prove his hundreds of thousands of civilians, Harris should be held point. This raid utilized advanced technology to deliver to account and not simply forgiven for making a ‘bad call.’” a precision strike against heavily defended targets, leading Hansen to propose that, by this point in the war, Fire and Fury is yet another entry on the growing list technology was available that would have allowed the of publications about the Allied strategic bombing RAF to “...hit the target with a precision measured in campaign against Germany. Hansen tells an excellent inches.” The implication is that the RAF did possess story. Unfortunately, his narrative is shaped primarily by the aircraft and associated technology to hit a specific his predisposition to proving Harris’s guilt. As to the and, in the case of the Ruhr dams, a militarily significant question of the role of bombing and its morality, Fire and target, and it could have ceased area bombing in Fury continues to stoke the fire of debate.
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