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ABSTRACT

ARMENIANS IN BRITISH INTELLIGENCE DURING I: A CASE STUDY OF THOMAS MUGERDITCHIAN

The role of in British intelligence has been largely neglected by historians of . My thesis will explore the multifaceted identities of Armenian dragomans, vice-consuls, and intelligence officers in British service through the careers of Thomas Mugerditchian, Thomas Boyajian, and Arshak Safrastian. These Armenian agents inhabited a unique middle-ground between the East and the West as Christians living in an Islamic Empire. They manipulated their identities to navigate both European and Ottoman circles, making them effective as intelligence officers. Before World War I, Armenian dragomans and vice-consuls were important intermediaries between British consulates in the and local populations. When the Ottoman Empire joined the war on the side of the , Armenian agents remained important to the as intelligence officers and translators. My thesis will explore the role of Armenian agents in the British war effort and how their service affected their complex identities, both how they perceived themselves and the extent to which different levels of the British government accepted them.

Michael John Rettig December 2017

ARMENIANS IN BRITISH INTELLIGENCE DURING WORLD WAR I: A CASE STUDY OF THOMAS MUGERDITCHIAN

by Michael John Rettig

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the College of Social Sciences California State University, Fresno December 2017 APPROVED For the Department of History:

We, the undersigned, certify that the thesis of the following student meets the required standards of scholarship, format, and style of the university and the student's graduate degree program for the awarding of the master's degree.

Michael John Rettig Thesis Author

Bradley Jones (Chair) History

Frederik Vermote History

Bradley Hart Media, Communications and Journalism

Barlow Der Mugrdechian Armenian Studies

For the University Graduate Committee:

Dean, Division of Graduate Studies AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRODUCTION OF MASTER’S THESIS

X I grant permission for the reproduction of this thesis in part or in its entirety without further authorization from me, on the condition that the person or agency requesting reproduction absorbs the cost and provides proper acknowledgment of authorship.

Permission to reproduce this thesis in part or in its entirety must be obtained from me.

Signature of thesis author: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis would not have been possible without the support and guidance of my thesis committee. I had the unique privilege of working closely with each member of my committee as if I had three Chairs rather than one. I would first like to express my gratitude to my Chair, Dr. Bradley Jones, whose conversations and advice spurred me on to think more deeply about my research. His guidance helped produce a more interesting and nuanced thesis. Dr. Bradley Hart and Professor Barlow Der Mugrdechian were similarly instrumental to my project from its earliest stages. They were the first to believe in this topic and encourage me to pursue it. Professor Der Mugrdechian and Dr. Hart invested countless hours reading drafts and providing valuable feedback through every step of my graduate career. I could not have asked for a better thesis committee. also kindly read an early sample of my work and provided me with important advice. Any mistake in this thesis is solely my own. The faculty of the History Department at Fresno State played an important role in fostering within me the skills necessary to write history; specifically Dr. John Farrell and Dr. Maritere López, who inspired me to be a better version of myself in the classroom. Dr. Lori Clune, Dr. Mark Arvanigian, Dr. Blain Roberts, and Dr. Jones also contributed to my formation as a historian through the courses they taught and teaching opportunities they provided. As a descendant of Thomas Mugerditchian, I have benefitted from access to his personal papers with the help of my family. I am indebted to my grandmother, Doreen Rettig, for preserving the family photos, letters, and documents of her grandfather Thomas Mugerditchian. It was these documents that first sparked my interest in Armenian intelligence officers. My aunt Linnette Bommarito has been v v my partner in cataloguing and archiving this material after my grandmother passed away. I am grateful to her for the hours she spent scanning the numerous Mugerditchian family photographs, some of which appear in this thesis. I am similarly indebted to Roberta Clark, another granddaughter of Thomas Mugerditchian, for graciously providing me access to the family papers she inherited and has so diligently preserved. They were invaluable to my research. Other relatives who contributed to my thesis include John and Peter Tashjian, Robyn Rene Millheim, Sona Dombourian, and Christine Dombourian Rinck. Though I can read printed Armenian text, I am not yet able to read Mugerditchian’s handwritten Armenian script. For this, Mary Avetisyan has been instrumental in meticulously deciphering and translating my great-great grandfather’s Armenian writings, for which I am deeply grateful. My research in the National Archives at Kew and the Churchill Archives in Cambridge would not have been possible without a generous research grant from the Foundation. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, John and Cindy, for their constant support of my education and for the countless opportunities they have provided me throughout my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

LIST OF FIGURES ...... vii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 CHAPTER 1: REVERENDS, SPIES, AND DRAGOMANS IN THE PERIPHERY ...... 16

CHAPTER 2: WITH LAWRENCE IN ...... 44

CHAPTER 3: NAVIGATING A POST-WAR WORLD ...... 67

CONCLUSION ...... 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 88

APPENDICES ...... 96 APPENDIX A: LIST OF ARMENIAN AND NATIVE DRAGOMANS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE ...... 97 APPENDIX B: LIST SHOWING SERVICE PERIOD OF BRITISH VICE CONSULS AT DIARBEKIR ...... 99

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Thomas Mugerditchian and Arshak Safrastian in 1907...... 18 Figure 2: Thomas Mugerditchian with teachers and students from College, circa 1880...... 20 Figure 3: Thomas Mugerditchian as he appeared before European diplomats and Ottoman officials ...... 36

Figure 4: The Mugerditchian family dressed as to flee Kharpert in 1916 .. 47

Figure 5: Thomas Mugerditchian at a social gathering in Cairo 1915...... 53

Figure 6: Thomas Mugerditchian with unknown soldiers...... 60

Figure 7: Thomas Mugerditchian with a British officer in Cairo 1917...... 64

Figure 8: Thomas Mugerditchian at Camp Ludd, 1918...... 65 Figure 9: Thomas and Esther Mugerditchian with some of their children and grandchildren in California 1923...... 78

INTRODUCTION

At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Thomas Mugerditchian, a Protestant Armenian minister, found himself fleeing the Ottoman Empire. Turkish authorities had sent orders to the governor of Diarbekir to execute Mugerditchian for allegedly spying on behalf of the Entente Powers.1 Mugerditchian was targeted for his service to the British Empire as a dragoman (translator and cultural liaison between Western and Eastern cultures) and as the vice-consul for the Ottoman province of Diarbekir. His wife and six children faced an uncertain future as the Turkish authorities used the coming war to carry out genocidal policies against their Armenian population. Before the war, it was common for British consulates to employ Armenian dragomans to gather intelligence and act as intermediaries with local Ottoman populations. Out of the many Armenians who served as dragomans, three were solely entrusted to protect British interests in their provinces as Acting Vice- Consuls: Mugerditchian, Thomas Boyajian and Arshak Safrastian. After British consuls were expelled from the Ottoman Empire at the outbreak of World War I, Armenians remained useful to the British war effort as intelligence officers and translators. Though historians have explored the roles of major British actors, such as T.E. Lawrence, , and George Lloyd, the roles of Armenian dragomans, vice consuls, and intelligence officers have been largely neglected. Through the course of their careers, Armenians in British intelligence manipulated their fluid identities to navigate Western and Eastern societies, making them ideal agents to serve British interests.

1 Ugur Umit Ungor, The Making of Modern : Nation and State in Eastern , 1913- 50. (, 2011), 58. 2 2

The British had several strategic interests for posting consulates throughout the Eastern Ottoman provinces. They sought to bolster the Ottoman Empire through much of the 19th century to counter Russian ambitions in the region. The British government viewed the Ottoman Empire as a buffer between Russia and the Canal in , which was vital to supplying British India.2 A crumbling Ottoman Empire would potentially disrupt the balance of power in the region in Russia’s favor. An alliance with the Ottomans was also important in pacifying Muslim subjects of the British Empire. The British India Office had been wary of its Muslim subjects after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, in which Hindus and Muslims revolted against the British East India Company because of religious tension. Although Hindu soldiers sparked the rebellion, the British largely held Muslims responsible for escalating the conflict. The India Office initially reacted to the uprising by suppressing the Muslim population through a series of massacres, arrests, and fines. The British feared that a union of Hindu and Muslim forces might dismantle the Raj and the only way to prevent this was to diminish religious tensions.3 Instead, the British government decided that an alliance with the Ottoman Sultan, the Caliph and protector of Islamic holy sites, would give them credibility with Muslims around the world. Conversely, they feared that if Turkey were to align with the Central Powers against the Allies, the Turks would incite the Muslim population of the British Empire to rebel.4 These fears, and the potential

2 Arman Kirakossian, British Diplomacy and the : From the 1830s to 1914. (Princeton, NJ: Gomidas Insitute, 2003), 36. 3 Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India. (: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 81, 89. 4 Geoffrey Miller, Straits: British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign (Hull: University of Hull, 1997), 282. 3 3 to have greater influence in Turkey, were the primary reasons the British government established consulates in the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Though the British Empire had strategic interests in the Ottoman Empire, they also had humanitarian concerns. Public sentiment in the , spearheaded by Liberal politician W.E. Gladstone in 1876, forced the government to address the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of their Christian minorities.5 In 1878, the Russians and Turks signed the Treaty of San Stefano, marking an end to the Russo-Turkish War raging since 1877. The Russians made territorial gains into the eastern Ottoman Empire as a result of the war and assumed the role of protector of the Christian Armenians under Article 16 of the Treaty. According to this article, the Sublime Porte was required to guarantee security for Armenians in the eastern provinces under Russian supervision.6 The British government was wary of the agreement because Russia would be able to exert more power over the Ottoman Empire under the guise of protecting Christian minorities. They forced the Russians to renegotiate the treaty at the (1878), where the British delegation was successful in pressuring Russia to abandon much of its territorial gains, thus ensuring the Armenian reforms would be a shared responsibility among the six signatory Powers. This precluded the need for Russian troops in Turkey, placing thousands of Armenians back under direct Ottoman control with no real mechanism in place to ensure the reforms. 7

5Akaby Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984), 33-34; D.C.M Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825. (London: Achron Books, 1971), 134; Michelle Tusan, The British Empire and the Armenian : Humanitarianism and Imperial Politics from Gladstone to Churchill. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 17-18. 6 Kirakossian, British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, 67. 7 Kirakossian, British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, 78-79. 4 4

The British tried to remedy this situation by posting consuls throughout Eastern Turkey to monitor Russian influence in the area and to report on the conditions of the Armenian population. Reports from the consuls stationed in the eastern provinces suggested that the Sultan was not implementing reforms as Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin stipulated.8 These consular reports were important in influencing the British government to pressure Sultan Abdul Hamid II to implement reforms in the late 19th century.9 However, the six European Powers who signed the Treaty of Berlin could not agree on how to deal with the Ottoman Empire and were thus unable to act in concert to ensure that the Sultan carry out the promised reforms. The Sultan took advantage of this situation and continued the persecution of the Armenians, concluding that reforms would be unnecessary if there were no longer Armenians living in the eastern provinces.10 Liberal British activists formed societies to draw attention to the unfair treatment of the Armenians. Lord Bryce, Member of Parliament for Aberdeen and liberal activist, formed the Anglo-Armenian Association in 1893.11 At one of the Association’s meetings that year, members gathered to honor Bryce’s “unwearied efforts” for the Armenians. The chairman of the meeting stressed Britain’s responsibility to ensure reforms under the Treaty of Berlin and claimed there was no race better suited to “advance the cause of civilization” in the Ottoman Empire

8 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question , 12; Kirakossian, British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, 83-84; Tusan, The British Empire and the , 18. 9 G.R. Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865-1939), Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in Turkey. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 5. 10 Kirakossian, British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, 79. 11 Kirakossian, British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, 281; Most sources date the establishment of the Anglo-Armenian Association to 1893; however, Michelle Tusan places the date at 1890. Michelle Tusan, “James Bryce’s Blue Book as Evidence.” The Journal of Levantine Studies 5, no. 2 (2015), 37. 5 5 than the Armenians.12 Bryce echoed these sentiments and lauded the Armenians for preserving their religion despite numerous invasions. Between 1894 and 1896, Ottoman Turks carried out a series of violent massacres against the Armenian community of the Ottoman Empire. Lord Bryce blamed the (named for Sultan Abdul Hamid II) on Britain for depriving the Armenians of Russian protection in the Treaty of Berlin. He claimed that if it were not for the European Powers, “[the Armenians] would have been spared the storm of fire, famine, and slaughter which descended upon them in 1895.”13 In 1897, British activists formed the Friends of to provide monetary aide to victims of the massacres. The organization published periodicals stressing Britain’s “special responsibility” to the Armenians under the Treaty of Berlin.14 Funds were dispensed by American missionaries and British consuls stationed in Turkey. European and American missionaries provided crucial aid to Armenian victims during the massacres of the 1890s. One of Mugerditchian’s first task as a British dragoman was to distribute relief funds and establish orphanages for victims of the Hamidian Massacres.15 It was common practice for European missionaries and consulates to use Armenians to help distribute relief, though the Turkish government frequently targeted and imprisoned such Armenians.16

12 “The Anglo-Armenian Association. Dinner to Mr. Bryce, M.P.” The [Manchester] Guardian, 13 May 1893. 13 “Mr. Bryce on Armenia,” Lichfield Mercury, 11 December 1896. 14 Tusan, The British Empire and the Armenian Genocide, 19; Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 10-11, 44-45, 60-61. 15 Mugerditchian, Autobiography of Rev. Thomas Mugerdichian (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 44. 16 The National Archives: PRO FO 195//2082/99 -100 J. Francis Jones to Sir Nicholas O’Conor, 9 Jan. 1900; TNA: PRO FO 195//2082/102 J. Francis Jones to Sir Nicholas O’Conor, 16 Jan. 1900. 6 6

Throughout the 19th century, British consuls also tried to maintain peace between the Turks, Kurds, and Armenians by mediating disputes. The British government was afraid that conflicts in the Ottoman Empire could escalate into a European war and destabilize the balance of power.17 According to D.C.M. Platt, the consuls had a “restraining effect” on the local populations and were successful in diffusing tensions between hostile ethnic groups.18 Consuls and vice-consuls were often transferred to serve in different posts throughout their careers. Vice- Consul Telford Waugh served in both Scutari in , and Diarbekir, an eastern province of the Ottoman Empire. Waugh noted that his duty in Diarbekir was “to watch and report on the reforms [of treatment towards Armenians]” and that British presence “may have prevented further outrages.”19 The demography of the Ottoman Empire was very complex, with a wide variety of ethnic and religious groups residing within its borders. As a result, the British consulates throughout the Ottoman Empire employed natives as dragomans. The word dragoman was derived from the Turkish word terjiman, or translator, though dragomans were more than translators.20 Dragomans served as mediators between the East and the West on behalf of the Sultan or European consulates. They also gathered intelligence, mediated local disputes, and aided their employer in navigating foreign situations. According to Waugh, dragomans in the British Embassy were “a feature peculiar to Missions to Oriental countries, where the languages and laws were so different from those met with in other parts

17 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 135; Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865-1939), 189. 18 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 134. 19 Telford Waugh, Turkey Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1930), 51. 20 John Dickie, The British Consul: Heir to a Great Tradition. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 69. 7 7 of the world.”21 It was important for consular dragomans, such as Mugerditchian, Boyajian, and Safrastian, to understand the customs, languages, and practices of the locals to gather intelligence.22 Armenians proved to be ideal candidates for consular service because of their ambiguous status in the Ottoman Empire. Turkish authorities treated the Armenians as second class citizens because of their Christian faith. As a result, Armenians were often the victims of massacre, unjust taxes, and false imprisonment. Educated Armenian often had better interactions with Europeans, as many of them studied in European universities or missionary-sponsored schools in the Ottoman Empire where they adopted Enlightenment ideas and European styles.23 According to the British Consul in , educated Armenians considered themselves to be more Western than Oriental.24 Because of this emphasis on education, Armenians often spoke English in addition to the local Kurdish, Turkish, and Armenian languages. This placed them in a unique position to serve as dragomans. However, Armenians in the 19th century did not fit comfortably into British conceptions of East and West. According to Joanne Laycock in Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity and Intervention, the British saw the Armenians as “special” and “worthy” of British attention, but also inherently “different” and often “savage.”25 They were not fully Eastern or Western, but something in-

21 Waugh, Turkey Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow, 26-27. 22 Yigal Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 12. 23 Richard Hovannisian, and David Myers, eds. Enlightenment and : The Armenian and Jewish Cases. (Atlanta: Scholars, 1999), 72. 24 Kirakossian, British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, 155. 25Joanne Laycock, Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity, and Intervention. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 30. 8 8 between. While the British public admired ancient Armenian civilization and respected its Christian heritage, they could not reconcile this image with that of the contemporary Armenian farmers, who were often indistinguishable from the local Turks and Kurds. British travelers criticized Armenian farmers for living under the same roof as their livestock and for their general lack of cleanliness.26 They were also critical of the “greedy and unscrupulous” Armenian merchants.27 However, they simultaneously admired Armenians for defending their Christian faith, going so far as to label Armenia as an “advanced post of European civilization.”28 According to Bryce, the Armenians were “intellectually and physically the most promising race in Western Asia.”29 The British elite reconciled contradictory ideas about Armenians by claiming they were a civilized race that had degenerated by living under Eastern oppression. They made similar arguments for “Levantines,” or Europeans who lived for long periods in the . The British elite did not trust Levantine consuls and dragomen to make objective reports because of their local interests.30 According to Vice Consul Waugh, “Some of these men had rendered us good service…but they and their families belonged to and their interest was naturally to stand well with the Turks.”31 Viscount Strangford, a British nobleman who lived part of his life in Constantinople, went so far as to claim that

26 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 64. 27 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 73. 28 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 34 29 “The Anglo-Armenian Association. Dinner to Mr. Bryce, M.P,” The [Manchester] Guardian, May 13, 1893. 30 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 156-157; Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865-1939), 6; For more on Levantines: Elie Kedourie, England and the : The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914- 1921. (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956), 73-78. 31 Waugh, Turkey Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow, 27. 9 9

Levantines adopted the “low” qualities of the locals; their “narrowness of mind, their follies, even their crimes.”32 During World War I, the British government promoted aiding the Armenians as a worthy cause to give a moral dimension to the war. They claimed to fight in defense of fellow Christians against Islamic barbarism.33 However, the British would later be quick to abandon their promises to the Armenians after the war. Laycock attributes this abandonment to the fact that the Armenians were on the “physical and cultural fringe” of the British Empire and thus easy to forget.34 While the British government deemed Armenians worthy enough to help them when it was convenient, it was easy to abandon them when they were no longer an imperial interest. Because of conflicting attitudes regarding Armenians, the Foreign Office did not always trust reports from Armenian agents. This was not a unique situation, as Scott Anderson demonstrates in Lawrence in Arabia: War Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East.35 Anderson notes that British agents did not fully trust intelligence gathered from Aaron Aaronsohn, agronomist and founder of the Jewish spy-ring Nili, because of his ethnicity. Anderson claims that a Jewish agent had to “prove himself worthy” in order to be trusted because of the anti-Semitism in the British government. 36 A Jew’s word was not worthless, but it was valued less than that of a Protestant British agent.

32 Percy Strangford, A Selection from the Writings of Viscount Strangford on Political, Geographical, and Social Subjects. ed. Emily Strangford. (London: Spottiswoode & Co., 1869), 63. 33 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 109-114. 34 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 223. 35 Scott Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East. (New York: Anchor Books, 2013), 27. 36 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 229. 10 10

According to. Platt, the Foreign Office was a snobbish department that held diplomats in higher regard than consuls, though there was little actual difference in their duties.37 The original duties of British consuls were to report on the commerce and trade in the regions they were stationed. Platt notes that the British consuls in the Ottoman Empire were more political than consuls stationed elsewhere throughout the world because they were safeguarding British interests against Russian and German competition.38 Though the consuls and diplomats in the Ottoman Empire carried out similar political duties, the prejudice remained due to the fact that Foreign Office officials came from higher social classes than consuls.39 British consuls and vice-consuls, who themselves faced prejudice from the Foreign Office, were more willing to hire and trust Armenian agents despite their supposed degenerate state. However, the Foreign Office sought to rid the British embassy in Constantinople of native dragomans in the 1870s to replace them with “natural born British subjects.”40 They established the Student Interpreter Service “to train Englishmen from home for the Dragomanate.”41 The British ambassador to Constantinople, Henry Elliot, argued that the British in Turkey should be represented by true Englishmen.42 Elliot believed British subjects could develop sufficient language skills to carry out the job without Levantines or natives. Lord Strangford echoed this statement, expressing that “we want our country to be

37 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 1, 72. 38 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 126, 130. 39 Platt, The Cinderella Service,1. 40 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 165; Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865-1939), 7. 41 Waugh, Turkey Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow, 28. 42 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 156. 11 11 served in Turkey as everywhere else, by the most perfect and highest type of English manhood.”43 He further claimed that only an English consul could provide “real knowledge” and would not dare “play juggling tricks in their despatches [sic], or suppress truth.”44 Despite this prejudice in the metropole, consuls and vice-consuls in the Ottoman provinces recognized the importance of native dragomans and continued to employ them. Platt notes that even if a consul was fluent in or Turkish, it was easier for a native to pick up gossip and local intelligence.45 The British vice-consul of Diarbekir hired Mugerditchian for his local contacts as much as for his language proficiencies.46 Before World War I, British consuls and vice-consuls were the most important sources of information in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. According to Yigal Sheffy, “nearly all information on troop deployment and movement, as well as on forms of German assistance [to the Ottomans]” was provided by British consulates.47 However, consuls lost their privileged position in the Ottoman Empire as relations between the two empires declined. In 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) rose to prominence in Constantinople in the , setting the Ottoman Empire on a collision course with Great Britain.48 The C.U.P reestablished the constitution of 1878 and reduced Abdul Hamid II to a figurehead, though they did not fully assume power

43 Strangford, A Selection from the Writings of Viscount Strangford, 55. 44 Strangford, A Selection from the Writings of Viscount Strangford, 67. 45 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 160. 46 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930/364 Hallward to P.W. Currie, 21 April 1896. 47 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 39. 48 Richard Hovannisian, Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times Vol II: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century. ed. Richard Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 229-320. 12 12 themselves.49 Unionists preached liberty and equality for Ottomans of all backgrounds and their ascent was celebrated by Armenians, , , and Muslims alike.50 However, the subsequent massacre of an estimated 20,000 Armenians in in 1909 quickly dispelled any illusions that the C.U.P. would provide equal rights to non-Turkic citizens.51 After a series of territorial losses in the First and Second (1912 and 1913), members of the C.U.P grew fearful that the Christians in their midst would revolt and the Eastern European powers of , , and Bulgaria would invade their western border. They believed the Armenians posed the greatest threat because they were a large Christian population in the very heart of the empire. , a leader of the Young Turk Revolution, led a coup against the pro-British Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha’s Liberal government in 1913. While Kiamil Pasha and the Liberals advocated for peace to prevent further territorial losses, the Unionists wanted to fight to protect Ottoman lands.52 By that summer, the C.U.P. controlled the Ottoman government and exiled Liberal opponents.53 Unionist leaders believed the only way to prevent additional territorial losses was an alliance with , Great Britain, or Germany. Though opinions were divided, Enver swayed fellow C.U.P. leaders to ally with Germany.54

49 Peter Balakian, The Burning : The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response. (New York: Perennial, 2004), 135-144. 50 Bedros Der Matossian, Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 23. 51 Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East. (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 13. 52 Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, 19. 53 Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, 18-22. 54 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2009), 43-50. 13 13

Once war was declared between Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1914, all Allied consuls were expelled from Turkey. The focal point for gathering intelligence on the Ottoman Empire shifted to the British Intelligence Department in Cairo. Mugerditchian would serve in this department and later be assigned to the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division as an intelligence officer. Armenian agents like Mugerditchian played an important role in the Campaign, the Palestinian Campaign, and on the Caucasian Front due to their ambiguous identity. Many of them seem to have served the British Empire in hopes that victory would secure an independent Armenian homeland. Mugerditchian spent much of 1915 encouraging the Intelligence Department to arm Armenians for such a purpose. According to Polly Mohs, British policy in Ottoman territories during World War I was often directed more by intelligence officers equipped with “regional expertise” rather than high ranking officials in London, Egypt, or India.55 Mohs further claims that “the most effective strategy for addressing the Anglo-Turk conflict was delivered by the intelligence officers on the ground.”56 Though Mohs’ study focuses on the , intelligence officers were similarly important in directing policy in the Palestinian campaign, as those in London were often out of touch with realities on the ground. The British use of Armenians in the war effort therefore raises interesting questions regarding the identities of these Armenians; both how they viewed themselves and how the British viewed them. While Laycock notes that the British government manipulated the ambiguous identity of Armenians and their suffering

55 Polly Mohs, Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War. (London: Routledge, 2008), 1. 56 Mohs, Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt, 4. 14 14 to justify the war effort, she does not adequately address the agency Armenians displayed in manipulating their own identities. Mugerditchian, Boyajian, and Safrastian used their ambiguous identities to comfortably operate within both Europeans and Ottoman circles, making them ideal liaisons between the Occident and Orient. They inhabited a unique middle-ground between the two worlds that enabled them to gather intelligence more effectively than British officials. However, their fluid identities were often rooted in their Armenian loyalties. Mugerditchian, Boyajian, and Safrastian employed the experience and influence they accrued on the periphery of the British Empire to protect Armenian interests. Before World War I, Mugerditchian and Safrastian (Boyajian was killed in 1895) used their influence in British consulates to protect local Armenians. During the war, they served as intelligence officers with the hope of securing a post-war peace favorable to Armenians. After the armistice, Safrastian and Mugerditchian used their contacts in both British and Ottoman circles to promote the creation of a free Armenian nation under a British mandate. Though their core identity was Armenian, Mugerditchian and Safrastian adopted British layers to their multi-faceted identities during their long careers in British service. Their Western education and experiences in the war instilled within them an appreciation for British technology, education, and liberal democratic values, and an aversion to perceived Eastern vices. They believed the British Empire was the Armenian people’s greatest hope for a free and independent homeland after the war. While Mugerditchian, Safrastian, and Boyajian were able to assume British identities in the periphery, British officials closer to the centers of power often distrusted Armenian agents, displaying prejudices that were out of touch with realities on the ground. However, officials on the ground in the Ottoman Empire were more prone to value the service of their 15 15

Armenian subordinates and advocate on their behalf. Studying the lives of these Armenian agents provides an interesting case study into the role of Armenians played in British intelligence and the interplay between their multifaceted identities. Chapter 1 demonstrates how the unique backgrounds of Mugerditchian, Boyajian, and Safrastian made them ideal agents. They had close cultural ties to Europe and the local Ottoman populations which made them important in the pre- war period, as tensions were rising between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Though the British Foreign Office opposed hiring native dragomans, consulates in the Ottoman Empire understood that Armenians could navigate local societies better than a European could. Armenian dragomans and vice-consuls were also important in protecting Armenians from Turkish aggression, though Boyajian himself would be murdered in 1895. Chapter 2 describes how Mugerditchian manipulated his identity to flee arrest at the outbreak of World War I before becoming an important intermediary between the British Intelligence Department in Cairo and their Arab, Greek, and Armenian allies. Safrastian served a similar role in the Front. Chapter 3 describes Mugerditchian and Safrastian’s post-war advocacy for an Armenian nation under a British mandate. Despite Britain’s failure to secure such a mandate, and several personal disappointments, Mugerditchian remained attached to the ideals he believed the British Empire represented.

CHAPTER 1: REVERENDS, SPIES, AND DRAGOMANS IN THE PERIPHERY

Though it was a common practice for British consulates in the Ottoman Empire to employ Armenian dragomans, Thomas Mugerditchian, Thomas Boyajian, and Arshak Safrastian are especially notable for their service as vice- consuls. Their upbringings made them particularly suited to act as liaisons between British and Ottoman circles. They were Western educated, which enabled them to learn English and develop strong ties to American and British missionaries and travelers. All three manipulated their language, dress, and appearance to optimize their usefulness to the British government. Their duties included collecting intelligence, promoting British trade, reporting on the conditions of the Armenians, mediating disputes between local populations, and distributing relief to Armenians on behalf of American and English donors. The Sassoon massacres in 1894 epitomize the importance of Armenian dragomans and vice-consuls, as they were vital to reporting on the massacres and distributing Western aid to . Despite their fluid identities and Western connections, they were primarily motivated to serve in British consulates to improve the lives of Armenians. They believed they could do so by bringing British technology, trade, and enlightenment into the lives of local Armenians. Armenian vice-consuls and dragomans also employed their protected status as British agents to defend Armenian victims of Turkish atrocities. Armenian dragomans and vice-consuls were uniquely qualified to carry out these duties as they straddled the Eastern and Western worlds. Mugerditchian, Boyajian, and Safrastian became fluent in multiple languages at a young age due to their unique upbringing, which made them ideal candidates in the eyes of British consuls. Thomas Kalo Mugerditchian was born 17 17 the son of Mugerditch Kalo, the chief of a Kurdified Armenian tribe called Khalta in the village of Rudvan.1 The Khalta had maintained their Armenian identity but only spoke Kurdish. American missionaries helped bring the to the region by establishing schools. Mugerditchian grew up speaking Kurdish and later learned English and Armenian at one such missionary school. By adulthood, Mugerditchian would also speak Arabic, Turkish, and Persian.2 Boyajian similarly benefitted from a Western education. He attended the Bebek Seminary in Constantinople, which was established by the American missionary Reverend Cyrus Hamlin in 1840.3 Though studies in Bebek Seminary included modern , Hamlin placed an emphasis on teaching English to create greater opportunities for his students.4 Hamlin claimed that “the native pastor, especially, must have resources beyond the poverty of his own language, or he will never maintain himself as an acceptable teacher of truth.”5 Thus, Boyajian became fluent in English in addition to local Ottoman languages. While Boyajian and Mugerditchian were educated by American missionaries, Arshak Safrastian was an exception. He was raised in a revolutionary family that took part in the in 1896, a bloody siege that ended with an Ottoman massacre of the region’s Armenian population.6

1 Mugerditchian, Autobiography of Rev. Thomas Mugerdichian (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 43; For more information on the Khalta, also referred to as Khalida: Thomas K. Mugerditchian, The Diyarbekir Massacres and Kurdish Atrocities. (London: , 2013), 71-72 2 Thomas Mugerditchian, “Fingers of Fate: The Tightening Grip,” (Inscription on reverse of photo), Author’s Personal Collection. 3 Frank Andrew Stone, Academies for Anatolia: A Study of the Rationale, Program and Impact of the Educational Institutions Sponsored by the American Board in Turkey: 1830-2005. (San Francisco: Caddo Gap Press, 2006), 57-58. 4 Stone, Academies for Anatolia, 64. 5 Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turk. (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1877), 282. 6 Balakian, , 60-61; Ervant Der Megerditchian, Treasures of Vasbouragan. (Watertown, Massachusetts, 1966), 555. 18 18

When tension in Van subdued with increased European attention on the massacres, Safrastian taught himself English and French and went on to become a history teacher at the Haigazian Central School in 1904.7 Three years later, the British vice-consul G.E. Tyrell approached Safrastian to offer him the position of dragoman in the Bitlis consulate.8

Figure 1: Thomas Mugerditchian, seated center right, and Arshak Safrastian, seated far right, in Bitlis 1907. Photo enhanced for clarity by Andrew Rettig.

7 Der Megerditchian, Treasures of Vasbouragan, 555. 8 J.R. Milne, “Diplomat in Boston Tells of Fighting Turks,” Boston Post, July 10, 1921. 19 19

In addition to their similar educational backgrounds, Mugerditchian and Boyajian were both Protestant ministers before becoming dragomans. It is notable that two of the three Armenian vice-consuls were Protestant ministers, as the British considered Protestant Armenians more civilized than their Orthodox brethren.9 Upon graduating from the Bebek Seminary in Constantinople, Boyajian returned to his hometown to become “the first ordained minister in Diarbekir.”10 He established an Armenian Evangelical church with the help of funds raised in England and with the partnership of American missionaries.11 Boyajian believed his Protestant congregation had an enlightening effect on the “ancient Oriental Churches.”12 In 1890, Mugerditchian carried out similar work after graduating from the Euphrates College Seminary Theological School, established by American missionaries in 1852. Mugerditchian helped the missionaries translate the New Testament into Kurdish using the .13 He spent the next six years as the Protestant minister of several Kurdish speaking Armenian churches throughout the province of Diarbekir.14

9 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 65; Safrastian’s religious affiliations remain unknown. 10 “Obituary Notes,” The New York Times, October 17, 1895. 11 “A True Armenian Patriot,” Boston Herald, 1895; Boyajian traveled to America to raise funds for his church in 1867, Leon Arpee, “A Century of Armenian Protestantism” American Society of Church History 5, no. 2 (June 1936), 156. 12 Thomas Valpy French and Herbert Birks, The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Valpy French: First Bishop of Lahore. (London: John Murray, 1895), 261. 13 The sultan saw such action as “subversive” because it fostered “ethnic self-consciousness” and threatened “Islamic unity.” Hans-Lukas Kieser, Nearest East: American Millenialism and Mission to the Middle East. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 57; Leon Arpee, A History of Armenian . (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), 280-281 14 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/1572 Mugerditchian to the High Commissioner of Cairo, 29 Nov. 1918. 20 20

Figure 2: Thomas Mugerditchian, seated far right, with teachers and students from Euphrates College, circa 1880.

In addition to serving as a minister, Boyajian acted as a mediator between Diarbekir’s British vice-consul, Henry Trotter, and Ottoman authorities. In 1878 Reverend Boyajian accompanied Trotter to an interview with Vali (governor) Abdul Rahman Pasha. Trotter described Boyajian as a “Protestant Armenian gentleman…whom I know to enjoy the fullest confidence of the Vali as well as myself.”15 Boyajian’s mobility in Ottoman, Protestant, and European circles made him a useful partner for Trotter. A year later, Boyajian helped Trotter diffuse religious tension between the local Chaldean, Jacobite, Armenian, and Protestant communities. Trotter made a distinction between the “Armenians” as adherents of the Apostolic Church and the

15 TNA: PRO FO 195-1211/85 Henry Trotter to Sir A.H. Laylard, 28 Dec. 1877. 21 21

“Protestants,” who would have been primarily Armenian as well. 16 The Chaldeans, Jacobites, and Armenian Apostolic populations felt that the Protestants became more outspoken and “overbearing” when Trotter arrived in Diarbekir.17 This tension led to several attacks against Protestant Armenians by Apostolic and Catholic Armenians. Trotter appealed to Boyajian and the Armenian bishop of Diarbekir to write to their communities appealing for peace so the conflict would not become a “scandal to Christendom.”18 Mediating such disputes and keeping the peace was an important task for British consuls, who feared that escalateing problems could have repercussions throughout Europe. Mugerditchian would later play a similar role in keeping peace by convincing a group of Armenian revolutionaries, who the British feared would stir up trouble, to leave the country.19 Boyajian served as the Acting Vice-Consul of Diarbekir on several occasions in the absence of a British consul. In addition to keeping the British embassy informed about the local economy, Boyajian monitored violence against Armenians and used his Western connections to distribute relief funds to refugees.20 He made trips to England during his career as a pastor and vice-consul to meet with evangelical organizations and raise funds for missionaries and disaster relief.21 A famine struck the Ottoman Empire in 1880 in which “it was

16 TNA: PRO FO 95/1211/236 Henry Trotter to E. B. Malet, 16 April 1879. 17 TNA: PRO FO 95/1211/236 Henry Trotter to E. B. Malet, 16 April 1879. 18 TNA: PRO FO 95/1211/238 Henry Trotter to E. B. Malet, 16 April 1879. 19 TNA: PRO FO 195/2251/185 Heard to Sir O’Connor, 19 Aug. 1907. 20 TNA: PRO FO 195/1617/2 Telegram, Mr. Boyajian to Sir W. White 4 Feb. 1888; TNA: PRO FO 195/1617/3 Decipher, Mr. Boyajian, 7 Feb. 1888; TNA: PRO FO 195/1617/16 A.C. Wratislaw to Sir W. White 19 Feb. 1888. 21 “The Famine in Armenia,” Glasgow Herald, July 29, 1880. 22 22 very common to see men and children, a mere heap of bones, lying naked in the streets, covered with flies they were too weak to brush away.”22 The English missionary, Thomas Valpy French, who later became the first Bishop of Lahore, commented on his way through Diarbekir that Boyajian “is engaged every day in distributing doles of bread or money to these poor famished, half-naked, diseased creatures of God.”23 Boyajian traveled to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1880 where he spoke to the Turkish Missions Aid Society in Edinburgh to raise relief funds for the famine.24 On another trip to Britain, Boyajian addressed the House of Commons on “the political and economic conditions of Asiatic Turkey.”25 He not only kept the British Empire informed, but also aided the Armenian community through his involvement in relief distribution during famines, earthquakes, and civil unrest. Mugerditchian would soon follow in Boyajian’s footsteps as the vice- consul of Diarbekir. The vice-consul of Van, Cecil Hallward, who was later transferred to Diarbekir, first noticed Mugerditchian in 1894 after the Turks massacred 3,000 Armenians in the Sassoon highlands.26 The massacre began when Kurdish tribes attacked Talori, a district in Sassoon. When the Mutessarif (administrator) of Guendj arrived with the Turkish army, they arrested several Armenians and continued to plunder whatever the Kurds had left.27 The

22 “The Famine in Asiatic Turkey,” The Colonist, August 3, 1880. 23 French and Birks, The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Valpy French, 242. 24 “Turkish Missions Aid Society,” The Norfork News, February 29, 1868; 25 “A True Armenian Patriot,” Boston Herald, 1895. 26 On the massacres in Sassoon, see: Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response, 53-57. 27 Turkey No. 1 (1895) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, Part I (Events at Sassoon and the Commission of Enquiry at Mush.) London: Harrison and Sons, 1895 23 23

Mutessarif reported to the Grand Vizier (prime minister) that the Armenians of Sassoon were revolting. This lie sparked events that would unfold into the massacre of the Armenians in Sassoon. Boyajian, who was then serving as the Acting Vice-Consul of Diarbekir, provided Currie with the true account of the massacres in a detailed report.28 Sir Philip Currie, the British ambassador to Constantinople, sent Hallward to report on the disturbances in Sassoon in the fall of 1894. Hallward reported that he was initially unable to “learn the truth” because the Armenians were afraid they would be punished for speaking to him.29 These fears were well founded, as a year earlier an Armenian was imprisoned for changing money for an English traveler named H.F.B. Lynch. Mugerditchian was then serving as the pastor of a congregation in Farkin, a village where a large number of survivors from Sassoon had taken refuge.30 He interviewed the victims, drafted a report, and sent it hidden in a cane with a young boy to the British, French, and Russian consuls in Moush. Hallward was impressed to receive such a well-articulated English report from an Armenian in such a remote village.31 Ambassador Currie put pressure on the Sultan to investigate the massacres in Sassoon, who subsequently responded that Hallward “secretly collected some Armenians” and convinced them to make a report against the Turkish government.32 Despite this denial, the Sublime Porte established a mock

28 Turkey No. 1 (1895) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 27. 29 Currie notes ascertaining the true account of the massacre through Boyajian, Turkey No. 1 (1895) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 31; Boyajian’s report to Consul Graves, Turkey No. 6 (1894-95) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 73-74. 30 Alice Muggerdichian Shipley, “Judge Upset at Long , Threatens Contempt of Court Charge.” California Courier, January 19, 1986. 31 Ibid 32 Turkey No. 1 (1895) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 38. 24 24 commission to investigate the massacres to appease the European powers. The commission’s investigation relied solely on Muslim witnesses and blamed the Armenians for the massacre.33 This prompted the British, French, and Russian consuls in the region to create their own commission based in Moush. British consuls R.W. Graves of Erzeroum and Hallward, then the consul in Van, spearheaded the British investigation.34 In the spring of 1895, a delegation of five Armenians presented further evidence on the massacres to the Moush commission.35 However, the commission was “in great need of a Dragoman with knowledge of Armenian and Kurdish, whose presence would inspire the witnesses with confidence, and help to establish the truth of the facts.”36 An Armenian dragoman was also necessary to verify the evidence of the Armenian witnesses.37 The Porte eventually consented to allowing the Armenian dragoman of the French consulate in Erzeroum, Dikran Srabian, to join the commission.38 Journalist Frederick Greene subsequently reported in The [Manchester] Guardian that it was “through the enterprise of the press…corroborated by information from private individuals” that the world discovered the truth about the Sassoon massacre.39 The fact that Mugerditchian and Boyajian spoke Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and English made them particularly useful to the

33 Balakian, The Burning Tigris, 56-57; Frederick Greene, “The Armenian Massacres.” The [Manchester] Guardian, May 1, 1895. 34 Balakian, The Burning Tigris, 57. 35 Turkey No. 1 (1895) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 102. 36 Turkey No. 1 (1895) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 110. 37 “The Armenian Inquiry.” Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, March 18, 1895. 38 Turkey No. 1 (1895) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 118. 39 Greene, “The Armenian Massacres,” The [Manchester] Guardian, May 1, 1895. 25 25 commission.40 Mugerditchian had strong connections to British and American communities and was thus unafraid of reporting to Hallward, while Boyajian himself was already a British employee. As the commission investigated the atrocities in Sassoon, Boyajian monitored the situation in Diarbekir as the Acting Vice-Consul. Several Kurdish chiefs implicated in the massacres visited Diarbekir on their way to and claimed that the Armenians had revolted in Sassoon.41 Boyajian’s local contacts kept him abreast of the strained atmosphere. He learned from “a respectable Mahommeden [sic]…in the course of conversation…that the relations between the Turks and Christians are very much strained.”42 Similarly, a “reliable Armenian” reported to Boyajian that he overheard an official ask if Diarbekir would become “another ,” referring to a prior massacre in that city.43 These interactions demonstrate the benefit of employing a native vice-consul to extract intelligence from local populations. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Kimberley, instructed Currie to “obtain some assurance from the Turkish Government” so the Kurdish chiefs would not be allowed back in Diarbekir.44 Tension between Turks and Armenians continued to rise after the Sassoon massacres. A series of violent massacres swept through the Armenian populated provinces of the Ottoman Empire in 1895, claiming the life of Boyajian among many others.45 He was remembered by Reverend Hamlin as “a natural gentleman”

40 Missionaries similarly played an important part in reporting the Sassoon Massacres to a Western audience. Owen Miller, “Sasun 1894: Mountains, Missionaries and Massacres at the End of the Ottoman Empire.” (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2015), 53-54. 41 Turkey No. 6 (1894-95) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 277. 42 Turkey No. 6 (1894-95) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 277. 43 Turkey No. 6 (1894-95) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 277. 44 Turkey No. 6 (1894-95) Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 298. 45 “A True Armenian Patriot,” Boston Herald, 1895. 26 26 with a mastery of English, Armenian, and Turkish.46 The Foreign Office replaced Boyajian with an official paid English consul, Hallward, because of the surge in violence against the Armenians in Diarbekir. The British press kept activists at home informed about the violence, who in turn pressured the government to aid the Armenians. Currie was initially opposed to using consuls to distribute relief, but eventually relented under pressure.47 On August 22, 1895, George M. Curzon, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, reported to the House of Commons that Vice-Consul Hampson visited Sassoon to rally the European missionaries in aid of the Armenians.48 Hampson reported that “nothing had been done before I arrived” because the Turkish authorities prevented the missionaries from distributing relief. 49 British consuls and vice consuls became vital to coordinating American and British relief efforts with the help of Armenian dragomans. In 1897, Francis Crow, the vice-consul of Bitlis, toured Sassoon and the surrounding regions to report on relief efforts and the attitudes of the Kurds. Crow wrote that he was “indebted” to his Armenian dragoman, Hagop Effendi, “whose services were especially valuable in places where nothing but Armenian and Kurdish were spoken.”50 When Safrastian became a vice-consul, word of his family’s revolutionary activities had reached the wealthy Egyptian Armenian notables Boghos Noubar Pasha and Yakoub Artin Pasha. When they heard of Safrastian’s appointment, they sent him

46 “A True Armenian Patriot.” Boston Herald, 1895. 47 Tusan, The British Empire and the Armenian Genocide, 83-84. 48 “Mr. Balfour Questioned as to an International Money Conference Aid for the Needy in Armenia,” The Wilmington Messenger [North Carolina], August 23, 1895. 49 TNA: PRO FO 195/1887/95 Decipher, Vice Consul Hampson, 4 August 1895; FO 195/1887/95 Decipher, Vice Consul Hampson, 28 July 1895. 50 Turkey No. 1 (1898) Further Correspondence Respecting the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, (London: Harrison and Sons, 1898.), 239. 27 27 money to distribute to the needy in Moush and Bitlis.51 After an earthquake struck Bitlis in 1907, Safrastian distributed money donated from California to the needy.52 When Hallward stopped in Farkin en route to his new post in Diarbekir, he discovered that the Turkish authorities had arrested Mugerditchian for distributing grain to Armenians in Sassoon.53 An American missionary in charge of the Bible House in Constantinople, William Peet, had forwarded the funds for the grain to Mugerditchian on behalf of the Sassoon Relief Committee. The authorities accused Mugerditchian of illegally accepting money from Americans and arrested him. Mugerditchian remained in prison for 73 days until he secured his release with a bribe. Mugerditchian’s arrest in relation to his connection to the British consulate was not unique. Local Turkish governors often targeted Armenians involved in relief committees following the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896. Boghos Effendi Tomayan, for example, was sentenced to five years in prison for distributing aid from the Armenian Relief Fund in London under the direction of Hallward and his successor, Vice-Consul Telford Waugh.54 Vice Consul Jones believed the authorities were trying to deter Armenians from engaging in foreign sponsored relief work.55 Shortly after Mugerditchian’s arrest, Hallward wrote to Currie with the intention of hiring Mugerditchian as his dragoman. Hallward noted that

51 Der Megerditchian, Treasures of Vasbouragan, 556. 52 TNA: PRO FO 195/2251/32 Arshag Safrastian to Wilkie Young, 16 July 1907. 53 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930 Hallward to P.W. Currie, 19 February 1896. 54 Waugh, Turkey Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow, 52. 55 TNA: PRO FO 195/2063/70 J.Francis Jones to Sir O’Conor, 10 July 1899. 28 28

Mugerditchian was a Protestant pastor and a “respectable man with a fair knowledge of English.”56 Currie responded that such an appointment would be undesirable. He was hesitant to assume responsibility for a native dragoman under British protection but noted that Hallward had the right to hire a scribe or translator instead.57 In 1877, Currie, then a senior clerk in the Foreign Office, had made the Levant Consular Service a “distinct service” with the intention of providing specialized training for Englishmen to replace native and Levantine consular staff.58 He instructed Hallward that “native dragomans are not to be appointed except under exceptional circumstances.”59 However, Hallward understood it was more difficult for Europeans to casually extract intelligence from local Ottoman subjects. He reported that the Turkish authorities distrusted the English which made it difficult to hold “direct communication with the natives” or frequent their homes “except on formal occasions.”60 Hallward repeated his request to Currie, arguing that he did not need a dragoman to translate Turkish, but to gather intelligence. It was easier for a native to investigate local disputes, pick up gossip, and visit officials. A British vice-consul would be subject to “elaborate, timewasting ceremony” when visiting Turkish officials.61 Hallward further complained that because there were no British subjects interests to look after in Diarbekir, his only duty was to gather

56 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930 Hallward to P.W. Currie, 10 March 1896. 57 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930/364 Hallward to P.W. Currie, 21 April 1896. 58 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 165. 59 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930 Memo, Hallward to P.W. Currie, 10 March 1896. 60 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930/365 Hallward to P.W. Currie, 21 April 1896. 61 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 161. 29 29 intelligence. This task was impossible without a native dragoman, making his post “practically a sinecure.”62 Currie eventually relented after Hallward promised that Mugerditchian had no local business ties and would not cause the consulate trouble by “engaging in litigation.”63 He also emphasized that Mugerditchian would likely be willing to leave the country “should this post be suppressed.”64 Hallward seemed to imply that though Mugerditchian was an Armenian, he was not deeply entrenched enough in his locality to be a burden on the British government. The exchange between Hallward and Currie demonstrates the divide between practical needs on the ground and prejudices closer to the centers of power. Hallward understood that Mugerditchian had useful skills and could collect intelligence better than a British officer, while the ambassador viewed him as a liability, as the British Embassy would be responsible for Mugerditchian if he were to have further trouble with the authorities. As a dragoman, Mugerditchian interceded on behalf of Armenians who were arrested for their connection to British and American relief organizations. In 1899, Turkish authorities intercepted a letter from Nerses Amirkhanian to his father Bedros, the Protestant pastor in Farkin. The man delivering the letter hid it suspiciously when Turkish police arrested him, though the letter itself was innocent. This led the Turkish authorities to arrest Nerses and search his home, where they found English and Armenian relief committee papers. The authorities sent a warrant for the arrest of the American missionary Dr. Andrus and 26

62 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930/365 Hallward to P.W. Currie, 21 April 1896. 63 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930/365 Hallward to P.W. Currie, 21 April 1896. 64 TNA: PRO FO 195/1930/365 Hallward to P.W. Currie, 21 April 1896. 30 30

Armenian relief workers who appeared in Nerses’ papers.65 They charged them for purportedly being revolutionaries based on an innocent letter misconstrued to have a political character.66 The authorities also found a letter signed by the Armenian Protestant pastor Abraham Hartunian that read, “Lord, what wilt thou have me do? If Jesus were in my place, what would he do?”67 They mistranslated his letter to read “My Chief, what is it you wish done,” as if writing to the head of a revolutionary party.68 The Turkish authorities then used the relief records to claim Hartunian was accepting money from the Americans to buy guns and ammunition. Hartunian informed an American missionary named Miss Shattuck of his plight, who subsequently implored the English and American ambassadors in Constantinople to secure his release. The British consulate in Diarbekir sent Mugerditchian to oversee the proceedings.69 Hartunian recalled in his memoir, “The presence of the dragoman encouraged us.”70 Mugerditchian monitored the case and ensured that the authorities were not purposefully mistranslating Armenian and English letters. He then visited the Vali (governor) to make inquiries about the case and was ordered to inform Vice-Consul Jones the consulate had no right to interfere.71 The Turkish

65 TNA: PRO FO 195/2063/26 C.J. Gates to J. Francis Jones 3 April 1899. 66 TNA: PRO FO 195/2063/21 Decipher, J. Francis Jones 9 April 1899. 67 Abraham H. Hartunian, Neither to Laugh nor to Weep: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide. (Cambridge: Armenian Heritage Press, 1976), 32-34 68 Hartunian, Neither to Laugh nor to Weep, 32-33. 69 TNA: PRO FO 195/2082 J. Francis Jones to Mr. de Bunsen, 1 May 1900; TNA: PRO FO 195/2082/149 J. Francis Jones to Sir O’Conor, 22 May 1900. 70 Hartunian, Neither to Laugh nor to Weep, 34. 71 TNA: PRO FO 195/2082/153 J. Francis Jones to Sir O’Conor, 29 May 1900. 31 31 authorities, under pressure from the British consulate, set Hartunian and his compatriots free after remaining in prison for over a year.72 Mugerditchian was able to use his status as a British consul to combat Turkish injustices against Armenians. In 1914, amidst rising tensions and rumors of an impending demonstration, the marketplace in Diarbekir was set ablaze.73 British Vice-Consul George Monk-Mason reported that witnesses saw Kurds sprinkling petroleum in the marketplace and that the fire had started in four different places.74 Monk-Mason claimed the fire could have been effectively prevented from spreading by removing the wooden shutters from the shops, but the Turkish police prevented the Armenians from fighting the spreading fire or saving their belongings while Muslim shop owners were allowed to protect their shops. Witnesses reported hearing the police deputy Memdouh Bey shout “let it burn!”75 Muslims then looted the burning Armenian shops under the protection of Turkish police. Monk-Mason claimed the Armenians would have been able to fight off the looters had not the police been protecting them. The Armenians were only able to stop the pillaging and fight the fire when Mugerditchian arrived.76 He instructed the able bodied men to pull down the burning shops around the bank to prevent the fire from spreading.77 According to Mugerditchian, the fire claimed 1,080 shops, 13 bakeries, two inns, and 14 lumber depots in less than five hours.78

72 Hartunian, Neither to Laugh nor to Weep, 35 73 Maria Jacobsen, Diaries of a Danish Missionary: , 1907-1919. Ed. Ara Sarafian. (Princeton: Gomidas Institute, 2001), 38. 74 TNA: PRO FO 195/2460 Monk Mason to Sir Louis Mallet, 19 Aug. 1914. 75 TNA: PRO FO 195/2460 Monk Mason to Sir Louis Mallet, 19 Aug. 1914. 76 According to Hilmar Kaiser, Mugerditchian’s presence inspired the Armenians to “make a stand against the police.” Hilmar Kaiser, The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. (: Istanbuil Bilgi University Press, 2014), 118. 77 TNA: PRO FO 195/2460 Monk Mason to Sir Louis Mallet, 19 Aug. 1914. 32 32

The following day, Mugerditchian and Monk-Mason toured the ruined marketplace. Several merchants and a trusted informant told Mugerditchian that the C.U.P. organized the fire as a weapon against the Christians.79 Like Boyajian and Mugerditchian, Safrastian used his status as a British agent to prevent crimes against Armenians. Safrastian later gloated to a Boston Post reporter, “I was now, of course, a British protégé. And what a time I had…You see, an accredited British official could do just about anything he liked in Turkey.”80 In one occasion, Safrastian grabbed a stick from a Turkish officer who was beating a young boy and proceeded to beat the officer unconscious.81 As a dragoman, Mugerditchian traveled to different Ottoman provinces to “gather information for the British government concerning the topography, population, economy, agriculture, industry, and military might of the country.”82 He wrote several reports for British intelligence, including information on the exports and imports of Diarbekir, a summary of the C.U.P. party in Egypt, and information on the different tribes of Diarbekir, , and Bitlis.83 He also sought to promote British trade in the Ottoman Empire. In 1907, Horace Wilkie Young, the then vice-consul of Diarbekir, wrote a report titled “Notes on the question of facilities for British Commercial Penetration in Asiatic Turkey,” proposing a scheme to increase British trade in the

78 Mugerditcian, The Diyarbekir Massacres and Kurdish Atrocities, 11. 79 Thomas Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1914 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 20 Aug. 1914, Translated by Mary Avetisyan 80 Milne, “Diplomat in Boston Tells of Fighting Turks.” Boston Post, July 10, 1921 81 Milne, “Diplomat in Boston Tells of Fighting Turks.” Boston Post, July 10, 1921 82 Alice Muggerdichian Shipley, We Walked Then Ran. (Phoenix: A.M. Shipley, 1984), 19. 83 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/1572 Mugerditchian to the High Commissioner of Cairo, 29 Nov. 1918. 33 33 region. 84 He lamented that no effort was being made to familiarize the Ottomans with the superiority of British goods, and that such a venture would be profitable. Wilkie Young proposed using “intelligence and reliable young men possessed of a fair knowledge of English among those who have been trained by the Jesuit or American Missions” to bring British goods to the Ottoman people.85 That same year, Mugerditchian attempted to become the arbiter of English civilization to local Armenians. He wrote to George Lloyd about an agreement to establish a store for British agricultural tools in Diarbekir under Mugerditchian’s supervision.86 Lloyd, the ambitious honorary attaché in Constantinople, was quickly becoming recognized for his expertise in Turkish affairs. He had traveled the Ottoman Empire and wrote several memoranda on “German schemes” and Turkish finances for the Foreign Office.87 In 1907, Lloyd was working on a special commission to promote British trade in Turkey.88 Mugerditchian similarly proposed that the British organize an agricultural show in Diarbekir to demonstrate English machinery to local farmers. He further suggested that rich English entrepreneurs buy farmland in Diarbekir under his name, since foreigners were not allowed to buy land in Turkey. Mugerditchian would then farm the land with “an English good farmer using machinery sent from England.”89 He claimed this would “attract the attention of the people [of Diarbekir] to use English

84 TNA: PRO FO 369/772/571 Mr. Wilkie Young to Sir O’Conor, 3 Dec. 1907. 85 TNA: PRO FO 369/772/574 Mr. Wilkie Young to Sir O’Conor, 3 Dec. 1907. 86 GLLD 7/2 K.M. Thomas to Mr. Lloyd, 15 Oct. 1907. 87 John Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 11-15. 88 Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire., 16-17 89 GLLD 7/3 K.M. Thomas to Mr. Lloyd, 26 Feb. 1908. 34 34 farming goods,” as “the natives sow…by means of their most ancient ploughs and wretched oxen.”90 Mugerditchian’s proposal demonstrates that he understood the uniqueness of his position, as both a subject of the Ottoman Empire who could purchase farmland, but also as an employee of the British Empire who could bring European progress to his home. The fact that Mugerditchian referred to his neighbors as “the natives” suggests that he saw himself as not fully native himself, but something elevated: an educated Protestant British employee. He similarly attempted to establish a Protestant British high school in Diarbekir to teach English.91 There is no evidence that any of his proposals bore fruit. In 1908, Vice-Consul Heard wrote to Lloyd complaining that he had been trying to promote British trade in Diarbekir to no avail. When the “biggest landowner” in the region asked for agricultural machinery, Heard sent Mugerditchian to investigate.92 Despite their efforts, British trade did not thrive in the eastern provinces according to Safrastian’s observations in the fall of 1908. Safrastian claimed that British trade was in decline and that locals were more interested in buying German and Italian goods. He noted that “the locals are only looking for cheapness in buying commodities, without considering quality.”93 In 1914, Mugerditchian traveled to London on the way to visit his oldest daughter in America, a journey he had “looked forward to all his life.”94 He visited the Board of Trade in London with a letter from Lloyd testifying that “if he

90 GLLD 7/3 K.M. Thomas to Mr. Lloyd, 26 Feb. 1908. 91 Mugerditchian, Autobiography of Rev. Thomas Mugerdichian (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 47. 92 GLLD 7/3 W.B. Heard to Mr. Lloyd, 24 June 1908. 93 “Notes on Foreign Trade,” The Scotsman [Midlothian], November 7, 1908. 94 GLLD 7/3 George Lloyd to Selby, 17, March 1914. 35 35 were to be overlooked and no interest taken in him it would do us harm in that part of Turkey.”95 To Mugerditchian, promoting British trade and agricultural machinery would improve the lives of local Armenian farmers and improve his standing in the region as the agent to oversee such affairs. Mugerditchian’s work brought him into frequent contact with both Turkish and European dignitaries. He manipulated his appearance depending on who he was meeting by dressing in Turkish clothes in the presence of Turkish officials and wearing English suits when meeting with European dignitaries.96 In a letter to his family, Mugerditchian wrote that he “always carried two hats with me, a grey homburg to wear among Europeans, and a red fez with a long black silk tassel to wear among Turkish officials.”97 Elite and educated Armenians had been adopting European dress since the 19th century after many of them studied abroad in European universities. These Armenians brought back Enlightenment ideas as well as European styles. They began to abandon the fez in favor of European hats and styles toward the end of the century.98 Mugerditchian similarly manipulated his name, alternating between Thomas Kalo Mugerditchian and the Anglicized “K.M. Thomas.”99 He understood the importance of appearing Eastern to the Turks and Western to British and Europeans diplomats.

95 GLLD 7/3 George Lloyd to Selby, 17, March 1914. 96 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, viii, 18. 97 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 47. 98 Hovannisian, and Myers, eds. Enlightenment and Diaspora, 72. 99 Alice Muggerdichian Shipley, “Judge Upset at Long Armenian Name, Threatens Contempt of Court Charge,” California Courier, January 19, 1986. 36 36

Figure 3: Thomas Mugerditchian as he appeared before European diplomats, left, and Ottoman officials, right.

The duties of British consuls in the Ottoman Empire also included certain social obligations. According to Platt, the Foreign Office expected consuls and vice-consuls to house “English globe trotters,…foreigners of distinction, officers of rank,…and British diplomats and consular colleagues.”100 When Boyajian was the Vice-Consul in Diarbekir, he hosted the English missionary Thomas Valpy French, who commented favorably on Boyajian’s “thoroughly ladylike English wife” who had connections with the Archibald Tait, the Archbishop of Canterbury.101 The fact that an Armenian from an eastern province of Anatolia and an English lady married implies that they shared a similar enough worldview and culture on which to build a marriage and attests to Boyajian’s ambiguous identity. Catherine Rogers Boyajian’s presence likely made her husband’s

100 Platt, The Cinderella Service, 86. 101 French and Birks, The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Valpy French, 242, 260. 37 37 household more welcoming for European travelers, as she was the “only European in Diarbekir” according to the French vice-consul Gustave Meyrier.102 Like Boyajian, Mugerditchian often hosted European dignitaries and travelers, including Mark Sykes, Conservative MP later known for his role in the Sykes-Picot agreement, and George Lloyd, who would later become the High Commissioner of Cairo. Mugerditchian provided intelligence reports for both Lloyd and Sykes during their tours of the Ottoman Empire, including a detailed report on Diarbekir’s rich mines.103 The archaeologist similarly crossed paths with Mugerditchian on her multiple visits to Diarbekir. Bell traveled throughout the Middle East at the turn of the century studying Eastern culture and landscapes. Her knowledge and expertise were instrumental to British intelligence in the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. Many referred to Bell as the “uncrowned queen of ” for her role in the nation’s formation.104 On Bell’s first visit to Diarbekir in 1909, Mugerditchian escorted her on several long expeditions while discussing news of the recent massacres in Adana and tension in the province.105 Bell visited Diarbekir a second time in 1911, where Mugerditchian, “a great friend of 2 years’ ago” settled her in to the British consulate.106 With a hint of entitlement, Bell noted the comfort of

102 Gustave Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir: Correspondance diplomatique du Vice-consul de France 1894-1896, eds. Claire Mouradian and Michel Durand-Meyrier. ( : L’Inventaire, 2000), 60. Segment Translated by Christine Dombourian Rinck. My thanks to Jelle Verheij for helping me acquire this source. 103 DDSY(2)/9/51 Mines and Mining in the of Diarbekir, 1913. 104 Janet Wallach, Queen: The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell: Adventurer, Adviser to Kings, Ally of Lawrence of Arabia. (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), xxi. 105 Gertrude Bell Diaries, 29, 31 May 1909. 106 Gertrude Bell Letters, Gertrude Bell to Unknown, 6 May 1911. 38 38 her accommodations and the help of “the good little Thomas Effendi [Mugerditchian],” who would do all of her jobs for her, as “he is an Armenian.”107 Mugerditchian also hosted figures more sinister to the British Empire. In 1910, Mugerditchian housed the German spymaster Baron von Oppenheim for a week at his home. Oppenheim was traveling throughout the Middle East meeting with prominent Turks and to promote Germany’s imperial interests and to incite Muslim jihad against the British.108 This made Oppenheim especially dangerous to the British because of their tenuous relationship with their Muslim subjects. The Germans did not make Oppenheim an official member of the diplomatic service and similarly did not give him a specific assignment so they would not be held responsible for his subversive activities.109 The British knew of Oppenheim’s work and called him the “Kaiser’s spy.”110 Mugerditchian warned Oppenheim that Germany was “following a very unwise and bad policy in inciting…the barbarous Asiatic races.”111 During his visit, Oppenheim offered Mugerditchian a higher paying salary of £50 a month to work for German intelligence, as well as £400 for his various intelligence reports. At the time, Mugerditchian only earned £10 a month from the British consulate.112 Though the Foreign Office paid him a fraction of the sum offered by Oppenheim, Mugerditchian rejected the offer because he considered

107 Gertrude Bell Letters, Gertrude Bell to Unknown, 6 May 1911. 108 Lionel Gossman, The Passion of : Archaeology and Intrigue in the Middle East from Wilhelm II to Hitler. (Cambridge: Open Book, 2014), 38. 109 Gossman, The Passion of Max von Oppenheim, 43. 110 Gossman, The Passion of Max von Oppenheim, 40. 111 K.M. Thomas, Untitled Speech (Unpublished), Author’s Personal Collection, 20 Dec. 1926. 112 Mugerditchian, Autobiography of Rev. Thomas Mugerdichian (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 46. 39 39

Germans the enemies of his people.113 In considering how to form his identity, Mugerditchian clearly drew a line between those he perceived as friends of Armenians, such as the British, and those who were not. At the core of his identity and the choices he made was a concern for his people. Mugerditchian’s daughter recalled how her father “wined and dined” Oppenheim until he grew so relaxed he began to boast that Germany would soon conquer Europe and America and “sit on top of the world.”114 Mugerditchian warned Oppenheim that he would forward these threats to the British government, to which Oppenheim replied that he was of noble European descent and that the British would take his word over Mugerditchian’s, whose noble lineage was not recognized in European society. Nevertheless, Mugerditchian forwarded his report to the Foreign Office, who subsequently reprimanded him for trying to incite trouble between King Edward VII and his cousin the Kaiser.115 The British government valued the word of a hostile spy over that of Mugerditchian because Armenians were considered “unreliable witnesses.”116 Safrastian faced similar distrust in 1912, four years after the celebrated Young Turk revolution in Constantinople. He sent a report to the British Consul in Erzeroum detailing the “acts of violence, murders, and brigandage” committed by the Kurds on Armenians.117 He similarly condemned “the dastardly criminal attitude displayed by the authorities towards such disorders and compared the

113 He similarly rejected a job offer by the German missionary to translate Kurdish in a Berlin university. Mugerditchian, Autobiography of Rev. Thomas Mugerdichian (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 46. 114 Shipley, We Walked Then Ran, 5. 115 Shipley, We Walked Then Ran, 6. 116 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 106. 117 TNA: PRO FO 424/230/7 Safrastian to McGregor, 3 Dec. 1911. 40 40

Kurdish atrocities to “the state of things under the blackest days of the old regime.”118 Safrastian blamed the for failing to protect their Christian subjects. The British ambassador to Constantinople forwarded the report to the Foreign Secretary, noting that, “M. Safrastian, as you are aware, is an Armenian, and his point of view is therefore likely to be somewhat biased.”119 Mugerditchian forwarded a similar report the same year detailing Kurdish abuses against Armenians: “there is no safety [or] security at all, and no body has any means of protection for life.”120 The Foreign Office commented, “it sounds an extremely unpleasant state of affairs; it is a pity we have to leave Diarbekir so long vacant, as one cannot be altogether sure of the account given by an Armenian.”121 Another memo expressed the desire to ask the American Embassy for their news to verify the report. One month later, Mugerditchian sent another report stating that the C.U.P. promised the Kurds they would not be punished for atrocities against Christians.122 Mugerditchian attached a letter from an American missionary, Dr. Thom, that verified his reports. The Foreign Office thought that such a report from an “Armenian native” was “too alarming” to act on without verifying that Dr. Thom was indeed an American.123 Because vice-consuls in Diarbekir rarely stayed longer than a year, and rarely in the summers, Mugerditchian often served as the Acting Vice-Consul. In 1914, he applied for the official title as the Honorary Vice-Consul of Diarbekir,

118 TNA: PRO FO 424/230/7 Safrastian to McGregor, 3 Dec. 1911. 119 TNA: PRO FO 424/230/7 Lowther to Edward Grey, 26 Dec. 1911. 120 TNA: PRO FO 195/2405/57 Mugerditchian to McGregor, 25 March 1912. 121 TNA: PRO FO 195/2405/54 Memo, Turkey No. 1705, 1 April 1912. 122 TNA: PRO FO 195/2405/69 K.M. Thomas to J. Monahan, 7 May 1912. 123 TNA: PRO FO 195/2405/67 Memo, Turkey No. 2461, 13 May 1912. 41 41 but Ambassador Louis Mallet responded that he was “generally averse to making any native…Honorary Vice Consul at a post where there is a regular Vice Consul, whose subordinate he must continue to be.”124 He further noted that he especially disapproved of Mugerditchian’s promotion because “he requires a considerable measure of control and is somewhat apt to presume on the position he already holds.”125 This rebuke, taken in light of Mugerditchian’s various proposals and petitions, suggests that Mugerditchian had begun to consider himself an important figure who deserved to be heard. In contrast, British diplomats closer to the center of power were more likely to disregard him as a nuisance. Despite the distrust of the Foreign Office, Mugerditchian’s direct superiors valued his loyalty and dedication to British service. They often wrote on his behalf when Mugerditchian applied for pay raises. The vice-consuls in Mugerditchian’s earlier career were more distrustful of him; however, over time he was entrusted with greater responsibilities. In 1897, Alex Telford Waugh, the then vice-consul of Diarbekir, left the French vice-consul in charge of British interests in his absence because it was “too difficult to trust native agents without supervision.”126 Yet over the years, Mugerditchian accumulated greater prestige and credibility among the British consulates in Eastern Turkey through his service. He was left in sole charge of the British Consulate in Diarbekir as Acting Vice-Consul nine times between 1898 and 1914, totaling 5 years and 2 months in charge.127

124 TNA: PRO FO 369/772 Sir Mallet to Sir E. Grey, 12 May 1914. 125 TNA: PRO FO 369/772 Sir Mallet to Sir E. Grey, 12 May 1914. 126 TNA: PRO FO 195/1981/253 Waugh to FO, 18 Feb. 1897. 127 TNA: PRO FO 141-468-3 List Showing Service Periods of H.B.M.’s Vice Consuls at Diarbekir, 7 May 1920. 42 42

In 1907, Vice-Consul William Beauchamp Heard of Bitlis asked for permission to borrow Mugerditchian from the consulate in Diarbekir because he knew the best sources of information and Heard had “full confidence in his discretion.”128 Later that year, Mugerditchian applied for a raise in his salary for his 12 years of service. Heard and George Lloyd petitioned on Mugerditchian’s behalf. Heard wrote that Mugerditchian had great influence in the land and was a “perfect mine of information.”129 He similarly argued that Mugerditchian was “so devoted to British interests that he…refused a tempting offer of German employment…and nothing would induce him to leave our service.”130 The same year, Heard petitioned for Safrastian to be compensated for his service as the Acting Vice Consul in Bitlis. Heard wrote that Safrastian executed his duties with “zeal and intelligence” during a tumultuous year.131 These impressions demonstrate the divide between the perceptions of British agents in close proximity to Armenians as opposed to the more distant Foreign Office. Armenian dragomans such as Mugerditchian, Boyajian, and Safrastian were important to local British consulates for translating, building trust with locals, gathering intelligence, maintaining peace, and advocating for British interests in the region. They were able to successfully operate as British agents on the periphery of the Empire, but were not fully accepted by those closer to the centers of power. Though Mugerditchian, Boyajian, and Safrastian were now British employees, the core of their identity remained Armenian. They drew clear lines between Western powers who were friendly to Armenians and those who

128 TNA: PRO FO 195/2251/88 Heard to FO, 22 Aug. 1907. 129 TNA: PRO FO 195/2251/182 Heard to Sir O’Connor, 19 Aug. 1907. 130 TNA: PRO FO 195/2251/185 Heard to Sir O’Connor, 19 Aug. 1907. 131 TNA: PRO FO 195/2251/544 Heard to A.S. Shipley, 10 Nov. 1907. 43 43 were not. As British vice-consuls, they used their privileged positions to improve the lives of Armenians by introducing British technology and by protecting them from physical harm. However, the position of Armenian consular agents was quickly jeopardized when the British government failed to convince Turkey to remain neutral in the war between the Allied and Central Powers.

CHAPTER 2: WITH LAWRENCE IN CAIRO

When the Ottomans entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, the British immediately closed their consular offices.1 Thomas Mugerditchian would soon use his local connections and manipulate his fluid identity to escape to Egypt, where he became an important liaison between the British Intelligence Department and local Armenian, Arab, Turkish, and Greek circles. He recruited intelligence officers, translated documents, and interrogated prisoners alongside men who played a large part in directing British policy in the Middle-East. Mugerditchian’s proximity to such men increased his influence. Arshak Safrastian served as an intelligence officer in the Caucasus, where he mediated between British troops and local Armenian militias. Other Armenians remained important as translators and intelligence officers in Gallipoli, Palestine, and the Caucasus throughout the war. During his time in Cairo, Mugerditchian continued to promote Armenian interests. He believed recruiting Armenians to the Allied cause would ensure a favorable post-war peace for a future Armenian state. He similarly advocated for a British- backed Armenian invasion of to free his people from Turkish massacres. Mugerditchian’s concern remained rooted in his Armenian identity and held the British Empire in high regard as a civilized bulwark against Turkish oppression. Once war was declared, the C.U.P. did not recognize Mugerditchian as a British consular agent and Enver promptly signed a warrant for his arrest as an enemy spy. Mugerditchian fled Diarbekir for Cairo with British Vice-Consul A. Monk-Mason and Monk-Mason’s family. In , they joined 27 other British nationals leaving the Ottoman Empire and journeyed together to . Mugerditchian led the group because he was the only one with knowledge of the

1 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 48. 45 45 local languages and dialects.2 In Beirut, Turkish authorities placed Mugerditchian under house arrest in his hotel. He repeatedly tried to leave the hotel whenever he noticed the guards change. Eventually, he approached a guard with “stooped shoulders and a godforsaken appearance” and requested permission to leave in Turkish.3 When Mugerditchian realized the guard was Kurdish, he spoke “in a sweet manner and in his own tongue,” repeating his plea to leave the hotel.4 According to Mugerditchian, “hearing his own language spoken by a dignified- looking man with a homburg [felt hat popularized among English gentlemen by Albert Edward, Prince of Wales] delighted this pitiful guard so much that he bowed several times never looking at my face, apologized for being there, and let me out.”5 Once Mugerditchian was free, he replaced his homburg with his fez to seek help from an old Turkish friend, Ghalib Bey, at the Beirut Post Office. Ghalib Bey revealed to Mugerditchian that the Minister of War, Enver Pasha, had sent a telegram ordering that Mugerditchian be “the first hanged man of the Armenians” and to be taken to Constantinople as a traitor.6 However, Ghalib Bey had held onto the telegram for four days without acting on it because Mugerditchian had protected him and his family six years earlier, though it is unclear how. Mugerditchian asked Ghalib Bey to keep the telegram hidden for a while longer,

2 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 47. 3 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 48. 4 Mugerditchian, The Diyarbekir Massacres and Kurdish Atrocities, 19. 5 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 48; Beverly Chico, Hats and Headwear Around the World: A Cultural Encyclopedia. (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 245. 6 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 48; Uğur Ümit Üngör references the arrest warrant but claims it was issued by the Minister of Interior, : Ungor, The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-50, 78; Mugerditchian’s account of his interaction with Ghalib Bey: Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1914 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 11 Nov. 1914. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 46 46 to which he replied “the telegram will remain under my seat even if it burns a hole there, until you have safely left Beirut.”7 Ghalib Bey advised Mugerditchian to hide his fez and wear his homburg instead. The local American vice-consul, whose nation was not at war with the Ottoman Empire, then aided Mugerditchian and four Allied vice-consuls in acquiring safe passage to Egypt on an Italian steamship. Mugerditchian and his family’s survival were tied to their ability to manipulate their appearances. Before leaving the Ottoman Empire, Mugerditchian sent a letter to his wife Esther through the American consul in Kharpert, , who would later be a key foreign witness to the unfolding genocide.8 Esther and six of their children had been living in Kharpert, northwest of Diarbekir, and were unaware of Mugerditchian’s prompt departure.9 They planned to join Mugerditchian in Diarbekir to evacuate as a family until Davis informed them that their father was forced to flee early.10 Mugerditchian, who understood that his British identity was now dangerous, instructed his family to hide their portraits of the British royal family and any trace of their connection to the Allies.11 Before the widespread massacre of Armenians in Kharpert, Turkish authorities tried to punish Mugerditchian for escaping by targeting his family. Mugerditchian’s daughter later recalled an instance when her brothers were stopped and questioned by Turkish gendarmes. When the boys presented their

7 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 48; Mugerditchian, The Diyarbekir Massacres and Kurdish Atrocities, 19-20. 8 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1914 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 16 Nov. 1914. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 9 The eldest daughter of Thomas and Esther lived in America 10 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 46. 11 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 46. 47 47 surnames as Mugerditchian, one gendarme replied, “no, no that is a gavour… [infidel] name. I’m looking for the English boys.”12 Davis continued to protect Mugerditchian’s family in the early years of the Armenian .13 When it became impossible to remain in Kharpert, the family fled to Russian territory disguised as Kurds. They then immigrated to California—the sons in 1918 and Esther and her daughters in 1919—after an arduous journey through revolution-torn Russia.14 In America, they adopted “Thomas” as their surname in place of Mugerditchian.15 For Mugerditchian and his family, the difference between freedom and death was connected to the clothes and hats they wore, the languages they spoke, and the names they chose.

Figure 4: The Mugerditchian family dressed as Kurds to flee Kharpert in 1916.

12 Shipley, “Judge Upset at Long Armenian Name, Threatens Contempt of Court Charge.” California Courier, January 19, 1986. 13 Leslie A. Davis, The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat’s Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917, ed. Susan K. Blair. (New York: Aristide D. Cartzas, 1990), 65-66. 14 Shipley, We Walked then Ran 15 Shipley, “Judge Upset at Long Armenian Name, Threatens Contempt of Court Charge,” California Courier, January 19, 1986. 48 48

As Mugerditchian was fleeing the Ottoman Empire, Safrastian was already safe in England. He left his post at Bitlis in 1911 to pursue a law degree in London, though he remained informed about circumstances in the Ottoman Empire as an active member of Lord Bryce’s Anglo-Armenian Association.16 Safrastian visited Mugerditchian in his hotel while the latter was in London and shared that 13 people were recently hanged in Bitlis.17 Stories of atrocities against the Armenians began to reach the West in the summer of 1915. In response, Bryce compiled the personal accounts of Armenian survivors and foreign witnesses from across the Ottoman Empire in a Parliamentary Blue Book. Bryce worked in partnership with Oxford historian Arnold Toynbee to produce nearly 700 pages of evidence “in the interest of historic truth.”18 According to Michelle Tusan, the Blue Book’s “repetition of evidence” demonstrated the “systematic nature” of the massacres and became vital to British efforts to prosecute perpetrators after the war.19 She notes that while the Blue Book had an effect on public opinion and relief work, it ultimately did little to bring perpetrators to justice.20 Yet, its effect on public opinion helped convince the British public their government was fighting a moral war to defend Christians in Turkey. Both Safrastian and Mugerditchian used their positions to document Turkish atrocities against Armenians. Several of their reports appeared in Bryce’s

16 Der Megerditchian, Treasures of Vasbouragan, 556. 17 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1914 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 11 May 1914. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 18 James Bryce, The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16, (London: Sir Joseph Causton and Sons, 1916), xvi. 19 Tusan, “James Bryce’s Blue Book as Evidence,” 40. 20 Tusan, “James Bryce’s Blue Book as Evidence,” 36. 49 49

Blue Book. In September 1915, rather than complete his studies, Safrastian declared that he could “no longer continue my college education when my fatherland is burning.” He left London for the Caucasus to fight in an Armenian contingent of the Russian army, in which all three of Mugerditchian’s sons also fought.21 Bryce supported efforts to recruit Armenians to fight on behalf of the Allies in the Caucasus. Though the Armenian volunteer force was small, Bryce used their presence as propaganda to convince his government that the Armenians were worthy contributors to the war effort.22 While in the Caucasus, Safrastian conducted an interview in Tiflis with an Armenian from Sassoon who witnessed massacres on his journey to Russian territory.23 Safrastian also interviewed witness Hagop Boghossian on their way to the recently liberated city of Van. Boghossian detailed how the Armenians of Van resisted the Turkish army that had come to massacre them until Armenian and Russian troops arrived to secure the city. Two months later, a Turkish advance forced the Armenians of Van to retreat with the Russian army. Boghossian described how hundreds of Armenians were massacred by Kurds during their retreat to Russia. The Armenians returned and governed the city for two years after the Turks evacuated Van in 1916. As Safrastian walked to the city of his birth, he “witnessed revolting evidence of the recent events” that Boghossian had told him about.24 Bryce incorporated both of Safrastian’s interviews in his Parliamentary Blue Book.

21 Der Megerditchian, Treasures of Vasbouragan, 556; W.E.D. Allen, “Arshak Safrastian.” The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and , no. 1/2 (1959), pp. 93-94; TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Thomas Mugerditchian to Sir Edmund Allenby, 21 . 22 Tusan, The British Empire and the Armenian Genocide, 146. 23 Bryce, The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16, 83-87. 24 Bryce, The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16, 74. 50 50

The following spring, Safrastian used his British connections to help Armenians once again. He left the Russian army to join Reverend Harold Buxton, secretary of the Lord Mayor’s Fund, to aid Armenian refugees. The Lord Mayor of London had established the Armenian Lord Mayor’s Fund to raise money for Armenian refugees in 1915.25 American missionaries were instrumental in providing aid to Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, but there was not a significant American or British presence in the Caucasus where thousands of Armenian refugees were fleeing. The Lord Mayor’s Fund partnered with other British and American relief organizations to ameliorate the conditions of Armenians in the Caucasus.26 The relief organizations wired money to the British consul in Moscow who forwarded it to leaders of the Armenian community in the Caucasus. Safrastian distributed £200 to Armenian refugees on behalf of the Armenian Red Cross in .27 The following summer, Buxton, Safrastian, and a group of nurses embarked on a relief mission through .28 The reverend described his expedition as a “pioneer party to ascertain what is really needed” for the Armenians.29 Safrastian served as the group’s guide because of his knowledge of the local land and his fluency in both English and Armenian.30 The party spent three months tending to the needs of 250,000 Armenian orphans before returning

25 Tusan, The British Empire and the Armenian Genocide, 154. 26 Tusan, The British Empire and the Armenian Genocide, 159. 27 “Armenian Red Cross and Refugee Fund,” The Scotsman [Midlothian], March 16, 1916. 28 “Armenian Refugees: Lord Mayor’s Fund,” The Times, April 7, 1916. 29 “Nation Driven from Home,” Evening Despatch [West Midlands], May 20, 1916. 30 “Nation Driven from Home,” Evening Despatch [West Midlands], May 20, 1916. 51 51 to London in August, 1916.31 Safrastian then returned to the London School of Economics where he would remain until he was called into the field again to serve as a British intelligence officer in the Caucasus. The crowded Italian steamer carrying Mugerditchian and the Monk-Mason family landed in Port Said, Egypt, on November 5, 1914. In the first few months of the war, 6,000 Europeans and Ottoman natives affiliated with the Allies arrived in Egypt fleeing the Ottoman Empire.32 British intelligence debriefed these evacuees, particularly British diplomats and consuls, for information on Turkish military movements. Mugerditchian complained that he was debriefed 12 times upon arriving in Port Said, where he provided British intelligence with “very important information on Turkish military movement to Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut.”33 In the following days, Mugerditchian traveled to Cairo where he utilized the skills and contacts he acquired as a dragoman in his new post at the Intelligence Department, serving alongside men who would help shape the modern Middle-East. In the winter of 1914, General John Maxwell, commander of the in Egypt, did not have enough qualified intelligence officers at his disposal. The in London sent seven Turkish-speaking experts to Cairo: S.F. Newcombe, the director of the Intelligence Department who later played a role in the Arab Revolt; George Lloyd, Member of Parliament who served as the attaché at Constantinople and would later become High Commissioner of Cairo; Aubrey Herbert, Member of Parliament who had been involved in Albania’s independence

31 “Nation Driven from Home,” Evening Despatch [West Midlands], May 20, 1916; “Armenians Dying in Prison Camps,” The New York Times, Aug. 21, 1916. 32 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 76. 33 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1914 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 18-19 Nov. 1914. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 52 52 and the and Balkan wars; Leonard Woolley, British archeologist and Middle-East expert; J. Hay; Harry Pirie-Gordon; and T.E. Lawrence, who would later become iconically associated with the Arab revolt. Philip Graves, The Times correspondent, also lent his expertise in Ottoman military affairs to the Intelligence Department.34 Their duties were to gather intelligence, monitor the Turkish army, and interrogate refugees and prisoners. In addition to these agents, the Intelligence Department utilized former British consuls, including Mugerditchian, to aid in translating and gathering intelligence. Mugerditchian was also able to provide intimate information on various Ottoman governors and their dispositions. Two of Mugerditchian’s first contacts in the Intelligence Department were Lloyd, whom he had former dealings with from Diarbekir, and Woolley, who oversaw agent recruitments.35 Mugerditchian made daily visits to the Intelligence Department and drafted reports for Herbert and Lloyd, who were primarily responsible for tracking the Turkish army.36 He was well connected in English and Armenian circles from his service as a vice-consul which made him an effective link between British agents and his local contacts in Egypt. In the course of paying calls on friends for tea or meals, Mugerditchian broadened his circle and increased his utility as an intelligence officer.

34 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 46; T.E. Lawrence, T.E. Lawrence: The Selected Letters, ed. Malcom Brown. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989), 69-70. 35 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1914 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 23 Dec. 1914. Translated by Mary Avetisyan; Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 46. 36 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1914 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 26, 28-30 Dec. 1914. Translated by Mary Avetisyan; Lawrence, T.E. Lawrence: The Selected Letters, 69. 53 53

Figure 5: Thomas Mugerditchian, seated far left, at a social gathering in Cairo 1915.

On a visit to one Mr. Asaturian, Mugerditchian met Sadik Bey, the Turkish exile who had established the Ottoman Liberal Party in opposition to the Young Turks.37 Sadik Bey complained to Mugerditchian about Enver Pasha’s alliance with Germany and the folly of opposing the Entente Powers. In February 1915, Mugerditchian and Captain Herbert visited Noureddin Pasha, Sultan Abdul Hamid

37 On Sadik Bey: “A Turkish Opposition Leader,” The [Manchester] Guardian, Feb. 27, 1912. 54 54

II’s former doctor, for a “very interesting and important conversation.”38 Several weeks later, Mugerditchian orchestrated a meeting between George Lloyd and Şerif Pasha, the former Turkish ambassador to Sweden and defector from the Young Turks party.39 Mugerditchian’s contacts made him especially useful as a mediator between the British and their potential allies in Arabic, Turkish, and Armenian circles. Throughout this period, British intelligence utilized Armenian, Greek, Jewish, and Arab refugees and defectors who supported the Allied cause and freely provided information.40 Some of these non-Turkic agents were willingly sent into Palestine or Asia Minor to infiltrate enemy territory while others were bribed into undertaking spy missions in return for permits to reside in Egypt.41 British authorities in Egypt decided to allow a contingent of Armenian volunteers to raid the Syrian coast under French leadership in early 1915, but this operation was canceled after Armenians in Paris protested that it might put Armenian residents of the Ottoman Empire at risk.42 In a letter to Aubrey Herbert in 1915, Mark Sykes wrote that “reliable agents,” preferably Armenians, should be sent to sabotage the railway that connected Damascus to .43 Though British agents in Egypt used Armenian, Greek, and Jewish agents in intelligence

38 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 9 Feb. 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan; On Noureddin Pasha as the sultan’s physician: “Young Turks Win,” Courier-News [Bridgewater], April 23, 1909. 39 “Turkish Statesman Denounces Atrocities.” The New York Times, Oct. 10, 1915; Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 22 Feb. 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 40 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 76-78. 41 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 78. 42 TNA: PRO FO 141/629 Commander and Chief EEF to The High Commissioner, 8 Sept. 1916. 43 Margaret Fitzherbert, The Man Who Was : A Biography of Aubrey Herbert. (London: John Murray, 1984), 143. 55 55 operations, the Foreign Office and War Office were hesitant to endorse arming and training Armenian refugees. In November 1914, Boghos Nubar Pasha, head of the Armenian National Delegation that advocated for Armenian reforms to the European powers, proposed that the British army invade Cilicia (the region on the Mediterranean coast connecting Anatolia to ) with a contingent of Armenian volunteers.44 On January 2, 1915 the British War Council decided to launch an attack on the Ottoman Empire to draw Turkish forces away from the Caucasus front against Russia. They considered invading the port of Alexandretta, in Cilicia, as Nubar Pasha proposed. Alexandretta had a deep natural harbor and was vulnerable to a naval attack. The British warship HMS Doris bombarded the region in December 1914 with near .45 T.E. Lawrence was a strong supporter of the plan and believed an invasion of Alexandretta would cut Turkish Anatolia off from their discontented Arab subjects and provoke the Armenians of the region to rebel, a point Mugerditchian similarly stressed in November 1914.46 According to Mugerditchian, if the British moved against the Ottomans in Cilicia, “internal revolution would have been inevitable and the fall of the Enverian regime would have been an accomplished fact.”47 In late January, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, decided not to attack Cilicia, conscious of the fact that the Anglo-French convention of gave France control of military operations in the Mediterranean. Churchill

44Boghos Nubar, Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918, ed. Vatche Ghazarian. (Waltham: Mayreni Publishing, 1996), 272. 45 Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, 95-97, 129-130. 46 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 96-99. 47Mugerditchian, Autobiography of Rev. Thomas Mugerdichian (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 46. 56 56 believed that by allowing the French to control Cilicia and Syria, where they had imperial ambitions, Britain would be free to assume control over the upcoming Dardanelles campaign.48 He was also nervous about reports of an impending Turkish attack on the .49 The British launched their naval assault on the Dardanelles straits in February 1915. The War Council believed a victory in the Dardanelles would enable them to capture Constantinople and pressure the Turks to surrender.50 Mugerditchian was instrumental in collecting intelligence for the campaign. Less than two weeks after the assault began, Mugerditchian brought two Armenians, Dr. Arsen Khoren and Tatul Nerkizian, to the Intelligence Department with information on the Dardanelles straits.51 Once the War Council concluded that controlling the straits by sea was not possible, they approved landing troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25. The Cairo Intelligence Department sent Dr. Khoren and Nerkizian with the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) to Gallipolli for the ground assault.52 One unnamed Armenian ANZAC intelligence agent extracted information on Ottoman troop formations and their morale from two Turkish prisoners in the first few days of fighting.53 The would end in disaster, with the British and ANZAC forces

48 Miller, Straits, 392, 395. 49 Miller, Straits, 392-394. 50 Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, 129-146. 51 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 26 Feb. 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 52 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 26 Feb. 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 53 TNA: PRO WO 157/668 ANZAC Examination of Prisoner 26/27 . 57 57 sustaining massive casualties. They evacuated the peninsula in defeat 259 days after the campaign started.54 On January 27, 1915 Mugerditchian recorded in his diary that Turkish forces had been spotted preparing to attack the Suez Canal. The Turks launched their expected attack on February 3, but failed to break through the prepared British forces. After the fighting, Mugerditchian helped interrogate prisoners and translate documents from captured Turkish officers. His linguistic proficiency enabled him to determine whether prisoners were lying when they claimed they were from a certain province while their accents betrayed another.55 When a group of five Armenian captives who fought for the Ottoman army refused to “reveal their secrets,” Herbert and Lloyd turned to Mugerditchian, who visited the prisoners the following day and convinced them to cooperate with British Intelligence. 56 Ottoman Armenian prisoners were often hesitant to betray information to the British out of fear that the Turks would retaliate with massacres against .57 However, in many instances Armenians willingly surrendered to the British and offered information about the Turkish military.58 Several months after the attack, Mugerditchian accompanied Colonel Newcombe to the Qasr El Nil barracks to interrogate a group of and Turkish captives. One of the Arabic prisoners was on his way to India with a British passport and

54 Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, 214. 55 John H. Tashjian (grandson of Thomas Mugerditchian) in discussion with the author, February 2017. 56 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 9, 10 Feb. 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 57 TNA: PRO FO 41/629 Sofia to High Commissioner for Egypt, 18 . 58 TNA: PRO WO 157/44 Intelligence Summary 6 Dec. 1916. 58 58 documents advocating jihad against the Allies.59 Mugerditchian promptly informed Colonel Newcombe of the subversive documents. Mugerditchian’s personal connections also helped him track Turkish agents and agitators against the Allies. In May 1915, local informants reported to Mugerditchian that several Egyptians were spreading unrest by claiming the Turks would capture Egypt within two months. He collected the names of the five conspirators to monitor their activities.60 Months later, Şerif Bey and Sami Bey visited Mugerditchian in the War Office to warn him that a C.U.P spy, Rustem Bey, and five of his agents were in Egypt to assassinate Dr. Riza Nur of the Ottoman Liberal Party.61 The plot failed when Nur’s servant learned of the conspiracy.62 The Intelligence Department frequently used Mugerditchian and his contacts to recruit agents. Shortly after the failed attack on the Suez Canal, T.E. Lawrence ordered Mugerditchian to secretly draft a list of Armenians with fighting experience and to instruct them to be “ready within 24 hours to leave for Cilicia.”63 Mugerditchian immediately updated Nubar Pasha, who was planning to meet with General Maxwell about possible operations in Cilicia. The following day, Mugerditchian reported to the War Office where he was told that the

59 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 9 April 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 60 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 12 May 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 61 On Riza Bey: Hülya Adak, “Who is Afraid of Dr. Riza Nur’s Autobiography?” Autobiographical Themes in Turkish Literature: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Olcay Akyildiz, Halim Kara, and Börte Sagaster (Würzburg : Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2007), 127-128 62 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 22 . Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 63 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 30 Jan. 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 59 59 operation had been called off for the time being.64 Later that month, after a series of meetings between Mugerditchian, Nubar Pasha, and Philip Graves, Mugerditchian was again asked to find ten Armenians willing to infiltrate Cilicia. Mugerditchian immediately suggested himself and his Armenian companions, Mr. Abah and Mr. Asaturian.65 Once again, the plans were called off. Mugerditchian spent much of March and April searching for translators who spoke English, Turkish, Arabic, and Greek to serve in the Gallipoli campaign. He found it difficult to keep up with the daily requests from Lloyd to find dozens of translators, so he asked his relatives and contacts to inform him of any “intelligent young Armenians” who spoke the required languages.66 Mugerditchian noted that “these young translators can not only help the British Government but they will also be able to do something useful for their own nation.”67 He hoped that by aiding the British, Armenians would ultimately be fighting for an independent Armenian state. However, he also expressed frustration towards Armenian revolutionaries who too often placed party loyalties over that of their motherland. According to Mugerditchian, these Armenians bragged about their willingness to fight during times of peace, but disappeared when they were needed. Many claimed they could not fight for the British without permission from their political parties.68 Mugerditchian lamented that Armenians

64 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 1 Feb. 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 65 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 18 Feb. 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 66 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 24 March 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 67 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 24 March 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 68 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 31 April 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 60 60 were not like the British and French spies who “are all educated and…can serve as a very good example for our compatriots.”69 The translators Mugerditchian did recruit, most of whom were Greek or Armenian, reported to the Mena House Camp, where the AZNAC troops were stationed, for training under Major Duncan Glasfurd. On April 2, Mugerditchian brought 16 translators to the Mena House Camp near the Pyramids where they joined their assigned regiments. Mugerditchian himself was assigned to the 1st Australian Divisional Head Quarter where he was responsible for overseeing the translators.70 He divided his time between serving the Intelligence Department in Cairo and his post at the Mena House Camp.

Figure 6: Thomas Mugerditchian, center, with unknown soldiers.

69 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 31 April 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 70 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 2 April 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 61 61

On April 16, Mugerditchian’s friend, Mr. Ayvazian, approached him offering to aid the British army in the Dardanelles campaign. Mugerditchian noted that Ayvazian was “well aware of Turkey’s power and preparedness both there and in Constantinople” because he and his family had recently lived in Constantinople before arriving in Egypt. 71 Four days later, Ayvazian was on a steamship to Athens to aid the British war effort. As Mugerditchian and his allies were contributing to the Dardanelles campaign, they were simultaneously pressing for an invasion of Cilicia that they hoped would aid both the Armenian and British causes. Nubar Pasha drafted a memorandum after meeting with General Maxwell in which he detailed the amount of support Armenians would give British troops if they were to invade Cilicia.72 According to Boghos Nubar Pasha, in light of the Ottoman government’s failure to reform conditions for Armenians, and in light of recent massacres, the Armenians would “greet the British soldiers as liberators…and will support them by all means.”73 Mugerditchian and his allies met with various Armenian intellectuals in the following days to form an Armenian National Defense Committee under the presidency of Boghos Nubar Pasha. The committee’s primary goal was to raise funds for Armenian volunteers to invade Cilicia and “to manage the issue regarding Armenia’s sovereignty (under the patronage of our allies).”74 Members of the Armenian National Defense committee periodically petitioned British

71 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 16 April 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 72 Nubar, Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918, 3. 73 Nubar, Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918,4. 74 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 5 March 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 62 62 authorities to intervene in Cilicia through the summer of 1915. Mugerditchian remained optimistic in a conversation with the Egyptian Armenian statesman and scholar, Yakoub Artin Pasha, speculating that “the fulfillment of our dreams will come from England.”75 However, while Ayvazian was in Athens he heard first-hand accounts of recent Armenian massacres from European missionaries. He sent a report to Nubar Pasha through Mugerditchian on July 8, 1915, detailing deportations, starvation, and mass executions.76 He stressed that the only hope of the Armenian people rested in an Allied invasion of Cilicia. Mugerditchian forwarded Ayvazian’s report to Nubar Pasha along with his own reports that the C.U.P. was “systematically perpetrating the annihilation of the Armenians everywhere. What is the use of a liberated Armenia without Armenians…?”77 By the fall of 1915, it was apparent that the British would take no action in Cilicia because it would require resources to be diverted from the Dardanelles campaign. The Armenian National Defense committee informed General Maxwell that they could no longer wait idly while their people were being massacred. They requested that Britain authorize and train Armenian volunteers to infiltrate Cilicia without the need for deploying British troops.78 The High Commissioner of Cairo forwarded the petition to London, where it was denied. The Foreign Office wrote that the “entire responsibility and arrangements for the Armenian Enterprise should be left to the French…owing to the considerable demand for all kinds of

75 Nubar, Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918,115-116; On Yakoub Artin Pasha: Arthur Goldschmidt, Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 25-26. 76 Nubar, Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918, 145-148. 77 Nubar, Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918, 218. 78 Nubar, Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918, 203-204, 272. 63 63 assistance which would be made upon us by the Armenians to maintain them under conditions [of] guerrilla warfare.”79 The Foreign Office agreed to send the Armenian volunteers in Egypt to Cyprus where they would be trained by French officers and incorporated into the French Foreign Legion.80 Many of these volunteers were refugees from , a mountain in the Ottoman Empire where Armenian villagers had resisted the Ottoman Army until they were rescued by a French warship.81 After the British retreated from Gallipoli in 1916, battle-weary troops returned to Egypt where they formed the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) to invade Palestine. The ANZAC divisions that served in Gallipoli formed the ANZAC Mounted Division. In June 1917, General Edmund Allenby was assigned to replace General as commander of the EEF with the mission to invade Palestine and capture by Christmas.82 Unlike the stagnant of the Western Front, the Palestinian Campaign was fluid and dynamic. It was the last in which cavalry proved effective. Because of this fast-paced nature, the EEF had difficulty in accumulating and consolidating intelligence for in-depth study. British mounted units captured hundreds of prisoners, defectors, and documents that needed to be examined.83 They solved this problem by attaching intelligence officers and translators who spoke Arabic, Turkish, and English to each cavalry unit, enabling them to interrogate prisoners and decipher documents while on the move.84 British

79 TNA: PRO FO 141/629 Secret Cipher: Troopers W.O. to Superflux, Cairo, 21 Sept. 1915. 80 TNA: PRO FO 141/629 Cipher: FO to High Commissioner of Cairo, 19 Oct. 1916. 81 TNA: PRO FO 141/629 High Commissioner for Egypt to Foreign Office, 9 Oct. 1916. 82 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 308. 83 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 316-317. 84 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestinian Campaign 1914-1918, 317. 64 64 troops then sent prisoners to P.O.W. camps for further interrogation. In the course of their interrogations, British agents identified Arab Ottoman soldiers sympathetic to the Prince Faisal’s Arab Revolt in the Hejaz. These Arabs provided valuable intelligence to the British and were subsequently trained and sent to fight with Faisal.85 Mugerditchian spent the remainder of the war as an intelligence officer with the ANZAC Mounted Division and in the P.O.W. Camp Ludd, where he interrogated prisoners and most likely helped persuade Arab prisoners to join Faisal’s revolt. Mugerditchian, among other Armenian intelligence agents, were important intermediaries between the British and local Egyptians and Palestinians during World War I.

Figure 7: Thomas Mugerditchian, seated, with a British officer in Cairo 1917.

85 Mohs, Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt, 5, 63, 67, 78; Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, 302; A.P. Wavell, The Palestinian Campaigns. (London: Constable and Co. Limited, 1933), 55. 65 65

Figure 8: Thomas Mugerditchian, right, at Camp Ludd, Palestine 1918.

Safrastian spent the final years of World War I as an intelligence officer for the Ministry of Information in London and with General Lionel Dunsterville’s forces in the Caucasus.86 Dunsterville’s mission was to prevent German and Turkish incursions in the region and to protect routes to Britain’s eastern empire in India.87 His small force of approximately 1,000 British troops entered in 1918 to defend the oil rich region from enemy troops with the help of local Armenians.88 Dunsterville had hoped to organize Georgian and Armenian forces for an easy victory against Enver Pasha’s war-weary army. The Georgians proved apathetic and unwilling to fight the Turks while the Armenians took up arms

86 TNA: PRO HS 9/1298/9 Letter to Major Vivian, 13 Nov. 1934. 87 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 355-358. 88 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace,, 359. 66 66 fearing additional massacres in the case of a Turkish victory.89 According to Safrastian, “Armenians formed 90 percent of the Baku forces” resisting the Ottoman army.90 Faced with fewer recruits than expected, Dunsterville and his small force of British officers and Armenian volunteers were unable to hold Baku against Turkish forces and evacuated the city on 14 September. Armenian agents thus played an important role as translators and intelligence officers in Gallipoli, Palestine, and the Caucasus during World War I. They believed their service would aid their countrymen being slaughtered by the Ottomans and ensure a place for Armenia in the post-war world. During his career in Egypt and Palestine, Mugerditchian increasing valued British ideals and education in contrast to Eastern vices. He believed Armenian agents had much to learn from their British and French mentors and that Armenian statesmen would have much to learn from British liberal democratic ideals after the war. Both Mugerditchian and Safrastian would later use their influence and experience to fight for a free and independent Armenian nation.

89 Lionel C. Dunsterville, The Adventures of . (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), 4-5. 90 Arshak Safrastian, “Mistakes of Armenian Propaganda,” The [Manchester] Guardian, December 15, 1919.

CHAPTER 3: NAVIGATING A POST-WAR WORLD

As agents of the British Empire, Thomas Mugerditchian, Thomas Boyajian, and Arshak Safrastian employed the influence and protection the position offered to defend Armenians and document Turkish atrocities against their people. Mugerditchian understood the British to be the natural friends of the Armenian people, whereas he believed the Germans had betrayed the Anglo-Saxon world by allying with the “barbarous Asiatic races.”1 He declined Max von Oppenheim’s offer to become a German agent because of his loyalty to his Armenian identity more than his attachment to Britain. As an intelligence officer in Cairo, Mugerditchian recruited Armenians into the British intelligence service largely so they could help liberate Armenian lands and have a greater claim to an independent homeland after the war. Though the core of his identity was Armenian, Mugerditchian’s Western education and nearly three decades in service to the British Empire had an effect on his identity. During and after World War I, both Mugerditchian and Safrastian used what influence they had in an attempt to secure a free and independent Armenian nation under a British mandate. Though this mandate never materialized, and though Mugerditchian faced prejudice from the Foreign Office he served, he maintained a strong appreciation for the British Empire. His attachment was not necessarily to the state, but to the ideas and institutions he believed Britain embodied. Mugerditchian viewed the world through a Western lens and continued to have faith in European powers. He would later remember his 26 years of British service as the “the best experience and enjoyment in my life.”2

1 Thomas, Untitled Speech (Unpublished), Author’s Personal Collection, 20 Dec. 1926. 2 Mugerditchian, “Fingers of Fate: The Tightening Grip,” (Inscription on reverse of photo), Author’s Personal Collection. 68 68

During World War I, the British often made vague promises to secure a homeland for the Armenian people in recognition of their service in the war and to prevent them from living under the Turkish yoke. Both Mugerditchian and Safrastian believed the post-war Armenian nation that would emerge should be a monarchy under British tutelage. In 1915, Mugerditchian recorded a conversation with T.E. Lawrence in his diary. According to Mugerditchian, Lawrence asked him what system of government would be best for the Armenian people after the war, a republic or a monarchy. Mugerditchian replied, “… a Republic as a form of government is harmful for Eastern countries, as they are used to having a monarch as the head of state. I added that for us Armenians, monarchy is more suitable.”3 Safrastian echoed these sentiments in a 1917 interview, claiming the Armenians should be governed by a limited monarchy under a mandate by Russia, Great Britain, or the United States. According to Safrastian, the government would “naturally evolve” into a Republic, but the “old tribunal instinct…would [initially] call for a prince at which to gaze…”4 Mugerditchian and Safrastian seemed to have adopted the British mentality that the Armenians and Greeks had deteriorated by living under an Eastern power and thus needed to be slowly taught liberal democratic values by Britain. On October 30, 1918, an Ottoman delegation led by Rauf Bey signed an armistice with British Admiral Somerset Calthorpe on the HMS Agamemnon, formally ending the conflict between the two empires.5 Shortly after, Germany surrendered to the Allied Powers, marking an end to World War I. The Allied

3 Mugerditchian, Personal Diary 1915 (Unpublished). Author’s Personal Collection, 5 May 1915. Translated by Mary Avetisyan. 4 Lowell Mellot, “What Will Become of Armenia after the War is Over?” Wilkes-Barre Times Leader [Pennsylvania], May 17, 1917. 5 Fromkin A Peace to End all Peace, 381-382. 69 69

Powers met to determine the conditions of surrender at the Paris Peace Conference in . Delegations from around the world attended the conference to advocate for their place in the new world order. A joint Armenian delegation, led by Avetis Aharonian representing the newly formed Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus, and Boghos Nubar Pasha, the head of the Armenian National Delegation representing the , hoped to secure a unified Armenian nation under the suzerainty of the Allied Powers.6 Mugerditchian and Safrastian were both involved in the negotiations to secure an Armenian homeland under British protection. Safrastian served as the Secretary of the Armenian National Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.7 There is evidence to suggest that Mugerditchian represented Armenian interests in the London Conference the following year.8 Despite Armenian advocacy, Britain was not willing to expend resources on an Armenian mandate that was not in its imperial interest.9 The American president, Woodrow Wilson, attended the Peace Conference espousing ideals of anti-imperialism and self- determination for subjugated peoples from his Fourteen Points speech to Congress in 1918. He drew the boundaries of a proposed Armenian state in the Treaty of Sevres that included most of the historically Armenian lands in the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty was signed by the defeated Ottoman government in Constantinople.10 Wilson proposed a sponsored American

6 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 142; Richard Hovannisian, Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times Vol II, 320. 7Der Megerditchian, Treasures of Vasbouragan, 556; “Future of the Armenian Nation,” The [Manchester] Guardian, Feb. 21, 1920. 8 K.M. Thomas, Untitled List of Achievements, Author’s Personal Collection. 9 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 121. 10 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 178. 70 70 mandate for Armenia in 1920 but it was rejected by the Senate, which also refused to join the League of Nations due to isolationist sentiments at home.11 As the Allies struggled to negotiate a peace settlement, a Turkish Nationalist movement emerged in Anatolia under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in opposition to the Ottoman government in Constantinople. By 1920, the Nationalists had established a de facto government in . They annulled the Treaty of Sevres and fought any Allied attempt to partition the Ottoman Empire to create a Greek or Armenian homeland.12 Once these negotiations failed, Safrastian traveled to the United States on behalf of the National Delegation to advocate for Armenian interests at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921, called by President Warren E. Harding.13 Safrastian hoped that the conference would address the “reestablishment of the Armenian state” according to the boundaries drawn by President Wilson in the Treaty of Sevres.14 He met with President Harding, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, and senators sympathetic to the Armenian cause.15 He lamented to the editor of the New York Tribune that while the European powers were eager to disarm Germany, they failed to do so for Turkey, though he remained hopeful that a unified Armenia was possible “by the cooperation of the United States and Great Britain.”16

11 Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace, 398. 12 A.L. MacFie, “British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-22,” Middle Eastern Studies, no. 3 (2002), 28. 13 “Armenia Expectant,” New York Tribune, July 26, 1921. 14 “Armenia Expectant,” New York Tribune, July 26, 1921. 15 Der Megerditchian, Treasures of Vasbouragan, 556. 16 “Armenia Expectant.” New York Tribune, July, 26 1921. 71 71

That same year, Mugerditchian promoted his own plans for a future Armenian nation. In 1921 the Foreign Office asked Mugerditchian for his views on the “Near East problem” and how to organize post-war Anatolia between the various ethnicities. His solution was for the formation of a Kurdo-Armenian state.17 According to Mugerditchian, while the European powers had advocated for greater freedom for Ottoman Christian subjects, they had ignored the plight of other “subject races, who in many respects had suffered equally,” namely, the Kurds.18 Mugerditchian noted that the Kurds had fought for independence from the Ottoman government in the 1880s but were largely ignored by European powers. He claimed the Ottoman authorities deceived the Kurdish separatists into supporting them by pointing out that the Europeans only cared for the Christian races. They then promised the Kurds greater autonomy if they joined the government in attacking Armenians.19 According to Mugerditchian, it was now the perfect time for the British to mandate a joint Kurdish-Armenian state independent of Turkish rule. He believed the Turks would accept this as a “feature in the maintenance of what remains of their Empire” because it would ensure their eastern border was under the mandate of an old friend of the Ottomans, the British, rather than the Russians.20 Mugerditchian claimed the Turks felt it was “only with the support of a friendly Great Britain that they can continue their existence as an Empire.”21

17 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 K.M. Thomas to Major R. McDonell, 26 April 1921. 18 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 McDonell to FO, 28 April 1921. 19 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 McDonell to FO, 28 April 1921. 20 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 McDonell to FO, 28 April 1921. 21 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 McDonell to FO, 28 April 1921. 72 72

In 1921 Mugerditchian organized a meeting between his pro-British Ottoman allies, including Ghalib Bey and Said Kiamil Pasha, son of the late Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha, and Mr. A.W. Boyd, the diplomatic agent for the British High Commissioner of Egypt.22 Mugerditchian had operated in many of these circles throughout his career and was now seeking to unite them to realize his vision for a post-war Armenian state. Ghalib Bey and Said Kiamil Pasha claimed Britain was the “first and only friend of the Turks” and it was “regretted that the Young Turks worked against Great Britain, thereby spoiling their own chance of success.”23 They pledged their support for a British-backed homeland for the Kurds and Armenians bordering an independent Turkey, and believed this would “solve the Eastern question in a manner satisfactory to all parties.”24 Boyd forwarded reports drafted by Ghalib Bey and Said Kiamil Pasha to Winston Churchill, then serving as Colonial Secretary. Mugerditchian then met with General Wyndham Deedes, under whom he had served in the EEF, and T.E. Lawrence to discuss the possibility of the Kurdo-Armenian state. If the British authorities approved of the negotiations, Said Kiamil Pasha, Deedes, and Mugerditchian would travel to London and invite delegates from the Kurdish movements as well as the Turkish government in Constantinople and the Nationalists in Ankara. Mugerditchian optimistically believed the Turks, Kurds, Armenians, and Arabs were “tired of the bloodshed in Anatolia” and “could if properly managed solve the whole problem among themselves.”25 Churchill

22 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 K.M. Thomas to Major R. McDonell, 26 April 1921. 23 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 K.M. Thomas to Major R. McDonell, 26 April 1921. 24 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 K.M. Thomas to Major R. McDonell, 26 April 1921. 25 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 K.M. Thomas to Major R. McDonell, 26 April 1921. 73 73 interviewed Said Kiamil Pasha on the recommendation of General Allenby but gave no guarantee of support.26 The Foreign Office recognized a “great deal of truth and many possibilities” in Mugerditchian’s plans, but also several major problems.27 They believed a Kurdo-Armenian state would eventually be dominated by Armenians, particularly the more “enlightened and cultured” Russian-influenced Armenians in the Caucasus, since the Kurds were so divided. These Armenians would then seek to incorporate the proposed Armenian homeland in Cilicia into their nation, which the British feared would give the Russians access to the Mediterranean Sea, uncomfortably close to British Egypt.28 Lawrence similarly dismissed Mugerditchian’s plans.29 Mugerditchian and Safrastian’s plans of uniting historically Armenian lands under a British mandate did not come to fruition, nor did Mugerditchian’s hopes for an Armenian Cilicia. Armenians were left with a fraction of their homeland in the Armenian Republic in the Caucasus, which was overrun by the in 1920. To further pursue a greater Armenian nation was not in Britain’s imperial interests, especially in light of the successes of Mustafa Kemal’s Nationalist movement. In addition to this disappointment, Mugerditchian would soon suffer a personal blow. After the war, Mugerditchian became a naturalized British subject and subsequently petitioned for the pension he was verbally promised if he spent 25

26 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 CO to Lancelot Oliphant, 14 May 1921. 27 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 Major R. McDonell to FO, 28 April 1921. 28 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 Major R. McDonell to FO, 28 April 1921. 29 TNA: PRO FO 371/6344 CO to Lancelot Oliphant, 14 May 1921. 74 74 years in British service.30 His superiors in the EEF, General Allenby, the then- High Commissioner of Cairo, and Colonel Deedes supported Mugerditchian’s petition. Though the Foreign Office decided they no longer needed Mugerditchian after the war, Allenby requested he be kept on “compassionate grounds” until his petition was answered so that he not be left “without means...stranded in Egypt.”31 He further requested that Mugerditchian be awarded a yearly pension, citing his “uniformly satisfactory” service in the EEF and Deedes’ “high opinion of him.”32 However, the Foreign Office replied that Mugerditchian’s case did not qualify for a pension because he had been paid through office allowances during his employment at Diarbekir.33 Allenby’s office pressed that “strong representations be made to the Foreign Office in order that the case may be reconsidered.”34 While the Foreign Office had justifiable grounds for denying Mugerditchian’s pension, it was well within their power to grant him an exception for his service. The fact that they did not demonstrates that while Mugerditchian thought of himself as an important actor, and while his superiors valued his service, the Foreign Office viewed him as little more than a native consular officer who was ultimately expendable. Mugerditchian’s wife Esther wrote from California to Emily Robinson, founder of the Armenian Red Cross and Relief organization in London, lamenting

30 TNA: PRO HO 334/117/279 Certificate of Naturalization, 12 Feb. 1920; TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Thomas Mugerditchian to Sir Edmund Allenby, 21 April 1919; TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 C.C. Harris to General Headquarters in Abbassia, 2 June 1920. 31 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Sir Edmund Allenby to FO, 29 March 1920. 32 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Sir Edmund Allenby to FO, 29 March 1920; TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Sir Edmund Allenby to Earl Curzon, 27 March 1920. 33 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525 F.G.A. Butler to the Secretary of the Treasury, 12 Nov. 1920; TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 W. Clark to Sir Edmund Allenby, 23 March 1920. 34 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 High Commissioner of Cairo to General Headquarters of Abassia, 28 April 1920. 75 75 that the Foreign Office had “forgotten how faithfully he had served the British Government in the past 25 years.”35 She further believed that the only thing they had against her husband was his Armenian identity.36 Esther complained that her husband was stuck in Egypt without money for traveling expenses to reach California or living expenses for when he arrived, though he had spent “the best years of his life” in British service.37 According to Esther, General Allenby and General Deedes told Mugerditchian they were both surprised that “the Foreign Office is refusing everything.”38 Robinson then wrote to the Foreign Office on behalf of Mugerditchian, noting his “valuable service” and his family’s hardships fleeing the Ottoman genocide against Armenians.39 She stressed that the British government should not leave him penniless but that “men in the East who have faithfully served the British Government should be suitably rewarded whatever their nationality…”40 In light of these repeated requests, a Mr. Sherwood of the Foreign Office suggested they ask the Treasury to grant Mugerditchian a “Compassionate Gratuity” of £46 a year for his decades of service.41 The Foreign Office asked the Secretary of Treasury whether this pension would be possible, “having regard to the length and value of Mr. Thomas’ services and the warm support extended to his application for relief by his superior officers.”42 Shortly after, N.W. Clayton of

35 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/31 Esther Mugerditchian to Emily Robinson, 23 Sept. 1920. 36 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/31 Esther Mugerditchian to Emily Robinson, 23 Sept. 1920. 37 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/32 Esther Mugerditchian to Emily Robinson, 23 Sept. 1920. 38 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/33 Esther Mugerditchian to Emily Robinson, 23 Sept. 1920. 39 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/30 Emily Robinson to FO, 19 Oct. 1920. 40 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/30 Emily Robinson to FO, 19 Oct. 1920. 41 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/28 Memo: Mr. Sherwood, 29 Oct. 1920. 42 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525 F.G.A. Butler to the Secretary to the Treasury, 12 Nov. 1920. 76 76 the Department of Public Security in Cairo, where Mugerditchian was currently working, reported that Mugerditchian desired to join his family in America. According to Clayton, Mugerditchian could not afford the expenses and did not wish to borrow £150 for the necessary travel expenses that his family would later have to pay back.43 With this in mind, the Foreign Office determined that Mugerditchian did not need a yearly pension and would be “personally content with less.”44 They decided to “compound” his payment into one lump sum of £100 “with a view to economy.”45 The Foreign Office then wrote to the Treasury to inform them that £100 would be sufficient for Mugerditchian rather than an annual pension.46 The Foreign Office sent Mugerditchian £100 in February 1921, allowing him to travel to Fresno, California to reunite with his family.47 Mugerditchian was content with the sum because he had another petition pending for compensation for his property losses in Turkey, totaling £30,000.48 He believed he qualified for both the British fund established for Armenian refugees as well as the fund for British subjects who lost property during the war. According to Mugerditchian, he was justified “First, as a British subject; second, as a British official…damaged in active service; and third, as an Armenian by birth.”49 Mugerditchian’s attempt to collect both British and Armenian reparation funds demonstrates the fluidity of his

43 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525 N.W. Clayton to The Residency, 18 Oct. 1920. 44 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/39 Memo: Turkey No. 1188, 5 Nov. 1920. 45 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525/39 Memo: Turkey No. 1188, 5 Nov. 1920. 46 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525 F.G.A. Butler to the Secretary to the Treasury, 8 Dec. 1920. 47 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 FO to High Commissioner for Egypt, 9 Feb. 1921. 48 TNA: PRO FO 369/1525 Mugerditchian to Allenby, 25 Dec. 1919; TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Mugerditchian to the Residency in Cairo, 24 Feb. 1921. 49 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Mugerditchian to the British Delegate Commission for the Assessment of Damage Suffered in Turkey, 2 June 1925. 77 77 identity and his ability to manipulate it to his benefit. However, this petition was also denied, likely because although Mugerditchian had worked for the British consulate, he was not a legal British subject when his property was confiscated.50 This exchange demonstrates that while Mugerditchian was able to culturally negotiate his identity, he was not able to do so in a legal sense. His language, appearance, religion, and clothing were not enough to make him British when it came to his petition. When Mugerditchian joined his family on their farm in California’s Central Valley, it was apparent to them that his identity had changed as a result of his experiences. Mugerditchian regretted that he did not have an income to provide for his family and immediately donned overalls to join his sons in their work on the farm. His daughter Alice recalled that Mugerditchian took charge “though he had never worked on a farm” and gave orders contrary to what her brothers had learned.51 Alice, a teenager at the time, grew frustrated that her father, whom she had been longing to see for six years, returned from Egypt a “commanding general who gave ruthless orders and demanded immediate obedience.”52 She blamed his experience in British intelligence for this transformation. According to Alice, there was initially a disconnect in the family because of their differing experiences. While she and her family were fleeing Diarbekir for their lives, constantly targeted for their Armenian identity, Mugerditchian was in Egypt with “an aide to wait on him hand and foot for twenty-four hours a day.”53 His experience was that of a British officer rather than an Armenian refugee.

50 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Minute on Residency Paper No. 1572/109. 51 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 288. 52 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 289. 53 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 289. 78 78

Figure 9: Thomas and Esther Mugerditchian, seated center, with some of their children and grandchildren in California 1923.

The family farm failed in 1923 when the price of raisins plummeted, forcing Mugerditchian to travel to New Orleans and Detroit in search of a job.54 Left without means once again, Mugerditchian petitioned for his pension in 1925, this time to the British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, the British Commission for the Assessment of Damage Suffered in Turkey, and George Lloyd, his former superior in the Intelligence Department who had been granted a peerage as Lord Lloyd of Dolobran.55 He once again cited his long career, arguing that if he had worked as a merchant or for a firm for 26 years, he would have received a

54 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Mugerditchian to the British Delegate Commission for the Assessment of Damage Suffered in Turkey, 2 June 1925; GLLD 14/21 Mugerditchian to George Lloyd, 8 Aug. 1925; GLLD 14/21 Mugerditchian to Stanley Baldwin, 15 Dec. 1925 55 Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire, 118-119. 79 79 pension; thus it was only right that he be compensated as a British officer.56 He told Baldwin that though he always considered Great Britain the standard-bearer of “Righteousness and Justice,” he did not feel he had been treated fairly.57 Mugerditchian later told Lloyd he regretted leaving Egypt and wanted to once again “be useful to our dear Empire” in a time of “Panislamic [sic] and Bolshevic [sic] propaganda.”58 He offered Lloyd, who was then High Commissioner of Cairo, his expertise in Turkish, Arabic, Armenian, and Kurdish affairs, as well as his connections with local Egyptian leaders if he were allowed to return.59 Lloyd determined that while Mugerditchian had been a “useful person” and “good servant,” it would not be practical for him to return to Egypt for employment.60 Though Mugerditchian was disappointed by failed British promises to secure a unified Armenian homeland and felt cheated out of a pension he believed the government owed him, he remained attached to the ideas he believed Britain represented. Mugerditchian’s analysis of the postwar world exemplifies his Western influenced identity. In an interview with the New Orleans States in 1924, Mugerditchian argued that if America had “taken her part in world affairs” after the Peace Conference with her “Anglo-Saxon genius for self-government,” world peace would be possible.61 He claimed that because “war always comes from the

56 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3 Mugerditchian to the British Delegate Commission for the Assessment of Damage Suffered in Turkey, 2 June 1925. 57 GLLD 14/21 Mugerditchian to Stanley Baldwin, 15 Dec. 1925 58 GLLD 14/21 Mugerditchian to George Lloyd, 8 Aug. 1925 59 GLLD 14/21 Mugerditchian to George Lloyd, 8 Aug. 1925 60 TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3/171 Minute on Residency Paper No. 1572/109; TNA: PRO FO 141/468/3/172 Residency in Cairo to Mugerditchian, 9 Jan. 1926. 61 TNA: PRO FO 371/10222 New Orleans States 24 Feb. 1924. 80 80

East,” it was necessary for the Anglo-Saxon races, including Germany, to “unite to force peace” in the world.62 In a speech delivered in 1926, Mugerditchian cited European historians who argued that had “impoverished the minds of the Turks” so they were not able to “produce leaders, diplomats, artists and scientists.”63 He noted Egypt as an example of the inefficiencies of “Turkish tyranny” and argued that British rule made Egypt a “prosperous country.”64 His views were both broadly conceived and a result of his lived experiences. Mugerditchian cited his family’s harrowing escape from Diarbekir as evidence to justify his belief that the Turks were an inherently violent race that needed to be restrained by Anglo-Saxon nations.65 He lamented that Germany had sought to use the “barbarous Asiatic races…to their advantage” in World War I, but now believed Germany could reclaim its place in the Anglo-Saxon world by joining hands with America and Great Britain.66 This view marked a shift from his attitude towards the Germans in 1919, in which he considered them “infidel Germans” and “acrimonious… hypocrites.”67 They had been the enemies of his people but were redeemed by their Anglo-Saxon heritage. By 1924 he feared that unless this Anglo-Saxon union materialized, “the war that will come [from the East] will stagger humanity.”68

62 TNA: PRO FO 371/10222 New Orleans States 24 Feb. 1924. 63Thomas, Untitled Speech (Unpublished), Author’s Personal Collection, 20 Dec. 1926. 64 Thomas, Untitled Speech (Unpublished), Author’s Personal Collection, 20 Dec. 1926. 65 “Rug Importers Open Branch.” The Shreveport Times [Louisiana], August 31, 1924. 66 Thomas, Untitled Speech (Unpublished), Author’s Personal Collection, 20 Dec. 1926; FO 371/10222 New Orleans States 24 Feb. 1924. 67 Mugerditcian, The Diyarbekir Massacres and Kurdish Atrocities, 2, 55. 68 TNA: PRO FO 371/10222 New Orleans States, 24 Feb. 1924. 81 81

In 1929, Mugerditchian’s loyalty was tested when he learned that a Kurdish prince, Sureya Bedr Khan, and an Armenian from the Republic of Armenia, Grigor Vartanian, were campaigning in the United States on behalf of Hoyboon, the Kurdish Independence Society.69 Hoyboon had declared an independent Kurdistan in 1927 and vowed to fight the Turks as long as they occupied Kurdish land.70 The Society expressed regret that because of the “sinister influence of the Turk and the ignorance of the Kurd,” Armenians suffered at the hands of Muslims in Anatolia.71 They hoped that by “recognizing the Turk as their common enemy, and the solidarity of their interests,” the Kurds and Armenians could work towards a “final reconciliation” and “if possible, cooperation.”72 Sureya Bedr Khan and Vartanian traveled among the Kurdish diaspora in America collecting funds for their independence movement. The British discovered that some Armenians in the United States were sympathetic towards this cause and contributed funds.73 While in the United States, Vartanian asked Mugerditchian to travel to Moscow with him to raise support for the movement. Though helping to wrestle his homeland from Kemal’s Turkish Republic on behalf of a friendly Kurdish Society was surely in his people’s better interest, Mugerditchian told Vartanian that he was a British subject and could do nothing without their consent, then proceeded to report the plot to the British Consulate in Detroit.74 Consul John Cameron forwarded the report to Sir , the Secretary of State

69 TNA: PRO FO 371/13827 Cameron to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 18 April 1929 70 Sureya Bedr-Khan, The Case of Kurdistan Against Turkey. (Philadelphia: Kurdish Independence League, 1928), 54. 71 Bedr-Khan, The Case of Kurdistan Against Turkey, 55. 72 Bedr-Khan, The Case of Kurdistan Against Turkey, 55-56. 73 TNA: PRO FO 371/13827 Cameron to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 18 April 1929 74 TNA: PRO FO 371/13827 Cameron to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 18 April 1929 82 82 for Foreign Affairs, adding that though Mugerditchian was 65 to 70 years of age, he was “very robust,” “mentally alert,” and ready to “go anywhere” for the British Government.75 The Colonial Office consulted , the High Commissioner of Iraq, who noted that Vartanian was a Soviet agent and that the Bolsheviks were likely using Hoyboon “for their own ends.”76 Clayton wrote that he had met Sureya Bedr Khan during the war and had no desire to admit him in Iraq to further Hoyboon’s agenda.77 He further requested that Cameron furnish a photograph of Vartanian, which Mugerditchian produced.78 Nothing further seems to have come from this case. Despite Mugerditchian’s disappointments with the British government, he had chosen to notify the Empire he had so long served rather than ally himself with the potentially Bolshevik-backed Kurdish Society. Because of his Western education and career, Mugerditchian adopted a British layer to his identity that was not always practical, but based upon ideals and his life experience. There is evidence to suggest that Mugerditchian continued to believe Britain was the best hope for a unified Armenia into the 1930s, despite its failed promises. In 1931, Dr. Nishan Baghdigian, an Armenian residing in Egypt who had been forced to fight in the Ottoman army before being captured by the British and subsequently transferred to a refugee camp, replied to a letter Mugerditchian had sent him regarding his thoughts on Armenia’s future.79 Baghdigian’s letter

75 TNA: PRO FO 371/13827 Cameron to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 18 April 1929 76 TNA: PRO FO 371/13827 Clayton to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 June 1929. 77 TNA: PRO FO 371/13827 Clayton to H.E. Satow, 17 July 1929. 78 TNA: PRO FO 371/13827 Clayton to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 June 1929; TNA: PRO FO 371/13827 Cameron to Arthur Henderson, 15 Oct. 1929. 79 Baghdigian to Thomas Mugerditchian. Author’s Personal Collection, 21 Sept. 1931. Translated by Amalie Meliksetyan; On Baghdigian’s experience as a Prisoner of War: TNA: PRO FO 382/232 British 83 83 questioned Mugerditchian’s steadfast loyalty to the Allies and their promises to prosecute the Turkish government for crimes against Armenians. He expressed frustration that Mugerditchian refused to abandon hope in the British, who only aided the Armenians when it was in their interest. According to Baghdigian, it was important to learn from the “bitter political experience” of the past and prevent England and other nations from manipulating the Armenian people for their benefit.80 Mugerditchian voiced similar sentiments years earlier in a 1926 speech, arguing that Britain had sacrificed the well-being of Christians in Turkey for its imperial interests. However, Baghdigian’s rebuke of Mugerditchian and his reliance on the Allies demonstrates that he continued to maintain faith in Great Britain into the 1930s.81 Baghdigian hoped that Mugerditchian would instead look to Armenians’ neighbors, the Kurds and Arabs, as natural allies.82 Mugerditchian’s Western education, 26 years in British service, and knowledge of Turkish crimes against his family and people cemented his Western identity. While he may have initially entered British service for pragmatic reasons, he internalized a British layer to his identity that would remain with him long after Britain failed to secure an Armenian homeland. He drew a stark distinction between Western and Eastern races. Mugerditchian not only believed Anglo- Saxon races were superior to Eastern races, but that it was their job to civilize the world and maintain peace. Though he was originally an Ottoman citizen,

Embassy in Washington to Sir Edward Grey, 22 Feb. 1916; TNA: PRO FO 382/232 R. Holloway to the India Office, 22 May 1916. 80 Baghdigian to Thomas Mugerditchian. Author’s Personal Collection, 21 Sept. 1931. Translated by Amalie Meliksetyan 81 Thomas, Untitled Speech (Unpublished), Author’s Personal Collection, 20 Dec. 1926. 82 Baghdigian to Thomas Mugerditchian. Author’s Personal Collection, 21 Sept. 1931. Translated by Amalie Meliksetyan 84 84

Mugerditchian benefitted from American and British cultural interactions at an early age. He believed Armenians had much to learn from the West, from British agricultural techniques, to discipline in war, to appreciation for democratic principles. Mugerditchian’s fluid identity became increasingly influenced by Western ideals as a result of his experience in British intelligence.

CONCLUSION

The experiences of Thomas Mugerditchian and Arshak Safrastian in British service remained with them for the rest of their lives. They returned from the war with changed identities and perceptions of the world. After decades of service both before, during, and after World War I, Mugerditchian found it hard to sit still. Regretful that he could not provide an income for his family, Mugerditchian moved to New Orleans to work in his brother-in-law’s Oriental rug shop in 1924.1 He later moved to Detroit, where he worked with an American lawyer to recover Armenian property confiscated by the Turkish government.2 He collected money and claims from Armenian survivors and presented them to the American-Turkish Claims Commission through his attorney, Grace Brown. The State Department secured compensation funds from the Republic of Turkey but ultimately refused to release any to Armenians who had previously been Ottoman citizens.3 Mugerditchian was blamed by the Armenian survivors he attempted to help for their failed claims. It was in Detroit that Mugerditchian contacted the British consul about the Hoyboon society with the hope that he would be called back into duty. Mugerditchain eventually moved back to California to live out the rest of his live surrounded by his evergrowing family. He died in 1945 at a rest home in San Jose at the age of 85.4

1 “Rug Importers Open Branch,” The Shreveport Times [Louisiana], August 31, 1924. 2 Shipley, We Walked then Ran, 290. 3 Juliet Davis, “The New World and the ‘New Turks’: the American-Turkish Claims Commission and Armenian-Americans’ contested citizenship in the interwar period,” Journal of Genocide Research 19, no. 3 (2017): 300. 4 “Rev. K.M. Thomas Dies in San Jose,” The Fresno Bee Republican, Oct. 21, 1945. 86 86

Safrastian settled in London for the last forty years of his life and remained active in Armenian and British circles. According to R. Yeghiazaryan, Safrastian and the English Armenian daughter of the late Thomas Boyajian, Zabelle, were among the important figures in fostering cultural ties between the British and Armenians in London.5 Zabelle Boyajian became an important novelist, translator, and poet in Armenian literary circles, translating Armenian poems into English and promoting cross-cultural events between the British and Armenian communities.6 During World War I, Zabelle promoted an event honoring the tercentenary of Shakesphere’s death by the Armenian Literary Society of London. Zabelle invited Mark Sykes to the event, noting that while “Armenia is at present overshadowed by calamities of fire and sword, she nevertheless wishes to offer her homage to the greatest genius of the world.”7 Safrastian was similarly important in the British Armenian community as the editor of the Armenian periodical Masis. He was also an avid scholar of Armenian and Oriental Studies and a reader at the British Museum.8 He participated in Oriental Conferences in Constantinople and Germany and published several works on Armenian and Kurdish history.9 Safrastian died in 1958 at the age of 73. The lives of Mugerditchian and Safrastian after their careers in British intelligence attest to the complex nature of their identities. It was these identities that allowed them to accrue influence in the periphery of the British Empire that they mobilized to aid Armenian interests. Over the course of their careers,

5 R Yeghiazaryan, Armenians in England: The History, up to 20-ies of the XXth century. (: Yason Printing House, 2014), 318. 6 Yeghiazaryan, Armenians in England, 321. 7 DDSY(2)/4/190 Raffi and Boyajian to Sir Mark Sykes, May 1916. 8 Allen, “Arshak Safrastian,” 94. 9 Der Megerditchian, Treasures of Vasbouragan, 557. 87 87

Mugerditchian, Boyajian, and Safrastian internalized a British layer to their identities and felt increasingly empowered to voice their opinions and be heard by the British government. They believed in the superiority of Western technology, religion, and enlightenment ideals and saw themselves as the arbiters of such values to the Armenian people. However, the closer Mugerditchian and Safrastian reached to the centers of power, the less influence they actually had. Officials in London did not recognize them as British, but as low-level native agents. A case study of these three Armenian agents provides an interesting insight into the experiences of Armenians in British intelligence during World War I, how their identities changed over time and how different levels of the British government perceived them. The British government’s treatment of Mugerditchian after the war in many ways reflects its treatment of the post-war Armenian state. Though British officials were willing to frame their empire as the protector of Armenians when it benefitted the war effort, they ultimately abandoned this role when it proved too costly.10 As Laycock notes, the Armenians were far enough on the periphery of the United Kingdom for British authorities to cast them aside “without provoking widespread moral outrage” among the British public.11 Mugerditchian was similarly discarded after the war when he was no longer needed, despite his nearly three decades of service to the British Empire. Rather than grant Mugerditchian an annual pension, the Foreign Office decided it would be more cost effective to give him only enough money to reach the United States. Though Armenians demonstrated great agency in manipulating their identities to further their cause, imperial interests ultimately held sway over their efforts.

10 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 180-235. 11 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 223.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: LIST OF ARMENIAN AND NATIVE DRAGOMANS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 98 98

List of Armenian and Native Dragomans in the Ottoman Empire Thomas Boyajian, British Dragoman, Diarbekir-circa 1860-1895 (with interruptions) Thomas Mugerditchian, British Dragoman, Diarbekir-1896-1914

Arshak Safrastian, British Dragoman, Bitlis-1907-1911

Yussuf (Youseph) Tatarian, British Dragoman, Erzeroum-1861-1911

Onnik Srabian, British Dragoman, Erzeroum-circa 1907

Dr. Vosgian, British Honorary Dragoman, Diarbekir-circa 1907

Gomidas Hekimian, British Dragoman, Trebizon-circa 1895

Hagop Effendi, British Dragoman, Bitlis-circa 1897

(Name unknown), British Armenian Dragoman, Mush-circa 1896

Gulzar Kiatibian, British Dragoman, Adrianople-date unknown

John Arabian, British Dragoman, Trebizon-date unknown

Foreign and Unknown consulates Dikran Srabian, French Dragoman, Erzeroum-circa 1895.

Bedros Marimian, Dragoman (Austro-protection)-circa 1891

Vartikis Effendi, Russian Dragoman, Van-circa 1891

Haroutiun Kasabian, French Dragoman, Diarbekir-circa 1913

Bedros Effendi, unknown consulate-circa 1912

Dragoman Effibian, unknown consulate-date unknown

Other Native Dragomans Athanasios Tripanis, British Dragoman, Adana-1909

Michael Effendi, Dragoman (unknown nationality), Erzeroum- circa 1891

APPENDIX B: LIST SHOWING SERVICE PERIOD OF BRITISH VICE CONSULS AT DIARBEKIR 100 100

List Showing Service Period of British Vice Consuls at Diarbekir1

1. Cecil Marshan Hallward (1 January 1896–7 December 1896)

a. Mugerditchian, Dragoman: February 1, 1896

2. Alex Telford Waugh (7 December 1896 – 18 May 1896)

a. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (18 May 1896 – 20 May 1899)

3. Jones Francois Jones (20 May 1899 – 1 May 1901)

a. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (1 May 1901 – 11 June 1901)

4. Frederick George Freeman (11 June 1901 – 3 September 1901)

5. Capt William James Anderson (3 September 1901 – 17 May 1903)

6. Hubert Caliste de Jacobi du Vallon (17 May 1903 – 8 October 1903)

a. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (20 May 1903 – 16 April 1904)

7. Horace Edward Wilkie Young (16 April 1903 – 26 June 1905)

8. Avalon Shipley (26 June 1905 – 28 October 1906)

a. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (28 October 1906 – 20 November

1906)

9. Richard Massie Graves (20 November 1906 – 27 March 1907)

a. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (28 March 1907 – 31 July 1907)

10. William Beauchamp Heard (in Bitlis) (31 July 1907 – 14 January 1908)

a. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (9 September 1907 – 14 January 1908)

1 FO 141-468-3 List Showing Service Period of H.B.M.’s Vice Consuls at Diarbekir, 7 May 1920.

101 101

William Beauchamp Heard (returned from Bitlis) (14 January 1908 – 2 December 1908) b. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (2 December 1908 – 10 February

1909)

11. Charles Donaldson Rawlins (10 February 1909 – 21 January 1910)

12. William Matthews Woodside (1 January 1910 – 31 March 1911)

a. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (31 March 1911 – 28 June 1913)

13. MG Harris (28 June 1913 – 17 September 1913)

14. Leonard Henry Hurst (17 September 1913 – 20 June 1914)

a. Mugerditchian, “in charge” (20 June 1914 – 23 July 1914)

15. A. Monk-Mason (23 July 1914 – 1 November 1914, when Mugerditchian

and Monk-Mason fled to Egypt and arrived on 19 November 1914)

Mugerditchian was in sole charge of the British consulate in Diarbekir for a total of 5 years, 2 months, and 25 days between 1896 and 1914, in addition to his service as a dragoman.