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Russia's Recognition of Independence of Abkhazia And avtoris stili daculia Russia’s Recognition of Independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – Causes of Deviation from Russian Traditional Recognition Policy NIKOLOZ SAMKHARADZE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO IVANE JAVAKHISHVILI TBILISI STATE UNIVERSITY IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Supervisor: Neil MacFarlane, Lester B Pearson Professor of International Relations St Anne's College, University Of Oxford Co-Supervisor: Zurab Davitashvili, Full Professor of International Relations Tbilisi State University February 2016 Abstract Recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russian Federation in August 2008 undermined stability in the Caucasus and future perspectives of Georgia. Since August 26, 2008 none of the states emerging from the USSR could be sure of inviolability of their territorial integrity, assumption confirmed by the Ukraine events later. It is undoubtedly a significant precedent both in international law and international relations. Recognition of new entities without consent of the parent state and subsequent erosion of territorial integrity principle became one of the most pressing topics of international relations. It is considered as an important bone of contention in current Russia-West discourse. In this research I explore norms of recognition, secession and self-determination in international law and their development. I trace the evolution of Soviet and Russian perspectives and policies on recognition of new states over the long term and discuss overall Georgia-Russia relations in order to find answers to why Russia recognised Georgia’s breakaway entities and whether this act was in line with traditional Russian policy of recognition. I apply the standard example of game theory - prisoner’s dilemma to explain Russian recognition, which I argue was caused by three major reasons: 1) Kosovo’s recognition by the western nations in disregard of Russian stance, 2) Prevention of Georgia’s membership to NATO and 3) necessity to legitimize presence of Russian armed forces in Georgia’s breakaway provinces. ii List of Acronyms AKP – Justice and Development Party (Turkey) AR- Autonomous Republic ASSR- Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic BTC – Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline CENTO – The Central Treaty Organisation CFE- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CIS –Commonwealth of Independent States CoE- Council of Europe CPSU – Communist Party of Soviet Union CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CST- Collective Security Treaty DRG – Democratic Republic of Georgia EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council EC- European Communities ECHR – European Court of Human Rights EU – European Union FLN – National Liberation Front of Algeria FRG – Federal Republic of Germany GA – General Assembly GDP – Gross Domestic Product GDR – German Democratic Republic GPRA – Provisional Government of Algerian Republic GSSR – Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic iii GU(U)AM – Georgia, Ukraine, (Uzbekistan), Azerbaijan, Moldova ICJ – International Court of Justice IIFFMCG -The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia JCC-Joint Control Commission KGB- Committee of State Security of Soviet Union KLA- Kosovo Liberation Army MAP – Membership Action Plan MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs NATO – Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation NKR – Nagorno Karabakh Republic OAU – Organisation for African Unity OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PACE – Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PD – Prisoner’s Dilemma PISG- Provisional Institution of Self-Government in Kosovo PPP- Pakistan People’s Party PRC – People’s Republic of China RF – Russian Federation RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic RSK – Republic of Srpska Krajina SC – Supreme Council SEATO – South East Asian Treaty Organisation SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia SSR- Soviet Socialist Republic TMR – Transnistrian Moldovan Republic iv TRNC – Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus UK- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland UN – United Nations UNFICYP - UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNOMIG – United Nations Observer Mission to Georgia UNSC- United Nations Security Council UNSG – United Nations Secretary-General UNSIMIC – United Nations Settlement Implementation Mission in Cyprus UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor USA – United States of America USD – United States Dollar USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WW – World War v Contents: Chapter I. Introduction 4 1.1 Research Topic 4 1.2 Research Goal and Structure 6 Chapter II. Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition in International Law 10 2.1 Introduction 10 2.2. Principle of Self-Determination in International Law 11 2.2.1 Sources of International Law 11 2.2.2 Historical Background 13 2.2.3 Self-determination in International Law 18 2.2.4 Court Decisions 27 2.2.5 Historical Title vs. Self-Determination 30 2.2.6 International Practice 32 2.2.7 Conclusion 33 2.3. Secession in International Law 35 2.3.1 What is Secession? 35 2.3.2. Secession in International law 36 2.3.3 Remedial Secession 39 2.3.4 Secession in Violation of International Law 44 2.3.5. Court Opinions 47 2.3.6 International Practice 52 2.3.7. Conclusion 65 2.4 Recognition in International Law 66 2.4.1 What is Recognition? 66 2.4.2 Evolution of Recognition 67 2.4.3 Theories of Recognition 70 2.4.4 Criteria of Statehood 74 2.4.5 Criteria for Recognition 77 2.4.6 Modalities and Forms of Recognition and Non-Recognition 80 2.4.7 Conclusion 84 Chapter III. Soviet/Russian Practice of Recognition of New States after 1945 86 3.1 Introduction 86 3.2 Recognition of States emerging out of Colonial Rule 87 3.3 Recognition of States Outside of Colonial Context 92 3.3.1 Group 1 - Recognition of Israel and Bangladesh 92 3.3.2 Group 2 – Recognition of Eritrea, East Timor, South Sudan 99 3.3.3. Group 3 – Non-Recognition -Northern Cyprus, Karabakh, Transnistria, Kosovo 100 3.4 Conclusion 117 Chapter IV. Russian Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 120 4.1 Introduction 120 4.2 History of Conflicts and Peace Processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 2 4.2.1 Status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia in Soviet era 121 4.2.2 Outbreak of Conflicts and Subsequent Peace Process 125 4.3 Georgian-Russian Relations in 1991-2008 141 4.4 Georgia-Russia War 156 4.5 Reasons for Russia’s Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 161 4.6 Theoretical Framework 174 4.7 Conclusion 181 Chapter V. Conclusion 186 Bibliography 194 3 Chapter I. Introduction 1.1 Research Topic Principle of territorial integrity of a state is an established, fundamental, sacrosanct principle of international law and a baseline for international relations. This principle however, was neglected twice in the short, six-month period running from February to August 2008 by four out of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. On the one hand, USA, UK and France recognised Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and on the other hand, Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s secession from Georgia. Recognition of new entities without consent of the parent state and subsequent erosion of territorial integrity principle turned into one of the most pressing topics of international relations. It is an important bone of contention in current Russia-West discourse too. Recognition of tiny entities in South Caucasus resonated as far as in Latin America and Oceania, thus outgrowing Georgian-Russian context and becoming a global issue. Russian Federation has been the most important stakeholder in all negotiations on protracted and frozen conflicts on the former Soviet territory, as the latter represents a zone of privileged interests for Russia. Hence, it is logical that Russia assumed the role mediator in these conflicts in early 1990’s and was the only country to provide peacekeeping forces in Georgia, emphasising the significance this region bears for Russian national interests. Despite Russian covert and overt financial or political support to Georgia’s breakaway entities and despite those entities’ appeals to have their independence recognised by the mighty northern neighbour, for almost two decades Russian Federation adhered to the principle of territorial integrity and ruled out recognition of independence of Georgia’s rebel provinces. Principle of inviolability of Soviet administrative borders was enshrined in the Charter establishing Commonwealth of Independent States, which was created in order to keep former soviet states together after the fall of the Soviet Union. The charter explicitly stated that “member states of CIS will build their relations on the basis of the inviolability of state borders, the recognition of existing borders and the rejection of 4 unlawful territorial annexations; the territorial integrity of states and the rejection of any actions directed towards breaking up alien territory”.1 Up until August 2008 Russia always supported UN Security Council resolutions reaffirming the territorial integrity of Georgia2. A sudden, unprecedented and, for many, an unexpected discontinuation of this policy occurred in the aftermath of 2008 Georgia-Russia war. On August 26, 2008, Russian Federation officially recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states3 calling on the rest of the world to follow suit and adapt to the new realities in the Caucasus. This recognition policy, however did not embrace other breakaway entities
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