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Birth of the American NCO at Valley Forge

A search through American military antiquity for the birth of the American

Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps led me to Valley Forge, 1777-78. Faced with demoralizing combat failures, severe shortages of food and supplies, woefully under trained and undisciplined troops, and a harsh winter ahead, the limped into Valley Forge for the winter, leaving doubt about the Revolution's hope for success. Many things soon changed, including the role of the NCO. Many factors influenced this transformation of the

Continental NCO at Valley Forge. The birth of the American NCO Corps was the result of

European precedent, Continental Army leadership gaps, and the Valley Forge experience.

The European precedent played a significant role in the shaping of the Continental NCO.

Of particular importance is the evolution of the European NCO, the colonists fighting alongside the British Army during the Seven Years War, and the colonial adoption of the British militia system. Europe had done a great deal of experimenting with the role of the NCO prior to the

American Revolution leaving much for the colonists to consider. European practices and traditions proved to influence both the colonial militias and the Continental Army. The role of the European sergeant was very defined prior to the so naturally the model for the Continental NCO would mirror in many ways. The English, French, Dutch and German continued to improve military equipment, tactics and professionalism throughout the 16th and

1i h centuries. Through this evolution, the role of the sergeant took shape. Success in battle generally hinged on the proficiency of disciplined drill. Conceived as drill masters by the Dutch, sergeants served as the principle trainer and were viewed with great prominence.

Commanders viewed NCOs as the principle disciplinarians of the unit and tasked them with nearly all of the day-to-day management of the troops. The sergeant also attended to the Valley Forge 2 development of the corporal. Serving as the sergeant's assistant, the corporal was responsible for posting the watch, equipping the troops, and conducting inspections, all under the watchful eye of the sergeant. These early sergeants also served as the company's primary liaison to the regiment. The regiment's sergeant major held daily meeting where he passed along the commander's new orders for the company, passwords, and general information. The British carried their NCO model to America during the French and Indian War. By the eve of the

American Revolution, the role of the sergeant experienced a decline and carried limited leadership responsibilities beyond maintaining the linear fighting lines in combat. However, the colonists witnessed Europe's version of NCO leadership and used this as a basis for their future army and militia model.

Nearly all senior Continental Army officers had served with the British during the

Seven Years War. Serving alongside the British provided an image of what a well disciplined and trained army looked like for our nation's future Revolutionary leaders. The problem facing the Continental Army leadership was not that they failed to see the need for building a professional army. The problem was that they didn't know how to build one. This was a problem that General would later remedy. What is important to note about the

British experience is that it connected our budding military commanders with the institution of a professional, disciplined fighting force.

Local militias were common in Europe, patticularly in England. Militias provided the crown a readily accessible pool in which to till regular army rosters. The colonists shared embraced the militia concept, for out of fear and suspect of a standing anny. When troubled with small uprisings or Indian skirmishes, the American Militia served as the tirst responders to any armed conflict. The Continental Congress was uncomfortable with a large standing army Valley Forge 3 and looked to the local militias as the safest alternative. Problems arose during the fonnation of the Continental Anny because militia units served as a power base of ilTegular musket infantry, valuable more for quantity than quality. The men of the Continental militias were the least trained members of the American army and their numbers swelled and diminished at unpredictable rates due to the short-term enlistments established by the Continental Congress.

This ultimately led to a rag-tag military representing more of a combined militia than a professional army, absent a professional leadership base.

Prior to Valley Forge, military leadership was poor at many levels in the Continental

Anny. Leadership gaps developed, particularly at the lower levels, between troops and officers.

Many of the officers had a limited concept of their duties. Influenced by the British system, they saw their responsibilities restricted to leading their men in combat. Their attitude towards drill was that it was a tedious chore fit only for sergeants. All other matters were considered to be solely in the purview of the sergeants. This method would work in an anny containing capable

NCOs, but this was not the case in the American Anny. Valley Forge and the emergence of the

American NCO would help change that.

The Valley Forge experience was a turning point in the war for the Continental Anny.

The Continental Army staggered into Valley Forge on December 19, 1777 bearing little resemblance of a structured anny, each individual unit possessed a different command structure, formations and drill procedures. Although a command structure was in place, its' leaders lacked experience and the knowledge necessary to discharge their duties effectively. Training was nonstandard and relatively ineffective. There was a high turnover rate in personnel due to short tenn enlistments as well as deserters, casualties, and illness. General Washington was aware that the Revolution was in jeopardy. He knew he had to resolve the systemic leadership problems, Valley Forge 4 restore discipline, and turn the army into a professionally drilled fighting force. General

Washington had to rebuild the Continental Army and he started with discipline.

Enlisting the services of Baron von Steuben was arguably the greatest decision General

Washington made in the course of the war. A professional soldier and master trainer, the

Prussian officer brought discipline to an inept army. Relying on years of Prussian military experience, von Steuben produced the remarkable Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops ofthe United States. Known as the Blue Book, von Steuben's manual simplified standard drills, organized battle formations, established camp organization, and defined NCO duties. Although using NCOs as trainers was not new, von Steuben expanded the NCO role to include marksmanship combat leadership, making the Continental NCO unique.

Prior to Valley Forge, troops had been taught formations and drill maneuvers along widely divergent lines. Each state had its own preference with regards to military doctrine. Without a standard system, cohesive teamwork on the battlefield was impossible. Drill remained a priority throughout the

Valley Forge experience and the NCO found himself in the middle of Washington's rebuilding effort. In terms of drill, the Continental NCOs witnessed the effectiveness of von Steuben's system. His hands-on instructions stressed the importance of the sergeant's ability to first master, and then teach his soldiers battlefield drill. By the time the Continental Army departed Valley Forge in the spring of 1778, for the first time since the war began, the troops under Washington displayed the training and discipline of a reliable fighting force.

Another challenge the Continental NCO faced was weapon employment. Within the army there were thirteen different kinds of muskets, individually crafted. Applying standard weapon drills to different weapons proved a difficult NCO task. With von Steuben's simplified weapons drill, NCOs were able to overcome drill complexity. As mentioned previously, marksmanship emerged as a unique philosophy in weapons training at Valley Forge. While European tactics relied on a heavy volume of Valley Forge 5

untargeted fire, the Continental NCO became responsible for aimed volley fire. This was a new concept

to open battle and added to the already expanding role of the Continental NCO.

The Continental Army developed five NCO ranks, each with distinct roles. The Sergeant Major

served as the assistant to the regimental adjutant, kept rosters, formed details, and handled matters concerning the interior management and discipline of the regiment. The Quartermaster Sergeant assisted the regimental quartermaster, whose duties he assumed during the quartermaster's absence. He also supervised the proper loading and transport ofthe regiment's baggage when on march. The First Sergeant enforced discipline and encouraged duty among troops, maintained the duty roster, made morning report to the company commander, and kept the company descriptive book. This document listed the name, age, height, place of birth, and prior occupation of every enlisted man in the unit. Sergeants and Corporals were expected to instruct recruits in all matters of military training, including the order of their behavior in regard to neatness and sanitation. Similar to British NCOs, in battle, NCOs were to close the gaps occasioned by casualties and encourage men to silence and to fire rapidly and true. However, the

Continental NCO also became battle field leaders. Known as a "covering sergeant", the Continental NCO stood behind the company officer to protect him. Each covering NCO could take over for line officers in combat ifneeded. Valley Forge made NCOs responsible for the care, discipline, and training of the men in garrison. The Valley Forge experience also emphasized the need to select quality soldiers for NCO positions. Because ofthe fluid nature of Indian fighting, the colonial militia NCO had more opportunity to exercise initiative that did their European counterpart. This greatly enhanced the overall leadership qualities of the Continental Army NCO.

NCOs proved invaluable during throughout the remaining struggle for independence.

General established the first formal system for rewarding acts of individual gallantry by the nation's fighting men. Designed to recognize enlisted and NCOs for "any singularly meritorious action," the award consisted of a purple cloth heart. Records show that Valley Forge 6 only three persons received the ward: Sergeant Elijah Churchill, Sergeant William Brown, and

Sergeant Daniel Bissel Jr. All three men were NCOs.

The Continental NCO evolved in the midst of severe hardships to become the army's primary trainers, caretakers of troops, and small unit combat leaders. Valley Forge was certainly a turning point in the war. The undisciplined, demoralized army that entered Valley Forge left equipped with solid small unit leaders in the form of the new Continental NCO, our predecessor. Valley Forge 7

Works Cited

Trussell, Jr John B.B. Birthplace of an Army: A Study of the Valley Forge Encampment. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission; 1976

Wright, Jr. Robert K. The Continental Army. Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History; 1986

Chidsey, Donald Barr. Valley Forge. New York: Crown Publishers, INC; 1959

Hogan, Jr. David W., Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., and Robert K. Wright, Jr. The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps. Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 2003

Fisher, Jr., Ernest F. Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the U.S. Army. New York: Ballantine Books: 1986

MG Frederick von Steuben, Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, 1779