, and the party would have also been helped by having ‘a gopher’ Reports minister at the , ‘minding what was going on’. Similarly, the culture and structure Coalition: Could Liberal Democrats have handled of Whitehall was always going to pre- sent the Liberal Democrats with major it better? challenges. Akash Paun believed that Autumn conference meeting, 18 September 2016, with , Whitehall, having grown accustomed, over many decades, to having one head and Akash Paun; chair: of government, had no desire to allow a Report by Neil Stockley second centre of power, in the shape of Deputy Prime Minister . He etween 2010 and 2015, the Lib- had made its burdens even heavier, and also charged that the Liberal Democrat eral Democrats participated in its electoral punishment worse than it negotiators did not think through what Bthe UK’s first peacetime coali- should might been, largely as a result of kind of support Nick Clegg would need tion government for some seventy years. inexperience in government and a cer- in order to discharge his cross-depart- They were momentous times for liber- tain political naiveté, combined with a mental roles as deputy prime minister. als, not least because the coalition came failure, which was at times quite aston- Moreover, they had failed to ensure, in to an abrupt end with the 2015 general ishing, to address basic questions of the early days of the government at least, election, which was catastrophic for the strategy. that there were sufficient special advisers party. The Liberal Democrats’ achieve- The meeting heard how the dam- to support Liberal Democrat ministers ments in office, what they did well, how age that the Liberal Democrats inflicted dealing with Conservative ministers and they might have handled coalition better on themselves had three elements: the their often radical policy proposals. As and lessons for the future will be debated structure of the government; the ways in a result, the party failed too often to get for many years to come, not least by lib- which the coalition was presented; and to grips with some of the Conservatives’ erals who hope to share power again. At the substance of specific policy decisions. important, politically charged policies, autumn conference, these questions were All of these drove the party’s core prob- such as the NHS reforms. addressed by Akash Paun of the Institute lem during the coalition: the loss of its Both David Laws and Akash Paun for Government, David Laws, the former distinctive political identity, which led were sure that the optics of the coalition schools minister who was a key player directly to the electoral wipeout of 2015. had undermined the party’s ability to in the , and Chris Akash Paun acknowledged that, be perceived as a separate, independent Huhne, the energy and climate change immediately after the May 2010 general party that was making a real difference secretary from 2010 to 2012. As with the election, the Liberal Democrats were to government policies, rather than as a Liberal Democrat History Group meet- well prepared for coalition talks and did mere adjunct to the Conservatives. Laws ing about the 2015 general election, held well at playing Labour and the Con- pointed out that Nick Clegg had impor- in July last year, there was a general servatives off against each other. The tant roles in the government, as chair reluctance to address whether the party’s party’s negotiating team had, however, of the Cabinet Home Affairs Commit- achievements were worth the electoral given rather less thought to which min- tee and . Whereas damage. The drivers of the electorate’s isterial positions the party should try to was regularly filmed harsh verdict on the Liberal Democrats, secure. He suggested that they should speaking for the government outside and they might have been prevented, have driven a harder bargain, and laid Number , Nick Clegg again provided the dominant theme. claim to important public service depart- had no similar premises or media forum All three speakers accepted that, from ments that were of most interest to vot- available to him. Two of his colleagues, the day the coalition took office, the ers, such as Health and Education. David Laws himself (briefly) and Danny Alex- party was doomed to lose a large amount Laws was in complete agreement on this ander successively held the role of chief of voter support. Akash Paun reminded point, and also explained, quite fairly, secretary to the Treasury, yet the Con- us of the simple, brutal rule of coalitions that members of the team felt the need servative chancellor, , in continental countries: the smaller to keep their roles as negotiators separate always presented the government’s major parties almost always suffer at the bal- from calculations as to which office they economic statements, some of which lot box. The senior partner claims credit might themselves hold. included key Liberal Democrat policies, for popular policies and achievements, Chris Huhne believed that in accept- to the Commons and the public. and leaves the junior partner to take ing the offers of the Department of Busi- The Liberal Democrats may have the blame for unpopular features of the ness, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and been complicit in making themselves government’s performance. According the Department of Energy and Climate secondary characters in the story. As to both David Laws and Chris Huhne, Change (DECC), ‘we walked into a Tory soon as the coalition took office, Nick about half of the Liberal Democrats’ vot- trap’. For these departments required Clegg had appeared with David Cam- ers from 2010 could have been expected the Liberal Democrats to make their eron in what Mr Paun called their to desert the party. Sure enough, the ‘messiest compromises’, on tuition fees famous ‘love in’ press conference in the party’s poll ratings began their nose- at BIS and nuclear power at DECC. In Downing Street Rose Garden. In the dive within months of the government’s hindsight, Huhne reflected, Nick Clegg same vein, David Laws cited Nick’s deci- formation. But the speakers analysed at should have taken on a major department sion to sit immediately next to David some length the ways in which the party of state, such as the Foreign Office or the Cameron in the Commons, listening and

Journal of Liberal History 94 Spring 2017 17 Report: Coalition – could Liberal Democrats have handled it better? looking up to him at Prime Minister’s he called ‘a terrible mess … that came of recent (and subsequent) single-party Questions, the part of parliamentary nowhere’, for which the leaderships of administrations. proceedings that features most fre- both coalition parties were ultimately Laws was correct to remind the meet- quently in TV news bulletins. responsible. ing of how much the Liberal Demo- On policy, the main topic of discus- For David Laws, and Akash Paun, the crats had delivered. However, in so sion was, understandably, tuition fees tuition fees debacle was the starkest exam- doing, he may have exposed some of – ‘the area we made the biggest hash of,’ ple of a bigger, more fundamental prob- the weaknesses of the party’s position according to David Laws. He suggested lem for the Liberal Democrats: the loss of in the coalition. On 7 May 2015, all of that the party had made two basic mis- the party’s distinctive identity after they the achievements he listed, impressive takes. The first was to go into the 2010 went into coalition. Laws conceded that as they were, were not in themselves, an general election still promising to oppose ‘we thought too little’ about the damage electoral asset for the party and did not any increase in tuition fees, which Laws that was done to the party’s brand, and help to any significant degree in address- saw as a hugely expensive commit- what could be done to address it. ing its lack of an identity with voters. ment that would do nothing to promote What, then, of the Liberal Demo- The meeting addressed some of the rea- social mobility. (Akash Paun opined that crats’ many achievements during the sons, including the fact that the Con- the presentation of the pledge showed coalition? Surely they proved that the servatives took the credit for some key that the Liberal Democrats did not seri- party had made a positive difference, policies, most notably the increased per- ously expect to be part of the govern- with an underlying framework of clear sonal tax allowance. would add that ment after the 2010 general election; in liberal values? Laws began his contribu- almost none of the policies were per- other words, they did not really expect tion with a list of policies delivered by ceived as being ‘pre-owned’ and then to have to deliver their promises on tui- the party, which ranged from the pupil ‘delivered’ by the Liberal Democrats tion fees.) Laws also believed that the premium, expanded early years’ edu- in office. Moreover, lists of policies sel- Liberal Democrats underestimated the cation for disadvantaged children, free dom resonate with voters. Chris Huhne high political price they would pay for school meals, the increasing personal summed up the Liberal Democrats’ pre- not following through with the com- tax allowances and halving the deficit dicament when he charged that they had mitment once in government. He sug- to pension reform, the creation of the failed to communicate their achieve- gested, with the benefit of hindsight, Green Investment Bank, shared paren- ments or encapsulate them in a simple that the party should have vetoed the rise tal leave, the 5p tax on plastic bags, and slogan or message. He also implied that in tuition fees in the early months of the more. ‘It’s an impressive list, of which we some of the achievements may have been government, invoking the clause in the can be genuinely proud,’ he contended. too small in scale to form the basis of an coalition agreement that allowed Liberal Then there were the Conservative initia- attractive appeal to the electorate. Democrat MPs to abstain in the relevant tives that the Liberal Democrats had put Similarly, David Laws was correct Commons vote. When the vote came, a stop to, including harsh welfare cuts, to point out how the Liberal Democrats they went three different ways, yet in the dismantling of employment laws and stopped some of the Conservatives’ more the public mind, the government par- the ‘Snoopers Charter’. (‘The list goes pernicious policies but, as Akash Paun ties ended up standing together behind on and on,’ he said.) Moreover, the Con- reminded us, they were always going to a single compromise policy, which rep- servatives and Liberal Democrats had have a difficult time claiming as successes resented a broken promise by the Liberal come together, during a financial crisis, the prevention of policies that had not Democrats. in a way that was ‘genuine’ and ‘pro- eventuated and that, as a result, the vast Laws cited other policy mistakes: the ductive’ and that provided ‘stable’ and majority of voters had not heard of. ‘bedroom tax’, which he saw as a logical ‘mature’ government, Laws maintained. David Laws and Chris Huhne move in principle, that had been imple- He went on to stress how policy-mak- explained how they and their colleagues mented too bluntly and with too many ing under the coalition had been more had tried to ameliorate the impact of the unfair impacts; and the NHS Bill which rigorous than had been the case under Liberal Democrats’ anticipated loss in

18 Journal of Liberal History 94 Spring 2017 Report: Coalition – could Liberal Democrats have handled it better? voter support by changing the system Liberal Democrat supporters. Later, he Report into the press, thereby enabling for electing MPs. The Alternative Vote argued that the Liberal Democrats had the party to carve out its own position. (AV) referendum of May 2011 had ended forgotten too easily that the Conserva- David Laws replied, convincingly, that in disaster, and a personal humiliation tives could have achieved very little Leveson was a unique situation and if for Nick Clegg. David Laws believed without their support. (‘We have got to replicated in future it could expose disa- that the party made two fatal misjudge- be tougher,’ he said, and ‘bend the knee greements that ‘cut both ways’, across the ments. One was to agree that the ballot to nobody.’) Still, both concluded that gamut of government policies. should be about AV, a compromise solu- Cameron and his colleagues could easily Akash Paun believed that junior coa- tion that would not lead to proportional have responded in kind, creating a stand- lition partners could define more distinc- outcomes and was too difficult to sell to off that would have rendered the govern- tive political territory and referred to voters. The other was to ‘not think hard ment much less effective. the way in which New Zealand’s multi- enough about how to win the referen- Some suggestions raised interest- party governments have evolved, so as dum, especially as a third party without ing questions and conundrums that can to allow ministers from smaller parties the active support of either Labour or the never be resolved. Akash Paun recalled a degree of latitude to disagree in public Conservatives. how, late in the life of the government, with some government policies. Whilst Chris Huhne argued that the party he had been converted to the view that New Zealand’s constitutional arrange- had underestimated the confrontational the Liberal Democrats should withdraw ments may merit further study in this nature of the AV referendum and the from the coalition, perhaps a year out regard, Liberal Democrats should be surrounding politics. The hard politi- from the 2015 general election. During aware that in successive elections, jun- cal reality, he said, was that Labour question time, Michael Steed recalled ior coalition parties and support parties would oppose anything on principle, how, in September 1978, the Liberal in that country have continued to fare despite having advocated AV in their Party had ended its pact with the Cal- badly at the ballot box. 2010 manifesto. Here, the big lesson Laws laghan Labour government, which had Michael Steed suggested that Liberal and Huhne drew for Liberal Democrats given the party more than six months to Democrats in a future coalition should in a future coalition government was recover from the downturn in its elec- follow the continental practice of tak- that they needed to secure at least one toral fortunes, and achieve a respectable ing over all the ministerial positions in a other major party’s support for electoral result in the May 1979 general election. few key departments, rather than being reform, in order to make the campaign He argued that, had the Liberal Demo- ‘scattered across Whitehall’, and deliver a for change as broad-based as . crats followed this precedent and with- policy agenda that the party could own. These observations were surely correct, drawn from the coalition a year before Chris Huhne responded that a party in but other parties, more likely Labour, will the 2015 general election, they may have coalition would, inevitably, have to take only support reform when they perceive saved between fifteen and twenty seats. responsibility for the government’s poli- that it is in their own interests to do so. David Laws was not persuaded that cies. Moreover, the Liberal Democrats The meeting heard many interest- the public would have been impressed by needed a ‘seat at the table’ across White- ing suggestions as to what the Liberal such an action, or that they would have hall (though not necessarily in all depart- Democrats might have done differently so easily detached the Liberal Democrats ments) in order to influence ‘events’. in order to reduce the electoral damage from the difficult decisions the party This was a lively and stimulating from going into coalition. Some of them had taken. His argument was compel- meeting that produced much food for broached the same issues as the group’s ling. A fully-fledged coalition that lasts thought for Liberal Democrats, now and July 2015 meeting, and left open a large five years has a very different impact on in the years and decades to come. At the number of questions. Once again, there a party’s reputation than a pact lasting very least, those entering into coalition were few easy or guaranteed solutions. eighteen months. Even so, Akash Paun government in future should be better Akash Paun briefly floated some posed a fair question: would the Lib- informed than their predecessors about ‘straw’ suggestions. One was that the eral Democrats would have really fared the big strategic questions and the tac- coalition itself was a mistake. He soon any worse than they did in 2015 had tical pitfalls that they need to address. recalled that the party’s options in May they staged an early departure from the There was, however, one surprising 2010 were very limited: a coalition with government? aspect of the meeting. The pretext for Labour was not viable. Had the Liberal But I believe that Mr Paun was on the coalition, for both parties, was the Democrats entered into a confidence and shakier ground when he pondered financial crisis that the country faced supply agreement with the Conserva- whether a change of leader – say, in 2014 in May 2010. For better or for worse, tives, they would have had much less – may have helped the party, given the the government was defined largely impact on government policy and with lack of viable alternatives to Nick Clegg by its economic policies, yet the meet- no Fixed Term Parliaments Act, Cam- and the dearth of alternative political ing hardly touched on them. Perhaps a eron would have been able to call an strategies that any new leader could have future meeting will address directly the early general election. pursued. coalition’s economic record and the role Another was that Nick Clegg and During question time, Andrew of the Liberal Democrats in this crucial his colleagues could have ‘said no’ more George, the former MP for St Ives, criti- area of policy, in the context of the his- often, and blocked more Conservative cised the ‘one party’ model of coalition tory of British liberal thought? policies. Similarly, Chris Huhne mused and favoured adopting some looser form that the Liberal Democrats might have of governing arrangement for a future Neil Stockley is a former Policy Director for forced the Conservatives to concede on power-sharing arrangement. He recalled the Liberal Democrats and a long-standing policies that were just as critical to their how Nick Clegg had made his own member of the Liberal Democrat History constituencies as tuition fees were for Commons statement on the Leveson Group.

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