The Politics of Foreign Borrowing in Middle Income Countries
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The Politics of Foreign Borrowing in Middle Income Countries by Benjamin Cormier A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Ben Cormier (2019) Abstract The Politics of Foreign Borrowing in Middle Income Countries PhD 2019 By Benjamin Cormier Department of Political Science University of Toronto Middle Income Countries (MICs) can use either official development finance or private markets when borrowing abroad. Each of these options provide different benefits and costs. How do MICs decide which option to prioritize? Why do MIC borrowing preferences vary? This study develops and tests a theory of partisan external borrowing preferences in MICs. Controlling for global and national economic conditions, right governments are more likely to use official financing while left governments are more likely to use private financing. The only time this is not the case is when there is an exceptionally large deficit, forcing the MIC to use creditors they would not otherwise. Fractioned regression and panel data models test the argument quantitatively, while four country case studies of Thailand, South Africa, Botswana, and Peru trace and illustrate the causal process. Explaining why borrowing preferences systematically vary across MICs has policy and theoretical implications with respect to debt sustainability, policy autonomy, and international financial relations in developing countries. Politically constrained borrowing also signals that transparency is essential for effective debt management in finance ministries. ii Acknowledgements This dissertation, and the PhD process overall, would never have been completed if not for the generosity and support of many people. My committee deserves sincere thanks for their time and support. Mark Manger was invaluable on professional and personal levels. His patience answering methodological questions allowed me to actually learn without fear of embarrassment. His willingness to work with me on other projects was an important confidence boost. His practical approach to everything, and his concern for me as a person outside of academia, made the final years of the PhD sensible and manageable. Lou Pauly was integral to connecting my simple curiosities to the field of political science. He stuck with me as I fumbled around figuring out what this project was. Antoinette Handley always found time to read everything and share precise comments despite increasingly- demanding roles during my time in Toronto. Her clarity of thought was essential to making this research coherent. Al Berry’s detailed comments, economic insights, and knowledge of Peru ensured I was asking the right questions and accounting for relevant factors from the outset. I learned from many others at U of T. Thanks to Seva Gunitsky, Gerry Helleiner, Matt Hoffmann, Sara Hughes, John Kirton, Wilson Prichard, Stefan Renckens, and Wendy Wong for either involving me with their work or discussing my work with me at various stages. Many visitors to U of T graciously took time to discuss and sharpen this research. Thank you to Vincent Arel-Bundock, Leo Baccini, Miles Kahler, and Layna Mosley for meeting with me while in Toronto. Thank you also to many fellow PhD travelers, especially Mike Gavin and Scott McKnight. I learned a lot from Mike and Scott was a real friend through all stages of the grind. A special thank you to Paul Cadario, whose enthusiastic support for students at U of T is unparalleled. Not only did he always involve me in his goings-on, but the fieldwork I did could not have taken place without his eagerness to share his vast network. Thank you to the School of Graduate Studies, the Munk School’s Richard Charles Lee Insights Through Asia program, and the Department of Political Science’s Michael W. Donnelly political economy fellowship for financial support for fieldwork. That fieldwork further depended on the time of many people in four countries on three continents in 2017. Thank you also to the many anonymous interviewees who took time for me and the support of academics from Thammasat University, University of Pretoria, University of Botswana, Universidad del Pacifico, and Universidad Católica del Perú. My deepest gratitude goes to my wife Ashley. Thank you for participating in this weird and uncertain journey, ensuring we always appreciate and enjoy the moment. You are the best. Thank you also to Christina, Lindsay, and the extended Koen clan for making Toronto a second home. Thank you to my friends, brother, and family for keeping me tied to New Hampshire, always letting me come home as if I never went anywhere. I dedicate this work to my parents, Mark and Betsy. Their love and belief are the only reasons that this whole endeavor, and everything that led to it, was possible. I could tell a linear story of my life to this point, but in reality it’s a chaotic story that only makes sense because of their support. Thank you. iii Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Literature Review Chapter 3: Theory and Quantitative Analysis Chapter 4: South Africa & Botswana Chapter 5: Peru Chapter 6: Thailand Chapter 7: Conclusion 1 – The Implications of Partisan Borrowing Chapter 8: Conclusion 2 – A Policy Recommendation for Effective Public Debt Management in Developing Countries Bibliography Appendices iv List of Tables, Figures, and Appendices Chapter 1 Table 1: Country Cases’ Annual New External Debt Commitments (% Official) 5 Chapter 2 Graph 1: Average External Borrowing: MICs vs LICs 14 Tables 1a & 1b: Annual Average Interest Rates and Maturities of New MIC Debt 18 Chapter 3 Table 1: Modeling the Partisan Effect on MIC External Borrowing 48 Figure 1: Adjusted Predictions of MIC Partisan External Borrowing 49 Figure 2: Adjusted Predictions: Center Governments Dropped 49 Chapter 4 Chart 1: South Africa and Botswana New External Debt Commitments (% Official of 54 Total New Debt) Chart 2: South Africa Central Government Primary Budget Position (%) 59 Chart 3: Botswana Central Government Primary Budget Position (%) 76 Chart 4: South Africa and Botswana Sovereign Credit Ratings 86 Chart 5: South Africa and Botswana Annual % Growth 87 Chart 6: South Africa and Botswana External Debt Stocks (% GNI) 87 Chapter 5 Chart 1: Peru Annual Commitments (% Official) by Partisanship 90 Chart 2: Peru Central Government Fiscal Balance and Expenditure Levels (% of GDP) 117 Table 1: Peru Sovereign Credit Ratings (year-end) 118 Table 2: Bond Data from MEF 119 Chapter 6 Chart 1: Thailand Annual Commitments by Governing Party Partisanship (% Official) 121 Chart 2: Thailand Central Government Fiscal Balance and Expenditure Levels 148 Table 1: Thailand Sovereign Credit Ratings 149 Appendices Appendix A: Table 1, Model 8 Country-Year List Appendix B: Main Models Variable Information (And Country Income Level Coding) Appendix C: Table 1, Model 8 Summary Statistics Appendix D: Robustness Checks of Main Model Appendix D1: Models of MIC External Borrowing With China Variables Appendix D2: LICs, no partisan effect Appendix F: Interview List v Chapter 1: Introduction External Borrowing Options and Politics Middle Income Country (MIC) governments have options when borrowing externally. They are poor enough to access official finance from multilateral and bilateral development institutions but also creditworthy enough to access private finance from bond markets and banks. These options provide different benefits and costs. Official finance comes with low interest rates and long maturities but include conditions. Private finance is condition-free but more expensive and shorter-term. MICs thus face a tradeoff between the price benefits of official creditors and the autonomy benefits of private creditors when borrowing abroad.1 How MICs navigate this tradeoff has implications for their development prospects, particularly because external borrowing decisions affect debt sustainability, fiscal space, state investment capacity, policy autonomy, and international financial relations. Why do MIC governments use different external creditors, taking on different benefits and costs when financing national budgets? Strict focus on national economic fundamentals, credit ratings, or global economic conditions cannot fully answer this question. Two brief country examples illustrate this. On one hand, high growth and a reputation for good governance have given Botswana some of the highest credit ratings among MICs from 1990-2015.2 Domestic officials and bankers confirm that markets show “all sorts of demand” for Botswana’s debt and that foreign investors “knock on our door all the time.”3 Yet Botswana resists these eager financiers. As one national official says, there are “stories about the benefits of issuing, 1 See Gurria and Volcker 2001; Fallon et al. 2001; Loser 2004; Griffith-Jones, Griffith-Jones, and Hertova 2008; Hostland 2009; World Bank 2012; World Bank 2017. 2 See Chapter 4, Chart 4. 3 Interviews 77 and 73, respectively. 1 [but we] just don’t buy it.”4 Despite significant market access, Botswana prefers official credit from development institutions when borrowing abroad. On the other hand, in the same period of time, neighboring South Africa came to have lower credit ratings due to inconsistent growth, troubling debt levels, and corrupt state-owned enterprises.5 Private finance was still available to South Africa but at higher interest rates and shortening maturities.6 Lower rates and longer maturities were available from official creditors,