Terwilliger, Zachary (ODAG)
From: Terwilliger, Zachary (ODAG) Sent: Monday, March 20, 2017 10:56 AM To: Tyson, Jill C. (OLA) Subject: FW: For White House review/clearance - DAG nominee Rod Rosenstein QFRs Attachments: Questions For the Record - Rod J. Rosenstein - MASTER DOC - CLEAN draft .... docx lmportanoe: High
Okay for me to send to Rod for final review?
Zach
From: Zadrozny, John A. EOP/WHO (b) (6) Sent: Monday, March 20, 201710:27 AM To: Terwilliger, Zachary (ODAG)
Zach:
FYI.
JZ w: (b) (6) c: (
From:Zadrozny, John A. EOP/WHO Sent: Monday, March 20, 201710:25 AM To: 'Tyson, Jill C.(OLA}'
Mashburn, John K. EOP/WHO Subject: RE: For White House review/clearance - DAG nominee Rod Rosenstein QFRs Importance: High
Jill:
See attached. I recommended some edits, (b) (5) (b) (5)
Let me know if any questions.
JZ w: (b) (6) c: (
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122 From: Tyson, Jill C. (OLA) (mailto:[email protected]) Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2017 4:35 PM To: Winfree, Paul L. EOP/WHO Zadrozny, John A. EOP/WHO
Cc: Ramer, Sam {OLA)
Paul, John:
Thanks again for your help clearing Rachel Brand's QFRs this weekend. Here is the next set, which I'm sure John Mashburn will send your way momentarily. I just wanted to thank you in advance for your help clearing these and apologize forthe very short deadline.
Feel free to reach out ifyou have any questions. Sincerely, -JCT
Cc: Sam Ramer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLA
From: Tyson, Jill C. (OlA) Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2017 4:28 PM To: Mashburn, John K. EOP/WHO (b) (6) Cc: Tyson, Jill C.(OLA)
John:
Please find attached draft responses to Questions for the Record posed to DeputyAttorney General nominee Rod Rosenstein following his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Committee advises that Mr. Rosenstein's responses must be submitted by tomorrow evening (Monday 3/20) so that he can be placed on the Committee' s 3/27Business Meeting agenda (to hopefully be voted out of Committee on 4/3). In order to allow time to address any comments we receive from the White House, we respectfullyrequest your comments by mid- day tomorrow. Sorry forthe short deadline and thanks for all of your help clearing our QFRs.
Feel free to call my cell ifyou have any questions. Thanks again, -JCT
Jill C. Tyson Deputy Assistant Attorney General Office of Legislative Affairs U.S. Department of Justice ,(b) (6) direct
I cell [email protected]
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122 Nomination of Rod J. Rosenstein to be Deputy Attorney General Questions for the Record Submitted March 14,2017
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN
1. Russian Interference with Elections
At your confirmation hearing, I asked you about the community’sU.S. intelligence assessment that Vladimir Putin ordered Russian a influence campaign designed to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. Duringyour hearing, you committed reading ort this “Assessing rep (titled Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections and released 2017. on January6,
a. Do you believe Russia interfered in our election? (b) (5)
b. If not,why not?
(b) (5)
c. Prior to your hearing,did anyone suggest or advise you not to read the public, unclassified report? If so,who gave you that suggestion or advice,and why? (b) (5)
2. Non-Responsive Record Non-Responsive Record
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Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122-000001 Nomination of Rod J. Rosenstein to be Deputy Attorney General Questions for the Record Submitted March 14,2017
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LEAHY Non-Responsive Record 1.
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1 https://www.bna.com/trump enforcement foreign n73014449002/ 2 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/13/donald trumps worst deal
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122-000001 Non-Responsive Record
5. At your hearing, you committed to finally reading the Intelligence Community’s joint assessment on Russian interference in the residential2016 p election.5 I was surp rised that you had not read this assessment, which ublicly has beenavailable p since January. During Attorney General Sessions’ confirmation hearing, he too iedtestif that he had not read the Intelligence Community’s publicly available report, but in his first writtenonses resp he stated: “I have no reason not to accept the intelligence community’s conclusion(s) as contained in the report.”6 Since then, Attorney General Sessions has consistently refused to unequivocally denounce Russia’s confirmed meddling in our electoral process. For instance, when recently pressed on whether the Trump camp aign believed Russia favored candidate Trump over others, Attorney General Sessions said, “I have never been told that.”7 And when ressedp if he thought Russia favored candidate, TrumpAttorney General Sessions responded, “I don’t have any idea,” and he then refused to comment on existing If evidence. confirmed, you would be working directly under an Attorney General p who does not a pear to take evidence of threats from Russia as a serious threat to our national security.
a. Since your hearing,have you read the Intelligence Community’s joint assessment on Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election? If you have not read the report,was it so that you could avoid directly answering questions about it during the confirmation process? (b) (5)
b. Do you accept the Intelligence Community’s findings as contained in that assessment? (b) (5)
c. If confirmed,do you commit to seriously investigating interference in U.S. elections from Russia or any other foreign government? (b) (5)
5 https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ICA 2017 01.pdf 6 https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/sessions-responses-to-leahy-questions-for-the-record-01-10-17 7 http://www.foxnews.com/on air/tucker carlson tonight/index html#/v/5346017322001
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122-000001 Nomination of Rod J. Rosenstein to be Deputy Attorney General Questions for the Record Submitted March 14,2017
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR DURBIN
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2. Non-Responsive Record
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Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122-000001 Non-Responsive Record
3. OnJanuary6, the Intelligence Communityissuedits assessmenttitled“Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent Elections.” U.S.
a. Have you now read either the classified or unclassified version of the assessment?
(b) (5)
b. Doyouacceptthe“KeyJudgments”presentedinthe assessment?
(b) (5)
c. DoyouaccepttheIntelligenceCommunity’sjudgmentthatRussiainterfered w ith our election?
(b) (5)
d. Do you know if Attorney General Sessions has read the assessment yet?
(b) (5)
4. Non-Responsive Record
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Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122-000001 Nomination of Rod J. Rosenstein to be Deputy Attorney General Questions for the Record Submitted March 14,2017
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR COONS
1. Non-Responsive Record Non-Responsive Record
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3. Non-Responsive Record
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Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122-000001 Non-Responsive Record
6. If confirmed,will you ensure that all investigations into Russian interference with the presidential election and the Trump administration are completed in a thorough and independent fashion?
(b) (5) .
7. If confirmed,how will you ensure that there is not political interference with the intelligenceagenciesandU.S.Attorneys’offices,w ithregard to anyinvestigation into Russian interference with the presidential election and the Trump administration or any other issue?
(b) (5) l
8. During his confirmation hearing, Attorney General Sessions stated that he did not have communications with the Russians, even though he had met with the Russian Ambassador on at least aratetwo sep occasions.
a. Do you agree with Attorney Sessions’ General decision to recuse himself from any current or future inquiry into the Trump campaign and administration’sinteractionw ith the Russian government?
(b) (5)
b. How will you ensure,to the best of your ability,that the Attorney General honors his recusal commitment and is not involved in investigations concerning the Trump campaign administration’s and interaction with the Russian government?
(b) (5)
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122-000001 (b) (5)
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Document ID: 0.7.24125.7122-000001 Tyson, Jill C. (OLA)
From: Tyson, Jill C. (OLA) Sent: Friday, March 24, 2017 1:12 AM To: Terwilliger, Zachary (ODAG) Cc: Ramer, Sam {OLA); Tyson, Jill C. (OLA) Subject: RE: 3-7-17 Nominations Hearing - Written Follow-up Questions (Rosenstein) Attachments: QFRs 2- Leahy- draft OLA responses 3.23.2017.docx
Zach:
Apologies for the late delivery of the attached draft answers. You will see a few comments embedded -D (b) (5)
Can you please edit asyou see fit then clear with Rod asap Friday (3/24}? I'd like to send Rod's preferred responsestothe WH by early afternoon with the goal of submitting responses to the Hill by COB Friday or Saturday atthe latest given the 3/27 markup. Please let me know if you need anything else.
Thanks, -JCT
From: Tyson, Jill C. {OLA) Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2017 5:37 PM To: Terwilliger, Zachary (ODAG) Subject: FW: 3-7-17 Nominations Hearing- Written Follow-up Questions (Rosenstein)
Zach -
Please see attached additional QFRs to Rod from Leahy. (b) (5) Lauren will work up draft responses tonight(b)(5) --. We'll get you drafts latertonight. (b)(5) transmittingthe QFRs backto the Hill tomorrow night or this weekend ( in advance of Monday's markup}. Thanks.
-JCT
(b) (6) From: Covey, Jason (Judiciary-Rep) Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2017 5:18 PM To· Kinan rnl::a a (ill D\ < I nl::a a l(inanl@1Krlni am1>· T,:,n..villia,:,r 7::ar-h::arv fl 1,aV Al=\
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7138 •-· ...... 0-1 ...__ ...... , ...... , ...... - ...... -...... ,n-,---.....-1·0-· --- , ...... •· ····o ...... , -...... , 1 ,--..-. • ..-...... ,
Attached please find follow-up questions submitted to the Honorable Rod J_ Rosenstein from Senator Leahy.
Thank you.
Jason A Covey Hearing Oerk I Senate Judiciary Committee http: / /judiciarv.senate.gov
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7138 Follow-UpQuestionsfortheRecordforSenatorPatrick Leahy, SenateJudiciaryCommittee, Hearing on theNominationofRodJ.Rosenstein to ServeasDeputyAttorneyGeneraloftheUnited States March23,2017
1. Iasked youinwritingwhyitwasproper forElliotRichardsontocommittoappointing an independentprosecutor forWatergatewhen his nominationwaspendingbeforethis Committee, butnotforyoutomakeasimilarcommitmentregardingRussianinterferencein ourelectionand possiblecollusion withtheT rumpcampaign. Youreplied, “Richardson’s decision to appointa specialcounselwasappropriategiventhefacts andcircumstances knownto him inMay1973. hosefacts T andcircumstances are includedinhistoriesofthe Watergateera. hefactsT and circumstancesknown tomeinMarch2017 arequite different.”
Thisweek we learned additionalfacts. OnMarch20,2017, atapublichearingheldbythe HousePermanentSelect Committeeon Intelligence, FBIDirectorJamesComey “confirm[ed] thattheFBI,aspartofourcounterintelligencemission,is investigating,theRussian government’s efforts tointerfereinthe2016presidentialelection. Andthatincludes investigatingthenature ofanylinksbetweenindividualsassociated withtheT rump campaign and theRussiangovernment,andwhethertherewasanycoordinationbetween thecampaign and Russia’s efforts. Aswith anycounterintelligenceinvestigation,this willalsoincludean assessmentofwhetheranycrimeswerecommitted. ”1
Toensurethattheinvestigation isinsulatedasmuch aspossiblefrom anyoutsideinfluences, this publicannouncementreaffirmstheneedforaSpecialCounselwho,unlike you,orthe FBI director,doesnotreportto theAttorneyGeneral, whowasforcedtorecusehimselffrom this investigation,andcannot befiredbythePresident. Inmyview, severalextraordinary circumstancesarepresent, includinganinescapableappearanceofaconflictofinterest.
a. Inlightofthesenewlypublicfacts,doyoustillbelievethatitwouldbepremature to committoappointinganindependentSpecialCounsel 2 toinvestigatethe Russian connectiontotheTrumpcampaign?
(b) (5)
b. NowthattheFBIhaspubliclyconfirmedacounterintelligenceinvestigationinto RussianinterferenceandpossiblecollusionwiththeTrumpcampaign,willyou committoappointingaSpecialCounseltoensureafullyimpartialinvestigation that isprotectedfrompoliticalmeddling?
(b) (5)
]
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7138-000001 (b) (5)
I
f
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Document ID: 0.7.24125.7138-000001 Gauhar, Tashina (ODAG)
From: Gauhar, Tashina (OOAG} Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2017 10:18 PM To: Crowell, James {OOAG) Subject: FW: Letter from House Intelligence Committee Attachments: Carlin 9 May 2017.pdf; ATT00001.htm
FYI - HPSCI sent a letter t o John Carlin.
From: (b)(6) per NSD Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2017 5:35 PM
auhar, Tashina (ODAG)
FYSA.
From: Carlin, John P. [mailto:[email protected]] Se .rfil't'ir.lW!!!,!lp To:
Per my voicemail, for discussion tomorrow on coordination with Department ofJustice. I am retaining Wainstein.
John P. carlin Partner Global Chair, Risk and Crisis Management Morrison &Foerster LLP 212-336-8600 [email protected] Sent from my iPhone
Begin forwarded message:
From: "Patel, Kash" •(b)(6) Date: May 9, 2017 at 1:41:04 PM PDT To: "[email protected]"
- External Emafl -
Mr. Carlin,
Please see the attached letterfrom the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regarding our ongoing investigation into the 2016 U.S. election. Thanks for your time.
Document ID: 0.7.24125.6089 Regards,
Kashyap P. Patel Senior Counsel for Counterterrorism House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Desk: 202-226·•• Cell: 202-360- • •
1bis mes.sage may be confidential and privileged. use or disclosure by anyone other than an intended addressee is prohibited. Ifyou received this message in error, please delete it and advise the sender by reply email.
Document ID: 0.7.24125.6089 Devin Nunes, California, CHAIRMAN K. Michael Conaway. Texas UNCLASSIFIED//COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Peter T. King, New York Frank A. LoBiondo, New Jersey Thomas J. Rooney, Florida HVC-304, THE CAPITOL Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida Michael R. Turner, Ohio U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASHINGTON, DC 20515 Brad R. Wenstrup, Ohio (202) 225-4121 Chris Stewart, Utah PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE Rick Crawford, Arkansas DAMON NELSON Trev Gowdy, South Carolina STAFF DIRECTOR Elise M. Stefanik, New York ON INTELLIGENCE Will Hurd, Texas MICHAEL BAHAR Adam B. Schiff, California. MINORITY STAFF D1RECTOR RANKING MEMBER
James A. Himes, Connecticut Terri A. Sewell, Alabama Andre Carson, Indiana Jackie Speier, California Mike Quigley, Illinois Eric Swalwell, California Joaquin Castro, Texas Denny Heck, Washington
Paul D. Ryan. SPEAKER OF THE House May 9, 2017 Nancy Pelosi, DEMOCRATIC LEADER
VIA CERTIFIED U.S. MAIL
Mr. John Carlin Morrison & Foerster L.L.P. 250 West 55th Street New York, New York 10019-9601 + 1 212-336-8600 jcarlin(a),mofo.com
Dear Mr. Carlin:
As part of its bipartisan investigation into Russian active measures directed at the 2016 U.S. election, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requests that you produce certain documents and other materials to the Committee and participate in a voluntary, transcribed interview at the Committee's offices.
First we respectfully ask that you produce to the Committee, by no later than the close of business on May 22, the following:
Any documents, records, electronically stored information including e-mail, communication, recordings, data and tangible things (including, but not limited to, graphs, charts, photographs, images and other documents) regardless of form, other than those widely available (e.g., newspaper articles) that reasonably could lead to the discovery of any facts within the investigation's publicly-announced parameters.
In complying with this request, we ask that you furnish to the Committee, in unredacted form, any and all responsive material in your actual or constructive possession, custody, or control or otherwise available to you, including responsive material possessed by any third party to be transferred to your possession and shared with the Committee. This request is also made on an ongoing basis: if after making an initial production to the Committee you find additional responsive material, you should produce that material to the Committee.
To the extent not encompassed by the above request, this letter also requests preservation of all documents, records, electronically stored information, recordings, data and tangible things (including, but not limited to, graphs, charts, photographs, images and other documents)
Document ID: 0.7.24125.6089-000002 UNCLASSIFIED//COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
regardless of form, other than those widely available (e.g., newspaper articles), related to the Committee's investigation, your interview, and any ancillary matters. ·
Should it become necessarv to do so, the Committee may supplement the document request contained in this letter at any time.
Committee staff will work with you to arrange your interview, at a time and date subsequent to your production of documents to the Committee. The interview may cover any topic within the publicly-announced parameters of the Committee's investigation, including Russian cyber activities directed against the 20 I 6 U.S. election, potential links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns, the U.S. government's response to these Russian active measures, and related leaks of classified info rmation.
Should you have any questions at any time, please contact Committee staff at (202) 225-41 2 1. If you are represented by an attorney, please forward this letter to your attorney, and have him or her contact the Committee on your behalf.
Sincerely,
Adam Schiff Member of Congress Ranking Member
Attachment: Parameters fo r Russia Investigation
2
Document ID: 0.7.24125.6089-000002 Intelligence Committee Chairman, Ranking Member Establish Parameters for Russia Investigation Washington, March 1, 2017
Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff have approved the Scope of Investigation for the inquiry by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into the Russian active measures campaign targeting the 2016 U.S. election. While the detailed, six-page scoping document remains classified, the investigation will seek to answer the following questions:
• What Russian cyber activity and other active measures were directed against the United States and its allies?
• Did the Russian active measures include links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns or any other U.S. Persons?
• What was the U.S. Government's response to these Russian active measures and what do we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future?
• What possible leaks of classified information took place related to the Intelligence Community Assessment of these matters?
To answer these questions, the Committee will seek access to and custody of all relevant information, including law enforcement and counterintelligence information, consistent with the Committee's oversight jurisdiction and investigative responsibilities. The Committee's inquiry will not, however, impede any ongoing investigation.
The Committee will also conduct interviews, take witness testimony, and review all reporting underlying the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) "Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections." The inquiry will seek to ensure that the ICA comported with all relevant Intelligence Community analytic standards, and that allegations of Russian collusion with any U.S. Persons and the leaks of classified information are fully investigated. While the Committee has access to the reporting underlying the ICA, the Scope of Investigation reiterates the need to expand access to those documents and to ensure they are delivered to and stored at the Committee. It also sets forth the expectation that the Intelligence Community provide any other relevant intelligence to the Committee.
Chairman Nunes said, "The Intelligence Committee has been investigating Russia for years and warning about the Putin regime's hostile international actions, its aggression in cyberspace, and its influential international propaganda campaigns. The committee is determined to continue and expand its inquiries into these areas, including Russian activities related to the 2016 U.S. elections. On a bipartisan basis, we will fully investigate all the evidence we collect and follow that evidence wherever it leads."
Ranking Member Schiff stated, "The House Intelligence Committee must conduct a bipartisan hwestigation into Russia's interference in our election. We must follow the facts wherever they may lead, leaving no stone unturned, and that must also include both the Russian hacking and dumping of documents as well as any potential collusion between Russia and U.S. citizens. This investigation is a national security necessity and anything less than a full accounting of all the facts will be insufficient to protect the country and meet the expectations of the American people."
Document ID: 0.7.24125.6089-000002 Schools, Scott (ODAG}
From: Schools, Scott (ODAG) Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 20171:26 PM To: Ramer, Sam (OLA) Subject: FW: John Carlin Attachments: Carlin 9 May 2017.pdf
FYI. I am going to speak with Ken at 5 pm today to discuss process with him. What is the process he should follow?
From: Wainstein, Ken [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, May 19, 201710:17 AM To: Schools, Scott (ODAG)
Scott, I hope you're doing well. John Carlin {cced here} received the attached letter from HPSCI rer estilj 1 documents and an interview. John has asked me to represent him in this process. He called ,:Mt'@• §'1 1 at NSD to find out the Dept's position on the request and to inquire about representation. · · ·· •suggested we reach out to you. Would you please let me know when you have a couple minutes for a call. Thanks very much. Ken
Kenneth L Wainstein Partner Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP 700 Sixth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Tel: +1 202.862.2474 Fax: +1 202.862.2400 [email protected] www.cadwalader.com
NOTE: The information in this email is confidential and may be legally privileged. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, you must not read, use or disseminate the information; please advise the sender immediately by reply email and delete this mess.age and any attachments without retaining a copy. Although this email and any attachments are believed to be_free ofany vims or other defect that may affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility ofthe recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is acceptedby Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use.
Document ID: 0.7.24125.6815 Bumatay, Patrick (ODAG)
From: Bumatay, Patrick (ODAG) Sent: Friday, May 12, 2017 12:51 PM To: Terwilliger, Zachary (ODAG) Subject: FW: Urgent: 2017-05-12 CEG OF to DOJ FBI (Briefings) Attachments: 2017-05-12 CEG OF to DOJ FBI (Briefings).pdf lmportanoe: High
Are you receiving t hese?
From: Burton, Faith (OLA) Sent: Friday, May 12, 201712:13 PM To: McKay, Shirley A (OLA)
Please log in and assign to NSD and FBI; I will acknowledge receipL Thanks. FB
From: Davis, Patrick (Judiciary-Rep} (b) (6) Sent: Friday, May 12, 201711:47 AM To:(b )(6), (b )(7)(C) per FBI Ramer, Sam (OLA)
Greg and Sam,
Attached is a letter from Chairman Grassley and Ranking Member Feinstein to Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Acting Director McCabe. Please confirm receipt, and please send all formal follow-up correspondence electronically in PDF format to (b) (6) (b) (6) . ndme.
The letter istime-sensitive and requests a response call by the of the day. Also, to clarify, Chairman Grassley and Ranking Member Feinstein are not asking for this to be a Gang of Eight Briefing.
Thanks, -Patrick
D::itri rk O O::ivi<;
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7193 Investigative Counsel Chairman Charles E. Grassley U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (202) 224-0:mlJ
Document ID: 0.7.24125.7193 CHARl£S E. GRASSLEY, i Kov.H L 0Av.i~. ~fCOil,._, 11nd StaffOiroetor JENN1~ 0uat,. Dtnnot:~rfc SrDff Oir'1QOt May 12, 2017 VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION The Honorable Rod J. Rosenstein The Honorable Andrew McCabe Deputy Attorney General Acting Director U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau oflnvestigation 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 Washington, D.C. 20535 Dear Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Acting Director McCabe: On Wednesday, May 3, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing titled, Oversight ofthe Federal Bureau ofInvestigation. At the hearing, there were several matters discussed that require follow-up briefings for the Committee that the former Director committed the Bureau to providing. In addition, on March 15, 2017, both of us received a briefing from former FBI Director Corney about the FBI's investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 election. We request that Mr. Rosenstein and/or Mr. McCabe, along with others who have firsthand knowledge of that briefing, provide a similar briefing to the rest of the Committee. Reportedly, the Select Committee on Intelligence received a briefing from Mr. Rosenstein on this yesterday. As the oversight committee of the FBI, it is important that the members of this Committee receive the same information. Please contact Patrick Davis of Chairman Grassley's Committee staff at (202) 224-5225 and Heather Savvyer of Ranking Member Feinstein's staff at (202) 224-7703 by 5:00 p.m. today to schedule the briefings. Thank you for your immediate attention to these important matters. Sincerely, Charles E. Grassley anne Feinstein Chairman Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary Committee on the Judiciary Document ID: 0.7.24125.7193-000001 Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA) From: Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA} Sent: Friday, May 12, 2017 6:36 PM To: Gauhar, Tashina (ODAG} Cc: Ramer, Sam (OLA); May, M. Benjamin (OLA); Cruikshank, Andrew A. (OLA) Subject: Final Transcript, Threats Hearing/SSC!, May 11, 2017 Attachments: Senate Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on World Wide Threats.Transcript.docx Tash/NSD: Attached please find the final transcript from yesterday's Annual Threats Hearing before SSCI {Open Hearing). Thank you, -Joanne Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101 SenateSelectIntelligenceCommitteeHoldsHearingonWorldWideThreats,May11,2017 BURR: I'dliketocall thehearingtoorder. I'dliketowelcomeour witnessestoday, directorofNationalIntelligence,Dan oats. C Dan,it'sgoodto seeour formercolleaguehere. DirectoroftheC entralIntelligenceAgency,MikePompeo, good to see you Mike. DirectorofDefenseIntelligence, GeneralVinceStewart;directorofNationalSecurityAgency, AdmiralMikeRogers;directorofGeospatial-IntelligenceAgencyRobertC ardilloand actingdirectorof theFederalBureauofInvestigation, AndrewMcC abe. Ithankall ofyou forbeingherethismorning, especiallytoyou DirectorMcCabeforfillingin on such shortnotice. Since1995 thiscommitteeismetin an open forum tohearaboutanddiscussthesecuritythreatsfacing theUnitedStatesofAmerica. Iunderstand thatmanypeopletunedin todayarehopeful we'llfocus solelyon theRussian investigationoftheirinvolvementin ourelections. Letmedisappointeverybody upfront. WhilethecommitteecertainlyviewsRussian intervention in ourelectionsasasignificantthreat, the purposeoftoday'shearingistoreviewandhighlighttheextent--totheextentpossible, therangesof threatsthatwefaceasanation. Thenational securitythreatpicturehasevolved significantlysince1995. Whatusedtobeacollection ofmostlyphysicaland statebasednational securityconcernshasbeen replacedbysomethingaltogetherdifferent. Today, ourtraditionalfocuson countrieslikeNorthKorea,Russia andIran iscomplicatedbynew challengeslikestrategicthreatsposedbynon-stateactorsin thecyberarena and thedangerof transnationalterroristswho can usetheInternettoinspireviolenceandfearin thehomeland, all withoutleavingtheirsafehavensintheMiddleEast. Whatisnotchanged, however, isthetirelessdedication andpatriotism ofthewomen and men who make uptheUnitedStatesintelligencecommunity. Theverypeoplerepresentedout(ph)witnessesthis morning. OneofthemanyreasonsIfind somany--somuch valueinthishearingisthatitprovidesthe Americanpublicwith someinsightintothethreatsfacingourcountry, butitalsoletspeopleknow what'sbeingdoneon theirbehalftoreducethosethreats. Iencourageall thewitnessestodaytonotonlyaddressthethreatstoournation,butthetalkabout whattheirorganizationsaredoingtohelpsecurethiscountrytothedegreetheycan in an unclassified setting. DirectorC oats, yourwritten statementfortherecord representsthecollectiveinsightofthe entireintelligencecommunity. Itisalengthyanddetailed accountofwhatthiscountryisfacing. Itisalsoevidenceofwhythesubstantial resourcesandinvestmentsthiscommitteeauthorizesarein factnecessary. From thehuman tragedyoftherefugeecrisisin theMiddleEasttotheriskthat territorial ambitionswill setoffa regional conflictintheSouthC hina Sea, it's complicated a and challengingworld. 1 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 DirectorPompeo, theKorean Peninsula isapointofparticularconcern tomeand tomanyon this committee. I'dlikeyourinsightsintowhatisbehindNorthKorea'sunprecedentedlevel ofnuclearand missiletestingandhowclosetheyareholdingtheU.S. mainland atriskofa nuclearattack. I'd alsovalue yoursenseofhowTuesday'selectionsofa newpresidentin SouthKorea isgoingtoimpactthingsforus on thatpeninsula. GeneralStewart, I'm sureyou'reawareofthereinvigoratedpolicydiscussionsonAfghanistan. Whilewe all respectthatyou can'tofferyourown recommendationson whatthatpolicyshouldbe, Iwould very muchvalueyourassessmentsofthesituation in Afghanistan today;includingthestateofgovernancein Kabul, thesustainabilityandproficiencyoftheAfghan national securityforcesand whetherTaliban reconciliation isarealisticobjective. IftheU.S. isrampingupin Afghanistan, knowtheI.Cweneed to .'s viewson whatwe'regettinginto. Ialsohopeyou'll shareyourassessmentsofthebattlefieldin Iraq andin Syria with usthismorning. Your insightsintoconditionson theground, includingongoingoperationstodislodgeISISforMosul and sustainabilityoftheMosuldam wouldbeofgreatvaluetothemembersofthiscommitteeand tothe public. AndRogers, Imadeacouplereferencestocyberalreadyand that'sforgood reason. Ofthemanydifficultchallengeswe'regoingto discussthismorning, nothingworriesmemorethan the threatofwellplanned,well executedwidescaleattackon thecomputernetworksand systemsthat make America work. From bankingandhealthcaretomilitaryand criticalinfrastructure. the functionalityofourmodern societyisdependenton computers. When thefirstlineoftheDNI's statementreads,andIquote, "Nearlyallinformation,communicationsnetworksand systemswillbeat riskforyears," unquote, thatalarmsme. AdmiralRogers, Ilookforward tohearingfrom thislineofassessments.you on DirectorC ardillo, ashead oftheNGAyou sitin the--atthenexusofinnovation in data collection and analysis. Given the complexityoftheintelligencequestionstheI.Cisbeingconfrontedwith . and theglobal natureofour - - ournational securitythreatstothiscountry--thatthiscountryfaces, expectationsofNGAarehigh. WeknowtheI.Ccan'tbeeverywhereatonce, . butthat'sstillkind ofwhatwelooktotheNGAtodo. I'd appreciateyoursenseofwhatNGAanalyticstrengthsaretodayand whattheroleofcommercial imageryisin NGA'sfuture. DirectorMcC abe, welcometo thetableandintothefray. Totheextentpossible, Ihopeyou'lldiscuss thebureau'sassessmentsoftheterroristthreatwithin ourborders. Youragentsareoften ourlastlineof defensehereathomeand, Iwill say, continuetodooutstandingwork. We'refortunatetohavesix peoplewith theexperienceand thededication thatwehavetoday. I'll closethere, butI'dliketohighlightformycolleagues; thecommitteewillbeholdingaclassified hearingon worldwidethreatsthisafternoon at1:30. IwilldoeverythingI cantomakesurethatthe questionsthatyou askin thisopen session areappropriate tothevenuethatwe'rein. Iwould askyouto thinkaboutthatlongandhard and, ifthere'saquestion, to --tomovetoastaffertoaskhim whether thisistheappropriatearea. BURR: 2 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Andifyou --asourwitnesses, feel thatthere'ssomethingthatyou can'tsufficientlyanswerin aopen settingthatyou willpauselongenoughtogetmyattention and --andI'll --we'll trytomakesurethat wemoved totheappropriatesetting. With that, Iturned thevicechairman foranycommentshemightmake. WARNER: Well thankyou,Mr. Chairman and thankyou foryourleadershipon thiscommittee andI alsowantto join in welcomingthewitnesses. It'sgood toseeyou all. Butitisimpossibletoignorethatoneofthe leadersoftheintelligencecommunityisnotherewith ustoday. ThepresidentsfiringofFBIDirectorC omeyTuesdaynight was ashockingdevelopment. Thetimingof DirectorC omey'sdismissal, tomeand tomanymemberson thiscommittee, on both sidesoftheisle, is especiallytroubling. Hewasleadingan activecounterintelligenceinvestigation intoanylinksbetween theTrumpcampaign and theRussian governmentoritsrepresentatives. And whetherwasany coordination between thecampaign andRussia'seffortstointerferein ourelection. Formanypeople, includingmyself, It'shard toavoidtheconclusion thatthepresident'sdecision to removeDirectorC omey wasrelated tothisinvestigation and thatthat- - thatistrulyunacceptable. We werescheduledtohear-- heardirectlyfrom directorC omeytodayin opensession. Weand the Americanpeopleweresupposed tohearstraightfrom theindividual responsiblefortheFBI investigation. Weanticipated askingdirectorComey, aseriesofquestionsabouthisactionsand the actionstheFBIin termsoflookingintowhichTrumpAssociates,ifany, and someoftheiractionsduringthecampaign asit relatestheRussians. However,PresidentTrump'sactionsthisweekcostusan opportunitytogetthe truth, atleastfortoday. You maywonderalittlebit, howseriously--IknowtheWhiteHousecontinuestodismissthis investigation. I'llpointsimplyfortherecord, thefrontpageoftheNewYorkTimes, whichshowsa pictureofclearlyaadministration thatdoesn'ttakethisinvestigationtooseriously. Itisimportantto restatethecriticalimportanceofprotectingtheindependenceandintegrityoffederallawenforcement. Thisiscentral tomaintainingtheconfidenceoftheAmericanpeoplein principlethatallAmericans, no matterhowpowerful oraccountablebeforethelaw. Thepresident'sactionshavethepotential to underminethatconfidence. And thatshouldbedeeplyconcerningnomatterwhichpoliticalpartyyou belongto. Thisweek'sremarkabledevelopmentsmakeourcommitteesinvestigation intoRussia'sinfluenceon the 2016U.S. presidential election even more important. And whileitiscleartomenowmorethan ever thatan independent, special counsel mustbe--mustbeappointed.Makenomistake,ourcommittee willgettothebottom ofwhathappenedduringthe2016presidential election andagain, Iwantto complimenttheChairman on hisworkin theseparate. Wewill notbedeterredfrom gettingtothetruth. Theseactionswilldonothingtoundermineour resolvetofollowtheevidencewhereveritleads. Wehopeto speaktoMr. C omeyand we'll speakto anyoneand everyonethathad somethingtoofferusin thisinvestigation andMr.abe, didn'tMcC 3 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 necessarilyexpecttoseeyou heretoday. Wedon'tknowhowlongyou'llbeactingFBIdirector, butwhy --we'll adhere towhattheC hairman hasindicatedin termsofthelineofquestioning. Iwill wanttomakesuremyfirstquestion foryou, even in thispublicsettingfor--willbeforyou to assurethecommitteethatifyoucomeunderanypoliticalinfluence from theWhiteHouseorothersto squash thisinvestigation orimpededitin anyway, thatyou'llletthecommitteeknow. Thisinvestigationshadit'supsanddowns,and again some, includingmyselfsometimesbeen frustrated with thepace. Wewill nodoubtfaceotherchallengesin thefuture. Butupsanddownsandbumps sometimesisbipartisanshipworks. It'saconstantstrugglebutoneworthmakingandI'm proudofthe waymembersofthiscommittee,from both sidesoftheaisle,haveconducted themselvesin oneofthe mostchallengingpolitical environmentswe'veeverseen. Atthesame time, Chairman BurrandIhaveputthisinvestigation on whatwebelievetobea solid bipartisan footingwith asharedgoal ofgettingthetruth. In spiteoftheeventsofthelast24hoursI intend tomaintain ourcommittee'sfocuson theinvestigation. Indeed, therecentactionsonlyincrease theburden ofresponsibilityon all ofustoensurethatweliveuptothischallengeand touncoverthe truth whereverthatleads. Thereis,obviously, consensusagreementamongtheU.S. intelligencecommunitythatRussian massively intervened with activemeasuresin the2016presidential elections,nordoIimaginethatanymemberof thiscommitteewassurprised toseetheexactsameRussian playbookjustbeingrun duringtheFrench electionsthatjusttookplacelastweekend. And one no shouldforgetbackin mid-2015DirectorC oats and --we--Ihad someofthefolksin from theGerman servicesrecently--thattherewashackinginto German'sBundestag. It'sfairtosaythatGermansshould anticipateseeingmorecyberattackdirected againsttheirelected officialswith theirupcomingnational electionsin September. In short, Russia'sdirectinterferencein democraticprocessesaround theglobeisadirectassaultthatwemustworkon togetheranditisclearly oneofthetopworldwidethreats. Thatbeingsaidgentlemen;I wanttostart, again, bythankingyou foryourservicetothenation. Iwant toparticularlynote thatDirectorC oats,whoistestifyingbeforethiscommitteein thefirsttimesincehis confirmation. Dan, Iknowthatyou andMarshawerereadyforretirementandI thinkyou bothforbeingwillingto serveyourcountryonemoretime. Ialsowanttorecognizethemen andwomenwhoyourepresent heretoday. Thesethousandsofdedicatedintelligenceprofessionalstoilminshadows, puttheirliveson thelineand makesacrificesmostofuswill neverknowin ordertokeepourcountrysafe. Ialsowanttomakethem --IwanttomakesuretheyknowthatI appreciatetheireffortsand am proud torepresentthem notonlyas thevicechairoftheIntelligenceC ommittee, butasa Senatorfrom Virginia wheresomanyofthoseintelligenceprofessionalslive. Thiscommittee'sannualWorldwide Threathearingisan importantopportunitytoreviewthethreatsand challengeswefaceasanation. Obviously, thesethreatscontinuetomultiple. Astheworldbecomesmorecomplexand challenging goodintelligencegivesourpolicymakersand nationalleadersaheadsupon thechallengestheyneed toaddress. Theintelligencecommunity,in manyways,isournation'searlywarningsystem. 4 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 However, afirealarm onlyworksifyou payattentiontoit. You cannotignoreitsimplybecauseyou do notlikewhatit'stellingyou. Similarly, weneed tomakesurethatall ourpolicymakerspayattention to thewarningsprovidedbyyou theindependent, nonpartisan intelligenceprofessionals. Sincetheworld'ssecond --SecondWorldWarAmerica hasrelied,asweallknow, on aglobal systemsof alliances, institutionsand normstoensureourstabilityandprosperity. Todaymanychallengesthreaten thatsystem. Thatsystem thathasbeen builtupoverthelast70years. hairman Mr. Cmentioned countrieslikeC hina andRussia arechallengingmanyofthe--theglobalinstitutions. Theyare, in many cases, seekingtoundercutanddelegitimizethem. Wemustworktogethertostand vigilantagainstthatthreat. Similarly, rogue statessuch asNorthKorea havesoughttoundercuttheglobal non-proliferation regime. ObviouslyNorthKorea isoneofthemost pressingissuesourcountryfaces. And, AdmiralRogers,as theC hairman mentioned,weall shareenormousconcern aboutboth theupside anddown sideofnewtechnologiesand theasymmetrical threatsthatareposedbycyberand other technologyactors. AndI would add aswell ardillo,--DirectorC Ithinkwe'vediscussed aswell our dominancein termsofoverheadin manywaysisthethreataswellfrom theemergingnations. Terroristgroupsand extremistsarealsoabletoaccessalotofthesenewtechnologies. And,whileISISin particularcontinuestosufferlossesin Syria, IraqandLibya, unfortunatelyitcontinuestospreadits hatefulideologythrough socialmediaand encrypted communications. WARNER: Gentlemen, I'veonlylightlytouched on afewofthechallengesweface. Ilookforward to thediscussion we'reabouttohave.But, again, Ithankyou forbeinghereandlookforwardtothishearing. Thankyou, Mr. hairman. C BURR: Ithankthevicechairman. Formember'spurposes, wehaveavotescheduled on thefloorat11o'clock. It'stheintentofthechair and vicechairthatwewill rotatethegavel sothatthehearingcontinuesthrough. Memberswillbe recognizedbyseniorityforfiveminutes.Whenweconcludetheopen session, hopefullyin --with enoughgapforourwitnessestohavesomelunch,wewill reconveneat1:30. Theafternoon vote, tomyknowledge, isnotsetyet, butwewill workaround that. Soplan tobebackat theSC IFby1:30forthathearingtostart. With that, DirectorC oats, thefloorisyours. COATS: Chairman Burr, ViceC hairman Warner, membersofthecommittee; thankyou fortheopportunityto appearbeforeyou today. 5 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 I'm herewithmycolleaguesfrom across theI.Ccommunity. . AndI'm sureIspeakformycolleagueMike Pompeo, new directoroftheC IA, thatthetwoofus, new tothejob, haveinherited an intelligence communitywithleadershipandprofessionals; with expertisethatisexceptional. Anditisagreat privilegetohold thesepositionsandknowwehavethesupportfrom across17agenciesrelativeto gatheringintelligence, analyzingand synthesizingthatintelligence. And several ofthoseleadersare sittingheretodayandwe'remostappreciativeoftheircontributionstotheircountryand tothisissue. Thecomplexityofthethreatenvironmentisever expandingandhaschallenged theI.Cto . stayahead of theadversary, andithasnotbeen an easytask. Given thetestswefacearound theworld,. theI.C continuesitsworktocollect, toanalyzeandintegratetheseandotherissues. Weappreciateverymuch thesupportfrom yourcommitteetoaddressthesethreatsin awaythatwillgivethepresident, the Congressand otherpolicymakersthebestandmostintegratedintelligence we canassemble. In theinterestsoftimeandon behalfofmycolleaguesatthetableI'lldiscussjustsomeofthemany challengingthreatsthatwecurrentlyface. Theintelligencecommunity'swritten statementforthe recordthatwassubmitted earlierdiscussestheseand manyotherthreatsin greaterdetail. Letmestart withNorthKorea. NorthKoreaisan increasinglygravenational securitythreattotheUnitedStatesbecauseofitsgrowing missileand nuclearcapabilitiescombined with theaggressiveapproach ofitsleader, Kim JongUn. Kim is attemptingtoprovehehasthecapabilitytostriketheU.S. mainland withanuclearweapon. Hehas taken initialstepstowardfieldinga--amobileintercontinentalballisticmissile, butithasnotyetbeen flighttested. NorthKoreaupdateditsconstitution in 2012 todeclareitselfa nuclearpower. Andit'sofficials consistentlystatenuclearweaponsarethebasisforregimesurvival. SuggestingKim doesnotintend - - notintend tonegotiatethem away. Althoughintelligencecollection on NorthKorea posesdifficulties given NorthKorea'sisolation. TheI.C.will continuetodedicateresourcestothiskeychallenge. Itrequiressomeofourmosttalented professionalstowarn ourleadersofimpendingNorthKorean actionsand ofin ofthe long-term implicationsoftheirstrategicweaponsprograms. In Syria, weassessthattheregimewill maintain itsmomentum on thebattlefieldprovided,asitslikely, thatitmaintainssupportfrom Iran andRussia. ThecontinuationoftheSyrian conflictwill worsen alreadydisastrousconditionsforSyriansandregional states. Furthermoreon April4th, theSyrian regimeused thenerveagentSarin, againsttheopposition in Khan Shaykhun, in whatisprobablythe largestchemical attackbytheregimesince August2013. TheSyrian regimeprobablyused chemical weaponsintheresponsetobattlefieldlossesalongtheHama battlefrontin lateMarch thatthreatenedkeyinfrastructure. WeassesstheSyria isprobablybothwilling and abletouseC Wchemical warfarein futureattacks, wedonotknowiftheyplan but todoso. are We still acquiringand continuingtoanalyzeallintelligencerelated tothequestion ofwhetherRussian officialshadforeknowledgeoftheSyrian Wattack C on 4April. And aswelearn thisinformation, wewill certainlyshareitwith thiscommittee. Cyberthreatscontinue torepresent acritical national securityissuefortheUnitedStatesfortwokey reasons. First, ouradversariesarebecomingbolder, morecapableandmoreadeptatusingcyberspace 6 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 tothreaten ourinterestand shapereal-worldoutcomes. And thenumberofadversariesgrowsas, nationstates, terroristgroups, criminal organizationsand otherscontinuetodevelopcybercapabilities. Secondly, thepotentialimpactofthesecyberthreatsisamplifiedbytheongoingintegration of technologyintoourcriticalinfrastructureandintoourdailylives. Ourrelationshipsandbusinesses alreadyrelyon ourcritical --on --on social mediaand communication technologiesand on critical infrastructureasitisbecomingincreasinglyrelianton theInternet. Assuch, thisraisesthepotentialforphysical, economic, andpsychological consequenceswhen acyber attackorexploitation ofitoccurs. Theworldwidethreatofterrorism isgeographicallydiverseand multifaceted. AnditposesacontinuingchallengefortheUnitedStates,forouralliesandpartnerswho seektocounterit. ISISisexperiencingterritoriallossesin Iraq andSyria withpersistentcounter-terrorism operations degradingitsstrength. However, ISISwill continuetobean activeterroristthreattotheUnitedStates duetoitsproven abilitytodirectandinspireattacksagainstawiderangeoftargetsaround theworld. OutsideIraq andSyria, ISISisseekingtofosterinterconnectednessamongitsglobalbranchesand networks,align theireffortstoitsstrategyandwithstand counterIsisefforts. WeassessthatISISmaintainstheintentand capabilitytodirect,enable, assistandinspiretransnational attacks. AlQaida anditsaffiliatescontinuetoposeasignificantterroristthreatoverseasastheyremain primarilyfocused onlocal and regional conflicts. Andhomegrown violentextremistsremain themost frequentand unpredictableterroristthreattotheUnitedStateshomeland. Thisthreatwillpersistwith manyattackshappeningwithlittleornowarning. In Turkey--tensionsinTurkeymightescalaterapidlyand unpredictablyin 2017asthegovernment's consolation --consolidation ofpower, crackdownson dissentand restrictionson freemedia continue. Letme nowjusttakejustaquickrun through somekeyareasoftheMiddleEast. In Iraq, Baghdad'sprimaryfocusthrough2017willberecapturingand stabilizingMosul and other territorycontrolledbyISIS. ISISin Iraqispreparingtoregrouphoweverand continuean insurgencyand terroristcampaign,even asitlosesterritory. WeassessthatIraqwill stillfaceseriouschallengestoits stability, political viabilityand territorialintegrity, even asthethreatfrom ISISisreduced. Reconstruction will costbillionsofdollarsand ethno-sectarian andpolitical reconciliation willbean enduringchallenge. In Iran,Tehran'spublicstatementssuggestthatitwantstopreservetheJoint ComprehensivePlanofAction becauseitviewsthedeal asameanstoremovesanctionswhile preservingsomenuclearcapabilities. Iran'simplementationofthedealhasextended theamountof timeIran would needtoproduceenoughfissilematerialforanuclearweapon from afewmonthsto aboutayear.Tehran'smalignantactivities, however, continue. Forexample, Iran providesarms, financingandtrainingand managesasmanyas10,000Iraqi, Afghan andPakistaniShia fightersin Syria tosupporttheAssadRegime. Iran hassenthundredsofitsown forces toincludemembersoftheIslamicRevolutionaryGuardC orpsandtheIRGC QudsforcetoSyria as advisors. In Yemenfighting--weassessfightingwill almostcertainlypersistin 2017between Houthi alignedforcestrainedbyIran and theYemenigovernmentbackedbyaSaudiled coalition. 7 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Neithersidehasbeen abletoachievedecisiveresultsthrough militaryforcetothispoint. Al-Qaidain the Arabia --Arabian Peninsula andISISbranchin Yemen haveexploited theconflictand thecollapseof governmentauthoritytogain newrecruitsand alliesthatexpand theirinfluence. In SouthAsia,theintelligencecommunityassessesthatthepolitical and securitysituation in Afghanistan will almostcertainlydeterioratethrough2018even with amodestincreasein militaryassistancebythe UnitedStatesanditspartners. Thisdeterioration isunderminedbyitsdireeconomicsituation. Afghanistan will struggletocurbitsdependenceonexternal supportuntilitcontainstheinsurgencyor reachesapeaceagreementwith theTaliban. Meanwhile, weassessthattheTaliban islikelytocontinuetomakegainsespeciallyin rural areas. Afghan SecurityForcesperformancewillprobablyworsen duetoacombination ofTaliban operations, combatcasualties,desertion, poorlogisticsupportand weakleadership. Pakistan isconcerned about internationalisolation and seesitsposition ofIndia'srisinginternational statusincludingIndia's expandedforeign outreach anddeepeningtiestotheUnitedStates. Pakistan willlikelyturn toC to hina offsetitsisolation, empoweringarelationshipthatwillhelpBeijingtoprojectinfluenceintotheIndian Ocean . In addition, Islamabadhasfailed tocurbmilitantsand terroristsinPakistan. Thesegroupswillpresenta sustained threattotheUnitedStates'sinterestin theregion and continuetoplan and conductattacksin India andAfghanistan. Pakistan isalsoexpandingitsnucleararsenalin pursuingtactical nuclear weapons, potentiallyloweringthethresholdfortheiruse. Wenowturn toRussia. WeassessthatRussia islikelytobemoreaggressivein --in global affairs,more unpredictablein itsapproach totheUnitedStatesand moreauthoritarian in itsapproach todomestic policiesandpolitics. WeassesstheRussia will continuetolookto leverageitsmilitarysupporttothe Assad regimetodriveapolitical settlementprocessinSyria on theirterms. MoscowisalsolikelytouseRussia'smilitaryintervention in Syria in conjunction with effortstocapitalize on fearsofa growingISISand extremistthreattoexpanditsrole in theMiddleEast. Weassessat Moscow'sstrategicobjectivesinUkraine,maintaininglongterm influenceoverKievandfrustrating Ukraine'sattemptstointegrateintoWestern institutions, will remain unchangedin 2017. Russia'smilitaryintervention in eastern Ukrainecontainsmorethan twoyears--continues, excuseme, morethan twoyearsaftertheMinskIIAgreement. Russia continuestoexertmilitaryanddiplomatic pressuretocoerceUkraineintoimplementingMoscow'sinterpretation ofthepoliticalprovisionsofthe MinskAgreement; amongthem,constitutional amendmentsthatwould effectivelygiveMoscowaveto overKiev'sstrategicdecisions. In hina;C C hina will continue, weassess, topursuean activeforeign policy. EspeciallywithintheAsia - Pacificregion,highlightedbyafirm stanceon competingterritorial claimsin theEastChina Sea and SouthC hina Sea,relationswithTaiwan anditspursuitofeconomicengagement across EastAsia. hina C viewsastrongmilitaryisacritical elementin advancingit'sinterests. Itwill alsopursueeffortsaimed at fulfillingitsambitiousOneBeltOneRoadinitiativetoexpand theirstrategicinfluenceand economicrole acrossAsia throughinfrastructureprojects. 8 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 JustaquicklookatSub-Saharan Africa, hometomorethanonebillion people, and expected todouble in sizebymid century. African governmentsfacethethreatofcoups, popularuprisings, widespread violenceandterroristattacks, includingfrom Al-QaidaitsISISaffiliates. In theWestern Hemisphere, Venezuela'sunpopularautocraticgovernmentwill turn toincreasingly repressivemeanstocontain political opponentsand streetunrest. Oilhaslongbeen theregime'scash cow,butmismanagementisled todecliningoutputin revenue. WeassesstheVenezuelan government will struggletocontain inflation,makedebtpaymentsandpayforimportsofscarce basicgoodsand medicines. Mexico'sgovernmentwillfocuson domesticprioritiestoprepareforthe2018presidential election, whileseekingtolimitfalloutfrom strained relationswith theUnitedStates. Publicdemandfor governmentaction againstcrimeand corruptionwill add topoliticalpressure. uba headsintothe AsC finalyearofpreparationsforahistorictransition toanextgeneration leaderin early2018,the government'sfocuswillbeon preservingcontrol whilemanagingrecession. Cuba, which continuesto userepressivemeasurestostiflehumanrightsand constraineddemocracy activists, blamesitslowingeconomyon lowerglobal commodityprices,TheUSembargoand the economiccrisisin Venezuela, akeybenefactor. Letmejustamake astatementon thethreatfrom illegaldrugs. ThethreattotheUnitedStatesfrom foreign produceddrugs, especiallyheroin, syntheticopioids,meth and cocainehavegrown significantlyin thepastfewyears. Thisiscontributingtopreviouslyunseen levelsofU.S. drugrelated mortality, which nowexceedsallotherU.S. causesofinjuriesordeath. Finally, I'dliketomakeafewpointsherethatareimportanttotheI.Cgoingforward. . Asyou areall very aware, section 702oftheFISAamendmentsactisduetoexpireattheend oftheyear. Icannotstress enough theimportanceofthisauthorityandhowtheI.CdoesitsworktokeepAmericanssafe.AndI . knowthatissharedbyeveryoneatthistable. Section 702isanextremelyeffectivetool toprotectour nation from terroristand otherthreats. AsIdescribedinmyconfirmation hearing,702isinstrumental so to much oftheI.C .'scritical workin protectingtheAmerican peoplefrom threatsfrom abroad. theIntelligencecommunityiscommittedto workingwith allofyou in both classified and unclassified sessionstoensurethatyou understand not onlyhowweuseourauthorities, butalsohowweprotectprivacyand civillibertiesin theprocess. COATS: Additionally, manyofyou haveasked as me partofmyconfirmation processaboutthestatusoftheI.C ., itseffectivenessand efficiencyandhowitcan beimproved. Aspartoftheadministration'sgoal ofan effectiveand efficientgovernmenttheODNI, hasalreadybegun areviewoftheentireintelligence communitytoincludetheofficeoftheDNI. And toanswertheveryquestionsabouthowwecanmakeourprocesseven morestreamlined,more efficientandmoreeffective. Myofficeisproud toleadthisreviewandIlookforward tothe confirmation ofmyprincipaldeputyin ordertoshepherd thisprocesstocompletion, andIhavetotal confidencein herthatshehasthecapacityand capabilitytoeffectivelylead thiseffort. 9 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 The recently a past -- past Intelligence Authorization Bill also includes the requirement for a review of the I.CFocused. on structures and authorities, 10 years beyond the intelligence reforms of the mid 2000s. Between these two reviews, I am confident that I will be able to report back to the committee with constructive recommendations onthe best ways forward for the whole of the I.C. In the short time I've been thison job, I have learned that the. I.Cis full of dedicated, talented, creative, patriotic men and women who are committed to keeping America safe, we must retain this posture while looking for ways to improve. In conclusion, the intelligence community will continue its tireless work against these and all threats but we will never be omniscient. Although we have extensive insight into many threats in places around the world, we have gaps in others. Therefore, we very much appreciate the support provided by this committee and will continue to work with you to ensure that the intelligence community has the capabilities it needs to meet its many mission needs. And with that, we are ready to take your questions. BURR: Director Coats, thank you for that very thorough and comprehensive testimony on behalf of the intelligence community. Dan, quite frankly, you make us proud seeing one of our own now head the entire intelligence community and I want to thank you and Marsha personally for your willingness to do that. COATS: Thank you. BURR: And to also go past you, we are anxious for your deputy to be consider by the committee, would you please send us a nomination? (LAUGHTER) COATS: We are doing our very best to do that and I'm -- nobody's more anxious than me. BURR: I'm -- I'm sure that's the case. I'm going to recognize myself for five minutes. Director McCabe, did you ever hear Director omey C tell the president that he was not the subject of an investigation -- excuse me did you everhear Director Comey tell the president he was not the subject of an investigation? MCC ABE: (inaudible) sir I -- I can't... BURR: Could you do your microphone please? 10 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 MCC ABE: Rookie mistake, I'm sorry. Sir, I can't comment on any conversations the director may have had with the president. BURR: OK. General Stewart, you heard Director Coats state on everybody' behalf that there is an expected deterioration of conditions in Afghanistan, can you give us DIA's assessment of the situation today in Afghanistan and what would change that deterioration? STEWART: Thanks Mr. Chairman. I -- I pay close attention to the operations in Afghanistan. I make two trips there each year, one before the fighting season and one following the fighting season. That way I get, on the ground, my own personal assessment of how things are going. I was there about six weeks ago. The NDSF two years into taking control of the security environment in the end has had mixed results in this past year. Those mixed results can be characterized -- can characterize the security environment as a stalemate and, left unchecked, that stalemate will deteriorate in the favor of the belligerents. So we have to do something very different than what we've been doing in the past. Let me back out just a little bit and talk about the fact that the Taliban failed to meet any oftheir strategic objectives that they outlined during the last fighting season. They controlled no district centers, they were able to execute high visibility attacks which causes a psychological effect, that has a debilitating effect. They maintain some influence in the rural areas but they control none of the large district centers. Having said that, the Afghan National Defense Security Forces did not meet their force generation objectives, they had some success in training of the force, they were able to manage a crisis better than they have in the past, they were able to deploy forces, but failed, in my opinion, to employ the ISR and the fire support to make them as effective on the battlefield as possible. Unless we change something where we introduce either U.S. forces, NATO forces that changes the balance of forces on the ground, changes the fighting outputs on the ground or add additional training and advising capability at lower levels than we do now; the situation will continue to deteriorate and we'll lose all the gains that we've invested in over the last several years. So they've got to get more trainers below the core level, I believe -- not sure how far down. Or they'd have to get more personnel on the ground; generate greater forces, greater fire support, greater use of ISR or this will in fact deteriorate further. BURR: Thank you, General. Admiral Rogers, every aspect of our daily lives continues to become part of a traceable, trackable interaction -- interacting environment now known as the internet of things. In addition, artificial intelligence, or A.I., has increasingly enabled technology to become autonomous. 11 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 WhatistheI.C.'scurrentassessmentoftheeverchangingcapabilitiesoftheinternetofthingsand what itpresents? ROGERS: Soitrepresentsbothopportunity, but--from aninformation assuranceorcomputernetworkdefense perspective, itrepresentsgreatconcern. Where theabilitytoharnessliterallymillionsofdevicesthat werebuiltfora verysimpledaytodayactivitiessuddenlycan betied togetherandfocusand oriented to achieveaspecificoutcome. We'veseen thiswithdenial ofserviceattemptsagainstacouplesignificant companieson EastC oastoftheUnitedStatesinthecourseofthelastyear. Thisisgoingtobeatrendin thefuture,it'spartofthediscussionswe'rehaving--I'm --I'm in themidst ofhavingsomediscussionsin theprivatesectorwith --thisisgoingtobeaproblem that'scommon to both ofus. Howcan weworktogethertotryto, numberone, understand thistechnologyand, number two, askourselveshowdoweensurethatit'snotturned around, ifyou will,againstus. BURR: Thankyou forthat. AdmiralRogers, I'llprobablyputthistoyou aswell. Section 702oftheFISAAmendmentsActauthorizes thegovernmenttotargetonlynon-U.S. personsreasonablybelieved tobelocated outsidetheUnited Statesforthepurposesofacquiringforeign intelligenceinformation. Section 702cannotbeused to targetanyperson locatedinsidetheUnitedStatesand thelawprohibitsthegovernmentfrom reverse targeting, thatistargetingon non-U.S. person outsidetheUnitedStatesspecificallyforthepurposeof collectingthecommunicationsofa person insidetheUnitedStates. TheI.C.usesFISA702collection authoritytodetect, identifyanddisruptterroristand othernational securitythreats. Howwouldyou characterize702 authorityandits importancetothecurrent intelligencecollection platform overall? ROGERS: Ifweweretolose702'sauthorities,wewouldbesignificantlydegraded ourabilitytoprovidetimely warningandinsightastowhatterroristactors, nation states,criminal elementsaredoingthatisof concern toournationaswell asourfriendsand allies. This702hasprovided usinsightthatisfocused bothon counterterrorism,butaswell ascounterproliferation,understandingwhatnation statesare doing. It'sgivenustremendousinsightsin thecomputernetworkdefensearena. Iwouldhighlightmuch --notall,much ofwhatwasintheintelligencecommunity'sassessment, for example,on theRussian effortsagainsttheU.S. election processin 2016wasinformedbyknowledgewe gained through2702authority. BURR: Thankyou forthat. ViceC hairman. ROGERS: 12 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I've got a couple questions that I -- hopefully will be -- only require yes or no answers. First, for the whole panel as the assembled leadership of the intelligence community, do you believe that the January 2017. WARNER: Intelligence community assessment accurately characterized the extent of Russian activities in the 2016 election and its conclusion that Russian intelligence agencies were responsible for thehacking and leaking of information and using misinformation to influence our elections? Simple yes or no would suffice. CARDILLO: I do. Yes, sir. STEWART: Yes, Senator. ROGERS: Yes I do. COATS: Yes I do. POMPEO: Yes. MCC ABE: Yes. WARNER: And I guess the presumption there -- or the next presumption, I won't even ask this question is consequently that committee assess -- or that community assessment was unanimous and is not a piece of fake news or evidence of some other individual or nation state other than Russia. So I appreciate that again for the record. I warned you Mr. McCabe I was going to have to get you on the record as this. well Mr. onMcC abe for as long as you are Acting FBI Director do you commit to informing this committee of any effort to interfere with the FBI's ongoing investigation into links between Russia and the Trump campaign? MCC ABE: I absolutely do. WARNER: Thank you so much for that. I think in light of what's happened in the last 48 hours it's critically important that we have that assurance and I hope you'll relay, at least from me to the extraordinary people that work at the FBI that this committee supports them, supports their efforts, support their professionalism and supports their independence. 13 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 MCC ABE: I will sir, thank you. WARNER: In light of the fact that we just saw French elections where it felt like deja vu all over again in terms of the release of a series of e-mails against Mr. Macron days before the election and the fact that this committee continues to investigate the type of tactics that Russia has used. Where do we stand, as a country, of preparation to make sure this doesn't happen again in 2018 and 2020 -- where have we moved in terms of collaboration with state voting -- voter files, in terms of working more with the tech community, particularly the platform -- platform entities in terms of how we can better assure real news versus fake news, is there some general sense Director -- C oats I know you've only been in the job for a short period oftime -- of how we're going to have a strategic effort? Because while it was Russia in 2016 other nation states could -- you know -- launch similar type assaults. COATS: Well, we are -- we will continue to use all the assets that we have in terms of collection and analysis relative to what the influence has been and potentially could be in future. Russians have spread this across the globe -- interestingly enough I met with the Prime Minister of Montenegro the latest nation to join NATO, the number 29 nation, what was the main topic? Russian interference in their political system. And so it does -- it sweeps across Europe and other places. It's clear though, the Russians have upped their game using social media and other opportunities that we -- in ways that we haven't seen before. So it's a great threat to our -- our democratic process and our job here is to provide the best intelligence we can to the policy makers to -- as they develop a strategy in terms of how to best reflect a response to this. WARNER: Well one of the things I'm concerned about is, we've all expressed this concern but since this doesn't fall neatly into any particular agency's jurisdiction you know, who's -- who's taking the point on interacting with the platform companies like the Google, Facebook and Twitter, who's taking the point in terms of interacting DHS image in terms of state boards of election? How are we trying to ensure that our systems more secure, and if we can get a brief answer on that because I got one last question for Admiral Rogers. COATS: Well, I think the -- the obviously, our office tasks and takes the point, but there's contribution from agencies across the I.C . We will -- I've asked Director Pompeo to address that and others that might want to address that also. But each of us -- each of the agencies to the extent that they can and have the capacity whether its NSA though SIGINT, whether it's NSA through human or other sources will provide information to us that we want to use as a basis to provide to our -- to our policymakers. Relative to a grand strategy, I am not aware right now of any -- I think we're still assessing the impact. We have not put a grand strategy together, which would not be our purview, we wouldprovide the basis of intelligence that would then be the foundation for what that strategy would be. 14 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 WARNER: My hope -- my hope would be that we need to be proactive in this. We don't want to be sitting here kind of looking back at it after 2018 election cycle. Last question, very briefly, Admiral Rogers do you have any doubt that the Russians were behind the intervention in the French elections? ROGERS: I -- let me phrase it this way, we are aware of some Russian activity directed against the Russian - - excuse me, directed against the French election process. As I previously said ongress before earlier C this week, we in fact reached out to our French counterparts to say, we have become aware of this activity, we want to make you aware, what are you seeing? I'm not in a position to have looked at the breadth of the French infrastructure. So I'm -- I'm not really in a position to make a whole simple declaratory statement. WARNER: Thank you, Mr. hairman. C BURR: Senator Rubio? RUBIO: Thank you, Mr. hairman. C Mr. McCabe, can you without going into the specific of any individual investigation, I think the American people want to know, has the dismissal of Mr.omey C in any way impeded, interrupted, stopped or negatively impacted any of the work, any investigation, or any ongoing projects at the Federal Bureau of Investigations? MCC ABE: As you know, Senator, the work of the men and women of the FBI continues despite any changes in circumstance, any decisions. So there has been no effort to impede our investigation today. Quite simply put sir, you cannot stop the men and women of the FBI from doing the right thing, protecting the American people, and upholding theonstitution. C RUBIO: And this is for all the members of the committee, as has been widely reported, and people know this, Kaspersky Lab software is used by not hundreds of thousands, millions of Americans. To each of our witnesses I would just ask, would any of you be comfortable with the Kaspersky Lab software on your computers? MCC ABE: A resounding no, from me. POMPEO: No. COATS: No, Senator. 15 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 ROGERS: No, sir. STEWART: No, Senator. CARDILLO: No, sir. RUBIO: On the--DirectorPompeo,on Venezuela whichwas mentionedinDirectorC oat'sstatements, asallof you areprobablywell aware, armed civilian groupsourcolectivos, thesemilitiasin thestreethavebeen armedbytheregimeforpurposesofdefending, forlackofa betterterm, theregimefrom protesters. Weall areawareoftheMaduroregime'scozyrelationshipwithHezbollah,withtheFARCwhichis , a designated terroristorganization, andlinkstonarcotrafficking. POMPEO: Amongtheweaponsand stockpileofthemilitaryin Venezuela areigla-S, basicallytheRussianvariantof ourstingermissiles. RUBIO: AndDirectorPompeo, ifyou could commenton theriskthatIbelieveexists; thatasthesegroups becomemoredesperate --potential even operateatsomepointoutsidethecontrol oftheMaduro regime, they'rerunningaroundin thestreetsalsoin search ofmoneyandfood and anythingelsethat theywanttogettheirhandson. Thethreatofanyadvanced weaponry, suchaswhatI'vejust mentioned, beingsoldortransferred totheFARCa , terroristorganization; todrugcartelsinsold Mexico,potentially; oreven sold toterroristorganizationson the blackmarket. Isthatareal threat?Isthatsomethingweshouldbecognizantof? POMPEO: Senator,itisareal threat. Aswehaveall seen, thesituation in Venezuela continuestodeteriorate, Madurogetsmoredesperatebythehour. Theriskofthesecollectivos(ph) actingin awaythatisnot underhiscontrolincreasesastimegoeson aswell. In aclassifiedsettingI'm happytosharewithyoualittlebitmoreaboutthedetailsofwhatweknow. Wehavenotseen anyofthosemajorarmstransferstakeplace, wedon'thaveanyevidencethatthose havetaken placetodate. Butthosestockpilesexistnotonly--notonlyintheMaduroregime, butother placesaswell. Thereareplentyofweaponsrunningaroundin Venezuela. Andthisriskisincrediblyreal and seriousand ultimatethreattoSouthAmerica entralAmericain andC addition tojustin Venezuela. RUBIO: Stayingin theWestern Hemispherefor--fora momentand --andisthepotential resultswith the director-- DirectorMcC abe as well asyou, DirectorPompeo. 16 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 I continue to be concerned about the potential, and what I believe is the reality, of a concerted effort on the part of the Cuban government to recruit and unwittingly enlist Americans -- business executives and others, even local and state political leaders an effort to have them influence of U.S. policy making on Cuba. And particularly the lifting of the embargo. Would this be a tactic consistent with what we have seen in the past from other nation states, including theuba? regime in C POMPEO: I'll I'll-- let Mr. McCabe make a comment as well, but yes, of course. Frankly, this is consistent with what -- right, this is the -- the -- the attempt to interfere in United States is not limited to Russia. The ubans C have deep ties, it is in their deepest tradition to take American visitors and do their best influence of the way that is in adverse to U.S. interests. MCC ABE: Yes, sir. Fully agree, we share your concerns about that issue. RUBIO: And my final question is on -- all this focus on Russia and what's happened in the past is that the opinion of all of you -- or those of -- you certainly all have insight on this. That even as we focus on 2016 and the efforts leading up to that election, efforts to influence policy making here in the United States vis-a-vis the Russian interests are ongoing that the Russians continue to use active measures; even at this moment, even on this day. To try, through the use of multiple different ways, to influence the political debate and the decisions made in American politics; particularly as they pertain to Russia's interests around the world. In essence, these active measures is an ongoing threat, not simply something that happened in the past. MCC ABE: Yes, sir, that's right. POMPEO: Senator, it's right. In some sense, though, we've got to put it in context, this has been going on for a long time. There's -- there's nothing new. Only the cost has been lessened, the cost of doing it. COATS: I -- I would just add that the use of cyber and social media has significantly increased the impact and the capabilities that -- obviously this has been done for years and years. Even decades. But the ability they have to -- to use the interconnectedness and -- and all the -- all that that provides, that didn't provide before I -- they literally upped their game to the point where it's having a significant impact. ROGERS: From my perspective I would just highlight cyber is enabling them to access information in massive quantities that weren't quite obtainable to the same level previously and that's just another tool in their attempt to acquire information, misuse of that information, manipulation, outright lies, inaccuracies at time. But other times, actually dumping raw data which is -- as we also saw during this last presidential election cycle for us. 17 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 BURR: SenatorFeinstein. FEINSTEIN: ThanksverymuchMr. hairman. C Wherethere'sobviouslymorethan onethreattoourcountry, Iwould arguethatthegreatestdangerto theUnitedStatesisNorthKorea andI am oneofthosewhohavebeen veryworried and tryingtofollow thisascloseaspossible. In thestatementfortherecordyou state, andIquote, "NorthKorea'snuclearweaponsand missile programswill continuetoposeaseriousthreattoU.S. interestandtothesecurityenvironmentin East Asia in 2017." You goon tothank--state,"Pyongyangiscommitted... (UNKNOWN) Thankyou. FEINSTEIN: ... todevelopingalongrangenucleararmed missilethatiscapableofposingadirectthreattothe UnitedStates." Theseassessmentscombined withNorthKorea'sbehavior, recentballisticmissile launchesandproximitytoU.S. forcesand alliesin Asia isdeeplyconcerning. Forthepurposeofthisopen hearingcould each ofyou expressthethreatposedbyNorthKorea in this publicsettingand then address, mostimportantly, someofthespecificactionsweretaken --we're takingasanation?And someofityou maywanttodoin theclosed hearinglater. COATS: Ithinkwecouldgetintogreaterdetailin theclosedhearingbutit'sclearthatwehaveassessed thisasa --averysignificant, potentiallyexistential threattotheUnitedStatesthathastobeaddressed. You're awarethere'sbeen considerablediscussion amongthepolicymakerswith ourprovidingintelligence with --with theadministration relativetostepsmovingforward. GeneralMattishastaken amajorrolein thisaswell asoursecretaryofStateandothers.Theinteraction with theChineseoflate--wethinkitcan playasignificantrolein termsofhowwedeal withthis. We havededicated averysignificantamountofourintelligenceresourcestoNorth --theissueofNorth Korea. AndI thinkwe'dlookforward togoingdeeperintoall ofthatin aclassifiedsession. FEINSTEIN: Letmeaskthis, isitpossible, in thishearing, toestimatewhen theywillhavean intercontinentalballistic missilecapableoftakinganuclearwarhead? COATS: I--Ithinkitwouldbebestifsafethatforthe--thosekind ofdetailsfortheclosedsession. FEINSTEIN: Can you sayin thissession howeffectiveC hina hasbeen in stopping some ofthetesting? POMPEO: 18 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 SenatorFeinstein letme--letmetrytoanswerthatasbestI can. Iactuallyjustreturnedfrom Korea I wastherelastweek. Ihad chancetomeetwith ourgreatsoldiers,GeneralBrooksandhisteam aswell asthegreatsoldiersoftheRepublicofKorea Armywhoareon thefrontlinesthere, they'redoing amazingworkin difficultcondition. a With respecttotheC hinese, theyhavemadeeffortsin awaythat theyhavenotmadebefore. FEINSTEIN: Good. POMPEO: In an efforttoclosedown thetradethattheyhaveandputtingpressure,diplomaticpressureaswell, on theNorthKoreans. Theintelligencesuggestswe'regoingtoneed moretoshakefreethisterribly challengingproblem. And --and thattheycoulddomore. And theyhavethecapacitytodomoreas well. FEINSTEIN: Couldyou bespecific?It'smy -- havetheyentirelystopped cold?What --towhatdegreehavethey reducedit?Andhowaboutoil andothercommodities? POMPEO: I'dprefertodeferthedetailsofthattotheclassified setting, buttherehavebeen restrictionson coal thathavebeen significant. FEINSTEIN: Isthereanyothercomment? STEWART: IfI --ifI could, Senator, NorthKorea hasdeclareditsintent. It'ssaiditpublicly,itproducespropaganda imagesthatshowstheirintenttodevelopintercontinental missile,snucleararmed. Whatwe'venot seen them doisdoacompleteend-to-end testofan IC BM with anucleardevice. In theclosed session wecan talkabouthowclosetheymightbetodoingthat. Butthey'recertainly unparalleledfastnucleardevice, processingenoughfissilematerialfornuclearwarheadsanddeveloping awiderangeofmissiletechnology; short, intermediate, longrangemissiletechnology. Sothey'regoingtoputthosetwotogetheratsomepoint, butwehavenotseen them dothattested end-to-end; missilelaunchintercontinental range,miniaturization and survival ofa reentryvehicle. But they'reon thatpath andthey'recommitted todoing. FEINSTEIN: Thankyou. CARDILLO: I'djustadd, Senator,on topofGeneralStewart'scomments, thattheyarein arace. He'spushingvery hard on theacceleratorhere. Thiswholepaneliswell awareofthatand --andwearedoingeverything in ourpower,and wecan giveyouthedetailsin closed, tomakesurethatwegiveyou andour--our customerstheadvantagetowinthatrace. 19 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 FEINSTEIN: IfI mightjustsay,Mr. Cardillo, you've--you'vegiven usverygoodinformation,verysolidinformation;it ismuch appreciated. Ithinkat,you know, itistimefortheAmerican peopletobegin tounderstand that, asadirectorsaid, wedoinfacthavean existential threatin thePacificOceanand weneed tocometo gripswithit. BURR: SenatorBlunt. BLUNT: Thankyou, Mr. hairman. C DirectorCoats, letmejoineverybodyelsein welcomingyou backtothecommittee,thistimeon the othersideofthe--ofthehearingattable. Butpleased, alongwithothers,thatyou takethis responsibility. It'smyunderstanding, Iwanttotalkjustalittlebitaboutthetoexecutiveordersonofvettingthatthe presidenthasbeen challenged on in court. Myunderstandingisyou're--astheDNIinvolvedin that vetting--in thatprocess, isthatright?Thescreeningprocess, isthatsomethingthatreportsupthrough you? COATS: You'retalkingabouttheclassification process? BLUNT: Yes--well, I'm talkingabouttheextremevettingwherethepresident'sissued --thefirstexecutiveorder wasJanuary27th wherethepresident'sordersaid thatwe'd suspend refugeeadmissionsfrom certain countriesfor90dayspendingareview. There'salso120daysmentionedin thatorder. And sincewerebeyond90daysand approachingthe120 days,myrealquestion isarewe--in spiteofwhat'shappeningoutsideoftheorganization, arewe continuingpursuethattimelineand arewe abouttogettothe120daysofhavingthatreviewperiod behind us? COATS: Iwouldliketotakethatquestion andgetbacktoyou with thespecificsrelativetothedaysaway,whatis been donetothisparticulardateand areweon --on target. Obviously, thisis--thisisgoingforward,I don'thavedetailsin frontofmerightnow, butI'dbehappytogetthatinformation foryou. BLUNT: Good,I'dbeinterestedin that, I'dbeveryconcernedfrankly, ifwe'renowover100, closeto120into thattimeframetofindoutthe120daysdidn'tgetthejobdonebecausewewerewaitingtofigureout howtheordercouldbeproperlyenforced. And soI'dbeinterestedin that. On thecyberfront,DirectorC ardillo, Iknowamongotherthings, yourorganization hasconductedwhat you'vecalled ahackathonoratleasthavebeen calledhackathons. Whathasthatdoneintermsof bringingotherpeopleintothediscussion ofhowweprotectourselvesbetterfrom thesecyberattacks? 20 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 CARDILLO: Sure, thankyou, Senator. Sowe'requiteproud atNGAofourhistoryofsupporttothecommunityand toyou. Butthroughpredominantlyhistoricallyclosedsystems, governmentowned systems, etcetera, as thecommittee'salreadydiscussed and thepanel'sresponded clearly,the--thehigh-tech realityofour world,theinterconnectednessoftheinternet,etcetera. Sowhatwe'retryingtodoistakethathistoricsuccessofourexpertiseand ourexperienceand then engagewith thatcommunityin awaythatwecan betterleverageourdata, in awaytoinform and warn you. And soI'm tryingtotapintotheagilityand theinnovation ofthatcommunity. Weusethese hackathonstoputoutchallengequestionsinwhich wecan engagewithindustryand academicin away that--that'll enableustodoourjobbetter. BLUNT: Letmeaskonemorequestion, wehad a--wehad awitnessbeforethiscommitteeon March the30th in an open hearing, C lintWatts,whoobservedthathesaid, quote, "Theintelligencecommunityisvery biased againstopen sourceinformation," thatendshisquote. Imaycometoyou on thattoo,Director Pompeo. Butin termsofgeospatial,what--whatareyou doingtherewith open sourceinformation? CARDILLO: We're--we'reengaging, asAdmiralRogersmentionedthough there--youknow, there'san upsideto thisconnectednessand thefactthat--thatthecommercial marketand the commercialimagerymarket isgettinginto abusinessthatwaspriora government-onlyentityhasgreatadvantageand weseekto build on thatand take--takeadvantageofthosedevelopments. Wealsoneedtogoin eyeswideopen and realizethatthereisarisk. SoIdon'thaveabias. Ihavean awarenessandappreciation forthisopen developmentandinnovation and mycommitmentistosmartlyengagewithit, tomakesurethatwe--weusethebestofitwhile we'reawarethatthere--thereisariskaswe doso. BLUNT: DirectorPompeo, doyou thinkthatwasafaircriticism thattheintelligencecommunityisbiased against usingopen sourceinformation? POMPEO: SeveralI thinkhistorically,thatmaywellhavebeen true. Idon'tthinkthat'sthecasetoday. Wehavean enormousopen-sourceenterprisethatdoesitsbesttostayupwith world classandinformation managementgetinformation thatisnot--notstolensecrets, butopen-sourceinformationtotheright placeattherighttimetohelpinform theintelligencethatwouldprovidetoyou and toourother customers. Sotoday, Iwould --Iwould saythatstatementisinaccurate. BLUNT: Thankyou,Director. Thankyou, hairman. C BURR: SenatorC ornyn? 21 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 CORNYN: Thankyou, Mr. hairman. C Letmeask--letmehighlightoneissueandthen aska question,DirectorC oats, aboutanotherissueI'd invitecommentfrom anyonewhohassomethingtheywanttooffer. I'vebecomeincreasingly concerned aboutforeign governmentshiringlobbyistsherein Washington. And unbeknownstto membersofC ongress, actuallylobbingC ongressto enactpolicieswhichmaybecontrarytothebest interestoftheAmerican people,ofcoursetheForeign AgentRegistration Actprovidessomelevel of transparencyforthatbutIjusthighlightthatissueand wecan comebacktoitatalatertimebecauseI wanttoaskyou aboutanothertopicaswell. TheC ommittee on ForeignInvestmentin theUnitedStates,orC FIUS, providesaveryimportantrolein determiningwhethertherearetechnologytransfersfrom theUnitedStatestoforeign governmentsand I'm --washappytoseeDirectorC oats,yourcomments on pagefourofyourwritten statement specificallyregardingC hina'sincreasingeffortto useinvestmentasawaytoimproveitstechnological capabilities. China we'veseen continuestousean aggressivecampaign tovacuum upadvancedU.S. technology howeverand wheneveritcan, whetherstealingitthrough cyberorbuyingitin theopen market. Doyou feellikethecurrentCFIUSprocessadequatelyprotectsagainstthisthreatvectorand areall elementsof theU.S. governmentcognizantofthesevulnerabilities? COATS: Ican'tspeaktohowmanyagentsof--oftheU.S. governmentareascognizantasperhapsweshouldbe butI certainlythinkthat, given hina'saggressiveapproach C relative toinformation gatheringand -- and all thethingsthatyoumentioned meritsa--a reviewofC FIUSin termsofwhetherornotitis- - needsto havesomechangesorinnovationsto --toaddresstheaggressive-- aggressiveC hineseactionsnotjust againstorcompanies, butacrosstheworld. They--theyclearlyhave astrategythrough theirinvestments, they'vestarted amajorinvestmentbank - -you namea parkoftheworldC hineseprobablyare --are therelookingtoputinvestmentsin. We've seen thesituation in Djibouti wherethey'realsoaddingmilitarycapabilityto theirinvestment, strategic area for--on theHornofAfrica therethat--thatyouwouldn'tnecessarilyexpect. Butthey'reactivein Africa, Northern Africa,they'reactiveacrosstheworld. Theironebelt,oneroadprocessopens--openstheirtradeand --and whatotherinteresttheyhaveto theIndian Ocean in --and adifferentwaytoaddressnationsthatthey'vehaddifficultyconnectingwith. Soit'sa--it'sclearlyan issuethatweoughttotakealookat. CORNYN: Thankyou. POMPEO: Senator-- SenatorC ornyn ifI might... CORNYN: Goahead. 22 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 POMPEO: ... justadd onecomment. CORNYN: Please. POMPEO: I'm sorry--twoquickcomments. Oneon C FIUS, you knowitmostlydealswith changingcontrol transactions, purchases. Therearemany otherwaysonecouldinvestin an entityherein theUnitedStatesand exertsignificantcontroloverthat entity, Ithinkthatoughttobelooked at. And then second and apartfrom CFIUStherearemanyvectors,youmentioned several.Anotherplaces areeducationalinstitutionswheretherearemanyfolkscominghere, someofwhoarecomingherein goodfaith tolearn butotherswhoarebeingsentherewithlessnobleundertakingsand missions. CORNYN: Thankyou. AdmiralRogers. (CROSSTALK) ROGERS: And theonlyadditional commentI wasgoingtomakewas,itisclearaswewatchC hina and other nationstheyaregaininggreaterinsightsastoour C FIUSprocesses,thecriteria thatweusethattend to shapeourdecision process. And soIthinkthat'salsoan issueofconcern thatwe'reawareofhere. CORNYN: Thankyou. Ilookforward tovisitingwithyou in theclosed session lateron. Thankyou Mr. hairman. C BURR: SenatorWyden. WYDEN: Thankyou verymuchMr.C hairman. Gentlemen, it'sfairtosayIdisagreed withDirectorComeyasmuch asanyoneinthisroom butthe timingofthisfiringiswrongtoanyonewith semblanceofethics. a DirectorC omeyshouldbeherethis morningtestifyingtotheAmericanpeopleaboutwheretheinvestigation he's been runningstands. Atourpublichearingin Januarywhereherefused todiscusshisinvestigation intoconnectionsbetween Russia andTrumpassociatesIstated myfearthatiftheinformation didn'tcomeoutbeforeinauguration dayitmightnevercomeout. Withalltherecenttalkinrecentweeksaboutwhetherthereisevidenceof 23 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 collusion, I fear some colleagues have forgotten that Donald Trump urged the Russians to hack his opponents. He also said repeatedly that he loved WikiLeaks. So the question is not whether Donald Trump actively encouraged the Russians and WikiLeaks to attack our democracy, he did; that is an established fact. The only question is whether he or someone associated with him coordinated with the Russians. Now, Mr. abe,McC the president's letter to Director omey C asserted that on three separate occasions the director informed him that he was not under investigations. Would it have been wrong for the director to inform him he was not under investigations? Yes or no? MCC ABE: Sir, I'm not going to comment on any conversations that the director may have had with the president... (CROSSTALK) WYDEN: I didn't ask that. Would it have been wrong for the director to inform him he was not under investigation? That's not about conversations, that's yes or no answer. MCC ABE: As you know, Senator. We typically do not answer that question. I will not comment on whether or not the director and the president of the United States had that conversation. WYDEN: Will you refrain from these kinds of alleged updates to the president or anyone else in the White House on the status of the investigation? MCC ABE: I will. WYDEN: Thank you. Director Pompeo, one of the few key unanswered questions is why the president didn't fire Michael Flynn after Acting Attorney General Yates warned the White House that he could be blackmailed by the Russians. Director Pompeo, did you know about the acting attorney general's warnings to the White House or were you aware of the concerns behind the warning? POMPEO: I -- I don't have any comment on that. WYDEN: Well, were you aware of the concerns behind the warning? I mean, this is a global threat. This is a global threat question, this is a global threat hearing. Were you... (CROSSTALK) 24 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 POMPEO: Tell me... (CROSSTALK) WYDEN: Wereyou aware? POMPEO: Senator,tell mewhatglobal threatitisyou'reconcerned with, please. I'm notsureIunderstand the question. WYDEN: Well, thepossibilityofblackmail. Imean, blackmailbyainfluential militaryofficial, thathasreal ramificationsfortheglobal threat. Sothisisnotaboutapolicyimplication, thisisaboutthenational securityadvisorbeingvulnerabletoblackmailbytheRussians. And theAmerican peopledeserveto knowwhetherin theseextraordinarycircumstancestheC IAkeptthem safe. POMPEO: Yes, sir, theCIA'skeptAmerica safe. And... WYDEN: So... POMPEO: And thepeopleattheCentralIntelligenceAgencyarecommitted tothatand will remaincommitted to that. And wewill... (CROSSTALK) POMPEO: ... dothatin thefaceof... WYDEN: You won'tanswerthequestion... POMPEO: Wewilldothatin thefaceofpolitical challengesthatcomefrom anydirection, Senator. WYDEN: But, you will notanswerthequestion ofwhetherornotyou wereawareoftheconcernsbehind the Yateswarning. POMPEO: Sir, Idon'tknowexactlywhatyou'rereferringtowith theYateswarning, I --I--Iwasn'tpartofanyof thoseconversations.I --I... (CROSSTALK) 25 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 WYDEN: The Yates warning was... (CROSSTALK) POMPEO: ... I have no first hand information with respect to the warning that was given. WYDEN: OK. POMPEO: She didn't make that warning to me. I -- I can't -- I can't answer that question, Senator... WYDEN: OK. POMPEO: ... as much as I would like to. WYDEN: OK. Director Coats, how concerned are you that a Russian government oil company, run by a Putin crony could end up owning a significant percentage of U.S. oil refining capacity and what are you advising the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States about this? COATS: I don't have specific information relative to that. I think that's something that potentially, we could provide intelligence on in terms of what this -- what situation might be, but... WYDEN: I'd like you to furnace that in writing. Let me see if I can get one other question in, there have been mountains of press stories with allegations about financial connections between Russia and Trump and his associates. The matters are directly relevant to the FBI and my question is, when it comes to illicit Russian money and in particular, it's potential to be laundered on its way to the United States, what should the committee be most concerned about? We hear stories about Deutsche Bank, Bank ofypress, C Shell companies in Moldova, the British Virgin Islands. I'd like to get your sense because I'm overmy time. Director McCabe, what you we most -- be most concerned about with respect to illicit Russian money and its potential to be laundered on its way the United States? MCC ABE: Certainly sir. So as you know, I am not in the position to be able to speak about specific investigations and certainly not in this setting. However, I will confirm for you that those are issues that concern us greatly. 26 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Theyhavetraditionallyandtheydoeven moresotoday, asitbecomeseasiertoconceal theorigin and the--and thetrackand thedestination ofpurposeofillicitmoneyflows, astheexchangeofinformation becomesmorecloudedinencryption and then moreobtuse,itbecomesharderandhardertogettothe bottom ofthoseinvestigations. Thatwould shedlighton thoseissues. WYDEN: Thankyou, Mr. hairman. C BURR: SenatorRisch? RISCH: Thankyou verymuch. Gentlemen, I --thepurposeofthishearingasthechairmanexpressedistogive theAmerican peoplesomeinsightintowhatwealldo,which theydon'tseeprettymuch atall. And soI thinkwhatI wanttodoisIwanttomakean observation and then Iwanttogetyourtakeon it, anybody whowantstovolunteer. AndI'm goingtostartwithyouDirectorC oats, tovolunteer. My--Ihavebeen --I'vebeen onthiscommitteeall thetimeI'vebeen herein theSenateandall through thelastadministration. AndIhavebeen greatlyimpressedbythecurrentadministrationshittingthe groundrunningduringthefirsthundreddays,asfarastheirengagementon intelligencemattersand theirengagementwithforeign countries. Thenational mediahereisfocusedon domesticissueswhichis ofgreatinteresttotheAmerican peoplebeithealthcare, beitpersonnelissuesin thegovernment. And theydon't--the--themedia isn'tasfocusedonthisadministrationsfast, andin myjudgment, robustengagementwith theintelligencecommunitiesaround theworld and with othergovernments. And myimpression isthatit'sgood anditisaggressive. AndI want--I'dlikeyou're--I'dlikeyour impression ofwherewe'regoing. Almostallofyou hadreal engagementin thelastadministration and all theadministrationsare different. SoDirectorC oats, you wanttotakethaton startwith? to COATS: I'dbehappytostartwith that, Ithinkmostpresidentsthatcomeintoofficecomewith an agenda in mindin termsofwhatissuesthey'dliketopursue,manyofthem issuesthateffect--domesticissues thataffectinfrastructureand education and anumberofthingsonlytofind thatthisisdangerousworld, thattheUnitedStates--thatthethreatsthatexistoutthereneed tobe --begiven attention to. Thispresident,whoIthinktheperception wasnotinterestedin that,IthinkDirectorPompeoandI can certifythefactthatwehavespentfarmorehoursin theOvalOfficethan weanticipated. Thepresident isavoraciousconsumerofinformation and askingquestionsand askingustoprovideintelligence. - I - wearebothpartofa processrun through thenational securitycouncil, GeneralMcMaster, all through thedeputy'scommitteesand theprincipal'scommitteesconsuminghoursandhoursoftimelookingat thethreats, howdoweaddressthosethreats, whatistheintelligencethattellsus--thatinformsthe policymakersintermsofhowtheyputastrategyin place. And sowhatIinitiallythoughtwouldbeaoneortwotimeaweek, 10to15minutequickbrief, has turnedintoan everyday, sometimesexceeding45minutestoan hourormorejustin briefingthe president. Wehave--Ihavebroughtalongseveral ofourdirectorstocomeandshowthepresident 27 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 whattheiragenciesdoandhowimportantitistheinfo--thattheinformation theyprovidehowthat- - forthebasisofmakingpolicydecisions. I'dliketoturn tomyC IAcolleaguetoget--lethim giveyou, and others,giveyou to theirimpression. RISCH: Iappreciatethat. We'realmostoutoftimebutIdid --DirectorPompeoyoukind ofsitin thesamespot weall sitin through thelastseveralyearsandIkind oflikeyourobservationsalongthelineofDirector Coats,whatyou feel aboutthematter? POMPEO: Yeah, IthinkDirectorC oatshaditright. HeandI spend timewith thepresidenteveryday, briefinghim with themosturgentintelligencemattersthatarepresented tousas--inourroles. Heasksgood, hard questions. Makeusgomakesurewe'redoingourworkin therightway. Second,you asked aboutengagementin theworld. Thisadministration hasreentered thebattlespacein placestheadministration --thepreviousadministration wascompletelyabsent. You all travel some too... RISCH: Yes. POMPEO: ... youwillhearthatwhen you gotravel. I'venowtaken twotripstoplacesand theywelcomeAmerican leadership. They'renotlookingforAmerican soldiers,they'renotlookingforAmerican bootson the ground, they'relookingforAmerican leadershiparound theglobeand thispresidenthasreentered that spacein awaythatI thinkwill serveAmerica'sinterestverywell. RISCH: YeahI --Icouldn'tagreemoreandwe--wedeal with them notonlyoverseasbuttheycomehere, as you know, regularly. POMPEO: Yessir. RISCH: And thefactthatthepresidenthaspulled thetriggertwiceashehasin --inthefirst100daysand --and doneitin afashion thatdidn'tstartaworld warand --and waswatchedbyboth ourfriendsand our enemieshasmadeasignificantand ahugedifferenceasfarasourstandingin theworld. Mytime'sup. Thankyou verymuchMr.C hair. WARNER: Thankyou Senator. SenatorHeinrich. HEINRICH: 28 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Director McCabe you -- you obviously have several decades of law enforcement experience, is it -- is it your experience that people who are innocent of wrong doing typically need to be reassured that they're not the subject of an investigation? MCC ABE: No sir. HEINRICH: And I ask that because I'm still trying to make heads or tails of the dismissal letter from -- earlier this week from the president where he writes, "While I greatly appreciate you informing me, on three separate occasions, that I am not under investigation." And I'm still trying to figure out why that would even make it into a dismissal letter. But let me go to something a little more direct. Director, has anyone in the White House spoken to you directly about the Russia investigation? MCC ABE: No, sir. HEINRICH: Let me -- when -- when did you last meet with the president, Directorabe? McC MCC ABE: I don't think I -- I'm in... HEINRICH: Was it earlier this week? MCC ABE: ... the position to comment on that. I have met with the president this week, but I really don't want to go into the details ofthat. HEINRICH: OK. But Russia did not come up? MCC ABE: That's correct, it did not. HEINRICH: OK, thank you. We've heard in the news that -- claims that -- that Director Comey had -- had lost the confidence of rank and file FBI employees. You've been there for 21 years, in your opinion is it accurate that the rankand file no longer supported Director Comey? MCC ABE: No, sir, that is not accurate. can I tell you, sir, that I worked very, very closely omey. with From Director C the moment he started at the FBI I was his executive assistant director of national security at that time and I worked for him running the Washington field office. And of course I've served as deputy for the last year. 29 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 MCC ABE: I can tell you that I hold Director omey C in the absolute highest regard. I have the highest respect for his considerable abilities and his integrity and it has been the greatest privilege and honor in my professional life to work with him. I can tell you also that Director omey C enjoyed broad support within the FBI and still does until this day. We are a large organization, we are 36,500 people across this country, across this globe. We have a diversity of opinions about many things, but I can confidently tell you that the majority -- the vast majority of FBI employees enjoyed a deep and positive connection Director to C omey. HEINRICH: Thank you for your candor. Do you feel like you have the adequate resources for the existing investigations that the -- that the bureau is invested in right now to -- to follow them wherever they may lead? MCC ABE: Sir, if you're referring to the Russia investigation, I do. I believe we have the adequate resources to do it and I know that we have resourced that investigation adequately. If you're referring to the many constantly multiplying counter-intelligence threats that we face across the spectrum, they get bigger and more challenging every day and resources become an issue over time. HEINRICH: Sure. MCC ABE: But in terms of that investigation, sir, I can -- I can assure you we are covered. HEINRICH: Thank you. Director Coats, welcome back. Would you agree that it is a national security risk toprovide classified information to an individual who has been compromised by a foreign government as a broad matter. COATS: As a broad matter, yes. HEINRICH: If the attorney general came to you and said one of your employees was compromised what -- what sort of action would you take? COATS: I would take the action as prescribed in our procedures relative to how we report this ad how it's -- how it is processed. I mean, it's a serious -- serious issue Our -- our -- I would be consulting with our legal counsel and consulting with our inspector general and others as to how -- how best to proceed with this, but obviously we will take action. HEINRICH: 30 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Would -- would one of the options be dismissal, obviously? COATS: Very potentially could be dismissal, yes. HEINRICH: OK, thank you Director. BURR: Senator Collins? COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. hairman C and Mr. Vicehairman. C Mr. McCabe, is the agent who is in charge of this very important investigation into Russian attempts to influence our election last fall still in charge? MCC ABE: I mean we have many agents involved in the investigation at many levels so I'm not who you're referring to. COLLINS: The lead agent overseeing the investigation. MCC ABE: Certainly, almost all of the agents involved in the investigation are still in their positions. COLLINS: So has there been any curtailment of the FBI's activities in this important investigation since Director Comey was fired? MCC ABE: Ma'am, we don't curtail our activities. As you know, has the -- are people experiencing questions and are reacting to the developments this week? Absolutely. COLLINS: Does that get in the way ofour ability to pursue this or any otherinvestigation? MCC ABE: No ma'am, we continue to focus on our mission and get that job done. COLLINS: I want to follow up on a question of resources that Senator Heinrich asked your opinion on. Press reports yesterday indicated that Director Comey requested additional resources from the Justice Department for the bureau's ongoing investigation into Russian active measures. Are you aware that request? Can you confirm that that request was in fact made? MCC ABE: 31 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 I cannot confirm that request was made. As you know ma'am, when we need resources, we make those requests here. So I -- I don't -- I'm not aware of that request and it's not consistent with my understanding of how we request additional resources. That said, we don't typically request resources for an individual case. And as I mentioned, I strongly believe that the Russian investigation is adequately resourced. COLLINS: You've also been asked a question about target letters. Now, it's my understanding that when an individual is the target of an investigation, at some point, a letter is sent out notifying a individual that he is a target, is that correct? MCC ABE: No ma'am, I -- I don't believe that's correct. COLLINS: OK. So before there is going to be an indictment, there is not a target letter sent out by the Justice Department? MCC ABE: Not that I'm aware of. COLLINS: OK that's contrary to my -- my understanding, but let me ask you the reverse. MCC ABE: Again, I'm looking at it from the perspective of the investigators. So that's not part of our normal case investigative practice. COLLINS: That would be the Justice Department, though. The Justice Department... MCC ABE: I see, I see... COLLINS: I'm -- I'm asking you, isn't it standard practice when someone is the target of an investigation and is perhaps on the verge of being indicted that the Justice Department sends that individual what is known as a target letter? MCC ABE: Yes, ma'am I'm going have to defer that question to the Department of Justice. COLLINS: Well, let me askyou the -- the flip side ofthat and perhaps you don't know the answer to this question but is it standard practice for the FBI to inform someone that they are not a target of an investigation? MCC ABE: 32 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 It is not. COLLINS: So it would be unusual and not standard practice for there -- it -- for there to have been a notification from the FBI director to President Trump or anyone else involved in this investigation, informing him or her that that individual I not a target, is that correct? MCC ABE: Again ma'am, I'm not going to comment what on Director Comeymayormay not have done. COLLINS: I -- I'm not asking you to comment on the facts of the case, I'm just trying to figure out what's standard practice and what's not. MCC ABE: Yes ma'am. I'm not aware ofthat being a standard practice. COLLINS: Admiral Rogers, I want to follow up on Senator Warner's question to you about the attempted interference in the French... ROGERS: French. COLLINS: ... election. Some researchers, including the cyber intelligence firm Flashpoint claim that APT28 is the group that was behind the stealing of the -- and the leaking of the information about the president elect of France, the FBI and DHS have publicly tied APT28 to Russian intelligence services in the joint analysis report last year after the group's involvement in stealing data that was leaked in the run up to the U.S. elections in November. Is the I.C.in a position to attribute the stealing and the leaking that took place prior to the French election to be the result of activities by this group, which is linked toRussian cyber activity? ROGERS: Again ma'am, right now I don't think I have a complete picture of all the activity associated with France but as I have said publicly, both today and previously, we are aware of specific Russian activity directed against the French election cycle in the course -- particularly in the last few weeks. To the point where we felt it was important enough we actually reached out to our French counterparts to inform them and make sure they awareness of what we were aware of and also to ask them, is there something we are missing that you are seeing? COLLINS: Thank you. BURR: Senator King. 33 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 KING: Mr. McCabe, thank you for being here today under somewhat difficult circumstances, we appreciate your candor in your testimony. On March 20th, Director Comey then -- Director omey C testified to the House of Representative, "I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russian efforts. As with any counter intelligence investigation this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed." Is that statement still accurate? MCC ABE: Yes sir, it is. KING: And how many agents are assigned to this project? How many -- or personnel generally with the FBI, roughly? MCC ABE: Yeah, sorry I can't really answer those sorts of questions in this forum. KING: Well, yesterday a White House press spokesman said that this is one of the smallest things on the plate of the FBI, is that an accurate statement? MCC ABE: It is... KING: Is this a small investigation in relation to all -- to all the other work that you're doing? MCC ABE: Sir, we consider it to be a highly significant investigation. KING: So you would not characterize it as one of the smallest things you're engaged in? MCC ABE: I would not. KING: Thank you. 34 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Let me change the subject briefly. We're -- we've been talking about Russia and -- and their involvement in this election. One of the issues of concern to me, and perhaps I can direct this to -- well, I'll direct it to anybody in the panel. The allegation ofRussian involvement in our electoral systems, is that an issue that is of concern and what do we know about that? And is that being up followed up on by this investigation. Mr. McCabe, is that part of your investigation? No I'm -- I'm not talking about the presidential election, I'm talking about state level election infrastructure. MCC ABE: Yes, sir. So obviously not discussing any specific investigation in detail. The -- the issue of Russian interference in the U.S. democratic process is one that causes us great concern. And quite frankly, it's something we've spent a lot of time working on over the past several months. And to reflect comments that were made in response to an earlier question that Director oats handled, C I think part of that process is to understand the inclinations of our foreign adversaries to interfere in those areas. So we've seen this once, we are better positioned to see it the next time. We're able to improve not only our coordination with -- primarily through the Department of Homeland -- through DHS, their -- their expansive network and to the state and local election infrastructure. But to interact with those folks to defend against ; whether it's cyber attacks or any sort of influence driven interactions. KING: Thank you, I think that's a very important part of this issue. Admiral Rogers, yesterday a camera crew from TAS (ph) was allowed into the Oval Office. There was not any American press allowed, was there any consultation with you with regard to that action in terms of the risk of some kind of cyber penetration or communications in that incident? ROGERS: No. KING: Were you -- you were -- your agency wasn't consulted in any way? ROGERS: Not that I'm aware of. I wouldn't expect that to automatically be the case; but no, not that I'm aware of. KING: Did it raise any concerns when you saw those pictures that those cameramen and crew were in the Oval Office without.... ROGERS: I'll be honest, I wasn't aware of where the imaged came from. KING: All right, thank you. 35 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Mr. oatsC -- Director C oats, you're -- you're - - you lead the intelligence community. Were you consulted at all with regard to the firing of Director omey? C COATS: I was not. KING: So you had no -- there were no discussions with you even though the FBI's an important part of the intelligence community? COATS: There were no discussions. KING: Thank you. Mr. hairman,C thank you. BURR: Thank you Senator King. Senator Lankford. LANKFORD: Thank you, let me just run through some quick questions this. on Director McCabe, thanks for being here as well. Let me hit some high points of some of the things I've heard already, just to be able to confirm. You have the resources you need for the Russia investigation, is that correct? MCC ABE: Sir, we believe it's adequately resourced... LANKFORD: OK, so there's not limitations on resources, you have what you need? The -- the actions about Jim Comey and his release has not curtailed the investigation from the FBI, it's still moving forward? MCC ABE: The investigation will move forward, absolutely. LANKFORD: No agents have been removed that are the ongoing career folks that are doing the investigation? MCC ABE: No, sir. LANKFORD: 36 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Is it your impression at this point that the FBI is unable to complete the investigation in a fair and expeditious way because of the removal of Jim omey? C MCC ABE: It is my opinion and belief that the FBI will continue to pursue this investigation vigorously and completely. LANKFORD: Do you need somebody to take this away from you and somebody else to do? MCC ABE: No sir. LANKFORD: OK. Let me ask you a separate question. As I go through the report and tracking through the worldwide threats that was put out, that Director Coats put out, there's a section on it in narcotics and the movement of illegal drugs. And there's a section on it about tens ofthousands ofillegal pharmacies that are online at this point distributing narcotics. And 18 to 20 of those go online a day, still. Can you help me understand a little more about what the FBI is doing to be able to interdict, to be able to engage, how many of those are American, how many of those are international and what we can do to be able to stop the movement of narcotics through our mail system? MCC ABE: Yes, yes, sir so -- it's a great question and one that we spend agreat deal of time on. As you know, the traffic of illegal narcotics is something that we, along with our partners at the DEA and other law and federal, state and local law enforcement partners are focused on for many years, we've had great success. But the issue, the threat continues to change, continues to develop and -- and confront us in new ways. The profusion of illegal online pharmacies is certainly one of those ways. And quite frankly, it's something that we are learning more about, spending more time on every day. LANKFORD: Well, I'm glad that it is highlighted in the report with tens of thousands of these pharmacies that are out there in the distribution systems, it's no longer a drug dealer on the corner anymore. They just deliver it to your house now and there's a whole different set of issues that we aggressively need to address on this. Director Coats, I have a -- I have a question for you. We've talked often about a cyber doctrine and its one of the issues that keeps being raised that other nations and nation states and -- and actors need to understand what our boundaries are and how we're going to do this. This seems to be talked to death. And everyone that I raise it with says yes, it needs to occur. 37 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 WhatI need toknowis, whohastheball on leadingouttomakesureayearfrom now, we'renottalking aboutweneed togetacyberdoctrine. Iguessspecifically, when wedothishearingnextyear, who should wehold accountableifwedon'thaveacyberdoctrine? COATS: Well, that'saverygoodquestion. Ithinkall ofuswould agreeweneed acyberdoctrinebecauseclearly itisoneofthetop, ifnotthenumberonethreattodaythatwe'redealingwith. Asyou know,the presidentpassed an effortunderthedirection offormerMayorGiuliani with this.Thathasnotled toa conclusion atthisparticularpointintime. Idon'thavethedetailson that. Iwould agreewithyou, however, thatthisisathreatthatourpolicymakersneed to --needtoaddress. I'm hopingthatwhen weareherenextyear,wewillhaveasolid responsetoyourquestion,butatthis particularpointin time, franklygiven theproliferationofissuesthatwe'retryingtodeal with,it'salmost overwhelming... LANKFORD: Anditisand that--and that'sgettingourhandstoall ofthem.Theyarejustsomanythingsthatare flyingaround, thiskeepsgettingleftandithasbeen foryears, beenleft. And whatweneed totryto figureoutishowdoweactuallyfind outwho'sgottheball andwhodowehold toaccounttobeableto helpusworkthrough thisoristhissomethingthatweneed tobeabletoworkthrough? Inoticed asIread throughyourreport, whichwasexcellentbythewayonall theworldwidethreats, everysinglesectionofyourreport, everysection ofithad asectionon Iran. Everypartofthat, that there'sathreatandin fact,in onesection ofit, you wroteIran continuesto betheforemoststate sponsorofterrorism. Whetheritwascyber,whetheritisactiveterrorism, whetheritisinvolvementin everydifferentnefariousaction, itseemstoalwayscirclebacktoIran atsomepoint, in somewayof facilitatingthis. Sothisis--thisisoneofthoseareasthatwe'vegottobeabletofigureouthowtobeabletodeal with. Justin abroadquestion on itand maybeGeneralStewartyou'dbetherightonetobeabletodeal with thisbutanyonecould --could answerthis.Myconcern is, isthatwhenwe're dealingwithSyria, the focusseemstobeon Russia in SyriaorISISin Syria and we'relosingtrackofthemovementofIran throughIraqintoSyria,we'relosingtrackofwhat'shappeningin Yemen and otherplaces. Who --whatisyourperception ofIran'sgoal through theMiddleEast?IstheirgoalhigherforYemen or isithighergoingintoSyria andintoIraq andtobeabletooccupyand stay?Andistheperception that theRussianswanttoremain thereorIranwantstoremain in Syriaandbethedominantforcethere? STEWART: ClearlyIran viewsthemselves as theregional --thedominantregionalpower.Theywill continuetouse militia forcesand asymmetricforcestoachievetheaimsofcontrollinglargepartsoftheregion. Iftheycan'tcontrol them physicallytheytendtoinfluencethem politically. Syria becomesaverykey strategicpointforthem, itallowsthem toleveragetheSyrian force, LebaneseandLebaneseHezbollah andmovecapabilityandforcesacrosstheregion. Theywillbein competition, atsomepoint,with Russia. 38 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Russia views themselves as the regional power, at least the dominant regional power today. I'm not sure that Russian and Iran's influence will remain aligned in the long term. In the near term they're very closely aligned as it relates to propping up and securing the Syrian regime. LANKFORD: Thank you. BURR: Senator Manchin. MANCHIN: Thank you Mr. hairman. C Thank all of you for being here, I really appreciate it and I know that, Mr. McCabe, you seem to be of great interest of being here. And we're going to look forward to really from hearing from all of you all in a closed hearing this afternoon which I think that we'll able to get into more detail. So I appreciate that. I just one question for Mr. abeMcC it's basically the morale of the agency, the FBI agency and the morale basically starting back from July 5th to July 7th, October 28th, November 6th and election day -- did you all ever think you'd be embroiled in an election such as this and did -- what did it do to the morale? MCC ABE: Well, I -- I don't know that anyone envisioned exactly the way these things would develop. You know, as I said earlier Senator, we are a -- a large organization. We are -- we have a lot of diversity of opinions and -- and viewpoints on things. We are also a fiercely independent group. MANCHIN: I'm just saying that basically, before July 5th, before the first testimony that basically Director omey Cgot involved in, prior to that, did you see a change in the morale? Just yes or no -- yes a change or more anxious, more concern? MCC ABE: I think morale has always been good, however we had -- there were folks within our agency who were frustrated with the outcome of the Hillarylinton C case and some of those folks very were vocal about that -- those concerns. MANCHIN: I'm sure we'll have more questions in the closed hearing, sir but let me say to the rest of you all, we talked about Kaspersky, the lab, KL Lab. Do you all have -- has it risen to your level being the head of all ofour intelligence agencies and people that mostly concerned about the security ofour country of having a Russian connection in a lab as far outreaching as KL Labs? Has it come with your IT people coming to you or have you gone directly to them making sure that you have no interaction with KL or any of the contractors you do business with? Just down the line there, Mr. ardillo?C CARDILLO: 39 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Well,wecounton theexpertiseofAdmiralRogersand theFBI toprotectoursystemsand soIvalue... MANCHIN: ...Butyou haveI--you haveITpeople, right? CARDILLO: Absolutely. MANCHIN: Haveyou talked to theITpeople?Hasitcometoyourconcernthattheremightbeaproblem? CARDILLO: I'm awareoftheKasperskyLabchallengeand/orthreat. MANCHIN: Letmetellyou, it'smoreofa challenge --morethan achallenge, sirandI wouldhopethat--I'llgodown thelinebutIhopethatallofyou --weareverymuch concerned aboutthis,verymuch concerned about securityofourcountrywatching(ph) theirinvolvement. CARDILLO: Wesharethat. MANCHIN: General? STEWART: WearetrackingKasperskyand theirsoftware. Thereisaswell asIknow, andI'vechecked thisrecently, no Kasperskysoftwareon ournetworks. MANCHIN: Anycontractors? STEWART: Now, thecontractorpiecemightbealittlebithardertodefine butatthispointweseenoconnectionto Kasperskyand contractorssupporting(ph)... MANCHIN: ...AdmiralRogers? ROGERS: I'm personallyawareandinvolved with thedirectoron thenational securityissuesand theKaspersky Labissue, yessir. COATS: Itwasn'tthatlongagoIwassittinguptheretalking--raisingissuesaboutKasperskyanditsposition here. And thatcontinuesin thisnewjob. POMPEO: 40 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 It has risen to the directorofthe IA Cas well, Senator Manchin. MANCHIN: Great. (UNKNOWN) He's very concerned about it, sir, and we are focused on it closely. MANCHIN: Only thing I would ask all of you, if you can give us a report back if you've swept all of your contractors to make sure they understand the certainty you have, concern that you have about this and making sure that they can verify to you all that they're not involved whatsoever with any Kaspersky's hardware. I'm going to switch to a couple different things because of national security. But you know, the bottom gangs that we have in the United States, and I know -- we don't talk about them much. And when you talk about you have rips, MS-13, you've gotthe Hells C Angels, Aryan Brotherhood, it goes on and on and on, it's quite a few. What is -- what are we doing and what is it to your level -- has it been brought to your level the concern we have with these gangs within our country, really every part of our country? Anybody on the gangland? MCC ABE: Yes sir. So we spend a lot of time talking about that at the FBI. It's one of our highest priorities... MANCHIN: Did the resources go out to each one of these because they're interspersed over the country? MCC ABE: We do, sir. We have been focused on the gang threat for many years. It -- like -- much like the online pharmacy threat. It continues to change and develop harried we think it'slikely a -- having an impact on elevated violent crime rates across the country, so we're spending alot of time focused on that. MANCHIN: One -- One last question real quick, my time is running out, is basically the question is on rare earth elements. I'm understanding ever since the closure of the California -- which is the Mountain Pass mine, which was the last mine that we had that was giving a domestic source of restless of elements, that's been closed, and now we're 100 percent dependent of foreign -- on basically foreign purchases of rare earth elements for what we need every day to run this country. We don't do any of it in this country anymore. And most of it comes from china. Do any of you have a concern about that? POMPEO: So, Senator Manchin (ph), I'll speak to that. Yes, we're concerned. We are -- we do a lot of work to figure out where they are and help the intelligence community -- help the policy community shape policy surrounding how we ought to treat this issue. But it's a very -- it's a very real concern, and it obviously depends on the elements. But we use them for important technologies to keep us all safe, those very rare earth elements. 41 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 MANCHIN: Letmejustsay,thatI --itsbeen told tomethatthedepartmentofdefenseneedsabout800tonsofrare earth elementsperyear, andI would wantyou tomakesureyou know, WestVirginia hasthe opportunitytoprovidethiscountrywith therareearth elementsithasbecauseofourminingprocess andall ofthatwe haveextractthrough theminingprocess. Wearehappytocometoaid, sir. (UNKNOWN) Thankyou, senator. BURR: Thankyou, SenatorManchin. BeforeIturn toSenatorC can otton, Isayforthemembers, thevicechair andIhavetostepoutfora meetingthatwe can'tpush off. Iwould askSenatorHarris, otton,SenatorC toconcludetheirfirst-roundquestions. Anymemberthatseeksadditionalquestionswillberecognized bythechair. Iwould askyou tolimitthosequestions,ifyoucan, butthechairwill ask--will saywe're notgoingoverfiveminutesforthesecond round ofquestions. Itismyhopewewillgivesufficienttimetothesesixgentlemen tohavenutritionbeforewereconvene at1:30into219. It'smyunderstandingthattherewillbeavote, circa 2:00, and wewilldecideexactly howwehandlethat. Buttheclosedhearings, weliketomakesurenobodymissesanything, sowe --we mightslightlyadjustwhatwe aredoing. WYDEN: Mr. hairman, C justandinquiry, andI appreciateyourthoughtfulness. So, inyourdeparture, as work we throughit, it'sstill acceptabletobegin anotherfive-minuteroundforthose... BURR: Uptofiveminutes. WYDEN: Thankyou. BURR: SenatorC otton. COTTON: Inmatesarerunningtheasylum. (LAUGHTER) COTTON: So, Ithinkeveryonein thisroom andmostAmericanshavecometoappreciatetheaggressivenesswith which wouldRussia usesactivemeasuresorcovertinfluenceoperations, propaganda, call them what you will, asyouragenciesassesstheydidin 2016andin hackingintothosee-mailsand releasingthem asnewsreportssuggesttheydid. In theFrenchelection lastweek--that'sonereasonwhyI soughtto revivetheRussian activemeasuresworkinggroupin theFY'17IntelligenceAuthorization Act. Theseactivitiesthatwillgofarbeyond elections, Ithink, asmostofourwitnessesknow. formerdirector oftheC IA, BobGates,in hismemoir"From the Shadows," detailed sovietcovertinfluencecampaigns 42 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 designed tosloworthwarttheU.S. developmentofnucleardeliverysystemsandwarheads, -missile defensesystemsand employmentofintermediatenuclearrangesystemstoEurope. Specificallyon page260ofhismemoir, hewrites"duringtheperiod,thesovietsmounted amassive covertaction operation, aimed atthwartingINFdeploymentsbyNATO. IAdevoted WeatC tremendous resourcestoaneffortatthetimeto uncoveringthesovietcovertcampaign. DirectorC aseysummarized thisextraordinaryeffortina paperhesenttoBush, Schultz, WeinbergerandC larkon January18,1983. Welaterpublisheditand circulateditwidelywithin thegovernmentand totheallies, andfinally, provided an unclassified versionofthepublictouse," endquote. I'dliketothanktheC IAfordiggingupthisunclassified versionofthedocumentandprovidingittothe committee, SovietStrategytoderailU.S. INFdeployment. Specifically, underminingNATO'ssolidarityin thosedeployments. Ihaveasked unanimousconsentthatitbeincludedin thehearingtranscriptand sincetheinmatesarerunningtheasylum, hearingnoobjection, we'llincludeitinthetranscript. (LAUGHTER) DirectorPompeo, earlierthisyear, Dr. RoyGodson testified thathebelieved thatRussia wasusingactive measuresand covertinfluenceeffortstoundermineournuclearmodernization efforts,ourmissile defensedeployments, andtheINFTreaty,in keepingwith thesepastpractices. Tothebestofyourabilityin thissetting, wouldyou agreewith theassessmentthatRussia islikelyusing such activemeasurestoundermineU.S. nuclearmodernization effortsand missiledefenses? POMPEO: Yes. COTTON: Thankyou. AsImentioned earlier, theF.Y. '17IntelligenceAuthorization Actincluded twounclassifiedprovisions thatI authored. Onewouldbere-startingthatold(inaudible)MeasuresWorkingGroup. Asecondwould requireadditional scrutinyofRussian embassyofficialswhotravel morethan theprescribeddistance from theirdutystation, whetherit'stheirembassyora consulatearound theUnitedStates. In late2016,when thatbill wason thevergeofpassing, Ipersonallyreceived callsfrom high-ranking Obama administrationofficialsaskingmetowithdrawthem from thebill. Ideclined. Thebilldid not pass. ItpassedlastweekaspartoftheF.Y. '17spendingbill. Idid notreceiveanyobjection from Trumpadministrationofficialstoincludefrom ourintelligence community. DirectorC oats, are you awareofanyobjection thattheTrumpadministration had tomytwoprovisions? COATS: No, I'mnotawareofanyobjection. COTTON: 43 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 DirectorPompeo? POMPEO: None. COTTON: Doyou knowwhytheObama administration objected tothosetwoprovisionsin late2016?I would add afterthe2016presidential election. COATS: Well, itwouldbepurespeculation. Idon't--Icouldn'tread --Iwasn'tabletoread thepresident'smind then andIdon'tthinkI canreaditnow. COTTON: Thankyou. I'dliketoturnmyattention toaveryimportantprovisionoflaw. Iknowthatyou'vediscussed earlier section 702. DirectorRogers, it'smyunderstandingthatyouragencyisundertakingan efforttotrytoreleasesome kind ofunclassified estimateofthenumberofU.S. personswhomighthavebeenincidentallycollected using702techniques. Isthatcorrect? ROGERS: Sir, we'relookingtoseeifwecanquantifysomethingthat'sofvaluetopeopleoutside theorganization. COTTON: Would --would thatrequireyou goingin and conductingsearchesofincidental collectionthathave been previouslyunexamined? ROGERS: That'spartofthechallenge. HowdoIgenerateinsightthatdoesn'tin theprocessofgeneratingthe insightviolatetheactual tenetsthat... (CROSSTALK) COTTON: So--sowe're--you'retryingtoproduceanestimatethatisdesigned toprotectprivacyrights, butto producethatestimate,you'regoingtohavetoviolateprivacyrights? ROGERS: Thatisapotentialpartofall ofthis. COTTON: Itseemshard todo. ROGERS: Yes, sir.That'swhyithastaken usaperiodoftimeandthat'swhywe'rein themidstofa dialogue. 44 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 COTTON: Is it going to be possible to produce that kind of estimate without some degree of inaccuracy or misleading information, or infringing upon the privacy rights of Americans? ROGERS: Probably not. COTTON: If anyone in your agency, foror that matter, Director McCabe, in yours, believes that there is misconduct or privacy rights are not being protected, they could, I believe under current law, come to your inspector general; come to your general counsel. Iassume you have open door policies. ROGERS: Whistleblower protections in addition, yes, sir, and they can come to you. COTTON: They can come to this committee. So four -- at least four different avenues. I'm probably missing some, if they believe there are any abuses in the section 702 (inaudible). MCC ABE (?): And anyone in their chain of command. COTTON: I would ask that we proceed with caution before producing a report that might infringe on Americans' privacy rights needlessly, and that might make it even that much harder to reauthorize a critical program, something that, Director McCabe, your predecessor last week just characterized, canif I paraphrase, as a must-have program, not a nice-to-have program. Thank you. BURR: Thank you, Senator otton. C Senator Harris? HARRIS: Thank you. Acting Director McCabe, welcome. I know you've been in this position for only about 48 hours, and I appreciate your candor with this committee during the course of this open hearing. MCC ABE: Yes, ma'am. HARRIS: 45 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Until this point, what was your role in the FBI's investigation into the Russian hacking of the 2016 election? MCC ABE: I've been the deputy director since February of 2016. So I've had an oversight role over all ofour FBI operational activity, including that investigation. HARRIS: And now that you're acting director, what will your role be in the investigation? MCC ABE: Very similar, senior oversight role to understand what our folks are doing and to make sure they have the resources they need and are getting the direction and the guidance they need to go forward. HARRIS: Do you support the idea of a special prosecutor taking over the investigation in terms of oversight of the investigation, in addition to your role? MCC ABE: Ma'am, that is a question for the Department of Justice and it wouldn't be proper for me to comment on that. HARRIS: From your understanding, who at the Department of Justice is in charge of the investigation? MCC ABE: The deputy attorney general, who serves as acting attorney general for that investigation. He is in charge. HARRIS: And have you had conversations with him about the investigation since you've been in this role? MCC ABE: I have. Yes, ma'am. HARRIS: And when Director omey C was fired, my understanding is he was not present in his office. He was actually in alifornia.C So my question is: wasWho in charge of securing his files and devices -- when that when that information came down that he had been fired? MCC ABE: That's our responsibility, ma'am. HARRIS: And are you confident that his files and his devices have been secured in a way that we can maintain whatever information or evidence he has in connection with the investigation? MCC ABE: 46 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Yes, ma'am. I am. HARRIS: It's been widely reported, and you've mentioned this, that Directoromey asked C Rosenstein for additional resources. And I understand that you're saying that you don't believe that you need any additional resources? MCC ABE: For the Russia investigation, ma'am, I think we are adequately resourced. HARRIS: And will you commit to this committee that if you do need resources, that you will come to us, understanding that we would make every effort to get you what you need? MCC ABE: I absolutely will. HARRIS: Has -- I understand that you've said that the White House, that you have not talked with the White House about the Russia investigation. Is that correct? MCC ABE: That's correct. HARRIS: Have you talked with Jeff Sessions about the investigation? MCC ABE: No, ma'am. HARRIS: Have you talked with anyone other than Rod Rosenstein at the Department of Justice about the investigation? MCC ABE: I don't believe I have -- you know, not recently; obviously, not in that -- not in this position. HARRIS: Not in the last 48 hours? MCC ABE: No, ma'am. HARRIS: OK. What protections have been put in place to assure that the good men and women of the FBI understand that they will not be fired if they aggressively pursue this investigation? MCC ABE: 47 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Yes, ma'am. So we have very active lines of communication with the team that's -- that's working on this issue. They are -- they have some exemplary and incredibly effective leaders that they work directly for. And I am confident that those -- that they understand and are confident in their position moving forward on this investigation, as my investigators, analysts and professionals staff are in everything we do every day. HARRIS: And I agree with you. I have no question about the commitment that the men and women of the FBI have to pursue their mission. But will you commit to me that you will directly communicate in some way now that these occurrences have happened and Director omey C has been fired? Will you commit me to that given this changed circumstance, that you will find a way to directly communicate with those men and women to assure them that they will not be fired simply for aggressively pursuing this investigation? MCC ABE: Yes, ma'am. HARRIS: Thank you. And how do you believe we need to handle, to the extent that it exists, any crisis of confidence in the leadership of the FBI, given the firing of Director omey? C MCC ABE: I don't believe there is a crisis of confidence in the leadership of the FBI. That's somewhat self-serving, and I apologize for that. (LAUGHTER) You know, it was completely within the president's authority to take the steps that he did. We all understand that. We expect that he and the Justice Department will work to find a suitable replacement and a permanent director, and we look forward to supporting whoever that person is, whether they begin as an interim director or a permanently selected director. This -- organization in its entirety will be completely committed to helping that person get off to a great start and do what they need to do. HARRIS: And do you believe that there will be any pause in the investigation during this interim period, where we have a number of people who are in acting positions of authority? MCC ABE: No, ma'am. That is my job right now to ensure that the men and women who work for the FBI stay focused on the threats; stay focused on the issues that are of so much importance to this country; continue to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution. And I will ensure that that happens. HARRIS: I appreciate that. Thank you. 48 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 MCC ABE: Yes, ma'am. BURR: Thank you. Senator King? Second round, five minutes each. Senator Wyden? WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. hairman. C I want to go back to the question I asked you, Director Pompeo. And I went out and reviewed the response that you gave to me. And of course, what I'm concerned about is the Sally Yates warning to the White House that Michael Flynn could be blackmailed by the Russians. And you said you didn't have any first-hand indication of it. Did you have any indication -- second-hand, any sense at all that the national security adviser might be vulnerable to blackmail by the Russians? That is a yes or no question. POMPEO: It's actually not a yes-or-no question, Senator. I can't answer yes or no. I regret that I'm unable to do so. You have to remember this is a counterintelligence investigation that was largely being conducted by the FBI and not by the CIA. We're a foreign intelligence organization. And I'll add only this, I was not intending to be clever by using the term "first-hand." I had- no second hand or third-hand knowledge of that conversation either. WYDEN: So with respect to the IA, C were there any discussion with General Flynn at all? POMPEO: With respect to what sir? He was for a period of time the national security advisor. WYDEN: Topics that could have put at risk the security and the well being of the American people. I mean I'm just finding it very hard to swallow that you all had no discussions with the national security advisor. POMPEO: I spoke with the national security advisor. He was the national security advisor. He was present for the daily brief on many occasions and we talked about all the topics we spoke to the President about. WYDEN: But nothing relating to matters that could have compromised the security of the United States? 49 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 POMPEO: SirIcan'trecall everyconversation withGeneralFlynn duringthattimeperiod. WYDEN: We'regoingtoasksomemoreaboutitin closed session thisafternoon. AdmiralRogers,letmeaskyou aboutatechnicalquestion thatI thinkisparticularlytroublingand thatistheS.S. 7question in the technologythreat. LastweektheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritypublished alengthystudyaboutthe impactontheU.S. governmentofmobilephonesecurityflaws. Thereportconfirmed whatIhavebeen warningaboutforquitesometime,whichisthesignificanceofcybersecurityvulnerabilitiesassociated with asignalingsystem seven reportsaysthedepartmentbelieves, andIquote,thatallU.S. carriersare vulnerabletotheseexploits,resultingin riskstonational security, theeconomyand thefederal governmentsabilitytoreliablyexecutenational securityfunctions. Thesevulnerabilitiescan be exploitedbycriminals, terroristsand nation stateactorsandforeign intelligenceorganizations. Doyou all sharetheconcernsoftheDepartmentofHuman --theHomelandSecurityDepartmentabout theseverityofthesevulnerabilitiesand whatoughttobedonerightnowtogetthegovernmentand the privatesectortobeworkingtogethermoreclearlyandin acoherentplan todeal with these monumental risks. These arerisksthatwe'regoingtofacewith terroristsandhackersand threats. AndI thinkthefederal communicationscommission hasbeen treadingwateron thisandI'dliketoseewhat you wanttodoto reallytakechargeofthistodeal whatisan enormousvulnerabilitytothesecurityof thiscountry? ROGERS: Sure. Iheartheconcern. It'sawidelydeployed technologyin themobilesegment. Isharetheconcern theDepartmentofHomeland securityin theirrolekind ofastheleadfederal agencyassociated with cyberand supportfrom thefederalgovernmenttotheprivatesectorasoverallresponsibilityhere. Wearetryingtoprovideatthenational securityagencyourexpertisetohelpgenerateinsightsabout thenatureofthevulnerability, thenatureoftheproblem. PartneringwithDHS, talkingtotheprivate sector. There'sacoupleofspecificthingsfrom atechnologystandpointthatwe'relookingatin multiple formsthatthegovernmenthascreatedpartneringwith theprivatesector. I'm notsmart, Iapologizeaboutall ofthespecificsoftheDHSeffort. Ican takethatfortherecordif you'dlike. WYDEN: All right. Ijustwanttorespondbefore we breaktoSenatorC otton'scommentswith respecttosection 702. Mr. Director, glad toseemytaxreformpartnerbackin thisrole. You knowMr. DirectorthatI think it'scritical theAmerican peopleknowhowmanyinnocentlawabidingAmericansarebeingsweptupin theprogram.Theargumentthatproducingan estimateofthenumberisin itselfa violation ofprivacy, is Ithinkafarfetched arguehasbeen madeforyears. Iand otherswhobelievethatwecan havesecurity andliberty, thatthey'renotmutuallyexclusivehavealwaysbelieved thatthisargumentthatyou're goingtobeinvadingpeoplesprivacydoesn'tadd up. Wehavetohavethatnumber. Arewegoingtogetit?Arewegoingtogetitin timesowecan havea debate thatshowsthatthose ofuswho understand therearethreatscomingfrom overseas, and we 50 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 supporttheefforttodeal with thosethreatsaspartof702. ThatwearenotgoingtohaveAmerican's privacyrightsindiscriminatelysweptup. Weneed thatnumber. When will wegetit? COATS: Senatorasyou recall, duringmyconfirmation hearing, wehad thisdiscussion. Ipromised toyou thatI would --ifconfirmedandI was, talk(ph)toNSAindeed withAdmiralRogers,tryto understand --better understand whyitwassodifficulttocometoaspecificnumber. I--IdidgoouttoNSA. Iwashostedby AdmiralRogers. Wespentsignificanttimetalkingaboutthat. AndIlearned ofthecomplexityofreaching thatnumber. Ithinkthe the --statementsthathadbeen madebySenatorC otton areveryrelevant statementsastothat. Clearly, whatIhave learnedisthatabreachofprivacyhastobemadeagainstAmericanpeoplehaveto bemadein ordertodeterminewhetherornottheybreachedprivacy. So, it --it--thereisaanomaly there. They're--they're--they'reissuesofduplication. Iknowthata--we'reunderwayin termsofsettingupatimewith thiscommitteeIbelievein June --as earlyasJunetoaddress--getintothatissueandtoaddressthat,andtalkthrough thecomplexityof whyit'ssodifficulttosay... WYDEN: I'm... COATS: ...thisisspecificallywhen wecan getyou the --thenumberand whatthenumberis. So, I--Ibelieve--I believe--wearecommitted --wearecommitted toaspecial meetingwiththecommitteetotrytogo through this--thisparticularissue. ButI cannotgiveyou adatebecauseI--I--and --and anumberbecausethe--Iunderstand the complexityofitnowand whyit'ssodifficultforAdmiralRogerstosaythisspecificnumberisthe number. WYDEN: I'm --I'm well overmytime. Thepointreallyisprivacyadvocatesand technologistssaythatit'spossible togetthenumber. Iftheysayit,and thegovernmentisnotsayingit, somethingisreallyoutofsynch. You'vegotpeoplewhowanttoworkwithyou. Wemustgeton with thisand tohavearealdebate about702 thatensuresthatsecurityandlibertyarenotmutuallyexclusive. Wehavetohavethat number. Thankyou, Mr. hairman. C RISCH: Thankyou, Senator. SenatorKing, Iunderstandyouhad a... KING: 51 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Thankyou, Senator. Ifthishearinghadbeen held twoweeksago, we'dbespendingthelasttwohours talkingaboutNorthKorea. AndI thinkweoughttopaysomeattention tothat. DirectorPompeoandDirectorC ardillo, couldyou usangive updateon theNorthKorea situation,the natureofthethreat, whethersomeofthepressurethatwewerefeelingtwoand threeandfourweeks agohasrelieved?Isthereanythinggoingonthatshould eitherconcern ormakeusfeelbetterabout thatsituation? DirectorPompeo? POMPEO: Senator,Idon'tseeanythingthatshouldmakeanyusfeel anybetteraboutthisthreat. Wehavea threatfrom flashpointsthatsomethingcouldsparkandhaveaconventional war,right, whollyapart from theissueswe talkaboutwithIC BMsand nuclear.Just a well-armed adversarythatourDepartment ofDefenseworkshard tomake sureand mitigateagainstthoserisksremain. They--theleadercontinuestodevelop,test, attempttoverifynotonlyinthelaunchesthatwesee, manyofwhichhavefailed,butlearnedfrom each one, butcontinue todevelopsoftwarethatimproves daybyday. Thisthreatisveryreal. We--weshould notallfocussimplyon theIC BMseither. American interestsareheld atrisktodayby shorter-rangemissilesin theater. EnormousAmerican assets... (CROSSTALK) KING: Seoulisheld atriskbyartillery. POMPEO: Seoulisheld atrisk. WehaveenormousAmerican interestsin and around theregion in Seoul. So, no, Iwouldn'tsaythatin spiteofthefactthatithasfallen outoftheheadlinesforthemomentthat there'sanydecreased riskassociated with thethreatfrom Kim JungUn. KING: Therewassomediscussionsafter--again, abouttwoweeksagoofenteringintosomekind of discussionswith theNorthKoreans. Hasanything--can you reportanythingon thatfront? POMPEO: Sir, there--there--therearenonethatI'm awareofrelated totryingtotalkKim JungUn awayfrom his nuclearmissileprogram. Wehavetaken actions. Theagency--I'vestood upaKorean mission centertodrawthebestminds,themostinnovative, create peoplefrom acrossouragency, andI'm surewe'llhaveothersjoin in from acrosstheintelligence communitytotryandfocusthiseffortsothatwecangetbackon ourfrontfootwith respecttoforeign intelligencecollection againsttheNorthKoreansandthecapacity--theimpactwhatKim JungUn is actuallydoing. 52 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 KING: On thatlatterpoint,wouldyou agreethatthe thepath -- toinfluenceisthroughC hina? POMPEO: Ithinkit'samongourmostproductivepathsand onethatIknowthepresident'scommitted toworking, asisSecretaryTillerson. KING: Thankyou verymuch. AdmiralRogers... CARDILLO: SenatorKing... KING: Yes? CARDILLO: I... KING: Yes, please? CARDILLO: Justtochimein. Iwasin frontofyourinclosed session acoupleofweeksago, givingyou greatdetail aboutthethreatyou'vejusthighlighted. Whatyou'llhearthisafternoon isjustan --you know,the continuation ofwhatI wasbriefingacoupleofweeksago. So, Iwould agreewith thedirectorthatthisis--thisthreathasnotonlybeen sustained, it'scontinuedto grow. KING: Becauseit'sfallen outoftheheadlinesdoesn'tmean it'snot... CARDILLO: That'scorrect. It'sstill ourhighestpriority. KING: Thanks. CARDILLO: Itis--itisthehighestpriority--the--oneofthehighest, ifnotthehighestprioritytheintelligence communityatthistime. Agreatdeal ofeffortisbeingspentrelativetohowwecan even betterassess thesituation andprovideall therelevantintelligencetoourpolicymakers. KING: Thankyou. Twofinalquestions. 53 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 AdmiralRogers, we--thereason Iwaslatethismorning, wehad averyinformativehearingin Armed Serviceson cyberwith some--Jim lapperandAdmiralStavitisandAdmiral C --GeneralHayden. The- - theupshotofthathearingwaswestilldon'thaveadoctrine.Westilldon'thaveapolicy. Westilldon'treallyfullyunderstand --youwould concur, Iassume, thatcyber'soneofthemostserious threatsweface. ROGERS: Yes, sir. KING: Anddoweneed tohaveapolicyand adeterrentpolicyand somethingfurtherthan whatwehavenow, whichiskind ofan adhocresponsetoevents? ROGERS: Right, ittendstobeacase-by-casebasis. Yes, sir. I--Iagree. And wespokeaboutthatwhen ItestifiedbeforetheSenate(ph)lastweekasamatteroffact... (CROSSTALK) KING: Andit-- SenatorMcC ain said --SenatorMcC ain said what'stheimpediment?Whycan't wegetthere? Isit--isitthestructureofourgovernment?Wegottoomanypeoplethinkingaboutthis?Whatisit goingtotaketogetustothepointofhavinga--adoctrinethatwillguideusin thisincrediblyimportant era. We--weareseeingthenation ofwarfarechangebeforeoureyes. ROGERS: Sir, Idon'thaveanyeasyanswerforyou. Myrolein life, notspeakingnowasadirectorofNSAbutas thecommanderoftheUnitedStatesC yberC ommander, istotheoperational commander. So, Idon't developpolicy. I--Iplayaroleon thedoctrineside, tryingtoprovidean operationalperspective. KING: Well, Ihopefrom yourposition though, you wouldbe... (CROSSTALK) ROGERS: Oh, yes, sir. KING: ...theadministration andeveryoneyou can thinkofbecause... ROGERS: Yes, sir. 54 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 KING: ...IdonotwanttogohometoMaineand saywell, wetalked alotaboutthisbutwedidn'tdoanything. And when theelectricsystem wentdown, you know,we --wemight'vebeen abletopreventit. ROGERS: Yes, sir. KING: DirectorPompeo, finalquestion. Doyou thinkthatRussian activityin the2016election wasaone-off? POMPEO: No, sir. KING: Thisisacontinuingthreat,isitnot? POMPEO: Yes, sir. KING: And thingsthattheylearnedin thiselection they'regoingtoapplyin --in 2018, 2020, andbeyond. POMPEO: Yes, sir.AndIhopewelearn from itaswell and willbeabletomoreeffectivelydefeatit. KING: AndIbelievethat'swhytheworkofthiscommitteeand othersissoimportantbecausewe'vegotto understand whattheydid, howtheydiditsothatwecan deal withitin thefuture. Wouldyou agree? POMPEO: Yes, Senator, Iwould. KING: Thankyou verymuch. COATS: SenatorKing, ifI couldjustadd tothat. Ithinkmakingthisastransferable--transparentaspossible,not onlytoour--our--ourown public, butthroughoutdemocraticnationsthatarefacingthis--thisthreat. ThemoreweinformourpeopleofwhattheRussiansaretryingtodoandhowthey'retryingtoimpact ourthinkingand ourdecisionsrelativetohowwewanttobegoverned and whatkind ofdemocratic institutionsthatwewanttopreserve, thebetter. So,myhopeistheRussianshaveoversteppedheretothepointwherepeoplewill saywe absolutely havetodosomethingaboutit. And weaskwillithaveto --topreventdeterrenteffortsin placeaswell aspotentiallyoffensiveefforts. KING: 55 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Well, I--Ithinkyourpointaboutopen hearingsandeducation isincrediblyimportant. You andI werein theUkraineandPolandjustaboutayearago. And whattheytold usovertherewasthatthebest defense--theycan'tshutdown theirTVnetworks, theycan'tturn offtheinternet. Thebestdefenseisifthepublicknowswhat'shappeningand theysayoh, it'sjusttheRussiansagain. And wehavetoreachthatlevel ofknowledgein --in thiscountry. So,Icompletelyagreeandhopethat asmuchofourworkaspossiblecan bedoneinopen hearing. Thankyou, Mr. hair(ph). C RISCH: Thankyou, SenatorKing. Gentlemen, thankyou somuch. Thankyou allforyourservice. Thankyou toall themen and womenofall17agenciesfortheincredible servicetheyprovidetothepeopleoftheUnitedStates, keepingthem safe, doingthingsthatmost peoplein America will neverknownorbeableto fullyappreciate. Mr. McCabe, aspecial thankyou fortosteppinguptothebattlefieldpromotion and --and representing youragencyquitewellhere. Thispartofthehearingwillbeadjourned. Andgentlemen, you haveaboutan hourand sixminutes. And we'll seeattheotherroom. Thankyou. Meeting'sadjourned. ListofPanelMemb ers andWitnesses PANELMEMBERS: SEN. RICHARDM. BURR, R-N.CC. HAIRMAN SEN. JIMRISC H, R-IDAHO SEN. MARCORUBIO,R-FLA. SEN. SUSANC OLLINS, R-MAINE SEN. ROYBLUNT, R-MO. SEN. TOMC OTTON, R-ARK. SEN. JAMESLANKFORD, R-OKLA. SEN. JOHNC ORNYN, R-TEXAS SEN. MARKWARNER, D-VA. EC VICHAIRMAN SEN. RONWYDEN,D-ORE. SEN. MARTINHEINRIC H,D-N.M. 56 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 SEN. JOE MANCHIN III, D-W.VA. SEN. KAMALA HARRIS, ALIF.D-C SEN. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, D-CALIF. SEN. ANGUS KING, I-MAINE WITNESSES: DAN COATS, DIREC TOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MIKE POMPEO, DIRECTOR, IAC ANDREW M C ABE, C AC TING FBI DIREC TOR ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS (USN), DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SEC URITY AGENC Y, AND C OMMANDER, U.S. CYBER C OMMAND ROBERT CARDILLO, DIREC TOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENC Y LIEUTENANT GENERAL VINCENT STEWART (USMC), DIREC TOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENC Y Source: QC Transcripts CQ CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS Congressional Hearings May 11, 2017 - Final ©2017, Provided under license from Bloomberg Government. Bloomberg Government Support: 1-877-498-3587 www.bgov.com All materials herein are protected by United States copyright law and/or license from Bloomberg Government, and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, published or broadcast without the prior written permission of Bloomberg Government. You may not alter or remove any trademark, copyright or other notice from copies of the content. 57 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6101-000001 Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA) From: Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA} Sent: Monday, May 15, 201710:40 AM To: (b )(6) per NSD (b )(6) per NSD Cc: Ramer, Sam {OLA) Subject: Final Transcript, SJC, May 8, 2017 Attachments: SJC Hearing 5.8.17 Yates and Clapper as Witnesses.docx Tash/NSD - Attached please find the transcript for the SJC hearing where former DAG Yates and former DNI Clapper testified. (b) (6) will be handling his portfolio, which includes all Cl matters (e.g., Russia, FISA, 702, etc.)). Thanks, Joanne tmmlll From: Gauhar, Tashina {ODAG) Sent: Friday, May 12, 2017 8:25 PM To: Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA} Thanks. Did we get one forthe Yates/Clapper hearing? From: Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA) Sent: Friday, May 12, 2017 6:36 PM , (b )(6) per NSD (b)(6) per NSD (b)(6) per NSD • • •• Tash/ NSD: Attached please find the final t ranscript from yesterday's Annual Threats Hearing before SSCI ( Open Hearing). Thank you, Document ID: 0.7.24125.611 3 .J UOIHIC (b) (6) Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113 Senate JudiciarySubcommittee on Crime and Terrorism Holds Hearingon Russian Interference in the 2016E lections, May8, 2017 GRAHAM: The hearingwill come to order, thankyou all forcoming. Here's sortofthe orderofthe day. I'll give a briefopeningstatementalongwith SenatorWhitehouse, then we'll have SenatorGrassleyand Feinstein followsome questioningand it'll be seven minute roundsinitiallyand we'll tryto do a second round of five minutes. To both ofthe witnesses, thankyou forcoming. I'll trytomake thisas reasonablyshortas possible and ifyou need a break, please letus know. So people wonderwhatare we doingand whatare we tryingtoaccomplish?In January, the intelligence communityunanimouslysaid thatthe Russiansthrough theirintelligence services tried to interfere in the 2016American presidential election, thatitwas the Russianswho hacked Podesta's e-mails. Itwasthe Russians who broke into the DemocraticNational Committee and itwas Russianswho helped empowerWikiLeaks. No evidence thatthe Russians changed votingtallies, howpeople were influenced bywhathappened onlytheyknowand God knows butI thinkeveryAmerican should be concerned about whattheRussians did. From mypointofview, there's no doubtin mymind it wasthe Russians involved in allthe things I justdescribed, notsome 400pound guysittingon a bed oranyothercountry. Russia is upto no good when itcomesto democraciesall overtheworld. DismemberingtheUkraine, the Baltics are always undersiege byRussian interference, so why?We wantto learn whatthe Russians did, we wantto find a wayto stopthem because they're apparentlynotgoingto stop until somebodymakes them. The hearingthatwasheld lastweekwith DirectorComeyasked a question, is itfairto saythat Russian governmentstill involved in American politicsand he said yes. So I wantHouse membersand Senatorsto knowitwas the presidential campaign in 2016, itcould be ourcampaigns next. I don'tknowwhathappened in France butsomebodyhackedinto Mr. Macron's accountand we'll see whothatmayhavebeen butthis is sortofwhatRussia does totryto undermine democracy. Sowhatare we tryingto accomplish here? GRAHAM: To validate the findings ofthe intelligence committee as much as possible and to come up with a course ofaction as a nation bipartisan in nature because it was the DemocraticPartyof2016 were the victims, could be the Republican Partyofthe future. When one party'sattacked, all ofusshould feel an attack. It should be an Article 5 agreementbetween both majorparties --all majorparties, thatwhen a foreign powerinterferes in ourelection, itdoesn'tmatterwho theytargeted, we're all in the same boat. Secondly, the unmaskingthe 702 program. Quite frankly, when I gotinvolved in this investigation, I didn'tknowmuch aboutit. DirectorComeysaid the 702program, which allows warrants forintelligence gatheringand a vital intelligence tool, I've learned to bid aboutunmaskingand whatI've learned is disturbing. So I don'tknowexactlyallthe details, whatgoes into unmaskingan American citizen, beingincidentally surveilled when theyinvolved with a foreign agent. I'd like to knowmore and I wantto make sure that thatunmasking can neverbe used asa political weapon in ourdemocracy, so I am all forhittingthe enemybefore theyhitus, intelligence gatherings essential. 1 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 ButI do believe we need to take a lookatthe procedures involved in 702, particularlyhowunmaskingis requested, who can requestitand whatcan --what--whatlimitationsexist, ifany, on howthe information can be used. So that'swhywe're here. We're here to find outall thingsRussia and the witnesses are determined bythe evidence and nothing else. And the702 reauthorization will come before theCongressfairlysoon and I, forone, have a lotof questions I didn'thave before. I've enjoyed doingthis with SenatorWhitehouse, SenatorFeinstein and Grassleyhave been terrific. Let itbe saidthatthe chairman and rankingmemberofthissubcommittee have allowed usto do ourjob, have empowered usand have been hands-on and it'smuch appreciated. And with that, I'll recognizeSenatorWhitehouse. WHITEHOUSE: Thankyou, Chairman Graham, forthe importantworkthis subcommitteeis doing understood your leadershipinvestigatingthe threatofRussian interference in ourelections. In January, America's intelligence communitydisclosed thatthe Russian governmenton the ordersof VladimirPutin engaged in an influence campaign throughout2016. In March, FBI DirectorComey confirmed that, and I quote him here, "The FBI as partofits counter-intelligence mission, is investigatingthe Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016election and thatincludes investigatingthe nature ofanylinks between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian governmentand whetherthere was anycoordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts." The FBI and the intelligence community's workisappropriatelytakingplace outside the publiceye. Our inquiryserves broaderaims. To give a thorough publicaccountingofthe known facts, to pose the questions thatstill need answersand to help us determine howbestto protectthe integrity and proper functioningofourgovernment. Atthe subcommittee's firsthearingon March15th, we heard from expertwitnesses aboutthe Russian toolboxforinterferingin the politics ofothercountries. Now, we can askwhich ofthese toolswere used againstus, bythe Russians, in 2016. Here'sa checklist, propaganda, fake news, trolls and bots. AsClintWattstold the Senate Select Committee on Intelligencein March, Russian state-sponsored media outlets, RTand Sputnikin the lead upto the election, quote, "Turned outmanipulated truths, false newsstories and conspiracies," end quote, providinga weaponized fake newseffortopenlysupportingDonald Trump's candidacy, quoting again, "While consistentlyofferingnegativecoverage ofSecretaryClinton." Thiswastoagain, quote, "Watch a deliberate, well organized, well resourced, well funded, wide ranging effort," end quote, byRussia, usingtrollsand bots to amplifyitsmessages particularlyacrosssocial media. These factsare notdisputed byanyserious person, so thisis a yeson the checklist. Hackingand theftofpolitical information. Throughout2015 and 2016, Russian intelligence services and state-sponsored hackersconducted cyberoperations againstU.S. politicaltargets, includingstate and 2 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 local election boards, penetratingnetworks probingforvulnerabilitiesand stealingprivate information and e-mails. Attribution ofthese crimesto Russian actorswasconfirmed in ourlasthearingand bymanyother sources. Sothis is anotheryes. Timed leaksofdamagingmaterial. Russian intelligence fronts, cutouts and sympatheticorganizations like Guccifer2.0, dcleaks.com and WikiLeaks, then time therelease of stolen victim data to maximize itspolitical effect, manipulate publicopinion and thereby, influence the outcomeofan election. WHITEHOUSE: Longtime Trump associate RogerStone admits to havinginteracted withGuccifer2.0and he foreshadowed released ofstolen data on Twitterin Augustand October2016. Timingcan matter. On October7th, justhoursafterthe damagingAccess Hollywood tapesofDonald Trump were made public, WikiLeaks began publishinge-mailsstolen from Clinton campaign manager, John Podesta. So yes, again. Assassination and political violence. LastOctober, Russian militaryintelligence reportedly conspired to assassinate the then primeministerofMontenegro as partofa coup attempt. In 2004, formerUkrainian prime minister, ViktorYushchenko wasdisfigured when he waspoisoned in a suspected assassination attemptbyRussian agents. Russian opposition figures are routinelythe targets ofstate directed political violence. Volodymyr(inaudible) hassurvived two recentpoisoningswhile Boris Nemtsovwas brazenlymurdered nearthe Kremlin in 2015. Thankfullywe have no evidence ofthathappeninghere. Investmentcontrol and keyeconomicsectors. We learned from HeatherConnolly's testimonyin ourlasthearingthatthe Kremlin playbookisto manipulate othercountriesthrough economicpenetration. Heavilyinvestingin critical sectorsofthe targetcountry's economicto create political leverage. Putin'spetro politicsusesRussia's control ofnaturalgas to create political pressure. Butno, asto that tactichere so far. Shadybusiness and financial ties. Russia exploits the darkshadowsofeconomicand political systems. FBI DirectorComeytestified last weekthatthe UnitedStatesis becomingthe lastbighaven forShell corporationswhere the opacityofthe corporate form allows the concealmentofcriminal funds and can allowforeign moneyto directlyand indirectlyinfluence ourpolitical system. Since the citizens united decisions, we've seen unprecedented darkmoneyflowin ourelections from 501(c)(4) organizations. We don'tknowwho's behind thatdarkmoney, orwhatthey're demandingin return. UsingShell corporations and otherdevices, Russia establishes elicitfinancial relationshipsto develop leverage againstprominentfigures through the carrot(ph) ofcontinued briberyorthe stickof threatened disclosure. 3 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Howabouthere?Well we knowthatPresidentTrumphas longpursued businessdeals in Russia. He's reported to have done orsoughtto do businesstheresince the mid1990s. As he chased dealsin Russia throughoutthe2000s hedeputized a colorful characternamed FelixSater to develop real estate projectsthere undertheTrump name. Sater's familyhas links toRussian organized crime. And Felixhimselfhashad difficultieswith the law. Satersaid in a 2008deposition thathe would pitch business ideas directlyto Trump and his team on a constantbasis. As recentlyas 2010, Trumphad a organization business card and an office in Trump Tower. DonaldTrumpJr. said in September2008thathe'd made halfa dozen trips in the preceding18months, notingthatRussian investors were heavilyinvolved in Trump'sNewYorkreal estate projects. We see a lotofmoneypouringin from Russia, he said. One Trumppropertyin midtown Manhattan had become, within afewyearsofopening, a prominent depositoryofRussian money, accordingto a reportin BloombergBusinessWeek. So here, there are still bigquestions. Ofcourse PresidentTrump could clarifythese questions byreleasinghis businessand personaltax returns. Corruptingand compromisingpoliticians. In testimonybeforethe judiciarycommittee lastWednesday, DirectorComeyacknowledged thatfinancial leverage hasbeen exploited byRussian intelligence over manydecades. Backto the daysof--dayofJoseph Alsop, theyused compromat(ph) orcompromisingmaterial to pressure and manipulate targeted individualswith the prospectofdamagingdisclosures. Has Russia compromised, corrupted, cultivated, orexerted improperinfluence on individuals associated with PresidentTrump, his administration, histransition team, hiscampaign, orhis businesses?Another bigquestion mark. We knowthatPresidentTrumphas had in hisorbita numberofveryRussia friendlyfigures. In August 2015, Trumpfirstmetinformallywith Michael Flynn who asDirectoroftheDefense Intelligence Agency, had developed strongprofessional relationshipswith Russian militaryintelligence. In Decemberofthatyear, Flynn traveled to Moscowfora paid speakingappearance atan anniversary gala forRT(ph) where he was brieflyseated nextto VladimirPutin. Quite a seatfora retired American General. Two monthsafterthattrip, Flynn wasreportedlyservingas an informal national securityadvisorto Trump. Trumpidentified a little knowenergyinvestornamed CarterPage as one ofhisforeign policy advisors. In late March2016, Page told BloombergPoliticsthatfriends and associates had been hurtbyU.S. sanctionsagainstRussia. And thatthere'sa lotofexcitementin termsofthe possibilitiesforcreatinga bettersituation, end quote. 4 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 On April 27, 2016Trumpand several ofhis advisors, includingJeffSessions, metSergeyKislyak, Russia's ambassadorto United States before a campaign speech. The speech which washosted bythe Centerfor the National Interesthad been arranged byTrump's son in law, Jared Kushner. Kislyakattended the TrumpRepublican convention and he toldthe Washington Postthathe had multiple contactswiththe Trump campaign both before and aftertheelection. In the daysafterthe Novemberelection, Russia's deputyforeign ministerconfirmed thathis governmenthad communicated with the Trumpteam duringthe campaign. And we knowMichael Flynn spokewith AmbassadorKislyakon December29, the same dayPresidentObama announced punitive sanctionsagainstRussia forits interference in the 2016 election. Trumptransition and administration officialsthereaftermade false statements to the media and the publicaboutthe contentofFlynn's conversationswith Kislyakapparentlyasa resultofFlynn having misledthem. Thiseventuallyled PresidentTrumpto askforFlynn's resignation, somethingI'm hoping Ms. Yatescan shed some lighton in hertestimonytoday. The presidentand his administration have yetto takeresponsibilityfororexplain these and other troublingRussia links, dismissingfacts asfake news and downplayingthe significance ofindividuals involved. More than 100days into the Trump administration and nearlytwo years since he declared his candidacyforpresident, onlyone person has been held accountable forimpropercontactswith Russia; Michael Flynn. Even then, the Trump administration hasmaintained thatFlynn's communications withthe ambassador were notin factimproper. He simplylostthe confidence ofthe president. We need a more thorough accountingofthe facts. Manyyearsago, an 18minute gaptransfixed the countryand goteverybody's attention in anotherinvestigation. In thiscase, we have an 18daygapbetween the notification ofthe White House thata seniorofficial had potentiallybeen compromised and action taken againstthat seniorofficial'srole. Atbestthe Trump administration hasdisplayed serious errors ofjudgment, atworstthese irregularities mayreflectefforts atcompromise orcorruption atthe hands ofRussian intelligence. Mysincere hope is thatthishearingand those to come will help us find out. Thankyou, Chairman. GRAHAM: Ourtwo witnesses are well known and will be sworn in butMr. Clapper, the formerdirectorofnational intelligence hasserved hiscountryfordecadesin uniform and outand dedicatedhis life to intelligence gatheringand we appreciate that. Ms. Yateswasthe formerdeputyattorneygeneral, iswell respected bypeople in the legal profession. Thankyou both forcoming. Ifyou'll please rise. Raise yourrighthand, please. Doyou affirm thattestimonyyou're aboutto give this subcommittee isthe truth, the whole truth, and nothingbutthe truth so helpyou God? YATES: (OFFMIKE ) GRAHAM: Mr. Clapper. 5 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 CLAPPER: (OFFMIKE ). Chairman Graham, RankingMemberWhitehouse and members ofthe subcommittee, certainlydidn'texpectto be before this committee oranyothercommittee ofthe Congress again so soon since I thoughtI wasall done with thiswhen I leftthe government. And thisisonlymyfirstoftwo hearings this week. Butunderstandably, concern aboutthe egregiousRussian interference in our election processis so criticallyserious asto meritfocus, hopefullybipartisan focus bythe Congress and the American people. Lastyear, the intelligence communityconducted an exhaustive reviewofRussian interference into our presidential election process resultingin a special intelligence communityassessmentorICAaswe call it. I'm here todayto provide whateverinformation I can nowas a private citizen on howthe intelligence communityconductedits analysis, came up with its findings, and communicated them to the Obama administration, to the Trumptransition team, to the Congress and in unclassified form to the American public. Additionally, I'll brieflyaddress fourrelated topicsthathaveemerged since the ICAwas produced. Because ofboth classification and some executive privilege strictures(ph) requested bytheWhite House, there are limitstowhatI can discuss. And ofcourse mydirectofficial knowledge ofanyofthis stopped on 20Januarywhen myterm ofoffice washappilyover. As you know, the I.C. was a coordinated productfrom three agencies; CIA, NSA, and the FBI notall 17 components ofthe intelligence community. Thosethree underthe aegisofmyformeroffice. Following an extensive intelligence reportingaboutmanyRussian efforts to collecton and influence the outcome ofthe presidential election, PresidentObama asked us to dothis in earlyDecemberand have it completed before the end ofhisterm. The two dozen orso analysts forthistaskwere hand-picked, seasoned experts from each ofthe contributingagencies. Theywere given complete, unfettered mutual accessto all sensitive raw intelligence data, and importantly, complete independence to reach theirfindings. Theyfound thatthe Russian governmentpursued a multifaceted influence campaign in the run-upto the election, including aggressiveuse ofcybercapabilities. The Russians used cyberoperationsagainstboth political parties, includinghackinginto servers used by the DemocraticNational Committee and releasingstolen data to WikiLeaksand othermedia outlets. Russia also collected on certain Republican Party-affiliated targets, butdid notrelease- anyRepublican related data. The Intelligence CommunityAssessmentconcluded firstthatPresidentPutin directed and influenced campaign to erode the faith and confidence oftheAmerican people in ourpresidential election process. Second, thathe did so to demean SecretaryClinton, and third, thathe soughttoadvantage Mr. Trump. These conclusions werereached based on the richness ofthe information gathered and analyzed and were thoroughlyvetted and then approved bythe directorsofthe three agencies and me. These Russian activities and the resultand (ph) assessmentwere briefed firstto PresidentObama on the 5th ofJanuary, then to President-electTrump atTrumpToweron the 6th and to the Congress via a seriesoffive briefings from the 6th through the 13th ofJanuary. The classified version was profusely 6 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 annotated, withfootnotesdrawn from thousandsofpages ofsupportingmaterial. The keyjudgmentsin the unclassified version published on the 6th ofJanuarywere identical to the classified version. While it's been overfourmonthssince the issuance ofthisassessment, asDirectorsComeyand Rodgers testified before the House Intelligence Committee on the 20th ofMarch, the conclusions and confidence levelsreached atthe time still stand. I thinkthat's a statementto the qualityandprofessional ofthe --of the intelligence communitypeople who produced such a compellingintelligence reportduringa tumultuous, controversial time, underintense scrutinyand with a verytightdeadline. Throughoutthe publicdialogue aboutthe issue overthe pastfewmonths, fourrelated topicshave been raised thatcould use some clarification. I'd like to take a fewmoments to provide -attemptto provide thatclarification. First, I wantto address themeaningofquote, "unmasking," whichisan unofficialterm that's appeared frequentlyin the media in recentmonths and wasoften I thinkmisused and misunderstand. So it frequentlyhappensthatin the course ofconductinglawfullyauthorized electronicsurveillance on validated foreign intelligence targets, the collectingagencypicks up communications involvingU.S. persons, eithertheirdirectinterfacewith a validated foreign intelligence targetorwhere there is discussion aboutthose U.S. personsbyvalidatedforeign intelligence targets. Underintelligence communityminimization procedures, the identities ofthese U.S. persons are typicallymasked in reports thatgo outto intelligence consumers and they're referred to each reportat a time as U.S. person one, U.S. person two, etcetera. However, there are caseswhen, to fullyunderstand the contextofthe communication thathas been obtained orthe threatthatis posed, theconsumerofthatcollected intelligence mayaskthe identityof the U.S. person be revealed. Such requests explain whythe unmaskingisnecessaryand thatexplanation isconveyed backto the agencythatcollectedthe information. Itisthen upto thatagencywhetherto approve the requestand to provide the identity. And ifthe U.S. person'sidentityis revealed, that identityisprovided onlytothe person who properlyrequested it, notto a broaderaudience. Thisprocess issubjectto oversightand reporting, and in the interestoftransparency, myformeroffice publishes a reporton thestatisticsofhowmanyU.S. persons' identitiesare unmasked based on collection thatoccurred undersection 702 ofthe FISAAmendmentAct, which I'll speakto in a moment. And in 2016, thatnumberwas1,934. On several occasionsduringmysixand a halfyearsasDNI, I requested the identityofU.S. personsto be revealed. In each such instance, I made these requests so I could fullyunderstand thecontextofthe communication and the potential threatbeingposed. Atnotime did I eversubmit a requestforpersonal orpolitical purposesortovoyeuristicallylookatraw intelligence noram I awareofanyinstance ofsuch abuse byanyone else. Second isthe issue ofleaks. Leaks have been conflated with unmaskings in someofthe public discourse, buttheyare twoverydifferentthings. An unmaskingis a legitimate processthatconsistsofa request and approval byproperauthorities, as I've justbrieflydescribed. Aleakisan unauthorized disclosure of classified orsensitive information thatis improperunderanycircumstance. I've longmaintained duringmy50-plusyearcareerin intelligence thatleaksendangernational security, theycompromise sources, methods and tradecraftand theycan putassets' livesatrisk. And forthe 7 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 record, in mylongcareer, I've neverknowinglyexposed classified information in an inappropriate manner. Third is the issueofcounterintelligence investigationsconducted bythe Federal Bureau ofInvestigation. While I can'tand won't commentin this settingon anyparticularcounterintelligence investigation, it's importantto understand howsuch investigationsfitinto and relate to the intelligence communityand atleastthe general practice I followed duringmytime asDNI with respectto FBI counterintelligence investigations. When the intelligence communityobtainsinformation suggestingthata U.S. person is actingon behalf ofa foreign power, the standard procedure is to share thatinformation with the lead investigatory body, which ofcourse isthe FBI. The bureau then decides whetherto lookinto thatinformation and handles anyensuinginvestigation ifthere is one. Given its sensitivity, even the existence ofa counterintelligence investigation's closelyheld, includingatthe highestlevels. Duringmytenure asDNI, itwasmypractice to deferto the FBI director, both DirectorMuellerandthen subsequentlyDirectorComey, on whether, when and towhatextenttheywould inform me aboutsuch investigations. Thisstemsfrom theunique position ofthe FBI, which straddlesboth intelligence and law enforcement. And as a consequence, I wasnotaware ofthe counterintelligence investigation Director Comeyfirstreferred to duringhis testimonybefore the House PermanentSelectCommittee for Intelligence on the 20th ofMarch, andthatcomportswith mypublicstatements. FinallyI'd like to commenton Section 702 ofthe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance ActAmendmentActs, asit'scalled, whatitgovernsand whyit's vital. This provision authorizesthe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courtto approve electronicsurveillance ofnon-U.S. person, letme repeatthat, non-U.S. person, foreign intelligencetargetsoutside the UnitedStates. Section 702hasbeen a tremendously effectivetool in identifyingterrorists and otherthreatsto us, while atthe same time protectingthe privacyand civilliberties ofU.S. persons. And as the -asChairman Graham indicated, Section 702 isdue forreauthorization byCongress thisyear. Itwasrenewed in 2012forfive yearsand itexpireson 31Decemberofthis year. With so many misconceptions flyingaround, it would be tragicforSection 702to become a casualtyofmisinformation and forusto lose a tool thatis so vital to the safetyofthis nation. In conclusion, Russia's influence activities in the run-upto the2016election constituted the high water markoftheirlongrunningefforts since the 1960sto disruptand influence ourelections. Theymustbe congratulatingthemselvesforhavingexceeded theirwildestexpectations with a minimal expenditure of resource. And I believe theyare nowemboldened to continue such activitiesin the future both here and around the world, and to do so even more intensely. Ifthere has everbeen a clarion call forvigilance and action againsta threatto the veryfoundation ofourdemocraticpolitical system, thisepisode is it. I hope the American people recognize the severityofthis threatand thatwe collectivelycounterit beforeitfurthererodes the fabricofourdemocracy. I'll nowturn to myformercolleague, ActingAttorneyGeneral SallyYates, foranyremarksthatshe hasto make. YATES: 8 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Thankyou. Chairman Graham, RankingMemberWhitehouse and distinguished membersofthe subcommittee, I'm pleased to appearbefore you thisafternoon on thiscriticallyimportanttopicof Russian interference in ourlastpresidential election and the related topicsthatthissubcommittee is investigating. For27years, I was honored to representthepeople ofthe United States with the DepartmentofJustice. I began as an assistantUnited States attorneyin Atlanta in the fall of1989, and like all prosecutors, I investigated and tried cases and worked hard to trytoensure the safetyofourcommunities and that those who violated ourlaws were held accountable. Overtime, through five Republican and Democratic administrations, I assumed greaterleadershippositions within the department. In the U.S. Attorney'sOffice in Atlanta, I served aschiefofthe fraud and public corruption section asfirst assistantUnited Statesattorneyand then wasappointed United Statesattorney. And then, I had the privilege ofservingasdeputyattorneygeneral fora little overtwo years, and finally, the current administration asked me to stayon asactingattorneygeneral. Throughoutmytimeatthedepartment, I wasincrediblyfortunate to be ableto workwith the talented careermen and women atthe DepartmentofJustice, who followed the facts and applied the lawwith tremendouscare and dedication and who are, in fact, the backbone ofthe DepartmentofJustice. And ateverystep, in everyposition, from AUSAto acting attorneygeneral, I always tryto carryoutmy responsibilityto seekjustice in a waythatwould engenderthe trustand the confidence ofthe people whom I served. I wantto thankthis subcommittee forconductingan impartial and thorough investigation ofthisvitallyimportanttopic. The effortsbya foreign adversaryto interfere and undermine ourDemocratic processes and --and those ofourallies pose a seriousthreattoall Americans. This hearingand othersthis subcommittee has conducted and will be conductingin the future are an importantbipartisan stepin understandingthe threatand the bestwaysto confrontitgoingforward. As the intelligence communityassessed in its Januaryof2017 report, Russia will continue to develop capabilities to use againstthe United Statesand we need to be readytomeetthose threats. I sincerely appreciate the opportunityto take partin today'sdiscussion. Now, I wantto note thatin myanswers today, I intend to be as fulsome and as comprehensive as possible, while respectingmylegal and ethical boundaries. As the subcommittee understands, manyof the topicsofinteresttodayconcern classified information thatI cannot addressin thispublic setting. Mydutyto protectclassified information applies justas much as a formerofficial, as itdid when I led the department. In addition, I'm obviouslyno longerwith the DepartmentofJustice and I am not authorized to generallydiscussdeliberationswithin DOJ ormore broadly, within the executive branch, particularlyon matters thatmaybethe subjectofongoinginvestigations. I takethose obligationsveryseriously. And I appreciate thesubcommittee's shared interestin protecting classified information and preservingthe integrityofanyinvestigationsthattheDepartmentofJustice maynowbe conducting. I lookforwardto answeringyourquestions. Thankyou. 9 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 GRAHAM: SenatorGrassley, would you like to make a statement? GRASSLEY: (inaudible) GRAHAM: OK. GRASSLEY: I don'twantto. GRAHAM: OK. GRASSLEY: I've gotquestions. GRAHAM: All right, you'll getto askthem. SenatorFeinstein? FEINSTE IN: Thankyou verymuch, Mr. Chairman and I'll be verybrief. We have prepared forthe committee and I'd like to askthestaffto distribute it, a background and time line on LieutenantGeneral Michael Flynn and some ofthe keydatesinvolved, which maybe ofhelpto the subcommittee. And I would justlike to take thisopportunityto thankthe subcommittee, Chairman Graham and --and the RankingMemberWhitehouse, I thinkyou've done a good job and yourwhole subcommittee has. And so thankyou very, verymuch. I'd justlike to make a fewcomments, ifI might, and putall the remarksin the record. I thinkitisa foregone conclusion aboutRussia's involvementand we see itreplicated even in the French election, perhapsnotto the extentorin the way, butcertainlyreplicated. On February9th, 2017, the Washington Postreported that eitherFlynn had misled the vice presidentor thatPence had misspoken. LieutenantGeneral Flynn resigned his poston February13th, fourdaysafter the Postbroke this story. There are still manyunanswered questionsaboutGeneral Flynn, including who knowwhat--who knewwhatand when. Forexample, the pressis nowreportingthatin addition to the warningfrom SallyYates, concernswere raised byformerPresidentObama directlyto then President-electTrump, 95 days before Flynn resigned. So the question, whatrole did Flynn playin communicationswith the Russians, both afterthe first warningbyPresidentObama and then afterthe warningbySallyYates?And I hope to askthat today. Whatroledid Flynn playin high-level national securitydecisions, again both duringthe 95days and the 18days when theWhite House wason notice? 10 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 So, I lookforward to hearing more aboutthis from you, actingAttorneyGeneral Yates. You have stated thatyou warned the White House on January26, nearlythree weeks before Flynn resigned thathe had notbeen truthful and mightbe vulnerableto Russian blackmail. And finally, there are othertroublingquestions regardingRussia's relationships and connectionswith Trump advisorsand associates. And there are questions aboutwhetheranyone was the targetof Russian intelligence, eitherto be exploited orcultivated. So, I will putmywhole remarks in therecord, Mr. Chairman. And I hope to asksome questions around these fewcomments. Thankyou verymuch forthisopportunity. GRAHAM: Yes, ma'am, withoutobjections. WHITEHOUSE: Mr. Chairman, mayI also putintothe record a letterdated November18, 2016from the ranking memberon the House Committee OversightGovernmentReform, on Representative lijahCummings, E givingthen Vice President-electPence notice aboutcertain --whathe called apparentconflictsof interestregardingGeneral Flynn? GRAHAM: Withoutobjection. General Clapper, on March 5, 2017, you said the followingtoa question. Here'sthe question. Does intelligence existthatcan definitelyanswerthe followingquestion, whetherthere were improper contacts between the Trump campaign and Russian officials?You said we did notincludeanyevidence in ourreport. And I sayour, that's theNSA, the FBI, the CIA, with myoffice, the DirectorofNational Intelligence, that had anything--thathad anyreflection ofcollusion between membersoftheTrump campaign and the Russians. There wasno evidence ofthatincluded in ourreport. ChuckTodd (ph) then asked, I understand that, butdoes itexist?You sayno, notto myknowledge. Is thatstill accurate? CLAPPER: Itis. GRAHAM: Ms. Yates, doyou have anyevidence --are you awareofanyevidence thatwould suggestthatin the 2016 campaign anybodyin the Trump campaign colluded --colluded with the Russian government intelligence servicesin improperfashion? YATES: And Senator, myanswerto thatquestion would require me to reveal classified information. And so, I --I can'tanswerthat. 11 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 GRAHAM: Well, I don'tgetthatbecause he justsaid he issuedthe report. And he said he doesn'tknowofany. So, whatwould you knowthat's notin the report? (CROSSTALK) CLAPPER: Are you askingme, or... GRAHAM: No, her. CLAPPER: Oh. YATES: Well, I thinkthatDirectorClapperalso said thathe was unaware ofthe FBI counterintelligence investigations. GRAHAM: Would itbe fairto saythatthe counter-intelligence investigation was notmature enough to come to his --to getin the report. Isthatfair, Mr. --Mr. Clapper? CLAPPER: I --that's an --that's a possibility. GRAHAM: WhatI don'tgetis howthe FBI can have a counter-intelligence investigation suggestingcollusion, and you, as directorofNational Intelligence notknowaboutit, and the FBI sign on to a reportthatbasically said there was no collusion. CLAPPER: I can onlyspeculate whythat'sso. Therewasn't --theevidence, ifthere wasany, didn'treach the evidentiarybarin terms ofthe level ofconfidence thatwe were strivingforin thatintelligence communityassessment. GRAHAM: OK, thatmakes perfectsense to me. Followup on that, are you familiarwith a dossieraboutMr. Trump compiled with some guyin E ngland? CLAPPER: I am. GRAHAM: Did you find thatto be acredible report? CLAPPER: 12 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Well, we didn'tmake a judgmenton that. And that's --that'sone reason whywedid notincludeitin the bodyofourintelligence communityassessment. GRAHAM: You didn'tfind itcredible enough to be included? CLAPPER: We couldn'tcorroborate the sourcing, particularlythesecond --third-ordersources. GRAHAM: Ms. Yates, are you familiarwith the dossier? YATES: (OFF-MIKE) CLAPPER: Microphone. GRAHAM: Microphone. YATES: IfI could tryto clarifyone answerbeforeaswell, because I think, SenatorGraham, you mayhave misunderstood me. You asked me whetherI was aware ofanyevidence ofcollusion, and I declined to answerbecause answeringwould reveal classified information. I believe thatthat'sthe same answerthatDirectorComeygave to thiscommittee when he was asked this question aswell. And he made clear, and I'd like to make clear, thatjustbecause I sayI can'tanswer it, you should notdrawfrom thatan assumption thatthatmeansthatthe answeris yes. GRAHAM: OK, fairenough. CLAPPER: I also think, ifI may, sir, thatthis illustrates whatI wastryingto getatin mystatementaboutthe unique position thatFBI straddlesbetween intelligence and lawenforcement. GRAHAM: I justwantthecountryto knowthatwhateverthey're doingon the counterintelligence side, Mr. Clapper didn'tknowaboutit, didn'tmake itin thereportand we'll see whatcomes from it. Ms. Yates, whatdid you tell the White House aboutMr. Flynn? YATES: I had two in-person meetingsand one phone call withthe White House Counsel aboutMr. Flynn. The firstmeetingoccurred on January26, called Don McGahn firstthingthatmorningand told him thatI had a verysensitive matterthatI needed to discusswith him, thatI couldn'ttalkaboutiton the phone and thatI needed to come seehim. And he agreed to meetwith me laterthatafternoon. 13 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 I tookaseniormemberofthe national securitydivision who wasoverseeingthismatterwith me to meetwith Mr. McGahn. We metin hisoffice attheWhite House which is a skiff(ph) so we could discuss classified information in hisoffice. We began ourmeetingtellinghim thatthere had been pressaccounts ofstatements from the vice presidentand othersthatrelated conductthatMr. Flynn had been involved in thatwe knewnotto be the truth. And as I -as I tell you whathappened here, again I'm goingto be verycareful notto reveal classified information. GRAHAM: Well the reason you knewitwasn'ttrue was becauseyou had collected some intelligence from an incidental collection system, isthatfairto say? YATES: And I can'tanswerthatbecause thatagain would call me -forme to reveal classified information. GRAHAM: Letme askyou this, did anybodyevermake a requestto unmaskthe conversation between the Russian ambassadorand Mr. Flynn? YATES: And again, Senator, I can'tanswera question like that, itwould call forclassifiedinformation... GRAHAM: ...Mr. Clapper, do you knowifthatwasthecase? CLAPPER: I don't. GRAHAM: Is there a wayto find thatout? CLAPPER: Well, in anothersettingitcould be discussed. GRAHAM: Butthereis arecord somewhere ofwho would make a requestto unmaskthe conversation with General Flynn and the Russian ambassador? CLAPPER: Well, I'm... GRAHAM: ...Ifone wasmade, there'd be a record ofit? CLAPPER: 14 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 I can't speakto thisspecificcase butI can generallycommentthatin the case of702 requests, yes, those are all documented. GRAHAM: OKand I don'tmean to interruptyou butthis is importantto me. Howdid the conversation between the Russian ambassadorand Mr. Flynn make itto the "Washington Post?" YATES: Which one ofus areyou asking? GRAHAM: Ms. Yates. CLAPPER: That'sa greatquestion. GRAHAM: I thoughtso... CLAPPER: ...All ofus would like to knowthatand I don'tknowthe answerto that. YATES: Yeah. Nordo I knowthe answerto that. GRAHAM: Is itfairto saythatifsomebodydid make an unmaskingrequest, we would knowwho theywere and we could find outfrom them whotheyshared the information with?Isthatfairto say, the system would allowusto do whatI justdescribed? YATES: Well, unmaskingrequestsare notmade to the DepartmentofJustice. GRAHAM: No butto the agencywho does the collection. YATES: That'smyunderstandingis thatyes... GRAHAM: ...So there should be a record somewhere in oursystem whetherornotan unmaskingrequest was made forthe conversation between Mr. Flynn and the Russian ambassador. We should be ale to determine ifitdid -ifit was made, whomade it. Then we can ask, whatdid theydo withthe information?Isthata fairstatement, Mr. Clapper? CLAPPER: Yes. 15 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 GRAHAM: OK. Nowwhatdid you finish?Whatdid you tell theWhite House? YATES: So I told them again thatthere were a numberofpress accounts ofstatements thathad been made by the vice president and otherhigh-rankingWhite HouseofficialsaboutGeneralFlynn's conductthat we knewto be untrue. And we toldthem howwe knewthatthis -howwehad this information, howwe had acquired it, and howwe knewthatitwas untrue. And we walked theWhite House Counsel whoalso had an associate there with him through General Flynn'sunderlyingconduct, the contents ofwhichI obviouslycannotgo through with you todaybecause it's classified. Butwe tookhim through in a fairamountofdetail ofthe underlyingconduct, what General Flynn had done, and then we walked throughthe variouspress accountsand howithad been falselyreported. We also told the White House Counsel thatGeneral Flynn had been interviewed bythe FBI on February 24. Mr. McGahn asked mehowhe did and I declinedto give him an answerto that. And we then walked through with Mr. McGahn essentiallywhywe weretellingthem aboutthis and the firstthingwe did was to explain to Mr. McGahn thatthe underlyingconductthatGeneral Flynn had engaged in was problematicin and ofitself. Secondly, we told him we feltlike the vice presidentand otherswere entitled to knowthatthe information thattheywere conveyingto the American peoplewasn'ttrue. And we wanted to make it reallyclearrightoutofthe gate thatwe were notaccusingVice PresidentPence ofknowinglyproviding false information to the American people. And, in fact, Mr. McGahn responded backtome to letme knowthatanythingthatGeneral Flynn would've said would have been based --excuse me --anythingthatVice PresidentPence would have said would have been based on whatGeneral Flynn had told him. We told him the third reason was--is because we were concerned thatthe American people had been misled aboutthe underlyingconductand whatGeneral Flynn had done, and additionally, thatwe weren'tthe onlyonesthatknewall ofthis, thatthe Russians alsoknewaboutwhatGeneral Flynn had done. And the Russians also knewthatGeneral Flynn had misledthe vicepresidentand others, because in the media accounts, itwasclearfrom the vice presidentand othersthattheywere repeatingwhatGeneral Flynn had told them, and thatthis wasa problem because notonlydid we believe thatthe Russians knewthis, butthattheylikelyhad proofofthis information. And thatcreated a compromise situation, asituation where the national securityadviseressentially could be blackmailed bythe Russians. Finally, we toldthem thatwe were givingthem all ofthis information so thattheycould take action, theaction thattheydeemed appropriate. I rememberthatMr. McGahn asked me whetherornotGeneral Flynn should befired, and I told him thatthatreallywasn'tourcall, thatwas upto them, butthatwe were givingthem thisinformation so thattheycould take action, and thatwas the firstmeeting. 16 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 GRAHAM: Thankyou, and I'll goto SenatorWhitehouse --one veryquickquestion. Was... YATES: Yeah. GRAHAM: ... are you eitherone ofyou awareofincidental collection byourintelligence community--ofany presidential candidate, stafforcampaign duringthe2016 election cycle? CLAPPER: Saythatagain, sir. I'm sorry(ph). GRAHAM: Was there anyincidental collection, where ourintelligence communitycollects information, involvinga presidential candidate on eitherside ofthe aisle during2015 or2016? CLAPPER: No, notto myknowledge. YATES: I believe DirectorComeywas also asked thisquestion and declined to answerit, so I'm --I need to follow the same lines the DOJ hasdrawn. Again, you should notdrawfrom thatthatmyanswerisyes, but rather, thattheanswerwould require me to reveal classified information. GRAHAM: Thankyou. SenatorWhitehouse. CLAPPER: My--myresponse is all within the contextofintelligence --foreign intelligence, notthe domestic consideration. YATES: (OFF-MIKE) GRAHAM: Exactly. WHITEHOUSE: Followingthe Comeyline, the directortestified a fewdays agoin thefull committee thatthe FBI had interviewed Mr. Flynn a daybefore, ortwo daysbefore, yourmeetingatthe White House, and you've justtestified thatyou hadtold the White House counsel thatthe FBI had interviewed Flynn and he'd asked --McGahn had asked, how'd hedo? YATES: Right. 17 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 WHITEHOUSE: Did you have the 302 with you when you were in theWhite House?Didyou showitto White House counsel?And had you seen itatthe time you wentupto the White House? YATES: No. The FBI had conducted the interviewon the 24th. We got a readoutfrom theFBI on the 25th, a detailed readoutspecificallyfrom the agents thathad conducted the interview. Butwe didn'twanttowaitforthe 302, because we feltthatitwas importantto getthis information to the White House asquicklyaspossible, so we had folks from the national securitydivision who spenta lotoftime with the agents, notonlyfindingoutexactlyhowthe interviewwentbuthowthis impacted theirinvestigation. WHITEHOUSE: So did you take thatsummarywith you?Do you haveanydocumentwith you thatdescribedthe FBI interviewofGeneral Flynn? YATES: Atthe time thatI wasthere, I had notesthatdescribed thatinterview, aswell as the individual thatwas with me --the seniorcareerofficial from the national securitydivision --had been partofall ofthose discussionswith the FBI. WHITEHOUSE: Did you discusscriminal prosecution ofMr. Flynn --General Flynn? YATES: Myrecollection isthatdid notreallycome upmuch in the firstmeeting. Itdid come upin the second meeting, when Mr. McGahn called me backthe nextmorning and asked the --the morningafter--this is the morningofthe 27th, now --and asked me ifI could come backto hisoffice. And so I wentbackwith the NSDofficial, and there were essentiallyfourtopicsthathe wanted to discuss there, and one ofthose topicswaspreciselythat. He asked aboutthe applicabilityofcertain statutes, certain criminal statutes and, morespecifically, about... WHITEHOUSE: Thiswas(ph) the second meetingatthe White House Council's Office in hisofficeagain? YATES: In his office again. WHITEHOUSE: With the same two individuals? YATES: Exactly. WHITEHOUSE: 18 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 On the followingday? YATES: Right. WHITEHOUSE: And you wentbackpursuantto a phone call requestora --was... YATES: Yes, the morningofthe 27th afterourmeetinghad occurred on the afternoon ofthe 26th, the morning ofthe 27th, Mr. McGann called me and asked ifI could come backto the White House to discussthis further. And wesetup a time and I wentoverthere thatafternoon, bringingagain the samecareer official with me from the national securitydivision, who wasoverseeingthis investigation. He had the same associate from the White House Council's Office and we talked through fourto five more issues. WHITEHOUSE: You could perhaps have waited until you actuallyhad seen theagents302 from the interviewofGeneral Flynn. Whygo ahead ofthat?Whynotwait? YATES: Well, because this was a matterofsome urgency, we... WHITEHOUSE: Describe. YATES: In makingthe determination aboutnotification here, we had to balance a varietyofinterest. Forthe reasonsthatI justdescribed a fewminutes ago, we feltlike itwascritical thatwe getthis information to the White House, because in partbecause the vice presidentwasunknowinglymakingfalse statements to the publicand because we believed thatGeneralFlynn wascompromised with respectto the Russians. We were balancingthis though, againstthe FBI'sinvestigation, as you would always do, and take into accountthe investigatingagency'sdesires and concerns abouthowa notification mightimpactthat ongoinginvestigation. Butonce GeneralFlynn wasinterviewed, there wasno longera concern aboutan impacton an investigation. WHITEHOUSE: Do you knowwhere thatinterviewtookplace orunderwhatcircumstances? YATES: I believe ittookplace atthe White House. WHITEHOUSE: The Flynn interview? 19 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 YATES: Yes. WHITEHOUSE: OK. Doyou knowifFlynn wasrepresented bycouncil atthe time? YATES: I don'tbelieve he was. WHITEHOUSE: OK. And the scenario thatyou were concerned aboutwas thatyou were seeingall these statements comingfrom the White House thatwere inconsistentwith whatyou knew, you presumed thatthe White House was beingtruthful which meantthatFlynn wasmisleadingthem. YATES: Right. WHITEHOUSE: Which meantthathe wasvulnerable to manipulation bythe Russians, who knowingwhathad actually taken place could call upthe national securityadvisorto the presidentand say, you gotto do this forus orwe're goingto outyou with all yourfolks and yourcareeris done. YATES: That'sright, because one ofthe questionsthatMr. McGann asked me when I wentbackoverthe second daywasessentially, whydoes itmattertoDOJ ifoneWhite House official liestoanotherWhite House official? And so we explained to him, itwasa wholelotmore than thatand wentbackoverthe same concerns thatwe had raised withthem the priorday, thatthe concern first aboutthe underlyingconductitself, thathe had lied to the vice presidentand others, the American public had been misled. And then importantly, thateverytime this lie wasrepeated and the misrepresentations were getting more and more specific, as --astheywere comingout. Everytime thathappened, itincreased the compromise and to state the obvious, you don'twantyournational securityadvisorcompromised with the Russians. WHITEHOUSE: Were there anytakeawaysfrom thefirstmeetingoraction itemsthatyou leftwith? YATES: Well, there was an action item in the second meetingbecause I got --we talked aboutseveral issues but... WHITEHOUSE: To getthe orderright, you said earlierthatthere were two meetings and a phone call. YATES: Right. 20 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 WHITEHOUSE: Was the phonecall the phone call thatsetupthe second meetingorwasthere a third... YATES: There was a third substantive phone call. There wasa... WHITEHOUSE: Go ahead, I can... YATES: Sorryaboutthat. One ofthe --one ofthe issuesthatMr. McGann raised with me in this second meeting thatagain wason the 27th, the dayafterthefirstmeeting, was hisconcern because we had told him before thatwe were givinghim thisinformation so thattheycould take action. And he said thattheywere concerned thattakingaction mightinterfere with the FBI investigation. And we told him, both the seniorcareerofficial and I, thathe should notbe concerned with it, thatGeneral Flynn had been interviewed, thattheiraction would notinterfere with anyinvestigation and in fact, I rememberspecificallysaying, you knowitwouldn'treallybe fairofus to tell you this and then expect you to siton yourhands. WHITEHOUSE: Was the interviewofGeneral Flynn accelerated once you became aware ofthisinformation and feltyou needed to gethis statementquickly? YATES: Well, we had wanted totell the White House as quicklyas possible and we're workingwith the FBI and in the course ofthe investigation but certainly, we did... (CROSSTALK) WHITEHOUSE: And the firstthingyou knowis thatyou have information thatonethingwassaid and the White House issayingsomethingdifferent. And you knowthatthatinformation irrespective ofwho is involved needs to getupto the White House quickly. And so atthatpoint, the decision was made to do the interviewso thatthatwaslocked down before you wentupto White House counsel? YATES: Right, so thatthatwould nothave a negative impacton the FBI investigation atthatpoint. And there wasa requestmade byMr. McGahn, in the second meetingasto whetherornottheywould be able to lookatthe underlyingevidence thatwe had thatwe had described forhim ofGeneral Flynn's conduct. And we told him thatwe were inclined to allowthem to lookatthat underlyingevidence, that we wanted to go backto DOJ and be able to make the logistical arrangementsforthat. Thissecond meetingon the 27th occurred late in the afternoon, this is Fridaythe 27th. So we told him thatwe would workwith the FBI overthe weekend on thisissue and getbackwith him on Mondaymorning. And 21 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 I called him firstthingMondaymorningto lethim knowthatwe would allowthem to come overand to reviewthe underlyingevidence. WHITEHOUSE: And was thatthe phone call oristhere a separate phone call? YATES: There was the phone call initiallyto lethim knowI needed to come see him. WHITEHOUSE: Yeah? YATES: Two meetings and then a phone call atthe endto lethim know... WHITEHOUSE: Thatthe material wasavailable ifhe wanted to see it. YATES: ... thatthe material was available. He had to call me back. He was notavailable then and I did nothear backfrom him untilthat afternoon ofMondaythe30th. WHITEHOUSE: And thatwasthe end ofthis episode, nobodycame overto lookatthe material? YATES: I don'tknowwhathappened afterthatbecause thatwasmylastdaywith DOJ. WHITEHOUSE: Gotit. OK. (LAUGHTER) GRAHAM: SenatorGrassley. GRASSLEY: Mr. Clapper, you said thatyou've neverexposed classified information in an inappropriate manner. I asked DirectorComeythese questionslastweek, so forboth ofyou, yesorno. Asfarasyou know, has anyclassified information relatingto Mr. Trump orhisassociates been declassified and shared with the media? CLAPPER: Notto myknowledge. GRASSLEY: Ms. Yates? 22 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 YATES: Notto myknowledge either. GRASSLEY: OK. Nextquestion; have eitherofyou everbeen an anonymoussource in anewsreportaboutmatters relatingto Mr. Trump, his associates orRussia's attemptto meddle in the election? CLAPPER: No. YATES: Absolutelynot. GRASSLEY: OK. Third question; did eitherofyou everauthorize someone else atyourrespective organizationsto be an anonymous source in a news reportaboutMr. Trump orhis associates? CLAPPER: No. YATES: No. GRASSLEY: OK. As faraseitherofyou know, have anygovernmentagenciesreferred anyofthe leaksoverthe past several monthsto the Justice Departmentforpotential criminal investigation? CLAPPER: I don'tknow. Asyou know, Senator, there is a processforthat --fordoingthat. - I don'tknowifthat - that's happened. GRASSLEY: Ms. Yates? YATES: I'm notatDOJ anymore, so I don'tknowwhat'sbeen referred. GRASSLEY: So then I guessto kind ofsum up, neitherone ofyou knowwhetherthe departmentauthorized a criminal investigation ofthe leaks? CLAPPER: I do not, sir. YATES: No, sir. GRASSLEY: 23 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 OK. Have anyofyou been questioned bythe FBI about anyleaks? CLAPPER: I have notbeen. YATES: No. GRASSLEY: OK. I wantto discussunmasking. Mr. ClapperandMs. Yates, did eitherofyou everrequestthe unmaskingofMr. Trump, his associatesor anymemberofCongress? CLAPPER: Yes, in one case I did thatI can specificallyrecall, butI can'tdiscussitanyfurtherthan that. GRASSLEY: You can't, so ifI askyou fordetails, you said you can'tdiscuss that, isthatwhatyou said? CLAPPER: Not--nothere. GRASSLEY: OK. Ms. Yates, can you answerthatquestion?Didyou everrequestunmaskingofMr. Trump, hisassociates oranymemberofCongress? YATES: No. GRASSLEY: Question two. Did eitherofyou everreviewclassified documents in whichMr. Trump, his associates or members ofCongress had been unmasked? CLAPPER: Yes. GRASSLEY: You have? Can you give usdetails here in this... CLAPPER: No, I can't. GRASSLEY: Ms. Yates, have you? 24 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 YATES: Yes, I have and no, I can'tgive you details. GRASSLEY: OK. Did eitherofyou evershare information aboutunmasked (ph) Trump associatesormembersof Congresswith anyone else? CLAPPER: Well, I'm thinkingbackoversixand a halfyears, I could have discussed itwith eithermydeputyormy general counsel. GRASSLEY: Ms. Yates? YATES: In the course ofthe Flynn matter, I had discussionswith othermembersofthe intel community. I'm not sure ifthat'sresponsive toyourquestion. GRASSLEY: And in both cases, you can'tgive detailshere. YATES: No. CLAPPER: No. GRASSLEY: The FBI notified the DemocraticNational Committee ofthe Russian'sintrusion into theirsystems in August of2015, buttheDNCturned down the FBI'sofferto gettheRussiansoutand refused the FBI accessto theirservers. Instead, itevidentlyeventuallyhired a private firm in thespringof2016. WikiLeaks began releasingthe hacked DNCe-mails lastJuly. Ittookroughly27,000 ofthe - 27,500DNCe mailsitreleased were e-mails sentafterthe FBI notified the DNCofthe breach. Mr. Clapper, would you agree thatone ofthe lessonsofthisepisode isthatpeople should cooperate with the FBI when notified offoreign hacks instead ofstonewalling? CLAPPER: Yes, sir. I generallythinkthat's a verygood idea. GRASSLEY: Mr. Clapper, you sentthe Russians --you said the Russians did notrelease anynegative information on Republican candidates. I believe thatthat'snotquite right. On June the 15th, 2016, Guccifer2.0 released to Gawkerand The SmokingGun more than 200pages ofthe DNC's opposition research on Mr. Trump's --hundreds ofpagesofwhatI would call dirt. This happened justtwo daysafterThe Wall StreetJournal published a plan forRepublican Convention delegatesto revoltto preventMr. Trumpfrom securingthe nomination. 25 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Whywasn't -whywasn'tthe Russian release ofharmful information aboutMr. Trump addressed in the Russia report?And wasthis even evaluated duringthe review? CLAPPER: I would have to consultwith the analyststhatwere involved in the reportto definitivelyanswerthat. I don'tknowpersonallywhethertheyconsidered thatornot. GRASSLEY: Can you submitthatasan answerin writing? CLAPPER: Well, I'm a private citizen now, sir. I don'tknowwhat --whatthe rulesare on my... GRASSLEY: Well, give methe name... CLAPPER: ... obtainingclassified --potentiallyclassified information, so I will lookin to it. GRASSLEY: OK. Mr. Clapper, you testified thatthe intelligence communityconducted an exhaustive reviewof Russian interference and the analysts involved had complete, unfettered access to all sensitive raw intelligence data. Do you have anyreason to believe thatanyagencywithheld anyrelevantinformation? CLAPPER: I don'tbelieve so, with one potential caveat, which is thatthere is the possibility,again acknowledging this role thatthe FBI plays in straddlingboth intelligence and lawenforcement, thatforwhateverreason theymayhave chosen towithhold investigatorysensitive information from the report. I don'tknowthat to bea fact. I was notapprised ofthat, I'm justsuggestingthatas apossibility. GRASSLEY: Mytime's up, Mr. Chairman. Thankyou. GRAHAM: Thankyou. SenatorFeinstein. FEINSTE IN: Thanks verymuch, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Yates, I'm notgoingto askyou anythingthatdeservesa confidential orsecure answer, but after yoursecond in-person meetingwithMr. McGahn, you said there were fourtopicshe wanted to discuss. Would you listthosefourtopics? YATES: 26 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Sure. The firsttopicin the second meetingwas essentiallywhydoes itmatterto DOJ ifone White House official liesto another. The secondtopicrelated to the applicabilityofcriminal statutes and the likelihood thatthe DepartmentofJustice would pursue a criminal case. The third topicwas hisconcern thattheirtakingaction mightinterfere with an investigation ofMr. Flynn. And the fourth topicwas his requestto seethe underlyingevidence. FEINSTE IN: Were all those topics satisfied with respectto yourimpression afterthe second meeting? YATES: Yes. The onlythingthat was reallyleftopen there would (ph) --wasthe logistics, forustobe able to make arrangements forthem to lookatthe underlyingevidence. FEINSTE IN: And you did make those arrangements? YATES: We did make those arrangements, butagain, I don'tknowwhetherthateverhappened, whetherthey everlooked at... FEINSTE IN: OK. YATES: ... thatevidenceornot. FEINSTE IN: Fairenough. Apparently, LieutenantGeneral Flynn remained national securityadviserfor18days afteryou raised the Justice Department'sconcern. In yourview, duringthose 18days, did the riskthatFlynn had been or could be compromised diminish atall? YATES: You know, I don'tknowthatI'm in a position to reallyhave an answerforthat. I knowthatwe were reallyconcerned aboutthe compromise here, and thatwasthe reason whywe were encouragingthem to act. I don'tknowwhatstepstheymayhave taken, ifany, duringthat18daysto minimize anyrisk. FEINSTE IN: Well, did you discuss thiswith otherDOJ careerprofessionals? YATES: Certainly, leadingupto ournotification on the 26th. Itwas atopicofa whole lotofdiscussion, in DOJ and with othermembersofthe intel community, and we discussed itatgreatlength. Butafterthe 30th, again, I wasn'tatDOJ anymore, so I didn'thave anyfurtherdiscussionsafterthatpointaboutwhat was beingdone with respectto that. FEINSTE IN: 27 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Did you consultwith othercareerprosecutors? YATES: Absolutely. We had, really, the expertswithin the national securitydivision. As we were navigatingthis situation, theywere workingwith the FBI on the investigation, and we were tryingtomake a determination abouthowbestto make thisnotification so thatwe could getthe information to the White House thattheyneeded to be ableto act. FEINSTE IN: So what'sthe pointthatyou were tryingto make --yes orno will be fine --thatGeneral Flynn had seriouslycompromisedthe securityofthe United States, and possiblythe government, bywhathe had done, whateverthatwas? YATES: Well, ourpointwas --isthatlogicwould tell you thatyou don'twantthe national securityadviserto be in a position where the Russians have leverage overhim. Now, in termsofwhatimpactthatmayhave or could have had, I can't speakto that, butwe knewthatwasnota good situation, which iswhywe wanted to letthe White House knowaboutit. FEINSTE IN: The Guardian has reported thatBritain's intelligence service firstbecameaware in late 2015 of suspiciousinteractions between Trumpadvisers and Russian intelligence agents. Thisinformation was passed on to U.S. intelligence agencies. Overthe springof2016, multiple European alliespassed on additional information to the United States aboutcontacts between the Trump campaign and Russians. Is thisaccurate? YATES: I --I can'tanswerthat. FEINSTE IN: General Clapper, is thataccurate? CLAPPER: Yes, itis and it'salso quite sensitive. FEINSTE IN: OK. Letme askyou this. CLAPPER: The specifics are --are---are quite sensitive. FEINSTE IN: When did componentsofthe intelligence communityopen investigations into the interactionsbetween trump advisersand Russians? Whatwas the question again, ma'am, I'm sorry? 28 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 FEINSTEIN: When did componentsofthe intelligence communityopen investigations into the interactionsbetween Trump advisersand Russians? CLAPPER: Whatwas the question, again, Ma'am?I'm sorry. FEINSTE IN: When did componentsofthe intelligence communityopen investigationsintothe interactionsbetween Trump advisersand Russians? CLAPPER: Well, I can --I referto DirectorComey's statementbefore the House Intelligence Committee on the 20th ofMarch --iswhen he advised thatthey'd open an investigation in Julyof'16. FEINSTE IN: And whatwas thereaction when you advised thattheinvestigation be opened asearlyasJuly15th? CLAPPER: I'm sorry? FEINSTE IN: I --I thoughtyou said thatyou advised on July... CLAPPER: No, DirectorComeydid, before the House Intelligence Committee... FEINSTE IN: The director(ph) --I see. CLAPPER: ... announced thatthe FBI had initiated investigation in Julyof2016. FEINSTE IN: Well, whatdid the intelligence agenciesdowith the findings thatI justspoke aboutthatThe Guardian wrote about? CLAPPER: Well, I'm notsure aboutthe accuracyofthat article, so clearlyoveractuallygoingbackto2015, there was evidence ofSoviet, excuse me, Freudian slip, Russian activity. Mainly, in an information gatheringor recon orderingmode, where theywere investigatingvoterregistration rollsand the like. And thatactivitystarted early, and so, we were monitoringthis asitprogressed, and certainlyas it picked up, accelerated in spring, summerand fall of2016. FEINSTE IN: OK. 29 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 So letme go backto you, Miss Yates, I take ityou were veryconcerned. Whatwas yourprime worry duringall ofthis? Now, you were worried thatGeneralFlynn would be compromised?Whatdid you thinkwould happen, ifhe were, and howdo you believe he would have been compromised? YATES: Well, we hadtwo concerns, compromise was certainlythe numberone concern and the Russians can use compromised material, information, in a varietyofways, sometimesovertlyand sometimessubtly. And again, ourconcern was, is thatyou have a verysensitive position, like the National Securityadvisor and you don'twantthatperson to be in a position, where again, the Russianshave leverage overhim. But, I will alsosay, anothermotivatingfactoristhatwe feltlike the Vice Presidentwasentitled to know thatthe information he had been given, and thathe was relayingto the American public, wasn'ttrue. FEINSTE IN: So, what's you're sayingisthatGeneralFlynn liedto the Vice President? YATES: That'scertainlyhowitappeared, yes, because the Vice Presidentwentout and made statements about General Flynn's conduct, thathe said were based on whatGeneral Flynn had toldhim, and we knewthat thatjustflatwasn'ttrue. FEINSTE IN: Well, asthe dayswenton, whatwas yourviewofthesituation?Because there were, I guess two weeks before, orwasit18days before DirectorFlynn wasdismissed? YATES: Well, again, I wasno longerwithDOJ afterthe 30th, and so I wasn'thavinginteraction orany involvementin this issue afterthatday. FEINSTE IN: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. GRAHAM: SenatorCornyn. CORNYN: Thankyou, Chairman Graham. And SenatorWhitehouse, fortoday'shearing. Thisisimportant, the American peoplehave everyrightto knowasmuch as possible aboutRussian interference in ourelections. But, as I think, as the Directorhastold usbefore manytimes, this isnot anythingnew. Although, perhaps, the level and intensity, and the sophistication, ofbothRussian overt and covert operations isreallyunprecedented, and I thankthe intelligencecommunityfortheirassessment. 30 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 I do regretthat, while these two witnesses are certainlywelcomed and we're glad to have them here, thatformerNational SecurityAdvisorSusan Rice, has refused to testifyin frontofthe Committee. It seems to me, there are a lotofquestions thatshe needs to answer. I would pointout, though, Mr. Chairman, thatbothSenatorFeinstein and I, are fortunateenough to be on the Senate Intelligence Committee, which is also conductinga bipartisan investigation underthe leadership ofChairman Burrand Vice Chairman Warner. One ofthe benefitsofthatadditional investigation, isthatwe have been given access to the raw intelligence collected bythe intelligence community, which I think, completeswhatunderstandablyisan incomplete picture. When you can onlytalkin a publicsettingaboutpartofthe evidence, butitis importantforthe American people tounderstand what's happening. I thinkthis subcommittee hearingis playingan importantrole in that. I wantto askDirectorClapper, because, I think, unfortunatelysome ofthe discussion aboutunmasking iscastingsuspicion on the intelligence communityin awaythatI thinkis, frankly, concerning. Particularlywhen we're lookingat reauthorizingSection 702 ofthe PatriotActbythe end ofnextyear. because asmanyhave said, I can't recall yourspecificwords, butI knowDirectorComeyhas called that the crown jewelsoftheintelligence community, and I'm veryconcerned thatsome ofthe information that's been discussed aboutunmasking, forexample, mightcause some people to worryabouttheir legitimate privacyconcerns. CORNYN: So when itcomesto incidental collection on an American person, and thatis unmasked atthe requestof some appropriate authority, can you describe, briefly, the papertrail and the series --and theapproval processthatis required in orderto allowthatto happen?That's nota trivial matter, isit? CLAPPER: The --and the --the process is that, firstofall, the judgment asto whetherornotto unmaskorreveal the identityisrendered bythe original collection agencyso normallythat's goingto be, in thecase of 702 --goingtobe NSA. And I know, formypart, because, asI indicated in mystatement, overmysixand a halfyearsofDNI, I occasionallyaskforidentities to beunmasked to understand the context. WhatI was concerned about, and those ofus in the intelligencecommunityare concerned about, is the behaviorofthe --the validated foreign intelligence target. Is thattargettryingtoco-opt, recruit, bribe, penetrate orwhat? And it's verydifficultto understand thatcontextbythe labels"U.S. person one," "U.S. person two." And as well, I should pointout, doingthaton an anecdotal basis, one SIGINTreportata time, in which you need to lookatis there a --is there a pattern here, and so I tried on mypartto be very, veryjudicious aboutthat. 31 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 It's a verysensitive thing. ButI did feel an obligation, as DNI, thatI should attemptto understand the contextand whothis person was, because thathad ahuge bearingon howimportantorcritical itwas, and whatthreatmightbe posed byvirtue ofthe --again, the behaviorofthe validated foreign intelligence target. So ourfocus wason the target, not --notasmuch asthe U.S. person --onlyto understand the context. CORNYN: Well, the factthatsome appropriate authoritymightrequestand receive the unmaskingofthe name of the U.S. person does notthen authorizethe release ofthatinformation --thatclassified - information - into the public domain?thatremains a crime, doesitnot? CLAPPER: Yes. Again, that's whyI attempted to make --to clarify, in mystatement... (CROSSTALK) CORNYN (?): Push the button. CLAPPER: That'swhy, in mystatement, I attempted to make thatdistinction between unmasking, an authorized, legitimate process with approval bythe appropriate authorities, and leaking, which isan unauthorized processunderanycircumstance. CORNYN: Mr. Chairman, I thinkit's reallyimportantthat, in orderto determine who actuallyrequested the unmasking, and in orderto establish whetherappropriate procedureswere undertaken underboth legislative oversightand judicial oversight, thatwe determine whatthatpapertrail is and followit... CLAPPER: SenatorCornyn, ifI may, I just --and I have to be verycareful here abouthowI phrase this, butI would justrepeatto you the definition ofwhat702is used for... CORNYN: Foreign intelligence (ph). CLAPPER: ... which is collection againsta non-U.S. person overseas. CORNYN: I don'tthinkyou can saythatenough, DirectorClapper. It's important, because peopleneed to understand that... CLAPPER: Happyto sayitagain. CORNYN: 32 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 ... we are both gettingnecessaryforeign intelligence... (CROSSTALK) CORNYN: ... to keepthe American people safe, butalso respectingthe privacyrightsand the constitutional rights ofAmerican citizens. CLAPPER: Absolutely. CORNYN: Ms. Yates, this is the firsttime thatyou've appeared beforeCongress since you leftthe Departmentof Justice, and I justwanted to askyou a question aboutthe --yourdecision to refuse to defend the president's executive order. In the letterthatyou sentto Congress, you pointoutthatthe executive orderitselfwasdrafted in consultation with theOffice ofLegalCounsel, andyou pointoutthattheOffice ofLegal Counsel reviewed itto determine whether, in its view, the proposed executive orderwaslawful on its face and properlydrafted. Is ittruethatthe Office ofLegal Counsel did conclude it was lawful on its face and properlydrafted? YATES: Yes, theydid. The office of... CORNYN: And you overruled them? YATES: ... I did. The office oflegal... CORNYN: Did you (ph) --what--whatis yourauthorityto --to overrule the Office ofLegalCounsel when itcomes to a legal determination? YATES: The Office ofLegal Counsel hasa narrowfunction, and thatisto lookatthe face ofan executive order and to determine purelyon its face whetherthere issome setofcircumstancesunderwhich atleast some partofthe executive ordermaybe lawful. And importantly, theydo notlookbeyond the face of the executive order, forexample, statementthatare madecontemporaneouslyorpriorto the execution ofthe .O. E thatmaybearon its intentand purpose. Thatoffice doesnotlookatthose factors, and in determiningthe constitutionalityofthisexecutive order, thatwas an importantanalysisto engage in and onethatI did. CORNYN: 33 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Well, Ms. Yates, I thoughtthe DepartmentofJustice had a longstandingtradition ofdefendinga presidential action in courtifthere are reasonable argumentsin its favor, regardless whetherthose argumentsmightprove tobe ultimatelypersuasive, which ofcourse is upto the courtsto decide and notyou, correct? YATES: Itis correctthatoften times, butnotalways, the civil division ofthe DepartmentofJustice will defend an action ofthe presidentoran action ofCongress ifthere is a reasonable argumentto be made. Butin this instance, all -all argumentshave to be based on truth because we're the DepartmentofJustice. We're notjusta lawfirm, we'rethe DepartmentofJustice and the... (CROSSTALK) CORNYN: You distinguish the truth from lawful? YATES: Yes, because in this instance, in lookingatwhatthe intentwasofthe executive order, which was derived in partfrom an analysis offacts outsidethe face ofthe order, thatis partofwhatled to our conclusion thatitwas notlawful, yes. CORNYN: Well, Ms. Yates, you had a distinguished careerfor27years atthe DepartmentofJustice and I voted for yourconfirmation because I believed thatyou had a distinguished career. ButI have to tellyou thatI find itenormouslydisappointingthatyou somehowvetoed the decision ofthe Office ofLegal Counsel with regard to the lawfulnessofthe president'sorderand decided instead thatyou would counterman (ph) the executive orderofthe presidentofthe United Statesbecause you happen to disagree with itas a policymatter. YATES: Well, itwas... CORNYN: I justhave to saythat. YATES: I appreciate that, Senator, and letme make one thingclear. Itisnotpurelyas a policymatter. In fact, I'll remembermyconfirmation hearing. In an exchange thatI had withyou and othersofyourcolleagues where you specificallyasked me in thathearingthatifthe presidentasked me to do somethingthatwas unlawful orunconstitutional and one ofyourcolleagues said oreven justthatwould reflectpoorlyon the DepartmentofJustice, would I sayno?And I looked atthis, I made a determination thatI believed thatitwas unlawful. I alsothoughtthatitwas inconsistentwith principles ofthe DepartmentofJustice and I said no. And that's whatI promised you I would do and that'swhatI did. CORNYN: I don'tknowhowyou can saythatitwas lawful and saythatitwas within yourprerogative to refuse to defend itin a courtoflawand leave itto the courtto decide. 34 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 YATES: Senator, I did notsayitwas lawful. I said itwas unlawful. GRAHAM: SenatorDurbin is next, butI have one quick, ifyou don'tmind SenatorDurbin, abouthow 702 works. You said something, General Clapper, I don'tquite understand. Is itunlawful to surveil with a FISA warranta foreign agentin the United States? CLAPPER: No, it'snot. Butthat'sanotherprovision. I was -I wassaying... GRAHAM: OK. CLAPPER: I was sayingwhat702does. GRAHAM: I justwantto make sure there isa procedure to do that. CLAPPTER: There is. GRAHAM: OK. SenatorDurbin? (UNKNOWN) Justto yourpoint, you said the word overseas. AmbassadorKislyakwasnot overseason December29th, was he? CLAPPER: That'scorrect. (UNKNOWN) Thankyou. DURBIN: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. Letme sayatthe outsetin response to SenatorCornyn, in yourconclusion aboutthe unlawful nature of the Muslim travel ban was, ofcourse, a position which was supported bythree differentfederal courts thatstopped the enforcementofthatban and ultimatelyled to the presidentwithdrawingthat particulartravel ban. Isthatnottrue? YATES: That'scorrect. 35 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 DURBIN: Thankyou. I wantto mention atthe outsethere thatthisis a criticallyimportanthearingand I wantto thank SenatorGraham and SenatorWhitehouse forthe bipartisan nature and the cooperation in this hearing. I thinkthe testimonywe've received from these witnesses and thepresence ofso manyotherofmy colleaguesis an indication ofhowwe viewthe severityand gravityofthe issue before us. I'm troubled thatthis greatcommittee with its greatchairman and all itsmembers doesnothave professional staffassigned to this investigation. It's the ordinarystaffofthe subcommittee who are workingit. I thinkthatwhatwe have seen with this situation callsforthe appointmentofan independentcommission, presidential commission orcongressional commission, one thatisclearly independent, transparentand can getto the bottom ofthe Russian involvementin ourlastelection processand thethreatthatfaces --we face in thefuture becauseofit. Shortofthat, we'll continue to do ourbeston a committee level with meagerresources in both the Intelligence Committee and here. And this is, I think, an issue thatbegs forso much more. I might also saythatI'm startingto hearfrom the Republican side ofthe table some real concerns aboutSection 702, which SenatorLee, Republican memberofthe committee and myself, have been callingforreform on forseveral years. Unfortunately, we didn'thavethe supportfrom the otherside ofthe table when we did. I hope thatwe can getitnowwhen we talkaboutreal reform to (ph)the 702 and protectingthe rights ofindividuals in America. Ms. Yates, letme askyou aboutthismeetingon Januarythe26th with White House Counsel Don McGahn. You shared the Justice Department's concern abouthiscommunications with Russia, his apparentdishonestyaboutthose communicationsand his vulnerabilityto blackmail. Isthatcorrect? YATES: That'sright. DURBIN: Was there anythingelse aboutthe relationshipofGeneral Flynn and the Russiansotherthan his representationsthathe had no conversation thatyou warned Don McGahn about? YATES: No. DURBIN: So itdidn'tgo backto his tripto Moscow, moneyreceived and so forth? YATES: No, itdid not. DURBIN: Itwasstrictlyon thatquestion? YATES: 36 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Yes. DURBIN: And then you had a second meetingthe nextday. YATES: That'sright. DURBIN: Is thatcorrect, on January27th? YATES: Athis request, yes. DURBIN: AtMr. McGahn's request. And atthatsecond meeting, did Mr. McGahn sayanythingaboutwhetherhe had taken the information you'd given him the previousdayto the president? YATES: No, he didn'ttell us. DURBIN: Are you aware ofthe factthatMr. Spicer, the White House press secretary, on February14th said, and I quote, "Immediatelyafterthe DepartmentofJustice notifiedthe White House counsel ofthe situation, the White House counsel briefed the presidentand a small group ofsenioradvisors?" YATES: I've seen media reports to thateffect, butthat's all I knowisfrom the media. DURBIN: So there was nostatementbyMr. McGahn thathe had eitherspoken to the presidentaboutyour concernswith hisnational securityadvisororwith anyothermembersofthe White House? YATES: No, he didn't advise usin the second meeting anyone he mayhave discussed this with the priorevening. DURBIN: I guess I wantto also go to the question which keeps gnawing atme here thatMr. McGahn asked ofyou. Is there anythingwrongwith one White House officiallyingto anotherWhite House official? YATES: Well, to be fairto Mr. McGahn here, I wouldn'tsaythathe said is there anythingwrong. Hisquestion was more essentiallywhat's itto the Justice Departmentifone White House official islyingto another? In otherwords, whyisthissomethingthatDOJ would be concerned about?And that'swhywentback through the listofissues and reasonswhythiswas troublingto us. DURBIN: 37 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Did you thinktherewasa legal reason to be concerned ifone WhiteHouse official lied to anotherWhite House official? YATES: We didn'tgo intothat. Andtothe extentyou maybetalkingaboutlike 1001 violation, thatwas not somethingthatwe were alludingto ordiscussingwithMr. McGahn. I thinkhispointwhen he made that pointto me wasthathe wasn't sure whythe DepartmentofJustice would careaboutone lyingto another, notto be discussingwhetherthatwas in facta crime. DURBIN: And the reason you told him was what? YATES: Was that, again, itwasa whole lotmore than one White House official lyingto another. Firstofall, it was the vice presidentofthe United Statesand the vice presidenthad then gone outand provided that information tothe American people who had then been misled and the Russians knewall ofthis, making Mike Flynn compromised now. DURBIN: You said earlier, I believe, thatMr. McGahn askedyou ifyou thoughttheyshould fire General Flynn at thatpoint. YATES: Right. DURBIN: And whatwas yourresponse? YATES: Told him thatitwas notourcall astowhetherGeneral Flynn wasfired, thatwe were givingthem this information so thattheycould take action, theaction thattheybelieved was appropriate. DURBIN: On February14th, afterGeneral Flynn resigned, Sean Spicersaid, and I quote, "There was nothingin whatGeneral Flynn did in termsofconductinghimselfthatwas an issue." Do you have anyidea whathe meantbythose words? YATES: No. I'm not--all I can sayishe didn'treach thatconclusion from his conversation with us. I can'tspeak to howhe arrived atthat. DURBIN: Letme askyou, there wasa period oftime, 18days, thatwe've referred to (inaudible) and duringthat period of18days, a numberofthings occurred; General Glynn continued to serve as the national securityadvisorfor18daysafteryou had briefed the White House aboutthe counterintelligence risk thathe posed. And duringthose 18days, General Flynn continued to hire keyseniorstaffon the National SecurityCouncil, announced newsanctionson Iran's ballisticmissile program, met with Japanese Prime MinisterShinzo Abe alongwith PresidentTrump atMar-a-Lago and participated in 38 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 discussionsaboutrespondingto a North Korean missile launch and spoke repeatedlyto the press about hiscommunications with Russian AmbassadorKisliak. DURBIN: Ms. Yates, in --in yourview, were there national securityconcernsin these decisions beingmade after the information you shared with the White House? YATES: I was no longwithDOJ afterJanuary30th, so I wasn'taware ofanyactions thatthe General Flynn was taking. So I --I couldn't reallyopine on that. DURBIN: General Clapper?Would you comment?Ifyou had the warningfrom the WhiteHouse --pardon me, from the DepartmentofJustice tothe White HouseaboutGeneral Flynn possiblybeingcompromised here, and then these importantnational securitydecisions had followed, wouldyou have concern about that? CLAPPER: Well, I would. Hypothetically, yes. I mean, again, I wasgone from the governmentaswell when all this happened. DURBIN: But--butyou've had quite a careerin intelligence and national security. And here, you have a man that's been told --the White House hasbeen told his --he could be compromised and blackmailed by the Russians--continuingto make thehighestlevel decisionsofourgovernment. CLAPPER: Well, that's --that's --itiscertainlya potential vulnerability, there's no question aboutit. DURBIN: I would sayso. Thankyou verymuch. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. GRAHAM: (OFF-MIKE) CRUZ: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. Thankyou to the witnessesforbeinghere today. Mr. Clapper, you --you testified asto the harms that come from leaks --the harms thatcome to our national security--and you also testified abouttheimportance ofprotectingclassified information and keepingitclassified. Duringyourmanyyearsin intelligence, and atthe DNI, have you everknowinglyforwarded classified information to a non-governmentemployee on a non-governmentcomputerwho did nothave authorization to receive thatinformation? 39 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 CLAPPER: Notto my--nottomyrecollection, no, sir. CRUZ: And, DirectorClapper, whatwould you do, atthe DNI, ifyou discovered thatan employee ofyourshad forwarded hundreds oreven thousandsofe-mailstoa non-governmentindividual, theirspouse, on a non-governmentcomputer? CLAPPER: Well, you know, I'm nota investigatoryorprosecutorial element. ButifI were aware ofit, I would certainlymake known to the appropriate officialsthatthatwasgoingon. CRUZ: Would thatstrike you asanythingordinary? CLAPPER: Hopefullynot. CRUZ: What--whatconcernswould thatraise foryou? CLAPPER: Well, itraisesall kindsofpotential securityconcerns. Again, depending on --on the --the contentofthe e-mail, whatthe intentwas, there'sa whole bunch ofvariables here thatwould have to be considered. But, you know, potentially, and again, this isa hypothetical scenario, itcould be quite concerning. CRUZ: Whatwould you expectto happen ifyou made a referral ofan individual who had forwarded hundreds oreven thousandsofclassified information... CLAPPER: Well... CRUZ: ... to a non-governmentemployee... CLAPPER: ... whether(ph)... CRUZ: ... on a non-governmentcomputer? CLAPPER: ... whateverthe transgression --potential transgression was, ifthere were sufficientevidence ofa compromise, we would file a crimes report. That'sstandard procedure thatwe use when there's the potentialforinvestigatingand prosecutingsomeone. CRUZ: 40 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Lastweek, I asked similarquestionsto FBI DirectorComey, and --and he said an individual who didthat would be subjectto, quote, "significantadministrativediscipline," butthathe washighlyconfidentthey wouldn'tbe prosecuted. Do you share thatassessment? CLAPPER: Well, I don't--I --I don'tknow. I thinkthe --the trackrecord is thatthe prioradministration, I think, prosecuted more people forleakingthan anyone in any--in anyotheradministration in the past. So it's difficultto dothat. And there are manycaseswe could notprosecute oreven seeka crimes reportbecause the potential audience ofpeople thatcould have been the perpetratorof--of--ofthese insecuritiescould notbe identified. CRUZ: Itis truethatotherindividuals who were notthe direct employeeofthe Democratic nominee for presidentwere prosecuted forthatconduct. Letme --letme shiftto a differenttopic. DirectorClapper, you --you also testified thatyou're notaware ofanyintercepted communicationsof anypresidential candidatesorcampaigns, otherthan the Trumpcampaign that'sbeen discussedhere. Is --is thatcorrect? CLAPPER: Yes. Butthat'sto myknowledge. But, you know, prioradministrations, priorcampaigns --theywouldn't have been visible to me. So I --I can't--I can'tsay... CRUZ: But--butin 2016, you're notaware anyothercampaigns orcandidates? CLAPPER: ... no. CRUZ: And, Ms. Yates, same question to you. YATES: I'm notaware ofanyinterceptionsofthe Trump campaign. CRUZ: And are you aware ofanyintercepted communicationsofanyothercandidatesorcampaigns? YATES: No. CRUZ: Okay. Because earlier, when Chairman Graham had asked you that, I --I thoughtyou'd declinedto answer. So perhapsI misunderstood that. YATES: 41 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 And I mayhave misunderstood the question. I thoughtthe question I declined toanswerwas a different one than that. So I'm --I'm glad I gota chance to clearitup. CRUZ: OK. So you have no information ofanyinterceptionsofthe Bernie Sanders campaign, HillaryClinton campaign... YATES: No. CRUZ: ... oranyothercandidate... YATES: No. CRUZ: ... in 2016, orcampaigns? YATES: No. CRUZ: OK. Let' revisitthe topic, Ms. Yates, that--thatyou and SenatorCornyn were talkingabout. YATES: OK. CRUZ: Itis correctthattheconstitution veststhe executive authorityin the president? YATES: Yes. CRUZ: And ifan attorneygeneraldisagreeswith a policydecision ofthepresident--a policydecision thatis lawful --does the attorneygeneral have the authorityto directthe DepartmentofJustice to defythe president'sorder? YATES: I don'tknowwhetherthe attorneygeneral hasthe authorityto do thatornot. ButI don'tthinkitwould be a good idea. And that'snotwhatI did in thiscase. CRUZ: Well, are you familiarwith 8USCSection 1182? YATES: Notoffthe topofmyhead, no. 42 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 CRUZ: Well, it--it--itisthe bindingstatutoryauthorityforthe executive orderthatyou refused to implement, and thatled to yourtermination. So it --itcertainlyisa relevantand notaterriblyobscure statute. Bythe expresstextofthestatute, it says, quote, "wheneverthe presidentfindsthatentryofanyalien or ofanyclassofaliens into the United Stateswould be detrimental to the interestoftheUnited States, he maybyproclamation, and forsuchperiod as he shalldeem necessary, suspend the entryofall aliensor anyclassofaliensasimmigrants ornon-immigrants, orimpose on the entryofaliens anyrestrictionshe maydeem appropriate." Would you agree thatis broad statutoryauthorization? YATES: I would, and I am familiarwith that. And I'm also familiarwith an additional provision ofthe INAthat says no person shall receive preference orbe discriminated against an issuance ofa visa because ofrace, nationalityorplace ofbirth, thatI believe was promulgated afterthe statute thatyou justquoted. And that's been partofthediscussion with the courts, with respectto the INA, is whetherthismore specific statute trumps thefirst one thatyou justdescribed. (CROSSTALK) YATES: Butmyconcern wasnotan INAconcern here. It, rather, wasa constitutional concern, whetherornot this --the executive orderhere violated theConstitution, specificallywith the establishmentclause and equal protection and due process. CRUZ: There isno doubtthe argumentsyou laid outare argumentsthatwe could expectlitigants to bring, partisan litigantswho disagree with the policydecision ofthe president. I would note, on January27th, 2017, the DepartmentofJustice issued an officiallegal decision, a determination bythe Office ofLegal Counsel, thattheexecutive order --and I'll quote - from theopinion -"the proposed orderisapproved with respectto form and legality." That'sa determination from OLCon January27th thatitwas legal. Three dayslater, you determined, usingyourown words, thatalthough OLChad --had opined on legality, ithad notaddressed whetherit was, quote, "wise orjust." YATES: And I also, in thatsame directive, Senator, said thatI was notconvinced itwas lawful. I alsomade the pointthatthe office of--OLClookspurelyatthe face ofthedocumentand, again, makes a determination as to whetherthere is somesetofcircumstances underwhich some portion ofthatE.O. would be enforceable, would be lawful. They, importantly, do notlookoutside the face ofthe document. And in this particularinstance, particularlywherewe weretalkingabouta fundamental issue ofreligious freedom --notthe 43 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 interpretation ofsome arcane statute, butreligiousfreedom --itwas appropriate forus to lookatthe intentbehind the president's actions, and the intentis laid in and outhis statements. CRUZ: Afinal, very--verybriefquestion. In the over200yearsofthe DepartmentofJustice history, are you aware ofanyinstance in which the DepartmentofJustice hasformallyapproved the legalityofa policy, and three days later, the attorneygeneral has directed the departmentnotto followthatpolicy, and to defythatpolicy? YATES: I'm not. ButI'm also notaware ofa situation where the Office ofLegal Counsel was advised notto tell the attorneygeneral aboutituntil afteritwasover. CRUZ: Thankyou, Ms. Yates. I --I --I would note, thatmightbe the case, ifthere's reason to suspect partisanship. GRAHAM: SenatorKlobuchar. KLOBUCHAR: Thankyou. I wantto thankyou verymuch foryourservice Ms. Yates. From beginningto end your distinguished careeras a prosecutorandI justwasputtingthistime table togetherand I realize thatyou're second meeting, when you wentoverto the whitehouse to warn them ofGeneral Flynn'sline, and his connectionswith Russia was the same daythatthis Refugee ordercame outand itwas the same day thatyou had to leave the justice department. So you --when did you meetwith the White House council on thatday? YATES: I metwith White House Council asbestasI can recall about3:00in the afternoon on the 30th. KLOBUCHAR: And duringthatmeetingdid theymention --anyone mention thatthis refugee orderwas aboutto come out? YATES: No. KLOBUCHAR: Did the actingAttorneyGeneral ofthe United States? YATES: No and thatwasonethingthatwasofconcern to us, is thatnotonlywas departmentleadership not consulted here and beyond departmentleadership, reallythe subjectmatterexperts, the national 44 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 securityexperts, notonlywas the departmentnotconsulted, we weren'teven told aboutit. I learned aboutthisfrom media reports. KLOBUCHAR: So you learned aboutitafterthe meetingattheWhite house Council from the media. YATES: Right. KLOBUCHAR: And then it's true thatduringyourhearing, then SenatorSessions, nowthe AttorneyGeneral actually asked you iftheviewsthePresidentwantsto execute are unlawful, should the AttorneyGeneral or DeputyAttorneyGeneral sayno?And whatdid you say? YATES: And I said yes, the AttorneyGeneral should. KLOBUCHAR: And then movingforward here, aswasmentioned bySenatorDurbin, this orderwas (inaudible) aftera lawsuitfrom the State ofWashington and Minnesota, the courtbasicallychallenged --the constitutionalityofthe order. The orderis nowtaken effect, butwhatI wantto getto rightnowis the factthatthe administration then withdrewits requestforan appeal ofthe courtrulingblocking implementation ofthe same orderand then theychanged the orderthatyou would notimplement. YATES: Right. And there were a numberofimportantdistinctions between travel ban one and travel ban two. Atthe time I had tomake mydecision forexample, the executive orderstill applied to green card holders, lawful permanentresidents and those who had visas. There were a numberofotherdistinctions as well. And look, letme say... KLOBUCHAR: Thankyou. YATES: Oh, OKsorry. KLOBUCHAR: I wantto geton to --butgo ahead veryquickly. YATES: LookI understand that, you knowpeople ofgood will and --whoare good folkscan make different decisionsaboutthis. I understand that. Butall I can sayis thatI did myjobthe best wayI knewhow. I looked atthisE .O., I looked atthe law, I talked with the folks atthe DepartmentofJustice, gathered them all to gettheirviews and theirinputand I did myjob. KLOBUCHAR: 45 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 OK. I appreciate that. Let'sgo to Russia. December29th, this is the date thatactuallySenatorGraham and I were with SenatorMcCain hearingaboutRussian interference, meetingwith leaders in the Baltic's, Georgia and Ukraine. Thisisthe date thatthe Presidentexpanded the sanctions againstRussia and this isthe date thatMichael Flynn reportedlytalkedto the Russians, perhapsseveral times aboutsanctions. He then wenton to nottellthe truth to the Vice President. And one oftheWhite House officialshas described the notification thatyou provided warningthem ofthis as a heads up. Howwould you describe a heads-up? YATES: Well atthe riskoftryingto characterize. I mean wewere there to tell the White House aboutsomething we were veryconcerned aboutand emphasized to them repeatedly. Itwasso theycould take action. KLOBUCHAR: So itwasmuch more formal than justa simple heythis is happening. Michael Flynn did notresign his position as national securityadvisoruntilFebruary13th. Thatis 18days afteryou wentovertherewith a formal warning. And in particularaftertheyknewaboutthison January28th Flynn wasallowedto join PresidentTrumpon an hourlongtelephone call with Russian PresidentVladimirPutin. Do you have any doubtthatthe information thatyou conveyed to the White House on January26th should have been made clearthatFlynn hadbeen potentiallycompromised byRussia?Thatthis information wasclear? YATES: Well the purpose in ourtellingthem again wasso thattheycould actand so thattheycould conveythat information. So I would hope thattheydid. KLOBUCHAR: Ifa high rankingnational securityofficialis caughton tape with a foreign official sayingon thingin private and then caughtin publicsayinganotherthingto the Vice President, isthatmaterial for blackmail? YATES: Certainly. KLOBUCHAR: Do you wantto add anythingto thatDirectorClapper? CLAPPER: No (inaudible). KLOBUCHAR: OK. I thinkit'sprettyclear. And I thinkit's prettyclearwhywe had this hearingtoday. I wanted to ask you, DirectorClapper, a fewthings aboutjustin general this Russian influence. When DirectorComeywashere lastweek, he said, "I thinkthatone ofthe lessons thatthe Russiansmay have drawn from this," he's talkingaboutthe election influence, "isthatthisworks." Thosewere Comey'swords, do you agree? 46 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 CLAPPER: Absolutely. And as I saidin mystatement, the Russians haveto be celebratingthe successofwhat --for whattheysetoutdo with ratherminimal resource expenditure. And the firstobjective was to sowdiscord and dissension, whichtheycertainlydid. KLOBUCHAR: And when you lookatthis, in addition to the hackinginto the DNCand Podesta'se-mails, all ofthose things, we also had the fake newspropaganda, whichis referenced in the report. I believe it's$200million, isthatall theyspentin the scheme ofthings?Somethinglike that? CLAPPER: Ifthat, which doesn'tinclude governmentsupportto --subsidies to RT. KLOBUCHAR: And howdoesRTwork, when you lookatthis? CLAPPER: Well, RTisessentiallya propaganda mouthpiece forthe government, since the predominance ofits fundingcomes from the governmentand the managementis close to Putin. So it's, as I say, I thinka governmental --Russian governmental mouthpiece. KLOBUCHAR: Ms. Yates, I'm askingyou in yourcapacityasa formerattorneygeneral and deputyattorneygeneral, I would askthisofDirectorComey, aboutthe use ofshell corporations. Nowsomethinglike 50percent real estate dealsover$5 million are nowdonewith shell corporations. We're tryingto push so thatthe TreasuryDepartmentputs more transparency. Thisissomethingthat European countries are working on rightnow. And I'm veryconcerned thatthisisanothervehicle where moneyislaundered. I'm concerned about loopholes in ourcampaign finance lawsaswell. Butcould you address thisjustfrom yourexperience as a criminal prosecutor? YATES: Sure. And those are all valid concerns. We're actuallylaggingbehind othercountries in the world. And we don'twantto become a haven then where you can have shell corporationsthatcan beused forall sortsofnefarious purposes. Theycan have national securityimplications aswell as criminal implications. KLOBUCHAR: DirectorClapper, did you wantto add anythingto that?And, again, thisis whyI believe an independent commission --in addition to the greatworkthat's beingdone bythis subcommittee andthe Senate Intelligence Committee, which is so important, aswell as the investigation, an independentcommission would allowa panel ofexpertsto go into the nextelection, go into2020, where DirectorComeyhad said "I expectto see them backin 2018and especially2020." 47 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Thoseare hiswords. Do you agree with that, Director? CLAPPER: Absolutely. KLOBUCHAR: And thatiswhyan independentcommission would allowusto come up with some ideas and howwe can stopthis from happeningagain, whetheritishowthemedia handled these things, howcampaigns handled these things, howintelligence agencies, when theyfind out, handle these things, because we cannotallowforeign countries to influenceourdemocracies. Do you agree, DirectorClapper? CLAPPER: I certainlydo. And I understand howcriticalleaksareand unmaskingand all these ancillaryissues. Butto me, the transcendentissuehere isthe Russian interference in ourelection process, and whatthat meansto the erosion ofthe fundamental fabricofourdemocracy. And thatto me isa huge deal. And they're goingto continue to do it. And whynot?Itproved successful. KLOBUCHAR: Thankyou. GRAHAM: Until theypaya price, I hope which theywill soon pay. SenatorSasse? SASSE: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. Thankyou, both, forbeinghere. DirectorClapper, howlikelydo you thinkitisthatforeign intelligence services are tryingto compromise congressional ITsystems? CLAPPER: Well, I thinkthat's --congressional ITsystemsare atarget, and have been. And certainlyI sawexamples ofthatduringmytime asDNI and then the --this isone case where we expeditiouslyinformed the Congresswhen we sawevidence ofthat. And, again, that's notjustRussians, there are othersoutthere doingthe same thing. SASSE: And whatintel value would itprovide to them? CLAPPER: 48 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Well, dependingon the nature ofthe material thatthey'vepurloined, it could be - quite sensitive. That - hard to make ageneral statementaboutit. Butjustasa general rule, itcould be quite damaging. SASSE: And could you talka little bitaboutthe relationshipbetween thatparticularintel gatheringon legislatorsand the interface with propaganda campaigns such as you sayRussia?I've heard you testifyin otherplaces aboutRussia'sactivityamongtheirnearneighbors. Whatisthe relationshipbetween propaganda and directorintelgathering? CLAPPER: You mean, on the partofthe Russians? SASSE: Yes, on theirneighbors. CLAPPER: Well, theywould certainlyuse that, as theyhave and examples ofthatin places like Georgia and the Balticswhere theywill turn evidence thator--orwhatthey've gathered and use thatas --asleverage or iftheycan, to use kompromat(ph), the --the Russian acronym forcompromise ofmaterial orthe real tribes (ph) so there'sall kinds ofnefariousthings theycan potentiallydo if--iftheygatherinformation like that. SASSE: One of--oneofthe unhelpful waysthatwe talked aboutthisissue in the present contextin D.C.'s polarized context, isit's almostalwaysretrospective aboutourelection in 2016. And so itdevolvesinto a shirts and skins exercise aboutwhatcandidate you allegedlysupported. DirectorComeylastweeksaid he expectsas SenatorKlobucharjustquoted him, he expectsthe Russians to bebackin 2018 and backwith a vengeance in 2020. I thinkitwould be helpful forthe American people to understand whatRussia does amongitsnearneighborsnow. So could you unpacka little bit more ofhowthatworks? CLAPPER: Well, they're --ifanything, in manyways, particularlythose countries thatwere in the formersoviet orbitwhich theystillfeel, shall I say, paternal about. And so places like Moldova, orthe Baltics, Georgia, theyare veryaggressive in usingall themultitude oftoolsthatwere on SenatorWhitehouse's checklist, wherevertheycan, howevertheycan, to influence the outcome ofelectionstowards candidatesoffor whateveroffice whom theythinkwill bemore pliantwith them. And --and ofcourse, what'snewand differenthere isthat --thataggressiveness is --is spreadinginto Western Europe. Aswe've seen I believe in France and will in Germany. And --and theirrelatives, in theirminds successatdoingthis is simplygoingto reinforce. So all the tools available to them, active propaganda, financing, candidatessympatheticto --to their cause, trolls, hacking, revelations of--ofconfidential e-mails, whateveritis, they'll --they'll use that fairlywell (ph). 49 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 SASSE: And could you give us some sense ofthe --withoutrevealingclassified information, the orderof magnitude oftheirfinancial investmentin these kind ofefforts?Ifyou're a nearneighborofRussia and you've gotyourArmy, Navy, AirForce, Marines then you mighthave a little bitofan Intel community and a little bitofa --ofa sortofIntel ops, info ops campaign going. Howdoes --whatisthe Russian investment? CLAPPER: Well, I can't --I can'tgive you a figure. I will saythough thatin --in comparison to a classical military expenditures, its --it's bargain a forthem. And ofcourse, whatthey're lookingforparticularlyin urope E isso dissension, splitunity, and ofcourse end sanctions. And iftheycan drive wedges between and amongthe European nationsbyand particularlybytheir manipulatingand influencingelections, they're goingto do it. SASSE: Director, do you stand bythe IC's JanuaryassessmentthatWikiLeaks isa known propaganda platform forRussia? CLAPPER: Absolutely, and I am in agreementwith DirectorPompeo's characterization ofWikiLeaks asa non-nation state intelligence service. SASSE: Unpackthata little bitmore, ifthat's the case, then you're sayingthatJulian Assange is nota journalist. CLAPPER: You're askingthewrongguya question like that, absolutelynot. SASSE: I mean, reasonable peoplein the American debate are worried when theyhearpeople in the ICtalk aboutsomethingthatsounds like its justinformation. I'm obviouslyhighlyskeptical ofMr. Assangeand I've been pushingthe Justice Departmentto askwhywe have notbeen takingsteps to prosecute him forparticularcrimesthathave endangered American intelligence assets. Butacrossthe continuum ofjournalistswho are legitimate journalists who are tryingto getinformation to helpthe American people underourFirstAmendmentto befullyinformed aboutthe operationsof ourgovernment, there are people in the journalisticcommunitywho will lean on ICresources to say, we wantto knowall thatyou're able to tell us. And the burden of--the burden is on the intelligenceofficial notto leakclassified information. The burden is noton the journalists to notaskhard questions. CLAPPER: Thatis correct, that's absolutelycorrect. SASSE: 50 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 And so it's useful forthe American people to hearyou explain, whyis Assange somethingotherthan just an American journalistaskinghard questions? CLAPPER: Well, I thinkand there's --there's obviouslyjudgment, here. And when a journalistdoes --does harm to the country, harmsournational security, compromisessensitive sources and methods and trade craft and puts the company--the --the country--deliberatelyputsthe countryin jeopardy, - I thinkthat - that's --the line is --is --that'sa red line, to use a --use a phrase, thatI thinkis --is unacceptable. SASSE: Have anyunauthorized disclosuresfrom Assange andWikiLeaks directlyendangered Americans and American interests? CLAPPER: In the --yes, absolutely. SASSE: Thankyou. Ms. Yates, I wanted to askyou acouple ofquestions. ButI'm almostatmytime, so I'll --I'll limititto one. Could you please explain the bureaucraticprocess in which concerninginformation aboutpolitical appointeeswould be broughtto theattention ofthe attorneygeneral?Justgive us a fewstepsin how thatprocesswould happen. YATES: When you sayconcerninginformation, whatdo you mean?If(ph)... SASSE: I'm tryingto elicitan answerfrom thatyou doesn'trequire you to saythat, related to Flynn particularly, you can'tdisclose howthishappened. I thinkitwould be useful forthe publicto understand, more generally, howinformation abouta political appointee would be broughtto the attorneygeneral from the FBI and other... YATES: I understand. SASSE: ... aspectsofthe intelligence community. YATES: Generally, ifwe discovered information --let'ssayan investigative agencylike FBI discovered information aboutapolitical appointee, theywould firstgetin contactwiththe relevantdivision ofthe DepartmentofJustice thatwould have jurisdiction overit, whetherit's the criminal division, the national securitydivision --whateveritmightbe. Theywould reportthatinformation there, and then, dependingon the seriousness ofthatinformation, itwould probablymake itswayto me, when I was deputyattorneygeneral, or, then, actingattorney general. 51 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 SASSE: Thankyou. GRAHAM: (OFF-MIKE) COONS: Thankyou, SenatorGraham. I wantto thankboth ofyou foryourdecadesofdedicated service in intelligence and lawenforcement, and foryourtestimonyhere today. The question beforeusis one ofreallygrave consequence, asyou suggested in youropening statements. Reallyan existential threatto ourdemocracy, which, ifnotfaced appropriately, will simply encourage increased aggressive actions. The realityisthata foreign adversaryintentionallyinfluenced our2016presidential election, and our presidentmaynotwantto confrontthis, butitisa reality, and one thatourU.S. intelligence community agreed aboutwith veryhigh confidence. I greatlyappreciate Senators Graham and Whitehouse in conveningthishearing, and in treatingthis veryreal threattoourdemocracywith the seriousnessthatitdeserves. FormerDirectorClapper, in youropeningstatement, you suggested thatthe Russians should be celebrating, andthattheyare likelyemboldened, because theysucceeded beyond theirwildestdreams and atminimal cost, and theyare likelyto continue. In the French national elections, which concluded yesterday, there was a --a stunningdump ofhacked e-mailsatthe lastmomentin an attempt--I, atleast, believe --to influence theoutcome ofthat election in a waydesigned to helpadvance a candidate favoredbythe Kremlin. And in thatinstance, there was a significantamountoffake news, ofmanufactured articles, mixed in with, seemingly, actual e-mailsthathad been hacked, and there are allegationsthatthere was coordination between alt-rightnewssitestryingto forward this information and to getitout around France and around the world. Is thatyourunderstandingofwhat's justhappened in France?And, more importantly, was there any evidence thatyou sawofcomparable coordination between alt-rightnews sitesand released information in the attemptstoinfluence the 2016American presidential election? CLAPPER: SenatorCoons, I --I honestly--all I knowiswhatI'm readingin the media, and so I --I don'thave access to anyintelligence information thatwould help mecastanylight --could authoritativelyansweryour question. All I knowis --is what's --what's in themedia. COONS: 52 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 But, duringthe period when you did have regularaccess to intelligence, didyou see anyevidence to suggestthatthe longstandingRussian practice ofspreadingmisinformation and fake newswas being amplified bynewssites in the United States, and anyreason to believe thatmighthave been coordinated orintentional? CLAPPER: Well, I don'tknowaboutthe latter. ButI --and I thinksome newsoutletswere --were probably unwittingofthat. Itcertainlywenton. ButI can't sayto whatextentthatwascoordinated intentionally with --with certain newsoutlets. COONS: And you... CLAPPER: Again, that's a --kind ofin the domesticrealm. COONS: ... you said thatthe Russians will continue thisbehavioruntil we impose some significant costs. Could you speakbrieflyto whatsortofactionsyou thinkwemighttake thatwould deterthem... (CROSSTALK) COONS: ... this action (ph)? CLAPPER: ... that's a little overmylaborgrade asan intelligence guy. I thoughtthe sanctions thatwe did impose on the --on the --as --and I was partofthat, as partofthe former--the formeradministration --were a greatfirststep. And(inaudible). COONS: Well, I'll simplysaythatI agree with you, and a bipartisan bill led bymycolleague, SenatorGraham, and co-sponsored by20senators, Republican and Democrat, would be a terrific nextstep. Ms. Yates, weestablished, in the course ofthese questions, that, on December27th and 29th, former national securityadviserGeneral Flynn discussed sanctionswith the Russian ambassador. So when the Trumptransition team told the Washington Poston January13th thatsanctionswere notdiscussed, was thatfalse? YATES: I understand thatthere have been news reportsto thataccount. ButI can'tconfirm whetherin fact those conversationsregardingsanctionsoccurred, because thatwould require me to reveal classified information. COONS: Understood. So I have awhole series ofquestionsaboutthings thatwould have been untrue were that the case. You're notgoingto be able to answeranyofthose. 53 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 YATES: Notto the extentthatitgoes to General Flynn's underlyingconduct. I can't address that. COONS: Well, then letme move to that, ifI might. YATES: Sure. COONS: On January24th, you justtestified thatNational SecurityAdviserFlynn was interviewed bythe FBI about hisunderlyingconduct, and thatthatunderlyingconductwasproblematicbecause itled to the conclusion the vice presidentwas relyingon falsehoods. Whatwas thatunderlyingconduct?And are you convinced thatthe formernational securityadviserwas truthful in his testimonyto the FBI on January24? YATES: Again, I --I hate to frustrate you again, butI thinkI'm goingto have to, because myknowledge ofhis underlyingconductis based on classified information. And so I can'treveal whatthatunderlyingconduct is. That'swhyI had to do sortofan artificial description, here, ofevents, withoutrevealingthatconduct. COONS: I understand that. On January27th you justtestified thatyou discussed with White --White House Counsel McGahn four differenttopics, and one ofthem included the possibilityofcriminal prosecution ofthe formernational securityadviser, and whatwould the applicable statutes be. Whatapplicable statutes did you discuss, and in yourconclusion, should the national securityadviser face criminal prosecution? YATES: SenatorCoons, I'm goingto strike outhere, because, ifI identified the statute, then thatwould be insightinto whatthe conductwas. And, look, I'm nottryingto be hyper-technical here. I'm tryingto be reallycareful thatI observe myresponsibilitiesto protect classified information. And so I --I can't identifythe statute. COONS: OK. Doyou believe the administration tookyourwarnings seriouslywhen you made this extraordinary effortto go to the White House and, in person, briefthe White House counsel on the 26th and 27th?Do you thinktheytookappropriate steps with regardsto General Flynn as thenational securityadviser, given thathe remained a frequentparticipantin veryhigh level national securitymatters fortwo weeks? YATES: 54 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Well, certainly, in the course ofthe meetings, both on the 26th and 27th, Mr. McGahn certainly demonstrated thathe understood thatthiswasserious. So he did seem tobe takingitseriously. I --you know, I don'thave anywayofknowingwhat, ifanything, theydid. Ifnothingwas done, then certainly, thatwould be concerning. COONS: So you don'tknowwhethertheytookanystepsto restricthis access to classified information, to investigate him further, upand until the --the Washington Postpublished information thatmade it clear thathe had been lyingtothe vice president? YATES: No, again, I was gone afterthe 30th. And so it's --I wouldn'tknowif--ifanysteps had been communicated to the DepartmentofJustice, butI was notaware ofany, no. COONS: Had you notbeen summarilyfired, would you have recommended to the WhiteHouse counselthatthey begin furtherinvestigations into the national securityadviser, orthattheyrestricthis accessto sensitive and classified information? YATES: Well, it's--it'sa bitofa hypothetical. Had I remained atthe DepartmentofJustice, and ifI were under the impression thatnothinghad been done, then, yes, I would have raisedit again with theWhite House. COONS: Thankyou. Ms. Yates. Thankyou, Mr. Graham (ph). GRAHAM: (OFF-MIKE) KENNE DY: Ms. Yates, Dr. Clapper, thankyou bothforyouryearsofservice to the American people. Ms. Yates, I wantto startwithyou. You declined to support --to defend PresidentTrump's executive orderbecause you thoughtitwasunconstitutional. Is thatcorrect? YATES: That'scorrect. Yes. KENNE DY: And you believe there wasno --you believe thatnoreasonable argumentcould be made in itsdefense, is thatcorrect? YATES: I don'tknowthatI would putitin that --in that way, Senator. I --this wasthe analysisthatwe went through. 55 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 KENNE DY: Letme --letme --letme stopyou, because I've gotawhole bunch ofquestions. YATES: Okay. KENNE DY: I justwantto understandyourthinkingfrom myperspective. YATES: Sure. KENNE DY: Did you believe, then, thatthere were reasonable argumentsthatcould bemade in its defense? YATES: I believed thatanyargumentthatwe would have tomake in its defense would notbe grounded in the truth, because, to make an argumentin its defense, we would have to argue thatthe executive order had nothingto do with religion, thatitwas notdone with an intentto discriminate againstMuslims. And based on a varietyoffactors... KENNE DY: And you were lookingatintent? YATES: Yes, and I believe thatthat'sthe appropriate analysis. And in fact, that'sbeen borne outin several court decisionssince thattime, thatthat's the appropriate analysiswhen you're doinga constitutional analysis isto lookto see whatare you tryingtoaccomplish here? KENNE DY: OK. Supposeinstead ofan executiveorder, thishad been an actofCongress. Would you have refused to defend it? YATES: Ifitwere the same act, yes. And in fact, the DepartmentofJustice hasdone thatin the past. For example, with DOMA, theDefense ofMarriage Act, when the DepartmentofJustice refused to defend DOMA. KENNE DY: Butthatwas apolitical decision, wasitnot? YATES: Well, I wasn'tatmain justice atthattime, so I can'tspeakto that. Butthatwas anotherexample of when DOJ did notdefendthe constitutionalityofa statute in thatsense. KENNE DY: OK. Butin youropinion, the executive orderis unconstitutional. 56 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 YATES: I certainlywasnotconvinced thatitwas constitutional, and given thatI wasn'tin the importofthis, I couldn'tin good conscience send DepartmentofJustice lawyersin to defend it. KENNE DY: Well, I wantto be sure I understand. Doyou believe it'sconstitutional orunconstitutional? YATES: I believed --I was notconvinced thatitwasconstitutional. I believed thatitwas unconstitutional in the sense thatthere was no wayin theworld I could sendfolks in there to arguesomethingthatwe didn't believe to be the truth. KENNE DY: So you believe it's unconstitutional? YATES: Yes. KENNE DY: OK. I don'tmean to waxtwo (ph)... YATES: And ifI can say, I can understand whymightbe a little frustrated with the language here... KENNE DY: I'm notfrustrated. I'm happyas a clown. YATES: And here's -here's the reason. Letme give you a little idea ofthe timingofthis. KENNE DY: Letme stopyou becauseI don'thave much time. I've got a lotofground to cover. YATES: OK. KENNE DY: I don'tmean towaxtoo (ph) metaphysical here, butatwhatpointdoesan actofCongress oran executive orderbecome unconstitutional? YATES: Well, itall dependson whatthe actdoes. KENNE DY: No, butI mean, atwhatpoint --is itbecome --I can lookata statute and sayI thinkthat's unconstitutional. Doesthatmake itunconstitutional? YATES: 57 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 I thinkthe issue thatwe faced atthe DepartmentofJustice isto defend this executive orderwould require lawyersto goin and argue thatthis has nothingto do with religion, somethingthat... KENNE DY: Butatwhatpointdoes a statuteoran executive orderbecome unconstitutional?Is itsome apriori (ph) determination?Itbecome --letme -tellingyou whatyou I'm gettingat and I don'tmean you any disrespect. Who appointed you to the United StatesSupreme Court? YATES: I was appointed... KENNE DY: Thatdetermined --isn'tita courtof(ph)final jurisdiction decideswhat'sconstitutional and not?In fact, aren'tmostactsofCongresspresumed to beconstitutional? YATES: Theyare presumed butthey're not alwaysconstitutional, and ofcourse, I was noton the Supreme Court. And I can tell you, Senator, look, we reallywrestled overthis decision. I personallywrestled over this decision and itwas notone thatI tooklightlyatall. Butitwas because I tookmyresponsibilities seriously... (CROSSTALK) KENNE DY: I believe you believe whatyou're saying. YATES: Yes, I do. KENNE DY: I justfind it-understand, this islikelyto come upin the future. YATES: Well... KENNE DY: Atwhatpointdoesan executive orderorstatute become unconstitutional?When I thinkit's unconstitutional oryou thinkit'sunconstitutional ora courtoffinal jurisdiction says it's unconstitutional? YATES: I believe thatitisthe responsibilityofthe attorneygeneral ifthe presidentaskshim orherto do somethingthathe orshe believes is unlawful orunconstitutional to sayno, and that's whatI did. KENNE DY: OK, I getit. 58 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 All right. Letme askyou both a couple questions. Can we agree, Directorand Counselor, thatthe Russians attempted to influence the outcome ofthe election? CLAPPER: Yes, sir, absolutely. YATES: Yes. KENNE DY: Do you believe thatthe Russians did in factinfluence the outcomeofthe election? Director? CLAPPTER: In ourintelligence communityassessment, we made the pointthatwe could notmake thatcall. The intelligence communityhasneitherthe authority, the expertise orthe resourcesto make thatjudgment. The onlythingwe said waswe sawno evidence ofinfluencingvotertallies atanyofthe 50states. But we were notin a position to judge whether--what actual outcome on theelection. KENNE DY: Howaboutyou, Ms. Yates? YATES: I don'tknowthe answertothatand I thinkthat's partofthe problem, is we'll neverknow. KENNE DY: OK. Have you ever--the Russians have been doingthisforyears, have theynot?I'm notminimizing whattheydid. I thinktheydid tryto influence theelection. CLAPPER: It's absolutelytrue. AsI pointed --as I mentioned in myopeningstatement, sir, the --they've been doing this since atleastthe '60s. KENNE DY: OK. CLAPPER: The difference, however, was this is unprecedented in termsofitsaggressivenessand the multifaceted campaign thattheymounted. That'snew. KENNE DY: Isn'tita factthatin 1968, the Kremlin --actuallyService A, which was partofthe AGB(ph), attempted to subsidize the campaign ofHubertHumphrey? CLAPPER: I don'tknowthe specificsofthat. I'd wantto research that, but again, thatcertainlycomportswith what Russian tacticswould be. 59 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 KENNE DY: OK. Isn'tita factthatin 1984, theKremlin tried to stopRonald Reagan from beingre-elected? CLAPPER: Again, I'd have to do some researchto verifythat. Butagain, it certainlycomportswith what, ifthey chosea candidate forwhateverreason theyhad an aversion to, theywould dothat. KENNE DY: OK. General Clapper, have you everleaked information, classified orunclassified, to a memberofthe press? CLAPPER: Notwittinglyorknowingly, as I said in mystatement. KENNE DY: Classified orunclassified? CLAPPER: Well, unclassified is notleaking. (LAUGHTER) Unclassified --that's --that's somewhatofa (inaudible). KENNEDY: And have you evergiven information to a reporterthatyou didn't wantto have yourname connected with, butyou wanted to see itin the paper? CLAPPER: I have not. I've had manyencounterswith media overmycareer. KENNEDY: I'm sorryaboutthat. (LAUGHTER) Howyou about, Ms. Yates? YATES: Otherthan situations where the DepartmentofJustice would arrange, forexample, forme to talkon background with reportersabouta particularissue to educate them aboutthat, no. I certainlynever provided classified information and thatwould be the onlykind ofbackground information... (CROSSTALK) KENNEDY: Do you know... 60 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 CLAPPER: I mighthave done the same thing, butcertainlynot--thatdoesn'tinclude sharingclassified information. KENNE DY: Do you knowanybodyelse atJustice who has everleaked classified orunclassified information to the press? YATES: No. KENNE DY: Ms. Yates? YATES: No. KENNE DY: OK. Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. I wentover. I apologize. (CROSSTALK) GRAHAM: SenatorLeahy? LEAHY: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. General Clapper, Ms. Yates, good to see you again. Good to have you backhere. I --Ms. Yates, I rememberso well yourconfirmation hearing. I rememberone senatorjustbearingin on you, intenselybearingin on you saying, "Would stand uptothe presidentofthe United States ifyou thoughthe was askingyou to do somethingunlawful?He's demandingunderoath foryou to sayyes, you would stand up?" And you told then SenatorJeffSessionsofAlabama that's whatyou would do and appears to me thatyou keptyourword. Apparently, it's OKto keepyourword dependingupon who the administration is. ButI'm proud ofyou forkeepingyourword when the presidenttried to seta religious testforentrance into thiscountry, something(inaudible) itwas unconstitutional. You said you aren'tgoingto uphold it. I wish thatMr. Sessionsand othershad keptasconsistentin thisadministration astheydid in the last. That'smyeditorial judgments. Now, you wrote to theJustice Department, "I am responsible forensuringthatthe positionswe take in court remain consistentwith this institution'ssolemn obligation to always seekjustice and stand for whatis right. Atpresent, I'm notconvinced thatthe (inaudible) executive order'sconsistentwith these 61 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 responsibilities, noram I convinced the executive orderislawful." Isthatan accurate statementofwhat you said? YATES: Yes, itis, Senator. LEAHY: And do you stillfeel thatwaytoday? YATES: Yes, I do. LEAHY: The White House claimed thatyou betrayed the DepartmentofJustice?Do you feelyou betrayed the DepartmentofJustice? YATES: No, Senator, I feelto have done anythingelse would have been a betrayal ofmysolemn obligation to representthe people and to uphold the lawand the Constitution. LEAHY: Was the White House tryingto tellthe Justice Departmenthowto carryoutthatexecutive order? YATES: Well, I didn'thave a lotofdiscussion with theWhite House aboutthisexecutive order. They--I'm sorry. I don'tentirelyunderstand the question. LEAHY: No, butI mean, did anybodyfrom the White House tryto directthe Justice Departmenthowtheyshould respond on thatexecutive order? YATES: Well, certainlythere wasdiscussion with the White House aboutlitigation strategy, butthatoccurred, to myknowledge, overthe weekend. But, afterthe 30th, when I issued mydirective, I was gone then that eveningaround 9:00, so I don'tknowwhatotherdiscussionsoccurred afterthat. LEAHY: Well, one, I applaud you forkeepingyourword to then SenatorSessions, who apparentlyhasa different standard as AttorneyGeneral. FBI DirectorComeytestified before this committee, he has told whyhe appointed a special counsel to investigate the lawplainly, backin 2003, he wasDeputyAttorneyGeneral, AttorneyGeneral Ashcroft hasrefused, himself. Someofthe seniorofficials andTrump campaign administration are connected to this Russian investigation, and AttorneyGeneral was forced to recuse himself. I do thinkthisisthe kind ofsituation where we should do what, then DeputyAttorneyGeneral Comeyas actingAttorneyGeneral did in the flame (ph) investigation, and appointa special counsel. 62 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 YATES: Well, Senator, I thinkthatmysuccessor, Rod Rosenstein has a bigjob ahead ofhim. And, I don'tthink I'm goingto be givinghim anyadvice from the cheap seats abouthowhe needsto do it. LEAHY: Well, letmeaskyou this, we knowaboutGeneralPutin's vulnerabilityto Russian blackmail, Attorney General Sessionsmisled this committee abouthiscontacts, and then he had to change his testimony. The President'sson-in-lawand senioradviser, also reported he failed to disclose contacts on his security clearance forms. Do you have ordid you have, ordid you have, anyconcerns aboutthe AttorneyGeneral, aboutMr. Kushnerorothertrumpofficials, vulnerabilityto blackmail? YATES: All thisinformation came to lightafterI was no longerwith DOJ. LEAHY: Did you have concerns, though, while you were atDOJ, thatGeneral Flynn mightbe vulnerableto blackmail? YATES: Yes, I did, and expressed those to the White House. LEAHY: You saywhyyou feel he mayhave been vulnerable to blackmail, and ifsomebodyelse fell into that samecategory, mighttheybe vulnerable to blackmail? YATES: Well, certainlyanytime the Russians have compromisinginformation on you, then you are certainly vulnerable to blackmail. LEAHY: Letme askGeneral Clapperthis. You've looked at a lotofthese, the othercasesofthe senior governmentofficials. Iftheyhave hidden financial information, thingsthatnormallydisclose when you take aseniorofficial position, is thatan area where theycould be blackmailed, ifit's discovered? CLAPPER: Yes, itis, ofcourse. LEAHY: And, is ityourexperience thatRussianssearch forthatkind ofthing? CLAPPER: Absolutely, theydo. LEAHY: 63 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 January, the intelligence community, the FBI, CIA, NSA, concluded high conference (ph) thatRussia interfered in the 2016election, to denigrate SecretaryClinton, helpelectDonald Trump. Lastweek, PresidentTrump contradicted thatconsensus, he said while itcould have been China, itcould have been a lotofdifferentgroups. Do you feel Russia was responsible? CLAPPER: Absolutely. And regrettably, certainlyhe, althoughthe conclusions thatwe rendered were the same as in the highlyclassified report, asthe unclassified, unfortunatelya lotofthe substantiation forthatcould notbe putin the unclassified reportbecause ofthe sensitivityofit. To me, the evidence wasoverwhelming, and verycompelling, thatthe Russiansdid this. LEAHY: Does itserve anypurpose forhigh officials, like the President, to say, "Well itcould have been somebodyelse, itcould have been china"?I mean does thatreally, doesthathelp us, ordoesthathelp Russia? CLAPPER: Well, yes, I guess itcould be --you could rationalize thatithelpsthe Russians byobfuscatingwhowas actuallyresponsible. LEAHY: Thankyou, thankyou verymuch, General. Thankyou, MissYates. It's good to have you, both, here. GRAHAM: SenatorFranken. FRANKEN: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. I wantto thankboth you and the rankingmemberfor--forthis hearingand these hearings. And I wantto thankGeneral Clapperand --and AttorneyGeneral Yatesfor--forappearingtoday. We have --the intelligence communities have concluded all 17 ofthem thatRussia interfered with this election. And we all knowhowthat's right. CLAPPER: Senator, as I pointed outin mystatementSenatorFranken, itwasthere were onlythree agencies that directlyinvolved in thisassessmentplusmyoffice... FRANKEN: Butall 17 signed on to that? 64 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 CLAPPER: Well, we didn'tgo through that --thatprocess, thiswasa special situation because ofthe time limits and my--whatI knewto be to who could reallycontribute to thisandthe sensitivityofthe situation, we decided itwas aconstantjudgment(ph)to restrictitto thosethree. I'm notaware ofanyone who dissented or--ordisagreed when itcame out. FRANKEN: OK. And I thinkanyone whose looked ateven the unclassified border'sprettyconvinced thatthisiswhat happened. And one ofthe questions is, whydotheyfavorDonald Trump?Thereare a numberof contacts and communications thatbetween Trump campaign officialsand associates and members of the Trump administration, JeffSessions as SenatorLeahymentioned. CarterPage, a formercampaign advisor, PaulManafortwho wasa formercampaign managerand chief strategist, RexTillerson, secretaryofstate, friend ofRussia war(ph) RogerStone, and ofcourse, Jared Kushner, White House senioradvisor, Simon Law(ph) and Michael Flynn. All --that's a lot, in --in my mind. Now, goingto Flynn, he appeared duringthecampaign on Russia Today. Russia Todayisthe propaganda arm, one ofthe propagandas arms. And nowyou, General, since you've retired have you appeared on Russia today? (LAUGHTER) CLAPPER: No, no, notwillingly, you know. FRANKEN: OK. And --and General Flynn received$37,000forsittingnextto Putin atthe 10th anniversaryofRussia today. Itseems --all this seemsveryodd to me and raised a lotofquestions. I was struckthatMr. McGahn did notaskyou in the second meetingwhyDOJ, General Yates, would have concerns thatthe --thatthe national securityadvisorhad lied to thevice president. In the first meeting, did you mention that?Thatthatwas --thathe mightbe compromised? YATES: Certainly, wewentthrough all ofourconcerns in the firstmeeting. And itwasin the second meeting thathe just raised the question ofessentially, whyisthisan issue forthe DepartmentofJustice ifone White House official liestoanother. FRANKEN: OKI don'tunderstand whyhe didn't understand that. YATES: I'm notsure I can helpyou with that, Senator. FRANKEN: Thisis--General Flynn afterthat, for18daysstayed there and wasin one classified thingafteranother. There are policiesthatdeal with who getsclearance, securityclearance and not. 65 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 The executive order12968outlinesthe rulesforsecurityclearancesand says thatwhen there is a credible allegation thatraisesconcern aboutsomeone's fitness to access classified information, that person's clearance should be suspended, pendinginvestigations, isthatright? The executive orderalso states thatclearance holdersmustalways demonstrate, quote, "trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion and sound judgment, aswell as freedom from allegiances and potential forcoercion." Isthatright? And yet, the White HouseCouncil did notunderstand whythe DepartmentofJustice wasconcerned. YATES: Well, to be fairto Mr. McGahn, I thinkthe issue thathe raised, he wasn'tclearon waswhywe cared thatMichael Flynn had lied to the vice presidentand others, whythatwas a matterof... (CROSSTALK) FRANKEN: I thinkthat's clear. YATES: Within DOJ jurisdiction. FRANKEN: I thinkthat's soclear, I can't... YATES: Yes. FRANKEN: And the presidenthad told --PresidentObama hadtold the incomingpresident-electtwo daysafterthe election, don'thire this guy. YATES: I don'tknowanythingaboutthat. FRANKEN: Well, that'swhatwe've heard. (LAUGHTER) FRANKEN: And we have McGahn doesn't understand what'swrongwith this?And then we have Spicer, the press secretary, sayingthe presidentwastold aboutthis. The presidentwastold aboutthis in late January, accordingtothe presssecretary. So nowhe's gota guywho has been, the formerpresidentsaid, don'thire this guy. He's clearly compromised. He's lied to the vice president. And he keeps him on, and he lets him be in all these 66 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 classified phone --lets him talkwith Putin. Presidentofthe United States and thenational security advisersitin the oval office and discuss thiswith Putin. Is itpossible thatthe reason thathe didn'tfire him then wasthat, well, ifI fire him fortalkingto the Russians aboutsanctions, and ifI fire --whataboutallthe otherpeopleon myteam, who coordinated? I mean, isn'titpossible thatthe reason --because you askyourself, whywouldn'tyou fire a guywho did this?And all I can thinkofisthathe would say, well, we've gotall these otherpeople in the administration who have had contacts. We have allthese otherpeople in the administration who coordinated, whoare talking. Maybe that. I'm justtryingto --we'retryingto puta puzzle togetherhere, everybody. And maybe, justmaybe, he didn'tgetrid ofa guywho lied to the vice president, who gotpaid bythe Russians, who wenton Russia Today, because there are otherpeople in hisadministration who met secretlywith the Russiansand didn'trevealituntil later, until theywere caught. Thatmaybe whyittook him 18days, until itbecame public, to getrid ofMike Flynn, who is a dangerto this republic. Care to comment? (LAUGHTER) YATES: I don'tthinkI'm goingto touch that, senator. Thankyou. GRAHAM: SenatorBlumenthal. BLUMENTHAL: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. And I wanttothankyou, SenatorGraham, and SenatorWhitehouse for conductingthishearingin a bipartisan wayand forprioritizingthis issue, which isofsuchgravityto our Democracy. I wanttothankeach ofyou notonlyforyourlongand distinguished service, butalso forthe conscience and conviction thatyou have broughtto yourjobs. Whetherwe agree ordisagree with you. I hope that there are youngprosecutorsaround the countryand youngmembers ofourintelligence committee who will watch this hearingand say, that's the kind ofprofessional I wantto be. Notjustexpert, butpeople ofdeep conviction and conscience. And I agree with mycolleagues thatthere oughtto be an independent commission thatcan have public hearings, produce recommendationsand a report. ButI also believe thatthere has to be a special prosecutor. Because whatI hearfrom people in Connecticutand from mycolleaguesin theirtown halls and meetings isthatpeople wantthe truth uncovered abouthowthe Russians soughtto interfere and undermineourdemocracyand electoral system. And theyalso wantaccountability. Theywantnotonlythe Russians to paya price, theywantanybodywho colluded with the Russians or aided and abetted them topaya price aswell. And there are criminal statutesthatprohibitthatkind of collusion, and imposeserious criminal finesand imprisonmentforpeople who mighthave done that. 67 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 And we knowthatthe FBI isnowinvestigatingthe potential collusion ofTrump associatesandTrump campaign and administration officialswith the Russians, as DirectorComeyhastold us and made public. So, there's no classified information there. The meetingthatthe FBI conducted on January24th preceded byone day, approximately, yourfirst meetingwithDonald McGahn. Isn'tita factthatMichael Flynn lied to the FBI? YATES: And I can'treveal the internal FBI investigation, Senator, even though it'snot--even though partwould notbe technicallyclassified, it's on ongoinginvestigation and I can'treveal that. BLUMENTHAL: Did you tell Donald McGahn thatthen-National SecurityAdviserFlynn told the truth to the FBI? YATES: No, he asked me howhe had done in the interview, and I specificallydeclined toanswerthat. BLUMENTHAL: Because itwas partofan investigation? YATES: That'sright. BLUMENTHAL: Was thatintended to indicate to him thatMichael Flynn had a problem in thatinterview? YATES: No, I was intendingto lethim knowthatMichael Flynn had a problem on a lotoflevels, butitwasn't necessarilywith respecttohowhe performed in the interview. I was intentionallynotlettinghim know howthe interviewhad gone. BLUMENTHAL: And lyingto the FBI isa crime, correct? YATES: Itis, yes. BLUMENTHAL: Violation of18United States Code 1001? YATES: That'sright. BLUMENTHAL: And it's punishable byfive yearsin prison? YATES: 68 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Yes, itis. BLUMENTHAL: So, ifMichael Flynn lied to the FBI, he had a ton oflegal trouble facinghim? YATES: He could face criminal prosecution ifhe lied to theFBI, yes. BLUMENTHAL: And ifhe became a foreign agentforanothercountry, forTurkey, which he was a foreign agentfor, withoutgettingpermission from the DepartmentofDefense, he faced criminal penalties forthatand still facesthem, correct? YATES: Yes. It'scertainlyFARAviolationscan be criminallyprosecuted, yes. BLUMENTHAL: In fact, it'sa violation of18United StatesCode 219, and that's punishable bytwo years in prison, correct? YATES: Mm-hmm. BLUMENTHAL: And his failure to disclose payments from foreign sourceswhich also he had done before you wentto DonaldMcGahn isalso criminallypunishable, is itnot? YATES: Thatwasnota topicI discussed with Mr. McGahn and so it'snotsomethingI can discussheretoday. BLUMENTHAL: Butitis in fact, from yourknowledge a violation ofcriminal law, is itnot? YATES: To notdisclose payments forit, yes, butI'm notspeakingto hisspecificconduct, justgenerallythatitis, yes. BLUMENTHAL: IfMichael Flynn is prosecuted foranyofthese crimes, isn'titpossible thatthe vice presidentofthe United Statesmightbe a witness? YATES: I guess itwould depend on the crime. BLUMENTHAL: Ifitwere a falsestatementto the FBI abouthisconversationswith the Russians, wouldn'tthevice presidentpotentiallybe called as a witness to corroborate thatfalse statement? 69 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 YATES: You know, I would be --certainlythat'spossible, butI would be speculatinghowsuch criminal prosecution would cometogether. BLUMENTHAL: So where I'm goingis, theneed fora special prosecutorisbecauseofficials atthe highestlevel who are responsible forappointingthe deputyattorneygeneral, the United States attorneygeneral are all potentiallywitnesses and theyare even targets, correct? YATES: Potentially. BLUMENTHAL: And so a special counsel, in orderto holdthose governmentofficialsorothersresponsible, reallyhasto be independent, correct? YATES: Well, DepartmentofJustice lawyerspride themselveson beingableto be independentregardlessof whetherthey're appointed as a special counsel. BLUMENTHAL: Butthe ultimate decision whetherornotto prosecute, forthe sake ofappearanceas well as in reality, should be made bysomeone who is unquestionablyindependent, objective, and impartial? YATES: Senator, I absolutelyunderstand yourconcerns here. Butthe factofthe matteris, is thatparticularlyas someone who justdeparted from the DepartmentofJustice, I'm justnotgoingto wade into whetheror nottheyshould have a special counsel oran independentcounsel in thismatter. I don'treallythinkthey need the formers tellingthem howto do theirjobs. BLUMENTHAL: Well, I'm goingto be veryunfairto you and just askyou, as a private citizen, wouldn'tyou like to see a special counsel appointed underthese circumstances? (LAUGHTER) YATES: Notgoingto go thereeither, Senator. BLUMENTHAL: As an expertwitness... (LAUGHTER) ... forourcommittee, I'll qualifyyou asan expertifJudge Graham allowsme to do it. Letme... GRAHAM: You'll have to payher. 70 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 (LAUGHTER) BLUMENTHAL: Letme justclose byaskingyou, mycolleague, SenatorFranken, made reference to warningsgiven to the --given byPresidentObama to then-President-electTrump abouthiringMichael Flynn. Thatis apublicreportfrom The NewYorkTimes, in fact, oftoday, which I askto be entered into the record. And I also askto be entered into the record, the February9th reportfrom TheWashington Post, I believe there hasbeen a reference to it. Withoutthatpublished report, and withoutthe free press tellingus a lotofwhatwenton, MichaelFlynn mightstillbe sittingin theWhite House as national securityadviser, because byJanuary30th, you were forced to resign, correct?You were fired. YATES: Yes, I was fired. BLUMENTHAL: So nobodywas around to tell the White House, asyou said, thatournational securitywas in danger. YATES: Well, there were stillthe careerofficials in the National SecurityDivision who had been workingwith me on thismatterthatwere there and were certainlyconversantin thefacts. BLUMENTHAL: Butthe ultimate decision to goto the White House was yours? YATES: Yes, itwas. BLUMENTHAL: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. GRAHAM: SenatorHirono. HIRONO: Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. In spite ofthe Trump administration'songoingeffortsto convince all ofusthatthere is nothingto see here with regardto Russian interference with our2016election, theTrumpteam's connections to these efforts, we need to getto the bottom ofthis. And so I thankChairGraham and RankingMemberWhitehouse forthese hearings. And in factI justhad a numberoftown hall meetings in Hawaii thispastweekend. And hundredsofpeople came, and believe me, theycare thatwe getto the bottom ofthis. 71 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 The Trumpadministration blamesPresidentObama forfailingto suspend General Flynn's clearance. And in factin press a conference today, Sean Spicersaid: veryone "E in the governmentgoesthrough the sameprocess." And he alsosaid: "There'sno difference ofa securityclearance once it'sissued. And basicallyas faras this administration isconcerned, nothingmore needed to be done" bythem regardingGeneral Flynn's clearance. DirectorClapper, isn'tittrue thatthe CIAhas a separate vettingprocess forNational SecurityCouncil appointees? And in factthe press isreportingtodaythatGeneral Flynn nevercompleted thatprocess. Can you enlighten us? CLAPPER: I can't speakto specificsofhowitwasdone withGeneral Flynn. I knowwhatI wentthrough asa political appointee twice in two --in a Republican and a Democraticadministration. And the vettingprocess foreithera political appointee orsomeone workingin the White House isfar, farmore invasive and far, farmore thorough than a standard TS/SCI clearance process. ButI don'tknowwhatprocess was used in General Flynn'scase. And nordid I have access to his complete investigatoryfile, so it's verydifficultforme to speculate on whatwas in itand whataction, if any, was taken bythe White House. HIRONO: Well, accordingto Sean Spicer, thathe had a clearance from the Obama administration, and thatwas it. And this administration had no furtherresponsibilities. So letme go on. Others ofmycolleagues have mentioned, and you yourself, Mr. Clapper, said thatRTis a Russian mouthpiece to spread propaganda. And, ofcourse, we knowthatGeneral Flynn attended a gala hosted by--ora 10th anniversarygala forRTin December, 2015, where he satnextPresidentPutin and gotpaid over$33,000forthat. Mr. Clapper, given the conversation thatMs. Yates provided tothe White House regarding --and thisis duringthe January26th and 27th timeframe --regardingGeneral Flynn, should he have satin on the followingdiscussions? On January28th, he participated in an hour-longcall, alongwith PresidentTrump, toPresidentPutin. And on February11th, he participated in a discussion with Prime MinisterAbe - and the presidentatMar a-Lago to discuss North Korea's missile tests. Should he --given the --the information thathad alreadybeen provided byMs. Yates, should he have participated in these two veryspecificinstances? CLAPPER: Well, I --you know, I can't, it's difficultforme to answer, Because I'm not --I --I wasout atthat... HIRONO: Well, let's sayyou were in. 72 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 CLAPPER: ... point. I --I don't--asjusta standard comment, a --a general comment, I - --I don'tthinkit --itwasa - I don'tthinkitwas a goodpractice. Putitthatway. HIRONO: So I thinkthis comports with some ofthe concernsthathavebeen raised aboutthe appropriatenessor adequacyofthe Trump administration'svettingprocess with regard to variousdisclosuresbyother members ofhis administration, and, asI mentioned, the administration'scontinuingeffortsto downplay Russia's interference in ourelections. AfterGeneral Flynn resigned on February13th, on February15th, PresidentTrumptweeted thatFlynn is a, quote, "wonderful man," and, quote, "it'svery, veryunfairwhat's happened to General Flynn," unquote. So, Mr. Clapper, is thisthe kind ofstatementthatwould be made bya presidentaware ofserious securityconcerns abouthisformernational securityadviser? CLAPPER: Well, I --I'm loath to commenton the tweets. I --you know, that's --thatwas, I --I suppose, an honest expression ofhowhe felt. HIRONO: Well, does thissound like somebodywho knewthatthere were serious securityconcernsaboutit, that he would sayitwasvery, veryunfair, andthat --thatMr. Flynn isa wonderful man?Maybe I should just... (CROSSTALK) CLAPPER: Well, I don't... HIRONO: ... and people can drawtheirown conclusions. CLAPPER: ... I --I don'tknowwhatinformation wasconveyed to the president. I --I have no insightthere. So I don'tknowto --the extentto which he had an understandingofwhattheformerattorney--acting attorneygeneral... HIRONO: Yes. CLAPPER: ... conveyed. I don'tknowhowmuch ofthatmade its wayto the president. HIRONO: 73 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Yes, preciselythat --thatisa concern thatI would have, thatitsoundslike perhaps the presidentwas notaware. And in fact, goingon, in March, the presidenttweeted thatFlynn should be given immunity --Flynn resigned on February13 --and thatthe FBI'sinvestigation is, quote, "a witch hunt." So, I'd like to askboth ofyou, should these tweets --these kinds oftweetsand othersimilarassertions bythe presidenthave anyinfluence atall on the FBI'songoinginvestigation into Russian interference in ourelections and team Trump'sconnectionsto theseefforts? CLAPPER: Well, itshouldn't, and I'm confidentitwon't. HIRONO: I hope so. I have a question aboutthe Foreign Agents Registration Actviolations --FARA. AnumberofTrump administration officials are belatedlydisclosingand registeringtheirworkon behalfofforeign governments underthe Foreign Agents Registration Act, some ofwhich raised- serious counter intelligence concerns. I asked DirectorComeyaboutthese concerns lastweek. Ms. Yates, whatare the consequences for White House stafferswho fail to disclose theirforeign contactson theirsecurityclearance forms? YATES: Well, there can be a varietyoframifications. You can lose yoursecurityclearance. You can lose yourjob, or, in certain circumstances, you can be criminallyprosecuted. HIRONO: Is itupto the DepartmentofJustice orthe FBI to pursue these kindsofallegations againststafferswho do notdisclose appropriately? YATES: Again, itwould all depend on the circumstancesofthe non-disclosure, whetheritwas willful, and what the circumstances were ofthe conductunderlyingthat. So itwould really--it'sgoingto - be veryfact specific. HIRONO: I agree thatitshould befact-specific, butconsideringthe allegations, though, I --I hope thateitherthe FBI orthe DepartmentofJustice ispursuingan investigation into these matters. Again, underwhatcircumstances would the DepartmentofJustice decide to bringcharges against someone forviolatingFARA?So you --you said, Ms. Yates, itwould depend on the facts... YATES: Right(ph). HIRONO: 74 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 ... ofthe --ofthe situation. Ifthe presidentorsomeone closeto him knewthataWhite House officialfailed to disclose workon behalfofa foreign government, and chose to coverthatup. Again, can you reiterate again the possible repercussionsto thisperson? YATES: To the individual? HIRONO: To the individual. Let'ssaythatthe allegationsare proven true. YATES: Thattheyfailto disclose theiractivityand thatthe Presidentcovered itup, orthe individual did? HIRONO: Let'ssaythe person kneworthe administration knewand then theindividual also covered itup? YATES: Well coverups are bad. They(inaudible) usuallyasevidence ofintentand so that's somethingthatwe lookatin makingdeterminations aboutwhetherit's somethingthatshould be criminallyprosecuted. Butagain, you knowit'sgoingto beveryfactspecific. It'shard to give you a hard fastanswer. HIRONO: And ifthe administration --eitherkneworshould have known --I'm sorry. GRAHAM: Senator. HIRONO: Thankyou verymuch, you've been very... GRAHAM: We're goingto doa second round, butwe're goingto do itquicklyand we're goingto do fourminute rounds and there'slight atthe end ofthe tunnel. We gota vote at5:30, so I promise you you're goingto getoutofhere prettyquick. ButI knowSenators have questions, startingwith me and I'm goingto enforce the fourminutes tomyself. General Clapper, duringyourinvestigation ofallthings Russia, did you everfind a situation where a trumpbusinessinterestin Russia gave you concern? CLAPPER: Notin the course ofthe preparation ofthe intelligence communities assessment. GRAHAM: Since? CLAPPER: 75 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 I'm sorry? GRAHAM: Atall, anytime? CLAPPER: SenatorGraham I can'tcommenton thatbecause thatimpacts an investigation. GRAHAM: Itwasn'tenough to putinto the report. CLAPPER: That'scorrect. GRAHAM: OK. Ms. Yates the rule oflaw, you cannotallowpeople to leakclassified information because theywant a particularoutcome, that's notthe ruleoflaw, is thatcorrect? CLAPPER: Absolutely. GRAHAM: Then I thinkyou both agree with thatconcept. DidMr. McCan(ph), in yourviewMs. Yates, ask reasonablequestionsaboutyourconcerns? YATES: I didn'treallyhave ajudgment aboutwhethertheywere reasonable orunreasonable. ButI do thinkthat Mr. McCan (ph) was tryingto getto the bottom, in ourdiscussion ofwhathad happened with General ... GRAHAM: And he wanted to actuallysee the information thatyou were talking about? YATES: He indicated he did. Again, I don'thave anywayofknowingwhathappened afterthat. GRAHAM: Buthe said he wanted to and you tried to setthatup. YATES: That'sright. GRAHAM: OK. Nowaboutsurveillance, this isveryimportant, an American citizen cannotbe surveilled in the United States forcolludingwith a foreign governmentunless you have a warrant. Is thata true statementofthe law? YATES: That'sright. 76 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 GRAHAM: Is itfairto saythatincidental collection occurs, even in the united States? YATES: That'scorrectaswell, yes. GRAHAM: OK. Sothere's two situations thatwe would have found outwhatGeneral Flynn said tothe Russian bastard. Ifthere was a FISAwarrantfocused on him, wasthere? YATES: You asking? GRAHAM: Yes, eitherone ofyou. YATES: Again I thinkyou knowI'm notgoingto answerwhetherthere was a FISAwarrant. Noram I even going to talkaboutwhetherGeneral Flynn was talkingto the Russians. GRAHAM: OK. CLAPPER: Oh I have to obviouslygoingto go alongwith ... YATES: Well ifhe wasn'ttalkingto the Russians, we've had a hearingforno good reason. So clearlyhe'stalking to the Russiansand we knowaboutit. So ifthere is noFISAwarrant, and I'm goingto find outaboutthis bythe way. The otherwaythatwe knewwhathe wastalkingabout, the Russia (inaudible) was incidentallysurveilled. So those were the two options. Do we knowwho unmasked the conversation between the Russian ambassadorand General Flynn?Was there unmaskingin this situation? CLAPPER: Are you lookingatme? GRAHAM: Yes sir. CLAPPER: I don'tknow. GRAHAM: Do you Ms. Yates? YATES: I can't speakto thisspecificsituation. But can I tryto clarifyone pointon thisunmaskingthing? 77 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 GRAHAM: Veryquickly. YATES: OKI'll tryto do itquickly. As a consumerofintelligence I would --forexample, I would receive intelligence reports from variousagencies. GRAHAM: I getthat, no. YATES: Nowoften timesthe names are alreadyunmasked bythe intelligence agencies ... GRAHAM: The bottom line here is I wantto knowhowitgotto the Washington Post. Somebodyhad to have access to the information and theygave ittothe Washington Post, isthata fairstatement? YATES: That'sright. That'swhatitlooks like tome. GRAHAM: Is thatrightGeneral Clapper? CLAPPER: Yes. GRAHAM: And itwas --neitherone ofyou did it? YATES: That'sright. CLAPPER: That'sright. GRAHAM: Howmanypeople can request unmaskingofAmerican citizen in ourgovernment, General Clapper, how many? CLAPPER: I don'thave an exactnumber. It'sI thinkfairlylimited, because it'sa --normallyfairlyhigh level officials. GRAHAM: Howdidyou knowthatGeneral Flynn was talkingto the Russian's who told you? YATES: 78 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 And I can'treveal thatin an open setting. ButwhatI was tryingto saywas, is thatoften times we receive intelligence reports where the name ofthe American citizen isalreadyunmasked, and it's unmasked by the intel agencybecause, notbased on anybody'srequest, butbecause the name ofthatcitizen is essential. GRAHAM: Is thatthe situation here? YATES: I can't --Senator, I cannot... (CROSSTALK) GRAHAM: Thankyou. Myfourminutes is up. Thankyou both. ButI wantto knowthe answerto these questions. SenatorWhitehouse? WHITEHOUSE: Thanks, again, Chairman. Two things. One, there aremultiple levelsofsecurityclearances, and they're issued bydifferent agencies, correct?So havingone from DoDdoesn'tnecessarilymake you good forall positions and places. CLAPPER: Itdoes not. WHITEHOUSE: And in DoDoperates clearances atmultiple levels, correct? CLAPPER: Right. ButI thinkthe keypointhere isthat, asI indicated earlier, the requirements fora TS/SCI versus the requirements foroccupyinga sensitive position in the White House asa partoftheNational Security Council or... (CROSSTALK) WHITEHOUSE: Wayhigherthan fora retired general? CLAPPER: Well, exactly. And as I can attest, much more invasive and aggressive than a standard TS/SCI. WHITEHOUSE: Nowin termsofcompromise tradecraft, ifyou have somebody, andyou have them compromised, it's prettystandard compromise tradecraftto askthem to do some little thingforyou underthe threatof havingthe compromisinginformation disclosed. 79 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 And ifyou succeed, you nowhave two thingson them. And you workitthatwayto getsomebodymore and more enmeshed in compromise until they're more orlessowned bythe intelligence agency. Isthat a fairdescription ofhowyou can developcompromise through regulartradecraft? CLAPPER: Yes, yes, yes. WHITEHOUSE: OK. Justwantto make thatsure, because we'retalkinga lotaboutithere. Lastthing, mylist. So, I wentthrough the list, itlooked like propaganda, fake news, trolls, and bots. We can all agree from the ICreportthatthose were in fact used in the 2016 election. Hackingand theftofpolitical information, the hackinto the DNC, into the Podesta e-mails, I thinkwe can all agree thatthat's ayes. Timed leaksofdamagingmaterial. Thatappearsverystronglyto be a yes, because ofthe timingofthe release, smackafterthe "Access Hollywood" release. I believe thatthe answerswere correct, no, asto in-countryassassination and political violence bythe Russians here in the UnitedStates. Would you both agree with that? CLAPPER: I don'tthinkwe turned upanyevidence ofthat. WHITEHOUSE: OK. And controllinginvestmentin keyeconomic sectors forleverage, itseems that oureconomyis probablya little too bigforthatand there was no evidence ofthatin the ICreporteither, correct? CLAPPER: That'scorrect. WHITEHOUSE: So, the question ofshadybusiness and financial ties thatnotonlystartoutasbribery, perhaps, oras highlyfavorable deals, secretdealswith Russians, butthatin turn can then turn into compromise? CLAPPER: Itcould. WHITEHOUSE: And it's notjustthe carrotofI'm continuingto bribe you, atsome pointyou have a stickoverthe individual of, I'm goingto outthe deal thatwe have unless you do this, correct? CLAPPER: That'sclassickompromat. WHITEHOUSE: 80 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 And we do notyetknowthe extentto which thathasplayed a rolein the 2016Russian election hack, correct? CLAPPER: I don't. WHITEHOUSE: And in termsofcorruptingand compromisingpoliticians, same, we don'tknowthe full extentof whetherornotpoliticianshave been corrupted and compromised? CLAPPER: I certainlydon't--I did notand don't. WHITEHOUSE: So, ifwe were to go down this, yes, yes, yes, no, no, question mark, question mark, would be ourtallyat the end. Are we agreed on that? CLAPPER: Yes. WHITEHOUSE: OK. Anything else, Ms. Yates? YATES: Notfrom me, sir. WHITEHOUSE: Terrific. Thankyou. I yield backmynine seconds. (LAUGHTER) GRAHAM: You're atrend-setter. SenatorGrassley? GRASSLEY: Mr. Clapper, you saidyes when I asked you ifyou everunmasked a Trump associate ora memberof Congress. ButI forgotto ask, which was it?Was ita Trump associate, a memberofCongress, orboth? CLAPPER: Overmytime asDNI, I thinkthe answerwason rare occasion, both. And, again, Senator, justtomake the pointhere, myfocuswason the foreign targetand atthe foreign target's behaviorin relation to the U.S. person. 81 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 GRASSLEY: OK. Howmanyinstanceswere there, orwasthere justone? CLAPPER: I can onlyrecall one. GRASSLEY: Could you provide... CLAPPER: Itcould have been more. And the bestaccountingofthiswould be in accordance with the procedure, the collectingagency, and thatwould be a bettersource ofrecordsthan the top ofmyhead. GRASSLEY: OK. Could you provide usmore details in a classified setting? CLAPPER: I could. GRASSLEY: OK. Miss Yates, the same question --you said, I don'tknowwhatyou saidto answermyquestion aboutif you were involved in anyunmasking, were you involved? YATES: No, I've neverasked foranyone to be unmasked. GRASSLEY: OK. SenatorGraham, both you and I, and maybe otherpeople, have been said thatwe need a classified settingto getsome answers here. I assume you're goingto pursue that? GRAHAM: Yes, sir. GRASSLEY: OK. Let'ssee, I gottime fora couple more questions, I believe. 82 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Regardlessofanydisagreementsthatwe have aboutallegationsofcollusion, the factthatRussia triedto meddle in ourdemocracyis obviouslya frontto all Americans. We have to punish Russia, and we have to deterall nationsfrom these shenanigans. Do you two believe thatthe government'sresponse, so far, has been enough to deterfuture attacksof this kind?And ifnot, whatelse wouldyou thinkwe should be doing? Miss Yates, would you startout, please? YATES: I thinkthey're comingback, and we have to do a whole lotmore, both to harden ourelection systems, ourstate election systems, to ensure thatfolksoutthere knowwhen they're lookingatnewsfeeds, that itmaynotbe real newsthatthey're reading. I thinkthatwe have to do more to deterthe Russians, and it wouldn'thurtto prosecute a fewfolks, butI don'tthinkwe should kid ourselves, thatwe'll be ableto prosecute ourwayoutofthisproblem. GRASSLEY: OK, Mr. Clapper. CLAPPER: Well, asmuch asI love Congressional Hearings, I thinkthere isa useful purpose served. Because I think the mostimportantthingthatneedsto be done here, iseducate the electorate as to whatthe Russians' objective is, and the tacticsand techniques, and procedures thatthey've employed and will continue to employ, and I predictitwill be againstallthe parties. And so, I thinkeducation ofthe publicisthe mostimportantthing we can do in this hearing, grudgingly though, I admitit, servesthatpurpose to the extentthatthiscan be shared openly. GRASSLEY: So, your. .. CLAPPER: I do thinkas well, there needsto be more done in the wayofsanctions to the Russians, oranyother government, thatattemptsto interfere in ourelection process. GRASSLEY: I'm done. GRAHAM: thankyou verymuch. SenatorKlobuchar? KLOBUCHAR: Thankyou. And we thankyou, both, forbeinghere again. 83 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 I thinkSenatorGraham asked ifyou would wantto come back, then DirectorClapper, and we're very glad thatyou're here. So, when I asked myquestionsbefore, I asked aboutthis general fact, ifa high-rankingnational security official iscaughton tape, with a foreign official, sayingone thingin private, and then sayssomethingin publicthat's different, and ifthat'smaterial forblackmail. And you, both, saidthatitwas. Can you give me an examples, justfrom yourexperience, DirectorClapper, ofwhen Russians have used, forone ofbetterwords, sex, lies, and videotape againstpeople asblackmail? CLAPPER: Well, I don'thave alotofdirectknowledge external to Russia, thisis a classical technique goingbackto Sovietera, thattheywould use to co-opt, compromise political opponents. And ofcourse, you know, the currentadministration in Russia is even more aggressive than that, where theyjustblotoutpeople for beingopposition. So, there are examplesofthat, I don'thave them offthe topofmyhead, butI have read, and seen it, particularlyduringtheSovietera, internal to the SovietUnion, thatthis wasa common practice. KLOBUCHAR: Whataboutourelection infrastructure, aswe move forward?Asyou said, one majorthingwe need to do, isto educate the public. And I'm veryconcerned, while we have differentstates, have different election equipmenton the rankingon rules, and we're workingon a Bill on this. Howimportantis thatto protectthe integrityof ourelection equipment? CLAPPER: It's quite importantand speakingnowasa private citizen, notmyformercapacity, I do thinkthatour election apparatusshouldbe considered critical infrastructure, and should have the protectionsthatare tended to that. Alotofstates pushed backwhen Jeh Johnson, secretaryofHomeland Security, engaged with state election officialsabouthavingthatdesignation and havingthe federal governmentinterfere in --in theirelection process. Butasa citizen, I'd be concerned with doingall we can to secure that apparatus partofthe --attendant(ph) to the intelligence communityassessmentthatwe putout. DHS putouta paperon bestpracticesfor--as an advisoryon howto secure election apparatuses in --atthe state and locallevel. KLOBUCHAR: Verygood. Do you thinkwe're doinga good enough job now, backto the propaganda issue, in educating ourcitizensaboutthis? CLAPPER: No, we're not. And the otherthingwe don'tdo well enough isthe countermessaging. KLOBUCHAR: And howwould you suggestwe could improve that? 84 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 CLAPPER: I would be for--I have been an advocate fora USIA(ph) on steroids. I feltthatwayin termsof counteringthe message from ISIS, who isverysophisticated atconveyingmessages and proselytizing and recruitingpeople. Oureffortsto countermessageare too fragmented in my--in myown opinion. That'sall I'm sayinghere. I --I would seriouslyconsiderthe notion ofa, asI say, a USIA(ph) on steroids notonlyforthe... KLOBUCHAR: Whatwould thatmean exactly? CLAPPER: I'm sorry? KLOBUCHAR: Well, someone thatwe could --we could message orcountermessage, and oureffortsto counter violentextremistideology, particularlythatfrom ISIS, who are veryskilled atthisand we --I don'tthink we do, asa nation, we do a good enough job. I thinkcountermessagingthe Russians, givingthem some oftheirown medicine much more aggressivelythan we've done now. And I would - hasten to add thatis -should notbe tagged onto the intelligence community. Itneedsto be a separate entityfrom the intelligence community, somethingthe I.C. would support, butshould beseparate from that. KLOBUCHAR: Mr. Chair, justone lastquestion. Ms. Yates, you broughta lawyerwith you, a careerlawyer, to the meetingatthe White House. Is thatright? YATES: Yes, that's right. KLOBUCHAR: About when you were givingthese warnings aboutthe knowledge you had on General Flynn. Is that normal practice?Whydid you do that? YATES: Well, thiswasa person who wasthecareerlawyerwho was supervisingthismatterand we thoughtthat itwasimportant. Firstofall, she had been the onewho was mostintimatelyfamiliarwith it, but secondly, we knewthatmytenure was goingto be shortand wanted to make sure thatthere was continuitythere and that... (CROSSTALK) KLOBUCHAR: You justdidn'tknowitwasgoingto be that short. YATES: I didn't. KLOBUCHAR: OK. Thankyou. 85 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 (LAUGHTER) GRAHAM: I thinkthe vote is on, so I hate to change, butlet's dothree minutes. KENNE DY: I can be veryquick. GRAHAM: Yes, sir. KENNE DY: Mr. Clapper, doesMr. Putin have anyassets in the United States? CLAPPER: I don'tknowthe answertothe question. KENNE DY: Who would knowthat? CLAPPER: Well, some componentin the intelligence communitymightknowitorthe FBI, butI don'tknow. KENNEDY: Do you knowifanyofMr. Putin's friends mighthaveassets in the United States thatare beingheld for Mr. Putin? CLAPPER: That'sa possibility, yes. KENNEDY: Who would knowthat?Same person? CLAPPER: I'm sorry? KENNEDY: Who would knowthat?Same person? CLAPPER: I would guessthe FBI. KENNEDY: OK. Ifthe intelligence communityand the attorneygeneral knewall thisinformation aboutMr. Flynn, howdid he geta securityclearance? CLAPPER: 86 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 KnewwhataboutMr. Flynn? KENNE DY: Well, thathe had had a conversation with the Russian ambassadoraboutsanctions. CLAPPER: Well, thatwas late --thatwas the 29th ofDecemberorso, wheneverthat --wheneverthat--as reported in the media when thattookplace. KENNE DY: January19th, I think, the presidentwas sworn in, 17th, somethinglike that. Howdid he geta security clearance? CLAPPER: Well, he wasa securityclearance --had one fora longtime. He's acareermilitaryintelligence officer. I don'tknowthe specificsofwhen his --when his fell due. The system iseveryfiveyears --the current system, everyfive years, you're supposed to getaperiodicreinvestigation. I don'tknowthedetailsof that. Itwould probablybedone byhis old agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, but... KENNE DY: Butdon'tyou have to getsome additional double secretsecurityclearance to serve in the White House? CLAPPER: Well, yes, you do. And as I indicated before... KENNE DY: Can i askyou howhe gotone... CLAPPER: ... the process isdone --I don'tknowhowit's done in this administration. KENNE DY: OK. CLAPPER: Butmyown knowledge ofhowitwasdone when I served in the Bush administration and again in the Obama administration, there's an extensive vettingprocess bythe FBI. KENNE DY: OK. Letme stopyou because I've onlygot50seconds. Ms. Yates, are there anyreasonable arguments thatcan be made in defense ofPresidentTrump's executive order? YATES: I don'tbelieve thatthere are reasonable legal arguments thatare grounded in truth thatcan be made in defense ofhisargumentthatthe travel ban was notintended to have an impact, a religious impact, and to disfavorMuslims. 87 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 KENNE DY: So you believe thatthe argumentsmade bythe lawyers who are nowdefendingthe executive orderare unreasonable? YATES: I believe thatthe DepartmentofJustice has a responsibilityto uphold the lawand to always speakthe truth, particularlywhen it'saboutsomethingas fundamental as thisexecutive orderwas, thatdealswith religious freedom. Butletme saythis. I have tremendous respectforthecareermen and women ofthe Departmentof Justice, includingthe lawyers in the civil division who are handlingthis. Buttheirobligation wasdifferent than mine. Theymustmake an argumentiftheycan make a reasonable legal argument. Asacting attorneygeneral, myresponsibilitywasbroaderthan thatand I had to lookbeyond the confinesofthe face ofthe .O. E to lookatthe president'sstatementsand to lookat otherfactorsto was determine what the actualintenthere, andthatwasthe basis formydecision. KENNE DY: And forthe record, differenttravel ban. GRAHAM: Yeah, there's a --the firstorderwaswithdrawn. There's a second one outthere. SenatorBlumenthal. BLUMENTHAL: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Yates, so far, the concerns you expressed aboutthe constitutionalityofthese executiveorders have been upheld bythe courts, correct? YATES: That'sright. BLUMENTHAL: Second, DirectorClapper, on the issue ofpossible use ofthe farrightwebsites bythe Russians, you were asked earlierwhetheryou have anyknowledge aboutthatpotential cooperation orinvolvement. Do you have independentknowledge ofthe use ofthose farrightwebsites? CLAPPER: I don't. I don'thave, atleastoffthe top ofmyhead, specificknowledge orinsightinto thatconnection. Could have been, I justdon'tknowthatdirectly. BLUMENTHAL: Butyou made reference topublished reports. You said, I think, you knewaboutitfrom whatyou read aboutin the newspapers. CLAPPER: 88 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Well, that's a specificreference to whathappened in --occurred in France. BLUMENTHAL: Correct. And the same tactics thatwere used mostrecentlyin France were also used oratleast reportedlyused in thiscountry? CLAPPER: Correct. BLUMENTHAL: And I'd like to putin the record one publicreport, there are probablyothers, a McClatchyreportof March20th, which begins with the lead, "federalinvestigatorsareexaminingwhetherfarrightnews sites played anyrole lastyears in the Russian cyberoperation thatdramaticallywidened the reach of newsstories, some fictional, thatfavoredDonald Trump's presidential bid." Itquotestowpeople familiarwith the inquiryand itgoes on to mention, "Amongthose sites, BreitbartNewsand Infowars." Mr. Chairman, ifthisreportcould be entered into the record. GRAHAM: (OFF-MIKE) BLUMENTHAL: Do you have knowledge, Ms. Yates, ofthatfederal investigation? YATES: I don't, and ifI did, I couldn'ttellyou aboutit. BLUMENTHAL: I thoughtthatmightbe youranswer. Finally, you said, Ms. Yates, thatwe're notgoingto prosecute ourwayoutoftheRussian continued attackon this country. ButputtingAmericansin prison iftheycooperate, collude, aid and abetor otherwise assistin thatillegalitymight send a verystrongdeterrentmessage, correct? YATES: I expectthatitwould, yes. BLUMENTHAL: And there are indeed criminal penaltiesexistingon the books, we don'tneed newlaws, which involve criminalityand potential criminal prosecution forthose acts, correct? YATES: Yes, that's right. BLUMENTHAL: Thankyou verymuch, Mr. Chairman. GRAHAMN: 89 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 Thankyou all. We're atthe end ofthe dayand you've been great. I thinkthe public is bettereducated, at leastI hope, aboutwhatRussia did. Seemsto be bipartisan consensus thatRussia tried to interfere with ourelection. We have some differences in otherplaces. Butjustsome housekeepinghere, you will provide to the committee ifyou could, Mr. Clapper --I know you're a private citizen now, butifyou could help usto determine the pool ofpeople thatcan request unmasking, we'd appreciate itsome laterdate. When itcomes to (inaudible) collection on 2016 campaigns, I'm a little confused, butI thinkwe found atleast one occasion where thatdid happen. You made a requestforunmaskingon a Trump associate and maybe a memberofCongress?Isthatright, Mr. Clapper? CLAPPER: Yes. GRAHAM: OK. Dowe knowanyothersoffthe topofyourhead ofanyothercandidate on eitherside ofthe aisle? CLAPPER: Well, I don't--there could have been otherrequests--unmaskingrequeststhatI... GRAHAM: Butthere'sa wayto find thatout. CLAPPER: Yes. GRAHAM: OK, good. CLAPPER: And the bestwayto do itwould be to the original collection agency... (CROSSTALK) GRAHAM: Right, to find outwho requested what. Finally, the currentdeputyattorneygeneral, do you knowhim, Ms. Yates? YATES: (OFF-MIKE) GRAHAM: Do you have confidence in him? YATES: Yes, I do. 90 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 GRAHAM: Thankyou all. WHITEHOUSE: Final comment? GRAHAM: Absolutely. WHITEHOUSE: Duringthe lasthearing, we had the authorofthe Kremlin playbookasone ofourwitnesses and we had the verywell-regardedKenneth Weinstein asoneofourwitnesses, and theyboth agreed thatthe United States isleavingitselfvulnerable to thiskind ofinfluence ifwe continuetoallowshell corporationsto proliferate withouta wayforlawenforcementto figure outwho the beneficial owners are. So I mention thatbecause Chairman Grassleyand I are workingon a piece oflegislation to helpsolve that, butI thinkit's veryimportantin this area and I justwanted to flagitand expressto Chairman Grassleymyappreciation forhisbipartisan cooperation on thatfront, and ofcourse, myappreciation to Chairman Graham forhisworkto make this hearingasuccess and so interestingand meaningful. Thankyou. GRAHAM: Thankyou both. The hearingis adjourned. List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS: SEN. LINDSE YGRAHAM, R-S.C. CHAIRMAN SEN. JOHN CORNYN, XASR-TE SEN. TE DCRUZ, R-TE XAS SEN. BEN SASSER-NE, B. SEN. JOHN KENNEDY, R-LA. SEN. CHARLE. SEGRASSLE Y, R-IOWAE XOFFICIO SEN. SHELDON WHITEHOUSED-R.I. , RANKING MEMBE R SEN. AMYKLOBUCHAR, D-MINN. SEN. RICHARDJ. DURBIN, D-ILL. 91 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001 SEN. CHRISCOONS, D-DEL. SEN. DIANNEFE INSTEIN, D-CALIF. XOFFICIO E SEN. PATRICKJ. AHY,LE D-VT. SEN. ALFRANKE N, D-MINN. SEN. RICHARDBLUME NTHAL, D-CONN. SEN. MAZIE K. HIRONO, D-HAWAII WITNESSES: SALLYQ. YATES, FORMERACTING ATTORNE YGERAL NE JAMESR. CLAPPE RJR., FORME RDIRE CTOROFNATIONALINTE LLIGE NCE Source: CQTranscripts CQCONGRESSIONALTRANSCRIPTS Congressional Hearings May8, 2017 -Final ©2017, Provided underlicense from BloombergGovernment. BloombergGovernment Support: 1-877-498-3587 www.bgov.com All materials herein are protected byUnited Statescopyrightlawand/orlicense from Bloomberg Government, and maynotbe reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, published orbroadcast withoutthe priorwritten permission ofBloombergGovernment. You maynotalterorremove any trademark, copyright orothernotice from copiesofthe content. 92 Document ID: 0.7.24125.6113-000001