Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
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PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court JANUARY 23, 2014 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board David Medine, Chairman Rachel Brand Elisebeth Collins Cook James Dempsey Patricia Wald i PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Part 1 INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………..………………………… 1 Part 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ………………………………………………………………………………… 8 Part 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE NSA SECTION 215 PROGRAM ..................................................... 21 Part 4 HISTORY OF THE NSA SECTION 215 PROGRAM ……........................................................ 37 Part 5 STATUTORY ANALYSIS ……………………………………………...……………………................... 57 Part 6 CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS …………………………………...……………..………................... 103 Part 7 POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE NSA SECTION 215 PROGRAM …………………………………………….………..………………….……. 137 Part 8 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT……………………………………................………... 173 Part 9 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING TRANSPARENCY………….. 190 Part 10 CONCLUSION ………………………………….….………………...…………………….….................... 207 ANNEXES ……………………………………………………………..…………………………………...................... 208 A. Separate Statement by Board Member Rachel Brand................................................. 208 B. Separate Statement by Board Member Elisebeth Collins Cook............................... 214 C. July 9, 2013 Workshop Agenda and Link to Workshop Transcript....................... 219 ii D. November 4, 2013 Hearing Agenda and Link to Hearing Transcript................... 222 E. Request for Public Comments on Board Study............................................................... 225 F. Index to Public Comments on www.regulations.gov .................................................. 227 iii Part 1: INTRODUCTION On June 5, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian published the first of a series of articles based on unauthorized disclosures of classified documents by Edward Snowden, a contractor for the National Security Agency (“NSA”).1 The article described an NSA program to collect millions of telephone records, including records about purely domestic calls. Over the course of the next several days, there were additional articles regarding this program as well as another NSA program referred to in leaked documents as “PRISM.” These disclosures caused a great deal of concern both over the extent to which they damaged national security and over the nature and scope of the surveillance programs they purported to reveal. Subsequently, authorized disclosures from the government confirmed both programs. Under one, the NSA collects telephone call records or metadata — but not the content of phone conversations — covering the calls of most Americans on an ongoing basis, subject to renewed approvals by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC” or “FISA court”). This program was approved by the FISC pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (“Patriot Act”). Under the second program, the government collects the content of electronic communications, including phone calls and emails, where the targets are reasonably believed to be non-U.S. persons located outside the United States.2 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act is the basis for this program.3 Immediately following the press revelations, the public and many policymakers began asking questions about the scope and nature of these NSA programs. Central among the issues raised was the degree to which the programs included appropriate safeguards for privacy and civil liberties. One week after the first news article appeared, a bipartisan group of thirteen U.S. Senators asked the recently reconstituted Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) to investigate the two NSA programs and to provide an unclassified report “so that the public and the Congress can have a long overdue debate” about the privacy issues raised.4 A July 11, 2013, letter from House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi requested that the Board also consider the operations of the FISC, which approved 1 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013). 2 Even when the target is a non-U.S. person, collections of communications involving U.S. persons may still occur, either where those individuals are in communication with non-U.S. persons or where they are mistakenly believed to be non-U.S. persons. 3 This is the program inaccurately referred to in early reports as the PRISM program. PRISM is actually the database in which such communications are compiled. 4 Letter from Senator Tom Udall et al. to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.pclob.gov/. 1 the two programs. On June 21, 2013, the Board met with President Obama and his senior staff at the White House, and the President asked the Board to review “where our counterterrorism efforts and our values come into tension.”5 In response to the congressional and presidential requests, the Board immediately initiated a study of the 215 and 702 programs and the operation of the FISA court. This Report contains the results of the Board’s 215 program study as well as our analysis and recommendations regarding the FISC’s operation. I. Background The PCLOB is an independent bipartisan agency within the executive branch established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.6 The Board is comprised of four part-time members and a full-time chairman, all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Board’s authorizing statute gives it two primary responsibilities: 1) To analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and 2) To ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.7 This Report arises out of the Board’s responsibility to provide oversight by analyzing and reviewing executive branch actions, in this case the operation of the Section 215 telephone records program. The Board today is in its third iteration. In July 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (known as the 9/11 Commission) recommended that “there should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil 5 See Letter from Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi to Chairman David Medine (July 11, 2013), available at http://www.pclob.gov/; Remarks by the President in a Press Conference at the White House (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press- conference. 6 Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 801(a), 121 Stat. 266, 352-58 (2007). 7 See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 801(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee). 2 liberties.”8 In August 2004, President George W. Bush created the President’s Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties by executive order.9 The President’s Board ceased to meet upon the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which created a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board within the Executive Office of the President.10 In 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act reconstituted the Board in its current form as an independent agency within the executive branch.11 The Act requires that all five Board members be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for staggered six-year terms. The Act further requires that the Board be bipartisan in composition. No more than three of the five members may be from the same political party, and before appointing members who are not from the President’s political party, the President must consult with the leadership of the opposing party. With the reconstitution of the Board, the 9/11 Commission Act terminated, effective January 30, 2008, the terms of the individuals then serving as Board members within the Executive Office of the President. From that time until August 2012, the Board did not function, as none of the positions on the Board were filled. Then, in August 2012, the Board’s current four part-time members were confirmed by the Senate, providing the reconstituted Board with its first confirmed members and a quorum to begin operations.12 8 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, at 395 (2004). The 9/11 Commission was a bipartisan panel established to “make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding” the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and to provide “recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.” Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 602(4), (5), 116 Stat. 2383, 2408 (2002). 9 See Exec. Order No. 13353, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,585 (Aug. 27, 2004). The President’s Board was chaired by the Deputy Attorney General and consisted of twenty-two representatives