DOCSLIB.ORG

NATO's Maritime Strategy and the Libya Crisis As Seen from The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
NATO's Maritime Strategy and the Libya Crisis As Seen from The Research Paper Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome - No. 90 – March 2013 NATO’s Maritime Strategy and the Libya Crisis as Seen from the Sea Brooke A. Smith-Windsor1 Contents In case you did not know, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has an Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS). The document, approved on 05 January 2011, was the first of its kind in over a quarter of a century. In AMS and the Strategic Concept 2 spite of this post-Cold War milestone, however, the strategy was endor- Origins 2 sed by the member states with little fanfare. Since its declassification in Content 3 March of the same year, it has been quietly buried in the NATO official AMS and Operation Unified website, largely out of sight from the popular media and (by extension) Protector 4 from the European and North American populace whose security and Crisis management 5 prosperity it is ostensibly designed to safeguard.2 The average person on Cooperative security 9 the street (or, perhaps more aptly expressed in this context, on the sea- Maritime security 10 front) should therefore be forgiven if he or she has never heard of, let Conclusion 11 alone read, a dedicated maritime strategy for the Atlantic Alliance in the 21st century. But exist it does. List of Abbreviations 12 It is possible to speculate about the reasons for the AMS’ quiet passage and lack of publicity. Perhaps it was a care on the part of the 28 Allied governments not to clutter NATO’s strategic messaging to their popula- tions, given that the new capstone Strategic Concept (November 2010) was itself little more than a month old. Or, perhaps it was a concern not to stoke the coals of inter-service rivalry by presenting any semblance of privileged status for maritime forces3 in the absence of comparable, new- ly-minted strategies for land and air forces. On the other hand, perhaps it was simply Allied preoccupation—in January 2011 at least—with the Research Paper ongoing ground war in land-locked Afghanistan. ISSN 2076 - 0949 (Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Print) ISSN 2076 - 0957 Whatever the reasons, the approach nevertheless represents a missed op- (Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Online) portunity for purposeful and transparent policy discourse with the public, NATO Defense College Research Division Via Giorgio Pelosi, 1 1 Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Ph.D., is a member of the NATO Defense College (NDC) Research Division and a 00143 Rome – Italy former special advisor to the working group that authored the Alliance Maritime Strategy (2011). Some elements web site: www.ndc.nato.int of this paper are based in part on a Study Project of NDC Senior Course 118, Committee 4, jointly mentored e-mail: [email protected] by the author and by Captain Jean Nicolas Gauthier (French Navy) in the midst of the Libyan crisis. The author would in particular like to acknowledge the valuable support provided by Captain Gauthier in compiling it. The Imprimerie DEd’A srl views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the NDC, NATO and their affiliated partners. V.le Scalo S. Lorenzo 55, 00185 Rome, Italy 2 www.dedaedizioni.com The AMS does not even appear in the Alphabetical Index of the NATO official website, www.nato.int. 3 Forces whose primary purposes are to conduct military operations at and from the sea. This is generally © NDC 2013 all rights reserved understood to include warships and submarines, auxiliaries, organic aircraft, fixed seabed installations, fixed shore installations (such as batteries) for the defence of seaways, shore-based maritime aircraft and other shore-based aircraft assigned to maritime tasks. 1 Research Paper No. 90 – March 2013 about a key component of official Alliance strategy in- central tenets of the AMS were relevant, even partly pro- tended to reinforce the much lauded yet scantly worded phetic, as regards the response demanded by the Libya grand strategy embodied in the “chapeau” Strategic Con- crisis. While OUP may be broadly described as success cept. It also represents an historic irony, especially in the for the AMS, shortcomings in political will, procedures context of mid-March 2011. At that time the Libya crisis and capabilities were evident during the maritime cam- was in full swing. The UN Security Council had already paign. With the benefit of hindsight, a number of con- passed Resolution 1970, imposing an arms embargo and ceivable remedies are therefore constructively presented targeted sanctions on the Gaddafi regime in the face of to chart the way forward in time for the next crisis to its wanton violence against Libya civilians. A day before confront Allied maritime forces. the AMS’ timid public release, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 had also been passed, autho- rizing a no-fly zone, a strengthened arms embargo, and AMS and the Strategic Concept “all necessary measures” to protect civilians short of a foreign occupation. Six days later, NATO had assumed Origins responsibility for the arms embargo under Operation Unified Protector (OUP) and, by 31 March, it had taken At their Lisbon Summit in November 2010, Allied over control of the entire enforcement operation. At its Heads of State and Government endorsed NATO’s peak, OUP would account for the deployment of no new official strategy entitled Active Engagement, Modern less than 21 naval assets (supply ships, frigates, destroy- Defense.4 If the Strategic Concept may be understood ers, submarines, amphibious assault ships and aircraft as an example of grand strategy—the melding of carriers), enabling air strikes ashore, humanitarian assis- policy with overarching guidance for the coordination tance, safety of life at sea (search and rescue) and the of military means to achieve it5—it would be reason- surveillance of an area measuring approximately 61.000 able, indeed logical, to have expected the development nautical square miles. So the first real test for NATO’s of individual service (army, navy, air force) strategies so-called crisis management “core task”, as espoused in thereafter in response to the top-down direction pro- the 2010 Strategic Concept, would to a significant de- vided. In practice, however, defense strategy formula- gree be a maritime one—though the document never tion is rarely so straightforward and the genesis of the once mentions the words “ocean”, “sea”, “maritime” or AMS is no exception. “navy”. Yet, as regards the AMS that was intended to fill this void, and which OUP would by extension also put As early as 2007, one of NATO’s two top strategic com- to the test for the first time in its existence, the Allies mands, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), advo- paradoxically were largely silent. cated for a new maritime strategy to replace the 1984 vestige of the Cold War.6 Such calls continued through- This paper intends to help redress the deficit in policy out 2008. By the spring of 2009, months before the discourse about the AMS and its relationship to the formation of the so-called “Group of Experts” to con- Strategic Concept, as well as in assessments of how the sider the outlines of a new Strategic Concept,7 an AMS strategy fared in its inaugural real-world encounter with initiating letter and work plan had been set in motion modern misery and mayhem at the hands of a despot. It with ambitious timelines. These were to culminate in argues that, even if not corresponding in structure and an envisioned North Atlantic Council (NAC)-approved evolutionary origin, the Strategic Concept and AMS are maritime strategy no later than January 2010.8 How- nevertheless compatible. Additionally, it reveals that the ever, work on the basis of the aforementioned time- 4 NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defense, Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 19 November 2010, available at: http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html (accessed October 2012). 5 See Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, Survival, 47.3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 33-54. 6 NATO, Allied Command Transformation, Multiple Futures – The Maritime Dimension, Unclassified PowerPoint Presentation, Spring 2007, provided to the author. The final report of the Multiple Futures initiative likewise urged Allies to: “Develop a comprehensive maritime strategy to address the threats to Alliance security on the maritime commons presented by demographic shifts, energy scarcity, organised crime, technology-savvy adversaries, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.” See: NATO, Allied Command Transformation, Multiple Futures Project – Navigating Towards 2030, April 2009, p. 62 7 The Group of Experts was formed in the autumn of 2009 and led by former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright. Its final report was tabled in May 2010. 8 See: NATO, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) development, 19 August 2009, 5000/S-6-8/TT-4449/Ser: NU. NAC 2 No. 90 – March 2013 Research Paper line continued unabated even after the initiation of points, ports, and other infrastructure such as pipelines, deliberations on a new Strategic Concept, the approval oil and natural gas platforms and trans-oceanic telecom- for which—it was by then well known—would not be munications cables […] [M]aintenance of the freedom of forthcoming until late 2010 at the earliest. Whether or navigation, sea-based trade routes, critical infrastructure, not it had been the intent to proactively and positively energy flows, protection of marine resources and environ- influence the outcome of the Strategic Concept in fa- mental safety are all in Allies’ security interests. At the vour of Alliance maritime forces by moving forward same time, the world’s oceans and seas are an increasingly on the AMS, in the end the grand strategy would come accessible environment for transnational criminal and ter- first.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Unlocking NATO's Amphibious Potential
    November 2020 Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE J.D. WILLIAMS, GENE GERMANOVICH, STEPHEN WEBBER, GABRIELLE TARINI Unlocking NATO’s Amphibious Potential Lessons from the Past, Insights for the Future orth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members maintain amphibious capabilities that provide versatile and responsive forces for crisis response and national defense. These forces are routinely employed in maritime Nsecurity, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), counterterrorism, stability operations, and other missions. In addition to U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and U.S. Navy forces, the Alliance’s amphibious forces include large ships and associated landing forces from five nations: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK). Each of these European allies—soon to be joined by Turkey—can conduct brigade-level operations, and smaller elements typically are held at high readiness for immediate response.1 These forces have been busy. Recent exercises and operations have spanned the littorals of West and North Africa, the Levant, the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Given NATO’s ongoing concerns over Russia’s military posture and malign behavior, allies with amphibious capabilities have also been exploring how these forces could contribute to deterrence or, if needed, be employed as part of a C O R P O R A T I O N combined and joint force in a conflict against a highly some respects, NATO’s ongoing efforts harken back to the capable nation-state. Since 2018, NATO’s headquarters Cold War, when NATO’s amphibious forces routinely exer- and various commands have undertaken initiatives and cised in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic as part of a convened working groups to advance the political intent broader strategy to deter Soviet aggression.
    [Show full text]
  • Revista Da Armada | 540 Sumário
    Revista da Nº 540 • ANO XLVIII • €1,50 MAIO 2019 • MENSAL ARMADA FUZILEIROS MOÇAMBIQUE 2019 NRP CORTE-REAL ALMIRANTE CHENS 2019 GAN19 CANTO E CASTRO LISBOA REVISTA DA ARMADA | 540 SUMÁRIO 02 Programa Dia da Marinha 2019 NRP CORTE REAL GRUPO AERONAVAL 10 04 Strategia (48) CHARLES DE GAULLE 06 Assistência Humanitária a Moçambique 08 NRP Álvares Cabral – Iniciativa Mar Aberto 19.1 12 Treinar Competências: O simulador como campo de treino 21 Academia de Marinha 22 Direito do Mar e Direito Marítimo (22) 24 Notícias 26 Vigia da História (109) ALMIRANTE 14 CANTO E CASTRO 28 Estórias (49) 30 Serviço & Saúde (5) 31 Saúde para Todos (65) 32 Desporto 33 Quarto de Folga 34 Notícias Pessoais / Convívios / Programa Homenagem aos Combatentes 35 Colóquio "O Mar: Tradições e Desafios" – Programa CC Símbolos Heráldicos CHIEFS OF EUROPEAN NAVIES CHENS 2019 – LISBOA 17 Capa Fuzileiros em Missão Humanitária – Moçambique Revista da ARMADA Publicação Oficial da Marinha Diretor Desenho Gráfico E-mail da Revista da Armada Periodicidade mensal CALM Aníbal José Ramos Borges ASS TEC DES Aida Cristina M.P. Faria [email protected] Nº 540 / Ano XLVIII [email protected] Maio 2019 Chefe de Redação Administração, Redação e Edição CMG Joaquim Manuel de S. Vaz Ferreira Revista da Armada – Edifício das Instalações Paginação eletrónica e produção Revista anotada na ERC Centrais da Marinha – Rua do Arsenal Página Ímpar, Lda. 1149-001 Lisboa – Portugal Depósito Legal nº 55737/92 Redatora Estrada de Benfica, 317 - 1 Fte ISSN 0870-9343 Telef: 21 159 32 54 CTEN TSN-COM Ana Alexandra G. de Brito 1500-074 Lisboa Propriedade Estatuto Editorial Marinha Portuguesa Secretário de Redação www.marinha.pt/pt/Servicos/Paginas/ Tiragem média mensal: NIPC 600012662 SMOR L Mário Jorge Almeida de Carvalho revista-armada.aspx 3800 exemplares MAIO 2019 3 REVISTA DA ARMADA | 540 Str 48 50 ANOS NAS FORÇAS NAVAIS PERMANENTES DA NATO DA GÉNESE ATÉ 1995 “Atuarão como um polícia de turno.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey and Black Sea Security 3
    SIPRI Background Paper December 2018 TURKEY AND SUMMARY w The Black Sea region is BLACK SEA SECURITY experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, siemon t. wezeman and alexandra kuimova* Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s The security environment in the wider Black Sea region—which brings takeover of Crimea and the together the six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey start of the internationalized and Ukraine) and a hinterland including the South Caucasus and Moldova— civil war in eastern Ukraine is rapidly changing. It combines protracted conflicts with a significant con- in 2014. ventional military build-up that intensified after the events of 2014: Russia’s Although security in the takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Black Sea region has always Ukraine.1 Transnational connections between conflicts across the region been and remains important for and between the Black Sea and the Middle East add further dimensions of Turkey, the current Turkish insecurity. As a result, there is a blurring of the conditions of peace, crisis defence policy seems to be and conflict in the region. This has led to an unpredictable and potentially largely directed southwards, high-risk environment in which military forces with advanced weapons, towards the Middle East. including nuclear-capable systems, are increasingly active in close proxim- Russian–Turkish relations have been ambiguous for some years. ity to each other. Turkey has openly expressed In this context, there is an urgent need to develop a clearer understanding concern about perceived of the security dynamics and challenges facing the wider Black Sea region, Russian ambitions in the Black and to explore opportunities for dialogue between the key regional security Sea region and called for a actors.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Revolutionary Discontent and F(R)
    Post-revolutionary Discontent and F(r)action- alisation in the Maghreb Managing the Tunisia-Libya Border Dynamics Clingendael Report Grégory Chauzal Sofia Zavagli Post-revolutionary Discontent and F(r)actionalisation in the Maghreb Managing the Tunisia-Libya Border Dynamics Grégory Chauzal Sofia Zavagli Clingendael Report August 2016 August 2016 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed, distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the Clingendael Institute as its source. Permission is required to use the logo of the Clingendael Institute. This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute ([email protected]). The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may present trademark and copyright infringement issues: links that involve unauthorized use of our logo, framing, inline links, or metatags, as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL. Cover photo: © Flickr, A young Libyan boy raises the Tunisian and Free Libya flags in Tataouine. About the authors Grégory Chauzal is a Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute, where he specializes on security and terrorism issues, with a special emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb and the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • Jan 4 2016 Comp Troller
    OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301 -1100 JAN 4 2016 COMP TROLLER MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER) DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF COMPTROLLER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND SUBJECT: Updates to Department ofDefense Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Volume 11A, Chapter 9, "Support oflnternational Military Activities" This memorandum updates the listing ofNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Force Integration Units and Centers of Excellence, and their assigned administrative agent, as currently published in Table 9-1 ofVolume 11A, Chapter 9. These changes will be incorporated into the next chapter update planned for June 2016. Table 9-1, "International Military Headquarter and Related Agencies and Administrative Agents Responsible for Their Support and for Support to U.S. Elements" is revised to add as A.S.m the Center of Excellence- Energy Security (ESCOE) in Vilnius, Lithuania. This change was requested in Attachment 1. The Air Force will serve as the administrative agent. In addition, Table 9-1 is revised to add six new NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) with their associated administrative agents as follows: A.2.g.(1) NFIU Sofia, Bulgaria- Air Force; A.2.g.(2) NFIU Bucharest, Romania-Army; A.4.f.(1) NFIU Tallinn, Estonia-Navy; A.4.f.(2) NFIU Riga, Latvia- Navy; A.4.f.(3) NFIU Vilnius, Lithuania-Air Force; and A.4.f.(4) NFIU Bydgoszcz, Poland-Army. These changes were requested in Attachment 2. A draft update of Table 9-1 reflecting these changes is provided as Attachment 3.
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region
    SIPRI Background Paper April 2019 THE FOREIGN MILITARY SUMMARY w The Horn of Africa is PRESENCE IN THE HORN OF undergoing far-reaching changes in its external security AFRICA REGION environment. A wide variety of international security actors— from Europe, the United States, neil melvin the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia—are currently operating I. Introduction in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has experienced The Horn of Africa region has experienced a substantial increase in the a proliferation of foreign number and size of foreign military deployments since 2001, especially in the military bases and a build-up of 1 past decade (see annexes 1 and 2 for an overview). A wide range of regional naval forces. The external and international security actors are currently operating in the Horn and the militarization of the Horn poses foreign military installations include land-based facilities (e.g. bases, ports, major questions for the future airstrips, training camps, semi-permanent facilities and logistics hubs) and security and stability of the naval forces on permanent or regular deployment.2 The most visible aspect region. of this presence is the proliferation of military facilities in littoral areas along This SIPRI Background the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.3 However, there has also been a build-up Paper is the first of three papers of naval forces, notably around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the entrance to devoted to the new external the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden. security politics of the Horn of This SIPRI Background Paper maps the foreign military presence in the Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Allied Maritime Command HQ MARCOM News Release
    Allied Maritime Command HQ MARCOM News Release Nov. 1, 2017 Operation Sea Guardian Patrols the Eastern Mediterranean MEDITERRANEAN SEA - Four NATO ships and one submarine, provided by Bulgaria, Italy, Romania and Turkey, in cooperation with maritime patrol aircraft from Greece and Turkey, conducted focused security patrols in international waters of the eastern Mediterranean Sea as part of NATO’s maritime counter-terrorism operation, Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) October 14 to 30, 2017. The focused security patrol concentrated on gathering pattern-of-life information about maritime activities in the international waters of the eastern Mediterranean Sea from off the coast of Syria to off the coast of Israel and Lebanon in support of the Operation’s Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) task. While operating in the focus area, the ships identified 900 motor vessels, from large commercial shipping vessels to smaller fishing vessels. The group hailed 39 of those ships and were invited onboard four ships in support of building a better understanding of the activities occurring at sea in the eastern Mediterranean. The group worked in coordination with support from NATO assigned Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) to cover the area and monitor the maritime activities across the area. This information is relayed back to Allied Maritime Command and added to the NATO Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP), a common picture available to all Allies. In support of the operation, both Greece and Turkey provided tankers, HS Prometheus and TCG Akar respectively,
    [Show full text]
  • The Development of Libyan- Tunisian Bilateral Relations: a Critical Study on the Role of Ideology
    THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBYAN- TUNISIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS: A CRITICAL STUDY ON THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY Submitted by Almabruk Khalifa Kirfaa to the University of Exeter As a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics In December 2014 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature: Almabruk Kirfaa………………………………………………………….. i Abstract Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations take place in a context shaped by particular historical factors in the Maghreb over the past two centuries. Various elements and factors continue to define the limitations and opportunities present for regimes and governments to pursue hostile or negative policies concerning their immediate neighbours. The period between 1969 and 2010 provides a rich area for the exploration of inter-state relations between Libya and Tunisia during the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st century. Ideologies such as Arabism, socialism, Third Worldism, liberalism and nationalism, dominated the Cold War era, which saw two opposing camps: the capitalist West versus the communist East. Arab states were caught in the middle, and many identified with one side over the other. generating ideological rivalries in the Middle East and North Africa. The anti-imperialist sentiments dominating Arab regimes and their citizens led many statesmen and politicians to wage ideological struggles against their former colonial masters and even neighbouring states.
    [Show full text]
  • The Turkey-UAE Race to the Bottom in Libya: a Prelude to Escalation
    The Turkey-UAE race to the bottom in Libya: a prelude to escalation Recherches & Documents N°8/2020 Aude Thomas Research fellow, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique July 2020 www.frstrategie.org SOMMAIRE THE TURKEY-UAE RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN LIBYA: A PRELUDE TO ESCALATION ................................. 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 1. TURKEY: EXERCISING THE FULL MILITARY CAPABILITIES SPECTRUM IN LIBYA ............................. 3 2. THE UAE’S MILITARY VENTURE IN LIBYA ................................................................................ 11 2.1. The UAE’s failed campaign against Tripoli ....................................................... 11 2.2. Russia’s support to LNA forces: from the shadow to the limelight ................ 15 CONCLUSION: LOOKING AT FUTURE NATIONAL DYNAMICS IN LIBYA ................................................... 16 FONDATION pour la RECHERCHE STRATÉ GIQUE The Turkey-UAE race to the bottom in Libya: a prelude to escalation This paper was completed on July 15, 2020 Introduction In March, the health authorities in western Libya announced the first official case of Covid- 19 in the country. While the world was enforcing a lockdown to prevent the spread of the virus, war-torn Libya renewed with heavy fighting in the capital. Despite the UNSMIL’s1 call for a lull in the fighting, the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its allies conducted shelling on Tripoli, targeting indistinctly residential neighbourhoods, hospitals and armed groups’ locations. The Government of National Accord (GNA) answered LNA’s shelling campaign by launching an offensive against several western cities. These operations could not have been executed without the support of both conflicting parties’ main backers: Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The protracted conflict results from both the competing parties’ unwillingness to agree on conditions to resume political negotiations2.
    [Show full text]
  • The Back Way to Europe a Case Study About Why Young Men in Gambia Are Prepared to Risk Their Lives to Get to Europe
    Department for Social Studies Peace and Development studies Bachelor’s Thesis The Back way to Europe A case study about why young men in Gambia are prepared to risk their lives to get to Europe Author: Frida Strand Jagne Supervisor: Per Dannefjord Examiner: Jonas Ewald Date: 2014-06-08 Subject: Peace and development 1 studies III Course code: 2FU31E Abstract Irregular migration is one of our times challenge and the news about migrants dying in the Mediterranean Sea seems to be more and more common these days. African migrants are risking their lives migrating by routes through the desert on trucks packed with migrants to get to Libya; this route is called the back way. From Libya they are crossing the Mediterranean Sea in small over loaded boats with the hope to reach Italy. This study focus on young Gambian men who say that they are prepared to risk their life by going the back way in order to reach Europe. Gambia is a small country in West Africa, a country that has been free from violence and war, a peaceful country. Yet the back way is something that is on everybody’s lips in Gambia today and a lot of people, especially young men, are trying to get to Europe through that way. This research is looking into why these young men are prepared to risk their lives to reach Europe; it is showing what it is that make people take their decisions to go. In order to find answers to this, interviews with young men in Gambia has been done and the material have then been analyzed with the help of the push and pull model, the rational choice theory and Charles Tilly’s ideas about durable inequality.
    [Show full text]
  • IOM – Gambia / Synthesis Report / May 2018 1
    IOM – Gambia / Synthesis Report / May 2018 1 the presentation of the material throughout the guide do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries. The European Union or IOM makes no warranties or representations, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of this document. In no event shall they be liable for any loss, damage, liability or expense incurred or suffered as a result of the use of this study, including, without limitation, any fault, error, omission, interruption or delay in this regard. This document contains links to third party websites. Sites that can be accessed from these links are not managed or controlled by the European Union or IOM. The European Union or IOM is therefore not responsible for the availability, content or accuracy of any linked site or link contained in this linked site. These links are provided for informational purposes only, and in no way constitute a recommendation or an invitation to use a service. The inclusion of any link does not imply any endorsement of the linked website of the European Union or IOM. IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.
    [Show full text]
  • Nato Unclassified 1 Nato Unclassified Headquarters
    NATO UNCLASSIFIED HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED MARITIME COMMAND Atlantic Building, Northwood Headquarters, Sandy Lane Northwood, Middlesex, HA6 3HP United Kingdom Our Ref: Tel: +44 (0)1923 956577 NCN: 57+ 56577 Date: 02 July 2019 Email: [email protected] IAW distribution NATO SHIPPING CENTRE NEWSLETTER MAY – JUNE 2019 Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) conducted a change of command ceremony on 20 May at Northwood Headquarters to mark the change of senior leadership at the command. General Tod D. Wolters, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, presided over the ceremony as Vice Admiral Keith E. Blount, CB OBE assumed command from Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, KBE CE who led NATO’s only standing Maritime Component Command since 2015. NATO MARCOM continues its operational activities highlighted by the training activities of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and Maritime Security Operations. Maritime Security Operations During May and June 2019, 68 and 56 warships respectively, from France, Turkey, Spain, Greece, Canada, Albania, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany took part in Operation SEA GUARDIAN in the Mediterranean, supported by flights of NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). The AEW flights were provided by NATO’s own assets, while the MPA flights were provided by Greece, Spain, Italy, Turkey, France, Portugal and USA. Submarines under NATO and national operational command have also provided critical support to this Maritime Security Operation. 1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED NATO UNCLASSIFIED Operation SEA GUARDIAN is an effective way for NATO to maintain maritime situational awareness in the Mediterranean, through the knowledge of the Maritime Pattern of Life and detecting anomalies to fight crime and counter terrorism at sea.
    [Show full text]