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Water for Kabul

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Water for Kabul WATER FOR KABUL Extension of the Water Supply System of Kabul A Project financed by KfW and Worldbank so far Owner of the works: MUDH Beneficiary: Kabul Water Supply Consultants for the Implementation: a Joint Venture of BELLER IGIP BETS 08/2005 1 1 Evolution of Population 4500 4000 4089 3500 3527 3000 3042 2500 2000 2356 1500 population (1000cap) 1000 500 Reihe1 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 ye ar 08/2005 2 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 2 Parameters of service at present • Pserved = 30,000hc x 15 cap/hc /2.8 million hab = 16% of Kabul population • qspec = 60000m³/d/2.8 million hab = 12l/cap/d with falling tendency • lspec = 530km/2.8 million hab = 0.19m/cap with falling tendency. 08/2005 3 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 3 Resources Project Target after IAP Upper Kabul River aquifer (UKRA) 34,200m³/d 18,000 Paghman (and Kharga) River aquifer 10,000m³/d 10,000 Lower Kabul River aquifer (=Microroyan) 10,000m³/d not considered Logar River aquifer 67,500m³/d 32,000 Total 121,700m³/d 60,000 equivalent to 44.4 million m³/a 22 million m³/a) 08/2005 4 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 4 Parameters of demand and production in PROJECT 2005 2010 2015 General domestic consumption, dwellings without flushing toilet in existing quarters of the City 50l/cap/d 50l/cap/d 50l/cap/d Taken from the water house connection 30l/cap/d 35l/cap/d 40l/cap/d Taken from well 20l/cap/d 15l/cap/d 10l/cap/d General domestic consumption, dwellings without flushing toilet in extensions to the City 50l/cap/d 50l/cap/d 50l/cap/d Domestic consumption in blocks of flats 100l/cap/d 113l/cap/d 125l/cap/d Nothing taken from the well Domestic consumption in quarters of high standing 150l/cap/d 150l/cap/d 150l/cap/d Taken from the water house connection 25l/cap/d 55l/cap/d 100l/cap/d Taken from well 125l/cap/d 95l/cap/d 50l/cap/d Domestic consumption from public taps 15l/cap/d Commercial demand in prorate of domestic demand 12% 13% 15% General administration demand in prorate of domestic demand 10% 10% 10% Industrial demand 10m³/ha/d 10m³/ha/d 10m³/ha/d Service level development, existing quarters, average 13% 56% 78% Service level of high standing quarters 50% 100% 100% Service level of quarters of average standing 20-60% 30-60% 80% Service level of quarters of low standing <30% 30% 60% Service level of semi-rural quarters 0% 30% 60% Service level of new extension zones n.a. 80% 80% Total losses as prorate of calculated demand 70% 40%for 25% for all existing, 25% for new 08/2005 5 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 5 Evolution of demand and Consumption ( Implementation of Short term project) 160,0 ( Implementation of Medium term project) 140,0 120,0 100,0 Demand 80,0 Consumption M m3/a 60,0 40,0 20,0 0,0 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 Year 08/2005 6 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 6 Global target • The global target is the improvement of the general living and health conditions of the Kabul population which at the end of 2002 was at 1.9million inhabitants and which is expected to reach 3.0 million and 3.5 million in 2005 and 2010, resp. • The direct indicator for the achievement of the target is the index of waterborne diseases, which were reported from a random sample to make up for 38% of the consultations with a high proportion of acute bloody diarrhoea. 08/2005 7 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 7 General project target The general target is the extension of the Kabul water supply system and the access of a maximum of the inhabitants, if not of all, to the piped water as a replacement of the progressively deteriorating local ground water. The target indicators for the project is the achievement of the following: parameter value unit distribution system length after reservoirs 1,360 km house connections, working 90,000 pieces public standpipes, working >600 pieces water sold 34 million m³/a water produced 44 million m³/a 08/2005 8 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 8 Selection of quarters to be served Regarding the restricted coverage of the demand, the quarters selected to be serviced under the project comprise: • those already having a distribution network but an insufficient resource, • those consolidated quarters where the construction of a network is pending since many years, in fact those earmarked already in the PRIL 1974 Masterplan, and • new extensions already developped or where the development is iminent. In all of the 3 cases however under considerations of the ability to pay and a technically and economically reasonable overall system layout. 08/2005 9 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 9 Technical design criteria Roughness value for trunks and principal mains k = 0.1mm Roughness for local mains, including valves and specials. k = 0.4mm Maximum velocity in trunks during peak v = 2.0m/s Maximum velocity in principal mains during peak v = 1.5m/s Minimum diameter for local mains DN 80 Minimum diameter for dc trunks DN 200 Standard house connection diameter DN 15 Hours of operation of biggest pump for suction tank sizing T = 2h Redundancy of pumps at peak none Maximum service pressure in network OPmax 6bar Minimum service pressure at peak hour at house connection OPmin 2,0bar Minimum transitional pressure above high points of trunks 2,0bar Nominal pressure of network components PN 10 Nominal pressure of trunk components, as may be the case PN 10, 16 or 25 Normal pump operating hours T op_av 20h Peak day operating hours T op_peak 23h Redundancy of pumps at peak day none Voltages for pump motors 0,4 or 0,7kV General consumers 0,4kV Frequency 50Hz MV 15 or 20kV Seismic coefficient To be investigated 08/2005 10 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 10 Network extensions • The distribution network is increased from approx 530km by 830km to 1,360km and covers an area of 8,000ha with a total population of approx. 2.0 million inhabitants wherefrom 1.4 million are served by house connections. • The trunks are increased from approx 41 km by 36 km to 78 km. 08/2005 11 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 11 Investment costs including Consultancy Services Total 100 million EUR Time-phased investment schedule for project (in million EUR) year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sum Annual expenditure 4 16 30 30 20 100 08/2005 12 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 12 Existing System 2005 08/2005 13 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 13 Head works of Project 08/2005 14 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 14 Head works Project plus Map of Kabul 08/2005 15 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 15 Logar Wellfi eld Extensions D t N r 6 D u 00 n N k 8 0 0 t runk DN400 NASAJI Well field LOGAR Well field 08/2005 16 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 16 Kabul’s Medium Term Water Supply -- Headworks 08/2005 17 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 17 Kabul’s Medium Term Water Supply Flow Chart 08/2005 18 WATER FOR KABUL -- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 18 Required Protection Zones 08/2005 19 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 19 Protection of Resources? 08/2005 20 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 20 Protection of Resources? 08/2005 21 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 21 Land Management ? Extra costs: 100,000 USD 08/2005 22 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 22 Conflict of Water Users 08/2005 23 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 23 Protection Zones of the former Urban Masterplan 08/2005 24 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 24 Upper Kabul Aquifer - Land occupation development 08/2005 25 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 08/2005 26 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT The END Thanking for your attention 08/2005 27 WATER FOR KABUL --- SUMMARY OF KABUL II PROJECT 13 Conflict of Water Users Evolution of Kabul Water Supply after completion of Project Brief Presentation of principal figures IAP 2005 Project size Inhabitants capita 2.800.000 3.400.000 + 600.000 served by house connections capita 450.000 1.400.000 + 950.000 public taps capita 600.000 600.000 No change not served capita 1.750.000 1.400.000 - 350.000 average day demand m3/d Not defined 175.000 peak day demand Not defined 263.000 annual Logar million m3/a 11,6 24,6 + 13,0 production Upper Kabul million m3/a 3,2 12,5 + 9,3 Lower Kabul million m3/a 3,7 3,7 + 0,8 Afshar million m3/a 3,5 3,7 + 0,2 total million m3/a 22,0 44,5 + 23,3 average production per population served l/cd 55,2 61,0 maintained average Logar 1000 m3/day 31,7 67,4 + 35,7 production Upper Kabul 1000 m3/day 8,6 34,2 + 25,6 day Lower Kabul= Microroyan 1000 m3/day 10,1 10,1 Not in project Afshar 1000 m3/day 9,7 10,1 + 0,4 total 1000 m3/day 60,1 121,9 + 63,9 Technical data Total capacity of principal reservoirs m3 32.700 73.000 + 40.300 Total length of distribution network km 483 1.360 + 880 House connections units 30.000 90.000 + 60.000 08/2005 28.
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