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Home , Historical method, Methodological dualism

: Theories and Methods

Kocka J 1977 Sozialgeschichte: Begriff, Entwicklung, Probleme. participated in these debates. In those periods, Meth- Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Go$ ttingen, Germany odenstreit is more or less intense and visible, while in Langlois Ch-V, Seignobos Ch 1898 Introduction aux En tudes periods of relative certainty and academic recognition, Historiques. Hachette, Paris this type of debate usually recedes into the back- Macintyre S 2000 History in a new country. Australians debate ground. So, seen from a historical point of view, their past. In: Torstendahl R (ed.) An Assessment of Twentieth Century . Royal Academy of Letters, History reflection on the role of methods and theories in and Antiquities, Stockholm, Sweden, pp. 71–86 history is in a sense a symptom of crisis; at least outside Meinecke F 1936 Die Entstehung des Historismus. R. Oldenburg, the small group of and philosophers who Munich, Germany permanently reflect on history in their capacity as Novick P 1988 That Noble Dream: The ‘ObjectiŠity Question’ and philosophers of history. This direct connection be- the American Historical . Cambridge University tween a ‘reflective mood’ among professional histor- Press, Cambridge, UK ians and their sense of professional uncertainty makes Oexle O G 1996 Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des His- sense because, as will be elucidated below, method torismus. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Go$ ttingen, Germany and\or theory have usually been presented as the Raphael L 2000 Flexisble response? Strategies of ’s cognitive foundations, especially its claim historians towards larger markets for national historio- graphies an growing scientific standards. In: Torstendahl R to produce ‘objective’ of the past. There- (ed.) An Assessment of Twentieth Century Historiography. fore, doubts and debates about method and theory in Royal Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, Stock- history are always doubts and debates about the holm, Sweden, pp. 127–47 discipline’s cognitive status, its academic credentials, Reill P H 1975 The German Enlightenment and the Rise of and its claim to . . University of California Press, Berkeley, LA Seen from the point of view of the of Ricoeur P 1983–85 Temps et ReT cit [Time and NarratiŠe]. Le Seuil, , debates about the role of methods and theories Paris, Vols. 1–3 in history have usually been directly linked to battles Scholtz G (ed.) 1997 Historismus am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. waged by the proponents of different conceptions of Eine Internationale Diskussion. Akademie, Berlin history for academic legitimacy and supremacy, that Smalley B 1974 Historians in the Middle Ages. Thames and is, for academic recognition and reputation. In periods Hudson, London Stieg M F 1986 The Origin and DeŠelopment of Scholarly of serious competition for ‘intellectual capital’ (Bour- Historical Periodicals. University of Alabama Press, Tus- dieu) between several competing groups, operating caloosa, AL within the same ‘academic field,’ debates about meth- Wang Q E 1995 Time perception in Ancient Chinese his- ods and theories in history have been intense. This not toriography. Storia della Storiografia 28: 69–86 only holds true for history, but also for other social Wehler H-U 1980 Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichts- such as sociology, economics, psychology, schreibung: Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen deutscher etc., and, therefore, are a characteristic of pluralistic or Geschichtswissenschaft. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Go$ t- poly-paradigmatic disciplines. tingen, Germany Characteristic for the periods of increased interest in White H 1973 Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in theory and method is also an increased interest in the Nineteenth-century Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press, history of the discipline in case from both an in- Baltimore, MD White H 1978 Tropics of . Essays in Cultural Criticism. tellectual and from an institutional angle. This interest Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD in disciplinary history is usually motivated by a desire to locate the origins of the preferred conception of R. Torstendahl historical theory and method in the discipline and to generate academic credentials by locating prestigious founding fathers or precursors of the preferred con- ception in the discipline’s pedigree. Therefore, in history, an increased interest in the history of history writing alias historiography can usually be observed alongside an increased interest in theory and method: History: Theories and Methods theoretical and methodical reflections usually are accompanied by reflections on the origins, , and Since history turned into an academic discipline in the variety of historiography. nineteenth century and professional historians claimed Seen from a philosophical point of view, debates a privileged epistemological status for their approach about the role of theories and methods in history often vis-a' -vis non-professional approaches to history, de- have a blurred character due to the vague philo- bates about the role of methods and theories in history sophical status of the central concepts of theory and have been characterized by a certain conjuncture. In method. Therefore, some elementary conceptual clari- periods of relative uncertainty and crisis about the fications are called for in order to answer the question status of history as a distinctive, academic discipline— why theory and method in history have turned into a such as the periods between 1880 and 1920 and 1965 to heavily contested area at times since history turned 1985 in the West—a substantial body of historians into an academic discipline.

6869 History: Theories and Methods

1. Theory and Method in History: Some related with distinct epistemological theories, linking Preliminary Distinctions methods of understanding to hermeneutic or phenom- enological theories of knowledge and methods of In discussing the role of theory and method in history, explanation to empirical theories of knowledge. Before it is necessary to introduce some basic distinctions. taking a better look at this terrain, however, it is first Due to the double meaning of history as res gestae and necessary to clarify the central concepts of method and as historia res gestae (see History: OŠerŠiew), theory in theory as well as their interrelationships in history. history can refer both to history as a process and to the When analyzed more closely, both method and theory knowledge of that process. Therefore, the first basic in history appear to have a broad variety of meanings. distinction to make is the distinction between: (a) theories, which deal with characteristics of history as a process (such as, for instance, Marx’s 2. Historical Method(s): Concept and History theory of history as class struggle); and (b) theories, which deal with the characteristics of Analyzing the meaning of ‘method’ in history, it is knowledge of history (such as, for instance, that useful to start with a clarification of the term ‘method’ scientific knowledge of history has the form of -like in other disciplines first (Meran 1985). In the math- knowledge or the form of concrete particulars). ematical sciences it is common to refer to axiomatic- Theories of type (a) can be called substantial or deductive, to infinitesimal, and to inductive methods, material theories of history, while theories of type (b) meaning a set of formal, technical procedures in order can be called cognitive theories of history, i.e., theories to solve problems within a specified range. Outside the of historical knowledge. mathematical sciences, the meaning of method is Cognitive theories of history can further be sub- usually far less defined. In philosophy, for instance, divided into: there is a long tradition referring to methods of all (a) epistemological theories and sorts, ranging from Descartes’ discourse on method to (b) methodological theories, while substantial theo- Kant’s transcendental method, from Marx’s dialectical ries of history can also be subdivided in finer subsets method to Husserl’s phenomenological method, and (see History: Forms of Presentation, , and to De Saussure’s structuralist method, to name just a Functions). handful. These ‘methods’ in philosophy, however, do Substantial and cognitive theories usually have been not constitute defined formal rules for specified ranges interrelated, because presuppositions about what can of problem solving, but constitute complex sets of be known about the past are linked to presuppositions ideas, concepts, and rules of thumb on how to analyze of how the past can be known. Substantial theories, specified domains, such as: for instance, which hold that the historical process is (a) scientific knowledge; characterized by underlying mechanisms and regulari- (b) the human consciousness; ties, analogous to theories of classical mechanics, have (c) the history of mankind; been interrelated with cognitive theories that posit that (d) the meaning of concepts; real knowledge of history implies knowledge of general (e) the meaning of language in use; or (see PositiŠism, History of). And the substantial (f) language as a system of signs. theory that the historical process is characterized by a ‘Method’ in philosophy, thus, is definitely not identical fundamental chaos or contingency and not by hidden with a set of formal techniques, but a loosely circum- regularities alias a ‘motor,’ has been interrelated with scribed program. This diffuse and nonformal cognitive theories which posit that real knowledge of meaning of method is also characteristic of the human history is knowledge of particular facts instead of sciences. general laws (see Historicism). In history, the term historical method was first Substantial theories, in this way, not only have introduced in a systematic way in the sixteenth century consequences for methodological positions, but also by Jean Bodin in his treatise of , for epistemological positions. Substantial theories, Methodus ad facilem historiarium cognitionem (1566). which posit some kind of affinity or even identity of the Characteristically, Bodin’s treatise intended to es- knowing subject and the object of history in contrast tablish the ways by which reliable knowledge of the with nature (as was the case with Hegelian idealism past could be established by checking sources against and its offshoots in historicism, such as Droysen and one another and by so assessing the reliability of the Dilthey’s versions of historicism), have usually been information conveyed by them, relating them to the interrelated with methodological theories. These posit interests involved. Historical method was thus at a distinct kind of method for the human sciences— the same time intended to defeat the skeptical doubts such as understanding, or , or interpret- with regard to the possibility of reliable knowledge of ing—in contrast with the methods of the natural the past. Skepticism (alias historical Phyrrhonism) sciences (usually defined as some form of causal or had been fed by a large quantity of scriptural forgeries law-like explanation). And these distinct methodolo- parading as original historical documents, primarily gical theories have, in their turn, usually been inter- produced by competing churches and nobles to back

6870 History: Theories and Methods up their claims to rights and property. Therefore, the These techniques were traditionally subdivided in traditional claims to impartiality, , and trus- three parts, corresponding to three subsequent steps in tworthiness of historians, dating back to classical research: Antiquity, were no longer believed, and were now (a) heuristics, that is the techniques how to locate replaced by a claim to impersonal and intersubjective the relevant sources; method. (b) source criticism, the techniques by which the This direct relationship between history’s claim to temporal and spatial origins of the sources are es- truth and method would characterize all later treatises tablished as well as their authenticity; and on historical method, although what was meant by (c) interpretation, by which the ‘cleansed’ infor- method did change over time. In the eighteenth mation derived from the sources is put together by century, historians of the Enlightenment, such as means of interpretation in order to infer ‘what really Schlo$ zer, included not only the source critical tech- happened.’ niques as the historical method (Forschung), but also Usually a distinction was made between primary the way the results of historical research were synthe- and secondary sources. Primary sources consist of the sized into a textual whole (Darstellung) and presented written material produced more or less contempor- to an audience. This broader conception of method aneously with the object of research, ideally recorded had its roots in the classical rhetorical tradition and by eyewitnesses (model: the official records of par- would only recently be rediscovered in historical liamentary debates). The time span between primary theory, that is from the 1970s onwards. The German sources and what they represent is thus as small as and historical theorist Johann-Gustav Droy- possible, because distance in time is regarded as a sen (Droysen 1977) has become one of the pivotal major source of unreliability of the information historians behind this ‘rediscovery’ of the textual and conveyed. Secondary sources consist of records writ- rhetorical dimensions of history, because his treatment ten a considerable time after the fact and not by of historical method in the earlier and the later versions eyewitnesses (model: ‘hearsay’). As the information in of his Historik embodies the transition from the secondary sources is based on other sources, it is, at broader to the narrower conception of historical best, ‘second hand’; therefore, it is regarded as less method (Meier and Ru$ sen 1988). reliable than information. According The larger part of the nineteenth and twentieth to the dominant, Western conception of history since centuries would be dominated by the research-oriented the nineteenth century, serious academic history can conception of historical method of the so-called only be based on primary sources, because those are Historical School in Germany, led by historians as the only reliable source of information on the past. Leopold Ranke and Berthold Niebuhr. Their con- Therefore, the (see ArchiŠes and Historical ception of history, long been regarded as the beginning Databases) were usually considered the workshop of of modern, ‘scientific’ history, harked back to the the professional historian. According to the same ‘narrow’ conception of historical method, limiting the nineteenth century Western conception, non-scrip- methodical character of history to source criticism. tural or ‘low’ cultures were primitive by definition and The historical composition and presentation—the simply had no history comparable with ‘high cultures.’ Darstellung—was no longer regarded as methodical In this way the scriptural, source based conception of and was now seen as the literary, artistic, or aesthetic historical method defined, and limited, the object of component of history. Therefore, the question of academic history to the history of ‘high cultures,’ whether history belongs to the arts or to the sciences especially the history of the West. It would last until could and did arise from the nineteenth century the second half of the twentieth century before these onwards, a question that became part of the con- Western in the very conception of historical tinuing (Stern 1970, Fay et al. 1998). method would be seriously criticized, especially by In the nineteenth century, during the process of postcolonial theory (see Subaltern History). rapidly increasing disciplinary differentiation and aca- Another traditional distinction was that between demic institutionalization, it became customary in the internal and external source criticism. Internal source human sciences to identify disciplines with one specific criticism is actually , i.e., the hermen- method, which was presented as the guarantee of its eutic procedures by which a text is reconstructed (if it ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity.’ In this process, sociology was is passed down in an incomplete form or in several identified with the sociological method and history variants) as a whole and the textual procedures by with the historical method. Canonical formulations of which authorship and textual authenticity are checked this conception of historical method can be found in E. and its meaning established. External source criticism Bernheim’s Lehrbuch der historischen Methode (1889) consists of those procedures by which a source is or in Ch. Langlois and Ch. Seignobos’ Introduction aux checked by information derived from other sources, eT tudes historiques (1897). written and material. The so-called auxiliary sciences, Historical method in the nineteenth century usually such as paleography, chronology, sillography, topo- referred to the techniques on how to conduct historical nomy, numismatics, and diplomactics, usually play an research of written materials, the so-called sources. important role in this phase when historians are

6871 History: Theories and Methods dealing with older periods. And when modern histor- The problem of whether and how it is possible to ians are dealing with nonscriptural, oral cultures or acquire knowledge of other , i.e., the mental with cultures that left few or no scriptural traces, states of others, such as thoughts and intentions, archeology and anthropology often function as auxili- separated from the knowing subject in both time and ary science. Reference to multiple methods within one space—the typical problem of the historian—has been discipline became the rule only in the course of the a fundamental one since mid-nineteenth century. twentieth century, thereby reopening the problem of According to , mental states could only be truth and objectivity and paving the way for a new known as far as they correlated with empirically wave of skepticism. For if the method can no longer be observable epiphenomena. The empirical dispositions regarded as the procedural guarantee for the truth and or expressions of other minds are seen as the only objectivity of the discipline, what could, so an influen- access to other minds (Hempel 1966). tial ran (Bernstein 1983, Megill 1994)? The proponents of phenomenological and Recognition of plural methods within one discipline, hermeneutic views ( is the theory of therefore, has often been regarded as a threat of the interpretation, originally of text interpretation), to the disciplines academic credentials. contrary, have always affirmed this possibility of a From the late 1960s onwards, the process of non-empirical access to mental phenomena. Pheno- methodological differentiation within all of the human menology claimed introspective methods as the sciences took an unprecedented pace, leading to a access to the mental universe; hermeneutics, far more temporary fragmentation of most disciplinary fields influential in theory of history than phenomenology, and a questioning of most traditional disciplinary claimed that ‘reading’ other minds could be conceived boundaries and self definitions. Significantly, the new, of as analogous to reading texts. ‘poly-paradigmatic’ self-image was at the same time The fundamental cognitive activity in all hermeneu- regarded by many as a crisis of their discipline. This tic theories is the interpretation of meaningful symbols also held for history, in 1960s and 1970s regarded by and symbolically structured phenomena (like actions many as one of the social sciences (Novick 1988, and cultural objects), whereas all empiricist theories Appleby et al. 1994, Iggers 1997 see History and the regard the observation of objects as the fundamental Social Sciences). cognitive activity. Just as it is possible to know the Historians identified the quantitative method (see ideas expressed in a text by reading and interpreting, it Quantification in History), the biographical method is possible to know the ideas expressed in actions and (see Biography: Historical), the comparative method in all human made objects by inferring the unobserv- (see ComparatiŠe History), the ideal typical method, able ideas from their observable expressions through understanding as a method (Verstehen), the causal re-enactment and interpretation by the historian method (ErklaW rung), as a method (Droysen 1977, Dilthey 1981, Collingwood 1993). (see Linguistic Turn and Discourse Analysis in History), This possibility was guaranteed, according to the the micro-historical method and a psychoanalytical hermeneutic views, by the basic unity of humanity, method in history (see ). Other historians implying the basic unity of subject and object of claimed that the concept of method had become knowledge in the human sciences. Therefore, each severely overstretched, holding that most advertised alter was an alter ego, accessible through a process of methods in fact were theories about historical know- intuitive identification and transfer in thought or in ledge, which could only be checked by the historical idea (therefore: idealism). So in historical epistem- method of source criticism. Therefore, a closer look at ology, just as in the other human sciences, the basic the relationship between historical method and theo- divide between 1850 and 1970 has been the one ries is necessary. between empiricist and anti-empiricist, idealist posi- tions. It would last until the 1980s, with the rise of and its offshoots in the discipline of 3. Theories of Historical Knowledge history, before the unitary presuppositions of hermen- eutic theories would be seriously criticized an ques- tioned. Western (white) male was no longer accepted 3.1 Empiricism and Anti-empiricism by all as the model of all humankind. This has led to a The connections between historical method and his- renewed emphasis on the basic diversity of knowing torical theory can be located both on the level of subjects and their epistemological and methodological and on the level of . As epis- relevance for disciplines like history (Scott 1991) (see temology is the theory of knowledge, historical ; Subaltern History and Linguistic Turn epistemology deals with the theory of historical knowl- and Discourse Analysis in History). edge, i.e., the conditions of its possibility, range, sources, and foundations. Two epistemological posi- 3.2 Unity Šs. Duality of Method tions have been defended in relation to historical knowledge from the nineteenth century onwards, Between 1850 and 1970, this basic divide in the domain empiricism and anti-empiricist idealism. of epistemology roughly corresponded with the basic

6872 History: Theories and Methods divide in the domain of historical methodology, i.e., conditions, predictable. According to this view on the the divide between the proponents of the theory of the logic of scientific explanation, that is also known unity of scientific method and the proponents of the under the headings of the subsumtion model, the theory of a fundamental methodological dualism of deductive nomological model, or the covering law the human and of the natural sciences. model of explanation, explanation and prediction in Methodology as such aims at the rational recon- science are basically the same; explanation is really struction of the normative rules, which are constitutive prediction in the past alias retrodiction. Scientific for a specific discipline and its development. Rational explanation, in this view, is showing why what reconstruction, in contrast with historical reconstruc- happened, was—given the known laws and circum- tion, presupposes that disciplinary practices and their stances—expected to happen because it was bound to development can be reconstructed in terms of logical happen: explanation boiled down to show what and empirical ; this presupposition is, of happened was logically necessary. Given the fact that course, an idealization of the rationality of real the general laws were usually (though not exclusively) disciplinary practice, because apart from rationality, interpreted as causal laws, formulating universal and power and privilege also play their role in reality. invariant connections between causes and effects, Methodology abstracts from those non-rational fac- scientific explanation was usually seen as causal tors in disciplinary life and aims to reconstruct the explanation and explanatory necessity also as cognitive criteria and ideals, by which the practitioners causal necessity: scientific explanation specifies the of a discipline judge one another’s products and causes of what happened by formulating its causal evaluate their relative quality. Methodology, there- determinations. fore, presupposes the existence of a basic cognitive Now although this unitary theory of scientific consensus and rationality among the practitioners of a explanation was amended and modified in time, in discipline. This presupposition, of course, has been order to account for statistical and probabilistic forms criticized both for the natural as for the human of explanation in the natural sciences, its status was sciences (Goodman 1978, Rorty 1986, Novick 1988). based on the assumption that ‘positivist’ theory at Next to the basic ideal of truth, other cognitive least provided an adequate reconstruction of natural ideals of a discipline are reconstructed by its meth- science and its development from the seventeenth odology, such as the explanatory ideals of the disci- century onwards. This assumption has been increas- pline and its criteria of . At this level the basic ingly undermined by postempiricist and postposi- methodological divide between the proponents of the tivist philosophies of science roughly since the 1960s unity of scientific method and the proponents of the and 1970s. Both the empiricist underpinnings of the dualism of scientific methods must be located, because covering law model and its logical claims were under- the divide revolves around the question whether there mined by historical examples, arguing that the sup- is one explanatory ideal for all disciplines or not. This posedly paradigmatic cases in the issue has dominated the methodological debates for did not fit the basic logical models of philosophy of more than a century since 1850 and is known under the science. Therefore, this ‘turn’ in the philosophy of labels of the explanation vs. understanding contro- science is often called the historical turn, because versy (Gardiner 1959, Hausmann 1991). According to history was mobilized against explanatory logic (Lak- the view, also often labeled as atos and Musgrave 1970). However, before examining , there was just one model or logic of the implications of postempiricism and postposi- explanation and development for all empirical disci- tivism in the for the opposition plines. Classical mechanics in the nineteenth century between classical unitary and dualistic methodological was usually considered the paradigm for all other theories, an overview of the dualistic positions and disciplines, including human sciences like history. The arguments is called for. only difference between the various disciplines was their phase of development. Underdeveloped disci- plines (like history) showed little similarity to New- tonian mechanics while developed ones did. Immature disciplines only produced ‘explanation sketches’ 3.3 The Autonomy of History (Hempel 1966), which had to be developed into real explanations. The only difference between disciplines The philosophical defense of the autonomy of his- was thus a matter of scientific maturity and not a torical explanation vis-a' -vis the explanatory models of matter of explanatory logic. usually has started off with a critique of Real scientific explanation boiled down to subsum- the unitary claim. From Droysen and Dilthey, through ing an event to be explained under a general law. Windelband, Rickert, Weber, Collingwood, and Gad- Therefore, the event to be explained can be logically amer, to White and Ricoeur, the argument has been deduced from the general law in combination with the developed that historical explanation is not only given circumstances (the so-called initial conditions) empirically different, but logically different from the and is at the same time, given the law and the initial covering law model. This claim of autonomy has

6873 History: Theories and Methods traditionally been defended in three variants: an Truth and Method (1972) would radically historicize ontological version, an epistemological version, and a the idea of historical understanding. methodological version. The second type of argument in defense of metho- The ontological argument for methodological du- dological dualism is not ontological, but epistemo- alism was first systematically developed by Droysen logical. It was first systematically developed by and later by Collingwood and his school. It usually and bears a resemblance to Droysen’s harks back to Vico and Hegel, because it is based on argument, because it also harks back to Hegel’s idea of an idea of a subject-object identity in history: in a subject-object identity in history with its implied history, humankind confronts themselves, and history, ‘history as the autobiography of mankind model.’ therefore, is the autobiography of humanity. History However, Dilthey does not ground historical method is fundamentally the process in which humankind directly in the subject-object structure of the historical expresses and develops themselves in the form of process itself, but in the ‘inner experience’ (‘innere diverse cultures; and because humankind has made Erfahrung’) of historical facts as ‘mental facts’ (geistige history, they are capable of knowing history in a direct Fakten). The ‘mental facts’ of history and of other way, according to this argument, just as the writer of Geisteswissenschaften consist of feelings, thoughts, and an autobiography knows the history in case in a direct strivings of human beings living in the past, which are way. Historians try to reconstruct cultures and the only accessible through the and the inner particular ideas expressed in its cultural practices experience of the historian. Like Droysen, Dilthey (such as religions and rituals) and its material artifacts posits that the historian makes the mental facts of the (such as its temples and sacred objects). When hist- past intelligible as expressions of ideas, by putting orians offer explanations for the past, they construct them in a particular spatio-temporal context alias in a intelligible and plausible connections between the Lebenszusammenhang. And, like Droysen, he contrasts culture and the ideas expressed in it on basis of their historical understanding with scientific explanation by research of the sources in case. When they succeed in rejecting causal, law like reasoning for history. But this task, they offer an understanding of the phen- unlike Droysen, Dilthey emphasizes the contrast of omena in case (Verstehen). Understanding history is the ‘inner experience’ of the historian with the ‘outer conceived of as similar to understanding a text; the experience’ of the scientist as the foundation of major difference is that the texts of history have more methodological dualism. or less disappeared and therefore must be recon- The third type of argument in defense of metho- structed first based on their traces by research. This dological dualism is of a methodological character. It type of intelligibility is possible, because in history, is not based on an ontological claim that history deals human beings confront themselves and therefore with an object fundamentally different from nature, intuitive understanding is possible in contrast to the and neither is it based on an epistemological claim that situation in the sciences of nature, where the knowing the historical facts are different from natural facts, subject confronts an external object. being accessible to an ‘inner’ way of knowing. Ac- The intelligibility sought for by historians—histor- cording to the methodological argument, as developed ical understanding—is thus centered on connecting by Windelband, Rickert, and Weber, two fundamental ideas to their expressions in particular spatio-temporal ways of knowing or methodological approaches can contexts, and proceeds by going back and forth be distinguished, which are connected by two funda- between parts and whole in the so-called hermeneutic mentally different aims or knowledge interests. The circle or spiral. Historical understanding is therefore first way to approach an object is a generalizing logically different from scientific explanation: the type method; in this case, one abstracts from the par- of connections, which historians present, is not causal- ticularity of the objects of knowledge and tries to ly determined and cannot be deduced from general detect and explain its general characteristics. Accord- laws. Historical connections are not necessary but ing to Windelband, this generalizing method was contingent connections, which always could have been specific for the nomothetic sciences (Greek: l different from their actual form. law, tithemi l to posit), such as the natural sciences. Neither are they based on empirical observation, The second fundamental approach to an object is but on plausible inferences, based on critical research the particularizing method; in this case one abstracts of the sources and on analogical reasoning. Historical from the general characteristics of an object of understanding at best produces plausible and prob- knowledge and tries to describe its specific charac- able knowledge and never certain or founded knowl- teristics. According to Windelband this particularizing edge, as scientific explanation, based on sensory method was specific for the ideographic sciences experience and logic presumably does. And being (Greek: ideos l particular, graphein l to describe), dependent on intellectual, interpretative activities by such as history. However, both the generalizing and the historian, which can be trained but not formaliz- the particularizing methods are independent of the ed, historical understanding, thus, remains ‘subjec- nature of their objects of knowledge; nature can be tive,’ i.e., embedded in the culture, time, and place of studied in an ideographic way (for instance, in ge- the historian. Based on this argument, Gadamer in his ology) and history can be studied in a nomothetic way

6874 History: Theories and Methods

(for instance, in developmental psychology). It all cism has thus relativized both the distinction between depends on one’s methodological interest in case. theoretical knowledge and empirical knowledge, at the Rickert and Weber would develop Windelband’s one side, and the distinction between interpretative basic ideas by introducing the dichotomy between knowledge and empirical knowledge, at the other. sciences of nature (Naturwissenschaften) and sciences Thus, it has brought conceptualization and interpret- of culture (Kulturwissenschaften). Rickert introduced ation to the center of the stage in all disciplines. In the idea that knowledge interests behind disciplines doing so, postempiricism has undermined traditional were guided by values (Wertbezogenheit); Weber underpinnings of the idea of fundamentally distinct pointed out that values usually change through time. scientific and humanistic methods and the idea of a According to him, the change of the guiding values fundamental contrast between the ‘objectivity’ of behind the sciences of culture could explain why those science and the ‘subjectivity’ of the . Both disciplines did not accumulate knowledge in the scientific domains aim at empirical argument and systematic form like the natural sciences, and why they inter-subjectivity (Megill 1994, Oexle 1998). seemed to enjoy an ‘eternal youth’ (Weber 1973). At , based on postempiricism, in turn, best, the sciences of culture could accumulate knowl- has effectively undermined the presupposition that all edge at the intermediate level between individualizing scientific explanations can be reduced to one basic descriptions and universal explanations in the form of model, i.e., the subsumtion model of explanation. By ideal types, according to Weber. He suggested com- discrediting this presupposition for natural science, parison as the method at this intermediate level. (Salmon 1990), postpositivism a fortiori has discred- Lu$ bbe, Veyne, and Mink would develop the Weberian ited the subsumtion model for the humanities. More- methodological position later, identifying history with over, the fact that the explanation of mental states by the particularizing methodological interest (Lu$ bbe nonmental states has not succeeded up to the present 1977, Veyne 1978, Mink 1987). has also discredited unitary views. (Bohman 1991). All in all, different conceptions of historical method In the theory of history, postempiricism and post- are connected to different theories of historical knowl- positivism have led to a renewed reflection on the edge. Since the characteristics of historical knowledge nature of historical knowledge in postmodernism and are usually defined in contrast with scientific knowl- in a renewed interest in approaches inspired by literary edge as the major ‘contrast class,’ theories of natural theory (see History and Literature). Now the classical science are also presupposed in theories of historical science model was discredited, the roots of history in knowledge. Fundamental changes in theories of natu- rhetoric and literature were rediscovered, leading to a ral science, therefore, affect theories of historical renewed interest in the linguistic forms in which history knowledge by detour. The rise of postempiricism, is represented, i.e., in theories of historical repre- postpositivism, and of the historical turn in the sentation. The postmodern vanguard, oft identified philosophy of natural science, thus have undermined with the linguistic turn (see Linguistic Turn and most traditional, classical defenses of methodological Discourse Analysis in History), pushed both theory dualism in an indirect way by undermining the and method in history into the background, locating classical unitary model of science. A few remarks must historical representation beyond epistemology and suffice. methodology, on the terrain of aesthetics, rhetoric, Postempiricism has effectively undermined the and politics (White 1973, Ankersmit and Kellner 1995, presupposition that scientific knowledge can ever be Fay et al. 1998). grounded on certain foundations in sensory experi- This move, in fact, harks back to the premethodical ence. The opposition between grounded and certain and predisciplinary roots of history, cutting history knowledge at the one side—traditionally attributed to loose from its a claim to constitute a truth-seeking the natural sciences—and inferential and probable discipline and to produce ‘objective’ knowledge knowledge at the other—traditionally attributed to (Ru$ sen 1983–89, Lorenz 1997). The history of theory the human sciences—has thus vanished. This opposi- and methods in history, thus, has come full circle at the tion has been replaced by the insight that all sensory turn of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the pen- experience is guided and framed by concepts and dulum is already swinging back, leading to broader theories. All empirical knowledge, therefore, is based approaches of history, which keep up the cognitive on interpretative activities of the knowing subject claims of the discipline based on both research because it is ‘theory-laden.’ Therefore, all knowledge (Forschung) and composition (Darstellung), while inte- is fallible and open to later reinterpretations. Post- grating the literary and the practical dimensions of empiricism, thus, has dissolved the presupposed history (see History: Forms of Presentation, Dis- absolute contrast between a ‘subjective’ kind of knowl- courses, and Functions). edge, based on interpretation—characteristically for the Geisteswissenschaften, the Kulturwissenschaften,or the historical sciences—and an ‘objective’ kind of Bibliography knowledge, based on empirical observation and ex- Ankersmit F R, Kellner H (eds.) 1995 A New Philosophy of periment, not in need of interpretation. Postempiri- History. London

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Appleby J, Hunt L, Jacob M 1994 Telling the Truth about History. Veyne P 1978 Comment on eT crit l’histoire? Paris New York Weber M 1973 Gesammelte AufsaW tze zur Wissenschaftslehre. Bernheim E 1889 Lehrbuch der historischen Methode. Leipzig, Tu$ bingen, Germany Germany White H 1973 Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nine- Bernstein R 1983 Beyond ObjectiŠism and RelatiŠism: Science, teenth Century Europe. Baltimore, MD Hermeneutics and Practice. Oxford Windelband W 1915 Geschichte und Naturwissenshaft. In: Bodin J 1595 Methodus ad facilem historiarium cognitionem. PraW ludien. AufsaW tze und Reden zur Einleitung in die Philosophie Geneva, Switerland und ihrer Geschichte, Vol. 2, Tu$ bingen, Germany, pp. 136–61 Bohman J 1991 New Philosophy of Social Sciences: Problems of Indeterminacy. Cambridge, UK C. Lorenz Collingwood R G 1993 The Idea of History. Oxford, UK Dilthey W 1981 Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. Frankfurt, Germany Droysen J-G 1977 Historik. Stuttgart, Germany HIV and Fertility Fay B, Pomper P, Vann R (eds.) 1998 History and Theory. Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, UK W It is widely recognized that HIV had a catastrophic Gadamer H G 1972 Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzuge einer impact on mortality from the early 1990s in much of philosophischen Hermeneutik.Tu$ bingen, Germany GardinerP(ed.)1959TheoriesofHistory:ReadingsfromClassical sub-Saharan Africa, and significant impacts in a few and Contemporary Sources. New York high prevalence countries of South East Asia. The Ghandi L 1998 Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction. New interactions between HIV and fertility are not so well York known, but they deserve the special attention of Goodman N 1978 Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis, IN epidemiologists, demographers, and behavioral scien- Hausmann T 1991 ErklaW ren und Verstehen. Zur Theorie und tists since they influence our understanding of the Pragmatik der Geschichtswissenschaft. Frankfurt, Germany epidemic trends and the sexual behavior which under- Hempel C 1966 Explanation in science and history. In: Dray W lies this. Limited of the impact of HIV on (ed.)PhilosophicalAnalysisandHistory. NewYork,pp.95–127 fertility is available from developed nations with low- Iggers G 1997 Historiography in the Twentieth Century. From level epidemics concentrated in high risk groups such Scientific ObjectiŠity to the Postmodern Challenge. Hanover, USA as intravenous drug users, recipients of blood trans- Koselleck R 1989 Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschicht- fusions, and men who have sex with men, but this licher Zeiten. Frankfurt, Germany review concentrates on the situation in African coun- Kuhn T 1962 The Structure of Scientific ReŠolutions. Chicago tries with generalized, heterosexually transmitted epi- Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds.) 1970 Criticism and the Growth of demics. The fertility effects in these populations are Knowledge. Cambridge, UK much more clear cut, both because the high numbers Lorenz C 1997 Konstruktion der Vergangenheit. Eine EinfuW hrung involved make it relatively easy to collect represen- in die Geschichtstheorie. Cologne, Germany tative data, and because historically low rates of $ Lubbe H 1977 Geschichtsbegriff und Geschichtsinteresse. Analy- contraceptive use make it feasible to distinguish tik und Pragmatik der Historie. Basel, Switzerland between involuntary, biological effects and behavioral Megill A (ed.) 1994 Rethinking ObjectiŠity. Durham, USA Meier C, Ru$ sen J (eds.) 1988 Historische Methode. Munich, responses to the epidemic. Germany Meran J 1985 Theorien in der Geschichtswissenschaft.Go$ ttingen, 1. The Nature of HIV and Fertility Interactions Germany Mink L 1987 Historical Understanding. Ithaca, NY Early speculation on the likely effects of the HIV Nagl-Docekal H 1982 Die ObjektiŠitaW t der Geschichtswissen- epidemic on fertility tended to concentrate on change schaft. Vienna Š in intentional behavior, and predicted resulting fer- Novick P 1988 ‘That Noble Dream.’ The ‘Objecti ity question’ and tility increases. Some authors believed that increases in the American Historical profession. Cambridge, UK Oexle O-G (ed.) 1998 Naturwissenschaft, , child mortality might fuel increases in childbearing Kulturwissenschaft; Einheit—Gegensatz—KomplementaritaW t?. activity, as parents would want to have many children Go$ ttingen, Germany to ensure that at least a few survived (Caldwell et al. Rickert H 1986 Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft. 1992). Others feared that in their quest for safe, Stuttgart, Germany uninfected partners, men would seek partnerships with Ricoeur P 1983–5 Temps et reT cit (3 Vols). Paris progressively younger girls, thereby lowering the Rorty R 1986 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford, UK starting age for childbearing. Later writing (e.g., Ru$ sen J 1983–9 Historische Vernunft. GrundzuW ge einer Historik Gregson 1994) has given much more weight to (3 vols.). Go$ ttingen, Germany biomedical factors and to unintended consequences of Salmon W 1990 Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minnea- changing behavior. polis, MN Scott J 1991 Women’s history. In: Burke P (ed.) New PerspectiŠes in Historical Writing. Cambridge, UK, pp. 42–66 1.1 Biomedical Factors Seignobos C 1897 Introduction aux eT tudes historiques. Paris Stern F (ed.) 1970 Varieties of History. From Voltaire to the HIV lowers fertility directly in several ways, not all of Present. London them yet fully understood. Most importantly, it causes

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Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences ISBN: 0-08-043076-7