History: Theories and Methods

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History: Theories and Methods History: Theories and Methods Kocka J 1977 Sozialgeschichte: Begriff, Entwicklung, Probleme. participated in these debates. In those periods, Meth- Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Go$ ttingen, Germany odenstreit is more or less intense and visible, while in Langlois Ch-V, Seignobos Ch 1898 Introduction aux En tudes periods of relative certainty and academic recognition, Historiques. Hachette, Paris this type of debate usually recedes into the back- Macintyre S 2000 History in a new country. Australians debate ground. So, seen from a historical point of view, their past. In: Torstendahl R (ed.) An Assessment of Twentieth Century Historiography. Royal Academy of Letters, History reflection on the role of methods and theories in and Antiquities, Stockholm, Sweden, pp. 71–86 history is in a sense a symptom of crisis; at least outside Meinecke F 1936 Die Entstehung des Historismus. R. Oldenburg, the small group of historians and philosophers who Munich, Germany permanently reflect on history in their capacity as Novick P 1988 That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectiity Question’ and philosophers of history. This direct connection be- the American Historical Profession. Cambridge University tween a ‘reflective mood’ among professional histor- Press, Cambridge, UK ians and their sense of professional uncertainty makes Oexle O G 1996 Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des His- sense because, as will be elucidated below, method torismus. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Go$ ttingen, Germany and\or theory have usually been presented as the Raphael L 2000 Flexisble response? Strategies of academic discipline’s cognitive foundations, especially its claim historians towards larger markets for national historio- graphies an growing scientific standards. In: Torstendahl R to produce ‘objective’ knowledge of the past. There- (ed.) An Assessment of Twentieth Century Historiography. fore, doubts and debates about method and theory in Royal Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, Stock- history are always doubts and debates about the holm, Sweden, pp. 127–47 discipline’s cognitive status, its academic credentials, Reill P H 1975 The German Enlightenment and the Rise of and its claim to objectivity. Historicism. University of California Press, Berkeley, LA Seen from the point of view of the sociology of Ricoeur P 1983–85 Temps et ReT cit [Time and Narratie]. Le Seuil, science, debates about the role of methods and theories Paris, Vols. 1–3 in history have usually been directly linked to battles Scholtz G (ed.) 1997 Historismus am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. waged by the proponents of different conceptions of Eine Internationale Diskussion. Akademie, Berlin history for academic legitimacy and supremacy, that Smalley B 1974 Historians in the Middle Ages. Thames and is, for academic recognition and reputation. In periods Hudson, London Stieg M F 1986 The Origin and Deelopment of Scholarly of serious competition for ‘intellectual capital’ (Bour- Historical Periodicals. University of Alabama Press, Tus- dieu) between several competing groups, operating caloosa, AL within the same ‘academic field,’ debates about meth- Wang Q E 1995 Time perception in Ancient Chinese his- ods and theories in history have been intense. This not toriography. Storia della Storiografia 28: 69–86 only holds true for history, but also for other social Wehler H-U 1980 Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichts- sciences such as sociology, economics, psychology, schreibung: Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen deutscher etc., and, therefore, are a characteristic of pluralistic or Geschichtswissenschaft. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Go$ t- poly-paradigmatic disciplines. tingen, Germany Characteristic for the periods of increased interest in White H 1973 Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in theory and method is also an increased interest in the Nineteenth-century Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press, history of the discipline in case from both an in- Baltimore, MD White H 1978 Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism. tellectual and from an institutional angle. This interest Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD in disciplinary history is usually motivated by a desire to locate the origins of the preferred conception of R. Torstendahl historical theory and method in the discipline and to generate academic credentials by locating prestigious founding fathers or precursors of the preferred con- ception in the discipline’s pedigree. Therefore, in history, an increased interest in the history of history writing alias historiography can usually be observed alongside an increased interest in theory and method: History: Theories and Methods theoretical and methodical reflections usually are accompanied by reflections on the origins, nature, and Since history turned into an academic discipline in the variety of historiography. nineteenth century and professional historians claimed Seen from a philosophical point of view, debates a privileged epistemological status for their approach about the role of theories and methods in history often vis-a' -vis non-professional approaches to history, de- have a blurred character due to the vague philo- bates about the role of methods and theories in history sophical status of the central concepts of theory and have been characterized by a certain conjuncture. In method. Therefore, some elementary conceptual clari- periods of relative uncertainty and crisis about the fications are called for in order to answer the question status of history as a distinctive, academic discipline— why theory and method in history have turned into a such as the periods between 1880 and 1920 and 1965 to heavily contested area at times since history turned 1985 in the West—a substantial body of historians into an academic discipline. 6869 History: Theories and Methods 1. Theory and Method in History: Some related with distinct epistemological theories, linking Preliminary Distinctions methods of understanding to hermeneutic or phenom- enological theories of knowledge and methods of In discussing the role of theory and method in history, explanation to empirical theories of knowledge. Before it is necessary to introduce some basic distinctions. taking a better look at this terrain, however, it is first Due to the double meaning of history as res gestae and necessary to clarify the central concepts of method and as historia res gestae (see History: Oeriew), theory in theory as well as their interrelationships in history. history can refer both to history as a process and to the When analyzed more closely, both method and theory knowledge of that process. Therefore, the first basic in history appear to have a broad variety of meanings. distinction to make is the distinction between: (a) theories, which deal with characteristics of history as a process (such as, for instance, Marx’s 2. Historical Method(s): Concept and History theory of history as class struggle); and (b) theories, which deal with the characteristics of Analyzing the meaning of ‘method’ in history, it is knowledge of history (such as, for instance, that useful to start with a clarification of the term ‘method’ scientific knowledge of history has the form of law-like in other disciplines first (Meran 1985). In the math- knowledge or the form of concrete particulars). ematical sciences it is common to refer to axiomatic- Theories of type (a) can be called substantial or deductive, to infinitesimal, and to inductive methods, material theories of history, while theories of type (b) meaning a set of formal, technical procedures in order can be called cognitive theories of history, i.e., theories to solve problems within a specified range. Outside the of historical knowledge. mathematical sciences, the meaning of method is Cognitive theories of history can further be sub- usually far less defined. In philosophy, for instance, divided into: there is a long tradition referring to methods of all (a) epistemological theories and sorts, ranging from Descartes’ discourse on method to (b) methodological theories, while substantial theo- Kant’s transcendental method, from Marx’s dialectical ries of history can also be subdivided in finer subsets method to Husserl’s phenomenological method, and (see History: Forms of Presentation, Discourses, and to De Saussure’s structuralist method, to name just a Functions). handful. These ‘methods’ in philosophy, however, do Substantial and cognitive theories usually have been not constitute defined formal rules for specified ranges interrelated, because presuppositions about what can of problem solving, but constitute complex sets of be known about the past are linked to presuppositions ideas, concepts, and rules of thumb on how to analyze of how the past can be known. Substantial theories, specified domains, such as: for instance, which hold that the historical process is (a) scientific knowledge; characterized by underlying mechanisms and regulari- (b) the human consciousness; ties, analogous to theories of classical mechanics, have (c) the history of mankind; been interrelated with cognitive theories that posit that (d) the meaning of concepts; real knowledge of history implies knowledge of general (e) the meaning of language in use; or laws (see Positiism, History of). And the substantial (f) language as a system of signs. theory that the historical process is characterized by a ‘Method’ in philosophy, thus, is definitely not identical fundamental chaos or contingency and not by hidden with a set of formal techniques, but a loosely circum- regularities alias a ‘motor,’ has been interrelated
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