Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza

Shir Hever The Economy of the Occupation A Socioeconomic Bulletin

№ 21-22 * June 2009 Shir Hever Economy of the Occupation

______Socioeconomic Bulletin № 21-22 Cast Lead:

______Israel Attacks Gaza June 2009 Published by the Alternative Information Center (AIC) http://www.alternativenews.org/

Jerusalem Beit Sahour 4 Queen Shlomzion Street Building 111 Main Street PO Box 31417 PO Box 201 Jerusalem, Israel 91313 Beit Sahour, Palestine Phone: 972-(0)2-624-1159; 624-1424 Phone: 972-(0)2-277-5444 Fax: 972-(0)2-625-3151 Fax: 972-(0)2-277-5445

Editor: Connie Hackbarth Graphic Designer: Tal Hever Printer: Latin Patriarchate Printing Press Cover: Installation by Mariona Obrador, photography by Mar Estragés, January 2009.

This research was conducted with the assistance of Diakonia.

The AIC further wishes to acknowledge the partnership of: Advocacy Project, Associazione Comunita Papa Giovanni XXIII, Ayuntamiento de Xixon through the help of Paz con Dignidad, the Basque government through the help of Mundubat, Broederlijk Delen, the Catalan Government through the help of Sodepau, Comite Catholique Contre La Faim Et Pour Le Developemment (CCFD), Diakonia, Gobierno de Espana - Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperacion through the help of Mundubat, Inter-Church Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), the Irish Government through the help of Christian Aid and Junta Castilla-La Mancha through the help of ACSUR Las Segovias.

Some rights received to The Alternative Information Center (AIC). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial License (USév3.0): http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/ Table of Contents ______

1. Introduction 5 2. Creation of the Gaza Strip 9 3. Israeli Separation Policies 15 4. Hamas Takeover of Gaza 20 5. Israeli Military Attack on Gaza 23 6. Israeli Society and the Attack 39 7. Economic Aspects of the Attack 42 8. Eﬀects of the Attack 57 9. Conclusion 60 Bibliography 62

All photographs in this bulletin are licensed under a Creative Commons license (for a legend of the following symbols see: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/). The cover shows an untitled installation by artist Mariona Obrador (January 2009), photographed by Mar Estragés (http://www.flickr.com/photos/marestra/3198421543/). Five photographs were taken by an anonymous resident of Rafah (http://www.flickr.com/photos/ rafahkid/): Two in page 4 show (above) an Israeli unexlopded missile in Rafah (Janury 7th 2009) and (below) a destroyed mosque (January 12th); The photographs in pages 7, 14 were taken in Jabalia on January 19th and the one in page 38 was taken there on January 25th. Four photographs were taken by Marius Arnesen (http://www.flickr.com/photos/ anarkistix/): The one in page 19 was taken on April 12th; The one in page 41 showing a destroyed mosque was taken on April 13th; The one in page 55 showing a bombed house was taken on April 15th; and the one in page 61 was taken on the same date. The photo- graph in page 56 was taken by The International Solidarity Movement (http://palsolidarity. org/) on Janaury 20th in a house in Jabalia. The map in page 8 was graphically adapted from a map by the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the Gaza Strip (Janaury 2009). The original map can be accessed under the following address: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_ gaza_crisis_overview.pdf. 4 | Economy of the Occupation Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 5

1. Introduction

he Israeli military attack on The aim of this paper is to provide the Gaza Strip, lasting from a general overview of the events of the December 27th 2008 to Janu- attack, with an emphasis on the at- Tth ary 18 , 2009, caused massive devas- tack’s context and the events that pre- tation in the Gaza Strip and threw the ceded it. The paper will explore some region into a state of confusion. The of the economic aspects of the attack levels of violence shocked and amazed and will conclude with several possi- people all over the world. ble effects this attack may have on the Although the Israeli army has Israeli occupation of the Palestinian been conducting ongoing operations territories. against Palestinians in the Occupied Some clarifications are in order be- Palestinian Territories (OPT) and fore a discussion of the attack can be- also against neighboring countries, gin. First, this report was written with this attack is of special importance a certain level of urgency, as the global and deserves separate analysis. The protest movement that emerged dur- attack was enabled by and embodies ing the attack demonstrated the need a change in world reaction to Israel’s to distribute facts about the attack at policy towards the Palestinians. The the soonest opportunity, to counter attack further signified a break with the efforts by the Israeli government several Israeli military and economic to obfuscate the topic, conceal facts policies towards the Palestinians, and regarding the attack and discourage at the same time was a culmination of debate. As this report was written in other Israeli policies. the first months following the attack, 6 | Economy of the Occupation most of its sources are newspaper ing the attack on Gaza. The argument articles. Such articles are not always “we didn’t know” cannot be used as completely accurate, and this is com- an excuse by Israelis when confronted pounded by the fact that Israel se- with these facts, as the facts were pub- verely limited journalists’ access to the lished in the Israeli media. Gaza Strip during the attack. Israeli Second, the terminology used in army officials did not disclose most this report has been carefully selected. of their own information about the The name of the Israeli operation: “Cast Lead” will not Israelis cannot claim ignorance regarding be used often, because the attack on Gaza. it has been coined by one of the warring course of the attack, the reasons for it, sides only (the attacker). The Israeli and its outcome. Because of this, some government did not declare war, and of the arguments presented here could officially the attack was an Israeli “op- be disproved in light of new informa- eration,” though in the Israeli media it tion that will be made available in the was called a “war.” Since this was not a future. conflict between two standing armies, A special preference has been giv- and as the fighting was mostly one- en to Israeli sources. Indeed, most of sided, the term “war” is inappropri- the information for this publication ate here, and the term “attack” will be is derived from Israeli sources, and used instead. This is despite the fact the reason for this is double. First, as that both the Israeli authorities and this publication comes out in English, the Hamas spokespeople endeavored it is an opportunity to give the inter- to use the word “war” and thus con- national reader access to information vey that intensive two-sided fighting usually less accessible. Second, the fact took place. For Israel, descriptions of that all this information was available intensive fighting help to justify its in Hebrew to Israeli readers is pre- widespread use of force that ended up sented here in order to clarify that Is- mostly harming unarmed and unin- raelis cannot claim ignorance regard- volved civilians. For Hamas, the im- Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 7 age of intensive fighting bolsters their mal damage on the invading Israeli public image as active and brave resist- troops, the aim of this paper is not ers of the occupation (Hass, 2009m). to ignore the role of Palestinians who Although the comparison of force resist the Israeli occupation. The con- between the Israeli army and the flict is not one-sided, and the deci- Hamas party in the Gaza Strip is sion of Hamas not to surrender and grossly mismatched, and the Hamas to keep fighting against overwhelming fighters were able to inflict only mini- odds had powerful repercussions. 8 | Economy of the Occupation

N Ashkelon Lebanon N

Mediterranean Sea Zikim Karmiya

Yad Mordekhai

West Mediterranean Netiv ha-Asara Bank North Rafah Sea International Gaza Gaza terminal for Strip passengers. Jabalia Camp Beit Lahiya Sderot Ash Shati' Camp Beit Hanoun Jabalia

Israel

Gaza City Mefalsim

Egypt Jordan Kfar Aza

Gaza Nahal Oz Sa'ad Crossing point Karni for feuls. Crossing point for goods. Alumim Shuva Tkuma

0 25 50 km Al Nuseirat Camp Kimrat Kfar Maimon Netivot Az Zawayda Be'eri Tushiya Deir al Balah Camp Al Bureij Camp Shokeda Deir al Balah Al Maghazi Camp Middle Area Re'im

Kisuﬁm

Al Qarara

Khan Yunis Camp Ein ha-Shlosha Bani Suheila Nirim Israel Khan Yunis Patish 'Abasan al Kabira Khan Nir Oz Tal as Sultan Yunis Magen Rafah Camp Crossing point Ein ha-Bsor

Rafah Rafah Governorate border Egypt Green line Airport Ye sh a Ami'oz Rafah Sufa Nir Oz Ohad Israeli built-up area International Both Sufa and Mivtakhim terminal for Kerem Shalom are passengers. used as alternative crossing points Sde Nitzan Built-up area Kerem for commercial and humanitarian 024 8 km Shalom goods. Refugee camp Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 9

2. Creation of the Gaza Strip

: Creation of the Gaza Strip In the war of 1948, Israeli forces entered these areas and occupied he United Nations (UN) en- them. The 360 square kilometer area dorsed the two-state solution which remained was the Gaza Strip, Tin 1947 based on the Parti- and it was taken over by Egypt. As tion Plan, simultaneously creating the Israel conducted mass ethnic cleans- state of Israel and a Palestinian state ing during the 1948 war, many Pal- by its side. Although the Palestinians estinian refugees fled to the area were the majority of the population that had become the Gaza Strip, (about two-thirds) living in the area and the United Nations Relief and to be partitioned, the Palestinian state Works Agency (UNRWA) set up was planned with a smaller territory large refugee camps for the fleeing (12 million dunams as opposed to 15 Palestinians (Shlaim, 2009). million for the Jewish state), and with- One can say, therefore, that Israel out territorial continuity. The western effectively created the Gaza Strip in part of the planned Palestinian state the 1948 war. The ethnic cleansing was to include the entire Western conducted by Israeli troops populated Naqab (Negev), including areas which Gaza with refugees, thus determining today contain the Israeli cities of Ash- the demographic and economic reali- dod and Sderot (Khalidi, 1997). ties of the area. 10 | Economy of the Occupation

: permanently in the Gaza Strip and Israeli Occupation the West Bank—or to leave for other of the Gaza Strip countries. This attempt was accompa- nied by projects to introduce innova- In the war of 1967, Israeli forces tions in agriculture and provide em- fought the Egyptian army and occu- ployment for Palestinians in the Gaza pied the Gaza Strip, as well as the Si- Strip (Gordon, 2008). nai Peninsula. Israeli forces found that These policies, however, suffered 65.1% of the Gazan population were from internal contradictions and were refugees, about half of them living in short-lived. Israel began to establish refugee camps, and this discovery has colonies for Jewish settlers inside the affected Israel’s subsequent treatment Gaza Strip in 1970 (Tal, 2005). Au- of the Gaza Strip. The war of 1967 thoritative measures of control were may be viewed as a continuation of used against the Gaza population the 1948 war; It was a further expan- (Gordon, 2008) and economic policies sion of Israel’s borders, and Israel now kept the Gaza economy dependent on had to once again face many of the Israel. Such policies included blocking the imports of machinery Israeli authorities realized that the and raw materials, thereby misery of the refugees could pose forcing Gazans to rely on Israeli-manufactured fin- a threat to its interests. ished goods. Israeli employers exploited the cheap same people it expelled from its bor- labor of the Palestinians in Gaza, ders in 1948 (Talhami, 2003). and Israeli settlements exploit- Israeli authorities realized that the ed the area’s fertile land and wa- misery of the refugees could pose a ter sources. Most importantly, Is- threat to its interests. As the occupy- raeli officials discouraged, delayed, ing power, Israel has tried to make the and undermined any economic Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip development that could create com- leave the refugee camps and settle petition with Israeli industries, thus Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 11 constraining Gaza’s economy (Arnon, surprise that the first Intifada began in 2007). For example, Israel placed re- the Gaza Strip and then spread to the strictions banning the formation of West Bank. The Palestinians of Gaza, cooperatives and circumscribed opera- most of them refugees living in oppres- tions of the Gazan Chamber of Com- sive density, have always had a lower merce (Roy, 2009). average standard of living than the Pal- By 2005, Israeli settlers controlled estinians in the West Bank. Further- 25% of the land of Gaza and 40% of more, the high concentration of refu- the arable land, although they num- gees was a reason for Israeli officials bered less than 0.6% of the popula- to be more cautious of Gazans and to tion of the Gaza Strip (Shlaim, 2009). exert control more directly. In Novem- Despite the restrictions imposed ber 1987 the Israeli secret police had by the occupation, Gazans were able a particularly large arrest operation in to create an agricultural sector that the Jabalia refugee camp (IDF Spokes- provided some income to the lo- man, 2009). Later, the first Intifada was cal population, with produce such sparked by a controversial car accident as flowers, strawberries and cherry in Gaza in December 1987 in which tomatoes. These industries did not a settler killed four Palestinians, and reverse the drop in the Palestinian which Palestinians said was an inten- standard of living, but merely slowed tional attack. The protest spread quick- it down (Shaban, 2009). ly to the West Bank (Gordon, 2008).

: : The First Intifada Oslo Negotiations

Although repressive policies, exploi- When negotiations began in 1993 tation, and economic deterioration between Israel and the Palestine Lib- caused by the Israeli occupation ex- eration Organization (PLO) for peace isted in the West Bank as well as in and the creation of a Palestinian state the Gaza Strip, it should come as no (the Oslo Process), Israel decreed that 12 | Economy of the Occupation

Palestinian autonomy will begin in the by UNRWA, the PA did not even Gaza Strip and in Jericho, thus show- have a role in providing basic public ing its unwillingness to retain control services (Bennis, 1997). of the former. International donors funded de- Israeli Prime Minister at the time, velopment projects in the Gaza Strip Yitzhak Rabin, said that he wished the during the 1990s. These projects were Strip would “sink into the sea,” mean- intended to help create the founda- ing he believed it to be a burden, not tions of a future independent Pales- tinian state with a vi- Rabin said that he wished the Strip able economy. These would “sink into the sea.” projects, however, were foiled by Israeli authorities, who delayed raw an asset for Israel, and that by oﬀering materials and workers from reaching it to the Palestinian Authority’s man- construction sites, and even bombed agement he would be relieving himself some of these areas (Hever, 2008). of the responsibility for its occupied The Oslo negotiations sputtered population (Hass, 1996). and eventually collapsed with the The Palestinian Authority (PA) outbreak of the Second Intifada. The took some control over the Gaza Second Intifada started in the West Strip in the 1990s, but set up its seat Bank, but resistance quickly spread in the West Bank city of Ramallah. to the Gaza Strip. Fighting has con- Despite the PA’s autonomy, Israel tinued even after the Second Intifada, continued to control the population and the total number of Palestinians registry, the movement of people, the killed in the Gaza Strip since the be- economic situation and Gaza’s contact ginning of the Second Intifada (Sep- with the rest of the world, leaving the tember 2000) and until right before PA with only administrative respon- the Israeli attack on Gaza (December sibilities for public services. Since 26th, 2008) by Israeli soldiers and civil- many services provided to refugees ians was 3,004, as compared to 1,833 in the Gaza Strip were administered in the West Bank. This is despite Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 13 the fact that the population in the June, October and November. These West Bank is larger than in the Gaza attacks were of a smaller scale than the Strip (B’tselem, 2009b). December 2008 attack (IDF Spokes- man, 2009).

: Israeli Disengagement Israel’s Responsibility

Unwilling to end the occupation and Despite the claim of Israel that the unable to make advancement in nego- occupation of the Gaza Strip ended tiations with the PA, the Israeli gov- in 2005, Israel continued to exercise ernment under Prime Minster Ariel direct and indirect control over the Sharon decided to adopt a unilateral Gaza Strip, and continued to deny the approach towards the Palestinians, Gaza Strip the trappings or the essen- and to redeploy its forces without tials of sovereignty. consulting or negotiating with Pales- The Gaza Strip’s borders, includ- tinian representatives. ing its border with Egypt, are con- In September 2005 Israel withdrew trolled by Israel. Israeli troops moni- its nearly 8,000 settlers from the Gaza tor the Gaza-Egypt border with live Strip and relocated its military bases cameras and decide when the border outside of the area. Israeli officials de- will be closed, opened, and who may clared that following this withdrawal, pass through. Palestinians are still not which Israel termed “disengagement,” allowed to establish a seaport in the the Gaza Strip is no longer occupied, Strip. Israel also controls the Gaza and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sha- airspace (B’tselem, 2009a) and moni- ron announced to the UN “the end of tors the Gaza Strip’s population regis- Israeli control over and responsibility try. The PA has no authority to issue for the Gaza Strip” (Gisha, 2007). official papers to residents without Is- After the Israeli withdrawal, the Is- rael’s approval (ibid.). raeli army officially attacked the Gaza The economy of the Gaza Strip is Strip three times during 2006—in completely subjugated to Israel’s deci- 14 | Economy of the Occupation sions. Israeli officials monitor and ap- force in the Gaza Strip (Molavi, 2009). prove or disapprove each item before The Fourth Geneva Convention (to which Israel is a signatory) de- Israel remains the occupying power fines the population in an oc- of the Gaza Strip. cupied territory as a “protected population,” and places responsibility for the safety of the oc- it can be imported or exported from cupied territory on the occupier, until the area. Even the allocation of radio the occupation ends (ICRC, 2009). and cellular frequencies is under Is- This point is important to re- raeli control (ibid.). member regarding the Israeli attack Because of these reasons and more, on Gaza: Israeli forces have attacked Israel is still considered, according to the people whom they are charged international law, as the occupying with protecting. Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 15

3. Israeli Separation Policies

sraeli governments have held con- tinians, instead using negotiators with flicting and contradictory policies military backgrounds. The new nego- Itowards the Occupied Palestinian tiators shifted the focus from striving Territories. The desire to expand Isra- for economic relations to striving for a el’s territory comes into conflict with clear separation between the popula- the desire to maintain a Jewish ma- tions (Selby, 2003). jority within that territory. Since the With the Second Intifada, and 1990s, the most prominent approach Prime Minister Barak’s claim that held by Israeli governments is that of “there is no partner for peace” (Bengal separation. The idea of separation is & Horev, 2006), the separation argu- to preserve the Jewish nature of the ment came to the fore of the Israeli state of Israel by minimizing contact political discourse. The Separation between Israeli citizens and the occu- Wall built in the West Bank became pied Palestinians. It’s also an attempt the symbol of this policy, until the Is- to keep the occupied Palestinians at a raeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip distance and thus avoid responsibility became an even clearer attempt at sep- for their well-being (Hanieh & Cook). aration (BBC, 2003). Both the Sepa- Separation was adopted as Israel’s ration Wall in the West Bank and the official policy during the Oslo negoti- withdrawal of settlers from the Gaza ations. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin Strip were attempts to minimize con- replaced the Israeli negotiating team tact between Palestinians and Israelis, that tried to negotiate close economic but without relinquishing Israeli con- relations between Israel and the Pales- trol over the area. However, with the 16 | Economy of the Occupation rapid rate of settlement construction, dropped to about 13,000 by 2008. separation cannot truly be achieved. After the Israeli redeployment from The withdrawal from Gaza was also Gaza, almost no Palestinians from the used by Israel to appease the inter- Gaza Strip were allowed to work in national community without actu- Israel. Also, the fences around Gaza ally making significant compromises. made smuggling across the border a Sharon’s close advisor Dov Weissglass near impossibility (Barnard, 2006). said that “The significance of the dis- Since the redeployment of Israel engagement plan is the freezing of the from the Gaza Strip, fighting between peace process. When you freeze that Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza process, you prevent the establishment Strip has not ended. In fact, with the of a Palestinian state and you prevent settlers out of the way, Israeli forces were able to bomb the area Israel defined not only the Hamas without the risk of harm- party, but the general population of ing Israeli settlers. Palestin- ians also fired rockets and Gaza as enemies. mortar shells into Israeli territory. In 2005-2007, a discussion on the refugees, the bor- 11 Israelis were killed by rockets fired ders and Jerusalem […] Disengage- from the Gaza Strip, while 1,290 Pal- ment supplies the amount of formal- estinians in Gaza were killed by the dehyde that is necessary so there will Israeli army (Shlaim, 2009). not be a political process with the Pal- Following the Hamas takeover in estinians” (Shavit, 2004). Gaza in 2007, Israel tightened its siege The result of the separation poli- on the Strip. Exports were brought to cies was a rapid reduction in the num- a complete halt, destroying the chanc- ber of Palestinian workers allowed es of Gaza to develop economic sus- to enter Israel and work for a living. tainability (Shaban, 2009). From a peak of over 120,000 Pal- In September 2007, the Israeli estinian workers coming to work in government declared the Gaza Strip Israel every day in 1991, the number to be a “hostile entity.” Thus, Israel Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 17 defined not only the Hamas party, manitarian assistance for basic needs but the general population of Gaza as (Roy, 2009). Israel allows a limited enemies of Israel, justified collective number of lorries to enter the Gaza punishment against the civilian popu- Strip every day, but permits them to lation, and denied its responsibility as carry only what it defines as “essen- an occupying power for the standard tial” and “humanitarian” goods (Ravid of living of Palestinians under occupa- & Issacharoff, 2009). Aid is con- tion (Sofer, 2007). trolled by several humanitarian agencies, the most prominent of which is UNRWA, which delivered food assis- Cracks in the Seal tance to 900,000 Palestinians in Gaza in 2008, out of a population of under Despite Israel’s efforts to close off the 1.5 million (RTE, 2009). Gaza Strip, some contact between the Following the Israeli attack on Gaza Strip and the outside world re- Gaza, Hamas militants have begun mained. Three of the few remaining trying to take over aid convoys and to channels were international (humani- distribute the humanitarian supplies tarian) aid, the tunnels, and the Free in a way that will reinforce Hamas’ Gaza Movement. popularity and legitimacy in the Gaza Strip (ibid.). The UN stopped aid shipments in response to Hamas’ ac- Aid tion, and as a result Hamas returned the goods (OCHA, 2009a). With exports and imports having ground to a halt, almost no workers allowed entry to Israel, and massive Tunnels devastation inflicted on local agriculture and industry, the Gaza Strip The underground tunnels between has become one of the most aid-de- the Gaza Strip and Egypt are one of pendent areas in the world. Ninety Hamas’ hallmark mechanisms for pro- percent of its population relies on hu- viding services to the besieged Gaza 18 | Economy of the Occupation

Strip and for obtaining goods and transport a variety of items that Israel weapons needed for its operations. banned from the official passages—in- The techniques for digging the tun- cluding foodstuffs, petrol, motorcycles, nels were developed by Hamas fighters livestock, electrical appliances, and in their resistance to the Israeli army. weaponry (Issacharoff, 2009c). Enclosed by a sophisticated system of After the attack on Gaza, with fences, electric fences, sentry towers, the continuation of the siege, the and under ongoing aerial surveillance, tunnels became even more essential Hamas fighters found themselves near- for the daily survival of Palestinians. Around 1,000 tunnels The Gaza Strip is probably the most were estimated to sup- aid-dependent region in the world today. ply two-thirds of goods in the Gaza markets, in addition to employing ly powerless to attack Israeli troops af- 12,000 people in the Strip (Cunning- ter the 2005 Israeli withdrawal. They ham, 2009b; Roy, 2009). dug tunnels to cross under the Israeli The tunnels thus quickly became fences and attack Israeli troops on pa- the most important aspect of the Gaza trol outside of the Gaza Strip. In one economy. Many Gazans invested their of these attacks Hamas fighters cap- money in digging tunnels, in their op- tured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and erations, and in commodities that were took him prisoner, with the purpose of smuggled through them or ordered to be freeing him in exchange for Palestinian smuggled in the future. The rising prices prisoners held in Israeli jails (Ravid, of consumer goods in Gaza because of 2009b). the siege made such investments appear The same technique of tunnel dig- lucrative, but the destruction of hun- ging was used to dig deep and long dreds of tunnels by Israeli bombard- tunnels under the “Philadelphi Axis”— ments caused many of the investors the border between the Gaza Strip and to lose their investments. This further the Egyptian Sinai peninsula. Hun- compounded the siege’s impact on the dreds of tunnels were dug and used to Gaza economy (Isacharoff, 2009c). Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 19

Free Gaza Campaign Gaza Strip, carrying food, medicine, medical doctors, and peace activ- The Free Gaza Campaign was devel- ists from various countries (includ- oped as a grassroots initiative to break ing Israel). As the attack on Gaza the Israeli siege by chartering boats, began, however, the Israeli navy took ﬁlling them with peace activists and aggressive action, ramming a boat car- humanitarian supplies, and sailing rying medical equipment and escort- from Cyprus to the Gaza Strip. Five ing it back to Cyprus (FGM, 2009; of these boats were able to enter the Agencies, 2008b). 20 | Economy of the Occupation

4. Hamas Takeover of the Gaza Strip

he Palestinian Authority tions were held following interna- was controlled for the tional pressure on the PA to hold Tfirst 11 years of its exis- a democratic process, as well as tence by the Fatah party, the stron- pressure by Israel that Palestin- gest party within the Palestine ians be “democratic.” U.S. President Liberation Organization (PLO). George Bush’s policy of “bringing Its first chairman was Yasser Arafat democracy to the Middle East” has- (1996-2004), followed by Mahmoud been presented as having clear im- Abbas (Abu-Mazen). plications for the Palestinians. Public The PA’s government in those years opinion in the OPT also called for failed to achieve advancement in the democratic elections. The Hamas negotiations with Israel, to improve party won the majority of seats in the the standard of living of Palestinians PLC, and was able to establish a gov- under occupation and was accused of ernment (Reuters, 2007). corruption and misuse of public funds The international community, led (Abu Issa, 2004). by the U.S. and European Union, chose to boycott the democratically- elected Hamas government, to stop The  Palestinian Elections sending funds to the PA, and to even threaten sanctions against any who In January 2006, the PA held gen- would trade with or support it. The eral elections for the Palestinian pressure against the Hamas govern- Legislative Council (PLC). The elec- ment included not only a financial Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 21 boycott, but also a freeze on the sala- of the PA (Broederlijk Delen, 2008) ries of PA workers. The decision to when he took office. The U.S. has also enact sanctions against the occupied provided military assistance to Abu Palestinians instead of against the Mazen’s office to help overthrow the occupying Israelis has further under- democratically-elected Hamas gov- mined the hopes of Palestinians that ernment (Klein, 2007). the world will come to their aid and In June 2007, Hamas used force to help them achieve justice (Shlaim, take over the Gaza Strip, taking con- 2009). The U.S. has further jeopar- trol of PA institutions (The Guardian, 2007). The conflict be- The international community rejected the tween Hamas and Fatah results of the Palestinian elections, and was short and bloody, with at least 116 deaths boycotted Hamas. (ICRC, 2007). Although Hamas took over by dized the unity talks between Hamas force, continued Israeli and international and Fatah by insisting on conditions pressure on Gaza has only fortified its which the Hamas party would find dif- popularity and the public support it en- ficult to meet, thus sowing discord in joys. International journalists reported the Palestinian public and rendering it that Hamas was able to restore order more difficult for Palestinians to form to the streets and create a sense of sta- a legitimate government (Roy, 2009). bility in Gaza that was broken only by The Israeli and international pres- Israeli attacks. sure on the PA culminated in the appointment of an interim government, headed by Salam Fayyad, in Ceasefire Violated by Israel June 2007. This government was not democratically elected, but Fayyad’s Egypt helped to broker a six month views were deemed acceptable to Is- ceasefire between Israel and Hamas rael, the U.S., and the EU, and so do- in June 2008, during which Isra- nors resumed their financial support el tightened its grip over the Gaza 22 | Economy of the Occupation

Strip. Israel prevented almost all ex- the ceasefire, proving that it was, in ef- ports from leaving the Strip, and fect, able to coordinate and control the limited imports to basic goods only. Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip Its goal was to strangle Gaza’s econ- (UN Human Rights Council, 2009). omy in the hopes of hurting Hamas’ On the Israeli side, there was no popularity (Shlaim, 2009). question about who is the sovereign The ceasefire was effective in achiev- body: the Israeli army is the only force ing Israel’s stated goal of protecting that can break the ceasefire from the its citizens from rocket fire from the Israeli side. In November 2008, Is- Gaza Strip, even as it was ineffective in rael violated the ceasefire by killing six achieving the stated goal of Hamas to Palestinians and injuring four others open the passages and relieve suffering in two separate attacks on Gaza. The of the population of Gaza. Compared Az ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades (the with an average of 197.6 rockets fired armed wing of Hamas) fired 35 rock- every month from Gaza in January- ets at Israel in response (Yahni, 2008). May (before the ceasefire), the ceasefire After Israel violated the cease- months of July-October had an average fire in November, rocket fire was re- of only 2.75 rockets fired each month sumed, but at a lower level of 112 into Israel. The ceasefire was signed rockets per month until the Israeli at- only with Hamas (and not other orga- tack on Gaza in December 27th (UN nizations with the willingness and abil- Human Rights Council, 2009). It ity to fire rockets into Israel). Though should be mentioned that Israel Hamas was not recognized by Israel as has fired more than eight times as the legitimate authority in Gaza, Israel many artillery shells into Gaza (car- has effectively relied on Hamas to en- rying heavier payloads than the force the ceasefire on other organiza- Palestinian Qassams) than the Pales- tions in Gaza. Hamas was indeed able tinian rocket fire to Israel from 2006- to reduce rocket fire by 98.6% during 2009 (Roy, 2009). Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 23

5. Israeli Military Attack on the Gaza Strip

The Cause example (not including December, in which Israel began the attack on amas has developed make- Gaza), was 18.2 Palestinians killed for shift, homemade rockets every Israeli killed (B’tselem, 2009b). H(called qassams) which Israeli officials, denying the right of were fired in tall ballistic arches into Palestinians to fight against an illegal Israeli territory. These rockets are occupation, have portrayed the rocket extremely inaccurate and cannot be fire as Palestinian one-sided aggres- aimed specifically at military targets. sion that justifies retaliation (Harel, They cause panic and anxiety in Israeli Ravid & Yagna, 2008; Jpost.com communities near the Gaza Strip and Staff & Katz, 2008). have disrupted daily life in these areas. One of the causes for the attack Since 2004 and until Israel launched was to restore the image and prestige its attack on Gaza in December 2008, of the Israeli army, following the em- nine Israelis were killed by rockets barrassing entanglement in Lebanon from Gaza (Global Security, 2009). in 2006. Israeli general Gadi Eisenkot For Israelis living near the Gaza explained that following the war with Strip, these rockets were very signifi- Lebanon, the official new policy of the cant, disruptive and dangerous, but Israeli army is the “disproportionate the rockets were no match for the Is- use of firepower.” He added that “from raeli munitions used against the Gaza our standpoint, these are not civilian Strip. The ratio of deaths in 2008, for villages, they are military bases” (Fish- 24 | Economy of the Occupation man & Ringel-Hoffman, 2008).* a re-examination of the causes for the Israel’s Deputy Chief of Staff attack. According to Harvard politi- General Dan Harel told mayors of cal scientist Sara Roy, one of the rea- Israeli towns near the Gaza Strip sons for the attack was the continued that “there won’t be a Hamas build- Hamas defiance of Israel’s occupation, ing left standing in Gaza.” The at- which threatened the Israeli authori- tack wasn’t aimed merely at toppling ties in comparison to the relatively Hamas, but was also an attempt to subdued resistance in the West Bank. neutralize Hamas’s capacity for fir- Hamas’ statements regarding its willing rockets into Israel (The Economist, ingness to end the conflict based on the 1967 borders threat- Israeli general Gadi Eisenkot said that en Israeli diplomacy “from our standpoint, they are not because they expose Is- rael’s policy to maintain civilian villages, they are military bases." control over the West Bank at all costs. This 2008). A week into the attack, Is- also explains why Israel, reluctant to raeli officers revealed that its aim was create the impression that Hamas to weaken Hamas by “breaking its was making any achievements, un- spirit” (Harel & Issacharoff, 2009a). dermined the ceasefire negotiations. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud In fact, one can say that the change Barak said that the operation had in Hamas’ stance toward Israel, plus been in planning for months, and was its willingness to negotiate and com- not launched in response to the end of promise, were among the reasons for the cease fire on December 19th (The Israel’s attack. In light of this change, Economist, 2008). Israel found it increasingly difficult to The failure of the attack to bring label and dismiss Hamas as a “terror- security to Israeli citizens must trigger ist organization” and watched in alarm

* I would like to thank Ram Rahat from Yesh Gvul for describing the Dahiyah Doctrine to me. A report by Rahat and Yesh Gvul on the attack on Gaza is forthcoming. Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 25 as various world leaders made moves toughness, despite being labeled as toward recognizing and engaging the “leftist” candidate (The Economist, Hamas (Roy, 2009). 2008). Barak must have remembered his own drop in popularity in the Second Intifada, how the eruption of The Elections violence propped up the opposition and brought him down in the 2002 One can only speculate on the man- elections. Perhaps he was hoping for ner in which the Israeli government, another reversal that could place him fully aware of the upcoming Israeli at the top again. Polls conducted dur- elections in February 2009, imag- ing the attack seemed to indicate that ined the attack on Gaza would af- the fighting bolstered Barak’s public fect their chances for re-election. image and could have brought him Prime Minister Olmert knew prior more votes (Bengal, 2009). to the attack that he would not Olmert, Livni and Barak must run for office in the next elections have known that the elections, oc- because he stood trial for allegations curring so soon after the attack of corruption. Minister of Foreign on Gaza, would be held under the Affairs Livni knew that she would shadow of this attack, and that se- run for office of Prime Minister curity issues would thus take prece- and that she could use the attack dence over social issues. Whatever as proof of her devotion to security their plans were regarding how the matters, despite being a woman— attack would affect their chances at something that was seen by some the polls, the elections had a different as a disadvantage for a candidate in result. Binyamin Netanyahu (former militarized Israel (Israel’s Women’s head of the opposition) took a stance Network, 2009). considered more right-wing than Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Olmert, Livni, and Barak, and sub- Barak hoped to stop the Hamas sequently won the elections and rocket fire in order to increase his formed an extreme right-wing power in the elections and prove his government (Shabi, 2009). 26 | Economy of the Occupation

Israeli Military Attack that essential infrastructures in Gaza on the Gaza Strip were collapsing (Hason, 2009). On the second day of the attack Is- In the first day of the attack, Israeli raeli forces bombed over a hundred dif- airplanes attacked police stations ferent targets in the Gaza Strip, 40 of across the Gaza Strip. In less than five which were tunnels on the border with minutes, over 100 missiles and bombs Egypt. Dozens of Palestinians tried to were dropped on Gaza. Israel reported flee from the attacks and escape to over 257 Palestinians killed in Gaza Egypt, but Egyptian border guards in the first 24 hours of the attack. At opened fire and hit about ten people to least 89 of these were non-combatants, prevent Palestinians from escaping to and most of the other casualties were safety (Hason, et. al., 2008). members of the civilian police. At least Israeli forces took about 200 Pal- 597 were injured in the first day of the estinian prisoners in the Gaza Strip, attack (Al Mezan, 2008). holding them for days on end in Israel’s attack destroyed basic infra- trenches, in the ground, and in pits structure in Gaza from the first day, without basic sanitary conditions. and from the second day aid agencies Food and shelter were provided in were forced to stop or limit their re- limited supply. Prisoners were also held inside trucks for Israel dropped over 100 missiles and an entire night, hand- bombs in the first day of the attack, cuffed, sharing blankets between them and suf- killing over 257 in 24 hours. fering abuse from Israeli soldiers and interroga- lief efforts because of the Israeli on- tors. Even after prisoners were trans- slaught. Hospitals ran out of basic ferred to permanent incarceration fa- supplies during the second day of the cilities, they were denied showers and attack (IRIN, 2008). On January 14th, toilets (Zarchin, 2009). And in fact, nine human rights organizations in the Israeli army was prepared to take Israel held a press conference to warn thousands of prisoners, but the troops Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 27 employed such intensive fire against After a week of bombing from the Palestinians that they had the oppor- air, Israeli ground troops invaded the tunity to take only a fraction of the Gaza Strip. Military officers explained live prisoners they were expecting to that airplanes nearly ran out of targets capture (Harel, 2009c). to bomb, and that the mud from the Israeli artillery shelling was target- rains of the first week of the attack ed at residential houses. Israeli mili- had dried, creating good conditions tary spokesmen claimed that the army for the invasion. Diplomats added that was firing at houses used by Hamas. Israel had diplomatic backing for the However, entire apartment build- invasion (Harel & Issacharoff, 2009a). ings were targeted because an apart- By the second week of the attack, ment within the building was said 40%-50% of the people of Gaza were to be used by Hamas; or buildings left without drinking water, most of were hit by the shelling of adjacent the residents of Gaza had no elec- buildings that allegedly contained tricity, and in several areas sewage Hamas fighters. Furthermore, houses began to overflow into the streets. were attacked even if their former All this occured because of Israeli at- residents were suspected as Hamas tacks on vital infrastructure in Gaza. members. In the first week of the at- Israeli forces also prevented Palestin- tack, Israeli soldiers called houses ian technicians from attempting to about to be bombed and warned the repair these infrastructures during residents. In the second week, phone the fighting (Hass, 2009a). Later in- calls were replaced by micro missiles vestigations uncovered evidence that that warned the residents to leave the Israeli army may have intention- the house quickly before the house ally bombed the sewage infrastructure was destroyed. Israeli troops ordered through the use of precise bombings the residents of the houses targeted of sensitive locations—even though for destruction to flee, although they the Gaza Coastal Municipalities Wa- often didn’t have a place to which ter Utility (CMWU) supplied the they could escape (Hass, 2009f; coordinates of all Gaza water facilities Mandel, 2009). to the International Red Cross, which 28 | Economy of the Occupation in turn provided these coordinates to On January 15th, 20 days into the the Israeli army. A 3,000 liter diesel attack and just before the end, eight storage tank was dragged into a basin, Israeli shells hit the El Wafa Hospital, polluting the groundwater. It is of par- destroying the men’s ward. Additional ticular interest that Israel bombed and structures hit include three additional destroyed the emergency pumping hospitals, an UNRWA enclave (de- station at Beit Lahiya, which was only stroying large amounts of supplies intended to relieve the On January 15th, Israel bombed the El hunger in Gaza), and Wafa hospital, a large media center and a building serving as a media center for sev- an URWA enclave. eral press agencies. Aid workers and journal- recently completed at the cost of US ists were also injured by the shelling. $350,000, but that project parts fund- Following the shelling, Israeli troops ed by the United States Agency for began storming deep into Gaza City International Development (USAID) with tanks and helicopters in tow (Isa- remained unharmed (Houk, 2009). charoff & Agencies, 2009; Roy, 2009). By the second week of the attack, By this time, reports were circu- aid organizations began to run out lating that Israeli forces were using of supplies and funding to keep the phosphorous weapons against civilian Palestinians in the Gaza Strip from targets in the Gaza Strip. These weap- starving. The bombing of tunnels to ons are illegal according to the Geneva Egypt also limited food supply into Conventions, and Israel did not admit the Strip. As tens of thousands of to using them during the attack. How- Palestinians in Gaza were displaced, ever, some of the patients in Gaza they immediately became internal ref- hospitals had injuries consistent with ugees in need of assistance, and were phosphorous weapons (Hass, 2009e). left without access to their own food As the attack raged on, thousands stores they were forced to leave be- of Palestinians throughout the whole hind (IRIN, 2009a). of Gaza sustained injuries. They were Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 29 hurt primarily by collapsing buildings emergency personnel were killed and and from Israeli munitions. Many of 50 were injured by Israeli troops in the injured people languished in pain, Gaza (Al Mezan, 2009). From Janu- and some even died, because the Is- ary 3rd to January 7th, 145 calls for raeli army prevented evacuation of ambulances from the al-Zeitoun the wounded to medical facilities. By neighborhood alone were left unan- January 1st, six medical crew mem- swered, because the Israeli troops pre- bers were killed by Israeli forces while vented ambulances from entering the trying to evacuate wounded people neighborhood (Sainath, 2009). to hospitals. The Red Cross issued a Reports from Gaza also claimed stern announcement condemning the that Israeli troops fired upon Pales- Israeli army for preventing medical tinians carrying white flags, killing teams from reaching the wounded. at least three such people on January The Red Cross cited a case in which 13th (Hass, 2009d). Further reports injured people waited four days until accumulated during the war of sol- medical teams were able to reach them, diers leaving hateful graffiti on homes, while an Israeli military encampment throwing bags of excrement on locals, was merely 80 meters away from the destroying household equipment, place where the wounded were lay- shooting at people carrying white ing. The Red Cross also mentioned flags, and additional cases of soldiers cases of children who had to wait for preventing ambulances from reaching days with the dead bodies of their the wounded (Hass, 2009f ). parents, and of dirt roadblocks that On January 18th, Israel declared prevented ambulances from reaching a unilateral ceasefire and the end of people in need of medical attention. the attack, although Hamas did not The Red Cross listed several cases in agree to stop its fire into Israel. As which Israeli troops opened fire on the Israeli government learned that their medical teams even after they the Egyptian mediators were unable coordinated their movements with to get Hamas to agree to a mutual the Israeli army in advance (Hass, ceasefire, they decided to pull out of 2009b). Throughout the attack, 23 Gaza and declare victory. However, 30 | Economy of the Occupation

Israeli troops remained stationed in tack, and people who were shot while certain parts of the Strip. Hamas trying to flee from the fighting. Sev- continued to fire rockets into Israel eral bodies showed signs of heavy vehicles running them The attack left Gaza with destroyed over. The destruction infrastructure, severe drinking water wasn’t only caused by heavy shelling, but also shortage and dangerous rubble. by soldiers entering Pal- estinian homes, shoot- as the Israeli troops were withdraw- ing at electrical appliances (such ing, and used this to claim victory as as television sets), and stealing well (Ravid et. al., 2009). valuables (Hass, 2009c). The ceasefire, however, did not As some of the bombs hit water signify the end of the violence. Israeli and sewer pipes, sewage contami- forces continued to bomb the tun- nation of drinking water became a nels and attack Palestinian targets in serious risk. Nearly half a million Gaza, albeit in a more sporadic man- people (a third of Gaza’s population) ner. In the first 40 days after the dec- were without drinking water as of laration of a ceasefire, Hamas fired January 18th (IRIN, 2009b). over 60 rockets and mortars into A delegation of 12 medical doc- Israel (Issacharoff & Ravid, 2009; tors from the Israeli Physicians for Harel & Issacharoff, 2009b). Human Rights organization reported As the fighting became less in- on the destruction they witnessed in tensive, the extent of the devastation the Gaza Strip when they entered to of the Gaza Strip gradually became render assistance. They reported de- apparent: streets blocked by rubble, stroyed infrastructure, dead bodies of electricity grids destroyed, bodies bur- animals that posed a sanitation risk, ied under the debris. Bodies found and hospitals filled with wounded re- amid the ruins included people who ceiving only the most basic treatment bled to death because medical help due to a shortage in medical equip- couldn’t reach them during the at- ment (Stern, 2009). Schools in the Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 31

Gaza Strip were destroyed as well, delayed the delivery of spare parts for including the American International the repair of Gaza’s largest wastewater School in Gaza and schools funded by treatment plant for over two months UNRWA (Sainath, 2009). after the attack (Frykberg, 2009a; The total number of casualties in Bartlett, 2009b). the attack was 1,434 dead and over The long-term environmental im- 5,000 injured. Among the injured pacts of the attack further include are about 1,900 people who became the risk of disease; the deterioration disabled and require rehabilitation of fishing capacity at the coast; and (Hass, 2009h; UN Human Rights health hazards from the debris left by Council, 2009). An estimated 1,346 shelling, unexploded ordinance, and children became orphans after losing buildings in advanced state of dis- one or two of their parents during the repair (Cunningham, 2009c, IRIN, attack (IRIN, 2009c). At least ninety- 2009d). Furthermore, solid-waste dis- three of the fatalities were shot and posal in Gaza is woefully inefficient. killed at short range (Hass, 2009l). Due to fuel shortages, garbage col- It is important to stress that the lectors must use animal-drawn carts, damage to lives and property in Gaza and have no means to deal with the continued well after the 23 days of estimated 600,000 tons of debris left- Israeli attack. The UN reported that over from the attack—or the 22,000 two months after the attack, 150,000 tons of rubbish that piled up in resi- Gazans were still affected by in- dential areas during the attack and adequate and unsafe water supply; now attracts flies, mosquitoes, and 50,000 of them remained without rats (Cunningham, 2009e). any water at all, and the rest received The attack also left long-term water only once every five or six days. and widespread psychological dam- Untreated sewage, at a daily average in Gaza. A survey conducted by age rate of 80,000 cubic meters, was the Gaza Community Mental Health pumped to sea from where it could Programme found that 73% of chil- seep into and further contaminate dren in Gaza thought at one point or underground water. Israeli authorities more that they were going to die, 68% 32 | Economy of the Occupation fear that a similar attack will happen sistance to reach the population of again, and 41% expressed the desire Gaza (Frykberg, 2009b). for revenge. The survey found that 59% of fathers and 75% of mothers were diagnosed with post-traumatic Coverage Restrictions stress disorder (PTSD) and over 59% of adults had anxieties about Despite two court petitions by the death, fearing heart attacks or can- Foreign Press Association, Israel re- cer as a result of exposure to weap- stricted access of reporters to the Gaza ons used by Israel during the attack. Strip and didn’t allow Israeli or inter- Parents also observed that their chil- national reporters to enter the area for dren became more aggressive and much of the attack’s duration (Weiss had emotional problems after the at- & Azarov, 2009). Local reporters of- tack (Cronin, 20089c). ten had to remain indoors due to the The UN also reported that Israel risk of being shot by Israeli soldiers. allows only 127 trucks of aid to en- As a result, real-time coverage of the ter the Gaza Strip every day, com- attack was limited at best and relied pared to 475 trucks admitted prior on reports by Israeli soldiers, who had to the blockade (Frykberg, 2009a). a clear bias in their reporting. Even The siege imposed on Gaza, par- the number of dead and injured was ticularly limitations placed on the impossible to confirm until after the amount of emergency aid that Is- attack subsided (Issacharoff, 2009a). rael allows into the Strip, has con- Two reporters for Iranian televi- tinued relentlessly since the end of sion were arrested and received two the attack. UNRWA claimed that months’ jail sentence for reporting in even food is not imported to Gaza real-time when Israeli forces began the in sufficient quantities (Agencies, Gaza invasion (Ha’aretz, 2009d). 2009). In light of this, forty inter- Two Israeli journalists, Amira national aid agencies issued a joint Hass and Shlomi Eldar, entered the statement criticizing Israel for not Gaza Strip in order to report on the allowing sufficient humanitarian as- attack, and were arrested immediate- Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 33 ly upon their return to Israel (Weill speak out about what they witnessed & Azarov, 2009). Hass’ information during the attack. from the Strip, from the time she Officers reported that different spent there and from her contacts in divisions expressed varying levels of brutality during the at- Israeli soldiers testified that they were tack: “The aggressive- instructed to kill indiscriminately. ness with which we entered the area left a lot of room for lower- Gaza, has been an invaluable source level commanders to maneuver. Para- for this publication. Without her de- troopers were more under control and fiant entry into Gaza, information supervision, and this is maybe the about what happened during the at- reason that they listed fewer excep- tack would be even more lacking and tions from other divisions” (Harel, incomplete than it is now. 2009c). Some soldiers said that the “orders were actually to commit murder” (Mandel, 2009). Soldiers’ Testimonies Although the mainstream media in Israel published only a selection of the While the Israeli authorities took testimonies presented by soldiers, per- pains to prevent information about sonal testimonies continued to flow in what really happened during the at- unofficial channels. In personal con- tack on Gaza from being distributed, versations, soldiers continued to reveal some of the most valuable sources of facts—for example, about houses de- information are reports from Israeli stroyed for no apparent reason. One soldiers themselves. soldier said, “Our officer told us to Although Israeli soldiers are taught fire at any suspicious movement, even to express absolute loyalty to the Is- half-suspicious, quarter-suspicious, raeli army and are forbidden from from the houses. You shoot, I don’t revealing military information to the care who is there, it’s only Arabs any- press, some soldiers felt the need to way. Fire automatic bursts, fire LAW 34 | Economy of the Occupation rockets, shoot whatever you want…” single disciplinary action was initi- (Rabbis for Human Rights, 2009). ated following the report (Kessel & Amnesty International also accused Klochendler, 2009). Israel of repeatedly breaching the rules of warfare during the attack (Amnesty Legal Aspects International, 2009). The Israeli army launched five in- Even before the attack on Gaza, vestigations headed by Israeli colonels. a team of Israeli international law These investigations were initiated in experts in the Israeli Military At- response to public pressure stemming torney’s Office discussed the vari- from soldiers’ testimonies and allega- ous Israeli plans for the attack. Re- tions by international organizations. luctant to approve attacks that were All of these investigations exonerated war crimes or could be construed as the Israeli army from intentional appli- war crimes, yet facing massive pres- cation of deadly force against civilians, sure from senior officers in the Israeli and called all the killings of civilians army, the team, headed by Colonel during the attack “mistakes.” Israeli Pnina Sharvit-Baruch,* eventually Minister of Defense Ehud Barak said approved the slaughter of the gradu- that the investigations “prove once ates of a police training course in more that the IDF is one of the most Gaza (carried out on the first day of moral armies in the world.” The Israeli the attack) and the use of phospho- army claims that only 1,166 Palestin- rous weapons (legal only when used ians were killed in the attack, and that for lighting, and illegal when used as 709 of them were “terrorists” (Pfeffer, weapons) (Feldman & Blau, 2009). 2009b). Because Israeli officers were not in- The investigators completed their vestigated or prosecuted for ignoring report in only 11 days, and not a the recommendations of the commit-

* Pnina Sharvit-Baruch was appointed as a lecturer in the Faculty of Law in Tel-Aviv Univer- sity following the attack on Gaza. Lecturers and activists protested this appointment, pointing to Sharvit-Baruch’s involvement in the attack and her alleged justification of war crimes committed by Israeli forces (Ilani, 2009a). Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 35 tee, and because the team’s recom- courts pressing charges against Israeli mendations were not consistent with officers (ibid.). international law, the argument that Indeed, Israel’s worries were war- Israel doesn’t employ a mechanism to ranted. The British Secretary of State enforce international law on its own for International Development, Doug- army is valid. This effectively justi- las Alexander, called for the investiga- fies, both morally and legally, taking tion of senior Israeli officers on sus- international legal action against Is- picion of war crimes (Primor, 2009). raeli soldiers who participated in the Norwegian lawyers have initiated a attack on Gaza. legal process against the three most Following the attack and the glob- senior members of Israel’s govern- al protests against it, Israel decided ment during the attack: Prime Min- to conceal the names of the Israeli of- ister Ehud Olmert, Foreign Minister ficers who fought in the Gaza Strip. Tzipora Livni, and Defense Minister This decision stemmed from the fear Ehud Barak (Ha’aretz, 2009c). that these officers could be tried for Richard Falk, a special UN rap- war crimes in international court. The porteur on human rights, declared Israeli government instructed the Is- that Israel committed war crimes in raeli media to censure the names and Gaza (UN Human Rights Council, faces of Israeli officers, and a mili- 2009), but Israel refused to cooperate tary censor was selected to enforce with the UN fact-finding mission to this decision. Division commanders Gaza that was convened to investi- were exempt from this decision be- gate the war crimes allegations. Israeli cause their identities were already authorities prevented mission mem- public knowledge (Avnery, 2009; bers from entering both Israel and Harel, 2009b). Gaza (Harel & Stern, 2009). Israel’s Minister of Justice Daniel The grounds for charging Israe- Friedman (who presided as Minis- li soldiers and politicians with war ter until April 2009) was appointed crimes are many, including widespread to head a special inter-departmental reports on the use of illegal weaponry taskforce to deal with international in densely-populated areas (Bartlett, 36 | Economy of the Occupation

2009a); deliberate targeting of civil- unless the UN Security Council ians, including civilians waving white asks the ICC to investigate Israel flags; attacking and killing medical despite its refusal to sign the ICC rescue teams; and using civilians as treaty (Molavi, 2009). human shields (Raymond, 2009). These accusations were corroborated by an independent fact-finding mis- International Reactions sion (PHR & PMRS, 2009). A report by Human Rights Watch also Israel has become much more sensitive to world public opin- Several international reports found ion towards its actions evidence of war crimes committed by since the 1990s, when its economy started to Israel during the attack. become more deeply integrated with the global found evidence that the Israeli army economy (Klein, 2001). This was ap- used illegal munitions during the parent in the attack on Gaza, as Israel attack (HRW, 2009b). strived to convince the world of its jus- Israel has a strong line of defense tification in attacking the Strip. against accusations by the Interna- Israeli Foreign Minister Livni said, in tional Criminal Court (ICC) be- a message echoed by the Israeli media, cause it has refused to sign its treaty that Israel is fighting a dual war—one and because the Palestinians do not against Hamas and one for world public have a state. Therefore, the ICC opinion (Livni, 2009). The Israeli For- does not have jurisdiction over the eign Office dedicated massive efforts to Gaza Strip. By holding a trial any- market the attack as an act of defense, way, the ICC would be recognizing and even uploaded videos to YouTube the Palestinians as a sovereign en- in an effort to win over public opinion.* tity, thus denying the occupation— The success of these efforts has

* See for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7ZRPyqHB6A; http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=WXPBTTiT8Cw; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5G8VKZFmsw. Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 37 been mixed. The European Union iticians refused to exert pressure on didn’t have a clear stand on Israel’s Israel and refused to talk to Hamas. attack, and ended up sending two The report found that the EU fo- delegations to the region during the cused on the minute details of the attack—one headed by French Presi- border crossings, not on the actual dent Nicolas Sarkouzi and one head- siege, and did not demand compensa- ed by Czech Foreign Minister Karel tion or even investigation by Israel for Schawrzenberg (Pfeffer, 2009a). As the destroyed facilities in Gaza that will be shown below, governments did were originally funded by the EU. not intervene to prevent or stop Is- The report found that the EU has im- raeli aggression, but popular opinion posed an ambiguous, self-contradict- around the world did see through the ing policy, and has failed to consis- propaganda efforts and massive pro- tently advance its stated goals in the tests were launched. region (EMHRN, 2009). While France condemned both the The United States expressed an Israeli attack and the Hamas rocket even clearer position of support for fire, the Czech Republic expressed Israel, arguing that Hamas is respon- support for Israel’s attack, arguing sible for the violence and that Israel that “Israel has the right to defend is merely defending itself. This posi- itself ” (Agencies, 2008a). David Cro- tion was bolstered by the majority of nin of the IPS news agency in Brus- the Jewish organizations in the U.S., sels argued that overall, the European yet within the U.S. during the at- Union has adopted a pro-Israeli ap- tacks there was also popular protest, proach, and is not applying to Israel including mass demonstrations and the same standards of respects for hu- calls to boycott Israel (Mozgovaya, man rights that it demands from other 2008). The U.S. worked to delay UN countries (Cronin, 2009a). Security Council discussion about a A report by the Euro-Mediterra- ceasefire to allow Israel more time for nean Human Rights Network found its attack (Ben, 2009). The only signs that Europe’s efforts to achieve a of change in U.S. policy with the new ceasefire failed because European pol- administration came in June 2009, 38 | Economy of the Occupation when the U.S. began to pressure Israel being smuggled into the Gaza Strip to increase the flow of food and con- (ibid.). Despite Egypt’s support for struction materials to Gaza. However, Israel, it also positioned itself as the U.S. has yet to challenge the very the mediator between Israel and legitimacy of the continuing siege on Hamas, thus enhancing its political Gaza (Ravid, 2009c). prestige (Harel & Issacharoff, 2009a). Egypt also supported Israel in After the first week of the at- its attack. In addition to providing tack, Israel enjoyed diplomatic backing to continue The international community’s tolerance to its assault on Israel’s attack created a feeling that “all bets are Gaza. The Eu- off,” and Israel won’t be punished for its actions. ropean Union issued a statement justify- diplomatic support, Egypt used its ing Israel’s “defensive action” and the forces to seal its border with Gaza U.S. maintained its full support of and tried to prevent weapons from Israel (ibid.). Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 39

6. Israeli Society and the Attack

Media Support however, hide the magnitude of the siege imposed by Israel on the Gaza he Israeli media was sup- Strip for years before the attack. The portive of the attack even media also hid the Israeli violations Tbefore it started. Journal- of the ceasefire and refused to report ist Gideon Levy from the newspa- on any opinion but that of the Israeli per Ha’aretz said: “No investigative military spokesmen (ibid.). committee could determine that the The attack took place on a Satur- Israeli media didn’t prepare for the day, in which at least 257 Palestin- war in Gaza properly: it prepared the ians were killed. And yet the headline ground, pushed for action and when of Israel’s popular newspaper Yedioth the attack commenced, it stood like a Ahronot the next day cried, “Half a choir and cheered. Different opinions? Million Israelis Under Fire.” No Is- Public debate? Not for us, thank you” raelis were hurt during that Saturday (Levy, 2009a). attack (ibid.). Levy continued to argue that the Only a week after the attack be- Israeli media did not attempt to hide gan, Ha’aretz published an edito- the devastation of Gaza from Israeli rial calling on Israel to end the eyes, because images of dead Palestin- fighting. Yet even this editorial com- ian bodies simply do not shock Israeli pletely supported the attack up until public opinion. The Israeli media did, that point (Ha’aretz, 2009a). 40 | Economy of the Occupation

Public Support Disqualifying the Arab Political Parties A week after the attack began, the Is- raeli government approved the call-up In January 12th, as the attack was of tens of thousands of Israeli reserve still raging in Gaza, Israel’s Central troops with an emergency draft (Ilan Elections Committee convened and & Ravid, 2009), yet the number of decided to disqualify the candidacy soldiers actually recruited was never to Israel’s parliament of two politi- published. This could indicate either cal parties representing Israeli Pal- estinian citizens. The two Israeli police arrested 801 protestors parties—Ra’am-Ta’al and against the attack. the National Democratic Assembly, which received that the Israeli army didn’t need as about 160,000 votes in the 2006 elec- many troops as it could muster, or tions and were the only two parties that, as in the war of 2006 in Leba- in Israel’s parliament without Jewish non, the oﬃcers were wary of the loy- parliament members—were disquali- alty and motivation of drafted troops ﬁed by a large majority (21 out of 30) and wanted to recruit only the most of the committee members, including eager soldiers. representatives from the Kadima and Israelis cultivate a narrative of vic- Labor parties. On January 21st, Israel’s timhood by Hamas, as if Hamas is High Court unanimously overruled the aggressor and Israel is merely de- the decision of the Central Elections fending itself. To that end the story of Committee and reinstated the two Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier held parties (Weiss & Azarov, 2009). captive by Hamas, is oft repeated. In This turn of events demonstrates the June, hundreds of Israelis attempted to levels of belligerence among Israelis dur- prevent food trucks from entering the ing the attack, plus the unwillingness of Gaza Strip, using Shalit’s captivity as Israeli parliament members to tolerate an excuse to try and starve the entire criticism voiced by Palestinian citizens population of Gaza (Khoury, 2009). of Israel over the attack (Bender, 2009). Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 41

‘Illegal’ Demonstrations, tors, killing four Palestinian protestors Mass Arrests and injuring many others (ibid.).

Protest within Israel against the attack, although not fully revealed by Political Paralysis the Israeli media, was significant. Most of the protest came from Pales- Months after the attack, the Israeli tinian citizens of Israel, but many Jews government failed to take any follow- also protested. up diplomatic action. After sending Israeli authorities responded by the army to attack Gaza, the govern- outlawing the protests and refusing to ment sent representatives to negotiate grant permits to most of the demon- with Hamas representatives in Egypt, strations. Israeli police arrested 801 but was unwilling to make compro- protestors, 277 of them children and mises in order to reach an agreement. juveniles. Of these people, 255 were Thus, the government was unable kept under arrest for a month or more to secure the release of the Israeli sol- (Weill & Azarov, 2009). dier prisoner Gilad Shalit, and unable Demonstrations that took place to stop the rocket fire into Israel. In ef- in the West Bank were forcefully dis- fect, the situation after the attack was persed by Israeli soldiers who used live politically similar that prior to the at- ammunition against the demonstra- tack (Harel & Issacharoff, 2009c). 42 | Economy of the Occupation

7. Economic Aspects of the Attack

Damage to Gaza economic targets. Four of Gaza’s most prominent cement and construction he extent of the damage to materials factories were destroyed in the Gaza Strip is difficult to the attack, and there is evidence that Testimate in monetary terms, they were destroyed with explosives because conducting a proper survey of planted inside by soldiers on foot. the damage requires free movement of A group of 17 Gazan businessmen appraisers in the Gaza Strip. conducted a survey and found that The damage to the Islamic Uni- 600-700 factories were damaged or versity in Gaza, which was directly destroyed during the attack, with the shelled by Israeli artillery, is estimated total damage to Gaza industrial and at US $20 million, though this es- commercial structures estimated at timate doesn’t take into account the US $185 million. The Israeli army loss of school days for the university contended that it destroyed build- students (Ormestad, 2009). ings from which weapons were fired Some of the first targets attacked at Israeli troops, and took care to in Gaza were the tunnels to Egypt minimize damage to uninvolved (The Economist, 2008). Palestinian civilians (Hass, 2009g). businessmen in Gaza argued that Is- The Israeli Committee against raeli forces focused their attacks on House Demolitions (ICAHD) esti- Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 43 mated that 4,247 Palestinian homes as a basis for its request for fund- were demolished by the Israeli army ing at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit during the attack (ICAHD, 2009). (PNA, 2009a). According to this es- The Palestinian Central Bureau of timate, the attack caused damages of Statistic published preliminary esti- a total of US $2.2 billion to the Gaza Strip (PCBS, 2009). Hamas was not allowed to send delegates The PA recovery to the Sharm El-Sheikh donors summit. plan has some obvi- ous shortcomings when considered as mates of the damage and found that an estimate to the damage caused by damaged infrastructure and buildings the Israeli attack. It is an inaccurate created a loss of US $1,225.6 million. estimate, with rounded numbers and It calculated lost economic activity based on rough generalizations—a (which includes losses of economic result of the limitations on the free activity after the attack, due to dam- movement of officials to conduct a aged production capacity) at US $804 comprehensive survey. million, and placed rehabilitation Furthermore, the PA recovery plan costs for injuries and support needed estimates damage caused to the Gaza for families of casualties at US $31.6 Strip at US $2.2 billion (slightly high- million. The total damage estimated is er than the estimate by the Palestin- therefore US $2,061.2 million. ian Central Bureau of Statistics), but The PA’s recovery plan, proposed asks for support worth US $2.7 bil- at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit lion for its recovery plan. The thinly- (which will be described below) in- disguised attempt by the PA to use cluded a broader scope of the dam- the Israeli attack on Gaza in order to age, and broke down damage caused re-establish its control over the Strip to the Gaza Strip item by item and overthrow Hamas undermines (PNA, 2009b). The PA prepared the legitimacy of its recovery plan in an estimate of the damages caused the eyes of the Palestinian people, and to the Gaza Strip in order to serve makes the plan less likely to succeed. 44 | Economy of the Occupation

Cost to Israel must take into account the international economic crisis. At a time when Unlike the war Israel fought in Leba- thousands of workers are losing their non in the summer of 2006, the direct jobs, sending thousands of workers to impact of the attack on Gaza on Is- battle might not cause as much loss rael’s economy has been limited. of productivity as it normally would The military cost of the war was (Bassok & Zrahiya, 2009). much lower for the attack on Gaza. The primary reason why the at- According to military reports, the war tack on Gaza was less expensive for with Lebanon cost the Israeli army Israel than the 2006 war with Leba- NIS 8.2 billion in direct costs (am- non wasn’t due to lower expenditures munition, replacing equipment, etc.) on armaments or the cost of call- while the attack on Gaza cost NIS 4.5 ing reservists, though, but the issue billion (Bassok, 2009). After the war of civilian safety inside Israel. The with Lebanon, the Israeli army was war with Lebanon placed the north able to convince the government to of Israel under rocket fire that para- spend NIS 9.6 billion in preparations lyzed economic activities in the area for the next war, and to increase the for a month, causing damage to the base defense budget by NIS 3 billion Israeli economy of about NIS 21 (Ravid, 2009a). billion (Hever, 2006). The cost of the attack on Gaza The attack on Gaza, however, was estimated at NIS 2.4 billion, but placed a smaller and much poorer area the main cost of the attack came with of Israel under rocket fire, and these the Israeli ground invasion of Gaza rockets were less dangerous than the on January 3rd. The direct spending ones used in 2006 by Hezbollah from for the attack was estimated to be Lebanon. In the years 2006-2008, in- slightly lower than the losses to the dividuals and businesses that suffered Israeli economy due to the decrease losses due to rocket fire from Gaza in productivity of Israeli workers re- were compensated a total of NIS 243 cruited to fight in the attack as re- million (Bassok & Zrahiya, 2009). serve soldiers. This estimate, however, Nevertheless, the fighting did af- Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 45 fect Israeli businesses in the area nesses. Thus, the main cost to Israel surrounding the Gaza Strip, includ- for the attack on Gaza was mostly in- ing Israel’s tourism industry. The Is- direct, through the economic pressure raeli Tax Authority handled a total of applied to Israel as a result of the at- 1,728 claims for compensation for the tack, which will be described below. 23 days of the attack (Levy, 2009b), Furthermore, it is impossible to and the government pledged to pro- separate the attack on Gaza from the vide compensation to public institu- international economic crisis as the tions for the damages brought by the cause for the reduction in tourism, fighting (Polack, 2009). Furthermore, and thus impossible to produce a use- the government promised compensa- ful estimate of the damage to Israel’s tion of NIS 200-600 million for mu- tourism industry (Rosenblum, 2009). nicipalities that were put under emer- The Israeli economy has actually gency situation (Arlozeroff, 2009). benefited in some ways from the attack on Gaza. Follow- The cost of the attack for Israel was cheaper ing the 2006 war with than the 2006 war with Lebanon. Lebanon, the Israeli army received a special emergency fund from The government also compensated the Israeli government, to be used for workers who were absent from work special operations and which accumu- during the fighting, and parents who lated NIS 800 million annually. By stayed at home with their children 2009 this fund had accumulated NIS during the attack (TheMarker, 2009). 2.4 billion. Thus the Israeli army had Compared to NIS 3.5 billion a source of funding for the attack that that the Israeli government paid as could not be used for other expenses. compensations for workers and busi- By tapping into the emergency fund, nesses in the north of Israel following the state effectively found a way to the war against Lebanon (Arlozeroff, increase public spending without in- 2008), the rockets fired from Gaza creasing the deficit, a policy move that were not as damaging to Israeli busi- could be expected to help the Israeli 46 | Economy of the Occupation economy cope with the international Some economists even hinted that economic crisis (TheMarker, 2008). by stimulating demand, a war could Israeli treasury officials said that help the Israeli economy rise from the the Israeli army will have to use its crisis (Maor, 2009). own budget for any operation that lasts up to a week, but longer operations might be financially supported War Profiteers by the government beyond the regular budget. This statement created an Though the attack was devastating for incentive for the top brass of Israel’s the Gaza economy and costly for the army to extend the operation in Gaza Israeli economy, no discussion of the as long as possible (Bassok & Zrahi- attack can be complete without talk- ya, 2009). ing about those who profited from it. The opinion of Israeli economists In Israel, certain industries were and businessmen regarding the eco- working full-time to keep up with de- nomic impact of the fighting with mands created by the fighting. Chief Gaza was very similar to their opin- among these were companies that ions regarding the war with Lebanon reinforce buildings or build shelters in 2006, namely, that the fighting as protection from rockets. Many of will have little or no effect on the Is- these companies were working at over raeli economy. Some economists ex- full-capacity to meet the stream of de- pressed worry that the attack could mands by municipalities and individu- cause the government to exceed its als who wanted quick protection from annual budget and increase the defi- the rockets (Ynet, 2009). Businesses cit, that the Israeli currency could that provide delivery services in the weaken and even that Israel’s inter- region surrounding Gaza experienced national credit rating could suffer. a boom in sales during the attack But most economists remained calm because Israelis were afraid to leave and pointed out that the Israeli stock their homes (Charuti-Sober & Koren, market did not seem affected by the 2009), and repair crews also had more fighting (TheMarker, 2008). work than usual repairing the damage Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 47 caused to structures by the rockets ple opportunities for well-connected fired from Gaza (ibid.). businessmen on the Israeli and Pales- Israeli military industries, whose tinian sides to generate high profits by biggest customer is the Israeli Minis- arranging the shipment of goods. Ten try of Defense, also profited from the trucks are allowed to move the goods attack through the production of mu- from the Israeli to Palestinian side of nitions and replenishment of military the Karni checkpoint—a distance of supplies (ibid.). 200 meters. Each truck making this Additionally, food companies pro- trip charges NIS 500, and the com- viding rations for troops reported pany which operates them earns an demand many times higher than in income of NIS 50-60,000 every day, regular days; restaurants that sell food or about US $5 million annually. Pal- to soldiers on their way to Gaza or estinian merchants in Gaza reported back raised prices; and telecom com- that they had to pay shipping costs 13 panies benefited from a surge in calls, to 33 times higher than they paid be- over double that of normal volume. fore the siege. This in turn has made Even drug companies that manu- consumption much more expensive facture relaxants reported a surge in for Palestinians in Gaza, who were al- sales (ibid.). ready burdened with high costs result- Six months after the attack, a spe- ing from the imposed shortage (Blau cial report by Ha’aretz uncovered that and Feldman, 2009). the siege on Gaza was fine-tuned to The Israeli military leadership at- meet the interests of Israeli produc- tempts to restrict as many goods as ers. The agriculture lobby directed possible, calling them “luxuries,” and the Ministry of Defense and the Co- also prevents construction materials ordinator of Government Activities from entering Gaza to help in the re- in the Territories (COGAT) to pick construction. Spokesmen said that they which fruit, vegetables, and meat wish to prevent luxuries from reach- products would be allowed entry into ing the captors of Israeli soldier Shalit Gaza based on Israeli market consid- while he is still held captive, and that erations. The tight siege created am- “luxuries are anyway not consumed by 48 | Economy of the Occupation the general public, but by the rich and market in Gaza, as they did before the corrupt leadership of Hamas.” The Is- siege, to dump excess produce and jack raeli authorities operate under the pol- up prices (Blau and Feldman, 2009). icy of “no prosperity, no development, Based on testimonies, Ha’aretz no humanitarian crisis,” meaning they journalists compiled a partial list of try to freeze time in the Gaza Strip and products that are allowed into Gaza. force discomfort and suffering in the These products include oil, flour, hope that it will undermine the Hamas sugar, pumpkin, carrots, frozen meat, leadership (ibid.). COGAT’s will- pasta, margarine, apples, persimmons, bananas, garlic, dia- The Israeli siege motto: “no prosperity, no pers and medicine. development, no humanitarian crisis.” The list of forbidden products includes sesame, books, choco- ingness to use collective punishment late, clothing, pomegranates, preserved against the entire population of Gaza is meat, semolina, kiwi, cherries, green embodied in its statement that “Shalit almonds, shoes, mattresses and wheel- doesn’t eat apricots, so his captors won’t chairs (ibid.). Even chlorine to help be able to eat them either”—as if all 1.5 stave off disease from the contami- million people in Gaza are the jailers nated water in Gaza is not allowed in of Shalit, rather than the prisoners of sufficient quantities (Bartlett, 2009b). Israel (Cohen, 2009). The UN reported that cooking gas Israel’s siege on Gaza is run in an and grain were allowed into Gaza in unpredictable fashion, and no list of controlled quantities, but UNICEF products allowed or forbidden to Gaza childhood development kits and toys has been published by the Israeli au- were denied at the checkpoint, as they thorities, forcing merchants and hu- were not deemed a “humanitarian pri- manitarian agencies to guess and there- ority” (OCHA, 2009b). fore waste money on shipments that are Although the interests of certain denied entry. On the other hand, Israeli Israeli producers are apparent in the merchants continue to use the captive Israeli siege policies, it is unlikely that Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 49 these interests are the main force set- the attack against Palestinian banks ting the tone of Israel’s policies to- and the financial sector in the Strip. In wards Gaza. As will be discussed 2006, the U.S. declared that any insti- below, the Israeli economy does not tution that makes a financial transac- profit from the siege on Gaza. tion with the PA could be accused of In the months after the attack, Is- abetting terrorism (US Department rael kept the siege on Gaza as tight as of Treasury, 2006). After Hamas took ever. Stored foodstuffs were destroyed power in the Gaza Strip and it was during the attack, and many tunnels placed under siege and rules differ- used to smuggle food were destroyed ent than those applying to the West during and after the attack. Food pric- Bank, several Israeli banks declared es in Gaza rose by 28% in 2008 (ac- they would cut ties with the Pales- cording to the International Monetary tinian banks in the Gaza Strip. Later Fund), and kept rising in 2009 even as the chairman of the Central Bank of the available income of Palestinians in Israel forced the banks to resume fi- Gaza declined. With most Gazans liv- nancial contact, in order to reduce the ing below the poverty line, many people likelihood of Hamas issuing a local had to lower their caloric intake, and currency (Veiler-Polack, 2009). the World Food Program announced Israel also prevented the PA insti- that “Gazans face an acute shortage tutions in the West Bank from send- of nutritious, locally-produced and af- ing money to their employees in the fordable food” (Cunningham, 2009d). Gaza Strip, so that even if PA workers still received salaries electronically,* the available cash in the Strip became Currency Strangulation very limited and banks there found it difficult to let their customers with- An important aspect of the Israeli draw money. About 5,000 Palestin- economic siege on the Gaza Strip is ians with disabilities incurred while

* It should be noted that PA workers received salaries only if they agreed to strike and abstain from working for the Hamas government in Gaza (Shaban, 2008). 50 | Economy of the Occupation working for Israeli companies have The importance of oil prices is es- been prevented from receiving their pecially pertinent regarding the global disability stipend since the beginning financial crisis. As the U.S. felt the of 2009 (ibid.). brunt of the crisis, the question of The currency crunch in Gaza U.S. debt has become far more ur- brought a further slowdown of eco- gent. During a crisis, it is more dif- nomic activities. But as Israeli au- ficult for the federal government to thorities were worried that Hamas keep a balanced budget, but also more might issue its own currency for the difficult to finance the immense debt Gaza Strip (thus undermining Israel’s of the U.S. In times of crisis investors financial control over the Palestinian flock to U.S. treasury bills as the tra- economy), they have allowed mea- ditional “secure” investment, and as a sured rationing of cash transfers to result of this tendency, the revenue on the Strip. The money was only PA such bills became negative for the first funds, and never enough to meet the time in history (Kruger, 2009). needs of Gaza’s population. In the Nevertheless, there is a limit on three months following the attack on how much available money investors Gaza, Israel allowed the PA to send have to buy these bonds. The chal- only NIS 225 million out of the NIS lenge for U.S. policymakers is that 680 million still missing to pay for the with the crisis unfolding and liquidity salaries of PA workers since the be- scarce in the global markets, the U.S. ginning of 2009 (Buck, 2009). needs to work harder to find buy- ers for its treasury bills—the bonds which fund the U.S. deficit. Oil Price Rise Among the main purchasers of U.S. treasury bills are the Organiza- Israeli economists estimated that the tion of Petroleum Exporting Coun- operation in Gaza could increase the tries (OPEC) countries (Fouskas international price of oil, like conflicts & Gökay, 2008), which saw a steep in the Middle East often do (The decline in profits as a result of the Marker, 2008). drop in oil prices because of the cri- Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 51 sis. During 2008 and until December if the violence escalates it could even- 24th (just before the attack on Gaza), tually impact oil production in the oil prices fell by an average of -0.28% Middle East. Even after the attack, every day of trade.* During the at- between January 20th and April 28th, tack, oil prices increased by an aver- 2009, oil prices continued to increase age of 1.13% every day, signifying the at a rate of 0.13% for every day of belief of traders and speculators that trade (EIA, 2009).

Oil Price Changes: January —April  7.5% 6/3/2008 8/5/2008 5/2/2009 9/4/2009 24/1/2008 14/2/2008 27/3/2008 17/4/2008 29/5/2008 19/6/2008 10/7/2008 31/7/2008 21/8/2008 11/9/2008 2/10/2008 4/12/2008 15/1/2009 26/2/2009 19/3/2009 23/10/2008 13/11/2008 25/12/2008 5.0%

2.5%

0.0%

-2.5%

3-day moving averages -5.0%

* In order to analyze the impact of the attack on Gaza on oil prices, an index was formulated to measure oil prices, including spot and future contract prices at every day of trading from Janu- ary 2008 to April 2009. Oil prices were averaged for Europe Brent, New York Harbor and the U.S. Gulf Coast. In order to avoid distortions due to diﬀerent prices for each type of oil, the prices of each type of oil were calculated based on the price change from the previous trading day, and these changes in percentage points were averaged out between the diﬀerent types of oil prices, giving equal share to each type of oil or oil contract. 52 | Economy of the Occupation

Its important to note that the rea- not necessarily indicate that the attack son for the change in the direction was fueled by oil interests. Oil prices of oil prices is not only the attack on have often increased as a result of Gaza, but also (and perhaps mainly) conflicts in the Middle East, many of the signs of recovery in the global them including Israel. The economists Shimshon Bichler The Israeli economy benefits from every and Jonathan Nit- truckload of aid to Gaza. zan have shown that fighting in the Mid- dle East has histori- economy from the international eco- cally contributed to the profits of oil nomic crisis. Nevertheless, the days in and weapon companies, and that such which the Israeli attack on Gaza took companies used their lobbies to influ- place created the strongest impact on ence U.S. policies in the region, which oil prices than any other period of could explain the reluctance of the time over the course of the 16 months U.S. to put pressure on Israel to stop covered by this check. the attack (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002; As the graph above demonstrates, Bichler & Nitzan, 2006). the effect of the attack on oil prices was concentrated in the first days of the attack, when uncertainty was Aid to Gaza high. Only after the first week of the attack, when it became clear that the Aid sent to the Gaza Strip is profit- fighting was mostly one-sided and able for the Israeli economy (Roy, that the international community 2009). All aid passes through Israel, was reluctant to intervene, did oil with fees paid for storage and trans- prices began to drop quickly, although port to Israeli companies. Often the they haven’t quite reached their pre- aid goods themselves are bought from attack levels (ibid.). Israeli companies (Hever, 2008). Isra- Though the impact of the attack el also collects a special “handling fee” on global oil prices is clear, this does of US $1,000 from every truck that Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 53 enters the Gaza Strip (HRW, 2009a). sat and spoiled in warehouses, wait- The most important way through ing to be cleared for entry into Gaza which aid is helping Israel, however, is (Cunningham, 2009a). by relieving Israel’s responsibility for Israel also denied that there is a the well-being of the occupied Pales- shortage of basic necessities in Gaza tinian population (Le More, 2008). (Ha’aretz, 2009b). A European Union In an unusual step, Israel placed se- Commission internal paper discussed vere limits on the transfer of humani- EURO 34 million in aid blocked by tarian goods into the Gaza Strip dur- Israeli authorities from entering Gaza ing the attack. The Israeli government since the end of the attack on Gaza realizes that humanitarian aid to the and until April (Buck, 2009). Palestinians is an Israeli interest, which Aid has continued to contribute to bolsters Israeli prestige and the legiti- the Israeli economy, despite the ob- macy of its attacks, as well as serves stacles placed by Israeli authorities. as a source of income for Israeli busi- EU countries (especially Belgium and nessmen. The decision to limit aid to Germany) used the PEGASE mecha- the Palestinians under attack in Gaza nism of transferring funds, enabling signifies that bloodlust and anger, as them to bypass Hamas and directly well as the desire to pander to popular pay the Israeli Dor Alon company to will, overtook practical considerations supply petrol and diesel to the Gaza by Israel’s leadership during this at- Strip. These products are needed to tack. Indeed, Israel allowed only a few generate electricity in the Gaza Strip dozen trucks to enter the Strip every and to ensure the operation of hospi- day, and did not allow goods such as tals and schools. Yet when the Israeli pasta, jam or paper to be delivered, government instructed Dor Alon to arguing that these were not “humani- cut down supplies to Gaza and ra- tarian” goods. U.S. pressure convinced tion the deliveries of petrol and diesel Israel to allow such goods into Gaza, in order to deprive the Gaza Strip of but only weeks after the attack (Ravid electricity, European countries con- & Issacharoff, 2009). Many tons of tinued to work with Dor Alon and to food had to be thrown away after they pay it for the fuels that it did transfer. 54 | Economy of the Occupation

Dor Alon enjoys a complete monop- were the Gulf States with US $1.65 oly over the Gaza market because of billion, followed by the U.S. with US Israel’s control over the passages (Cro- $900 million (only a third of which nin, 2009b). is for the Gaza Strip, with two-thirds A special donors committee was designated for the PA in the West convened on March 2nd in Sharm el- Bank), and the European Union with Sheikh, Egypt, in order to raise funds US $440 million (Reuters, 2009; for restructuring the Gaza Strip. JCPA, 2009). Hamas was not invited to send representatives to the committee, and Egypt denied visas to businessmen Denied Reconstruction from Gaza who were supposed to present to donors the damage caused Donors conditioned their assistance to the Strip (Hass, 2009j). on aid being funneled through the PA, the UN, and the Reconstruction funding remains unused, as World Bank, so Israel denies entry of construction materials. that Hamas would not have any hand in aid distribution. The U.S. pledged US $900 mil- Moreover, no Gaza-based organiza- lion in aid to Gaza under the condi- tion has a say in the distribution of tion that the funding will not reach the funds (Morrow & Al-Omrani, Hamas. The U.S. said that the money 2009). is intended to strengthen Abu Mazen’s Since Israel is still responsible for position. This aid, however, cannot be the population of the Gaza Strip, the used for rebuilding until Israel allows donations are actually a boon for Isra- construction materials (cement, steel, el, relieving it from its accountability etc.) through the passages into Gaza for the damage it inflicted during the (Ha’aretz, 2009b). attack (Hass, 2009i). The complic- Other donors pledged a total of ity of donor organizations with the US $4.48 billion. The biggest donors Israeli occupation has been severely Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 55 criticized by human rights groups and other necessities into the Strip for im- other organizations (Human Rights mediate consumption (Barel, 2009). Organizations, 2009). The refusal of Hamas to give the Furthermore, by excluding Hamas West Bank PA monopoly over the from the discussion, the donors have management of the reconstruction ef- precluded the possibility for the funds forts has created further delay in the to be used for reconstruction and help- recovery (Issacharoff, 2009b). ing Gazans out of the grip of poverty Finally, as Israel has kept the pas- and unemployment. Without Hamas’s sages closed to all construction ma- cooperation, as the group with le- terials, the commitment of the in- gitimacy and popularity among the ternational community to help in general population, funds can only reconstruction remains purely theo- be used for delivering foodstuffs and retical (Blau & Feldman, 2009). 56 | Economy of the Occupation Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 57

8. Eﬀects of the Attack

lthough Israel’s army had attack also failed to harm Hamas’s a clear military advantage popularity in Gaza, as was evident Aagainst Hamas in numbers, in the election for UNRWA’s la- training, and equipment, one can bor union, the biggest employer in hardly say that Israel won the conflict Gaza, which Hamas representatives against Hamas. won (Hass, 2009k). Colonel Ilan Malca said that his One of the most significant ef- soldiers were frustrated that the at- fects of the attack was a global in- tack was stopped without defeating crease of economic action against the Israeli occupation. The global movement to boycott Israel grew The movement to as reports came out describing the violence protest the Israeli and destruction. occupation by economic pressure, known as the “BDS Hamas and without bringing Gilad movement” (BDS stands for boy- Shalit back (Harel, 2009a). cott, divestment and sanctions) By March 1st, 41 days after the has been growing steadily in recent Israeli unilateral ceasefire, 65 rock- years, especially since the 2005 call ets and mortar shells were fired from by Palestinian civil society for BDS Gaza into Israel, proving that the at- as an effective, non-violent means of tack was unable to stop rocket fire pressuring Israel to end the occu- into Israel (Dvir-Shar, 2009). The pation (Badil, 2005). 58 | Economy of the Occupation

During and after the attack on Each one of these types of pressure Gaza, global protests against Israel on Israel has been strengthened fol- reflected a change in world opinion lowing Israel’s attack on Gaza. There toward Israel. Yet the greatest impact are hundreds of campaigns with var- came from the BDS movement, which ied levels of success, but in the inter- has expanded in size and impact, and est of brevity, only one example will be is currently the strongest it has been given here for each type of campaign. to date (Juma’, 2009). The BDS pressure on Israel takes (1) Union Action—Horrified by four primary forms: Israel’s excessive use of violence, the Congress of South African (1) Labor unions which fight ag- Trade Unions (COSATU) called ainst cooperation with Israeli com- on the South African govern- panies. ment to cease relations with Is- rael and close the Israeli embassy (2) Campaigns against internation- in Pretoria (M&G, 2009). The al companies that have factories in South African Transport and Al- the settlement industrial zones, or lied Workers Union (SATAWU) which supply equipment or servic- also refused to handle Israeli es to the Israeli military or to the ships (Juma’, 2009). settlements. (2) The French Veolia company, (3) Consumer boycott of Israeli which is involved in a light-rail goods (some of the campaigns boy- project in Jerusalem that creates cott only those goods produced in transportation infrastructure for the settlements). illegal settlements in the city, has been the target of widespread criti- (4) Academic boycott—refusal to cism and pressure. After years of recognize Israeli academic institu- such pressure, which multiplied in tions, to fund them, and to cooper- the wake of Israel’s attack on Gaza, ate with them. Veolia announced that it would Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 59 abandon the illegal project in Jeru- It is also important to note that salem (Bar-Eli, 2009). during the attack, the Women’s Co- alition for Peace launched a new (3) Consumers in France raided website: www.whoprofits.org. The supermarkets and confiscated Is- website, set up by the WhoProfits raeli products to protest Israel’s project of the Women Coalition for crimes against the Palestinians, Peace, is a database of companies particularly land confiscation and (Israeli and international) that prof- the attack on Gaza (Nir, 2009). it economically from the Israeli occupation. Various BDS campaigns (4) A briefing paper by the Pales- have begun using this website as a tine Society of the School of Ori- source of information and a way to ental African Studies (SOAS) in generate a stronger message and call London, published following the for BDS. attack on Gaza, traced various What is especially striking about links between Tel-Aviv University the growing protest against Israel is and its military research on behalf that it has been received by the Is- of the Israeli military, including re- raeli public and has reached the main- search used in the attack on Gaza. stream Israeli media. The SOAS document was distrib- The protests against Israel’s at- uted amongst academics around tack on Gaza were often classified the world, who might conclude as “anti-Semitic” acts, but the Israeli from it that they should minimize media could not ignore that there or cut their ties with the Israeli does exist a strong connection be- Tel-Aviv University (SOAS Pales- tween protest and the attack on tine Society, 2009). Gaza (Ilani, 2009b). 60 | Economy of the Occupation

9. Conclusion

ecause of the limitations im- and hope that they and their loved posed by the Israeli authori- ones would survive. Bties on coverage and the abil- This report, however, is a compila- ity of Gazans to meet outsiders and tion of other reports, an attempt to get their message across, there is a real piece together the picture of the Israe- danger that the story of the attack on li attack on Gaza. Its main angle is the Gaza will be stifled, and its magnitude Israeli angle, as it attempts to demon- will not be properly understood by strate that the vast majority of Jewish the international community. Israeli society has been aware of the The Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip war crimes and atrocities committed was one of the most important events by the Israeli troops, and nonethe- of the Israeli occupation. The use of less chose to support the attack. The lethal force against a defenseless, help- Israeli public’s support for the attack less civilian population was unprec- is a large warning sign. It tells Israeli edented its intensity since 1967, when politicians that brutality is popular. In Israel occupied the Gaza Strip. this attack the Israeli public demon- Palestinians in Gaza had no re- strated levels of tolerance to violence course to defend themselves. Besieged that have not been seen before since from all sides, they had nowhere to the 1948 Nakba. One has to wonder flee. Unable to surrender and unable whether there is sufficient popular re- to fight back, they could only watch sistance within Israel to prevent the the horror unfolding around them, Israeli authorities from perpetrating Cast Lead: Israel Attacks Gaza | 61 genocide. If the Israeli army killed action to hold Israel accountable for 1,434 Palestinians in Gaza, how do its crimes. The Israeli public did not we know that in the next attack they mobilize against the attack, and the will not kill 14,000 or more? Palestinians were not strong enough to defend themselves. Without international pressure to make The only hope which Israel accountable for its crimes, how can the remains to prevent next attack be prevented? a real genocide from taking place in the Palestinian territo- The leaderships of the U.S., Eu- ries is that the international commu- rope, and many Arab countries were nity will effectively set the limits, and willing to allow Israel to carry out its ensure that Israel will be accountable attack, and they failed to take timely to the world for its actions. 62 | Economy of the Occupation

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The Alternative Information Center (AIC) is an internationally oriented, progressive, joint Palestinian-Israeli activist organization. It is engaged in dissemination of information, political advocacy, grassroots activ- ism and critical analysis of the Palestinian and Israeli societies as well as the Palestin- ian-Israeli conflict. The AIC strives to promote full individ- ual and collective social, economic, political and gender equality, freedom and democracy and a rejection of the philosophy (ideol- ogy and praxis) of separation. The most urgent regional task is to find a just solution to the century-old colonial conflict in Palestine and confront the ongoing Israeli occupation-regime within its international framework. The AIC method of action develops from the awareness that local struggle must be practically and analyti- cally situated within the framework of the global justice struggle. The internal AIC structure and working relationship aims to reflect the above mentioned values. Shir Hever Economy of the Occupation

The Economy of the Occupation, published monthly by the Alternative Information Center (AIC), offers a new approach to the economic situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and Israel. This bulletin will provide accessible and singular analyses of the socioeconomic interests behind the Israeli occupation of Palestine. At the present time, the majorities amongst the otherwise politicized Palestinian and Israeli populations possess a limited understanding of their own socioeconomic situation. Available publications are sporadic, insufficient, often biased and fail to consistently link society, politics and the economy in the OPT and Israel. This disempowering state of affairs makes it all the more critical to offer alternative readings of the economic reality of the occupation. The publication touches on various issues such as inflation, debt, trade, employment, poverty and capital, and demonstrates the influence of these issues on the daily lives of Palestinians and Israelis. The aim is to enhance awareness and to contribute to a more informed struggle for social justice and a just peace for Palestinians and Israelis.

Publications of the AIC are also available at: www.alternativenews.org