THE RUSSIA's INTEREST BEHIND the INVOLVEMENT in GEORGIA – SOUTH OSSETIAN CONFLICT by Esmira Guseinova Submitted to Central E

CEU eTD Collection [Type text] [Type THE RUSSIA’S INTEREST BEHIND THE INVOLVEMENT INGEORGIA–SOUTH THEINVOLVEMENT INTEREST BEHIND THE RUSSIA’S In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Advisor: Professor Szabolcs Pogonyi Nationalism StudiesProgram Central European University Central European OSSETIAN CONFLICT Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Esmira Guseinova Esmira Masters of Arts Submitted to Submitted 2012 By CEU eTD Collection US for the Kosovo independence. Kosovo the for US whereas the recognition conflict, in the of the Republicinvolvement of its South Ossetia explain was only interests a response to the NATO long-term and military and economic geopolitical, Moscow, rather, the breakaway region was means to put pressure on Tbilisi. Russia’s them. secessionist movements and self-determination claims and notgranting the full recognition to South Ossetian region. The Kremlin was balancing between the support for South Ossetian ‘near abroad’. Therefore Russia’s government was highly involved in the conflict settlement in Abstract Creation of independent and sovereign Republic Southof Ossetia was not initial plan for After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia aimed to restore its influence over the i CEU eTD Collection support andmotivation they that were givingme work the during on mymoral thesis paper. their for Agdeeva Nailya and my parents thank to want really I finally, And research. members for theirhelp, and support suggestions thatthey were givingfor improvement of the his patience and all suggestions and advices that he gave me during the process of writing. writingmy thesis paper. Iam sincerely my thankful to supervisor Professor Szabolcs forPogonyi Acknowledgements In addition, Iwould like to thank all the Nationalism Studies Department Faculty Iwouldlike toexpress my toallgratitude whothose helped me through processthe of ii CEU eTD Collection Russia’s Reaction to independence claim to independence Reaction Russia’s for independence claims Ossetian of South Origins Russia’s interests behind involvement in South Ossetian conflict Relations Ossetian South – Russian Dual citizenship in South Ossetia Russian - Georgian Relations Historical Background Theoretical framework Introduction Contents Bibliography Appendix Conclusion Autonomy Self-Determination Secession De facto States Recognition Statehood Russian citizenship: help or motive? Kosovo setsa precedent Case of Kosovo ...... 72 ...... 13 ...... 69 ...... 22 ...... 6 ...... 1 ...... 74 ...... 8 ...... 11 ...... 57 ...... 18 ...... 25 ...... 5 ...... 61 ...... 30 ...... 33 ...... 39 ...... 35 ...... 57 iii ...... 52 ...... 42 CEU eTD Collection precedent showed to secessionist regions that independence is attainable if managetoput is independence attainable they that secessionistregions to showed precedent The like Russia. states multiethnic for especially worldwide, regions in secessionist situation of Kosovo by arguing that itwill set aprecedent, which had a destabilizepotential to the recognition tothe objected fiercely Federation Russian the year earlier a just half Nevertheless, Abkhazia. and Ossetia South ofGeorgia: breakaway territories two of independence orevenversus confrontation. conflict, ‘West’ Russia a Georgia-Russian iswider shifted towards focus the butrather Ossetia, South Georgia and between asaconflict longer no depicted is The “Ossetian problem” much widerconflict. of component one is only it rather Ossetia, South and Georgia nexus: dyadic through explained pursuing their interests in the conflict and in the conflict settlement. The Five Day War cannot be led to the war, during started that the breakup of Many Sovietthe Union. couldreasons andfactors be listedthat various parties (States,happened. international withwholosses large whyit blameindependent andto uncertainties state civilian about or organizations of war andhumandespair. South five day endedwith Ossetia becoming The war a attackingtroops Ossetia capital the brokeof out on South news,the showing terrifying episodes and politicalGeorgian about reports games,the of with Olympic beginning the stops conflictwheremilitary elites)tradition, ancient the Despite people. for Ossetian big the butas tragedy a Games inChina, were Introduction Right afterwards the war, Dmitry Medvedev signed decrees recognizing the recognizing decrees signed Medvedev Dmitry war, the afterwards Right crisis protracted partof an unsettled of outbreak latest violence, is The warof the 2008 –for many08.08.08 day ispeoplewith that not associated beginningthe Olympicthe of 1 de facto CEU eTD Collection ethnic ethnic and conflict wasitself point. a focus region, whereas,Kosovo, through its support by the US and NATO, is perceived as a case of neighboring inthe interests government Russia’s and relations Georgian – Russian towards independence for and claims is of self-determination right on focus not the primary wherethe perspective, a wider from be perceived should Abkhazia and Ossetia South of recognition Russia’s andKosovo to independence Granting by Russian government. the reaction controversial Ossetia. South Georgia is respected by US, EUmember states, yet it rejected independence to the Republic of sovereign republic in the expense of Serbia’s territorial integrity, whereas the territorial unity of and jurisdiction of the state). Nevertheless, today, Kosovo is recognized by many states as a preserved by means any (internal isaffair the exclusionary field andsubject tothesovereignty has integrity of state tobe the territorial norms by such international because outcomes, resisted andGeorgia strongly was done itSerbia unliterary, rather in was of Czechoslovakia) case stability and occurred at the expense of territorial unity. Itwas not a mutually agreed act (as it is because independence seen as more attainable onceis a set. precedent autonomy, substantial for example solutions, settlement conflict any accept less likely to be would elites secessionist regions, insuch resolution conflict of process the could worsen Kosovo pro-Western/US vision.of Additionally, governmentand recognition pressure adopt the on There are many parallels to be traced between the two cases; however the results are a Recognition of Kosovo and South Ossetia was seen as a move to undermine political per se . In the case of war in South Ossetia the center of attention is shifted 2 CEU eTD Collection interests. Union as a mean to putpressure on Georgia pursuingits geopolitical, economic and military assist ethnic mobilization and claims forindependence from the time of dissolution of the Soviet independence. Or was it rather the Russian government’s well-planned and long-term strategy: to Russia’sKosovo toreact became a‘suitable’on casefor later and government grounds ethnic for independence originated in the atmosphere of Georgian oppression and discrimination on later to grant recognition to South Ossetia. Hence, the problem is whether South Ossetian claims becomes a ‘good’ reason for Russia to intervene (on the basis to protect Russian citizens) and member such state, behavior sparkedRussianaggression ledand to war.Thethe War of 2008 Western orientation,looked to the EU as an ally and declared it wanted to become a NATO views. Western hoped tomaintain over Georgiapower in caseGeorgianthe governmentdecided adoptpro- to independence. Russian The wassitting government fencethe on in conflictregards tothe as they sphere ofinfluence) and supportSouth Ossetian in their claimsfor self-determination and even between equilibrium principle the to keepitcompliance of integrity withinterritorial (to its Georgia within Russia’s sphere of influence. Therefore, the Russian government had to find Moscow did not recognize the Republic of South Ossetia, because it wasimportant to have officially However, self-determination. for claims their supported it region; Ossetian South dissolution of USSR, the Russian government was highly involved in the conflict settlementin the From ‘answer’. the for Ossetia South used government Russian the independence, received After the Rose Revolution and Presidency of Saakashvilli, Georgia adopted a pro- The Russian – Georgian nexus must be analyzed in order to see why after Kosovo 3 CEU eTD Collection within Russian within Russian sphere of influence. secessionist region. South Ossetia became ameans to exert pressure on Georgia and keep it forkeep to between tension andits important Russian the strategically Georgia government with strong Russian support didnotaccept any peace plans was only USand tothe response forindependence.the Kosovo NATO guided for stirring upthe tensions on Georgian breakaway while territories; itselfrecognition economic calculation, consideration in bordering region, by which Russia’s government was determination, but rather as an outcome of particular circumstances: Russian geopolitical and self- internal of right the denied and violations rights human oppression, systematic to exposed been have Ossetian that concerns of out not done was Federation Russian by the Ossetia South of how Kosovo affairinfluenced on this balancing politics. This thesis claims that the recognition movement in South Ossetia without full recognition of the region as an independent country, and elaborate Russia’son interests government in borderingthe for theseparatist support regions; thebreakupafter of Union Sovietthe and uptothe2008War.In my Iam work going to After the Rose Revolution and Saakashvilli’s pro-Western orientation, South Ossetia The focus of my work is on Russian – Georgian and Russian - South Ossetian relations 4 or negotiations sinceitwas negotiations or CEU eTD Collection one goal goal independence,one –independenceresults buthave– and reached different another State – Republic of South Ossetia. The leaders of these two regions have been pursuing State – Republic of Kosovo, half a year later several states has acknowledged the existence of borders. demarked newly of ‘victims’ a became who people for terminology) organizations, nationalizing and states external national homelands (using Brubaker’sRogers international stability, security and focal for international became a regions point secessionist South Ossetia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Tatrstan, etc. made claims forindependence. Those multiethnic make-up on their territories, and as a result anumber of entities, such as Abkhazia, disputes andeven of genocides ethnic groups. These could states peacefully not maintain the territorial violence, a placestates became ethnic of emerged successor newly some Unfortunately century many new states emerged, especially with the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia. stability, when the political map remained almost unchanged. However, by the end of twentieth later in work. analyzed the analysis of Russian –Georgian and Russian South Ossetian relations will be discussed and the chapter, in this be discussed not will conflict Georgian – Ossetian South in the involvement the behind calculations and abroad’ ‘near in the Federation Russian the of Interests entities. for the andsecession of statehood features normative andpresent analyze based on the right of self-determination. Therefore, this theoretical framework is aiming to secession through independence creation and of state upon normative aspects looked the elite Theoretical framework The end decolonizationthe of andperiod upto 1990sisthe viewed as a time of territorial Ossetian South independence. was leadership Ossetian South the for goal ultimate The As wasmentioned beginningthe earlier, of by 2008 wasmarked of emergence the a new 5 de facto de facto independent CEU eTD Collection peacekeeping forces and establishment of forces negotiation and mechanism:Control peacekeeping of quadripartite Joint establishment between Georgia and Russia which led “todeployment of joint Russian, Georgian and Ossetian Resolution 1244. Council United Security Nations with in accordance administration civilian temporary established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) - the force establishing for responsible asecure inKosovo. environment international peacekeeping was Force which (KFOR), a NATO-led Kosovo of The protectorate form of intervention intodomestic affairs of a state. Indeed, since 1999 Kosovo was under state or re-build post-conflict state newcreate in to attempt organization) international (state, byexternal actors an taken activity building exist:exogenous and processes. endogenous First, thestate-building is process seen as Menocal defined itas a construction of a functioningTwo state. main todefine approaches state- http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1244(1999).pdf. 4 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm. 3 2002). Peace, International for Endowment Carnegie for Brief 2 1 of concept used by wasfirststate-building Tilly Charles the establishment of a new state, it is worthwhile to refer to literature on state-building. The Statehood creation. andstate claims of self-determination discussion in the purposes compare/contrast for casesareuseful two those therefore independence, “Resolution1244(1999),” United Nations, Security Council, accessed December22, 2011, 2011, 22, December accessed Organization, Treaty Atlantic North Kosovo,” in role “NATO’s Charles Tilly, ed., Ottaway, M. and Lieven, A., “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality” (policy As the ultimate goal for Kosovo and South Ossetia’s political leaders and elite has been The Formation of theNational States in Western Europe 4 In the case of South Ossetia, in June 1992 a cease-fire agreement was signed in agreement 1992acease-fire June In Ossetia, caseof the South 2 , ‘exogenous’ instate-building process general involves some 6 1 , Verena Fritz and Fritz AlinaRocha , Verena (Princeton: University Press, 1975). 3 At the same time UN had CEU eTD Collection settlement. forwasa in Security of (OSCE) facilitator Organization the conflictEurope and Cooperation and Pakistani lessons from theKargil crisis 8 7 6 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=42. 5 ethnic ingredient does not change the basic fact that all such collective actions simply amount to organization; ethnicity is viewed as one of the main components for mobilization. “But the and requireguidance political movements These somecatalytic elements. requiring second conflict is probable only if there is some potential transformation from the first phase to the and needs expectations functions,government Functions andExpected -thewillingness respond to publicto Political Settlement or elite consolidation, Survival functions -the prioritization of core building. Alan Whaites has developed a model of state-building, which involves three areas: Commission with Georgian, South and North Ossetian and Russian participation.” phases: group definition,phases: group mobilization, group andstrategic bargaining” option available.“The leading process toethnic tensions andis conflict dividedinto three bestavoid by the how them to andchoosing calculate conflicts ethnic topreventmodel how also stressed the significance of political mobilization and elite consolidation. They provide a al. et Tellis mobilize to society. elites presence importance of strong the emphasize Governance’ importance. Chesterman et al.in ‘Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Tellis, Ashley J., C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo. Medby, AlanWhaites, “States in Development: Understanding State-Building” (DFID Working Paper, 2008). JimNichol, “Russia-Georgia conflict inAugust 2008:Context and Implications of US Interests,” (2009), 2. 2011, 22, December accessed Georgia,” history: “Conflict The involves‘Endogenous’ approach a state-society toimplementrelationship state- Elite engagement and elite manipulation in state-building processes has significant has processes in state-building manipulation elite and engagement Elite 6 7 . (Santa Monica, Calif.:Rand, 2001), 11. 7 Limited conflicts under thenuclear umbrella: Indian 8 . Authors state that the 5 Additionally, CEU eTD Collection 12 http://uasdan.com/gazet/995-adamon-nyhas-mify-i-pravda.html. an instrument for the validation of claims to statehood on the part of new entities by existing DugardandDavid toJohn According serves as receive Raic,recognition recognition. widespread 11 10 and Pakistani lessons from theKargil crisis 9 mobilization for political factor as a critical increase power it” or capture to designed mobilization of forms political with Georgians, which later led tobloodshed. organization was aslaterambiguous ‘Adamon Nihas’ was accused of aggravation of relationship seats. of majority won Nihas’ statements of ‘Adamon Nihas’ members, in elections to Supreme Council,members of ‘Adamon independence on September 20,1990wasarranged under strong the pressureand persuasive fascist tendencies in Georgia, the organization fascist in organization tendencies the acquiredfeatures. Georgia, political of with escalation the However, forced assimilation. to and language resistance Ossetian the organization, whichaimedcultural at and spiritual revival a nationof through preservationthe of establisheditdid pursue not any political of goalsseparatism, or itwas purely a cultural pushing ruling asidethe party. Soviet Even duringthough time the the organization was Established at end the of 1980’s, this organization periodwithin short of time became dominant, organization. Nihas’ ‘Adamon ofUSSRwasthe the dissolution time of the at independence Recognition Tellis, Ashley J., C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo. Medby, Ibid. “ Ibid. Ⱥɞɚɦɨɧɇɵɯɚɫ In order to become an equal member in the international community, a new entity to has anew becomein entity community, In order to member anequal international the The catalytic element for mobilization of Ossetian people and declaration of . Ɇɢɮɵɢɉɪɚɜɞɚ 12 Nevertheless, the attitude among Ossetians towards the towards among Ossetians attitude the Nevertheless, ,” uasdan.com, accessed March 10, 2012, (Santa Monica, Calif.:Rand, 2001), 12. 10 . 8 Limited conflicts under thenuclear umbrella: Indian 9 and leadershipis seen 11 Proclamation of CEU eTD Collection 18 of recognition itself that creates statehood and international personality. In other words, a state the constitutive and the declaratory.According to the constitutive school of thought, “itis the act competing Regardingrecognition. Unilateral be theories two recognition, should examined here: non- andcollective recognition, collective and unilateral exist: of recognition Several types recognition. international toreceive has entity nations, the community of into the to beadmitted 17 16 press, 1985). 15 14 94. 13 nations of community of the member States criterion, but rather is now is rather but criterion, “Legality of origin and conformity with internationalaccepted norms isnotan additional human rights and self-determination. In addition, Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce regarding standards the fulfill to has entity the 1933, Convention in Montevideo described States other with into relations enter to a capacity government that is in effective control of its territory and independent of any other authority, and Convention on Rights and Duties of States, are a permanent population, adefined territory, a criteria have be to met; statehood for whichistraditional incriteria described 1933 Montevideo with the rules of international law” with rules the international of origin.“This requires that in achieving the traditional criteria, the entity must doso in conformity has to bemet– legality forthe statehood of fifth state criterion reveals, practice international Ibid, 127. ScottPegg, Ibid, 589. Bruce, Lante Nii Ibid, 96. Kohen, G. Marcelo For the new entity to succeed in a claim for statehood, besides the criteria for statehood criteria in besidesthe succeed new fora claim For the entity to statehood, Nevertheless, despite an entity’s potential to meet the requirements for statehood, in order International Society and the De Facto State Africa and international law - the emergence tostatehood Secession: international law perspectives the only 16 criterion for statehood” . However, Scott Pegg 13 . However, for astate to be recognized, several 9 14 (England: Ashgate Publishing, 1998). . (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006), 17 18 makes a counterstatement, claiming . (Cambridge: Cambridge university 15 assumes that, as CEU eTD Collection http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/. 22 100. 21 20 19 does notexistdoes is it until recognizedas such by states” other Internal and external with conducted policies Russia’s ‘approval’ and concurrence. region has notperformed in their capacity to enter intorelations with other states, except Russia. underdeveloped andhighlyfirst dependent, from Tbilisi and from then Secondly,Moscow. this Montevideo Convention 1933, South Ossetia, unlike Kosovo, has been economically beenhas not for toany in Statehood described admitted criteria Regarding organizations. of and only recognized being sporadically Ossetia Republic of whereasthe South member state, UN recognized by 85 countries by State means of non-recognition” collective mayit of block acceptance the a Conversely, of recognition. by collective process community the international the to States new of admission in the role important an plays Nations United when new is State grantedmembership to internationalthe organizations (United Nations). “The recognition - when States exercise their rights for recognition collectively (European Union), or uncertain’ been hitherto has that something fact ‘asa (declares) simply by States acknowledges and recognition other that of statehood on the other hand, maintains that an entity becomes a State on meeting the factual requirements “Who Recognizes Kosova as an independent state,” accessed November 21, 20011, 21, November accessed state,” anindependent as Kosova Recognizes “Who Kohen, G. Marcelo J. L. Brierly, ScottPegg, When Kosovo declaredWhen Kosovo its independence for time, second the unlike one,itfirst was collective by done also be could community international tothe States new of Admission International Society and the De Facto State The law nationsof Secession: international law perspectives 22 , meaning that the Republic of Kosovo sooner or later can become a (6thed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 139. 20 . 21 10 . (England: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), 129. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006), 19 . The declaratory school of thought, CEU eTD Collection 26 25 24 are able to, have a right to and whether it is in compliance with international havelaw toachieve international itare ableto, arightto andwhetheris in with compliance 23 itin recognition. unable toreceive widespread as international arena, the illegitimate remains time of period a significant for maintained is control effective which over provideleadership toagiven in governmental that services population territorial area, a defined state is anentity features long-term,which and effective, popularly-supported organized political Nevertheless, matter how noiseffective it illegitimate states is that the first one is legitimate no matter how ineffective itis, whereas the later one is coin of flip quasi-state the the side statehood” international recognition and view themselves as meetingcapable of the obligations of sovereign The movement. anti-colonial the during independence for right the state), continue to enjoy rights and privileges as any other state, just because they were granted capabilities which withare associated – (failedsovereign statehood quasi-states puppet state, lack states recognized of number thefact Despite that states. ofsovereign club to the new States map should be frozen and remain as itis, by this they are reluctant to grant recognition and admit States De facto states; however the concept of concept the however states; Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. ScottPegg, The question isThe question that raised in on literature available South OssetiaSouth andKosovo(until beenconsidered2008) have as However, today,international organizations and States hold the opinion that the political 26 International Society and the De Facto State . Nonetheless, despite, the ability of the ‘state’s’ capability functionto effectively,it de facto states correspond to the interests of this thesis work. Thus, the Thus, work. thesis of this interests tothe correspond states de facto 23 . In Pegg’s words the difference between quasi- and state has received only slight attention in academic world. 24 . 11 (England: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), 4. de facto de facto states is whether such states de facto 25 . They seek state can be seen as independent de facto de facto CEU eTD Collection 29 August 2006), 11. 28 press, 1985), 590. 27 territory concerned territory anditsgroup territory…”. national link the a between policy of USSRcreated the “The nationalities Wheatley to According times. in Soviet held were which policies nationalities the of legacies are which people, for belonging to land.this language Territory, and traditions are themain aspects of identification identifying are Ossetians South Ossetia, South and North between border by divided are group, ethnic themselves ifis tobe itas a territory regarded state” only with the territoryConvention. inMontevideo is stated which ofstatehood, for criteria South traditional of Ossetiaindependence. In hisScott book Pegg,compares a and have a strong sense of criterion – state’s ability to enter intodiplomatic relations with other states, and here the problem itis a whichquasi-state is dependentupon Russia inall aspects. is not developing economically, even though South Ossetia is support, the government cannotprovide its people employment, social security,medical care and South Ossetia has an ineffective government that is not able to exist without Russian’s economic states have ineffective government and are notable to sustain and develop. As time has showed Somali, are recognized and admitted to the world community of sovereign nations, however such states, it can be concluded that many states – quasi-states, puppet states and failed states, such as ScottPegg, report, (conference Georgia” in state the and Minorities “National Nilsson, Niklas and Popjanevski Johanna Bruce, Lante Nii The second criterion – defined territory Thesecond is criterion – – defined the for territory there size nominimum requirements regardingFirst, population,“there mustbe people identifying themselves with the International Society and the De Facto State Africa and international law - the emergence tostatehood 29 . In regard to effective government, comparing . Inregardtoeffective government, 28 27 – even though Ossetian people, belonging to one to belonging people, Ossetian though even – 12 (England: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), 46. de facto state with a sovereign state in terms de facto This theforth brings usto (Cambridge: Cambridge university de facto independent in its essence its in independent state andsovereign state CEU eTD Collection preserving the existing territorial preserving theexistingmap” territorial because there is a strong global consensus against secessionist self-determination and in favor of fail herelacksbecause it orcannotit popular support providefails governance.Rather, effective 30 secessionist movements worldwide. Nevertheless, some entities do have a qualified right for supported territorial integrity of beingGeorgia, it afraid will that destabilize and escalate South Ossetia, European Union as well as OSCE condemned these actions, other states states will never attain widespread recognition as sovereign states. The states. as sovereign recognition willneverwidespread attain states mostis that probability “thestates: overwhelming asPegg However, part. as constituent inevitably comes down to the issue of secession from the state for which this territory is regarded international society does in this case, is merely ignoring the existence of the cannotenter diplomatic relations with other states, even though it has a potential for it. What asthe comes, Secession interestremained only locally. Ossetian claims for worldwide recognition and been pursuing their own interests in this conflict (Georgia, Russia, OSCE). Otherwise, South other states, besides the parties that were directly involved in the conflict settlement and have existenceof the before that, as Georgians, worldwide of 2008 attracted sufferings attention the civilian aswell to the Ossetians population: until the point when this entity pose a threat to international stability and security. The War in ScottPegg, As independence is a final for a reaching point International Society and the De Facto State de facto state is characterized by non-recognition in the international it in is state arena, international bynon-recognition the characterized 30 . When Russia unilaterally recognized the Republic of de facto de facto 13 (England: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), 223. independent South independentOssetia South wasignored by de facto existence of would state the have and quasi states, it means that it de facto de facto state does not does state state, up de facto CEU eTD Collection 34 Ossetians. South of position the affected negatively moto“Georgiathe Georgians”, for duringhis Georgian nationalism hasterm which escalated, homogeneouscreate continued state, he in such Union,policy advocated to order Gamsakhurdia Facism. Ideology .” In 33 http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/georgia/HISTORY.html. 32 134. 31 of growth). rates wasleading in and political SSR economic (Georgian Soviet period Georgia SSRhad been in‘special’ position under Moscow the patronage rule South Ossetia turned intointernal colony of Georgian Republic. autonomy autonomy and nationalism Georgian stayed significant. factGeorgians that were alsooppressed under Stalin'smaintainedit regime, substantial cultural power: Stalin and his chief of secret police – Lavrenti Beria, both were Georgians. Despite this in officials top two the implemented was program the when time the At party. Communist Georgian withauthorities supportof the duetofavoritism Moscow, Georgianthe towards program aimed toeliminate minority “Georgianization”groups. wasvigorously forwarded by Soviet times, especially in late 1930s when a “Georgianization” program was launched. The and andona day-to-day economically againstoppressed discriminated socially, basis since settlement of the dispute within the parent state” the peaceful for remedies no andeffective reasonable are andthere human rights, of suppression State, are denied the right of internal self-determination or subjected to serious and systematic people forming a numerical minority in a State, but a majority within a particular part of the secession. “A qualified right for secession comes into being, it has been suggested, when a Ibid. Mark Bliev, “Soviet-Georgian Totalitarian Regime and South Ossetia,” “From National-Chauvinism to Provintial “Georgia-History,”accessed November23, 2011 Kohen, G. Marcelo Secession: international law perspectives South Ossetia in Russia-Georgian 14 31 ɋ ollisions . Ossetians claim that they have been have they that claim . Ossetians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006), 32 Mark Bliev claims that during Stalin during that claims Bliev Mark (Moscow: publisher“Europe”, 2006). 33 According to him, in him, to According 34 After the breakup of the CEU eTD Collection “international norms do not address address the not norms do “international element has to be added – besidesstate, thetraditional triad (population,andindependent territory government), the forth of existence continuous of the importance the highlight Pegg well as Scott Tancredi as law, minorities are international of newbirth States. 38 37 172. 36 http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/25/1245.html. 20012, 35 secession, but simply acknowledges the result of the Saakashvili substantial rejected in autonomy offered that 2005. Nevertheless, at the same time Ossetians did notaccept any peace plans or negotiations and power. came to strengthenedSaakashvili when Ibid,182. Ibid. Kohen, G. Marcelo Ivan Kotlyarov, “The logic of South Ossetia Conflict,” Russia in Global Affairs, (2008), accessed February 12, International norms do not prohibit or authorize secession, they simple ‘guide’ it, In the In There has been an assumption that international law neither prohibits nor authorizes nor prohibits neither law international that anassumption been has There The preservation of sovereignty and opposition to Ossetian separatism also was separatism Ossetian to and opposition sovereignty of preservation The Saakashvili craved the restoration of Georgian sovereignty over the former autonomous of Georgian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. its territory state safeguarding pain naturally Georgians feltlackand the acute the about republics that had drifted away in the early 1990s. Every nation has a natural concern for de facto Secession: international law perspectives created entities what has to be questioned is their unlawful origins.Antonello 36 Despite the fact that the principle of territorial integrity is a priority in is a priority integrity of territorial fact principle the that the Despite lawfulness not prohibited of the process of State creation. substance from seceding under international from international law. seceding under 15 of the processes, but rather their de facto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006), processes may leadwhich to the 35 38 37 de facto CEU eTD Collection in certain situations, for a right to independence. In contrast, In independence. aright to for in certain situations, Press, 2003), 56. 43 (50-77.New York: University Press, 2003.) 42 AsserPress, 2003), 79. 41 40 189. 39 to secede; itsimply fixes boundariesthe which newthe entity will eventually inherit” not ensure representation of all peoples discrimination without in its government notdoes observe the principle of andequal rights self-determination of peoples and which does given people is annexed after 1945, 4) and if a given people live in the territory of a State which the territories to be de-colonized, 2) it is laid in constitution, 3) if the territory populated by a in on when1)people only case the self-determination rightof the to aslegal element accepted can be Secession apply allowand secession. of right self-determination debateswherethe the procedure ethnic conflicts, nor does it reduce violence or minority oppression self-determination.According toDonald L. Horwitz, secession is almost never an answer to Hurst Hannum, on the contrary, provides four principle arguments in favor of the right to secede: ethnic antagonists between further warfare prevent not does partition affirm that studies and quantitative conflicts, secession should notbe viewed as generally desirable solution to the problems of ethnic Stephen Macedo and Allen E. Buchanan, Allen and Macedo Stephen Julie Dahlitz, Ibid, 193. Kohen, G. Marcelo Donald L. Horwitz, “A right to Secede?,” in Authors like Rosalyn Higgins, Stanislav V. Chernichenko and Vladimir S. Kotliar focus on The secederight held to by isethnic groups derived from reinterpretation of principlethe of ” 39 Therefore, “self-determination pertains to the pertains “self-determination Therefore, Secession and international law: conflict avoidance - regional appraisals 43 Secession: international law perspectives . Secession and self-determination Secession and Self-Determination 16 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006), substance uti possidetis (New York: New York University 42 , Stephen Macedo, Allen Buchanan Allen Macedo, Stephen , . Therefore, partition or of State creation,of State providing, does not give any title (The Hague: T.M.C. 41 . 40 . CEU eTD Collection 46 45 2000), 237. Press, 2003), 69. 47 44 beginning of 1990s. in the entities those of status independent for voted majority where referendum, popular asimportant, Kosovo and South Ossetia had unilaterally its independencedeclared through merely on a majority vote of the population of a given subdivision or territory” Ibid. Ibid, 241. Stephen Macedo and Allen E. Buchanan, Allen and Macedo Stephen Robert McCorquodale, 1) 3) 2) It is an important note that there is “no recognition of a unilateral right to secede based to right of isa unilateral recognition “no there that note isIt important an concentration, and be of sufficient size to be an independent political community)” political independent be an to size sufficient be of and concentration, group should posses an awareness of itself as a distinct group, have a certain territorial only to rejection of any particular state, butalso to rejection of the state itself. (Note: the Liberal democratic theory – “the right towithdrawal and this right can be extended not disputed territory disputed territory has been settled bymembers of thegroup” dominant which the group has kept its self-determination claim alive, and the extent towhich the immediacy and nature of the historical grievance of the secessionistgroup, the extent to Brilmayer proposes a “territorially based test incorporating the following criteria: the of individual human suffering” minimization a with coupled harmony international of maximization “a Buchheit: system. oppressive (Human rights and humanitarian concerns – as a right for self-defense, secession from Self-determination in international law 45 Secession and self-determination . 17 (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate/Dartmouth, (New York: New York University 46 47 . . This note is 44 . CEU eTD Collection 2000), 205. 51 50 49 1995), 12. 48 emphasis was on the right toexternal self-determination,it was insisted that peoples have a right were minorities ethnic, or religious orcultural groups State’s borders, colonial people were deemed not tohave a right to self-determination; neither changes in it was tobe tothis applied only principle: to internal limitations were there however Self-Determination who insisted that this right be a general criterion for the liberation of peoples For Lenin it was a means of realizing the dream of worldwide socialism, he was the first one Points. Fourteen in Wilson’s crystallized became principle this period, post-war in the principle as aguiding of self-determination Wilson becameapublic advocate Woodrow President important role in the development of the international community. After the First World War, US be attained and put into practice at the end of endof conflict. practicethe at the into put and be attained protection of national minorities collapsed. for League system the however, of theself-determination, principle indirectly addressed Nations regime created in regime created 1945” initially was notdetermination as recognizedfundamental under Uniteda right the Nations inconsistentmannerin which itwas applied following the First WorldWar, the principle of self- Robert McCorquodale, Ibid, 37. Ibid, 13. Antonio Cassese, Antonio Since 1945 the focus of the principle of self-determination has been on decolonization. The The origins of the self-determination principle can be traced back to the French Revolution, Since the birth of self-determination concept, it has spread all over the world and played an During the Second World War, self-determination was proclaimed as one of the objectives to Self-determination of peoples: alegal reappraisal Self-determination in international law 51 . 18 48 (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate/Dartmouth, . 50 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, However, “in part because of the 49 . TheLeagueof CEU eTD Collection Press, 1996) 19. 55 54 WestCo., Pub. 1996),590. 53 1995), 45. 52 independence of time the at held they that borders administrative colonial the of of principle newthe of states theterritory legal over debates of government and to participate in the political process that governs it” governs that process political in the participate to and government status – and an ‘internal’ aspect –the right of the population to choose its own system of international its – determine rightthe of apeople to an aspect both has ‘external’ determination land over control about seeking self-determination though political independence and it statehood, was an rather issue eraraised.colonial post- in the valid legally be still should self-determination iswhether question the completed, freely to choose their international status protect the status quo that emerged after the two world wars, especially with regard to the small regardtothe world with especially quothat emerged wars, two the thestatus after protect eruptmovements stability secessionist international borders. of right of self-determination of peoples, this State has a right toprotect its territorial integrity when comply with international norms and equal grants rights toits fellow citizens and respectthe Ruth Lapidoth, Ibid. David L. Ratner and Thomas LeeHazen, Thomas and Ratner L. David Antonio Cassese, Antonio uti possidetis The right to self-determination does not always imply or lead to secession, because “self- The 1990s was aperiod of break upsandsecessions, itdid not solely concern ethnic groups The territorial integrity is a top priority in international law; this principle was intended to intended was principle this law; ininternational priority isatop integrity territorial The Autonomy: flexible solutions to ethnic conflicts provides that states emerging providesfrom thatstates decolonization inheritshall presumptively Self-determination of peoples: alegal reappraisal 53 . With the emergence of new states and claims for statehood, at the core Securities regulation: cases and materials 52 . Nevertheless, with decolonization virtually 19 , (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, uti possidetis 55 . Therefore, when a State , 5th ed., (St. Paul, Minn.: was laid. Principle laid. was 54 . CEU eTD Collection AsserPress, 2003), 102. 60 10, 2012. February accessed Nations,” United of the Charter the with Accordance in States among Co-operation and Relations 59 58 57 AsserPress, 2003), 111. 56 among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations andCo-operation Relations Friendly Law Concerning of International Principles on Declaration peoples” force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, and self-determination of “non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States, prohibition of the threat to use States to protect violation of human rights of their citizens. rights. On these bases Russian troops launched a counterattack on the territory of South Ossetia human of violations casesof the gross rule tothe represents exception the itthat states where external relations of any other State creed orcolor race, as distinction without to of andif territory peoples wholea Staterepresents the the belonging people thegovernment to when this government complies with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of determination. are: the duty to protect human rights and the duty to recognize the principle of self- Julie Dahlitz, Audiovisual Library of International Law, “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Ibid, 100. Ibid, 112. Julie Dahlitz, Third State does not have a right to intervene, directly or indirectly,into domestic affairs or Besides exceptional cases, aState has a right touse force to protect its territorial integrity 56 . This principle is closely interrelated with other principles of international law, such as 57 . However, there are also limits on this principle, ones that important for these works Secession and international law: conflict avoidance - regional appraisals Secession and international law: conflict avoidance - regional appraisals 60 , however the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, 58 as stated in the UN General Assembly 1970 20 59 . (The Hague: T.M.C. (The Hague: T.M.C. CEU eTD Collection AsserPress, 2003), 102. 61 ɋ Ossetia. South of mere existence giving the full recognition of statehood before 2008. Russia was the only state that supported the the Soviet Union and was one of the main actors who kept up independence claims without of dissolution the since process settlement conflict in the involved been has Federation Russian according to Scott Pegg, is more facilitative, than determinative. As was referenced earlier, the intodomestic affairs of other states and support secession, the role of external assistance, mentions thegenocide of Ossetian people asameans create ethnocraticto in state 1917-1920 also as He logic did Georgia. same tothe was Ossetia acting according andUSSR South was one of the first Republics that exited the Union thereby violating territorial integrity of fellow citizens and did not respect the right of internal self-determination of Ossetians. Georgia fact that Georgia did not comply with international norms and did not grant equal rights to its which were created by the principle of national autonomies. His claims are mainly based on the the dissolution of the USSR de-facto gave the right for self-determination to all political entities, protection andhumanitarian aid, butnottosupport secession integrity of a State, 2) act neutrally to prevent internal conflict through cease-fire, 3) or provide Julie Dahlitz, ollisions”, claims that South Ossetia has the right for self-determination based on the fact that Famous Ossetian historian Mark Bliev, in his book “South Ossetia in Russia-Georgian Even though international organizations and third States do not possess a right tointervene Regarding the role of international organizations – 1) they can act in support of territorial Secession and international law: conflict avoidance - regional appraisals 21 61 . (The Hague: T.M.C. CEU eTD Collection McCorquodale, (England, 2000) 195-267. 65 Press, 1996), 23. 64 Autonomy Reconsidered,” 63 (Moscow: publisher“Europe”, 2006). a means of responding successfully to concerns about minority rights, particularly when genocides. South Ossetia could have led to different outcomes, probably with fewer victims, but without Granting substantial autonomy,instead of abolishingin it beginningthe of 1990s for Kosovo and 62 antagonism conflictthe strong hasby mistrust generated and severe granting autonomy” the should “It beself-determination can determination. often be remembered before that achieved it resolution. of conflict isonly for recipe thesuccess, part one is it astraightforward not However, he is aware of all the shortcomings of an autonomy concept and therefore notifies that regions. infor minority rights human and respect the conflicting hand, other the guarantees hand the survival enables according existingthe of states tothe Autonomy aggression. Georgian resist to way only the as state independent of creation and determination and 1989-1992 as another circumstance, which proves that South Ossetia has a right for self- Ruth Lapidoth, Mark Bliev, “South Ossetian Right for Self-Determination,” in Hurst Hannum, “Rethinking Self-Determination,” in Hans-Joachim Heintze, “Implementation of Minority Rights through the Devolution of Powers – The Concept of Hans-Joachim Hans-Joachim Heintze Hurst Hannum Hurst Ruth Lapidoth also highlights that autonomy can be considered as a valid means of self- Autonomy: flexible solutions to ethnic conflicts 65 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights views autonomy as a way preventto ethnic conflicts, “autonomy may be 63 offers to look at territorial autonomy as a solution that on the one 22 Self-Determination Internationalin Law , (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace South Ossetia in Russia-Georgian uti possidetis 9 (2002):325-343. principle, and on ɋ ollisions , Robert 64 , . 62 CEU eTD Collection 67 McCorquodale, (England, 2000) 195-267. 66 independence” is sincetheir goal by as defeat, a definition of arrangements an autonomy “see acceptance would groups moods then, points, boiling reachtheir and tensions secessionist ethnic separatist territorial integrity of Serbia and Georgia further on. maintain to help and borders international the of stability the to significantly contributed compactly concentrated in their regions, and autonomous status in the early 1990s might have minorities are territorially concentrated in significant numbers”. Albanians and Ossetians are time whengranting status of autonomy be by would accepted fittingand toSouth Ossetian it did not work out because of the regimes and policies of Gamsakhurdia and Shevarnadze at the which would preserve Georgia’s territorial integrity. However, despite the potential of autonomy of interethnic clashes), for South Ossetia, autonomy could have worked out and be an alternative, show its inability to deal with conflicting regions; additionally, Kosovo has always been a place status andfuture independence was only the appropriate outcome otherwise ‘West’, for itwould regarding consensus reach and problem Kosovo the settle to inability presence; international athand”task arsenal of constitutional drafters, politicians, and diplomats that must be suited to the particular emphasize that “autonomy is a means, not an end”.Autonomy is only one of the tools “in the not necessarily lead toa permanent solution of ethnic conflicts, therefore, authors explicitly Ibid. Hurst Hannum, “Rethinking Self-Determination,” in Unlike Kosovo (where autonomy was a weak option due to several reasons: long-lasting However, granting autonomous status has to be done in the right point of time, before 67 . 66 . But, Hannum, as well as Hans-Joachim Heintze,is aware that autonomy will Self-Determination inInternationalLaw 23 , Robert CEU eTD Collection Kokoity’s rhetoric of independent South Ossetia. South independent of rhetoric Kokoity’s leaders. And when substantial autonomy was offered to Ossetia, it was not accepted because of 24 CEU eTD Collection 72 71 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072905.shtml. 70 69 http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/ossetia.htm. 68 of of independence from Georgian inauthority, December 1990Ossetians held an election of their during aseries of Ossetian againstrebellions thefirstGeorgian Republic. Historical Background intended toweaken South Ossetian autonomy and power in the political system.” ThethisSeptember as 1990during interpreted move Ossetians elections. parliamentary a directly attempts did notlead to success. “The Georgian leaders... ban all regional political parties in by demanding to be unified with North Ossetia, with Russia’s support. Nevertheless their USSR. Since 1989SouthOssetians attempted togain independencethe from Georgianthe state waseverything overseenby authority bothethnic for Soviet the groups. because for eachother, inrespect andmutual lived peace have relatively people Ossetian situation camechanged when Georgia rulein under Soviet 1923. Ossetia into Northern and regions.” Northern into Southern Ossetia Georgia. At the same time, North Ossetia was left under the domain of Russia, thus splitting status the of being Ossetian South the Autonomous Oblast (SOAO) within SovietRepublic the of Ossetia South granted government Soviet “The authorities: wasmade bySoviet status Ossetia Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 2011, 27, December accessed Georgia,” in Separatism Ossetian “South Ratlif, Rebecca “Tension Again on the Rise in South Ossetia,” Eurasianet.org, accessed December 27, 2011, 27, December accessed Eurasianet.org, Ossetia,” South in Rise onthe Again “Tension In September 1990, the Ossetians declared sovereignty inIn September declaredsovereignty Ossetians 1990,the USSR. the Between made independence1918 and1920,thefirstto South overtures were Ossetian The first clashes took place at the beginning of 1990s, during the dissolution of the 70 Since then then andSince latethe upto 1980sGeorgian and 25 69 The decision on South on decision The 68 However, the However, 72 As a manifestation 71 CEU eTD Collection 76 International), 40. 75 74 http://www.caucasus.dk/chapter4.htm. 73 Republics from Republics from USSR"whichthe was passed onApril Article3, 1990. 3stated that: for ResolvingSecession Relatedto the of playedUnion Lawon"OnProcedures Questions the of USSR and Georgia’s desire to leave the Union; crucial role in the elimination of autonomy parliament. Ossetia, with a clear majority of the people supporting South Ossetia secession from Georgia and region while exiting Union. the future status, clearly thatif autonomy of South Ossetia Oblast remains, Georgia would lose this as a separate administrative unit within the Republic of Georgia.” Oblast Autonomous Ossetian abolish South the voted to and of election the results the cancelled Ibid. Tim Potier, Ibid. 2011, 27, December accessed conflict,” Ossetian Georgian-South “The Kaukasusforsning, for Selskab Dansk “In a Union republic whose territory includes areas with concentrations of national of includes with concentrations areas territory whose “In a Union republic “In a Union republic has that withinit autonomous republics, autonomous provinces and Decision to abolish South Ossetian autonomy was connected to the upcoming dissolution “In January 1992, a referendum was held in Tskhinvali, the regional capital of South Thus, according tothis lawsubunits of Union Republics haddecide aright to upon their referendum results.” voting in these localities shall be considered separately during the determination of the groups that make up the majority of the population in a given locality, the results of the republic, as well as to raise the question of their own legal state status.” decide independently question the of instaying in USSR the or secedingthe Union The peoples of republicsautonomous formations and autonomous shall rightthe retain to autonomous regions, the referendum shall be held separately in each unit.autonomous 73 Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A Legal Appraisal “The Georgian response was swift.Within days the Georgian Supreme Council 76 26 74 , (Kluwer Law 75 CEU eTD Collection Georgia and Russia in June 1992. armed presence on the territory of South Ossetia. A cease-fire agreement was signed between community”. by the“international recognition 81 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=42. 80 http://www1.amrican.edu/ted/ice/ossetia.htm. 79 http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/318/zone-of-conflict-clash-of-paradigms-in-south-ossetia.html. (2009), 78 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072905.shtml. 77 Russian participation.” and Ossetian North and South Georgian, with Commission Control Joint mechanism: negotiation forces and of Russian, Georgian peacekeeping quadripartite and Ossetian establishment joining Russia.” Russia, which provided economic opportunities to the South Ossetians. The closure of the was marketa well-known for its smuggling activities and biggest wasthe trading with partner financial with support, military training andarms. In 2004 Georgian closedauthorities themarketErgneti. Georgia The provided and integrity territorial its maintain to Georgia of position returned back under the control of Georgian authority. NATO and United States supported the both ethnic groups for more than ten years. settlement. was afacilitator of conflict (OSCE) Jim Nichol, “Conflict history: Georgia,” Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, “Zone of Conflict: Clash of Paradigms in South Ossetia,” The journal of Turkish Weekly2011, 27, December accessed Eurasianet.org, Ossetia,” South in Rise onthe Again “Tension Rebecca Ratlif, “South Ossetian Separatism in Georgia,” accessed December 27, 2011, 27, December accessed Georgia,” in Separatism Ossetian “South Ratlif, Rebecca When Saakashvili came topower, he claimed that South Ossetia’s territory should be Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008: Context andImplications of US Interests 77 However, the secession was secession the However, 80 Additionally, Organization the for Security and in Cooperation Europe 79 An inagreement June 1992led deployment “to joint of 78 de facto 81 27 Such a decision led increasing to Georgia’s Theagreementprovided arelative peacefor , because it did notlead to official , (2009), 2. CEU eTD Collection South Ossetia,South and areferendum was supportingapproved Georgia’s territorial integrity.” of governor elected was Sanakoyev Dmitriy pro-Georgian the Ossetia…, in South Georgians did not recognize the outcome of referendumthe “’inand alternative’ voting among ethnic 87 86 from itsGeorgia” “Independence” toreaffirm Ossetia in South of Russia.” Eduard Kokoity rejected plan, the assertingin 2005 “weOctober [South Ossetians] arecitizens “president” Ossetian South settlement. andapolitical rehabilitation, economic demilitarization, of consisting settlement, athree-stage and autonomy substantial Ossetia offered that for South territorial integrity Georgia.of “In July Saakashvili2005, President announced anew peace plan suspended upuntil 2008. rebels. Ossetian South and military Georgian the between resolved. Violentclashes place took againin with 2004 shelling and gun battles taking place 85 84 83 http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/318/zone-of-conflict-clash-of-paradigms-in-south-ossetia.html. (2009), 82 South Ossetians while pushing them to turn even more to Russia’s help.” negative theeconomicbrought and“intensified unemployment problemsmarket results: for http://www1.amrican.edu/ted/ice/ossetia.htm. Ibid. Ibid. Jim Nichol, Ibid. 2011, 27, December accessed Georgia,” in Separatism Ossetian “South Ratlif, Rebecca Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, “Zone of Conflict: Clash of Paradigms in South Ossetia,” The journal of Turkish Weekly As a verification Kokoity’s of words, “a popular referendum was heldin 2006 November maintain and settlethe to conflict the weremade by Saakashvilli Several attempts was signedinEven a cease-fire though agreement June 1992 85 Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008: Context andImplications of US Interests 28 84 Since conflict 2004the remained 86 . However, the US and OSCE 83 the issue still wasnot still issue the 82 , (2009), 3. 87 CEU eTD Collection http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=42. December27, 2011, 88 offensive” significantly in conflict with zone Georgian on Tskhinvali,attack followed by Russian counter- between sides remained suspended until early August 2008when situation deteriorated conflictRussiazone. the Ossetia modifications andnegotiations never and South accepted of areas in Georgian-controlled administration provisional established and Commission Control “Conflict history: Georgia,” International Crisis Group, Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, accessed “In “In changes2007 Georgia proposed topeacenegotiations toreplace OSCE-led Joint 88 in toprotectRussianorder citizens andofferhumanitarian aid. 29 CEU eTD Collection 90 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc,2009), 31. 89 national interests of Georgia in favor of Russia.” beginning. Not surprisingly, Shevarnadze’s critics considered this move as a betrayal of the any from ruled out very the parity possibility peacekeepingstructure of representation and the North and South Ossetia on one side and Georgia on the other. “Hence both the political formula of agreementthis could be called “3+1”, asitincluded Russia and delegations from andit in tobe out wereactingGeorgia. concert, turned very battalions for negative Russian Boris Yeltsen. The agreement was clearly advantageous for Russia, given that Ossetian and in Ossetia with South conflictthe on agreement cease-fire he Dagomys signed verified when elected Chairman of Parliament, who was viewed as the Russian backup man and this was Gamsakhurdia, whotraditionally asa was viewed Russophobe. In1992EduardShevarnadze was state. Not surprisingly, twoprojects came into clash, especially with the regime of nearby. At the same time newly independent Georgia returned to its project of creating a nation- influence acquire to andtried of empire restoration an back tothe arenaandwent in global the movements. secessionist tothe assistance and political and havebeen supporting Ossetian’s self-determination claims and providing financial,military beginning very the from conflict in the involved heavily was Federation Russian the why reveals of the Soviet Union represent aparticular interest in regard to the conflictin South Ossetia, as it Russian -Georgian Relations Ibid. Thronike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russians in the 1990s,” in After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation failed to find its new role Russian – Georgian relations number along history,however, the time after the collapse 30 90 TheGuns of August 2008 Russia’s War in Georgia, ed. Georgia, 89 The CEU eTD Collection 95 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc,2009), 35. 94 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17303471. 93 92 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc,2009), 32. 91 particular interests. particular Independent States (CIS), which from verybeginningthe Russia defined as a zone itsof own Therefore H. W. Bush validated and even welcomed the creation of the Commonwealth of involve in the region as then it was primarily preoccupied by the events in the Balkans. that in return Moscow will help Georgia to restore its territorial integrity and return secessionist Thus, Russia had influence over vital aspects of Georgian internal and external affairs. andSecurity. Interior, of that Defense, government, in Georgian the ministers” “power three of appointmentthe influence the over alsoacquiredin unprecedented bases but military Georgia, military inbases maintain four country. the agreement on “the status of the Russian troops in Georgia” according to which Russia was to rapprochement with the West. had itself fuelled, Russia could dominate thenewly states andindependent prevent their Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Making itself as the sole ‘peacekeeper’ in the conflict that Moscow republic by supporting various movements, secession ‘luckily’ Georgia had twoof them: influence. as anyway Russiansphereof deed, itwas underthe Georgia entered the organization on 21, 1993 October on theorganization Georgia entered Ibid. Thronike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russians in the 1990s,” in “Georgia Profile,” BBC news Europe, accessed May 1, 2012, Ibid, 34. Thronike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russians in the 1990s,” in Shortly after the dissolution of the USSR the ‘West’ and the US were not willing to Being loyal Russian to authorities by going along with theirinterests naively supposed Lacking sufficientresources Russia impose could itshegemony over theformer Soviet 91 Nevertheless, Georgia refused to join CIS, but it was rather a symbolic 92 Despite of the fierce opposition to join CIS at the beginning, 94 Russia obtained not only the right tomaintain its 31 TheGuns of August 2008 Russia’s War in TheGuns of August 2008 Russia’s War in 93 , Shevarnadze also had to sign a military Georgia, ed. Georgia, Georgia, ed. Georgia, 95 CEU eTD Collection 97 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc,2009), 37. 96 authorized Russian military military touseauthorized Russian jets Geargian airspace” “Shevarnadze publicly Russia’sendorsed invasion of Chechnya in 1994andDecember Russian authorities calculated Georgia that wouldsupport Russia’s invasion of Chechnya, thus secessionist regions would play Russianinterestsagainst in Caucasus.North Having this in mind by separatism thetension –Chechnya, which wereethnic sustaining with characterized and regions under Georgian the authority. Thelogic behind this was Russiathat itself had regions out Russian citizenship toresidents of OssetiaSouth andAbkhazia. regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is the main tool of influence. Thus, Russia started to hand keeping after therevolution secessionist upthe that within Kremlin tension therefore the realized Mikhail isSaakashvilli well forknown his orientationpro-Western and the USsupporter, asitGeorgian whom ‘lost’ politics, desperate Shevarnadze, Kremlin couldthe manipulate. integrity. territorial provinces of Abkhazia and south Ossetia. In this move, the Kremlin was clearly challenging regime with Georgia, but with notice that the visa is not required for residents of Georgia’s Tbilisi’s policies, hence Georgia made steps towards NATO. Therefore, Russia adopts a visa reintegration of breakaway regions, because it was one of the leverages for Moscow to push on Ibid, 45. Thronike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russians in the 1990s,” in With the Rose Revolution and Saakashvilli’s presidency, Russia was loosing control over By the end of 1990s, for Georgian authorities became clear that Russia will not assist the 97 32 TheGuns of August 2008 Russia’s War in 96 . Georgia, ed. Georgia, CEU eTD Collection 100 99 http://geo.1september.ru/2004/28/4.htm. 98 residents unrecognizedrepublic. of the tothe passports Ossetian OssetiansSouth have nochance tocross bordersthe with such improvised documents. officials. Regardless regimeof simplified border Russia (for travelling to is visa not required), diplomas, etc. were printed out on commercially available printers and signed by government certificates, birth aspassports, such documents Temporary exhausted. was stock style passports the South Ossetian citizenship record were in common use. population has citizenship of RussianFederation.the legislation of Republic of South Ossetia permits dual citizenship, therefore, a majority of isCitizenship alegal base for manifestation the andmutual of rights However,the obligations. citizenshipfor its constituents as a political legal and betweentie person and Republic. facto citizenship is illegitimateconsidered worldwide, because it wasgiven by self-proclaimed or sometimes, the motive for the acquisition of a second Russian citizenship exists when the first Russian Federation in addition to citizenship of the country of their residence. However, of the Soviet Union, citizens of former Soviet Republics wished to obtain citizenship of the Dual citizenship inSouth Ossetia Ibid. 2012, 13, March accessed Ossetia, ofSouth Republic The “Tskhinvali Begins Issuing South Ossetian Passports,” Civil.ge, accessed13, March 2012, independent state, such as South Ossetia. such asSouth state, independent As every sovereign andindependentstate, the Republic of OssetiaSouth provides Dual citizenship remains a relevantproblemSoviet for countries, post after breakthe up Therefore, onAugust 15,2006 South the Ossetian authorities began issuing South Due to vaguethe status of regionthe its Sovietand isolation, passports of 1974 style with 33 98 However, by midthe 2000’sSoviet 100 Issuing South Ossetian South Issuing 99 de CEU eTD Collection and Abkhaziaand (East View Press,2008), 100. 102 http://www.newsru.com/world/15aug2006/osetia.html. 101 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13314. maystateless) exchange passportstheir for Soviet Russian ones. Ossetia) and who refuse to recognize the authority of the mother country (and are therefore of formerthe USSRwholive inso-called unrecognized (including states Abkhazia and South on citizenshipthe of Russianthe Federation in June2002.Under newthe Russianlaw, citizens ones. South Ossetians received Russian citizenship on the basis of amendments to the federal law expiredSoviet-style passports and were Ossetians notwillingexchange to them for Georgian travel. international for useful more is and arena the citizenship of their own country, simply because it has a obtaining than value practical more much has Ossetians a South for Federation Russian of citizen Ossetians who reside in the territory of the Republic have Russian citizenship as well. Being a of recognizestheindependenceof that Ossetia. Republic the South ispassport local mainly intended for use and does havenot anylegal value outside the countries as Ossetian in South legal the the respect environment in international vulnerable the citizens Ossetia South for edition limited special in issued types of passports: Russianthe Federation, Soviet-style andinternational which passports, were simplified paper work in the republic, because by that time South Ossetian population held three hadpassports more of a nominal value than a practical onepassports (though of common sample “Countdown towar inGeorgia,” Russia’s Foreign Policy and MediaCoverage of the Conflict in South Ossetia “SouthOssetia started to issue localpassports,” Newsru.com, accessed March 13,2012, Russian wereissued passports forinhabitants of South Ossetia in 2002-2003 when Due to the ‘shortcomings’ of holding South Ossetian citizenship, the majority of 34 101 ). The Republic of South Ossetia makes their legal 102 value on the international the on value Thus, 56% of South Ossetian CEU eTD Collection 105 Abkhaziaand (East View Press,2008), 100. 104 http://www.newcaucasus.com/index.php?newsid=4541. 103 Therefore, the top question is question the Therefore, of top how Georgiathe on are somany there an independentterritory reason for bringing Russian troops in South Ossetia was the protection of Russian citizens. it was a way of ‘covert annexation of Georgian territory” integrity. territorial and sovereignty Georgia’s on infringes above, mentioned to former Georgian President EduardShevardnadze Russia’s the newlaw, citizenship which was is to population passports Ossetiaof by South seen an and Georgia as step accordingunfriendly issuance The of Russian has by authorities. beenprobed issue that Georgian controversial Russian citizens in the territory of South Ossetia. The decision to supply Russian passports is a spot where warcan ateruptany time, taking intoaccount this abackup plan was needed. in Residents territory the of Republicclearly unrecognized had inmind they that live ina hot forfactor Ossetians in determinative acquire their to of decision citizenship Federation. Russian rose up to 98%. population received passports of Russianthe Federation,mid by Augustthe of 2006thenumber Ibid. “Countdown towar inGeorgia,” Russia’s Foreign Policy and MediaCoverage of the Conflict in South Ossetia ³ɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɟɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɚɜȺɛɯɚɡɢɢɢɘɠɧɨɣɈɫɟɬɢɢ As it out in turned 2008, theGeorgian governmentfears werewell founded. The official The Georgian government voiced concerns over the presence of such a large number of Russian citizenship: helpormotive? The fact that Russian passports are more useful for international travel was not the 103 35 : ɡɚɢɩɪɨɬɢɜ 105 ,” News Caucasus, accessed March 13, 2012, 13, March accessed News Caucasus, ,” . 104 Hebelieved that CEU eTD Collection http://www.newcaucasus.com/index.php?newsid=4541. http://glavnoe.ua/articles/a2507. 2012, 109 108 http://www.rg.ru/2008/03/14/doklad-dok.html. accessed March 14, 2012, 107 http://visalink-russia.com/russian-federation-law-russian-federation-citizenship.html. 106 passports (ID cards), but international passport (issued for foreign travel) with which it was goodwill, but a well-planned long-term strategy. For example, Russia was issuing not internal was donepassports inability due to Ossetiansof totravel South Soviet-stylewith passports. within its sphere of influence. Of course, Russia was referring to the fact that issuance of Russian was pursuing their own interests in the region in order to keep an eye on Georgia and keep it citizenship tothepopulation of Ossetia. South offering By theRussian passports, government Therefore only the way gettingof Russiancitizenship –wasillegal. integrity. territorial acknowledged Georgian Russia becausethen Ossetian regions, South of South Ossetia." Ossetia and there is no Russian diplomatic representation or consular office in the Republic Russian Federation does not have diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Lukin: “according to the information of Consular office of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the to the report (2007) by the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation Vladimir accordingfactquestion is can into the what becalled that However, office. Russianconsular the legal Russian forpassports South Ossetians couldbe issued by only representativesdiplomatic or citizenship Federation Russian on law Federation Russian the to According citizens. Russian “’ “ “ Russian“The Federation law on RussianFederation citizenship,” accessed14, March 2012, ɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɟɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɚɜȺɛɯɚɡɢɢɢɘɠɧɨɣɈɫɟɬɢɢ ȾɨɤɥɚɞɍɩɨɥɧɨɦɨɱɟɧɧɨɝɨɩɨɩɪɚɜɚɦɱɟɥɨɜɟɤɚɜɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɡɚ Ɇɭɥɶɬɢɩɚɫɩɨɪɬ Nevertheless, facts prove that the provision of Russian citizenship was not the actof the wasnot citizenship ofRussian provision the that facts prove Nevertheless, The warin 2008 was a clear example of why Moscow was willing togive Russian ’: 107 ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɟɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɬɜɨɨɬɘɠɧɨɣɈɫɟɬɢɢɞɨɄɪɵɦɚ Thus, the Russian Federation could nothave diplomatic relationships with 36 : ɡɚɢɩɪɨɬɢɜ ,” News Caucasus, accessed March 13, 2012, March accessed News Caucasus, ,” ,” 2007 2007 Ƚɥɚɜɧɨɟ ɝɨɞ , accessed March 13, ,” ,” Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵ 108 , 109 106 , CEU eTD Collection http://cominf.org/node/1127818105. 112 111 http://www.newsru.com/world/05mar2009/so_pasporta.html. 2012, 110 US and NATO. Therefore, mass passportization of South Ossetians,for Moscow was only the Georgia and its conflict regions, because Saakashvili clearly states his orientation towards West- with which visa system was functioned. By Kremlin the this, had heatedup the tension within Georgia), because they opted from Georgian citizenship by choosing citizenship of another state part of Ossetia Republic of this of the andregion independence South as constituent consider citizenship illegally resided on the territory of Georgia (as Georgia does not recognize the permits dual citizenship time did not allow dual citizenship dual allow not did time Ossetians placed themselves out of Georgian legislature, as Georgian legislature at that point of republic.independent as since 2008 the Ministry of External Affairs treats South Ossetia as a sovereign and automatically exchange passports inwilling to theWar,Russia wasnot fiveyearsdate after and Russian borders by not letting them immigrate. Federation. Therefore, Moscow wanted to have South Ossetians as their citizens only outside of passports explaining it by the fact they have a place of residence outside of the Russian Ossetian population, they do not register them for the place of residence and do not issueinternal though the Ministry of Internal Affairs implicitly recognizes Russian citizenship of South problematic to find ajob. In order to be accepted for work an internal passport is needed, even “ Ibid. “ ɀɢɬɟɥɹɦɘɠɧɨɣɈɫɟɬɢɢɩɟɪɟɫɬɚɥɢɜɵɞɚɜɚɬɶɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɟɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɚ ɄɨɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɢɹɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɘɠɧɚɹɈɫɟɬɢɹ Furthermore, with the acquisition of citizenship of the Russian Federation, South Another factor that deserves attention is the fact that Russian passport has an Russian expiration passport factthat is deserves attention the factor that Another 110 112 . Therefore, from the legal point of view, Ossetians with Russian 111 , while constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia ,” ɂɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɨɧɧɨɟɚɝɟɧɬɫɬɜɨɊȿɋ 37 ,” Newsru.com, accessed Mrach 14, Mrach accessed Newsru.com, ,” , accessed March 14, 2012, CEU eTD Collection by havingleverage this againstGeorgian authorities. region and secessionist andover havecontrol domestic asubstantial into interfere affairs move to 38 CEU eTD Collection 114 Warin Russia’s 113 was expanding In on high 2004, rates. secessionist regions of Georgia. Russian administrative and military control over South Ossetia bureaucracy of South Ossetia with representatives of the Russian power ministries” of Russian power the Ossetiarepresentatives with of South bureaucracy population received Russian “Kokoity citizenship, began filling positions in governmental the president of self-proclaimed republic. By the end of 2002, when majority of South Ossetian presidential seat and the choice fell on Eduard Kokoity. On December 6, 2001 he was elected according to its preference and interest. The plan was to appoint aloyal Moscowto person on the resulted in Georgia’s exitfrom CIS. appointment the visa regime with Georgia, which was mentioned above, was imposed and After his became minister. a prime whenVladimir Putin peacebroke relative eventhe However, policies. interventionist pursuing and regions secessionist of side the taking clearly Federation decade, was hard to build-up trust between conflicting sides, especially when the Russian Georgia and its secessionist regions. Nevertheless, after the bloody conflicts in the beginning of Russian –SouthOssetian Relations See appendix Table 1. Andrei Illarionov, Russian “The Leadership’s Preparationfor War 1999-2008,” in 1993- 1999 was 1993- 1999 aperiod of relative in stability between relations Russia and Georgia, The Rose Revolution and afterwards led to even closer cooperation between Moscow and In 2001, newthe Russianleadership tookfurther steps in ‘constructing’ SouthOssetia Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr(New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2009), 53. it included transferring Russia officers to South Ossetia for routine military routine for Ossetia South to officers Russia transferring included it military andinstructors to the Russian dozen territory. sendingseveral Moreover, from Ossetia, forSouth cadets in at Vladikavkaz military the academy department construction militaryof bases near Java and Tskhinvalli, aspecial opening the included These Ossetia. in South goals main government’s Russian the havedecree outliningappears been asecretsignedto what president “the Russian 39 The Guns of August 2008 113 . 114 CEU eTD Collection Georgia and the World” (Policy CentralPaper, Asia – Caucasus Institute Silk Road Program, Studies 2008). 118 Warin Russia’s 117 2006, in BBC monitoring. 116 Warin Russia’s 115 Georgia’s sovereignty Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,because thespecific type of relationships which inleadership it aslegalization was considered Tbilisi of of annexation territory and threatening Russia establisheddiplomatic direct relations with governmentthe in Tskhinvali. warbegan, to when phaseof preparation yearslater, Two active administration. Sanakoyev’s nullifies Tbilisi until Georgia with negotiations all of termination announced Kokoity organized a parallel presidential election, where Dmitry Sanakoyev won. As a result Eduard of self-determination.” basedon peoples, their right to Moscow. Putin declared that the fate of those nations would be defined by the will of their Commonwealth for Democracy and the Rights of Nation. Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Support as well as a Declaration on the Creation of Ossetia. of structure Thus, the Kremlin had total control over South Ossetia through their people in the governmental Andrei Illarionov, Russian “The Leadership’s Preparationfor War 1999-2008,” in “Unrecognized republics within Georgia and Moldova increased plan cooperation,” Radio Ekho Moskvy,14 June Andrei Illarionov, Russian “The Leadership’s Preparationfor War 1999-2008,” in Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popianevski, Niklas Nilsson, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Implications and Causes Georgia: Warin “Russia’s Nilsson, Niklas Popianevski, Johanna E.Cornell, Svante In 2006,when Eduard Kokoity was re-elected asapresident, Georgian government In 2004 leaders of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria signed a Treaty on Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr(New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2009), 61. Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr(New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2009), 56. ministries of defense, security, and law enforcement.” service, as well as the appointment of Russians to the head of South Ossetia’s 40 117 116 “They also proclaimed their loyalty 115 The Guns of August 2008 The Guns of August 2008 118 By CEU eTD Collection Russia’s Warin Russia’s 119 plans. their against played have recognition of Kosovo, and of course, any negotiations or resolution in conflicting regions would Russian authorities, as by that time the Kremlin was getting ready to respond to ‘West’ for way for peaceful resolution of the conflict were rejected by South Ossetian leaders, precisely territories within Russia proper” “was Putin proposed virtually identical which to that existed between andMoscow federal the Andrei Illarionov, Russian “The Leadership’s Preparationfor War 1999-2008,” in During summer the of 2008 various proposals for negotiations andagreements tofind a Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr(New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2009), 68. 119 . 41 The Guns of August 2008 CEU eTD Collection 120 dollars, butRussia isloosing not financially,only butits powerin would Europe decline. Pipeline. Caucasus plans’ South regarding were beneficial for the Kremlin. While he was in power, Russia managed to restrain ‘western Shevarnadze was in power – former member of communist party - who conducted policies which wanted to ruin the plans,it had to focus on Georgia. Also, for substantial amount of time Eduard region. the in position America’s samereinforce damage time, andatthe toRussia designed wassolely political experts Georgiathrough (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline). BTCpipelinesomeaccording project to diminishing role in it. Substitution to the existing way of energy recourse transferring was and gas, hence it was seeking alternative way of gas and oil transportation and Russia’s issues in countries. Understandably,European itis inconvenient for Europe – consumer of oil in portion gas supply have enough is considerable considerable, to overthe range influence of theEurope. Russia offer to could that gas) and (oil resources cheapenergy were influence political course for restoration of its sphere of influence. The means for re-establishment of its switched Russia’s political orbit toEuropean Union. When Putin came topower, he took a partof in USSR the European the situated formermajority republics of as decreased, drastically Russia’s interests behind involvement inSouth Ossetian conflict Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc,2009), 39. Thronike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russians in the 1990s,” in The opening of new pipeline for the Kremlin would mean a loss of hundred millions of From the Russian point of view, Georgia was the weakest link in that chain and if Russia Of course, Russia was not the only supplier of energy resources in Europe; however,its Since the dissolution of the USSR, political importance of Moscow on global arena 120 42 TheGuns of August 2008 Russia’s War in Georgia, ed. Georgia, CEU eTD Collection http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm. 121 switched to the ‘frozen’ part, whereas, when Georgia’s leaders were standing between Russia Georgia’s authorities in the face of Shevarnadze was loyal to Moscow, it soothed the conflict and (substantial autonomy,for example). ‘Frozen conflict’ was the most suitable option – when was findwilling to afinal solution, which wouldbe beneficial South Ossetiato adGeorgia settlement, before War the in 2008, ithad not provided full South recognition Osseetia,to nor it because it onlyin was‘ethnic’ form. claims just tomake the essence of the conflict ‘ethnic’, though it was rather ethnopolitical one, NATO. Therefore, it can be stated that Russia supported South Ossetian self-determination bestway joiningfrom were the to keepGeorgia inand Abkhazia Ossetia conflicts South ethnic internal or external; that is why the Kremlin was actively using this tool in Georgia. Escalation of in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Well known that conflict – is a good way to settle the problem: forces representative gavemovements stir of peacekeeping achancemediator or upseparatist to potential its clearly the frozen on Moscow ethnic andbeingof conflicts understood territories regarding land disputes: that it was heading to NATO, however the main obstacle to join NATO was unsettled question Besides, after the Rose Revolution, Georgia openly declared its orientation towards the West and “Study NATOon Enlargement,” NATO, accessed 28, April 2012, Even though, from dissolution the of Soviet Russia Union was involved in conflictthe invite Alliance.” to join the astate whether to determining accordance with OSCEin principles. means Resolution peaceful by of suchdisputes disputes those wouldsettle be must a factor in disputes jurisdictional internal or claims, “States which have ethnic orexternaldisputes territorial including disputes, irredentist 43 121 CEU eTD Collection Russia’s Warin Russia’s 123 http://uasdan.com/chochiev/otvets/print:page,1,1294-malenkiy-pobedonosnyy-genocid.html. 122 recognition. If Russian actually was supporting and advocating South Ossetian right for self- three times: January 2006, March2008 2003, March Ossetian Kokoitypresident Eduard asked Russiatorecognize theindependence of republicthe seen from the fact that from the time of dissolution of the USSR and the War in 2008, South arena. world onthe Saakashvili order to reinforce the image of the conflict and let down a moral make up of Georgia and and Medvedev several times each said that Georgia committed genocide of Ossetian people in the right for self-determination which implies secession and independence. After the war, Putin blame in Georgia genocide further.committing tunnel, so Georgian army had chance to kill as much civilian population as possible in order to Ossetian people. That is why 58 disqualify Georgia worldwide by itpresenting as an aggressor whocommitted genocide of burst out one day. The Kremlin had to show its strong intensions to control the ‘near abroad’ and independencebut conflictOssetiahad toSouth granted the and Abkhaziaevenlonger,the to independence of South Ossetia Russia managed for 18years and probably,it would nothave conflict. the ‘unfreeze’ adecision theKremlin to was making interests, andeconomic itsand political Andrei Illarionov, Russian “The Leadership’s Preparationfor War 1999-2008,” in “ Ʌɨɜɭɲɤɚɞɥɹɋɚɚɤɚɲɜɢɥɢ Moscow’s unwillingnessMoscow’s togranta full independence toSouth Ossetia evidently can be To balance between motivation for self-determination claims and not acknowledging full Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr(New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2009). ,” Uasdan.com, accessed May 1, 2012, th Army was waiting for two days at the northern gate of the Roki 122 44 Thus, South Ossetia can claim that they have they that claim can Ossetia South Thus, 123 , but the Kremlin did not acknowledge the acknowledge not did Kremlin the but , The Guns of August 2008 CEU eTD Collection 125 Warin Russia’s 124 – Ossetian conflict” – Ossetian called Baden Document that could have opened the way for peaceful resolution of the Georgian for South Ossetia within Georgia and in 1999, along with Eduard Shevarnadze signed the so- status autonomy of accept a enhanced and to wasready conflict bilateral asettlementof the on region,the because“hehad with voluntarily and sincerely cooperated Georgian the authorities Ossetia, as at that point acting president Ludvig Chibirov did notsatisfy Moscow’s ambitions in wrestler.” professional EduardKokoity,inOssetia Moscow, whohada as a both dubious reputation businessman ad Ossetian prime minister, Gerasim (Rezo) Khugaev; and the former trade representative of South South twice then by and official Communist former Chochiev; Alan movement, national Ossetian South the leader of intellectual the included These leaders. Ossetian radical South most called a ‘Meeting of Four’ – “a meeting between himself and the three men considered to be the by approved –inMoscow 2001an officer of Russianthe secretservice organized whatwas self-interests of being involved in the conflicts. First of all,because this same ‘leadership’ was is simplybecauseitwould play in theagainst Kremlin’s interests ‘nearthe abroad’. answer The beginning? very the from independence the recognize it not did why determination, him,because “Chochiev would not perform rolethe defined for him by Russianthe leadership, nominee Russia was going to support in the presidential elections in 2001. The choice fell on whose Kokoity, chooses Moscow afterwards soon Therefore relations. Georgia-Ossetia of Ibid. Andrei Illarionov, Russian “The Leadership’s Preparationfor War 1999-2008,” in The next question that might arise is why South Ossetian leadership discerned Russia’s discerned leadership Ossetian South is why arise might that question next The Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr(New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2009), 52. 125 , he was obviously not ‘suitable’ for Russia’s plans regarding the evolution 124 The ‘Meeting of was aimingFour’ change to the leadership in South 45 The Guns of August 2008 CEU eTD Collection 129 128 127 Warin Russia’s 126 while Khugaev was unable to overcome registration barriers” toovercome registration while Khugaev was unable as prime minister. as prime – a Moscow’s minion. – aMoscow’s insituation Khadjimba whenSergey conflicting regions the defeated in Bagapsh 2004 elections of pulse the on hand a have to intension strong its Abkhazia of example the on illustrated and people whom Kremlinthe it appoints would nothave changed much. Vladimir Putin the flourishing on were successfully territory). independencefrom it orwouldGeorgia stuck completely with get smuggling activities (which Moscow financing and without it there would not be even a smallest chance to attain any kind of amount of any fields minerals.of Economically,Ossetia was South completely dependent upon and cannot attract tourists to its resorts. Additionally, South Ossetia does not posses a significant political as well as military one. Compared to Abkhazia South Ossetia is a landlocked country South Ossetian authorities, as the last one would definitely loose more than the firstmore than loose one. the last would definitely asthe one Ossetian authorities, South agricultural produce.” border, halting railway communication with Abkhazia andbanning importthe of Abkhazian province for Bagapsh’s temerity, theAbkhazian closing portion Russianthe of –Georgian elections, however he refused to do so, therefore “Moscow promptly punished the whole Ibid, 58. Ibid. Ibid. Andrei Illarionov, Russian “The Leadership’s Preparationfor War 1999-2008,” in Finally, even if South Ossetia would have resisted the role which Moscow assigned to it Secondly, South Ossetia did nothave ability to survive without Russia’s help, economic, Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr(New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2009), 52. 127 129 128 Thus, it was unreasonable to be in confrontation with Moscow for After elections, Russia demanded Bagapsh to annul the results of 46 126 . Yet, in 2002 he was appointed The Guns of August 2008 CEU eTD Collection had two ways out – to Georgia or to Russia. Ossetians were not willing to leave toGeorgia, and war can erupt at any time, taking this intoaccount backup plan was needed. South Ossetians Residents on territory the of unrecognized Republic clearly had inmind that they livespot inhot determinative onefor Ossetians in their decision to acquire citizenship of Russian Federation. of holdingOssetian South citizenship. of South Ossetian residents were in need to obtain another citizenship, due to the ‘shortcomings’ explained earlier, citizenship as well as passports was given out illegally. However, the majority population was aware that from Russia’s side it was not an act of goodwill,because as was to intervene intodomestic affairs by referring that Russia is protecting its citizens. Probably, the right thing to do in order to show care and protection, and at the same time always have a reason among South Ossetians. Giving Russian citizenship to South Ossetia residents was exactly the decidedly:firstly appoint to ‘its people’ on leadingthe positions and secondly, support gain region. the Ossetia.South With such rhetoric made Moscow abid on preventing stabilization of insituation radical position, and priority in his political agenda was to achieve recognition of the Republic of with Moscow’s plans, therefore Kokoyti was chosen as a person who would promote more As was said earlier, Lyudvig Chibirov’s leadership and his political rhetoric did not go along importantthe positions in governmentthe people werecomingfrom approval/help.Moscow’s presidency. 2000 Since Kremlinthe has chosen a differentpolicy Ossetia: South regarding for collapse of Soviet Union the twist in Moscow’s interests in the region came with Vladimir Putin At this time Shevarnadze became less loyal to Moscow and the Kremlin had to act more Even though Russia was involved in the conflict settlement in South Ossetia since the The fact that Russian passports are more useful for international travel was not the 47 CEU eTD Collection http://politsovet.ru/12714-.html. accessed April, 15, 2012, 130 and secession and only on June 1, 2006 arightforhas Ossetia self-determination South that it had neveropenly acknowledged Ossetia, War. phaseof second Chechen after in Caucasus, especially North situation the prevalent bases on the territory was one of the priorities, because it was strategically important in the interests. Presence on the territory of South Ossetia this was the main goal. Allocation of military in Russia’s is not oil resources or mineral any possess not does which Ossetia South of territory States and International organizations. Plus, Russia is the biggest country in the world and small worldthe arena which wouldhave lead economicto and political actions from all over theworld: obviously understood that annexation of territory in the 21 expressedits willingness through referendum the join to RussianFederationthe in 1992. Russia the territory. However, Russia never aimed to annex South Ossetia, even though South Ossetians wereable Ossetians pensions.haveto travel a better and on behalf itsof citizens and it was the best way to build amilitary bases,in response South had majority of South Ossetian residents their citizens, giving toMoscow to act on this territory citizen. reason to become Russian is its another citizens provides Federation Russian because Russia was seen as best place to escape. Furthermore, the larger pension benefit that the Ossetia has a right for self-determination, thus showing its support for South Ossetian separatist Ossetian South for support its showing thus self-determination, for has aright Ossetia “ ɊɨɫɫɢɹɩɪɢɡɧɚɟɬɩɪɚɜɨɘɠɧɨɣɈɫɟɬɢɢɧɚɫɚɦɨɨɩɪɟɞɟɥɟɧɢɟ Despite of the political,military and economic support that Russia provided to South Distribution of Russian passports Georgia considered as a form of illegal annexation of Therefore, from distribution the of Russian passports both sides werewinning: Russia 130 , for the first time Moscow announced that South 48 ,” ,” st ɉɨɥɢɬɫɨɜɟɬɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɨɧɧɨɟɚɝɟɧɫɬɜɨ century century would damageits image on , CEU eTD Collection 132 http://xn--b1agedd7ch9h.xn--p1ai/news/379035. April 15, 2012, 131 territorial integrity. territorial of principle the as law international in the right respected less not is self-determination for right claims, Kamynin- Mikhail – Affairs Internal of Ministry of representative As a movements. why Russia wanted to prop up Shevarnadze’s rule. Putin hurriedly sent to Tbilisi Minister of Saakashvili itcame topower openly declared that Georgia turns to ‘West’ andThis NATO. is towards Russia and went along with Russia interests, remaining loyal to the Kremlin, so when after the Rose Revolution. If before the Rose Revolution, Shevarnadze was more or less oriented becameconflicts a‘suitable’ leveragein especially presidency this struggle during Putin and Tbilisi, in order to remain it within its sphere of geopolitical and economic interests. Zone of are claims neutralized. movements determination separatist until samethe therefore Moscowcould right, acknowledge not andsupport South Ossetians in self- would imply that secessionist regions on the territory of The Russian Federation is entitled for for self-determination arighthas South Ossetia that and declaration make-up, the multiethnic tense situation in North Caucasus delayed the recognition of the right. Russia is a country of right for self-determination only in 2006? Probably, it would have been done earlier, yet having a reality. politico-legal prevalent rather is condition a possible integrity territorial of principle the to reality, adherence in existing the however integrity, territorial of principle the Georgia’s respects Moscow officially Ossetian and this region was recognized worldwide as conflict zone. Kamynin states that Ibid. “ ȼɆɂȾɊɎɡɚɹɜɢɥɢ For Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia became an instrumental tool to put pressure on Then the question might arise, why would Moscow officially support South Ossetian 131 132 , Moreover, Tbilisi did nothave a direct control over the territory of South ɱɬɨɊɨɫɫɢɹɭɜɚɠɚɟɬɩɪɚɜɨɘɠɧɨɣɈɫɟɬɢɢɧɚɫɚɦɨɨɩɪɟɞɟɥɟɧɢɟ 49 ,” ,” ɂɡɜɟɫɬɢɹ , accessed , CEU eTD Collection 133 been desperate enough toaccept Russianbacking.been desperate presidency. Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, his stated task was to resolve the crisis and preserve Shevaradze 135 134 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc,2009), 45. recognition. emergence of new states, pressurize on the uniqueness of the case was seen as a way to gain efforts.” negotiations, but still all insist on the uniqueness of their cases and saw no reason to coordinate peace else nervously everybody’s watching amongwas secessionists…Everybody other and Caucasus). of Transdnistrea republic in “None them North was actively seeking support Ossetia, Abkhazia, South in regions (Naghorno-Karabakh, region the separatist between Georgia and South Ossetia, but at the same time there were not any alliance-building efforts financially and military. did nothave any other plan B country which would support their claims and help them it did not always comply with Moscow’s plans, whereas South Ossetia was in the position that it open-minded and had sustainitself potential itsto outletto due economically, sea the (tourism), that situation was different in Abkhazia comparatively to South Ossetia. As Abkhazia was more obtained almost a total control over the situation in separatist regions, though it has to be noted, from away turn andMoscow. to waskeen Thronike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russians in the 1990s,” in Pavel Baev, Pavel Ibid. During was cooling 1990’stheconflict to peace down negotiations betweenRussia, sincein Therefore, early Russia involvementactuallywas deeper,2000, conflictthe it 135 Although, it was understandable, as with the collapse of communist regime and 133 Russia's policies in the Caucasus With no larger strategy, Russia blindly supported the one person who might have (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 14. 50 134 TheGuns of August 2008 Russia’s War in Nevertheless, Saakashvili came topower came Saakashvili Nevertheless, Georgia, ed. Georgia, CEU eTD Collection 138 137 136 organizations which hoped to attemptconflictorganizations whichhopedinmanagement to Caucasus”the all to todeny international attempts access and well-coordinated time was consistent in addition receive a leverage against Tbilisi. “One distinctive feature of Russia’s policy at that it assumingwould cooperative course, that be easierandcheaper stabilization” toprevent Republics, it was not willing tocontribute to the positive development, Russia chose a “non- destabilizing factor” uprooted population, living often foryears in conditions of extreme hardship,is a significant population and huge amount of refuges. For the Russian part, it was seen as a plus, because, “this NATO war in Balkans was a top priority. majority of them was preoccupied with the events in the Balkans, because for the ‘West’ and Ibid, 19. Ibid. Pavel Baev, What was not unique in those cases is the fact that conflicts led to the mass emigration of Russia's policies in the Caucasus 136 . As Moscow wanted to restore its influence over former Soviet (London: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs, 1997), 15. 51 138 , additionally, 137 and CEU eTD Collection the instability?” (Pace Discussion Paper) in Paper) Discussion (Pace instability?” the 140 http://www.harnnet.org/index.php/articles-corner/english-articles/155-the-politics-of-ethnocracies. 139 Georgian language, consequently, they not have did a real ability influenceto and participate in However, those who did participatein legislative work, did not have a great proficiency in the in wasvery inlow: Georgia process political and representation participation Minority instructure. Georgia’sstate minoritiesIndeed, ethnic wereunderrepresented settlement. on the wayforconflict of obstacles was one peaceful the ethnocracy Georgia’s Lyudvig Chibirov was cooperative with Tbilisi’s in authorities conflictthe resolution process, of regime that them. oppresses Even first though the presidentof self-proclaimed republic Georgian nationalism and ethnocratic type of regime, South Ossetians were not willing to be part due to strong the Therefore, USSR. the tostay itwithin chose where in referendum participate because it had to make sure that while exiting the Union, South Ossetia did nothave right to aimed to build ethnocratic state and secondly, Tbilisi abolished South Ossetian autonomy, first self-determination, of all because Zviad becamewhen independent Georgia Gamsakhurdia Origins of South Ossetian claims for independence “ “Armenian and Azeri Minorities in Georgia” Crisis Group Report; “Minorities in the South Caucasus: factor of factor Caucasus: South inthe “Minorities Report; Group Crisis Georgia” in Minorities Azeri and “Armenian The Politics of Ethnocracies,” Harnnet. Org, accessed December 23, 2011, 23, December accessed Org, Harnnet. ofEthnocracies,” Politics The After the breakup of the Soviet Union, South Ossetia could notuse their right for internal intention.” concerning distribution areultimately the of power subordinated to this basic of state power are controlled by a specific ethnic collectivity.All other considerations eight members in the 150 member-strong Parliament.” member-strong 150 in the members eight by only arerepresented Minorities minorities. of for therepresentation arrangements local levels. single-chamber Georgia's parliament notprovide does anyspecial enforcement agencies. Political representation is also an issue, both on national and firm perception of ethnic in discrimination especiallypersonnel appointments, in law “Seniorposts tend be government to occupied by ethnicis Georgians, and there a “The raison d'être 139 of the ethnocracy is to secure that the most important instruments Ethnic minorities in Georgia: Current Situation 52 140 , Agit Mirzoev, 2. CEU eTD Collection Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 5(Sep., 1999), 574. 142 in Paper) Discussion (Pace instability?” the 141 economic, or political statuses’”. or economic, socio- change cultural/linguistic, influenceandto try acquire acertain people of the interests’ “as conflict anorganized strugglingfor movements political when 'national the‘national process aspect, whereas on the behalf of South Ossetia this conflict was ethnic one. Yamskov sees ethnic to obtainindependencebased principle onthe of self-determination. ethnocratic regime in Georgia as one of the factors that launched and then intensified the desire work. parliamentary Ossetians and launched separatist movement. andlaunched separatist Ossetians autonomy and strongGeorgian nationalism sharpened thefeelings of being oppressed for official and administrative language in country the by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, abolition of cultural autonomy and as a resultled to aspiration for separatist movement. many grounds. Ethnocratic type of regime came into contradiction with Ossetian desire to obtain foron several werediscriminated duetothefact status decades political thatnon-Georgians be excluded from the participation and representation in government, at least group. dominant ethnically the of hands in is power state that sure makes and heldby ethnically the group. The ethnocraticdominant state tends todominate in political affairs Valery Tishkov, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse of Typologies and Data,” “Armenian and Azeri Minorities in Georgia” Crisis Group Report; “Minorities in the South Caucasus: factorof For Russia, the infusion of conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia had a geopolitical A division along ethnic lines and declarationthe of Georgianthe language as only the While the state structure is based on ethnocratic principles ethnic minorities will always 141 Such political structure characterizes ethnocratic states, where control is wherecontrol states, ethnocratic characterizes structure Suchpolitical 142 Undeniably, Ossetians were struggling for the change in their Ethnic minorities in Georgia: Current Situation 53 de facto , Agit Mirzoev, 2. . The Journal of Journal CEU eTD Collection 143 Therefore language, tradition and territory were themain ofidentificationaspects for individuals. August 2006), 11. 145 Affairs 1944-), Vol. 78,No. 4(Oct., 2002), 834. 144 Dov Lynch, “Separatist states and post-Soviet conflicts,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of InternationalEthnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective to Wheatley: nationality would have a single state. The Soviet times set grounds for the secession. According treatment from Tbilisi, South Ossetians also wanted to unify with North Ossetia, so their for their authorities will suffice. sovereignty - nothingless than state areas state-orientated separatist of these made theobjectives revolution or any other means to capture the power. The linkage of ethnicity with territory has overthrow the existing government. Therefore the separatist movement took place instead of For South Ossetia separatism was seen as a way to create a new state unit, rather than to revised, then why should boundaries established by empires long since dead be preserved?” John Lewis Gaddis,"Toward the Post-ColdWorld," War Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), 110 in Johanna Popjanevski and Niklas Nilsson, “National Minorities and the state in Georgia” (conference report, (conference Georgia” in state the and Minorities “National Nilsson, Niklas and Popjanevski Johanna As John Lewis Gaddis points out, "if the boundaries of the dying Soviet empire are to be The desire to secede originated due to the fact that South Ossetiareceivefact proper not duetothe South did that secede originated to The desire territory territory and language…” culture and national historiography Nationality became inthus understood terms of individuals and anofficial national language was established, along with a national all of bureaucratic for classification madewas acategory Nationality nation. a titular “nations”which tobeperceived allowed bounded as entities andascribedterritorially manner a in demarcated were boundaries national Union, Soviet former the “In 144 , Rita Jalali and SeymourMartin Lipset, (Winter 1992-1993), 605. 145 54 Racial and Racial 143 CEU eTD Collection 147 August 2006), 11. 146 the identified; legacies by Soviet were conditioned factors the back that to traced identification and territory. The fact that minorities have been disproportionately excluded can be and excluded from the public and social life of Georgia, owing to the Soviet vision of national especially the early 1990s, was a time when the Ossetian minority were discriminated against language.” notdo who Georgian speakthe those accommodating nationality and “according toDr. Wheatley, difficult toimagine a Georgian nation capable of disintegration, Georgian the language started to play a dominantrole in the defining Georgian Georgian nationalism was not as strong as it was by the time of dissolution. rule, due to the fact that everything was administered by Moscow for every one and the issue of and which is related to North Ossetians. The issue of separation did notcome up during Soviet Republic. Yet, Ossetians identified themselves as a nationality which is different from Georgians traditions and territory, even though it was an Autonomous Oblast within the Georgian Socialist South Ossetia from Georgia through its national policies. South Ossetia has its own language, Ibid. report, (conference Georgia” in state the and Minorities “National Nilsson, Niklas and Popjanevski Johanna As language was one of the signifier of group identity, after the Soviet Union’s Evidently, the USSR created an environment for the following issues of secession of “The term membershipGeorgian denotes of an ethnic Georgian community not and on on Georgian incapableterritory, thus of full acquiring Georgian citizenship.” increasingly principle tofrom referred latethe 1980sin as non-Georgians branding guests each national territory in the USSR as being the homeland for one exclusive nationality, a idea of the nationality” reinforced Theidea “titular of state. of Georgian the citizenship 55 147 Thepost-Sovietperiod, 146 CEU eTD Collection 150 149 August 2006), 12. 148 for the control. remain influence in the ‘near abroad’ and conflict in South Ossetia became in tool in the struggle for the Kremlin heightento the tensions within Georgia, because it understood that it had to to assisted and revival independencethe claims it asthen self-determinations of was favorable agenda, he waspro-peacefulrather settlement.conflict However, by 2000 Russiasignificantly during Lyudvig the Chibirov’s presidency independence was mainnot the priority of his political autonomy and ethnocratic type of by regime manifested Zviad Gasakhurdia. Nevertheless, Ossetia formed before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. They intensified with the abolition of and keepit tried to by meansthe offorce and political supremacy. Georgia and unify with other ethnic Ossetians, whereas Georgia was reluctant tolose territory the Soviet Union reinforced ethnic tensions within Georgia, South Ossetia wanted to secede from division the along lines ethnic was presentlongbefore independence. Georgian Thebreakupof fact that Moscow had an ability preventto ethnic conflicts from explosion. the dissolution of the USSR. Both groups coexisted with one another in the Soviet era due to the before originated ethnicities Georgian and Ossetian South between tensions the that means which homeland and the key role of language as a symbol nationalof identity. bureaucratization of nationality, the privileged status of titular nationalities, the discourse of Ibid, 17. Ibid, 15. report, (conference Georgia” in state the and Minorities “National Nilsson, Niklas and Popjanevski Johanna What can be concluded is the fact that the origins of claims for independence of of independence South is the of fact for origins claims the that can beconcluded What Georgia’s population is traditionally intodivided Georgians andnon – Georgians, Georgian society was already ethnic along lines longdivided its before independence 56 148 150 so 149 , CEU eTD Collection 155 154 153 152 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm. 151 involvement of NATO troops to preserve the peace.” mediation efforts led to the Rambouillet Accords, which called for Kosovo autonomy and the inmassresulted andkilling migration forced Albanians.of international “Intense ethnic full-scale campaign againstKLA on the pretext that itwas a terrorist organization. The campaign Kosovo independence. Between 1998 and 1999the armed conflictbegan, Milosevic launched a Autonomous province had representatives in federal the organs it possessed nearly equal rights as the six constituent Socialist Republics of the S.F.R.Y.” Constitution gave Kosovo the status of a Socialist Autonomous Province within Serbia. As such, incorporated into Yugoslavia with of status the autonomous province. Case ofKosovo claim independence to Reaction Russia’s Milosevic imposedMilosevic ruledirect from Belgrade support in referendum, constitutionhad significantly the autonomy reduced provincesof and Albanian In 1989newantagonism escalated. Serbian Constitution was adopted popularthrough languages. official of one became recognition, except for Albanian Albanian exceptfor government. recognition, declared Kosovoresponse, its independence in However,itdid1991. lead not to international the “Background note: Kosovo,” US Department of State Diplomacy in Action, accessed Ibid. December22, 2011, 53. States,” ofNew Creation the and Referenda Independence Decide: People the “Let Vidmar, Jure Ibid. “Background note: Kosovo,” US Department of State Diplomacy in Action, accessed December22, 2011, In 1997 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged as an organization for protection of Territory of Kosovo became a part of Serbia during the First Balkan War and later was later WarBalkan and First the apartofduring became Serbia Kosovo of Territory However, by the time of dissolution, when Slobodan Milosevic came to power, Serbo- 154 57 as a part of campaign to create GreatSerbia. In 155 However Milosevic refused to disarm, 153 with veto power, and Albanian 151 “The 1974Yugoslav 152 CEU eTD Collection http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1244(1999).pdf. 160 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm. 159 http://www.un.org/russian/documen/scresol/res1999/res1244.htm. 2011, 158 Post-Communist Europe 157 http://www.friendsofbosnia.org/edu_kos.html. 156 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm. in Kosovo. forcea NATO-led responsible asecure establishing for international peacekeeping environment refugee returns. substantial autonomy and self-governmentfor Kosovo and provision favourableof conditions for of points 1244 Resolution maintenancewere: of Serbian territorial integrity, of provision administration would that under operate Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).” NATO-led security force toenter Kosovo, which would befollowed by a United Nations civilian Rambouilletincluding the pull out of all Serb forces from Kosovo.” “The war finally ended in June with Milosevic accepting most of the earlier terms of then NATO initiated campaign against Serb military, which resulted in Milosevic’s submission. regarding Kosovo status in 2005. The ContactGrouphadGuiding set in Principles November violencestop UNSecurity andinterethnic for Therefore clashes. negotiationsCouncil called between all parties involved, however such policy did notlead to refugee returns, nor it did not Nations Security Council 1244. Resolution Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) - the temporary civilian administration in accordance with United “Resolution1244(1999),” United Nations, Security Council, accessed December22, 2011, 2011, 22, December accessed Organization, Treaty Atlantic North Kosovo,” in role “NATO’s Sammy Smooha and Priit Jarve, “A Model Making: The Case of Kosovo,” in The GlennRuga with by help Julie Mertus, “History warof the inKosovo,”accessed December 22, 2011, ³Ɋɟɡɨɥɸɰɢɹ Since 1999Kosovo wasunder protectorate of The Kosovo Force(KFOR), whichis At the beginning of Kosovo future status process, the aim was to reach the consensus 159 1244(1999),” At the same time UN had established the United Nations Interim Administration 158 , ed. Robert Curis, p.193. ɈɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɹɈɛɴɟɞɢɧɟɧɧɵɯɇɚɰɢɣ 160 58 , ɋɨɜɟɬȻɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ 156 “And agreed to allow a Fate of Ethnic Democracy in , accessed December22, 157 Main CEU eTD Collection http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/88236.pdf. 161 by supported many UN memberand states was highly by advocated UN Special Martti Envoy politicaltowards and territorial The settlements.dispute declaration independenceof was noreal movesa decade almost were there for because followed, independence of declaration the therefore andhumanitarian spheres, territory of Kosovo? UNMIK and KFOR were supervising almost every aspect of political, civil the on international long,presence adecade almost for under, exercise “autonomy” to possible Kosovo, it was not applicable to the existing circumstances. First of all, towhat extend it was of future the for alternatives the of one been have could autonomy considerable though even Unitedthe Nations Mission in Kosovo and KFOR protectorate. genocide in long-lasting1999, presence of peace-keepingforces, stay under the administration of regard this case as unique in Yugoslavia’s context,dissolution followed byinterethnic clashes, Kosovo recognized that countries and community” “international that factdue tothe recognition, anymore, soon February Kosovo proclaimed17, 2008, its independence and received wide was maintaining notincapability status-quo acceptablein resolutions. Therefore, conflict otherwise it wouldinability proof of NATO and ‘West’ todeal with conflicting regions andits autonomy grantingor independence were the onlypossible outcomes available for Kosovo. situation, neither can be partitioned or annexed to other state. 2005 regarding Kosovo settlement Kosovo status: of cannot be returned tothe pre-1999 “Kosovo Contact Group Statement,” London31 January, 2006, accessed December22, 2011, As it was seen, despite positive potential of autonomy,it was a weak option for Kosovo, Secondly, unproductive after andlong-lasting negotiations concerning the fate Kosovo, of It was clear, that process of Kosovo future status settlement should be expedited, because de-facto no autonomy existed. 59 161 Thus, provision of considerable CEU eTD Collection Autonomy Reconsidered,” 165 American Journal of Sociology 164 103. Kovacs, Petra and Dimitriejevic distrust: The prognosis for post-conflict settlement in multiethnic communities in the former Yugoslavia 163 162 apart” falling from states existing prevent to means “effective an be to in order be artificial not should continues torun an inadministrative apparatus Autonomousthe Province. Thus, autonomy the major part is under control of self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. Nevertheless, Serbia still Kosovo region is regardedas Autonomousthe Province ofKosovo andMetohija, the though, considerable amountof recognition from UN memberaccording states, Republic to of Serbia, groups. research revealed, Kosovo had the lowest average level of tolerance towards other ethnic mutual antagonism andgrowing Serbian nationalism after deathof the AndTito. as sociological society, heterogeneous wasadeepdivision of there peaceful coexistence lines, ethnic along Kosovo long before the outbreak of armed conflict.” had in walls mistrust been builtof level Instead, ahigh experienced of coexistence. cordial deal regions.unstable with Kosovo,” Ahtisaari. very the defining “From start, processaimed the at of structure an independent Hans-Joachim Heintze, “Implementation of Minority Rights through the Devolution of Powers – The Concept of Randy Hodson, Dusko Sekulic, Garth Massey Source, “National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Kosovo,” in Thrive Can Practices Good Before Needed “Policies Anastasijevic, Duske James Ker-Lindsay, 165 Fourth, evenFourth, though nowadays is Kosovo functioning asindependent and state received a Third, autonomy was not aviable option due to the fact that “Kosovo has never 164 it has to 162 because otherwise NATO and ‘West’ would lose it face and show its incapability to function Kosovo, thepath tocontested statehood in the Balkans International Journal on Minority and Group Rights , (May, 1994):1547. asone. 60 163 Kosovo has never been a place of (London 2009), 112. 9 (2002). Managing hatred and , ed. Nenad The CEU eTD Collection much of attention. of much 166 as not lead to official recognition, therefore up to 2008 South Ossetia and Kosovo had been referred independence. Both entities proclaimed independence atthe beginning of it1990s, however did Kosovo sets aprecedent to Serbia. deep participation, international community could not just goaway and handed the problem back supervise situation the and provide guidance for establishment of new institutions, and since its to (UNMIK) Kosovo in Mission Administration Interim UN the established it conflict; the community’ could notlet it happen. Secondly, the UN was greatly involved in the settlement of potential impositionautonomy,of it wouldof lead tooutburstof violence and ‘international reasons. First of all,independence and recognition was the only feasible outcome, besides the Ossetia or Kosovo are Kosovo or Ossetia territorial integrity or the right for self-determination, however, the issue whether either South and the SovietUnion major dispute waswhich theof principles should be respectedmore: moves secessionistagainst infavor of Sinceterritorial theintegrity. dissolution of Yugoslavia the issue of secession from Georgia and Serbia respectably, but there is a worldwide consensus James Ker-Lindsay, de facto Both, for South Ossetian and Kosovo political elite the ultimate goal was to attain Unlike South Ossetia, Kosovo managed to gain international recognition due to several 166 states. Emergence of the new states of South Ossetia and Kosovo inevitably lead to Kosovo, thepath tocontested statehood in the Balkans able to function as independent and sovereign states did not attract that attract not did states sovereign and independent as function to 61 (London 2009), 109. CEU eTD Collection interests which Russia was pursuing in South Ossetia and NATO and the US in Kosovo. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 101. 168 Otherwise, if Pandora box has been opened it is hard to hold it back. In any way, the recognition principles” to settle conflicts ranging from Kosovo to the frozen “universal conflicts the for need in a was Georgiathere that announced he when in policy change the on hinted regionsmedia in the‘uniqueness’ secessionist will cause other Kosovo. for therecognition of itwas acounter-reaction by the existing realities in the ‘near abroad’, where Russia had to maintain the influence over and emergence.was conditioned and decision The state of statehood by normative aspects guided the membership in the club of Sovereign states. At that point, Russia’s leadership decision was not of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it did not imply that Russia considered them eligible for the August 2008PresidentDmitryi Medvedev signed a decree which acknowledged therecognition Whenin andits accordinginterests benefits. to by Moscow coordinated every action almostwas 167 social terms. Thus, the in and economic independent become truly haveto states areeffective,do they apotential those whether isit butnot international law toachieveindependence, whether in with compliance Ronald D Asmus, Pavel Baev, Pavel In case of South Ossetia, the entity was more of a puppet state then The question raised is whether South Ossetia and Kosovo able to, have a right to and It was clear that the ‘uniqueness’ of Kosovo which was often referred by the western Russia's policies in the Caucasus A little war that shook the world: Georgia, Russia,and the future of the West effectiveness of those states was less of importance then then states wasless particular the of ofimportance those (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 14. 62 167 . Therefore, in early 2006, Putin de facto (New York: one, as one, 168 . CEU eTD Collection 173 172 171 170 Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 103. 169 Regarding Kosovo, Saakashvilli had no influence over Western policy in Balkans in policy Western over influence no had Saakashvilli Kosovo, Regarding had no choice, but to go along with whatever NATO and European countries thought was right. he had chosen pro-Western course in its foreign affairs and was heading into NATO, thus, Tbilisi for maneuvers,because had little room Saakashvilli However, its regions. secessionist to regard was leadership wouldand Kosovo aware of thatrecognition threat inthe Georgian of bring status. Kosovo upon decision NATO’s or Pristina and betweenBelgrade negotiation the despite has been settingof aprecedent, Kosovo simply had to live with the fallout of Western policy influence and the rules of the game, above all vis-à-vis the United States. Moscow had always willingwas not goingagree or to on Kosovo uniqueness,“it as Russianwas about and status Kosovoon wasunique, the itthinkingwould went that indeed be unique. independence. in tensions regions toKosovo conflicting asresponse Georgian protectitselfinability madeto from decision byWestern countries escalation and Russia’s of Moscow with diplomatically or ground the on either not develop any kind of Plan B for managing the consequences of that policy for Georgia – Ibid, 102. Ibid. Ibid, 88. Ibid, 104. Ronald D Asmus, The decision finalregarding status of Kosovo had aninevitable side effectGeorgia, on If the United States, the European Union, and Russia could all agree that the compromise the that agree all could and Union, Russia European the If UnitedStates, the A little war thatshook the world: Georgia, Russia,and the future of the West 63 172 171 . Therefore Tbilisi was trapped between and the problem was that the West did 173 However, Russia 170 (New York: . Georgia 169 , CEU eTD Collection gave a television hegaveaddress, where saidthat: atelevision on it, and showed Georgia Europehow is handle able to the crisis. In April 2008, Saakashvilli 176 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17476&search=. 175 Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 103. 174 remain must a closedRussian geopolitical preserve” post-Soviet ‘space’ in its entirety, encompassing the former state of the Soviet Union,is and another ‘truth’, as Professor Emeritus John Erickson writes that Russia “insists doggedly that the 177 2009),Inc, 126. Guns of August 2008 Russia’s War in to the will itsof people, harming Russia in no way” refuse on its plans, though, “as a sovereign state, Georgia may chart its own course, subject only bordering region, so it was manipulating the situation in conflicting regions to push Tbilisi to saw Georgia’s willingness to become a NATO member state as a threat to its influence in the alliance” in of nation itself North-Atlantic apeace-loving eyes the as to “portray aggression from the Georgian side it had no chance to become a NATO member, therefore it had influence.” viewed NATO’s intervention in Kosovo as a demonstration of American power and its sphere of and Strategy David J. Smith, “The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian Policies Before the 2008 War,” in “Sokhumi Rejects Tbilisi’s Proposal as ‘PR Sunt,’” 29 March 2008, Ronald D Asmus, John Erickson, “Russia Will not be Trifled With: Geopolitical Facts and Fantasies.” In diplomatic efforts with our friends and allies to maintain our peaceful and democratic and peaceful our maintain to allies values in tocreate guaranteesorder forand protection forGeorgia’s security and protection of friends our with efforts diplomatic “We will defend andnotgive upour territorial integrity…We will keep upmaximum Thus, Georgia, in order to show its restraint, portrayed Russia as having malicious attacks Under existing circumstances, Saakashvilli could do little, as if there was any form of , ed. ColinS. Gray Geoffreyand (London:Sloan Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), 260. 174 A little war thatshook the world: Georgia, Russia,and the future of the West Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, M.E. York: (New Starr Frederick and E. Cornell Svante ed. Georgia, 64 176 177 . However, the Kremlin believed in believed Kremlin the However, . . Geopolitics: Geography 175 (New York: . The Kremlin The CEU eTD Collection 178 the end of the day itis a two-ended stick and the second end will come back and hit them in the law system. He said that: "They have not thought through the results of what they are doing. At declaration independencestated that of was unilaterally itinternational prepared andundermined the warnings proclaimed Kosovo butdespite precedent-setting, its Putin independence. Vladimir Monitoring. 181 180 179 2009),Inc, 126. Guns of August 2008 Russia’s War in is a response to the perceived threat of NATO enlargementin this region.” Kosovo precedent, that this is a response to the West’s neglectof Russia’s positions, and that this 1: “They clearly have said – and this was reiterated by Putin to me – that this is a response to the NATO particularly itsmovement, approach membership.to had decided togo to war in order to teach the ‘West’ a lesson and tostall Georgia’s westward designated course: to respond ‘West’ on Kosovo. The big picture is that after Kosovo, Russia negotiations with Russia’s authorities, at the same time, the Kremlin was following its insisted, Putin told him that David J. Smith, “The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian Policies Before the 2008 War,” in “Georgian pundits comment on results of Putin-Saakashvili meeting,” Ibid, 139. Ibid, 141-142. From From verybeginningthe Russia made its position clear thatindependent will Kosovo be Georgia” peace and force everyone to togive uptheir aggressive andirresponsible policies towards Nevertheless, Georgia’s ‘friends andallies’ didit nothelp groundsthe on or through directed against you but againstdirected willbe responseto our them.” to Kosovo. You should notworry, it shouldn’t bother you. What we do will not be shall respond not to you, but to the West – America and NATO, and in connection “As for thedisputed territories ofAbkhazia andSouthOssetia, in regardwe this 178 . Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, M.E. York: (New Starr Frederick and E. Cornell Svante ed. Georgia, 65 179 24 Saati Saakashvili told Reuters on May , 28 February 2008, in BBC 181 180 Saakashvili The CEU eTD Collection http://www.kosovocompromise.com/cms/item/topic/en.html?view=story&id=2378§ionId=1. 185 http://rt.com/politics/moscow-on-kosovo-no-means-no/. 184 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090220/120237609.html. 183 http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1203714121.65/. 182 Kremlin fiercely independence,opposed giving the support for Serbian territorial integrity; in the independence. Kosovo lesswas the no catalystbut the process, Abkhaz political Ossetia and the South to acatalyst became of 2008 war The regions. Abkhazia, referring endshould the be puttowhat Georgiahad done to populationthe in those later Russian president signed a decree on the recognition of independence of South Ossetia and UNSCR 1244was still in guaranteeing Serbia'sterritorial force, integrity. moreover hesaid that determination, Kosovo from independencedeclaring andthatthe people Kosovo of didenjoy not a rightto self- prevents law international general that said proceedings, ICJ in the representative legal Russia's Kosovo". foreign policy moves infuture, including the ones related to thesolving of issuethe with forpartner" Russia in Europe Southeastand announced "Weintendcontinue to coordinate to our firm" stays also integrity stated: “Ourfor support Serbia's course of inaction defendingits sovereignty and territorial precedent-setting. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov gave no results, and one of the reasons was that Russia’s authorities were keen to depict face". “ “Moscow onKosovo: nomeans no!,” RT, accessed May 10, 2012, “Russia not getting ready to recognize Kosovo - Lavrov,” RIAnovosti, accessed May 7, 2012, “A Long Road from Kosovo to Kurdistan,” Asia Times Online, accessed March 10, 2012, Russia-US clash atICJoverlegality of Kosovo's UDI,”Kosovo Compromise, accessed 10, April 2012, 182 Despite of the contradicting attitude towards the recognition: in the case of Kosovo, the During the debate before the ICJ in December 2009, Kirill Gevorgian, who today acted as Despite of the great effort to portray breakaway province of Kosovo as unique case 184 183 .On May 29, 2009, President Medvedev described Serbia as a "key the unilateral unilateral the declaration was illegal, that stressed and 66 185 But only half But yearonly a CEU eTD Collection 187 south Ossetia and Abkhazia 186 with US the and Federation Russian the between ‘confrontation’ larger inmuch tool instrumental to existing circumstances the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia turned out to be the the ‘creation’ of new states on the territory of Georgia was not the primary goal for Moscow, due ‘West’, the Kremlin had chosen the separatist regions as means of leverage for Tbilisi. Though, presidency hisand agenda Georgia’s torestore territorial integrity and clearmove towards the space withinto keep its post-Soviet the influence, sphere Saakashvilli’s andwith the of different: Russia has always insisted that the CIS was a top foreign policy priority what can be said about Russia’s actions on the ground, however the bigger picture is somewhat civilians, which Russia furiously tried to presents, and humanitarian disaster after the war. It is of Ossetian genocide and by Georgia aggressive actions the measure to asacounter Secondly, first of all, as a response to the recognition of Kosovo by the US, and UN member states. and independence werethe Abkhazian following: integrity of Georgia. The arguments which Mr. Medvedec brought upin favor of the Ossetian case of South Ossetia, the Kremlin ‘preferred’ the right for self-determination over the territorial Ibid, 327. Ana K. Niedermaier, As it is seen, recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia’s leadership was done 4) 3) 2) 1) acting in accordance with international norms, exercising the right of nations to self- to determination.” nations of right the exercising norms, international with in accordance acting In demanding recognition as independent states, Abkhazia and South Oseetia are resistance. deprived these republics of status the entities,of autonomous provoking civil Abkhazia either de jure or de facto; by its arbitrary decision, the Georgian parliament Union,its sovereignty nolonger extended to the territory of South Ossetia and After Georgia refused tohold March the 1991 referendum on preserving [Soviet] the including democratically formed institutions of legislationgovernment, and armies. Both republics already have all states, independentof necessary attributes the condition for the security of the peoples wholive there. “Recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a necessary Countdown war to Georgia: in Russia's foreign policy and media coverageof the conflict in (Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Press, 2008), 417. 186 67 187 and wanted and CEU eTD Collection south Ossetia and Abkhazia 188 there. bases military locating Russian on agreements state state-to NATO. Besides, having recognized these republics, Russia can bypass Georgia and directly sign Ana K. Niedermaier, Countdown war to Georgia: in Russia's foreign policy and media coverageof the conflict in (Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Press, 2008), 418. 68 188 CEU eTD Collection Russia’s role in the transportation and supply of gas and oil. Therefore, the new alternative wanted to diminish Europe Of course, toEurope. was asuppliercheap energy of recourses time, Russia had a considerable weight over the range of issues in the European countries, as it involved. ‘frozen’ phase from the relative 1993-1999, stability becould between observed all parties inbeen had conflict Thus,the process. the in conflict-settlement the authorities Georgian republic, togain wanted substantial cultural autonomy and Georgia within wascooperative with unification.recognition or Since then,Lyudvig Chibirov, president the of self-proclaimedthe expressed the wish to be unified with North Ossetia, however it did notlead to official break Union, upof Sovietthe Ossetia madeand South independence todeclare attempt and the After them. to recognition full the granting not and Ossetians South of claims determination for self- thesupport between balancing theKremlin therefore was in ‘nearabroad’, the influence for the providingsecessionist forces territories. settlement, in peacekeeping conflict the forinterfere Moscow to in region.the to Sincethen and upto2008,Russia wasactively involved Georgia – South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Conflicting regions became the best means and reasons dissolution of the Union led to the aspiration of the separatistmovements on the territory of tried to pursue its own political course in foreign relations as well as in domestic affairs. The and foreign policies of its member states. At the same time former republic of USSR – Georgia - post-Soviet space. With the emergence of the CIS, Moscow tried to keep influence over domestic Conclusion However, significant changes started when Vladimir Putin became a Prime Minister. At the its maintain to interests long-term its by conditioned was conflict in the involvement Russias Since the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia’s foreign policy was spinning around the 69 CEU eTD Collection http://www.silkroadstudies.org/BTC_6.pdf. 189 nationalism manifested by Nevertheless,Gamsakhurdia. during the Chibirov presidency his main of Georgian escalation the andwith abolished autonomy later when the was came determination gainingleadership wasconcerned the about andelite claims cultural autonomy, self- the for the US and Europe for Kosovo. By the time of dissolution of Soviet Union South Ossetian maintainstrategy withinto near the abroad influence sphere its of for andbetheanswer NATO, in asaresult warand South grant independencethe Ossetia andAbkhazia. to main to interfere becamethe later reason which Ossetians, majority of South overwhelming the people to leadingthe positions, whowere pursuing Russian interests; and citizenship granting to of ‘right’ Ossetia: appointment South the territory of control the actively under taking started turn of political orientation towards the ‘West’ and NATO (after the Rose Revolution), Moscow separatist territories. became a means to push on Tbilisi and thirdly, Russia can arrange its military contingent on the on the territory prevent state to gain membership in NATO. Secondly, escalation of conflict slowed down the process for Georgia to join NATO, as unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes declaration to join NATO, Russia’s leadership staked on breakaway territories. First of all,it used all available means push to on Tbilisi. Europe, bearing this in mind, the Kremlin chose the weakest link in the chain – Georgia, and 2003. Theproject implied political motives diminish to Russia’s influence and in role the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project gained momentum in 1998 “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications forTurkey,” Zeyno Baran, accessed 10, April 2012, Concerning South Ossetia,it became aninstrumental tool for Kremlinthe in its long-term Thus, since the time of Putin presidency and deterioration of relations with Georgia, due to By the early 2000 Georgian authorities became less loyal Moscowto and with the open 70 189 and followed construction in CEU eTD Collection of set of interacting circumstances in the head of which was the recognition of Kosovo. in of headof which wastherecognition the interacting circumstances of set of Georgian territory was not the plan from the beginning, the recognition itself occurred simply out Abkhaz leadership toMoscow. For authorities in Russia, creation of several states on the recognition to South Ossetia, though proposals had been send for several times by Ossetian and such a strong supportfor independence andself-determination claims, Russiadidnot grand afull no whowould toturn one to or financial provide support to theregion.Nevertheless, of despite primary goal for South Ossetian elite, it had to play by Moscow rules, because otherwise, it had state frompuppet Despite 2000-2008. this factthat independent statehood and recognition was a implied secession was given by Moscow. Sovietperiod, due to its national push the policies, andmotivation for self-determination which But, despite of the fact that origins of self-determination claims of South Ossetians have roots in Kremlin.the Thus, when Kokoity was elected and hispriority top gainwas to independence. agenda was cooperation andsettlement, conflict which by 2000 wasnot needed course the for Even though South isas South Ossetia referred Even though de facto 71 state, on the ground itbecame Russia’s CEU eTD Collection https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html. 190 Georgian 71% (official), Russian 9%, Armenian 7%, Azeri 6%, other 7% Languages: Georgian Azeri Armenian83.8%, 6.5%, Russian5.7%, other2.5%1.5%, (2002census) Ethnic groups: Southwestern Asia, bordering the Black Sea, between Turkey and Russia Location: (CIA (CIA Factbook) Appendix CIA - WorldThe Factbook –Georgia (April 28,2010). 72 190 CEU eTD Collection since October 31,2008 Bolshakov, Alexander Michailovich 31, 2008. Bulatsev, Aslanbek Soltanovich Tanaev, Yury Anvarovich Caucasian Military District. 2008 –August 18,2008, from August 9alsoCommander-in-chief 58 the of VasilyLunev, Vasiljevich Vladimir Kotoev, Kuzmich 11, 2006–February 28, 2008. Laptev, Andrey Ivanovich November 9,2006. Attoev, Boris Majitovich March 3, 2006–November 8,2006. Dolgopolov, Nikolai Vasiljevich Morozov, YuriIonovich 2008. Mindzaev, Michail Chebodarev, Oleg March 2, 2006. Yarovoy, Anatoly Ossetia, December11,2006–October 3,2008. Ossetia, July 6, 2004 – December 10, 2006; Secretary of Security of Security Council of South Barankevich, AnatolyKonstantinovich Russian Citizens inthe MilitaryPolitical and LeadershipofSouthOssetia,2004-08: New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2009.) The Guns Augustof 2008Russia’s Warin editedGeorgia, Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr. from(Taken Illarionov, Andrei.“The Russian Leadership’s forPreparation War 1999-2008.” In Table 1 , FSB major-general; Chairman of KGB of South Ossetia, January 17, 2005 – , FSB colonel, chief of the State Border Guard of South Ossetia since 2005. , FSBlieutenant-general; of AprilMinister Interior, August26, 2005– 18, , prime minister of South Ossetia, July 5, 2005–August 18,2008. , FSB lieutenant-general, Chairman of KGB of South Ossetia since , lieutenant-general,, Minister of Defense of South Ossetia, March 1, , major-general,, Minister of South Ossetia since October 31. , lieutenant-general, Minister of Defense of South Ossetia, December , FSB colonel, Chairman of State Protection Guard, since 2007. , FSB major-general, Chairman of KGB of South Ossetia, , FSB colonel, prime minister of South Ossetia since October , Chief of the South Ossetia Presedential Administration , lieutenant-genaral; Minister of Defense of South 73 th Army of the North CEU eTD Collection Books: Bibliography: 12) 11) 10) 9) 8) 7) 6) 5) 4) 3) 2) 1) Georrrey Georrrey Sloan (London: Frank260. 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