Parimal G. Patil. Against a Hindu God: Buddhist in . New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. xi + 406 pp. $50.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-231-14222-9.

Reviewed by Stephen Phillips

Published on H- (January, 2010)

Commissioned by Daniel A. Arnold (University of Chicago)

Early in the history of classical Indian philos‐ dūṣaṇa), is the main focus of the book under re‐ ophy, the Nyāya Sūtra directs arguments against view. recognizably Buddhist positions, as does Nāgārju‐ The Buddhist-Nyāya debate is multidimen‐ na against Nyāya and its sister school Vaiśeṣika, sional, involving epistemological controversy re‐ without, on either side, identifcation of the oppo‐ garding the nature and status of perception, infer‐ nent by name. Great thinkers of both camps--from ence, testimony, and other issues, as well as meta‐ Vātsyāyana (c. 400) through Vācaspati (950) and physical disputes concerning, in particular, Udayana (1000) on the Nyāya side, and especially whether there is an individual self or any other Dignāga (500) and Dharmakīrti (625) among Bud‐ thing (including God) that endures, or whether ev‐ dhist reasoners--attack the others’ theses or rebut erything is essentially momentary. And as Parimal the others’ objections to positive arguments. By Patil shows, much of the general confict is rele‐ the eleventh century, Udayana is able to fll two vant to Ratnakīrti’s purported refutation of what large volumes with almost nothing but close com‐ is historically the central Nyāya inference for īś‐ bat with the Dignāga school, “Discernment of the vara. There are a dozen or so theistic inferences, Truth about the Self” (Ātma-tattva-viveka) and invented for the most part by Udayana, but the “Handfuls of Flowers of Critical Reasoning [Prov‐ one Ratnakīrti targets was advanced by Vāt‐ ing the , īśvara]” (Nyāya- syāyana and all the early Nyāya Sūtra commenta‐ kusumâñjalī). Almost contemporaneously, Rat‐ tors, and was the only theistic inference defended nakīrti (1050), one of the latest Buddhist luminar‐ by Gaṅgeśa in the fourteenth century in his solidi‐ ies to write in Sanskrit, engages Nyāya in tightly fying of New (navya) Nyāya. reasoned treatises, one of which, “Refutation of Patil has brought to bear on his study and in‐ Arguments Establishing Īśvara” (Īśvara-sādhana- terpretation of Ratnakīrti’s refutation most of the H-Net Reviews interlocking theses of Ratnakīrti’s Buddhist world‐ sion--available to non-specialists. That this scholar view. He is particularly good at showing the sote‐ can write is an understatement. Ratnakīrti’s views riological point of the refutation, while at the are easily grasped. Without very many explicit same time establishing that Ratnakīrti considers comparisons, Patil’s exposition is full of reso‐ his reasoning epistemically rational--i.e., that Rat‐ nances with Plato, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, nakīrti thinks his argument objectively cogent G. W. F. Hegel, and much analytic refection. The from the Nyāya or any point of view irrespective footnotes, which are prodigiously extensive, pro‐ of purpose (except to that of believing the truth). vide pertinent text and translation along with the In this review, I shall emphasize limitations of best philosophic and scholarly references, but can Patil’s study, showing what it is not but perhaps be ignored without losing the train of the argu‐ might have been. What the book is, though, is out‐ ment. Everyone has much to learn from this book. standing scholarship making innovative use of There are a couple of ironies, however, in distinctions ironed out in contemporary episte‐ what Patil tells us about his project at the begin‐ mology to present--without jargon--Ratnakīrti’s ning. I shall bring these out at the end of the re‐ philosophy in its full glory, which is glorious in‐ view. First, the heart of the book, the inference deed. Painstaking examination of the refutation of that Ratnakīrti refutes, which can be reconstruct‐ Nyāya’s theistic inference launches the deepest of ed formally as an “inference for others” probes into Ratnakīrti’s entire system. (parârthânumāna): Patil reveals an amazing degree of interlock (1) Earth and the like have an intelligent mak‐ among Ratnakīrti’s positions. The refutation of the er as an instrumental cause. theistic argument ties up tightly with Ratnakīrti’s (2) For they are efects. rejection of what he takes to be the Nyāya episte‐ (3) (This is) like a pot (which has an intelligent mology of inference, and connects with his alter‐ maker as an instrumental cause), and unlike an native theory of the nature and underpinnings of atom (which is not an efect); where an efect, the source of knowledge, which is, according to there an intelligent maker as an instrumental the Dignāga school, along with perception one of cause. only two pramāṇas. (Patil translates pramāṇa (4) Earth and the like are similar (fall under the here, appropriately, as “instrument of warranted rule). awareness,” not giving it a realist rendering such (5) Therefore earth and the like have an intelli‐ as “generator of knowledge” or “generator of true gent maker as an instrumental cause. cognition.”) The value of this book lies as much in The supplementary argument that the intelli‐ the holism of its presentation (matching the co‐ gent maker is īśvara (“God”) is that this is the best herence of the system portrayed) as in the clarity candidate, no hypothesis being as simple as īś‐ with which Ratnakīrti’s refutation is displayed. By vara as creator. Nyāya’s motto in reasoning about thinking critically along with Ratnakīrti as he entities that are theoretic (in the sense that in no elaborates his complaints against Nyāya, and by instances are they known immediately by percep‐ careful study of Ratnakīrti’s other works and tion) is to assume only as much about a posited those of his most important Buddhist predeces‐ cause as is necessary to account for an efect in sors, Patil has given us a “must-read.” By “us” I view. Nyāya philosophers formulate causal princi‐ mean mainly scholars of classical Indian thought, ples on the basis of correlations without bias whatever the more specialized interest. But also, about the sorts of things that can be linked, so to his great credit, Patil has made Ratnakīrti--and long as the cause has the character that makes it Indian Buddhist philosophy in general, which in able to perform the role for which it is proposed Ratnakīrti comes arguably to its fullest expres‐

2 H-Net Reviews in the frst place. Thus, the God inferred by nakīrti succeeds, it seems, in making the case that Naiyāyikas is not considered omnipotent, since there is no signifcant doubt about growing grass’s atoms, ether, and individual selves are eternal not having an intelligent maker, at least of the and uncreated, and laws of karmic justice, etc., sort familiar to us through the likes of examples are what they are independently of God’s creative such as a pot and a potter. action. But God is omniscient, knowing all there is The issues I have identifed (following Patil) to know about everything; otherwise, God would are related: extrapolation is limited to instances not be able to play the required causal role, since that are well known, according to the Buddhist-- only an agent thoroughly familiar with the mate‐ instances where we are acquainted with an efect rial with which he or she works is capable of pro‐ and the intelligent agent who is an instrumental ducing the intended result, like a weaver with cause thereof, and indeed, acquainted with an ex‐ thread to be woven. trapolatable characteristic of the connection such Ratnakīrti counters that all that can be known that we may say that the reason or prover proper‐ about the property to be proved--the sādhya, ren‐ ty is due to the target. Ratnakīrti’s rival theory of dered by Patil as “target,” which in this case is the pervasion as inference-warranting, which Patil property having an intelligent maker--is that it is shows to be based on the apoha (“exclusion”) the‐ not unconnected with the inferential subject––the ory of concept-formulation, avoids the error of pakṣa or “site” in Patil’s translation, in this case, making us know too much, and for this reason “earth and the like.” But according to Ratnakīrti does indeed seem to be preferable to the Nyāya (and others), there are obvious counterexamples theory. Patil is at his best in illuminating the Bud‐ to the purported pervasion of the prover proper‐ dhist “exclusion” theory, which on his reading is ty--the sādhana, rendered by Patil as the “reason,” the knot at the center holding together the sepa‐ which in this case is being an efect--by the target. rate strands of Ratnakīrti’s system. The apoha the‐ For instance, growing grass is an efect but does ory is in my view abstruse, including, Patil shows, not have an intelligent maker. both selective and negational components. How‐ The Nyāya response is to include all seeming ever, Ratnakīrti does seem to derive from it the counterexamples in the set of things taken to be right scope for inference’s capacity to generate the inferential subject. Thus, growing grass is to knowledge. About a chapter is devoted to apoha be included in the “and the like” (“etc.”) part of and Ratnakīrti's epistemology of inference, which the phrase “earth and the like” at step (1) above, are as central to the book as a whole as the refut‐ and no counterexample can be drawn from the ed theistic reasoning. pakṣa, or “site,” on pain of begging the question. Now to the two ironies. The frst has to do The whole point of inference is to make us know with what Patil tells us about the disciplines in something about an inferential subject that we which he works, which include, he says, philoso‐ did not know previously, and so we cannot as‐ phy as well as indology and religious studies. But sume we know, prior to the inference, whether is it doing philosophy to walk us up to the edge of the site is or is not qualifed by the target. Patil an evaluative overview without telling us any‐ shows that Ratnakīrti exposes the trick here, thing about what we should fnally think, i.e., which has to do with whether there is signifcant about whether Ratnakīrti’s refutation is really doubt about grass’s not having an intelligent mak‐ successful, or whether his is really the superior er. He argues that growing grass cannot legiti‐ epistemology? Ratnakīrti here comes across as mately be part of the site if there is no such doubt. seeming right because Ratnakīrti himself surely With sophisticated epistemological moves, Rat‐ takes his reasoning to be cogent, and Patil chan‐

3 H-Net Reviews nels its force admirably. But we never really hear of atoms. Thus the intelligent maker could not be the voices of the other side, and Patil does not much like us, it is pretty evident, in both the himself take a stance. Nyāya and Buddhist conceptions. It is signifcant that Ratnakīrti argues not only To be sure, Patil tells us repeatedly that Rat‐ negatively, but also puts forth several positive ar‐ nakīrti’s Naiyāyikas are not necessarily the real guments--for momentariness in particular, as well McCoys, but only the interlocutors of his treatises, as for the thesis that meditation on momentari‐ saying “Ratnakīrti’s Naiyāyikas” so frequently that ness has soteriological value. There are weak po‐ when the qualifying possessive is not used (but sitions here on which Patil does not dwell. For ex‐ only the word “Naiyāyikas”), we assume an ellip‐ ample, the hinge thesis that from meditation on sis and understand that it is only the Naiyāyikas momentariness we become capable of yogic per‐ of Ratnakīrti’s own conception that are meant. ception of dharma is mysterious but not illu‐ This is not entirely true, however, in chapter 2, mined by Patil. (Why should such meditation re‐ where the Nyāya epistemology is laid out before duce selfshness--which is all that is mentioned in the īśvara inference is dissected in chapter 3. defense of the claim – any more than, say, medita‐ There Patil does an excellent job overall in pre‐ tion on ātman à la Nyāya?) And it is surely highly senting Nyāya’s theory of knowledge. Early implausible that we have the power to construct Naiyāyikas are quoted, and, I repeat, he has mas‐ external, intersubjective objects, the objects of tered the philosophic idiom required to make the bodily and linguistic acts. Ratnakīrti’s subjectivist views plain, including some terrifc innovations. thesis is, however, glossed over by Patil in my However, there are distortions from the Nyāya judgment. I am suggesting, then, that a properly point of view, it seems to me, probably due to his philosophic study would not be the mere mouth‐ slightly confusing Ratnakīrti’s Naiyāyikas for Vā‐ piece for Ratnakīrti that this book becomes--albeit caspati and company when these are not the there is tremendous merit in allowing Ratnakīrti same. The difculty is perhaps compounded by to address us in our own philosophic terminology Ratnakīrti’s being quite a bit more fair-minded to‐ in a study that is, all told, like a lucid translation wards Naiyāyikas than is, say, Udayana in pre‐ but better. senting Buddhist theories. We are talking mostly The second irony is that Ratnakīrti argues about subtleties. But the “certifcation conditions,” that Buddha is omniscient. In broad perspective, for example, that Patil stresses belong alone to Nyāya’s attribution of omniscience to īśvara Ratnakīrti. Ratnakīrti has a brilliant rhetorical seems like a species of error common to all the re‐ strategy in his “Proof of Momentariness by Posi‐ ligious philosophies of classical India--including tive Correlation” (Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi anvayât‐ (which, like Buddhism, is atheistic while mikā), showing that his inference does not fall to yet attributing omniscience to the Jina). Further‐ certain well-known fallacies, to wit, Patil’s “certif‐ more, as Patil mentions but does not elaborate, cation conditions,” and he employs the same strat‐ Ratnakīrti accepts that earth and the like do have egy or, we could say, holds his Naiyāyikas to the an intelligent maker, just not Nyāya’s īśvara. same standards with respect to their īśvara infer‐ Within Nyāya, Vācaspati argues that insofar as ence--albeit in the one case the examined infer‐ one of the causal functions for which īśvara is ence passes the tests and in the other it fails them. posited is to combine atoms, īśvara must be bodi‐ But this is not how Nyāya looks at certifcation. If less; for if an embodied being were thought to a specifc fallacy is alleged, the proponent has an bring this about, then another combiner would be epistemic duty to show it to be non-genuine, but required, ad infnitum, all bodies being made up not a duty to consider all defeating possibilities.

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A related misconstrual: Patil tells us in sever‐ al places that Ratnakīrti criticizes the Nyāya theo‐ ry for its view that “a fnite, unspecifed number of empirical observations and nonobservations can establish the absence of a reason property in all dissimilar cases” (p. 149). This is a straw man. To know Śābaleya as a cow is to know something about any particular cow, including future cows. Similarly, one knows about anything smokey that it is something fery (and about anything non- fery that it is non-smoky). But negative correla‐ tion, like the positive, delivers a fallible projec‐ tion, and a judgment of pervasion can be wrong though appearing to be warranted. Unlike Rat‐ nakīrti’s Naiyāyikas, the real ones are not so pre‐ sumptuous. The deep issue is how sensitive to po‐ tential defeaters we have to be in order to act con‐ fdently on our inferences. Surely, contra Patil’s Ratnakīrti (304-305), we needn’t be aware of all possible defeaters. Inferences may have to be cer‐ tifed when challenged, but we do not have to be as sensitive to defeaters as Ratnakīrti and Patil make out, at least not according to Nyāya. Patil has given us a great book on Ratnakīrti, partially through learning and presenting the views of Ratnakīrti’s opponents, which he has done admirably well, although the book lacks an evaluative overview and does not present equally the two sides of the debate about īśvara. It is a penetrating study of Ratnakīrti’s entire philoso‐ phy for all that, indeed perhaps better for the re‐ strictions.

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Citation: Stephen Phillips. Review of Patil, Parimal G. Against a Hindu God: Buddhist Philosophy of Religion in India. H-Buddhism, H-Net Reviews. January, 2010.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=25550

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