The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Information Series EISENHOWER SYMPOSIUM
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The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Information Series EISENHOWER SYMPOSIUM —IKE AND ME“ Edited by: Hans N. Tuch and G. Lewis Schmidt Copyright 199 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Introduction by Abbott Washburn emarks by Barry Zorthian emarks by Burnett Anderson emarks by $ames Halsema emarks by Hans Tuch After Dinner Section%Introduction by Abbott Washburn emarks by Henry Loomis Comment by Frank Shakespeare Comment by $ames (eogh Letter from Arthur Larson Preface In commemoration of e)-President Dwight D. Eisenhower.s 100th birthday in October 11102 the 3.S. Information Agency Alumni Association 43SIAAA5 and the Public Diplomacy Foundation2 both of Washington2 D.C.2 sponsored a symposium and dinner on October 112 1110 to recall the President.s creation of the 3.S. Information Agency and his interest throughout his presidency in what is now called public diplomacy. 1 His e)ecutive order establishing 3SIA in 1178 was one of the President.s first acts of reorgani9ing the 3.S. :overnment after his election because2 as he said so often2 it was of utmost importance to the nation that the 3nited States government communicate with foreign publics and effectively tell America.s story abroad. The commemorative event took place at Fort McNair in Washington2 D.C.--the symposium in the Arnold auditorium of the National Defense 3niversity2 and the dinner and subsequent program at the Officers Club. It brought together retired veterans and current staffers and spouses of 3SIA and related organi9ations involved in the 3.S. :overnment.s public diplomacy. Many of those who attended served in 3SIA here and abroad during the Eisenhower presidency. Abbott Washburn2 who had been Deputy Director of the 3.S. Information Agency during the entire period of the Eisenhower administration2 served as host and moderator of the evening.s program. This short volume records the prepared remarks of those who took part in the symposium2 Ike and USIA2 and in the after-dinner discussion. They were Burnett Anderson2 $ames Halsema2 Hans Tuch2 Barry Zorthian--all retired 3SIA foreign service officers who served in the Agency during the 1170s; Henry Loomis2 former director of Voice of America and deputy director of 3SIA; Frank Shakespeare and $ames (eogh2 former directors of 3SIA. Appreciation is due those who helped make the evening possible--Peter Brescia2 Fred Coffey2 Cliff :roce2 Mim $ohnston2 obert Lincoln2 $ack O.Brien2 Lew Schmidt2 Abbott and Wanda Washburn. The Editors Introduction by Abbott Washburn When we who had worked on Ike.s 1172 campaign staff came to Washington with the President2 Stalin was still alive. The Cold War was at its most frigid. One of the first things the President did was appoint the $ackson Committee to study the Cold War2 to talk with everybody who knew anything about it2 and to make recommendations to him. I was assigned as e)ecutive secretary of the $ackson Committee by C.D. $ackson2 the special assistant to the President for psychological operations. Wanda2 my wife2 was also on the Committee staff2 as was Henry Loomis. The Committee labored for about A months in a historic old house on the corner of 1Ath and Eye2 NW2 now torn down. Eisenhower had faith in psychological and information activities because he was convinced they had shortened WWII and saved lives. As the new President2 he found himself in a Bbattle for men.s mindsB. From the $ackson Committee he wanted a plan and structure that would start to win the battle for men.s minds. Few diplomats2 he felt2 were good at these kinds of operations2 and Secretary Dulles agreed with him. 2 The top-secret $ackson Committee report made numerous recommendations for improving our conduct of the Cold War. But it did not recommend a new agency for international propaganda and related activities. Eisenhower himself2 however2 was convinced that what was needed was an organi9ation of e)perts--something like those who had staffed the Office of War Information. He acted on the recommendations of C.D. $ackson and Nelson ockefeller and established the 3SIA by E)ecutive Order in the summer of 1178. The ne)t thing was to find a Director for the Agency. I don.t know whether or not C.D. knew Ted Streibert2 the former head of the Mutual Broadcasting System who was then serving on $im Conant.s staff at HICO: in :ermany 4Dr. $ames Conant2 3.S. High Commissioner for :ermany5. But C.D. ended up recommending him to the President. Ike asked C.D. to ask $im whether we could have Ted. 4That.s a little sidelight on how DDE operated--it was not an order but Bask $im if he could spare Streibert.B5 When Ted arrived2 we knew he was the right man2 a tough hard-worker who knew what had to be done. I went over to the Agency as his Deputy and as liaison with the White House. Ed Schechter 4former 3SIA colleague5 sent me a recent note on how it looked from the other end. He was at HICO:2 having helped set up IAS in Berlin-- adio in the American Sector--and having dealt with Messrs. oy Cohn and David Schine2 as did BTomB Tuch 4Hans Tuch2 former 3SIA colleague5 who was also in :ermany then. Ed wroteC ...I was stationed in Bonn and Streibert was sent by the Eisenhower administration as a sort of BSuper PAOB to look at the giant information outfit in :ermany... I happened to be Chief of the adio Branch for the American Zone and since Streibert came from a radio background he was particularly interested in this field. Thus2 I came to know him quite well during the 8 months or so of his stay and we got along very well indeed. Eventually2 he did confide that he would be nominated as 3SIA Director. People used to say that Streibert had Bice in his veins.B Maybe--but at that time2 with an organi9ation quite confused and a bit shattered by Cohn and Schine2 he was in my opinion an e)cellent choice. We took our policy guidance from the State Department. But the Agency reported directly to the President2 who took a keen interest in its operations. He wanted to see us on a regular basis2 whether or not we had particular problems to discuss with him. Often Ted would take other agency officials over to the White House for these meetings. Dou can imagine what this did for moraleE The President also wanted the world opinion factor to be cranked in to NSC meetings when decision-options were being discussed. He put us at the table at the NSC where we could speak up without being first asked what we thought or what data we had. 4Previously2 in the back row 3 as observers2 we could not do this.5 Often he would ask us direct questions2 e.g. BIf we landed Marines in Lebanon2 what would the public reaction beF How would the news media react over thereFB He always listened intently2 patiently. He always wanted the best intelligence. He was always receptive to ideas2 even though he might not agree in the end. So you can see why he liked our opinion polls in other countries. They gave him an added dimension. Henry Loomis 4former Director of VOA and Deputy Director of 3SIA5 spoke with him about this2 and will report on that later. Foster Dulles 4Secretary of State5 was against the polls. One day he called Henry and me over to his office2 saying that they were an intrusion2 an embarrassment to him2 and made the conduct of foreign affairs more difficult. Henry was in charge of polling at that time. We did not discontinue the polling2 as you know. Toward the end of the Eisenhower administration2 the polls showed some disapproval of 3.S. policies2 thus giving rise to the Bprestige pollsB issue in the 11A0 Ni)on/(ennedy election campaign. The Democrats argued that under Eisenhower/Ni)on American prestige had plummeted overseas. In the middle of this2 Oren Stephens2 who headed esearch for us2 phoned me in a state of turmoil. Oren was from Arkansas and his family had known the Fulbrights for a long time. He said that Senator Fulbright had just got him on the phone and demanded that he send the latest opinion polls up to the Hill. He stalled as long as he could until the Senator said2 BWell2 are you going to do itFB I said to Oren2 BWhat did you tell himFB Oren replied2 BI said2 .Senator2 I have to go to the bathroom2 I.ll call you back.EB That was a phony issue in the campaign. Our overall prestige abroad was as good as ever. Another phony issue was the so-called Bmissile gap.B The President knew from the 3-2 intelligence-gathering cameras that there was no missile gap. He could have disclosed the whole thing publicly2 but he didn.t in order to protect the operation. This is also a sidelight on how he operated. Politics were secondary. In the 117A presidential campaign2 for e)ample2 he did little campaigning because the larger problems of the Sue9 crisis and the Hungarian rebellion were on his front burner. He said that if this lost him the election2 so be it. Two other e)amples of his receptivenessC 1. I wrote a memo to him via Ted Streibert in early 11772 suggesting a BPresident.s ProgramB to encourage personal contact by average American citi9ens with their counterparts in other countries. He liked this from the beginning2 discussed it with us thoroughly.