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The Channel Tunnel

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The Channel Tunnel Source: Getlink Group The Channel Tunnel Procuring authorities Government of the United Kingdom, Government of the Republic of France Project company Getlink Group (previously Eurotunnel) Contract obligations Design, build, finance, maintain, operate, transfer (DBFMOT) Start of operations 1994 Financial closure year 1987 (syndication of the Project Finance Facility) Capital value Location GBP9.5 billion (USD11.8 billion – 1994 value) The English Channel between Folkestone (England) and Coquelles (France) Contract period (years) 99 Sector Water crossing, fixed link, rail and road Key facts No governmental subsidies, 100% Project Finance 8 | GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE HUB CASE STUDY: THE CHANNEL TUNNEL Project highlights The Channel Tunnel is a roughly 50 km rail tunnel countries initially for a period of 55 years, then linking Folkestone, Kent, in England, with Coquelles, extended to 99 years until 2086. Getlink’s head Pas-de-Calais, near Calais in northern France. The office is located in Paris. tunnel extends beneath the English Channel at the Originally estimated at GBP 4.8 billion in 1985 Strait of Dover. It is the only fixed link between the (about USD6.2 billion, 1985 prices), the Channel island of Great Britain and the European mainland. Tunnel’s total cost was much higher than It allows the city of London to be directly connected expected, reaching GBP9.5 billion by the end of by train to Paris, Lille, Brussels, Amsterdam and its construction (about USD14.5 billion in 1994).2 Cologne – thanks to the Eurostar and Thalys Project costs were vastly underestimated and an train lines. overrun of 80% was incurred.3 This was due to The Channel Tunnel was officially opened in 1994. delays related to “construction cost, equipment Train operation consists of shuttle trains conveying delivery and testing problems”,4 and to changes cars and coaches and other trains conveying heavy to the design of the project during construction to goods vehicles between the two terminals. Other increase safety. The project was financed entirely trains using Getlink infrastructure are operated by by private sector capital, including five banks who the respective owners. were part of the TransManche Link consortium. Financing originated partly from investment by Getlink, previously Groupe Eurotunnel (until 2017),1 shareholders and partly from GBP8 billion of debt is a public company that manages and operates (about USD12.2 billion, 1994 prices). the Channel Tunnel, including the Eurotunnel Shuttle vehicle services, and earns revenue on other trains through the tunnel (DB Schenker freight and Eurostar passenger trains). The company was formed in 1986, with the objective of financing, building and operating a tunnel between the two 1 Note that Getlink and Eurotunnel will be used interchangeably throughout the case study depending on the point in time being discussed 2 Anguera, R. (2006). The Channel Tunnel – An ex post economic evaluation. Retrieved from: https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/transa/ v40y2006i4p291-315.html 3 Flyvbjerg, B. (2014). What You Should Know About Megaprojects, and Why: An Overview. 4 Finnerty, J.D. (2012). Chapter 18 Case Study: The Eurotunnel Project (in: Project Financing – Asset-Based Financial Engineering). John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. Connectivity Across Borders | 9 Project timeline5 Development 1802 First design for a cross-Channel tunnel HISTORY OF THE PROJECT 1867 Approval of a design by Napoleon III The idea of a tunnel under the English Channel has and Queen Victoria and exhibition at the a long history with the first proposal dating back to Universal Exposition 1802, and several others following over subsequent years.6 The idea was discussed several times during 1880 First attempt at tunnel excavation the 20th century but only in the 1960s did dialogue between France and the UK result in a call for 1882 French and UK Governments drop proposals, leading to the drafting of a convention the idea and excavation stops due to public in 1972, which gave the Channel Tunnel Group the safety concerns mandate to start the technical and financial feasibility 1960s The Channel Tunnel Study Group presents studies and the preparation of the construction works. to the governments a proposal of railway tunnel, Government-funded tunnel boring works started in bored or submerged, comprising a twin rail tunnel 1974 but were cancelled in 1975 by the newly elected with a service tunnel UK Government for financial reasons, including the oil crisis.7 The project resumed in 1981 with the 1973 Signature of the Franco-British Channel formation of a joint working group to study technical Tunnel Treaty giving mandate to the Channel and economic aspects of a fixed link. After four Tunnel Group to lead the study and preparatory years of studies and discussions, the procurement construction work procedure was initiated in 1985 under British Prime 1975 Cancellation of the works by UK Government Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President for financial reasons and times of the oil crisis François Mitterrand for the construction of the link as we know it today. 1981 Resumption of the work, and the governments setting up a joint working group POLICY AND PLANNING SETTING to study technical and economic aspects of a The Channel Tunnel was approved with the fixed link signature of the Treaty of Canterbury (signed by 1985 Start of a call for proposals, and selection of the French and UK Governments on 12 February Eurotunnel as the winning proposal for the project 1986), which authorised the construction of the Fixed Link as a concession without any public 1986 Signature of the Treaty of Canterbury financing or guarantees. The Treaty of Canterbury between the UK and French Governments, and of also established the creation of the Channel Tunnel the Concession Agreement conceding the project Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) as the body in to Eurotunnel charge of supervising the construction and operation 1987 Signature of the Railways Usage Contract of the Fixed Link on behalf of the French and UK which determines Eurotunnel’s source of income Governments, as well as the general application of based on charges and tolls levied on traffic the Treaty. The IGC is the body in charge of adopting volumes and implementing rules for the Channel Tunnel. Safety aspects of the project are managed under the remit of 1993 End of construction the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA). 1994 Opening of the tunnel, the first Eurostar Another key document to the Channel Tunnel’s train link created between Paris, Lille and London inception is the Concession Agreement (signed 14 March 1986),8 which establishes the rights and 1997 Eurostar lines extended to Brussels roles of the concessionaires, the two governments 2015 Eurostar lines extended to Avignon, and the IGC. It stipulates that concessionaires of the Lyon and Marseille Channel Tunnel “have the right and the obligation to carry out the development, financing, construction 2018 Eurostar lines extended to Amsterdam and operation during the Concession Period” (i.e. for 55 years from 1986 – extended by 10 years in 1994, and extended again in 1997 to 99 years until 2086). 6 GetLink Ltd. (2019). Our history. Available at: https://www. getlinkgroup.com/en/our-group/history/ 7 Ibid. 5 Sources: Dupont (1990), Finnerty (2012), Getlink (2019), Wilson (1994), Winch (1996). 8 https://www.getlinkgroup.com/content/uploads/2019/09/Extracts- Concession-Agreement-UK.pdf 10 | GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE HUB CASE STUDY: THE CHANNEL TUNNEL This is done “at their own risk, without recourse to In return, the railways pay a fixed charge and tolls government funds or to government guarantees of based on the volume of traffic passing through the a financial or commercial nature and regardless of tunnel together with a contribution to Eurotunnel’s whatever hazards may be encountered”. Furthermore, operating costs. There is a minimum charge level, a “the Concessionaires [are] free to determine their mechanism to ensure a guaranteed level of cash flow tariffs and commercial policy and the type of service to Eurotunnel over the first 12 years of operation”.10 to be offered. In particular, laws relating to control The Railways Usage Contract is of fundamental of prices and tariffs shall not apply to the prices and importance to the Channel Tunnel, together with the tariffs of the Fixed Link”.9 Treaty of Canterbury and the Concession Agreement, in giving confidence to investors that the Channel The third key document is the Railways Usage Tunnel will remain operational. Contract, which determines Eurotunnel’s source of income. According to Michael Grant, at the time The project contractual structure and associated Eurotunnel’s Corporate Finance Manager, “Under this governance structure are illustrated in Figure 1. Contract, Eurotunnel is required to make half of the tunnel capacity available to the British, French and Belgian railways for their Eurostar and freight trains. UK government Treaty of Canterbury (1986) French government Channel Tunnel Safety Intergovernmental Commission Authority Concession Agreement (1986) Getlink Group (previously Eurotunnel) Eurotunnel plc + Eurotunnel SA. Banks (Project ownership, operation and financing) Shareholders Channel Tunnel Group + France-Manche (Construction project management) Railways Usage Contract (1987) Deutsche Bahn Transmanche Link and other railway Ten design and construction firms Eurostar, DB Schenker, undertakings (Project implementation) Europorte (railway Five banks undertakings)
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