Party Power and Legislative Decision-Making in Congress By
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Party Power and Legislative Decision‐Making in Congress by Andrew Ojala Ballard Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ John Aldrich, Co‐supervisor ___________________________ Michael Munger, Co‐supervisor ___________________________ Scott de Marchi ___________________________ David Rohde Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2018 ABSTRACT Party Power and Legislative Decision‐Making in Congress by Andrew Ojala Ballard Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ John Aldrich, Co‐supervisor ___________________________ Michael Munger, Co‐supervisor ___________________________ Scott de Marchi ___________________________ David Rohde An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2018 Copyright by Andrew Ojala Ballard 2018 Abstract Questions of party power and legislative outcomes are central to our understanding of Congress. And yet, our knowledge of these concepts has many gaps. We know little about exactly how parties negotiate legislative deals with their members—and hold them to their deals—or about how parties exert agenda control before bills reach the floor. We also have limited knowledge of how predictable the outcomes of bills are, particularly from their content. These questions remain unanswered largely because political scientists have traditionally not had data or methods at their disposal to answer them. In my dissertation, I provide some answers to these questions by focusing on modern text analysis techniques. In chapter one, I examine how parties make deals with recalcitrant members on landmark legislation, and more importantly, how members are held to their deals. Particularly, I argue that public statements are a tool wielded by the party, and when members are convinced to vote for a bill they are provided incentive to make a statement in support of the bill to lock them into their vote. Using a novel data set of all public statements made by members of Congress, and two pieces of landmark healthcare legislation (the Affordable Care Act in 2009‐2010 and the American Health Care Act in 2017), I show that members of Congress do make public statements after they make deals to vote with the party, and that these statements are likely for the purpose of precommitting to vote with the party. 1 In chapter two, I seek to quantify the level of agenda control exerted by the majority party on bills that never reach a final passage vote. To do this, I present the first systematic estimates of how members would have voted on bills based on a characterization of bill content from bills’ text, would they have come to a final passage vote. I find that the majority party not only exercises negative agenda control, but also considerable positive agenda control. I also find that the minority party in the House is systematically and consistently shut out of the agenda process, but not the policymaking process. In chapter three, I investigate how predictable the outcome of bills is and whether bill content has a part to play in the predictability of bill outcomes. I am able to predict where bills end up in the US House of Representatives with high accuracy, and that knowledge about the content of a bill has a sizable effect on how well we can predict bill outcomes. 2 Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 1 List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. 6 List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ 7 Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... 9 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 12 1. Public Statements in Congress as Precommitment Devices ............................................. 17 1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 17 1.2 Precommitment and Passing Legislation .................................................................... 19 1.3 A Tale of Two Health Care Debates ............................................................................ 23 1.3.1 Data and Method ....................................................................................................... 23 1.3.2 The Affordable Care Act (2009‐2010) ...................................................................... 26 1.3.3 American Health Care Act (2017) ........................................................................... 29 1.4 Evidence of Statements as Precommitment Devices ................................................. 32 1.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 40 2. Bill Text and Agenda Control in the U.S. House of Representatives .............................. 45 2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 45 2.2 Background ..................................................................................................................... 49 2.2.1 Measuring Agenda Power ....................................................................................... 50 2.3 Methods ........................................................................................................................... 59 2.3.1 Data ............................................................................................................................. 59 2.3.2 Bill Text Versions and Legislative Stages ............................................................... 59 3 2.3.3 A Model to Predict Congressional Voting ............................................................. 62 2.3.4 The Plausibility of Predicting Votes which Never Happened ............................ 63 2.3.5 Considering Majority‐ and Minority‐Sponsored Bills ......................................... 65 2.3.6 Characterizing Policy Content with doc2vec ........................................................ 66 2.4 Results .............................................................................................................................. 72 2.4.1 Validating the Model ................................................................................................ 72 2.4.2 Predicting Votes on Non‐Voted Bills ...................................................................... 77 2.4.3 Agenda Power along the Legislative Process ........................................................ 77 2.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 85 3. Bill Content and Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives ................... 90 3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 90 3.2 Background ..................................................................................................................... 91 3.3 Methods ........................................................................................................................... 96 3.3.1 Data ............................................................................................................................. 96 3.3.2 Modeling a Bill’s Journey through the House ....................................................... 96 3.4 Results ............................................................................................................................ 100 3.4.1 Predicting Where Bills Finish in the House ......................................................... 100 3.4.2 Predicting Whether Bills Pass ................................................................................ 106 3.4.3 The Effect of Bill Sample and Neural Weights .................................................... 110 3.5 Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 114 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 120 Appendix A— Public Statements in Congress as Precommitment Devices: Supplement ..................................................................................................................................................... 124 4 Appendix B—Bill Text and Agenda Control in the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplement ................................................................................................................................ 126 Appendix C—Bill Content and Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplement ...............................................................................................................................