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Home , Hugh Blair, Thomas Reid

NOTES

CHAPTER I

{1} Reid's abstract of his 'Inquiry into the Human based on the of Common ' is presented in a printed version by David Fate Norton on pp.12S-131 of ': Critical Interpretations' edited by Stephen Barker and Tom Beauchamp under the title 'Reid's Abstract of the Inquiry into the Human Mind'. The abstract is a quite invaluable presentation of one main theme of the Inquiry in which notions or conceptions are distinguished from sensations and copies of sensations, and the question about the origin of notions is clearly set out and a sober assessment given of the prospects of arriving ay a clear answer to it. In his important paper ' on Thomas Reid's An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles ofCommon Sense: A New Letter to from July 1762' (Wood [1]) Paul Wood persuasively argues that the abstract was written in response to the newly discovered letter of Hume to Hugh Blair that is the central concern of Wood's paper. The importance of that letter to Reid scholars thus needs no further emphasis, even though there are plenty other ways in which it is important besides the spur to Reid's writing of the abstract. {2} See his [1] p.186. A of a scarlet of course might not be a thought of such an object as a scarlet one. But in any case the more an impression of a scarlet object resembles the of one the harder it is for Hume to insist that the distinction between feeling and thinking is readily to be perceived. {3} I make the perhaps rash presumption that for Hume an object of thought, whatever can be thought of, must, when it is thought of, appear to the mind. But then since Hume goes on to claim that everything which appears to the mind is a that narrows the possible status of objects of thought right down to , that is, impressions or . {4} Hume's words are: IIIf I comprehend the author's doctrine, which, I own, I can hitherto but imperfectly, it leads us back to innate ideas II . {S} Note the way the question is put as if constituting a response to Hume's accusation that Reid is forced to accept an innateness doctrine for some ideas. As far as I am aware this is the only sort of response Reid makes to this kind of criticism; moreover it is surely far from being inapposite even though it does not entirely rule out innateness as a causal factor. NOTES 245

{6} Thus Quine argues in his [8] that once one has despaired of translating scientific statements into observational and set-theoretic terms and accepted the attendant bankruptcy of Cartesian there is still room for a naturalised epistemology. See especially p.82. {7} Hume complains in the letter to Hugh Blair that Reid ignores such evidence as this presented by himself on behalf of the view that " all ideas are cop'yd from impressions". {8} See Popper [1], especially pp,44-46. {9} Contrast lohn Wright's [2]. There he argues in effect that Hume is denying that we have notions in such cases even though to all appearances we do. Thus such terms as 'cause' serve in some sense as incomplete symbols in Hume's philosophy. {to} Here I am conscious of a debt to Popper's discussion of Hume in [I]. See especially p,42 and p. 56f. Not to mention Professor A.I. Ayer's discussion of the that is uniform in [2]. {II} Contrast Hume's discussion of allied matters in Treatise 11,111,1 and 11,111,11. The possibility that only so-called 'for the most part generalisations' can apply in such fields as this seems to occur to Hume in some of these discussions. The view that such generalisations alone can be the fruits of investigation in the social is argued for vigorously in McIntyre's [1] chapter 8. {12} See especially her [1], part III. The reader would do well to study that part before embarking on the final chapter of this book on first principles.

CHAPI'ERll

{I} See especially Intellectual Powers II,XIII (H p.295b,296a) where Reid notes that Arnauld, having maintained that ideas are modifications of our , and finding no other modification of the mind that can be called the idea of an external object, says that 'idea' is only another word for perception. And there is no question at this stage of Arnauld's discussion (chapter V) of these perceptions of external objects being perceptions of something other than external objects. {2} Thus in his seminal paper [2] Frege seems to hold that in such non-extensional contexts singular noun phrases stand for their (Sinne) rather than the usual objects for which they stand. The consequences of the apparent non-extensionality of some uses of 'see' is discussed by Hintikka in his [2] 'On the logic of Perception' 246 NOTES

contained in his [1]. {3} There are a number of distinguished exponents of the view that Hume believed in external material bodies as well as impressions, most notably John Wright in [1]. There are also plenty distinguished exponents of the view that Hume identified external bodies with impressions, so that behind impressions there are no bodies differing in nature from impressions in that, for instance, they are not fleeting. Just in what sense impressions represent any bodies at all needs spelling out in order to facilitate discussions of the former view. In any case that view can surely derive no support from the philosophical system that Hume thinks we are driven to embrace and in which perceptions and objects are distinguished. For as Hume says at Treatise I,IV,II (SB p.211):

There are no principles either of the understanding or the fancy, which can lead us directly to embrace this opinion of the double of perceptions and objects, nor can we arrive at it but by passing through the common hypothesis of the and continuance of our interrupted perceptions. {4} Interestingly enough there is no trace of such a retraction in the edition of the first letter to the Bishop of Worcester contained in the fourth volume of the 1823 reprinting of Locke's works entitled 'The Works of ' printed for Thomas Tegg et alia. But equally there is no trace of an endorsment of such a position as Reid claims Locke has rejected. Material related to the topic that is our concern is to be foound in this •corrected , edition of the first letter on pages 74-78 of volume IV but Locke's topic in these paragraphs is the adequacy of simple ideas. {5} Thus Berkeley who makes a rigid distinction between inert ideas and active spirits allows that a spirit may act upon another spirit by producing an idea in the other spirit. Thus in the second of his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Everyman edition p.248, we find:

..... these ideas ..... , either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure, what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears. They must therefore exist in some other mind, whose will it is they should be exhibited to me. And on p.249 we find:

From all of which I conclude, there is a mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive. {6} Seeing is clearly something someone does but not what someone does in order to. affect something or someone else which is seen. Per contra pushing something is done to affect the thing pushed, to bring about a change in it or in its to other things or both. See NOTES 247

Geach [3] Essay 10.3 (God's relation to the World). {7} Not everyone takes the view that in non-extensional contexts singular terms refer to or si~nify such strange things as it appears Frege would have them signity, namely, senses (Sinne) or modes of presentation of objects. All that seems to withstand examination in this quaint view, a view which I hesitate to ascribe to Frege in so many words, is that in a wide variety of non-extensional contexts terms whose senses contain the same mode of presentation of that which is designated by them may be interchanged without change of - in the sentences containing them. {8} Think of the eye as a hemisphere. Let the points A and B be the extremities of a body confronting the eye and let them be in one straight line AB. Let C be the centre of the sphere of which the eye is a hemi-sphere; then the angle ACB is the angle which the object whose extremities are A and B subtends at the eye. {9} The clearest explanation of constancy scaling known to me is that given in R.L. Gregory's [1], chapter 9. The point that Descartes was aware of such phenomena is contained on p . 152ff of chapter 9. As far as I am aware such phenomena are unjustly neglected by Reid in his published discussions of perception and visible appearances. Briefly, what it comes down to is that the smallness of Reid's angle (referred to in the previous footnote) for middle-distanced objects is some how compensated for so that such objects look larger than they would if Reid's angle was the sole determinant in how much of the visual field they took up.

{1O} Professor David Hamlyn remarks in his well-known [I] that

Reid thought that the secret lay in a strict distinction between sensation and perception. He was perhaps the tirst philosopher to insist upon this rigorously, and he was quite right in doing so, although he was not always clear about the consequences to be drawn.

The context of these remarks suggests that Hamlyn considers that the sensation-perception distinction is one that Reid finds vital to his critique of scepticism about the existence of a material world. And this much is certainly right. However there seems to be suggested in Hamlyn's discussion of Reid on perception the view that the sensation-perception distinction is one that is a fundamental ingredient in such positive account of perception as is offered by Reid. And here I would beg to distance myself from such a suggestion especially if we are to understand it as having the implication that in vision a fundamental role is played by visual sensation of the same kind as Reid thinks is played by olfactory sensation in the case of smell. Hamlyn is well aware of a point emphasised in Ben-Zeev's 248 NOTES discussion [1] of Reid's views of perception that as far as Reid is concerned an act of perception is not thought of as being a temporal successor to an act of sensation. Moreover Ben-Zeev rightly points out that it is not by way of the activity-passivity distinction that Reid makes his distinction. For him the mind is not passive in sensation as opposed to being active in perception since the mind is purely active as opposed to such items as walls or roses as, indeed, emit effluvia but cannot thereby affect the mind. How then does Reid draw this important distinction? One way in which he clearly draws it is in terms of the of an object distinct from an act of mind. Perception is an act of mind having an object distinct from that act unlike sensation which does not. Suppose now that someone such as Duggan suggests that the visual appearances of the Inquiry will serve well as visual sensations. Then the objection can be raised that since in their case Reid clearly allows there to be an object of sorts distinct from the act of mind then such cannot serve as visual sensations serve. One important distinction in the case of vision and of which Hamlyn shows ample awareness is that between original and acquired perception. Ben-Zeev seems to take the view that some authors, perhaps Locke, have drawn a sensation perception distinction along such lines. However such a basis does not seem to be suitable for Reid's purposes in so far as it is true that original perception can be temporally prior to acquired perception. It would seem safe to conclude here by noting that in so far as the important distinction in the case of visual perception is not the sensation-perception one then the view that the sensation-perception distinction is fundamental to Reid's account of perception is erroneous. { II} In this illusion two straight lines of equal length are drawn parallel to one another on a flat surface and by a suitable addition of lines which are not parallel to the first two lines to both ends of the first two lines one of the first two lines is made to look longer than the second of them. See for instance R.L. Gregory's [1] p.136.

CHAPTERm

{I} Contrast Descartes' famous passage on wax in Meditation II with Reid's view here:

But while I say this, the wax is put by the fire. It loses the remains of its flavour, the fragrance evaporates, the colour changes, the shape is lost , the size increases, it becomes tluid and hot, and it will no longer give a sound if you rap it. Is the same wax, then, still there? Of course it is; nobody denies it, nobody thinks otherwise. Well what was in the wax that was so distinctly known? Nothing that I got through the senses; for whatever fell under taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed; yet the wax is still there. NOTES 249

{2} It should be stressed that Reid, in company with Berkeley, takes the view that certain features of three-dimensional bodies are directly or originally perceptible by touch, in contrast to the case of sight in which three-dimensional features of bodies constitute the deliverances of so-called acquired perception. If that were not clear then a lot of the relevance of the passage about our past to the adjacent passage about the globe might understandably be missed by many readers. In particular they might miss the point that the sphericality in the case was indeed the testimony of one of the senses, as far as Reid is concerned. {3} My approach to the problems of hereabouts plainly owes much to J.L. Austin's [1]. {4} See Gregory's [1], chapter 9 for a clear and thorough presentation of this point of view. {5} Reid's lengthy and fascinating discussion of the geometry of visibles in which, notoriously, he claims that visually straight lines have non-Euclidean properties occurs in the Inquiry chapter VI, section IX. It is given a full discussion in Norman Daniels' [1]. For Reid's money the geometry of tangibles is Euclidean, an opinion in which he follows Berkeley, and for which he offers no justification, least of all one remotely like that submitted for the case of the visibles. {6} Bennett remarks in [1] p.70:

whether we say that ideas represent or are caused by real things, there is serious error only if the thesis [that ideas are caused by or represent real things] is expressed in an all-at-once way, purporting to relate sensory states en bloc to objective states of affairs en bloc. The fact that Locke erred in this way is expressed, fairly satisfactorily, by calling his position 'the veil of perception doctrine' .

And so Reid would only be guilty of accepting this doctrine if he held that visual appearances shrouded or represented facts in an all-at-once way.

{7} See his [1] in which a thorough consideration and presentation of a full-bodied sceptical position is worked out. My discussion owes much to his first chapter. {8} Consider G. E. Moore's [3] where he says (p.227):

Would it not sound rather ridiculous for me now, under these circumstances, to say 'I think I've got some clothes on' or even to say 'I not only think 1 have, 1 know that it is very likely indeed that 1 do have, but 1 can't be quite sure'? and on the next page:

the circumstances are such as to make it quite obvious that 1 don't merely think that 1 have, but know that 1 have. 250 NOTES

{9} See Gettier's [1] and the enormous literature that has sprung from it. But in fact the first of the examples in that paper is defective in regard to establishing the point he wishes to make.

CHAPTER IV

{I} For a discussion of ontological commitment the reader is referred to the writings of W.V. Quine in particular to 'On what there is' in his [1]. However let the reader be warned that by an ontological commitment to material bodies I mean a commitment to the view that there really are material bodies, that material bodies are actual (or wirklich as Frege uses that term) as well as being objects in Frege's sense. Analogous points apply to there being minds and to there being a God. Thus I depart from Quine in limiting the main sense of the word 'exists' to actuality and'ontological commitment' is likewise limited. Hence I am committed to the rejection of his view that

If spatio-temporal reference is lacking when we affirm the existence of the cube root of 27. this is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing. and not because we are being ambiguous in our use of exist. {2} See, for instance Quine's 'Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis' in his [1]. His position would appear to be that river-stages are not mind dependent entities but that these are momentary parts of a process through . This process Quine then proceeds to call a river, rather than calling by that name the continuing river that endures throughout the procession of'waters' or multiplicities of water molecules down it. As he expresses his position in [1] p.65:

You can bathe in two river stages that are stages of the same river. and this is what constitutes bathing in the same river twice. A river is a process through time. and the river stages are its momentary parts. Admittedly a process through time is a continuing process. But we have no definite case of continuing entities in the offing unless it is clear by some agreed criterion for ontological commitment that talk of processes is talk of entities. {3} Here I resort to the thought of Aquinas to try to get Reid out of difficulty at this point. See his [1], Third Part, Question 77, Article 2. Among other things Aquinas says there that

because the first is . the consequence is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the medium of dimensive quantity. {4} See for instance the second of the Three Dialogues between Hylas NOTES 251 and Philonous. {5} Hume spotted such difficulties as this in a manuscript version of the Inquiry that he saw. See the letter to Blair mentioned above. {6} See his extensive and interesting discussion of the primary and secondary distinction in his [1] in which certain ingredients in Reid's account of these matters come into prominence. {7} Consult his [1] in which truth-conditions for judgments involving certain parts of speech do not involve occurrences of those parts of speech in the clauses following 'if and only if'. Thus in the truth-condition for a conjunctive sentence the clause following 'if and only if would not contain the 'and' of the conjunctive sentence inside any sentences concerning whose truth remarks were made in the course of presenting the truth condition. Again in the case of 'Snow is white is true' if and only if snow is white the truth-condition does not present a requirment couched in a wording more complex or involved than occurs in the sentence whose truth-condition is being presented.

{8} See Wittgenstein' s [1] pp .144-148. It should be remarked that at Reid himself seems to adopt such views in the case of certain mental dispositions and their occurrences. See for instance his remarks on at Intellectual Powers VI,VI,H p.458a.

{9} It will be said that it is not possible for a body other than mine to have feelings which are mine if I am not conscious of them. All that needs to be said on this issue at this stage is that it is not self -contradictory for me to maintain that I have feelings of which I am not conscious and thus that someone of Mill's persuasion would need to argue that such a position was incoherent or untenable in some other way in view of difficulties about consciousness that are discussed in the eighth chapter of this book. {1O} For more illustrations of this, sometimes called secondary sense, see Wittgenstein's [1] pp.135-141.

{II} See his [1] in which he attempts to account for most mental as dispositions to act in certain ways. {I2} A most notable exception is Hume in his Dialogues of Natural Religion. For a discussion of Hume's employment of the evolutionary point see 1. P. Monteiro's [1]. {13} In the segment of his course for 1780 entitled 'Natural Theology' 252 NOTES

Reid reveals to his audience a preference for attempting a of the necessary existence of a first cause based on acceptance of the first that every beginning of existence must have a cause that produced it. He says (D p.lO)

Thus we are necessarily led to a first cause of all or to an intInite succession of , one producing another without a cause. The last of these is evidently absurd; tor an intinity of beings without a first cause cannot possibly be, because it would be a chain every link of which would be an effect which stood in need of a cause and what is true of a part is equally true of the whole. Thus we are unavoidably led to admit the existence of some eternal being, uncaused, necessarily existing and by his power producing everything we see.

But consider a chain of such beings as Reid describes. It is very far from clear that without a cause for the whole series each being in the series is an effect standing in need of a cause, since ex hypothesi each member of this chain is produced by the action of its predecessor which then presumably has good title to count as its cause. So each link has a cause after all. Of course from the fact that each link did have a cause it in no wise follows that we have uncovered the existence of some cause productive of every member of the chain. And that suggests that it is question begging to maintain with Reid that what applies to a part must apply to the whole. {14} A fine instance of a quantifier-shift fallacy of which Hume shows adequate awareness in his Dialogues on Natural Religion. {IS} But God does, at least as Aquinas would construe God in his [1]. { 16} To be found in his first Enquiry IX and in the Dialogues on Natural Religion.

CHAYfERV

{l} This style of objection is as old as 's Sophist. See 262a of Burnet's text. {2} The reader may feel that much of this section contains a great deal of material which has already been spelt out adequately elsewhere such as in Kretzmann's [1]. Well it certainly needs re-iterating that Locke thinks that names belong to individuals and not to their ideas, if only to subvert the prejudice that Locke's notion of immediate signification is a seman tical notion in the modern sense in which it might be assimilated to denotation or Fregean Bedeutung. Such a prejudice can be seen spelt out naked and unashamed in such recent and important books as Blackburn's [1] and of course given that the prejudice is correct the consequences Blackburn draws, together with other consequences NOTES 253 drawn here, are quite correctly drawn and wholly unacceptable. But the prejudice is, I claim, on the basis of the texts I cite ill founded. {3} And surely now we have here a good case for the position that Locke recognises, albeit somewhat dimly, fairly profound semantic differences between common and proper nouns and, of course, in terms of a relation different from that of immediate signification. {4} Arnauld and Nicole say in the fifth edition of the Port-Royal Logic part I, chapter six, p. 64:

I call the comprehension of an idea the attributes which it includes in itself and which one cannot remove without destroying it. Thus the con prehension of the idea of a triangle includes extension, figure, three lines, three angles, and the equality of these three angles to two right angles, &c. I call the extension of an idea the su bjects to which the idea agrees, what one also calls the inferiors of a general term the latter being called superior in regard to them. Thus the idea of a triangle in general extends to all the several types of triangles. In the next paragraph Arnauld and Nicole add by way of comment that while one cannot remove any of the attributes from the comprehension of a triangle without destroying it (I presume that the idea is what 'it' refers back to here)

instead one can narrow it [the idea] as to its extension, only applying it to some of the subjects to which it agrees without thereby destroying it.

This seems to justify my claim that Reid's notion of comprehension is close to the Port-Royal notion, whereas it emerges that Locke's notion of comprehension closer to the Port-Royal notion of extension. Of course this only helps my claim that Locke's notion of comprehension is on a par with though, of course, different from the relation of proper names to their usual bearers, that is, that it is a seman tical notion quite unlike the notion of immediate signification. {5} In particular in [3] chapter 4, p.73. Prior has repeatedly, most notably in his posthumous [2], advocated Mill's view of proper names as the correct one in the teeth of opposition from such writers as Geach. A more modern and comprehensive thesis about proper names akin to Mill's view, namely that proper names are rigid designators, is to be found in Kripke's [1] and [2]. {6} Reid is not claiming at this point that 'whiteness' may serve as a predicate in a sentence attributing whiteness to a white thing or to white things. {7} See his [2], chapter 1, pA, for instance. {8} See his [1] in Geach and Black's [1] pA8. 254 NOTES

{9} This point about definition only holds if indeed it is true that, as Reid puts it, Ita definition ought to comprehend the whole nature or of the thing defined". For some descriptions of iron, for instance, will certainly serve as definitions of it by genus and differentia, such as 'a malleable and magnetizable metal', even if they do not fulfill Reid's very strict requirment. {lO} Unless by the phrase 'the object from which a general conception is taken' Reid means something quite other than that which first of all occurs to a twentieth century commentator. Certainly taken in the way that is obvious to us the SItuation is even worse with cases such as sheep, men and their ilk. We do have the phrase 'object lesson' which seems to hint at a use of the word 'object' in which its is somewhat akin to 'paradigmatic'. Perhaps the key to the mystery lies herabouts. {II} In [1] Kripke stresses that we often use proper names without having to hand adequate about their bearers that would enable us to distinguish them from other individuals of the same sort. { 12} How this is to be determined seems to me to be an important aspect of this issue. For an interesting and powerful discussion of the issue and for a view different from the Kripkean one that it would appear I favour see Gareth Evans' [2]. { 13} Frege would assign objects such as the table I am writing on, the equator and numbers to the realm of reference. Whereas whatever it is that 'my table' refers to in such a sentence as 'Smith thinks that my table is too large' would apparently be assigned to the realm of sense. See his [4] for these doctrines. The terminology of realms opf sense and of reference belongs to his posthumous writings. {l4} Most prominetly Routley in [1] who repeatedly claims that Reid is a forerunner of his advocacy of non-existent objects or, as he calls it, noneism. {15} A favourite example of a non-existent impossible from Quine's 'On what there is' in [1]. {l6} Here I am conscious of benefiting from exchanges with Gregory McCulloch which sent me back to Frege's [3] and [4]. Another important discussion of these matters is Geach's [3] Essay 4.5 ('The Perils of Pauline'). Routley's discussions of these questions are to be found in his [1] chapter 7. {17} See Arnauld's Des Vraies et des Fausses Idees, Chapter VI. {I8} Or perhaps we have a manifestation here of a widespread philosophical view that existence is not an attribute or, if indeed an NOTES 255 attribute, at best a very special case of one. {l9} See his 'Essays on Logical Atomism' for a clear exposition of his Theory of Descriptions (of such phrases as 'the philosopher who drank hemlock') and of a view of proper names that allows that theory to be applied to the current problem. If Russell's discussion is unclear to you Quine's in 'On what there is' should be a help. {20} For a clear exposition of such theories see Quine's [2]. {21} Such a construal of proper names is advocated by Quine in [6] among other works to get round the difficulty here. {22} A point rightly emphasised by Routley in [1]. {23} Consult again Quine's exposition of the doctrine that to be is to be the value of a bound variable in 'On what there is'. Here that view is being put up for discussion. {24} But this view is not unanimously held. See Parsons' [1], pp. 38-41, for instance. {25} We can recast this argument in more explicit form following Parsons in [I] p. 38, in order to lay bare its presuppositions. Consider then a surface that is both round and square. Then

(l )The round and square surface is round and (2)The round and square surface is square. (3) (x)( x is square = > (x is not round)), where substitutes for 'x' signify objects to which 'surface'applies.

(4) The round and square surface is square = > the round and square surface is not round. (5) The round and square surface is not round, from (2) and (4). (6) The round and square surface is round and the round and square surface is not round, from (1) and (5). But we have still worse to come, namely (7) The round and square surface is round and it is not the case that 256 NOTES

the round and square surface is round. Now it is to be noted that if 'surface' does not apply to what I conceive to be a surface both round and square then 'the round and square surface' does not designate or describe a surface; and so we cannot then infer (4) from (3). (5) is then blocked, ans so (6) and (7) cannot be reached. However if what is conceived to be a surface in this context is something that may rightly be designated or described as an individual surface, and if it is correct that "the x such that Fx is not G" may be interchanged with "it is not the case that the x such that Fx is G" where "(Ex)Fx" holds and the quantifier binds variables ranging over merely conceivable individuals, we shall reach (7) and be in deep trouble, unless we withhold all manner of being from merely conceivable individuals, and maybe not even then. To refuse to admit that 'the round and square surface' signifies an object in any sense of that term would seem to be to refuse to allow that an individual surface both round and square can be conceived. But once that is allowed it would seem that only by denying the force of the strong logical analogy between variables ranging over Fregean objects and variables ranging over mere conceivables can assent be withheld from (7). {26} For more illustrations of such impossible visual objects see R.L. Gregory's [1], p.222f.

CHAYfERVI

{ 1 } For the benefit of those readers who have forgotten or are unfamiliar with Hume's regularity account of causation I offer the following quotation from from his first Enquiry VII, part II:

Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience. therefore. we may define a cause to be an object followed by another. and where all the objects similar to the first. are tollowed by objects similar to the second. Or. in other words. where. if the first object had not been. the second never had existed. {2} Here I have in mind the possibility that a single episode of thought might be a single episode in the nervous system, without it having to be the case that for a given kind of episode of thought there has to be a fixed kind of event in the nervous system of the human animal. For even within this neuronal type of realisation of thought and feeling there might be scope for different of realisation of thought in the same human being at different times. The possibility of different types of realisation being available for thought is advocated by Putnam in his [1] and is based therein on an analogy between thought and software and the nervous system and hardware. NOTES 257

{3} Certainly if 'somehow arise' is tightly construed as these determinations being events describable in the language of a deterministic particle physics then these events could not, given the initial conditions, have occurred otherwise than they did when they did. However it certainly is not obvious that a token of a type of mental event needs to be identical with a very fixed type of physical event in order to run a satisfactory monistic materialistic view of mental events. And so it does not seem to follow from the view that a given set of neuro-physiological events was inevitable at a given time and place within the confines of a human body that a certain fixed description of a person's mental activity or indeed of other kinds of activity is the only inevitable and appropriate option for desciption of that person at that time and place. However it does seem equally clear that given that a certain set of neuro-physiological events was there and then inevitable in a human body some restriction on what would be appropriate as a description of the state of mind of the person is called for. In any case it emerges that if we grant that a certain type of neuro-physiological state or event has a certain kind of neuro-physiological outcome that invariably accompanies it it does not seem to follow from that alone that a given psychological event in a person, a determination of the will for instance, which we may allow for the sake of argument to be identical with a particular neuro-physiological event of a sort subject to strict regularity must have been the invariable concomittant of a fixed type of psychological event. The kind of I have in mind here is outlined and defended in Davidson's [3]. {4} Thus Clarke comes to this conclusion in his Correspondence with Leibniz over Newton's Mechanics. See the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Clarke's first reply, p.14. {5} Reid does not deny that 'cause' and 'agent' are used in other ways but he is apt to dismiss these other ways as 'hackneyed'. See for instance Active Powers I,VI, H p.526b. {6} Difficulties such as this are raised and discussed in Philippa Foot's [1] Essay IV.

{7} See his 'Two Dogmas of ' in [1] in which he mounts a sustained attack on the notion of analytic truth and its ilk. {8} See Akrill's edition of De Interpretatione. Lukasiewicz's view of these passages in his [1] is similar. For a different view of this matter see Elizabeth Anscombe's [1].

{9} See his [1] in which this view is clearly expounded. {lO} lowe much to Richard Taylor's [1] in my exposition of this variety of argument. 258 NOTES

{l1} For beginnings in this direction see Prior's [1] and for a more rigorous and satisfying account consult Thomason's [1]. See also Jeffrey's later [1]. {12} According to Cahn's [1] Gersonius argued in just this way.

CHAPTER VII

{ 1 } Notice how Hume begins this fascinating passage with the somewhat dubious assertion that the ideas of cause and effect are separable. One is led to ask whether he means that the notion of cause and the notion of effect are separable or that the idea of a particular operative cause is distinct from the idea of the effect resulting from it. He then goes on to argue that since these ideas are distinct we can easily grasp the idea of an object being non-existent this moment and existent the next being distinct from the idea of a cause or productive principle. This inclines me to interpret the beginning of Hume's passage in the second way since here Hume's line is that the idea of any particular coming-into-being is separable from that of a cause. {2} When Hume says "we pronounce it necessary that everything whose existence has a beginning should also have a cause" this is open to a number of different interpretations. One is

Necessarily everything whose existence has a beginning has a cause. which I have called form I. But another is the following one, namely

Whatever you take if its existence has a beginning then it must have a cause. and this in turn needs disambiguation since it might well be that the scope of 'must' is confined to "it have a cause", a case of what medieval logicians called necessitas consequentis, or that the scope of 'must' be the entire conditional sentence so that it could be rewritten as

Whatever you take it must be that if its existence has a beginning then it has a cause. Form I may be rewritten for purposes of comparison with this as

It must be that whatever you take if its existence has a beginning then it has a cause.

It seems clear that Hume thinks that to establish the demonstrative certainty of "Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence" is to establish the necessity of a cause to every new existence. Doing the former goes a long way to doing the latter if the necessity of a cause to NOTES 259 every new existence may be expressed by form I and if the 'it must be' of form I corresponds closely in meaning to 'it is demonstrably certain that'. However such a construal of 'it must be that' certainly rules out the interpretation where 'must' has narrow scope, since that interpretation enables one to point to a beginning of something's existence and truly say: "That must have a cause", and in the sense 'demonstrably certain' of 'must' such a remark must, unless viewed as shorthand for some other remark, always be false. And yet, it will be said, surely Hume didn't want to deny that we can and do say of an event with a beginning: "That must have a cause". Well can Hume be saved? Maybe, if establishing form I with the modal operator construed with wide scope and bearing a sense close to 'it is demonstrably certain that' allows the inference of form I with a different modal operator of wide scope bearing an appropriate sense (one that allows it to be truly said that an individual event must have a cause); and where that operator in turn allows transition to be made from form I to the form involving 'must' with narrowest scope. Alternatively 'that must have a cause' might be viewed as having a suppressed antecedent and the whole viewed as containing 'must' with wide scope in spite of all appearances to the contrary. Accordingly Alexander Broadie's comment on an earlier version of this chapter is justified. It indeed does not follow from the mere fact that Hume thinks that in order to demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence it suffices to establish the demonstrative certainty of form II (Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence) that Hume thinks that the necessity of a cause for every new existent is the demonstrative certainty of form II. {3} The fact that some attributes may be disjoined in our conception, in Reid's sense, does not of course mean that they can be, for instance, visually disjoined. But of course it can also be said that the fact that a state of affairs can be visualised does not, of itself, guarentee that "it is so far possible that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity" . {4} Hume's statment here that the idea of cause and effect is derived from experience might lead a reader to think that it was Hume's opinion that the notions of cause and effect are so derived. But here he merely means the idea of a particular cause and that of a particular effect. Or does he?

{5} It is remarkable how in [I] Popper singles out this underlined sentence as an important ingredient in Hume's view and thereby inspires the thought that it might be different in content from the succeeding sentence about the course of nature. Hume however, as we see just below, seems to think they are the same in content. {6} Consider the argument: Those instances of a kind of thing of which we have had no 260 NOTES

experience resemble those instances of which we have had experience. All previously observed swans are white. Therefore the next swan to be observed is white. The argument would seem to be valid. Now imagine that it is Australia. Then the conclusion could perfectly well be false. In that case, when the second premise is true, the first premise must be false. However this point does not apply if we substitute for the first premise of this argument "Nature is uniform". Thus Professor Ayer in [2]. And I am sorely tempted by Popper to extend this observation to Hume's proposition that the course of nature continues uniformly the same. {7} See his [3] in which the animistic label is attached to such accounts so as to suggest a pre-scientific attitude. But, as I argue, that element in Reid's account of causation is the very reverse. The view that the notion of cause is related to that of and purpose is to be found alive and well in the writings of in particular his [1].

{8} It seems to be inconsistent to maintain that a bodily movement is a product of initial conditions coupled with exception less mechanical laws and then to maintain that that very movement is the product of an agent with active power and (in Reid's notion of active power) consequent contingent . But it might be consistent, although perhaps absurd, to maintain that a movement is mechanically caused via such laws and initial conditions and that an action that is underpinned by it, brought about in part because the movement occurred, was caused by an agent endowed with active power and contingent causality.

CHAPfER VIII

{ I} This point only holds if names are names of people rather than of human beings. Note also that in this quotation we come accross a sense of 'signify' connected with how proper names function. They seem to have their function adequately described in this sense of that term by the statement "a proper name signifies a particular thing", a doctrine to which Reid shows a considerable attachment. {2} Locke says in his second reply to Stillingfleet, (Anglican) Bishop of Worcester:

I hope, my lord, your countryman will not be displeased to have met with Sosia to chop logic with, who, I think, has made as intelligible, how his real self ..... might be reaUy in distinct places at once ..... ; as it is intelligible how any real being under the name of a common nature, or under any name bestowed upon it may ..... reaUy be in divers places at once ...... NOTES 261

{3} For the view that Reid has anticipated this difficulty see R.G. Swinburne's contribution to Swinburne and Schoemaker [1] p. 13. {4} That is, it still may be absurd, although not self-contradictory, to affirm that a person may be in two places at one and the same time. {5} See his admirably clear account of Lockean persons in [I].

{6} See John Perry's introduction to his collection [1]. It seems that Berkeley saw this point earlier than Reid if a footnote in A.G.N. Flew's [ I] is to be believed. {7} For a discussion of such issues and the attendant difficulties in constructing systems of tense logic to cope with them the reader should consult A.N. Prior's [1], chapter VIII. {8} See Frege's [1], p.44. Hostility to such a distinction or the usual way it is drawn is exhibited by Geach in his essay on Frege in Anscombe and Geach [1]. {9} Such as is advocated by Quine in [6] and David Lewis in [1] in Rorty's [1]. For presentations of positions hostile to such entities see, for instance, Wiggins' [1] and Geach's [3] 10.5. [1O} Grice's proposal is couched in a language much closer to that favoured by the friends of -time worms than I have presented it here. See his [1] in Perry's [1].

{II} In his clear and stimulating paper [1] in the first number of Reid Studies. {12} Thus Geach in his [1] chapter 26, pp.117-121. {13} As Anscombe emphasises in her [2]. {14} Compare Wittgenstein's [4] where at 5.633 he remarks: Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. {I5} See Frege's [5], section 62, p.73e where, speaking of mathematical objects, he says: ..... we have already settled that number words are to be understood as standing for self-subsistent objects. And that is enough to give us a class of which must have a sense, namely those that 262 NOTES express our recognition of a number as the same again. If we are to use the symbol a to signify an object, we must have a critereon for deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a, even if it is not always in our power to apply this critereon. The fact that Hume may well have no such notion of an object seems born out by the accounts he offers of the notion of identity in the Treatise where, for instance, he says (I,IV,VI SB p.253):

We have a distinct idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd variation of time; and this idea we call identity or sameness. We have also a distinct idea of several difierent objects existing in succession, and connected together by a close relation; and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a notion of diversity, as if there was no manner of relation among the objects.

{l6} As is clearly explained in Lehrer's [1]. {17} Thus Williams in his admirably clear discussion of such matters in his [1]. { 18} This sort of case is extensively discussed in the literature on this subject. See especially Thomas Nagel's [2]. {l9} For such cases see Hofstadter and Dennett's [1].

{20} A notion defined by Parfit in [2] as follows:

..... I am q-remembering an experience if (1) I have a about a past experience which seems in itself like a memory belief, (2) someone did have such an experience, and (3) my belief is dependent upon his experience in the same way (whatever it is) in which a memory of an experience is dependent upon it. {21} My translations are from the version of Leibniz's text in the edition of the Nouveaux Essais edited by 8runschwig listed in the bibliography. {22} See the discussion in Maddell's [1] chapter 5, pp.122-133. {23} This would seem to be a consequence of David Lewis' views on . See his [1] in Rorty's [1].

CHAPTER IX

{I} Thus a first principle to the effect that there are material bodies might help towards the interpretation of sense-experience as experience of the behaviour of such bodies. A priciple that events in given NOTES 263 circumstances will probably be like events were in similar circumstances might well serve as a guide to the formation of sensible conjectures (as opposed to what Reid calls hypotheses). A principle to the effect that I am responsible for voluntary actions of mine will help guide my imputations of right or of wrong conduct. Different first principles play somewhat different supportive roles over against the propositions they might be said, in blanket fashion, to 'justify'. Clearly too rigid a model such as is often preferred by Reid of first principles as axioms and of other principles as following therefrom as in Euclidean Geometry will often be wildly inappropriate. {2} I have in mind some features belonging to criterea that candidate first principles have to satisfy according to the ingenious interpretation of Reid on this subject due to Louise Marcil-Lacoste.

{3} Here Reid has in mind such thinkers as Berkeley. Hume is a more difficult case. {4} One way of characterising a difference between Classical and Intuitionistic logic is to observe that Classical logic permits one to pass from a conclusion (resting on a set of asumptions) which is doubly negated to a conclusion (based on the same set of assumptions) that is unnegated and vice-versa, whereas Intuitionistic logic only allows the passage from a conclusion which is unnegated to a doubly negated one. {5} For a recent discussion of this issue ably advocating the view that their meaning does not differ see T. Williamson's [1]. See also A.N. Prior's [4] and Michael Dummett's [2].

{6} Thus is the so-called principle of charity sold. See for instance Quine's [6] where he says:

For certainly, the more absurd or exotic the beliefs imputed to a people, the more suspicious we are entitled to be of the translations; themyth of the prelogical people marks only the extreme. For translation theory, banal messages are the breath of lite. {7} The question is pressed by Yves Michaud In his address to the Aberdeen Reid conference of 1985 in its forthcoming proceedings. {8} But the thesis that is justified true belief or justified true belief plus "I know not what" can only be correct if it does not mean that for a proposition to count as justified it must be somehow non-circularly derivable from propositions that are more obvious than it. If this point is accepted we might well count a proposition as justified by showing it to be equivalent to a first principle by means of derivations.

{9} The importance of this candidate for first principle status was 264 NOTES brought home to me when listening to an address of to the Hume society conference in in 1986. But he is not responsible for this formulation of the view that any attempt to justify it is bound to fail. PO} This is a point pressed by Louise Marcil-Lacoste, together with the point about methodical investigation of these powers being a constant theme in Reid's writings. { II} Here Reid has clearly anticipated many of the central views of J.L. Austin on the nature of such activities. { 12} But only on the face of things since the notion of cause that Reid thinks is primary is not repudiated by Newtonian . Nevertheless the investigation of ultimate causation is hardly other than a remote concern of a scientist using Newtonian principles of investigation. {13} Most if not all of these points can be found in A.J. Ayer's chapter on memory in [1]. { 14} Correspondence with Paul Wood helped me come to clearly distinguish these positions. In particular his advice to turn to Reid's remarks on instinct in Active Powers III, part I, II was particularly useful.

{ 15} It cannot be denied that Reid does at times come to wed himself to providential in some of his pronouncements. Thus consider Active Powers IV,VI (H p.617):

The genuine dictate of our natural faculties is the voice of God, no less than what he reveals from heaven; and to say that it is fallacious is to impute a lie to the God of truth. But it cannot be said that he argues for this position which, I still think, is very much at odds with the main lines of his thought on the dictates of our natural faculties, especially the dictate that these faculties are not fallacious. BmLIOGRAPHY

1. This bibliography begins with a section listing some editions of various works of Reid referred to in the text. In this section we shall also list editions of works of philosophers such as Hume and Locke to whose writings reference either by citation or quotation is frequently made by Reid or by whose thinking Reid has clearly been influenced, although we shall, of course, not feel obliged to list editions of every philosophical or scientific work to which Reid refers. Alas there is not the time to determine which editions of the works of those philosophers were available to Reid himself; but that question is not beyond treatment given that the library stock of Aberdeen University and of Glasgow University during the appropriate periods of Reid's life can be accurately ascertained. In the circumstances it seems best to list those editions of those works available to the author of this commentary. Items in these lists will be accompanied by titles of works of which they are editions as well as by abbreviations of those titles employed in the text.

A. Editions of Reid's works:

(1) The works of Thomas Reid, D.D. with notes and supplementary dissertations eighth edition by Sir William Hamilton, volumes I and II. Edinburgh: James Thin 1895. This edition of Reid's works contains among others (i) An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the principles of . (ii) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. (iii) Essays on the Active Powers of Man. (iv) A brief account of 's Logic, with remarks. It also contains, among other items, most of Reid's correspondence and 's important memoire Account of The Life and Writings of Thomas Reid.

In the text of 'Thomas Reid and the Way of Ideas' work (i) is referred to by 'Inquiry', work (ii) by 'Intellectual Powers' and work (iii) by 'Active Powers'. 'H' in page references refers to Hamilton. 266 BIBLIOGRAPHY

(2) An Inquiry into the Human Mind Thomas Reid edited with an introduction by Timothy Duggan. The University of Chicago 1970. This is an edition of the Inquiry only but is readily available. (3) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Thomas Reid edited with an Introduction by Baruch Brody. M.LT. press 1969. A paperback edition of the Intellectual Powers ideal for the beginning student. (4) Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind Thomas Reid edited with an introduction by Baruch Brody. M.LT. press 1969. A paperback edition of the Active Powers ideal for the beginning student. There is, as yet, no standard edition of Reid's works worthy of the name, although it is customary to treat (1) or some one of its earlier editions as if it were such, and I have deferred to this custom. In connection with this remark I shall observe that (2), (3) and (4) are reprints of their respective works from an edition of Reid's works different from Hamilton's, namely the American edition of 1813. This edition was published by Samuel Etheridge, Jr. in Charlestown and claims to be edited by Dugald Stewart. Mention should be made of three editions of three separate unpublished works of Reid, to one of which there is frequent reference in my first chapter. These are: (a) An Abstract of the Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense in Norton [3] (b) The Cura Prima in Norton [4] and BIBLIOGRAPHY 267

(c) Thomas Reid's lectures on Natural Theology (1780) in Duncan [1]. Finally it would be wrong not to make mention of Reid's very considerable quantity of manuscript material that is yet to see the light of publication. To see what progress has beeen made to date on cataloguing it and preparing some of it for publication the reader is referred to the article by Charles Stewart-Robertson in the first number of 'Reid Studies'. B. Editions of works of important philosophers with whom Reid is in debate: Locke, John: (1) Essay: An Essay concerning Human Understanding, edited by J.Yolton, Dent and Dutton, 1965. (Based on the fifth edition.) (2) Correspondence with Stillingfleet: The works of John Locke, A New edition corrected, in ten volumes, Volume IV. London: Printed for Thomas Tegg et alia 1823. Reprinted by Scientia Verlag, Aalen 1963.(,T' in page references refers to Tegg.) Hume, David: (3) Treatise: A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1960.(,SB' in page references refers to Selby-Bigge.) (4) First Enquiry: in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777 and edited by Selby-Bigge. Third edition by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford 1975. ('SB/N' in page references refers to Selby-Bigge and Nidditch.) (5) Dialogues: Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, edited by Kemp-Smith, Oxford 1935. Arnauld, Antoine: (6) Des Vraies et des Fausses Idees, in Oeuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld, Docteur de la Maison et de la Societe de Sorbonne, Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation 1964.('1' in page references refers to Idees.) (7) The Port-Royal Logic: Logique de Port-Royale, Introduction par P. Roubinet, Publications de la faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de L'Universite de Lille, 1964. (A reprint of the fifth edition.) 268 BIBLIOGRAPHY

(8) The Port-Royal Grammar: Grammaire Generale et Raisonne, 1660, Claude Lancelot et Antoine Arnauld. Scolar Press 1968. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: (9) Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement Humain, edited by Jacques Brunschwig, Garnier Flammarion 1966. (Based on Gerhardt's edition.) (10) The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, edited by H.G. Alexander, Manchester University Press 195 . This contains all passages the reader need consult from Newton's Principia (lO) and Newton's Opticks (11) as extracts. Newton, Isaac: (10) Principia: The Mathematical Principles of , by Sir , Translated into English by Andrew Motte. London pr. for B. Motte, 1729. (11) Opticks: Opticks: or, A Treatise of the reflections, refractions, inflections and colours of light. London: S. Smith and B. Walford, 1704. Kant, Immanuel: (12) Prolegomena: Prolegomena to any Future that will be able to present itself as a Science, translated by P.G. Lucas, Manchester University Press, 1971. Descartes, Rene: (12) Meditations. (13) on Method. both in Philosophical Writings. A selection translated and edited by Elizabeth Anscombe and P.T. Geach: Revised edition, Nelson 1970. Berkeley, George: (14) Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. (15) The Principles of Human Understanding. (16) An Essay towards a new Theory of Vision. All in: A New Theory of Vision and other Writings, Berkeley, edited by A.D. Lindsay, Dent 19lO. BIBLIOGRAPHY 269

Butler, Joseph: (17) The Analogy of Religion, ed. Rt. Hon. W.E. Gladstone, Oxford 1907. Malebranche, Nicolas: (18) De la Recherche de la Verite, edited Genvieve Lewis, Vrin 1945-6.

2. In this second section of the bibliography is to be found a list of works which the author has found it valuable to consult for the composition of this book. It consists of a list in alphabetical order of authors of books or papers or both. The name of each author is accompanied by a numbered list of his writings that the author of this book has consulted. Anscombe, G.E.M. [1] Aristotle and the Sea Battle, Mind 65 1956 pp. 1-15. [2] The First Person, in Guttenplan [1]. [3] An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Hutchinson 1959. Anscombe, G.E.M. and Geach,P.T. [1] Three Philosophers, Blackwell 1963. Aquinas, St. Thomas

[I] Summa Theologiae, Blackfriars, 1964-1980. Austin, J.L. [1] Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford 1962. [2] How to do things with Words, Oxford 1962. Ayer, A.J. [1] The Problem of Knowledge, MacMillan, 1965. [2] Probability and Evidence, MacMillan 1972. [3] The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, MacMillan 1955. 270 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barker. S. See Barker and Beauchamp. Barker. S. and Beauchamp. T. eds. [1] Thomas Reid. Critical Interpretations. Philosophical Monographs. Philadelphia 1976. (This is an admirable source for bibliographical information on Reid.) Beauchamp. T. See Barker and Beauchamp. Bennett. J.F.

[1] Locke. Berkeley and Hume: Central Themes. Oxford 1971. Ben-Zeev. A. [1] Reid's Direct Approach to Perception. Studies in History and . 17. 1986. pp.99-114. Blackburn. S. [1] Spreading the Word. Oxford 1984. Black. M. See Geach and Black. Cahn. S. [1] Fate. Logic and Time. Yale 1967. Capaldi. N. See Norton. Capaldi. Robison. Daniels. N. [1] Thomas Reid's Inquiry. The geometry of Visibles and the case for . Burt Franklin 1974. Davidson. D. [1] Truth and Meaning. Synthese 1968. [2] Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford 1980. BIBLIOGRAPHY 271

[3] Mental Events, in [2]. [4] Actions, and Causes, in [2]. Diamond, C. See Diamond and Teichman. Diamond, C. and Teichman, J. eds. [1] Intention and Intentionality, Brighton 1979. Dummett, M.

[1] Bringing about the Past, in Gale [1]. [2] The Significance of Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis, in [3]. [3] Truth and other Enigmas, Duckworth 1978. Duncan, E.H. [1] Thomas Reid's Lectures on natural Theology (1780), Transcribed from Student Notes, Edited with an Introduction by Elmer H. Duncan with a new essay by W. R. Eakin. University Press of America 1981. Evans, G. [1] Things Without the Mind A Commentary upon Chapter Two of Strawson's Individuals, in van Straaten [1]. [2] The Causal Theory of Names, Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 47 (1973) pp. 187-208. Faurot, J.H.

[1] Thomas Reid, On Intelligible Objects, Monist, Volume 61, No.2 1978 pp.229-244. (This number of the Monist contains some interesting articles on Reid as well as more bibliographical information for students of Reid.) Flew, A.G.N. [1] Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity (revised version) in Martin and Armstrong [1]. 272 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Foot, P.

[I] Virtues and Vices, Essay IV (Freewill as involving ), Blackwell 1978. Frege, G. [1] On and Object, in Geach and Black [1]. [2] On Sense and Reference, in Geach and Black [1]. [3] Logic [1897], in Long and White [1].

[4] Introduction to Logic [August 1906], in Long and White [1]. [5] Foundations of Arithmetic, translated by J.L. Austin, second edition revised, Blackwell 1953. Gale, R. ed.

[I] The Philosophy of Time, MacMillan 1968. Geach P.T. [1] Mental Acts, Routledge 1957. [2] The Perils of Pauline, in [3]. [3] Logic Matters, Blackwell 1981. Geach, P.T. and Black M. eds. [I] Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Second edition, Blackwell 1980. Grave, S.A. [1] The of Common Sense, Oxford 1960. [2] The "Theory ofIdeas", in Barker and Beauchamp [1]. Gregory, R.L. [1] Eye and Brain, third edition, Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1977. Grice, H. P. [1] Personal Identity, in Perry [1]. BIBLIOGRAPHY 273

Guttenplan, S. ed. [1] Mind and Language, Oxford 1975. Haack, S. [1] The Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge 1978. Hamlyn, D. [1] Sensation and Perception: a study in the History of Philosophy, Routledge 1963. Harman, G. See Harman G. and Davidson D. Harman G. and Davidson D. eds. [1] Semantics of Natural Languages, Reidel 1972. Hintikka, K.J.K. [1] Models for Modalities, Reidel 1969. [2] On the Logic of Perception, in [1]. Hirsch, E. [1] The Concept ofIdentity, New York 1982. Hofstadter, D. and Dennett, D.

[1] The Mind's I, Penguin 1980. Jeffrey, R.C. [1] Coming True, in Diamond and Teichman [1]. Kretzmann, N. [1] The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory, Philosophical Review, 77,1968, pp.175-196. Kripke, S.A. [1] Naming and Necessity. in Harman and Davidson [1].

[2] Identity and Necessity, in Munitz [1]. 274 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Le Grand, Antoine [1] Institutio Philosophiae, Tome I Logica, 1672. Lehrer, K. [1] Reid on Consciousness, Reid Studies, No.1 (1986-87) pp.1-9. Lewis, D.

[1] Survival and Identity, in Rorty [1]. Long P. and White R. eds. [1] Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings, edited by Hermes, Kambartel, Kaulbach and translated by Peter Long and Roger White, Blackwell 1979. Lukasiewicz, J. [1] Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic, reprinted in McColl [1]. [2] On Determinism, reprinted in McColl [1]. Macintyre, A. [1] After Virtue (second edition), Duckworth 1985. Mackie, J.L. [1] Problems from Locke, Oxford 1976. Madell, G. [1] The Identity of the Self, Edinburgh 1981. Marcil-Lacoste, L. [1] and Thomas Reid, McGill 1982. (This book contains important bibliographical information for students of Reid.) Marsh R. ed. [1] , Logic and Knowledge, Allen and Unwin 1956. C.J. Martin and D. Armstrong, eds. BIBLIOGRAPHY 275

[1] Locke and Berkeley, MacMillan 1968. Matthews, E. [1] Descartes and Locke on the Concept of a Person, Locke Newsletter 8,1977, pp.9-34. McColl, S, ed. [1] Polish Logic, 1920-1939, Oxford 1967. Mill, J.S.

[I] An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 6th edition, New York 1889, p. 243f. [2] A System of Logic, 8th edition, Longman's 1967. Monteiro, J-P. [1] Hume, Induction and Natural Selection, in Norton, Capaldi and Robison [1]. Moore, G.E. [1] A Defense of Common Sense, in Moore [5]. [2] Four Forms of Scepticism, in Moore [5]. [3] Certainty, in Moore [5]. [4] Is existence a Predicate? in Moore [5]. [5] Philosophical Papers, Allen and Unwin 1959. Munitz M. ed. [1] Identity and Individuation, New York 1971. Nagel,T.

[1] Mortal Questions, Cambridge 1979.

[2] Brain-Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness, in [1]. [3] What is it like to be a bat? in [1]. [4] Subjective and Objective, in [1]. 276 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Norton, D.F. [1] Hume's Scottish Critics, in Norton, Capaldi and Robison [1]. [2] David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton 1982. [3] Reid's Abstract of The Inquiry into the Human Mind, in Philosophical Monographs 1976. [4] The Cura Prima, in Marcil-Lacoste [1]. Norton, D.F, Capaldi,N, Robison, W, eds.

[1] McGill Hume Studies, Austin Hill Press, 1979. Parfit, D. [1] Lewis, Perry and What Matters, in Rorty [1]. [2] Personal Identity, Philosophical Review 80, 1971. Parsons, T. [1] Nonexistent Objects, Yale 1980. Perry, J. [1] Personal Identity, edited by J. Perry, University of California Press, 1975. [2] The Importance of Being Identical, in Rorty [1]. Popper, K.

[1] Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1963. Prior, A.N.

[1] Past, Present and Future, Oxford 1967. [2] Objects of Thought, eds. P.T. Geach and A.J.P. Kenny, Oxford 1971. [3] The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms, eds. P.T. Geach and A.J.P. Kenny, Duckworth 1976. [4] The Runabout Inference Ticket, Analysis 21,1960, pp. 38-39. BIBLIOGRAPHY 277

Putnam. H. [1] Minds and Machines. in S. Hook ed. Dimensions of Mind. New York 1960. Quine. W.V. [1] From a Logical Point of View. Harvard 195 . [2] Set theory and its Logic. Second edition. Harvard 196 . [3] Identity. Ostension and Hypostasis. in [1]. [4] Two Dogmas of Empiricism. in [1]. [5] On What There is. in [1]. [6] Word and Object. M.I.T. 1960. [7] Ontological Relativity and other Essays. New York 1969. [8] Epistemology Naturalised. in [7].

Rorty. A. O. ed. [1] The Identities of Persons. University of California press 1976. Routley. R.

[I] Exploring Meinong' s Jungle and Beyond, Department of Philosophy, Monograph series; no. 3, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 2600, 1980. Russell, B.A.W.

[1] On Denoting, in Marsh [1]. [2] The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, in Marsh [1]. Ryle, G.

[I] Dilemmas, Cambridge 1953. [2] The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson 1949. Schoemaker S. See Schoemaker S. and Swinburne R. 278 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Schoemaker S. and Swinburne R.

[1] Personal Identity, Blackwell 1984. Stewart M.A. [1] Locke's Mental Atomism and the Classification of Ideas:I, The Locke Newsletter 1979, pp.53-82. Swinburne R. See Schoemaker S. and Swinburne R. Taylor, R. [1] Fatalism, in Gale [1]. Thomason, R.H. [1] Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps, Theoria, 3, 1970, pp 264-281. Unger, P.

[1] Ignorance, Oxford 1975. van Straaten, Z. ed. [1] Philosophical Subjects, Oxford 1980. Vernier, P.

[1] Thomas Reid on the Foundations of Knowledge and his Answer to Scepticism, in Barker and Beauchamp [1]. Vesey, G.N.A. [1] Of the Visible Appearances of Objects, in Perceiving Art Works, ed. J. Fisher, Philadelphia 1980, pp.42-58. This contains a reproduction of the Old woman/young woman diagram from the American Journal of Psychology, 42 (1930), p.444. Von Wright, G.H. [1] Time, Truth and Necessity, in Diamond and Teichman [1]. Watts, Isaac

[1] Logick, 1724. BIBLIOGRAPHY 279

Wiggins, D. [1] Sameness and Substance, Oxford 1980. Williams, B. [1] Personal Identity and Individuation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,57, pp 229-52. Williamson, T. [1] Equivocation and Existence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 88,1987-88, pp.109-128.

Wittgenstein, L.

[1] The Blue and Brown Books, Blackwell 1960. [2] On Certainty, Blackwell 1969. [3] Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell 1967. [4] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,Translated by D. F. Pears and B. McGuiness, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1962. Wood, P. [1] David Hume on Thomas Reid's An Inquiry into the Human Mind, On the Principles of Common Sense: A New Letter to Hugh Blair from July 1762, Mind 95 (1986) pp.411-416. [2] Catalogue to 'Thomas Reid and the ' an exhibition at the Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto 1985. [3] The Hagiography of Common Sense: Dugald Stewart's Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, in Philosophy, its History and Historiography, ed. A.J. Holland, Reidel 1985. Wright, J.P. [1] The Sceptical Realism of David Hume, Manchester University Press 1983. [2] Hume versus Reid on Ideas: The New Hume Letter, Mind 76,1987, pp.392-398. YoIton,J 280 BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid, Blackwell 1984. INDEX

This index is an index of names and of subjects. Certain names which occur very frequently in the text such as 'Reid' are not listed with page references. Not all names of authors of works consulted appear but these can be found in alphabetical order in the second section of the Bibliography. ability authority of experience,161-165 ability plus Author of Nature,84 opportunity ,I SO AyeI' ,A.J. ,159,162,245,264 abstract (ofInquiry),1-12 awake,58 awareness ,193-198 abstract general idea,93 axiom,151 ,156,213-222,263 abstract truth,168,214 absurd ,164 ,188 ,212 abuse oflanguage,33 act bearer (ofname),108 act upon,33 beginning of existence ,154-161 Bedeutung (Frege) ,252 act of the mind,41,l11 billiard ball,132-135 act, immanent,33 Blackburn, S.,252 act, transitive,33 blame ,131 act, social,228 body,21-29,61-67,130-2,184-92 active ,135 ,145 ,246 existence of body,61-67 active power, see power, active bodies, external,246 active principle,166 bodies, material,21-6,61-7 adequate conception, see conception, brain,21-33,56-7 adequate brain in a vat,57 adjective,95 brain processes,29-33 adverb,95 brain bisection,201 aftirmation ,114,238,239 Brave Oft1cer Paradox, 179-84 ambiguity, 147 ambiguity in scope,147 amnesia,177 analogy,2,28,32,108 candle,40,240 cause,16,154-169 analogical expression ,I 09 analysis,121 cause, efticient,135-168 angle ,33-36 cause, intelligent,88 Anscombe, G.E.M. ,257,261 cause, occasional, 140 apparent magnitude,34.42,70 cause, ultimate, 138 appearance,48-52 whatever begins to exist must have a appearance of colour ,67-71 cause which produced it,154-5,210 visible appearances,40,42,46,52,68-9 certainty, 165-9 ,258 apprehension, simple,233-237 certainty, demonstrative, 157 ,259 Aquinas,250,252 certainty, intuitive,161 Aristotle,6,142-145 charity, principle of,218-22 Arnauld,22,104,l16-128 Clarke, S., 167 ,257 atom,185 c1ass,96,121 attribute,95-111 colour ,61-75 attributes, combination of,98 common sense,19,53,208-9,219,232-3 attributes, collection of,97 ,110 communication (of ), 133 authority,215 comprehension (of idea or term),94-101 282 INDEX

conception,8-10,107-111 depth,82 conceive,108,124-7,160-2 depth cues,52 what is conceived, 112-3 depth-grammar ,37 conceivable, 116,128 Descartes, R. ,34,44-6,55-8,205,242-48 descriptions, definite,121 conception, clear and distinct,68 design,85-9 general conceptions,95-115 designate,1l2 conceptions of individual designation, rigid, 106-7 things,101-2 determination, 136-41 conjecture, 14-5,263 determinable, 115 conjunction,46 determinate, 115 conjunction, constant, 16,27,158 determinism connected, 10-13 deterministic system, 131-41 connotation,99 dimensive quantity,65 conscious, 12,38-9,41-3,85,108,179,194 di scourse, 121 -7 consciousness, 12,38-9,75,174-9,192-20 discourse, fictional, see 1 fictional discourse constitution,9,136,230-33 disorder ,47-52 constitution of (my) nature,77 disposition ,229 ,251 contiguity, 166 division,67,188,203 contiguous,161,17 divide,239 contingent, 135-7 divided ,175,201 contingent attribute,83-5 divisibility (intlnite) ,68 contingent event,135 Duggan, T.,39-41, contingent proposition,84 contingent truth, 75,83-4,168,214,227 continuity,205 effects, 85-9 , 135-7,158-9,229,258-9 epistemic,48-61 continuant, 182-5 epistemic appearance,51 continu'd existence,63 contrary causes,169 epistemic possibility, 147 contrariety of events, 169 epistemological,l 0-19 ,48-53 conviction,47,150 epistemologically prior, 12 corpuscle, 173 epistemology naturalised,9-12,245 counterfeit guinea ,45 error,44-6 course of nature, 160-2,259-60 essence, 14,39,63,254 creator establish,12,221 creature Evans, G.,73 creatures of the fancy, 113-4 event (unique),89 creatures of the imagination,1l5,126 every event has a cause, 162 criterion, 73,85, 188,204-215 everyday transactions,59 custom,10,164 evidence,ll-16,60,78-80,199-207,227-3 7 evil scientist,56-60 evolution,87,251 Davidson, D. ,73 exist,83-90,107-111 day,17 ,,28 deception ,47 ,65 existence as an attribute,116-122 deceive ,44-5 existence, real,168, decision,141 experience, 159-68 experiment,46,159 decide,141 explain,14 definition, 101-8,161 ,220,253 deliberation, 149 explanation, 75,234 delta,201 external delusion external bodies,3,14,246 deluded ,24 external denomination,32, 123, denotation,99 external object,8, 9 ,22,34-6 INDEX 283

external signs,91 ,230 grain of sand,4 gravitation ,15, 168 external to the mind,25,110 Gregory, R.L.,247-8,256 eye,34-5,48,72-4,195,247 grounded,164,211 ,225 grounds,54 guarantee faculty ,9, 12,13,223-226,237 ,242-3 ~uarantee, supernatural,240-3 fallacious,30,44-5 ,223 ,242,264 gUllt,149-51 fallacy Gulliver, L.,116 fallacy of equivocation ,35 fallacy of the senses,45,223 fallacy, modal,142 Haack,5.,144 fancy picture,126 Hamlyn, D. ,247 feel ,5 ,37 ,70 hardness,6-8,16 feelings,8,78-82 hardware ,256 fiction, 14, 115 harmony, established,139 fictional work,115 hidden ,82 fictitious, 199 ,207 Hume,throughout figure,7,25,64-8 hunger,16 figure of speech ,105 hypothesis, 12-18 ,29 tinj;er ,40 hypothesis, ideal,21 ,192 fimte,4 first person,201-2 first principle,9-12,48-67,75-90,208-43 1,,172,197 first principle of contingent, I am not thought,l72 ,76,80,83,213,223,228 idea,1-5,13,16,17,20-9,30,62,66,72,13 first principle of necessary 3,189-194,245-53,259 truths,61, 154, 172,225, idea, complex,92 fleeting (perceptions) ,5,246 ideas, innate, see innate fool ,163-4 force (perceptions), 1 ,28,32 ideas foresight, 141-5 ideas as intermediaries,23-4 forensic,l77 idea, simple,2,5,12,20, freedom , 135-6 identity,173-192,205 Frege, 100,113,183,196,247 ,254,261 identity, perfect,184-92 fundamental,208-31 future,147,241, identity, imperfect, 185 ,204 ,207 imagination ,21,109,193 future contingent,141-5 image,25,30-4,42,106-9 future tense,145-9 imagine,116,127-8, immaterial,76 immediate,58,93-5 Geach, P.T.,253-4,261 immediate object,23,109,128 genera,96,100,107,225 immediate object of perception ,25 general,91-104 impression,I-18,21-29 ,63-4,158,196,24 general conception, see 4-6 conception, general simple impression,2,12 general idea,92 indicate,37 ,77 ,194,212,228 indifterent (sensations) ,38-41 general law, see indirect (perception),27 law, general indirect (proof) ,220 general word,94-107 induction,16-7,154-61 genius,14 inductive-introspective approach ,242 geometry,52,249, inference,46,70,86 geometry ofvisibles,249 innate ideas,9,69,244 give rise (knowingly),131-2 instances, 18, 160,259 globe,46-7,64,204,249 instantiation rule (quantifiers), 183 God,32,61 ,118,141 ,149,242 intellectual substance,200 284 INDEX

intelligence,85 mass of corpuscles, 173 intelligent,84,168 mass of matter, 174 intelligent being,176,199 material bodies,21-4,34,61-3,250,262 intelligent cause, see material things,36 cause, intelligent mathematics, 182 invisible, 78-89, mathematically deduced,72 intermediaries, see ideas as McCulloch, G.,254 intermediaries meaning 'is' of equality or identity,179-84 meaning, distinct,101 Measor, N.,43,51, memory,158,177,183,202-3,223 235 26 4 ' , J efi'rey, R. ,258 Jacobson, A. ,31 method,232 judgment,208-10,237-9 !nethodological, 12-14 ,229 judgment of nature,238 MIchaud, Y.,221-3,263 judgment we torm by sight,49 mind,l ,2,12-19,21-9,32-3,58,76,108-9, justitication,8-12,19,53,208-11 218223 124,206,227-8,235 justitied true belief,222,263 ' , minute (size) ,4,49 modal (logic), 144 modal fallacy,142 Kant, 1.,154 modal status,84,155-7 knowledge, 12-17 ,23,45-51,154,218-222 mode of presentation ,247 ,237,263 monad, 172-8 ,184, 199 ,205 Kripke, S.A. ,253-4 Moore, G.E.,52-60 moral,151 moral and accountable being,140 language,36-8,54,216 moral estimation, 140 law moral , 140 laws of our constitution ,9-20 moral responsibility, 152 laws of motion, 135 , 149, 171 motion ,6-9 ,27 ,32,65-8, 133 laws of nature,10-19,167-70,229 movement, 130-6 nature is governed by movement of small bodies, 133 fixed laws, 163 movement of the body, 136 law of non-contradiction,122 motive, 131 law, ,18-20 Mueller-Lyer diagram,48-52 Leibniz, G. W. ,33,187,199,200-4,257-262 Lewis, D.,261-2 names,36-8,95-9,105,112,1l6 180-3 25 Ie Grand, A.,44-7 2,260 ' , Lehrer, K.,262-3 lite,138,173 names of classes, 96 logic, 171 ,220 proper names,93-6,104-7,112-7 nature,13-18,44,65,75,85-7,168,173 19 c1assicallogic,220,263 1,230 ' intuitionist logic,220 ,263 lot of intelectual stuff,200 nature is govverned by fixed laws,163 lot of thinking stutf,200 nature is uniform, 163 ,245 lunatic,53 Naturalism, Providential,234,241-3,264 necessary, 75-90,135-7,213-4 necessarily ,39-41,135,144,233,258 madman,163-4 negation ,238-9 Mackie, J.L.,73 nerves,27-9,47 Malebranche, N. ,118 neuro-physiological events,257 Marcil-Lacoste, L. ,229-31 ,242,263-4 Newton, 137 ,166,232 mark,164-5,210-1 Newtonian,166,230-2,264 mass,67,,188 nominalism, 93-5 INDEX 285 noneism,254 phenomena, 14,17 ,47 ,79,167 ,232 non-extensional,245-7 pictures, 4 7,92 Norton, D.F.,7 ,4,13,234,240-4 planet,135,226 notion,6-8,14-16,21,36,68-71,184,258 plural number,95,104 notion of body, 189 point notion of cause,264 coloured points,3 noun,95,253 point of a sword,6 common noun,94-9 power, 7-9,14-16,22-3,32,132-6,140-51, 166,175 active power ,132-49 object,3,29-43,67-71,108,124,196,248, power to determine this way or 254-6 that, 136 objects of thought,2,7 ,23-4,112,123 speculative power, 135,145-6 objects of perception ,86 predicate, 100,253 object of sense, 165-7 predicatables,97 objective nuclear predicate,l16-22 objectively in the mind ,123 preference (of the mind),132-5 presupposition,59,152,160-4,169-71,22 obligation, moral, see moral 9-31 obligation observe,16,30-1 presupposed,83,230-1 Prior, A.N.,98,147 ,257 ,261,263 observation ,11,15 ,169 ,228 probably ,18,241,262 observed instances ,169 probability, 160 ,62 projection ontological commitment,61,122 ,250 project, 72 ontologicallevel,61 pronoun,95 ontological status,97,109,128 first person pronoun,201-2 ontology of continuants,185 proof operations of our minds,38 ,85 ,193 ad absurdum,214 overlook,40 indirect proof,220 for the most part we overlook proposition,57 ,83,100,121,127 ,208-20, our sensations,40 238-9 trifling proposition ,21 0 prudence,53,155,163-4,169-71 pain,6-8,26,37-9,47-9,82,177-9,197 painting,49 pantomimes,77 quality ,217 ,251 Partlt, D.,262 primary quality ,68-71 Paris,2 secondary quality ,69-71 Parsons, T.,255 quantitier ,183,252,256 part,4,67,105,188,206,250 quasi-remember ,203 ,206 part of a person, see person, questions about words, 184-5 part of Quine,11,63,122,142,244,250,261,263 particles,74,186 particulars,23,25 particular ideas,22-6,31,36,92 reaction,29 passion,194,229 real, 14,39 ,42,108-9 ,112 perception ,26-9 real essence, 101 acquired perception ,11,46 real existence,9,58,108-9,111,168 indirect perception,27 real magnitude,34 Perry, J.,193,261 person,I72-9 real table,25,34-5 ,44-5,74,158,161,164,217-9,223, person, part of,l72-9 234 person stages, 183 perspective ,52 reasoning,19,44,83,155-7,169,218-9,22 286 INDEX

6 see,,8,25,28-9,42,52,66,76,82,128,245 reflection,9,12,38,58,198,217,228,238 self, 172-3 ,200 attentive reflection,12,228 self.. evident, 16, 151,164-8,208-10,242 retlective state, 198 semantic,252-3 regulae philosophandi,232 sensation,4-12,16,21-6,36-43,67-71 ,193 relation,3,17,158,192 ,234,247-8 relative,3 sensations of colour, 71 relative and obscure notion ,68-9 sense,26,54, remember, 172,177,180-4,200-02 senses,45-6,55-7,63-4,69-70 remembrance,172,202-3 evidence of the senses,78-80 represent,2-4,105,246 deliverances of the senses,213 representation, 12,22-3,34,63,91,235 sense organs,28,30,47 representative,22-3 sensorium,32 resemblance,7 ,9,22,36, 160 settled, 144-5 resemble,4,7,8,17-18,68,158 already settled,l44 instances of which we have ship,185 no experience must resemble ship of Theseus,187 those of which we have had sign,14,23,38,46,69, 71, 77 ,86,91,94,18 experience,158 2,228 responsibility, 171,263 external signs,91 ,230 river ,201,250 natural signs,14,37-8 Rome,189 signification,77 ,93-6,100,106-7 round immediate signification,91-2 round square cupola on Berkeley simple College, 122 simple apprehension,233,237 route to the self, 191-4 simple idea, see idea, simple Routley, R.,1l9-20,254 Russell, B.,113,121-2,255 simple impression, see impression, simple simple notion,9,236 ,15,16 same,173-4,199-201,220 situation, 106 same body,186,189 smell,37-41 same city, 190 smell of a rose,36,37,39 same consciousness,174-6,199,202 sofiware,256 same man,173-5 solid same mass,186 solidity,67-8 same organised living body, 173 solitude,76,83 solitary mathematician,215 same person,174-5,177-9,202,204 sort,94 same plant,186,201 space same river,201 ,250 absolute space,137 same self,174-5 species,87 ,95-100,107-111,127,225 same set of memories, 199 specitic names,97 same ,175 square,255 same statements,201 square circle, 127 same thinking thing,174 state, 197-9 state of mind,197 same tree, 173-4 stuif,7,46,1l0, same watch, 187 substance, 16,98,162,172-4,217 sceptic,220 Supreme Being,168 scepticism,1,232-3 surface,4,72,127 scope, 147 syllogism ,34,86 wide scope,259 system seatight,145 deterministic system, 131-5 INDEX 287 table,4-8,33-37,42,63 unique,89 table which we see,25,34-5 universe,39 ,89,121,151,204 Taylor, R. ,257 universal, 14,19,126-8,182,215-6 term,103, universal and primary opinion,34 term of my thought,123-5 universal acceptance,216 testimony universally believed,215 testimony of the universal express assent,216 senses,45-6,52 ,62 ,213 ~niversal indispensability,216 theory,! 1 unIversals,97,110 theory of ideas, see ideas, unknown,69 theory of thing,86 thing conceived,101,,1l4 variable or interrupted,192 thing that I conceive,124 variables,182 thing signitled,14,77-8 veil of perception ,249 thinking, 1 ,2,49,113,217,244 velocity, 137 think of,33,111-2,122 Vernier, P.,222 Thomason, R.H. ,148,258 Vesey, G.N.A.,49-51 thought,7 ,21,32,37,43,59,75,80,91,133 visualise,126 ,201,244,256 visual sensations,40 three-dimensional, 11,59,82 vivacity,21 time,2,4,147 voice of God,264 volition, 139 absolute time,137 voluntary, 133,198 timeless, 147,183 voluntary action ,39,130-1,198,231 toothache,70 touch,2,6,7 ,37 ,82 voluntary exertion, 150 transubstantiation ,65 voluntary , 140 train Von Wright, G.H.,166,205 train of ideas,2,4 vulgar ,3,4,8, 17 ,25,36,70,169 train of impressions, 17 trans-world identity, 106 triangle, 108-11 0 wall,29-33 trust ,44-5 ,53 ,232 wax,,248 trustworthiness,234 Westminster Bridge,102-3 truth,84,116,,214 white,99 true,59,101-3,114,127,213,237-8, whiteness,99 it is already true that,148 the whiteness of this sheet 99 Wiggins, D.,261 ' true at all times, 183 will,130,167 true to life,47 Williams, B.A.O. ,201,203,262 truth of our faculties,224-6 wisdom,15,86 truth condition, 147 ,251 wisdom of Nature,15 turf,64 Wittgenstein, L. ,54-60,78 tympanum,29 Wood, P.,9,244,264 word,21,92-4,99,185 words for metals,105-6 unconscious, 11 world,89 uncertainty work ofnature,9,84 uncertainty of events, 169 wrongness of killing infants, 177 , uncertainty in the causes, 169 under an obligation,152 understanding, 167 yolton, J.,2 Unger, P.,56 uniform experiments,159 uniform sequence,78 Zermelo, E. ,121 uniformity,131