War of the Words

Thesis on the representation of the Islamic State by the

Obama administration

Frank Kleef

University of Amsterdam

Supervisor: dhr. prof. dr. R.V.A. (Ruud) Janssens

Student no.: 10547045

20-06-2017

Abstract

The Obama administration used a strategy that actively sought to delegitimize the enemy in order to pursue its efforts to counter the Islamic State and portrayed it as a manifestation of evil.

In this thesis I intend to argue that by representing the effort to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State as a conflict between freedom and evil, the Obama administration utilized a very idealistic rhetorical framework. Problematically, the approach taken by the Obama administration to counter the Islamic State really had more to do with the United States itself than the Islamic State, the alleged object of the conflict. Although Obama was frequently lauded for deviating from the rhetorical idealism of the Bush administration, analysis shows that the rhetoric of the Obama administration only changed in style rather than in substance. This thesis aims to contribute to the current academic discourse considering the general reflection on the

Obama administration. More specifically, about its Middle East policy and its comprehensive effort to counter the Islamic State. Consequently, it remarks on the problematic approach with which the Obama administration sought to react to the situation in the Middle East and the

Islamic State. By doing so, I intend to contribute to the understanding of the Western discourse in order to improve its reaction to out-group crises.

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: 8

1.1: Conceptualizing the Islamic State 9

1.2: The Islamic State, the terrorist group 11

1.3: “A violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam” 14

1.4: Defense by offense 17

1.5: The enemy as the quintessential other 18

Conclusion 21

Chapter 2: 23

2.1: The post-Bush War on Terror 24

2.2: The global war on the Islamic State 30

2.3: War to construct 35

Conclusion 39

Chapter 3: 42

3.1: Twinkle, twinkle Northern Star 44

3.2: The global battlefield 50

3.3: Sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing 52

Conclusion 54

Conclusion 57

Bibliography 61 Introduction

Addressing the leaders of a multitude of predominantly Muslim countries in Saudi Arabia on

21 May 2017, President Donald J. Trump argued that the global struggle against terrorism is “a battle between barbaric criminals who seek to obliterate human life, and decent people of all religions who seek to protect it. This is a battle between Good and Evil.”1 In this speech, Trump seemed to echo the rhetorical style adopted by George W. Bush, who frequently likened those committing terrorist actions to evil during his presidency. President Barack H. Obama aimed to deviate from such rhetoric and instead tried to play down the threat. After the Islamic State captured the city of Fallujah in January 2014, he likened the Islamic State, primary object of the American campaign during his second term to counter terrorism, a “Junior Varsity Team.”2

Obama claimed this at a very early stage in the insurgency of the Islamic State. Over the course of his presidency and as the Islamic State grew rapidly, Obama rarely deviated from this rhetoric of downplaying the threat. Yet, only three days after 128 came to perish in the terrorist attacks on the evening of November 13th, 2015, he stated that “ISIL is the face of evil” at the G20

Summit in Turkey. 3

Obama seldom issued such obviously idealism-infused statements, which would credit the struggle against the Islamic State with epic importance and a recruitment tool for the Islamic

State. Generally, the discourse his administration seems to have used was more subtle than the statements. Obama frequently stated that he intended to abandon the idealism-infused approach to the Global War on Terror, predominantly present in the rhetoric of his predecessor, during

1 The White House. “President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit.” Whitehouse.gov. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/21/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american- summit (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 2 Remnick, D., ‘Going the Distance: On and off the road with Barack Obama’, The New Yorker (27 January 2014) (05-06-2017). 3 Garunay, M., ‘President Obama at the G-20 Summit: We Are United Against This Threat.’ Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/11/16/president-obama-g-20- summit-we-are-united-against-threat (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

1 the campaign for the presidential elections of 2008 and early in his first term as President of the

United States. Analysts like Ryan Lizza, at The New Yorker, argued in his article “The

Consequentialist” that Obama was a not an idealist nor a realist, but a consequentialist, reacting to developments at hand.4 This theory might have been accurate at the time the article was published in 2012, just at the end of Obama’s first term. However, during the second term of the Obama administration, in which the Islamic State rose to prominence, a more idealistic rhetoric regarding the issue of fighting the Islamic State seemed to dominate its discourse.

The scholarly debate surrounding the discourse of the Obama administration is quite divergent in opinions. Most of the sources I consulted seemed tainted with personal political preferences, choices, and agendas. Yet, all scholars agree that the general concept of the policy established by the Obama administration regarding the Middle East and the struggle against the

Islamic State is flawed and seemed to be failing. Disagreement seems to rule on how exactly the performance of the Obama administration in its efforts to counter the Islamic State could have been more effective. The argument from Asaf Siniver and Scott Lucas is very illuminating in this debate, who suggested in their article ‘The Islamic State lexical battleground’ that the wording of the policies of the Obama administration signifies that it was basically evading commitment to the conflict. Alternatively, Andreas Krieg rather argues in his article

‘Externalizing the burden of war’ that the multilateral approach taken by the Obama administration actually signals a readjustment to a changing global order. Externalizing the burden of engagement then is viewed as the switch from a leading nation to a supporting role for the United States and reliance on the powers of the Middle East. Instead, Jülide Karacok argues in her article ‘The Failure of Indirect Orientalism’ that the Islamic State itself is evidence for the failure of the indirect Orientalism she observes in the Middle East policy of the Obama

4 Lizza, Ryan, ‘The Consequentialist’, The New Yorker (May 2011).

2 administrations. Although these are only a few of the sources I consulted for this thesis, all have significant presence in the theory I produced.

Ultimately, with this essay I aim to test the approach taken by the Obama administration against the Edward Said’s theory about relations between the countries of the West and the

East. In his groundbreaking work Orientalism (1978), Said argued that Western actors have defined the East as inferior and subservient to the West. He continued that the Western conceptualization of the East is based on Western values and concepts, suggesting that the dominant Western image of the East is a Western construct, rather than reality.5 By distancing the people of the East from the West by a “semi-mythical construct,” Said argues that the in- group version of the out-group rhetorically becomes the in-group’s object “to possess and direct.”6 The rhetoric of the Obama administration regarding the Middle East and the Islamic

State seems to incorporate such a possessive character. An illuminating example is the governmental issue on strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for

21st Century Defense,” in which the over-arching goal seems to be promoting an international order based on the rule of law.7 Constituent to this established national interest is the belief that the rights inherent to such a legal construction are universal rights. However, these values are actually Western products. Promoting an international order based on the rule of law, would thus technically mean imposing Western in-group values on its out-group. Another important aspect to this theory is the way the Obama administration sought to antagonize and delegitimize the Islamic State. In line with framing the Islamic State to be the “face of evil,” Obama called its ideology “A violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam,” thereby assuming the moral high ground.8 By assuming the moral high ground, Obama inverted the logic of John

5 Said, Edward, Orientalism (1978), xviii. 6 Said, Orientalism, xviii. 7 Department of Defense. ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, Defense Strategic Guidance (January 2015). 8 Garunay, ‘President Obama at the G-20 Summit’, (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

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Winthrop, framing the United States as a “city upon a hill,” implying that its illogical to condone the behavior of the Islamic State, thereby suggesting that what the American government condones is inherently logical and opposed to the evil that is the Islamic State: good.

The unifying question is how the discourse of the Obama administration limited its capability to develop an adequate policy for countering the Islamic State. Therefore, this thesis will primarily focus on analyzing the rhetoric of the Obama administration regarding its comprehensive effort to counter the Islamic State. Despite the fact that developments surrounding American engagement in the struggle against the Islamic State mainly happened during his second term, I will extend the timeframe to the campaign of Obama for the presidential elections of 2008, in which he was portrayed as an opponent of the wars waged by the Bush administration. In order to do so, I will draw parallels between the rhetoric regarding the Global War on Terror from the Bush administration, Obama’s interpretation, and his approach to the conflict against the Islamic State.

This thesis builds on the presumption that discourse represents a deliberate choice of language to describe certain phenomena, reflecting his or her views, the choices one is willing to make and the choices that are excluded from the pallet of possibilities beforehand. I aim to comment on the fallacy of such rhetoric when putting oneself up for the task to grapple with the global problem of terrorism and extreme ideologies. Therefore, this thesis will analyze the rhetoric utilized by the Obama administration regarding the Islamic State, its capability to pose a threat to the United States, and its suggested conceptualization of the way it is supposed to be countered. I will do so through three chapters, each emphasizing the rhetorical framing of the

Islamic State by the Obama administration on a different operative scale. The first chapter will analyze the official discourse of the Obama administration on the concept of the Islamic State.

I will then expand this argument by putting it in a regional framework, analyzing how the

Obama administration represented the conflict against the Islamic State in its general Middle

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East policy. I will then extend this argument by putting it in a global framework, questioning how the Obama administration represents its own part in the struggle against the Islamic State and what it means for its general foreign policy.

In the first chapter I will argue that the discourse of the Obama administration suggests rhetorical conviction of the Islamic State as an enemy to mankind, a vehicle of evil. The discourse of the administration regarding the Islamic State is contradicting, at the least. Obama frequently tried to rationalize the nature of the radical Islamic violence, as he did when focusing on its roots in sectarianism and tribalism in his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg from The

Atlantic. However, he has also suggested more antagonizing images of the enemy, often in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in Europe or the United States. This would include calling the

Islamic State the ‘face of evil’ at the G20 Summit, or calling their ideology “a violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam,” as he did in the aforementioned interview with

Goldberg.9

In the second chapter I will argue that the turn to multilateralism under Obama, aimed to strengthen its partners in the Middle East, was employed to increase the American-centered in-group. Extending the argument from the first chapter, I will focus on the multilateral approach taken by the Obama administration and what this would mean for the order of the

Middle East. By abandoning the unilateral approach from its predecessor, the Obama administration externalized the burden of warfare to the countries of the Middle East, who faced the direct consequences and felt the primary impact of the conflict. Instead of sending a large armed force to deal with the Islamic State for the powers of the Middle East, the Obama administration encouraged its leaders to cooperate and face the mutual problem with their own

9 Goldberg, Jeffrey, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic (April 2016)

5 forces and strength. Clearly, the long-term effect was the strengthening of an American- centered coalition in the Middle East, extending American influence in the region.

In the third chapter I will argue that the representation of the threat posed by the Islamic

State to American national interests in the Middle East by the Obama administration signifies that the conflict is part of a larger agenda, rather than an end goal by itself. The crux of this argument relies on my observation that the destruction of the Islamic State does not seem to be the nucleus of the rhetorical framework constructed by the Obama administration. Its focus on multilateralism would rather suggest that the goal to obliterate the Islamic State was part of a larger agenda instead of focusing on the problem at hand, or even at the Middle East. Despite the fact that Obama aimed to dissociate idealism from politics and ultimately ended up utilizing ideologically induced rhetoric shows either the ingrained presence of idealism in American politics as well as the perseverance of American exceptionalism. The selectively used, aforementioned, rhetorical style of ascribing epical proportions to the conflict served to encourage non-American policy makers to engage in the fight against the Islamic State, to be

American proxies. Ultimately, Obama seemed to encourage other nations to stand on what he believed to be the right side of history: the American side of history.

This thesis is a product of my effort to comment on the current academic debate surrounding the conceptualization of the nature of the Islamic State itself and the response as established by the Obama administration. Furthermore, this thesis is a case-study of the discourse of the Obama administration on the Middle East, radical Islamic, terrorists, and the

Islamic State. I aim to contribute to the current academic discourse considering the general reflection on the Obama administration, and more specifically, about its Middle East policy and its comprehensive effort to counter the Islamic State. Consequently, with this thesis I intend to remark on the approach taken by the Obama administration in order to react to the situation in the Middle East. By doing so, I aim to contribute to Western discourse on the Islamic State and

6 similar organizations in order to improve efficiency in the fight for a lasting peace without extremist groups like the Islamic State.

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Chapter 1: Terminological Warfare

President Obama never really was ambiguous about his conviction that the United States would ultimately defeat the Islamic State. Before the Islamic State conquered territory in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, just before its militants captured their first major city, Fallujah, he told David

Remnick of The New Yorker that “The analogy we use around here sometimes, and I think is accurate, is if a jayvee (Junior Varsity) team puts on Lakers uniforms, that doesn’t make them

Kobe Bryant,” thereby downplaying the threat the Islamic State poses to American strategic interests.10 After the beheadings of American journalists James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and Peter

Kassig (or Abdul-Rahman Kassig following his adopted Islamic name), Obama seemed to perceive an increased danger. In his speech from September 2014 he claimed that the United

States “can’t erase every trace of evil from the world, and small groups of killers have the capacity to do great harm.”11 He continued by stating that “if left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States.”12

In this opening chapter it will be argued that the discourse of the Obama administration suggests rhetorical conviction of the Islamic State as an enemy to mankind, a vehicle of evil.

Consequently, it will analyze the scholarly debate surrounding the discourse of the Obama administration regarding the concept of the Islamic State. Scholars have been in disagreement when considering the rhetoric of the Obama administration regarding the Islamic State and the campaign it has engaged in to counter it. Currently, the debate seems to be divided between scholars that consider Obama’s rhetoric regarding the Islamic State evidence of a strategy that

10 Remnick, ‘Going the Distance’ (05-06-2017). 11 The White House. “Statement by the President on ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1 (Accessed on 05- 06-2017). 12 The White House. “Statement by the President on ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1 (Accessed on 05- 06-2017).

8 is deliberately evasive and scholars who rather argue that delegitimizing the Islamic State served the strategic interests of gaining support for the cause against the Islamic State. For example, Associate Professor in International Security Asaf Siniver and Professor of

International Politics Scott Lucas focus in their article “The Islamic State lexical battleground:

US foreign policy and the abstraction of threat” on the choice made by the Obama administration to persist in calling the group by the acronym ‘ISIL.’ Short for ‘Islamic State in

Iraq and the Levant,’ the American government thus insisted on using a geographical name from the colonial era that is actually no longer in use. Furthermore, it ignored the more commonly used references such as ‘the Islamic State,’ ‘the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

(ISIS),’ or ‘Daesh (acronym for the Arabic name al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham).’

Siniver and Lucas argue that by tactically refusing the Islamic State recognition of its self- proclaimed statehood, the Obama administration aimed to evade a political, economic, military, and ideological commitment to the conflict.13 However, scholars like political analyst Phyllis

Bennis in her book titled Understanding ISIS and the Global War on Terror (2015) assert that

Obama adopted this kind of rhetoric as part of his campaign to counter the Islamic State in order to delegitimize the group and its claims.14 This debate on the matter of discourse regarding the

Obama administration when referring to its adversary calling itself the Islamic State will then form a premise for the next chapter, which will consider the representation of the physical threat to the American homeland and its citizens as posed by the Islamic State.

1.1: Conceptualizing the Islamic State

Political opponents of Obama have frequently called his campaign to counter the Islamic State incoherent and too restrained to be effective. While campaigning for the Presidential elections,

13 Siniver, A. and Lucas, S., ‘The Islamic State lexical battleground: US foreign policy and the abstraction of threat’, International Affairs 92 (1) (2016), 64. 14 Bennis, Phyllis, Understanding ISIS and the New Global War on Terror (2015), 35.

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Donald Trump commented that the war was being waged “politically correct,” arguing that

“we’re not taking it to them.”15 Senator John McCain has similarly been critical of the Obama administration regarding its efforts to counter the Islamic State, stating in July 2015 that "our means and our current level of effort are not aligned with our ends (…) that suggests we are not winning, and when you are not winning in war, you are losing."16 Whereas his opponents have frequently stated their desire, or conviction, that it is necessary to step up the war, the

Obama administration has proven to be reserved about full commitment to engage in efforts aimed at achieving the goal to “degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL,” as Obama suggested in

September 2014.17 Similarly, journalist Patrick Cockburn argued in his book The Rise of the

Islamic State (2015) that war-weariness has prevented the Obama administration from committing completely to a large-scale operation to counter the Islamic State in Iraq.18

According to Cockburn this has led the United States to a general “politics of the last atrocity” in the Middle East; a restrained policy focused on responding to events the United States is morally obliged to react to, such as the beheadings of Foley, Sotloff, and Kassig.19

Siniver and Lucas have argued that one of the most evident signs of this war-weariness is the ambiguity over the name the Obama administration used to refer to the group that calls itself the Islamic State, ‘ISIL.’ They assert that using the term ‘ISIL’ can be regarded as an evasion in strategic, policy, and operational terms. By rhetorically detaching the group from

Syria, the Obama administration has eliminated the incentive to form a response to the Islamic

State in its local setting. The ‘L’ in ‘ISIL’ is supposed to refer to the geographical area called

15 Fox News. “Trump slams Obama, Clinton for ‘politically correct’ war against ISIS, warns of more attacks.” Foxnews.com. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/08/18/trump-slams-obama-clinton-for-politically-correct- war-against-isis-warns-more-attacks.html (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 16 Riechmann, Deb. “Senators criticize US policy to combat Islamic State militants.” Usnews.com. https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2015/07/07/us-military-chiefs-face-tough-questioning-from- senators (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 17 Hudson, David. “President Obama: “We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we- will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 18 Cockburn, Patrick, The Rise of the Islamic State (New York: Verso Books, 2015), 145. 19 Cockburn, The Rise of the Islamic State, 93.

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‘the Levant’ in colonial times. Siniver and Lucas refer to an article from The New York Times by Maureen Dowd when they question whether this colonial reference should be read as “a nostalgic nod to a time when puppets were more malleable and grateful to their imperial overlords.”20 However, Bennis argues that the L should be read as an insult. The geographical area ‘the Levant’ was referring to is basically the same area as al-Sham refers to, which the group has previously included in their name when they still referred to themselves as the Islamic

State in Iraq and al-Sham (Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham). Not unlike the name the group adopted after their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed the establishment of a global Caliphate in June 2014, the Islamic State (al-Khalifa or ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah), the name is thus supposed to refer to the group’s aspirations, rather than their position. According to Bennis, the insult then seems to be the colonial connotation in the term ‘the Levant,’ suggesting that the Middle East is not the Islamic State’s to claim as their own.21

1.2: The Islamic State, the terrorist group

Another frequently debated point of discussion is the way the Islamic State should be considered in terms of its organizational structure. Obama stated on the 13th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, in 2014, that “ISIL is certainly not a state (…) it is recognized by no government nor by the people it subjugates."22 He continued by claiming that "ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple, and it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way."23 Siniver and Lucas argue that this should be considered a rhetorical trick. By abstracting the Islamic State as a terrorist threat, the Obama administration has adopted the post-2001 discourse in which counterterrorism was preferred over confrontation in local

20 Siniver, Lucas, ‘The Islamic State lexical battleground’, 66. 21 Bennis, Understanding ISIS and the New Global War on Terror, 35. 22 Killough, Ashley. “Strong reaction to Obama statement: ‘ISIL is not Islamic.” CNN.com. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/obama-isil-not-islamic/ (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 23 Killough, Ashley. “Strong reaction to Obama statement: ‘ISIL is not Islamic.” CNN.com. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/obama-isil-not-islamic/ (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

11 terms.24 They continue by arguing that this approach showed a lack of strategic coherence, stating: “as long as the priority is set as the fight against ‘terrorism,’ and the ‘homeland’ is not attacked, then success can be claimed.”25 Counterterrorism then functions as a way to respond to the threat without committing to war in a large, structured fashion. Therefore, refusal of recognition of the Islamic State’s statehood could be tactically employed by the

Obama administration in order to downplay the threat and decrease the perceived urgency for a coherent response.

However, a relevant question is whether an incoherent strategy can still be considered a strategy, and if so, can it be altered at all? As political correspondent Ryan Lizza from The New

Yorker argues, Obama seemed to deal with the crises case-by-case and evaded a template response, which corresponded with his rhetoric that idealism should be abandoned and policy makers should instead rule with a realistic approach.26 Incoherence then becomes an essential element to the strategy. Aspects might change over time as the Middle East is subjected to changing conditions, but that is what the strategy is supposed to anticipate. In contrast, Shadi

Hamid from The Atlantic referred in his 2013 article to Obama’s Middle East policy during the

Arab Spring as subjected to a ‘Responsibility Doctrine,’ using the term from foreign-policy analysts Nina Hachigian and David Shorr.27 Hachigian and Shorr define the Responsibility

Doctine as “a strategy of “prodding other influential nations (…) to help shoulder the burdens of fostering a stable, peaceful world order.”28 Hamid would then suggest that Obama had no strategy but instead responded to the developments at hand and acted mainly to encourage other powerful nations. Although both interpretations might seem different explanations of the same conclusion, the difference lies in the matter of intent. Whereas Lizza argues that Obama

24 Siniver, Lucas, ‘The Islamic State lexical battleground’, 63-64. 25 Siniver, Lucas, 78. 26 Lizza, Ryan, ‘The Consequentialist’, The New Yorker (May 2011). 27 Hamid, Shadi, ‘Islamism, the Arab Spring, and the Failure of America’s Do-Nothing Policy in the Middle East’, The Atlantic (9 October 2015). 28 Hachigian, N. and Shorr, D., ‘The Responsibility Doctrine’, The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2013), 73.

12 believed an incoherent case-by-case strategy to be more useful and thus intentional, Hamid presents Obama’s Middle East policy as contradictive and a result of an “unwillingness or inability to use American leverage to pressure Arab governments, including those with Islamist leanings.”29

Yet, refusing to recognize the statehood of the Islamic State is not essential for delegitimizing it according to Siniver and Lucas. On the contrary, they would rather argue that to acknowledge the Islamic State and its governance is a precondition for challenging its legitimacy, confronting its claims with evidence of its policies and ideology. By putting it up to the same test as the rest of the nations of the world that are deemed legitimate, Siniver and

Lucas argue that the Islamic State could prove its own legitimacy or fail this test and lose its claim. However, the question remains whether the government of the Islamic State is aiming to play following the rules of the other nations of the world at all. Will it accept to abide to another law and notion of legitimacy than their own?

American historian and expert on conflict analysis Matthew Levinger would rather argue that Obama has made use of the negative connotation of the term ‘terrorists.’ In his essay

‘A Core National Security Interest: Framing Atrocities Prevention,’ Levinger analyzed speeches from Obama and formulated three rhetorical frameworks: the legalistic (or liberal internationalist) frame; the moralistic frame; and the security frame. He found that Obama focused primarily on the moralistic and security frameworks when addressing the topic of the

Islamic State. For this chapter the moralistic framework is more relevant for this discussion, the security frame will be discussed in the next chapter. In contrast to Siniver and Lucas, Levinger argues that Obama’s primary objective of his speeches regarding matters involving the Islamic

State as “to convey the aura of legality, morality, and security (or il-legality, immorality, and

29 Hamid, Shadi, ‘Islamism, the Arab Spring, and the Failure of America’s Do-Nothing Policy in the Middle East’, The Atlantic (9 October 2015).

13 insecurity), rather than an iron-clad logical exposition.”30 Obama’s rhetoric often addressed the brutality of the perpetrators and the suffering of their victims. Levinger continues by stating that this would correspond to the first of four institutional Strategic Priorities as the State

Department identified in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review from April

2015, “preventing and mitigating conflict and violent extremism.”31 By delegitimizing parties like the Islamic State through framing the atrocities they commit in a moralistic way, denouncing them in humanitarian, emotive terms, the Obama administration seems to wage a propaganda war in order to discourage people from supporting, or joining, the Islamic State.

Correspondingly, the Obama administration initiated efforts such as the ‘Think Again, Turn

Away’ campaign from the United States State Department on social media. Its official YouTube account frequently posted videos containing stories told by survivors of the Islamic State and footage reportedly shot within the borders of the Caliphate, testifying of the brutality and horrors executed by militants of the Islamic State.32

1.3: “A violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam”

A third point frequently debated is the representation of the Islamic State by the Obama administration in terms of its ideology. Despite the group’s inclusion of ‘Islamic’ in its name, thereby referring to its supposedly Islamic roots and ideology and heavy support from Sunnis,

Obama stated that in his speech on 10 September 2014 that “ISIL is not Islamic. No religion condones the killing of innocents, and the vast majority of ISIL’s victims have been Muslim.”33

This rhetoric can be considered as an extension of Bush’s speech on 20 September 2001, when

30 Levinger, Matthew, ‘A Core National Security: Framing Atrocities Prevention’, Politics and Governance Vol.3 (4) (2015), 29. 31 Levinger, ‘A Core National Security’, 27. 32 Katz, Rita. “The State Department’s Twitter War With ISIS is Emberrassing.” Time.com. http://time.com/3387065/isis-twitter-war-state-department/ (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 33 Hudson, David. “President Obama: “We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we- will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

14 he addressed the Muslims throughout the world, saying “We respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah.”34 Just like Bush, Obama seemed to dissociate the enemy and its affiliates from Islam in order evade its actions being interpreted as an attack against Islam, which would affect American partnerships and alliances.

Yet, as Jean-Pierre Filiu, professor of Middle East Studies at the Sciences Po in Paris argues, those directing the propaganda of the Islamic State seem to frame the conflict in religious terms that would include an attack on the religion of Islam itself. As Filiu argues, the ideology of the Islamic State seems to have been built upon the apocalyptic prophesy heralding a final battle against the Western powers near the town of Dabiq.35 John Brennan, director of the CIA, suggested that joining the Islamic State in this rhetorical style should be avoided, claiming that “the goal is not to force a Huntington template onto this conflict,” referring to

Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996).36 Therefore, as Bennis seems to suggest, the Obama administration has been lured into a war in the Middle East by the Islamic

State. This would explain the goal of the atrocities it commits, most violently, and spreads via the internet as propaganda. By directly attacking the Islamic State after public outrage, rather than through proxies, the United States and its allies are giving the Islamic State exactly what it seems to want.37

The analysis of the rhetoric of the Obama administration by Bennis would then suggest that it was aimed to dissociate the effort to counter the Islamic State from the unilateral response

34 The White House. “Address to a Joint Session and the American People”. Georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 35 Withnall, Adam. “Isis apocalypse expert says sending ground troops to Syria is the ‘worst trap’ the West could fall into.” Independent.co.uk. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-apocalypse-expert- says-sending-ground-troops-to-syria-is-the-worst-trap-the-west-could-fall-a6764731.html (Accessed on 05-06- 2017). 36 Goldberg, Jeffrey, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic. 37 Bennis, Understanding ISIS and the New Global War on Terror, 31.

15 to the 9/11 attacks as initiated by the Bush administration. When Bush addressed Congress nine days after the 9/11 attacks, he stated that “they hate our freedoms, our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”38

Consequently, he portrayed the situation as a binary conflict between the advocates of freedom and those opposing it, a direct confrontation between the United States and its ideological counterpart. Much like the prophesy of the Islamic State, the Bush administration seemed to theorize that failing to stop the enemy would be a disaster of apocalyptic proportions.

As Bennis suggests, the rules of establishing an Islamic caliphate require its caliph and government to gain acknowledgement of the global Islamic community, or Umma.39 Obama therefore seems to have been focusing on countering al-Baghdadi’s claim on the true meaning of Islam. Evident in this ideological warfare is his statement in an interview with Jeffrey

Goldberg from The Atlantic, claiming that the ideology of the Islamic State is “a violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam by a faction—a tiny faction—within the Muslim community that is our enemy, and that has to be defeated.”40

Bennis does agree with Obama that a large number of the supporters and militants of the Islamic State were encouraged by violence, heroism, despair, anti-Western sentiments, or other personal reasons. However, she argues that expressions of religious faith by the Islamic

State, such as its version of the sharia law, seems rooted in Wahhabism. Based on the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, this fraction within Islam is centered on a “return to the fundamentals of their faith, ensuring that God – rather than materialism or worldly ambition – dominated the political order.”41 More accurately, she continues, the ideology of the Islamic

State adheres to the strand within Wahhabism that focuses on the teachings of Ibn Saud. While

38 The White House. “Address to a Joint Session and the American People”. Georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 39 Bennis, Understanding ISIS and the New Global War on Terror, 27-28. 40 Goldberg, Jeffrey, ‘The Obama Doctrine’. 41 Bennis, 32.

16 al-Wahhab aimed to spread his teachings through education, study, and debate, Ibn Saud was determined on enforcing Wahhabism through violence in order to enhance his own political position.42 Furthermore, Bennis argues that most of its militants are Sunni Muslims and are reportedly encouraged to join the ranks of the Islamic State because of sectarian motifs. Around

2005, a war commenced between Sunni and Shi’i Muslims after Sunnis had become disenfranchised under the Shi’a governments. Therefore, she asserts, a large number of Sunnis fighting under the flag of the Islamic are more focused on fighting Shi’ites than any other war really.43 Bennis would thus suggest that Sunni Islam has been a bigger pull factor for the recruits than the fundamentalist approach that Obama maintained.

1.4: Defense by offense

Another approach to consider this way of framing the Islamic State in religious terms is suggested by Levinger. Instead of framing Obama’s rhetoric surrounding the ideology or religion of the Islamic State in terms of delegitimization, he would rather argue that the Obama administration sought to advocate its policy measures, or rather, the lack of it. In correspondence with his observation that Obama hardly ever framed countering the Islamic

State as a matter of American national security, as will be further discussed in the next chapter,

Levinger argues that Obama has effectively justified inaction in the face of genocidal violence.

After analyzing Obama’s rhetoric utilizing a qualitative model for linguistic analysis developed by Russian linguist Roman Jakobson, Levinger concludes that by expanding the in-group, forming a coalition to fight the Islamic State multilaterally, the Obama administration eliminated the need for action from the United States.44

42 Bennis, Understanding ISIS and the New Global War on Terror, 32. 43 Bennis, 54-55. 44 Levinger, ‘A Core National Security’, 41.

17

The model developed by Jakobson analyzes the meaning of texts and how it is shaped through utilizing patterns of repetition and contrast. Besides its ‘referential function,’ he observed that the semiotic content of a text is also determined by its ‘poetic function,’ how meaning is constructed by the juxtaposition of textual elements.45 It presumes that “in political speeches, as in poetry, meanings are established and reinforced in large part through the strategic use of the “poetic function.”46 In his article Levington analyzed fifteen speeches and statements from Obama in total based on three topics. Five speeches and statements, each regarding the conflict in Libya, the conflict in Syria, and the American response to actions taken the Islamic State. All were delivered between 2011 and 2015. By focusing on three frameworks, the “legalistic,” the “moralistic,” and the “security-related,” Levinger observed that by using rhetorical devises to emphasize the boundaries between the in-group and out-group, or ‘other’ as Edward Said would argue, the Obama administration has increased apathy from the in-group towards the out-group. Because members of the in-group are characteristically depicted to be

“warranting of greater concern,” members of the Obama administration rhetorically justified inaction.47 Consequently, Levinger concludes, “a compelling strategic narrative cannot involve only words; it must involve words that express shared values and that are translated into action.

Protecting threatened civilians throughout the world from genocide and mass atrocities is one imperative around which American interests and American values coalesce.”48

1.5: The enemy as the quintessential other

When Obama stated in September 2014 that “ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple, and it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way," one could argue that

45 Levinger, ‘A Core National Security’, 30. 46 Levinger, 31. 47 Ibid, 26. 48 Ibid, 41.

18 he aimed to display the barbarity and violent nature of the Islamic State.49 By framing the

Islamic State and its militants as barbaric, having failed to modernize its views on the religion it corrupts and the world, a humanitarian risk, and an enemy to international laws such as the

Geneva Conventions, the Obama administration adopted a rhetoric of antagonization. However, disagreement ruled the Obama administration on how to evaluate the threat of the Islamic State.

Secretary of State John Kerry argued in an interview with Goldberg that the Islamic State “is a threat to everybody in the world,” wondering “what would happen if we don’t stand and fight them.”50 On the contrary, Obama maintained that the Islamic State is not an existential threat, asserting that climate change is.

Key to this strategy of antagonization is the need to dehumanize the enemy, according to leading authority on the Middle East Amer Tahiri. By stating that the Islamic State was a problem for everyone on the globe, Tahiri would argue that Kerry rhetorically convicted those operating under the flag of the Islamic State of a ‘crime against humanity.’ 51 The concept of a crime against humanity was created in the eighteenth century, when pirates acted as sovereigns and posed a problem for the international community. In addressing the problem, those involved with the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Treaty of Rastadt (1714) developed the judicial concept of the crime against humanity. Those found guilty had their coverage under penal code or laws of war withdrawn. Tahiri, with Kerry, argued that the members of the Islamic State had extracted themselves from humanity by behaving in a way deemed unhuman, or as Tahiri argues: “wild beasts.”52 Having committed genocide, the Islamic State was thus not represented to be an Iraqi, Syrian, or Islamic problem, but a problem for mankind in its entirety. As Kerry stated in Paris on November 16th, 2015 in response to the terror attacks in Paris, that “this is not

49 Killough, Ashley. “Strong reaction to Obama statement: ‘ISIL is not Islamic.” CNN.com. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/obama-isil-not-islamic/ (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 50 Goldberg, Jeffrey, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic. 51 Taheri, Amir, ‘The Middle East in Search of a New Balance of Power’, American Foreign Policy Interests 36 (2014), 348. 52 Taheri, ‘The Middle East in Search of a New Balance of Power’, 348.

19 a clash of civilizations. These terrorists have declared war on all civilizations.”53 It should be noted that, unlike Obama, Kerry was an overt advocate for stepping up the military engagement to counter the Islamic State. Therefore, it should be taken into consideration that Kerry aimed to encourage nations to join the fight against the Islamic State by choosing to exaggerate the type of enemy the Islamic State is to the in-group.

As mentioned above, Obama chose a less apocalyptic rhetoric in the way he framed the type of enemy civilization was dealing with and instead downplayed the threat by, for example, calling it a jayvee team, or a lesser threat than climate change. By questioning how one could distinguish between rhetoric in support of a clearly defined strategy and language utilized to rhetorically cover up the lack of strategy, Siniver and Lucas argue that one should scrutinize the way the Obama administration refers to its enemy. Just like referring to the Islamic State by using “ISIL,” calling the enemy a jayvee team or playing down its capacity to pose a threat seems part of an evasion. They thus suggest that the Obama administration was playing down the size and threat of the Islamic State in order to distract from strategic failure.54

However, all these arguments seem to fail in formulating a complete, comprehensive argument. Whereas the argument from Taheri would be accurate for the words of John Kerry, it does not seem to be applicable when regarding the rhetoric of Obama, the official leader of the Obama administration. The rhetoric of dehumanization in the terms Taheri employs would thus not represent the entire Obama administration. Furthermore, the suggestion from Siniver and Lucas would primarily apply to the argument that Obama aims to restrain American involvement in the war to counter the Islamic State. Yet, by playing down the threat that the

Islamic State poses, Obama would counteract his efforts to form a coalition to fight the Islamic

State by discouraging them. The argument would, however, correspond with the theory of

53 Shahrestani, Vin. “John Kerry: Isil has ‘declared war against all civilisations.” Telegraph.co.uk. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11999752/John-Kerry-Isil-has-declared-war-against- all-civilisations.html (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 54 Siniver, Lucas, ‘The Islamic State lexical battleground’, 78.

20 scholars like Levinger who maintain that central to the anti-Islamic State strategy stands a rhetoric to delegitimize the enemy. Playing down the threat towards the home front would primarily serve the strategic interest of discouraging potential militants and take away the incentive for American officials to call for stepping up the war. Playing down the enemy’s capacity of threatening the world order and the lives of its inhabitants thus seems more logical when considered to correspond with Obama’s presumed conviction that leading the United

States into a war in the Middle East again would be unwise.

Yet, whereas Kerry framed the Islamic State as a problem of everyone, a claim that has been rebuked by many, Obama’s approach could also be explained as part of a campaign to frame them as enemies of mankind. By delegitimizing the claim of the Islamic State, Obama rhetorically revoked its right to exist. As Obama remained adamant to refrain from engaging the American military, he did urge regional powers to intervene. The approach of delegitimization would serve two goals. First, to delegitimize the Islamic State in order to dry up its human resources. Second, to morally strengthen the cause to counter the Islamic State by legitimizing its cause.

Conclusion

This chapter argued that the Obama administration rhetorically convicted the Islamic State to be an enemy to mankind. It focused on four rhetorical devices that seems to dominate the debate: naming the enemy, conceptualizing it in terms of structure, conceptualizing it in terms of ideology, and finally, antagonizing the enemy.

All authors agree that the Obama administration did not rely on a coherent military campaign. Instead, its efforts to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State were centered on utilizing soft power. In doing so Obama and his staff members insisted on referring to the enemy as “ISIL” in order to refrain from recognizing the establishment of the Caliphate

21 rhetorically as a fact. By reacting in minimalistic proportions, it did not fully respond in terms of the apocalyptical prophesy of the Islamic State that spoke of a final epic battle against between the crusader army, by many believed to be the American army. Furthermore, the

Islamic State was constantly framed as a terrorist organization, never a state, in the narrative of the Obama administration. This was also evident in the persistence in representing the Islamic

State as a violent group of murderers and calling its ideology “a violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam.” As Levinger argues, by framing the conflict in moralistic terms, the Obama administration emphasized the differences between the in-group and the out- group. Consequently, it enlarged the in-group and took away the imperative for the United

States to step up its war efforts. Finally, although Obama did not share Kerry’s opinion that the

Islamic State posed a threat to everybody in the world, instead playing it down, Obama did formulate a clear image of the Islamic State as an unequivocal ‘enemy.’ By shaping a certain image of the enemy, Obama clearly made a rhetorical suggestion at a binary conflict between the civilized and barbarians. Yet, he made sure to refrain from exaggerations in order to evade framing it in apocalyptic terms and provide the enemies of the United States with incentive to join the Islamic State.

In conclusion, this chapter thus argued that the Obama administration clearly focused on a strategy of delegitimizing the Islamic State in its efforts at rhetorical warfare. It claimed that this strategy served three purposes. It aimed to serve the purpose of canalizing the call for war in the United States, delegitimizing the Islamic State towards potential recruits and allies, and finally to mobilize support for the coalition. One could thus observe that Obama applied his statement before the United Nations that “ideologies are not defeated with guns. They’re defeated by better ideas—a more attractive and more compelling vision” on the struggle against multiple adversaries.55

55 Siniver, Lucas, ‘The Islamic State lexical battleground’, 78.

22

Chapter 2: Concerning the physical threat of the

Islamic State to American national security

In April 2016 President Obama claimed in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic that “ISIS is not an existential threat to the United States.”56 While Obama frequently stated that he was convinced that the United States should be involved in the conflict in a leading position, he also remained adamant that he would not order boots on the ground. Such behavior signaled that the American government did not perceive the threat to be dire, which showed its partners that the United States would not be fully committed to renewed military engagement in the Middle East. Obama externalized the burden of the struggle to counter the Islamic State primarily to the powers of the Middle East while the United States would provide support. By strengthening the regional coalition against the Islamic State, the United States also envisioned to create an alliance of powerful, stable, partners based on the principles of a democracy. What does this mean for the role of the United States within this conflict?

In this chapter I intend to argue that the Obama administration pursued a multilateral approach to the struggle against the Islamic State in order to strengthen its partners in the Middle

East, thereby increasing the American-centered in-group. Expanding the in-group would correspond to the principle of ‘democratic stability,’ which Obama based his presidency on according to Kadri Liik, political analyst for the European Council on Foreign Relations.57

Consequently, I will first argue that although Obama dissociated his administration from the

Global War on Terror, it actually never ended, nor did it change substantially. Second, I will

56 Goldberg, Jeffrey, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic. 57 Liik, Kadri. “What can we expect from Russia in Syria.” Ecfr.eu. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_what_can_we_expect_from_russia_in_syria5035 (Accessed on 05-06- 2017).

23 argue that the Obama administration continued to utilize the politics of fear from his predecessor in order to gain support. When confronted with the challenge of fighting the Islamic

State, the Obama administration deviated from the rhetoric from George W. Bush, but did utilize the already present public threat perception inherited from the Bush era. As Richard

Jackson argues, the politics of fear are essential when in need for popular support. Similarly,

Obama externalized the burden of warfare in order to keep the promises he made when he campaigned before the presidential elections of 2008. This will prove essential for the last point, in which I will argue that the predilection for multilateralism by the Obama administration shows that the struggle against the Islamic State is instrumental to the agenda transcending the defeat of the Islamic State, namely a stronger, more substantial order in the Middle East on

American terms.

2.1: The post-Bush War on Terror

According to Associate Professor American Politics and International Studies Trevor

McCrisken many mistook Obama’s plans for responsible withdrawal from Iraq for a symbol of a general disengagement from the Global War on Terror. Although Obama repeatedly promised to step up the war against America’s ‘real’ enemies in countries such as Pakistan, and intensify the war in Afghanistan, the audience seemed to believe that Obama aimed to withdraw significantly from the global counterterrorism effort after he would win the elections.58 Instead,

Senator Obama focused on withdrawing American military forces from the War in Iraq and represented it as a nuisance from the real war, the Global War on Terror. After the elections,

Obama commenced the gradual withdrawal of American military forces from Iraq, but

58 McCrisken, Trevor, ‘Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice’, International Affairs 87:4 (2011), 783.

24 increased military presence and action in other terrorist-infested countries such as Pakistan and

Afghanistan.

After the Obama administration seemed to persist in continuing the global effort to fight terrorism, academics like Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard Jackson began arguing that the ambitious promises that Obama allegedly made had stranded in Washington. Bacevich argued in January 2010 that “the candidate who promised to “change the way Washington works” has become Washington’s captive” and Jackson argued that the promises of change had been trapped by the assumptions about the 9/11 attacks. The presumed existential nature of the terrorist threat left the impression that it was self-evident that it must be countered and the war thus should go on.59 However, as McCrisken argues, abandoning the global counterterrorism effort never was a priority in itself for the Obama administration. On the contrary, “his key criticism of the Bush administration was not that it was giving too much emphasis to terrorism in its foreign policy, but that it allowed itself to be distracted from the ‘real’ war on terror by invading Iraq.”60 Accordingly, in July 2008, Obama emphasized “the real and present danger posed by violent extremists who would use terrorism against Americans at home and around the world.”61 According to McCrisken, Obama thus shared the conception of imperative of fighting terrorism of his predecessor, which both thought to be necessary in order to guarantee the national security of the United States.

McCrisken further argues that this resulted in a continuation of the counterterrorism strategy in the fashion of the late-Bush period during the first term of the presidency of Obama.

Because of the international backlash against the early strategy, strategic thinking within the

Bush administration changed between 2006 and 2007. Many of the promises Obama made thus actually heralded the modifications Bush had already effectuated.62 Senior Lecturer in Global,

59 McCrisken, ‘Ten Years On’, 783. 60 McCrisken, 786. 61 Ibid, 787. 62 Ibid, 784.

25

Urban and Social Studies Aiden Warren and Lecturer in International Relations Ingveld Bode suggest in their article “Altering the Playing Field: The U.S. Redefinition of the Use-of-force” that the counterterrorism campaign of the Obama administration has actually deepened some of the more disputed aspects of the Bush-era. They argue that whereas the Obama administration has decreased American military presence in terms of boots on the ground, it has expanded its use-of-force by targeted killings through utilizing drones.63 This would indicate a lower threshold towards military force since the risk of losing American lives was taken out of the equation.

Feste argues that the Obama administration focused primarily on an approach of problem solving.64 It therefore operated through a different ‘lens’ than the Bush administration did. Whereas the Clinton administration aimed to snuff out the threat by refusing to engage those responsible for it, the Bush administration encountered the result from that, intensification, and chose to fight it. Consequently, the Obama administration engaged the crisis with more experience than the Bush administration did and was thus able to acknowledge that a solution by force had failed. Instead of intensifying that force, Obama aimed for gradual de- escalation and started countering al-Qaida through forging new partnerships.65 Therefore, it began committing to solving the problems that ultimately constituted the enemy rather than putting all its resources on confronting the enemy militarily. Unlike Bush, Obama seemed to be following a ‘constructivist dictum,’ which would leave the interpretation of the threat unfixed.66

This would mean that, although destroying al-Qaida remained an essential objective, its destruction ceased to be a primary objective. Instead, obliterating the threat that al-Qaida constituted and utilized in order to threaten the United States became more important.

63 Warren, A., Bode, I., ‘Altering the Playing Field: The U.S. Redefinition of the Use-of-force’, Contemporary Security Policy 36:2 (2015), 182. 64 Feste, Karen A., America Responds to Terrorism: Conflict Resolution Strategies of Clinton, Bush, and Obama (2011), 203-204. 65 Feste, America Responds to Terrorism, 10, 66 Feste, 10.

26

As Warren and Bode argue, “when it came to interpreting the right to use military force in self-defence, the transition from Bush to Obama can be characterized as a change in style rather than in substance.”67 In accordance to the 2001 Authorization for Use Military Force, which licensed the killing of individuals associated with al-Qaida and its affiliates on a global scale under the Global War on Terror-framework, Obama continued to pursue this strategy through the deployment of drones. The Obama administration therefore continued the precedent of Bush by fighting al-Qaida on a ‘global battlefield.’68 As the Director of the CIA John O.

Brennan argued:

we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the United States takes the

legal position that—in accordance with international law—we have the authority to

take action against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-

defense analysis each time. And as President Obama has stated on numerous

occasions, we reserve the right to take unilateral action if or when other

governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves.69

Considering the scope and inclination to wage war against al-Qaida, the Obama administration thus did not show very much difference from the Bush administration. Nevertheless, as Feste suggests, Obama and his administration did show an inclination to accept the limitations to such a war, stating in his 2010 State of the Union Address: “let’s put aside the schoolyard taunts about who’s tough. Let’s reject the false choice between protecting our people and upholding our values (…) let’s leave behind the fear and division.”70 By doing so, Obama also aimed to

67 Warren, Bode, ‘Altering the Playing Field’, 182. 68 Warren, Bode, 187. 69 The White House. “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/2010-state-union-address#transcript (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 70 Feste, America Responds to Terrorism, 220.

27 eliminate propaganda tools for the terrorist organizations, evident in his campaigns to close prison facilities such as Guantanamo Bay.

Nevertheless, Obama continued Bush’s rhetoric that emphasized the necessity for self- defense against terrorism, according to McCrisken. In his second autobiographical work

Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (2006), written before he had been elected President, he expressed that “the effect of September 11 felt profoundly personal’ and believed that “chaos had come to our doorstep.”71 Furthermore, McCrisken refers to the speech he gave before Congress following the failed Detroit bombing plot of Christmas Day

2009 as the moment in which Obama articulated his dedication to the Global War on Terror,

“using language that could just as easily have been deployed by his predecessor.”72 During this speech he argued that:

Over the past two weeks, we’ve been reminded again of the challenge we face in

protecting our country against a foe that is bent on our destruction. And while

passions and politics can often obscure the hard work before us, let’s be clear about

what this moment demands. We are at war. We are at war against al Qaeda, a far-

reaching network of violence and hatred that attacked us on 9/11, that killed nearly

3,000 innocent people, and that is plotting to strike us again. And we will do

whatever it takes to defeat them.73

Richard Jackson articulated a similar argument in his 2004 article “The Politics of Threat and

Danger: Writing the War on Terrorism” (2004) as the ‘politics of fear.’ By invoking the memory

71 Obama, Barack H., The audacity of hope: thoughts on reclaiming the American dream (2006), 291–292. 72 McCrisken, ‘Ten Years On’, 788. 73 The White House. “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation Security.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president- strengthening-intelligence-and-aviation-security (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

28 of the 9/11 attacks and discussing the possibility of similar disaster in the future, Obama utilized the fear for such a repetition in order to gain support for his campaign to counter the threat.

Jackson observes that deploying this politics of fear serves multiple purposes, it enforces social discipline, mutes dissent, and increases the power of the national security state.74 Key to the politics of fear is that it is utilized to normalize fear in a state of war and to legalize the doctrines of pre-emptive war. By rhetorically framing the enemy to be extraordinarily dangerous, the presumed nature of the adversary justifies the means with which the administration aims to eliminate the threat. During the presidency of Bush, Jackson observes, this was used to justify extralegal, or doubtful, behavior, such as the murder of prisoners during Operation Enduring

Freedom, the illegal incarceration of terrorist suspects, and the murder and inhumane treatment of prisoners at detention facilities such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.75

Accordingly, Jackson observes that since the Global War on Terror started there has been a national adjustment to the threat of terrorism involving security measures at airports, airplanes, steel and concrete barricades around public buildings, government websites that encourage the building of sealed rooms and the hoarding of essential supplies, and a color- coded national terrorist warning system.76 It would be reinforced by officials such as the United

States Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz questioning “If they had the capability to kill millions of innocent civilians, do any of us believe they would hesitate to do so?” and Vice

President Dick Cheney claiming that any “rational person” should fear the terrorist threat.77 The rhetoric of the Obama administration thus relied heavily on the previously established national state of fear in order to continue the American campaign to fight al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their affiliates: the ‘true’ enemies of the United States.

74 Jackson, Richard, ‘The Politics of Threat and Danger: Writing the War on Terrorism’, British International Studies Association (22 December, 2014), 13. 75 Jackson, ‘The Politics of Threat and Danger’, 19. 76 Jackson, 13-14. 77 Ibid, 6-7.

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2.2: The Global War on the Islamic State

In contrast to the efforts to counter al-Qaida and its affiliates, the Obama administration did not show any intention to confront the Islamic State. Although Obama vowed to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State, this has resulted in a multilateral approach that primarily relied on local forces supported by American airstrikes, targeted killings through the use of drones, and focusing on draining the resources the Islamic State has been relying on, among others. Although, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Obama and a multitude of members of his administration have systematically played down the capabilities of the Islamic State, they insisted that fighting it was necessary to guarantee the safety of the citizens of the United States.

How was fighting the Islamic State simultaneously represented as necessary and insignificant?

Not unlike the internal dispute of framing the enemy, the Obama administration also seemed divided on the perception of threat. Obama himself too has remained ambiguous about his conception of the threat that the Islamic State poses. After he compared the Islamic State to a JV-team in January 2014, he maintained on a conference in Argentina in March 2016 that

“Groups like ISIL can’t destroy us, they can’t defeat us. They don’t produce anything. They’re not an existential threat to us.”78 As Obama explained, although they did deem it necessary to engage, multilateralism would be the better option considering broader challenges to the international order.79 Although Obama claimed to reserve the right to unilaterally attack the

Islamic State, he justified his refusal to do so by arguing that it would be unwise and unnecessary.80 As a result, various observers, such as Patrick Cockburn and Shadi Hamid, came to view the approach of the Obama administration as incoherent and defined by events.

78 The White House. “Remarks by President Obama and President Macri of Argentina in Joint Press Conference.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2016/03/23/remarks-president-obama-and-president-macri-argentina-joint-press (Accessed on 05-06- 2017). 79 The White House. “Statement by the President on ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1 (Accessed on 05- 06-2017). 80 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Obama Doctrine.” The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

30

Although a strategy of problem solving would indeed qualify as being led by events, they would rather suggest it is an educated approach of adjustment and re-interpretation, which would correspond with the ‘consequentialist approach’ which Ryan Lizza identified broached upon in the previous chapter.

However, Obama displayed more concern between early 2014 and 2016. After the release of the videos that showed the decapitations of American journalists, with the first video uploaded to YouTube on 19 August 2014, the perception of threat regarding the Islamic State increased rapidly. On 10 September, Obama addressed the world in a televised message, stating that: “If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States” and that although the government agencies had not yet detected specific plotting “our Intelligence Community believes that thousands of foreigners (…) have joined them [The Islamic State] in Syria and Iraq. Trained and battle-hardened, these fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks.”81 Two weeks later he appeared on the CBS News program “60 Minutes” admitting that his staff, referring specifically to James R. Clapper Jr., the Director of National of Intelligence, had underestimated the impact of the developments in Syria and Iraq and the capabilities of the Islamic State.82 Furthermore, in May 2015 he notified Congress of his decision to extend the ‘national emergency’ that was declared in Executive Order 13303 of 22 May 2003 beyond its initial expiration date, 22 May

2015. Accordingly, Obama wrote that:

Obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and maintenance of

peace and security in the country, and the development of political,

administrative, and economic institutions in Iraq continue to pose an unusual and

81 Hudson, David. “President Obama: “We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we- will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 82 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/world/middleeast/president-obama.html (05-06-2017).

31

extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United

States. Accordingly, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national

emergency with respect to the stabilization of Iraq.83

Such rhetoric would suggest that Obama did consider the situation dire and American efforts to rebuild Iraq essential for American interests.

Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry extended such rhetoric by arguing in an interview with Goldberg that the Islamic State “is a threat to everybody in the world,” wondering “what would happen if we don’t stand and fight them.”84 One could draw two conclusions from this kind of rhetoric. First, the rhetoric of Kerry could be interpreted as emphasizing the danger to everyone because of the randomness of the terrorist attacks. Second, it could refer to cataclysmic, or even apocalyptic, effects. Jackson identifies several rhetorical fallacies in what he calls ‘the green scare,’ the public anxiety for manifestations of radical Islam. He traces the green scare back to the 1980s, when officials began qualifying acts previously called hijackings, bombings, assassinations, sabotage, etc. under the umbrella term ‘terrorism.’ A result of this reclassification was that it appeared as if there was a new wave of violence. In order to illustrate this clouding anxiety, Jackson refers to a 1987 survey, which showed that 68 to 80 percent of the surveyed people regarded the threat of terrorism to be ‘serious’ or ‘extreme,’ despite the fact that there were only seventeen deaths that year due to violent acts labeled as terrorism.85 A result of this surge in threat perception is the appearance to what he calls ‘super-terrorism,’ or what may also be called ‘catastrophic terrorism,’ which often relies on the rhetorical framing of the threat to be unprecedented. It thus heavily relies on inflation of the capabilities of the

83 Obama, Barack H. “Message – Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Iraq.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/19/message- continuation-national-emergency-respect-iraq (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 84 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Obama Doctrine.” The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 85 Jackson, ‘The Politics of Threat and Danger’, 6.

32 threat. Following that rhetoric, Kerry seemed determined to continue the Bush rhetoric of a conflict as what Jackson calls a ‘supreme emergency,’ which would in international law permit the involved nation to take any measures deemed necessary for their survival, including pre- emptive war.86

Warren and Bode observe a continuation of the Global War on Terror discourse in the legal authority for the Obama administration to pursue military efforts against the Islamic State.

They argue that the draft “Authorization for Use of Force against ISIL” that Obama sent to

Congress in February 2015, was based on two disputed assumptions. First, like the 2001

Authorization for use of Military Force, the draft provided flexibility to pursue targets on a geographical, global, scale in order to deny its militants “a safe haven.”87 The 2015 draft authorization proposed by Obama only sought to repeal the 2002 document that authorized the

War in Iraq, but left the authorization of 2001, which legalized the Bush administration to wage the Global War on Terror, in place. Obama’s draft of 2015 should therefore be considered as an attempt from Obama to update the 2002 authorization since it was no longer relevant. The

Global War on Terror against al-Qaida that the United States was waging in Iraq was already covered by the 2001 Authorization for use of Military Force. While the 2001 authorization provided the legal foundation to continue the war against al-Qaida and its affiliates on a global scale, the 2015 draft was supposed to supplement this by authorizing a war that did not include geographical boundaries either. Unfortunately for the Obama administration, Congress did not authorize the draft. Yet, as Russel Berman from The Atlantic reported, since the draft aimed to repeal the 2002 Authorization for use of Military Force and prohibit ground combat, its decision only kept the already existing authorizations in place. By rejecting the draft authorization,

86 Jackson, ‘The Politics of Threat and Danger’, 6. 87 The White House. “Remarks by the President on Request to Congress for Authorization of Force Against ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2015/02/11/remarks-president-request-congress-authorization-force-against-isil (Accessed on 05-06- 2017).

33

Congress made the use of military force against the Islamic State formally a war left undeclared.88

Secondly, the draft considers the Islamic State to be affiliated to al-Qaida. Although it is established that the group has its origins in al-Qaida, Warren and Bode suggest that the group rebranded itself as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) after its secession. The relation between the two groups could most accurately be described as that of “strategic foes following different priorities.”89 As political analyst Phyllis Bennis argues, the groups split on differences, including the strategic goal of proclaiming the Caliphate. Whereas the command of al-Qaida remained adamant in their conviction that establishing an Islamic Caliphate would be a long- term objective and focused on fighting the West, the group of militants that later regrouped under the name ISI aimed to establish a Caliphate in the short-term.90 As Aaron Y. Zellin from

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy argued in his article “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement,” the war between the Islamic State and al-Qaida erupted as an ideological difference, but resulted in a war over legitimacy in the context of the global movement for Jihad. Consequently, al-Baghdadi considers the Islamic

State to be the true heir of bin Laden’s al-Qaida rather than his successor under the banner of al-Qaida itself, Ayman al-Zawahiri.91

Shrouded in ambiguity, the Obama administration seems to vary between continuity and dissociation from the rhetoric of the Bush administration during the Global War on Terror in its interpretation of the threat from the Islamic State to the United States. Although Obama initially downplayed the capabilities of the Islamic States and its militants, it came to reconsider after Jihadi John decapitated three American journalists, after which it began to grow as a

88 Berman, Russel, ‘The War Against ISIS Will Go Undeclared’, The Atlantic (15 April 2015). 89 Warren, Bode, ‘Altering the Playing Field’, 190. 90 Bennis, Understanding ISIS and the New Global War on Terror, 27-28. 91 Zellin, Aaron Y., “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy no. 20 (June 2014), 6.

34 concern and ultimately required the renewal of the National Emergency, invoked after the commencement of the War in Iraq. Whereas Obama never followed suit with Bush by refusing to call the enemy an existential threat, a glimpse of his predecessor surfaced when he stated in

September 2014 that “this is a core principle of my presidency: if you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.”92

2.3: War to construct

Obama insisted from the start that the Islamic State did not pose an existential threat to the

United States, yet seemed forced to react. Instead of imposing a renewed military invasion on

Iraqi territory, the Obama administration relied on soft power and aerial support. The shift to surrogate warfare in the American effort to counter the Islamic State shows that the Obama administration operated as if it thought it to be imperative to a leading power in a conflict that was simultaneously not deemed very urgent. One is left to wonder, what motivated the Obama administration to become engaged in the conflict involving the Islamic State?

Bennis argues that the Obama administration reacted to what she calls ‘the CNN-factor’ or the ‘Twitter-factor.’ Despite the displayed reluctance of the Obama administration to wage war against the Islamic State, the CNN-factor morally compelled it to react. To illustrate this, she refers to the American intervention in October 2014, when the Islamic State threatened to occupy the Iraqi city of Kobane. Although Kobane is situated close to the Turkish border, it was deemed strategically insignificant for an effective countermovement against the Islamic

State. Nevertheless, it became emblematic for the weakness of a policy of non-intervention as

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused the Turkish military to intervene and the American failure to protect the civilian population. After heavy news coverage and social media attention,

92 Hudson, David. “President Obama: “We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we- will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

35 the Obama administration launched airstrikes and persuaded Erdogan to allow units of the

Kurdish Peshmerga to cross the Turkish-Iraqi border and intervene.93

Just as it could not ignore the threat it received by the Islamic State after the release of the videos which showed the decapitations of journalists James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and Peter

Kassig, the Obama administration seemed to be reacting to threats and pressure. In their article titled “The Islamic State’s Symbolic War: Da’esh’s Socially Mediated Terrorism as a Threat to

Cultural Heritage,” Claire Smith, Heather Burke, Cherrie de Leiuen, and Gary Jackson argue that the Islamic State invokes the Twitter-factor by inflating its own capabilities. By deploying a strategy of shock, awe, and censure, the Islamic State operates on a campaign that is focused on gaining maximum publicity. Unsurprisingly, it thrives on displaying and disseminating their violent deeds. Smith, Burke, De Leiuen, and Jackson observe that this has impact on three levels. First, on a local scale it provides the Islamic State with an aura of invincibility that eliminates the impetus for resistance. Regionally, this successfully reinforces their claim of inevitable success. Victory for the militants of the Islamic State is inevitable because they are fueled by the powers of Allah, or so they seem to claim. Last, internationally it serves the purpose of attracting recruits to the cause. As they argue, the video material serving this campaign only serves its purpose if it is watched.94 This would adhere to Cockburn’s argument about the focus of the Obama administration on ‘the politics of the last atrocity,’ in which the modus operandi would then focus on responding to moral outrage.

Bennis argued that the Obama administration got lured into the trap set by the Islamic

States. I would counter that it would be too simplistic to believe that the Obama administration did not anticipate the possibility of a trap to lure the United States back into military engagement in the Middle East. It could be accurate if the Obama administration would have repeated the

93 Bennis, ‘Understanding ISIS and the New Global War on Terror’, 168-169. 94 Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, Jackson, ‘The Islamic State’s Symbolic War: Da’esh’s Socially Mediated Terrorism as a Threat to Cultural Heritage’, Journal of Social Archeology Vol. 16 (2) (2016), 176.

36 mistake made by Bush: full confrontation. On the contrary, Feste rather argued that despite the knowledge that the United States would step into a trap when it would engage in a military confrontation with the Islamic State, the Obama administration was compelled to engage. The strategy of problem solving, by some viewed as ‘defined by events,’ could then be regarded as an educated strategy of forced engagement. A limited war of attrition aimed at supporting, rather than leading the construction of a solid post-Islamic State order instead of than blind destruction.

As political risk analyst Andreas Krieg argues in his article “Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East,” the shift to rely on surrogate powers through multilateralism and technical surrogates such as drone warfare represents a shift in American overseas engagement.95 By externalizing the burden of war, the

Obama administration reflected a realization that the United States is not omnipotent, which would include a narrative of risk rather than threat. Warren and Bode refer to two documents in particular to explain the roots of the American strategy of attrition. First, the 2012 issue of the Defense Strategy Guideline, pushed by Obama, indicated that the Obama administration abandoned the practice of ground combat entirely and would instead singularly increase the use of aerial warfare as conducted through Predator and Reaper drones.96 Second, the draft which

Obama sent to Congress in 2015. In this document Obama invited Congress to formally restrict the official authority inherent to the office of the President of the United States to order combat troops to fight the Islamic State for a period of three year after its enactment.97 Since Congress rejected the draft, Obama maintained the authority to issue all options necessary for efficient warfare under the authorization of both 2001 and, left in place, 2002 authorization. Krieg argues that this strive for efficiency corresponds to the Rumsfeld Doctrine, which emphasized the

95 Krieg, Andreas, ‘Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East’, International Affairs 92:1 (2016), 103. 96 Warren, Bode, ‘Altering the Playing Field’, 185. 97 Warren, Bode, 190.

37 necessity of a “flexible, responsive, and agile military relying on technology and a limited footprint.”98

Krieg identifies the most important factors for the development of this approach to be austerity as a result of the economic crisis that plagued the international financial world and an

American public that became increasingly war-weary as result of the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan.99 The result was a product of the imbalance between risk and threat. Surrogate warfare itself is a result of a calculation of risk rather than threat. The patron externalizes the burden of warfare in order to minimalize the risk by using surrogates in order to deal with a threat that is estimated to have a small capability to actually pose a threat. Examples could be drones or surrogate armies, such as the Iraqi army, to minimalize the threat to soldiers of the patron. By putting Iraqi lives on the line instead of American, Obama not only eliminated the risk to the American army, but also the political risk for himself.100 Whereas Bush faced heavy criticism for the amount of American deaths in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama sought to evade that risk by relying on surrogate warfare.

So it seems that the modus operandi of the Obama administration for operating in the

Middle East has an exceptional emphasis on sharing the burden of warfare, both strategically as well as operationally. Krieg extends this argument by stating that “on the strategic level, it emphasizes the need for collective action through coalition warfare and for capacity-building of local partners and allies.”101 By making the American partners in the Middle East more capable of managing crises on their own, dealing with conflicts both militarily, politically, as well as economically, Obama sought to decrease American expenditure in the region and

98 Krieg, ‘Externalizing the burden of war’, 104 99 Krieg, 104. 100 Ibid, 108. 101 Ibid, 104.

38 stronger partners in the region. As Obama himself argued, a more substantial Middle East order would transform the region into a partner to, rather than a client of, the United States.102

Kadri Liik argues in her article “What Can We Expect from Russia in Syria” that Obama is a believer, or at least practitioner, of the theory that democracy is a driver for stability.103 On the United States General Assembly of 28 September 2015, Obama articulated a defense of democracy, arguing that it is the unequivocal foundation for stability. Liik argues that this is the same vision that Bush displayed with regard to his policies in the Middle East, namely: “the belief that one needs to address the root causes of terrorism, such as authoritarianism, corruption, repression, and then, on fair foundations, democratic stability can take root.”104 This theory would suggest that democracy is the natural cure to both authoritarianism and terrorism.

By promoting multilateralism, the Obama administration actively sought to increase the regional democratic capability in order to fight what the White House and its allies frequently called ‘evil.

Conclusion

In this chapter I argued that the Obama administration pursued a multilateral approach to the struggle against the Islamic State in order to strengthen its partners in the Middle East, thereby increasing the American-centered in-group.

First, I argued that the rhetorical Global War on Terror under the Obama administration did not change substantially from the version as commenced by its predecessor. Whereas

Obama promised to step up the global effort to counter terrorism during the presidential elections of 2008, he also promised change. Physically, this change occurred in a shift from

102 Goldberg, Jeffrey, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic. 103 Liik, Kadri. “What can we expect from Russia in Syria.” Ecfr.eu. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_what_can_we_expect_from_russia_in_syria5035 (Accessed on 05-06- 2017). 104 Liik, Kadri. “What can we expect from Russia in Syria.”

39 unilateralism to multilateralism and from boots on the ground to surrogate warfare. The Obama administration diverted from the overtly ideological rhetorical framework from the Bush administration and instead seemed to turn into a more pragmatic, subtle approach. Second, I argued that Obama also continued the rhetoric of his predecessor that could qualify as the

‘politics of fear’ as defined by Richard Jackson. Throughout his presidency, Obama consistently rejected the rhetorical style regarding the Global War on Terror of the Bush-era. The discourse that focused on framing the enemy as an existential threat while simultaneously rhetorically vowing responsibility to actively pursue the demise of the Islamic State. Although the Obama administration frequently emphasized that the Islamic State was not necessarily a threat to the

United States, he continued to stress that it had proven itself to be dangerous to the regional stability. Consequently, the Obama administration seemed to alternate between discouraging domestic resources to support active engagement in the struggle against the Islamic State and encouraging foreign actors to become involved. This assumption led this chapter to argue that the predilection for multilateralism by the Obama administration shows that the struggle against the Islamic State is instrumental to the agenda transcending the defeat of the Islamic State, namely a stronger, more substantial order in the Middle East on American terms. Guided by the vision that democracy inherently leads to stability, the multilateral approach of the Obama administration suggests that it viewed the conflict involving the Islamic State as an opportunity to strengthen the Middle East order. By encouraging countries of the Middle East to deal with the Islamic State themselves, he encouraged them to improve their capability to fight and prevent threats such as terrorism to become problematic to the regional stability.

Clearly, in order to increase its in-group, the Obama administration encouraged the

Middle East order to improve its own substantiality. By expanding the in-group, a group of partners and allies focused on complying Western values and interpretations of concepts such as democracy and human rights, the Obama administration focused on pursuing the nucleus of

40 the American strategic interests as established in “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” promoting an international order based on American values.

41

Chapter 3: The Bigger Picture

The previous chapter has shown that the Obama administration engaged in a comprehensive effort to counter the Islamic State, convinced that its eradication of the global landscape both physically and ideologically was not a direct matter of American national security. Although inconsistent in his perception of threat, it seems that Obama himself did not lose confidence that the United States would overcome. While addressing the nation on 10 September 2014, he stated that it was a core principle of his presidency that “if you threaten America, you will find no safe haven,” adding that he would use force to “anyone who threatens America’s core interests.”105 Accordingly, the National Security Strategy published in February 2015 reminded the reader of four national interests that could serve as umbrella-guidelines:

- “the security of the United States, it’s citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;“

- “a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic

system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;”

- “respect for universal values at home and around the world;” and

- “A rule-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace,

security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global

challenges.”106

105 Hudson, David. “President Obama: “We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we- will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil (Accessed on 05-06-2017). Obama responded to the threat issued by the Islamic State in its first decapitation video titled A Message to America, which was released on 19 August 2014 and showed the decapitation of American journalist James Foley 106 Obama, Barack H., Letter from the President: Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Washington, DC: The White House, 11 February 2015), 2.

42

These goals are a continuation of the strategic interests established in the publication

“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” issued in January

2011. To impose this agenda on the Middle East, a multitude of difficulties were identified.

Most prominent were the strained relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Syrian civil war, the ongoing Global War against Terror, and the global effort against the Islamic State.

As Secretary of Defense Ash Carter argued in his statement on the American military strategy in the Middle East before the Senate Armed Services Committee: “The Middle East presents a kaleidoscope of challenges, but there, as everywhere, our actions and strong military posture are guided by what’s in America’s interests. That’s our North Star.”107

In this chapter I intend to argue that the representation of the threat posed by the

Islamic State to American national interests in the Middle East as established by the Obama administration shows an extra-regional interest. Rather than its stated interest in countering the

Islamic State in order to promote a maintainable Middle East political order and see that as a goal on itself, it shows that these guidelines also serve the extra-regional purpose of rolling back

Russian influence in the Middle East. Consequently, this chapter will start by identifying the role of the Islamic State within the framework of the set American foreign policy interests in the Middle East. Second, I will argue that the promotion of these guidelines involves fighting the Islamic State and strengthening regional allies, which necessarily counters the interests of the Russian-led regional coalition, consisting of Syria and Iran. Thirdly, I will argue that this policy shows ideological drivers which involve a continuation of the rhetoric of American exceptionalism. Consequently, this chapter will focus on the question why the Obama administration became involved once again in a matter which itself has frequently stated to be a conflict of the Middle East that should be solved by the local powers. Although it has claimed

107 Department of Defense. “Statement on the U.S. Military Strategy in the Middle East and the Counter-ISIL Campaign before the Senate Armed Services Committee.” Defense.gov. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/626037/statement-on-the-us-military-strategy-in- the-middle-east-and-the-counter-isil-c/ (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

43 to aim for multilateralism and preferred to describe its involvement as merely supportive, the

Obama administration simultaneously continued to employ a rhetoric of leadership and invulnerability. Although the Obama administration seemed willing to recognize, even promote, a global shift to apolarity, it seemed persistent in its vision of the United States as a leading nation.

3.1: Twinkle, twinkle Northern Star

American Middle East policy has been rather consistent since the presidency of Ronald Reagan.

It has had a primary focus on four points: providing security for Israel, acquiring oil, preventing

Iran from developing its nuclear program and thwarting its growth to prominence, and pursuing a campaign to counter sectarian violence and terrorism. Operating within the established international order with a broader agenda, it is relevant to question how the fight against the

Islamic State corresponded to the rest of this American agenda. How should one consider the position of the Islamic State within this framework?

Following the guidelines as established in the National Security Strategy of 2015, the first matter to consider is the American effort to guarantee the security of its allies and partners in the region. Qualifying as official allies are Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait. Iraq, Saudi Arabia,

Qatar, Oman, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates should rather be considered strategic partners in the region. Uniting these nations is the fight against the Islamic State. Scholars agree that its presence undoubtedly poses a risk to the stability of these countries. The Islamic State functions as the orchestrator of a violent conflict with national consequences in Iraq and Syria, the attraction of radicals and its call to commit atrocities in their country of origin. It therefore poses a risk to citizens of the countries. Yet, like the United States, these nations have not faced any existential threat until or on the moment Obama left the presidential office on 20 January

2017.

44

Another important factor to consider is the war between Sunnis and Shi’ites. As Julide

Karakoc, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science of Gedik University in

Istanbul, argues in her article “The Failure of Indirect Orientalism: Islamic State,” the American campaign to counter the Islamic State has been largely Sunni-based and could therefore be considered a continuation of the indirect Orientalism from the start of the century.108 In her article, Karakoc argues that the existence and relative success of the Islamic State exemplifies the failure of American indirect orientalist policy. Most characteristical for this policy was the promotion of Turkey as a model for transformation after the Arab Spring and the protection of

Israel, which functioned as a representative of Western powers in the Middle East.109 Another characteristic weakness Karakoc observes is the indiscreetness in selecting the factions willing to fight the regime of al-Assad that were to receive American support. Because the Obama administration emphasized the necessity of removing al-Assad from office, it did not vet properly and began supporting moderates and radicals alike. Instead of promoting stability in

Syria within the prospect of a possible post-Assad future, the Obama administration was not very cautious when picking their surrogates. The resulting instability between regional power players such as Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia provided an opportunity for the Islamic

State.110 An opportunity it evidently grasped.

The capability to provide security to allies and partners seems rather correlated to the second guideline, promoting prosperity. Since the Islamic State aims to conquer territory, it necessarily accompanies conflict and war. Consequently, inherent to the situation surrounding the Islamic State is destruction, a crippled regional economy, and the undermining of regional trade, which will have a negative impact on the capability of regional nations as well as exterior powers to promote prosperity in the Middle East. Yet, a 2015 study by Elena Ianchovichina and

108 Karakoc, Jülide, ‘The Failure of Indirect Orientalism: Islamic State’, Journal of Socialist Theory: Critique 42:4 (22 December 2014), 597. 109 Karakoc, ‘The Failure of Indirect Orientalism’, 597. 110 Karakoc, 600-601.

45

Maros Ivanic from the World Bank Group predicts that Syria and Iraq face the biggest share of war costs, “losing 14% and 16% in per capita welfare, respectively.” Their analysis, titled

“Economic Effects of the Syrian War and the Spread of the Islamic State on the Levant,” shows that, ultimately, all countries of the Levant region will lose in terms of per capita welfare.111

The countries surrounding the conflict zone will have to deal with the ever-growing mass of refugees, which will reflect upon the job market, the demand for resources and services.

Furthermore, Ianchovichina and Ivanic estimate that, because of the economic importance of

Iraq and Syria for the region, regional trade will be negatively affected. This suggests that, as long as conflict rules the region, it will undermine regional economic substance.112 Clearly, the capability of the United States to promote prosperity in the Middle East is thus very much connected to the existence of the Islamic State as a threat to the political order of the Middle

East. In order to promote prosperity in the Middle East, the existence of the Islamic State is thus rather critical since it heavily relies on the capability to create a sustainable, secure environment.

This is equally true when considering the strategic interest that would imply extending the international order based on the principles of law and order to the Middle East that will support the efforts to promote security and prosperity. Achieving this would cement a political order based on multilateralism and able to counter and prevent global challenges. The Islamic State challenges this principle in two ways. First, as established when elaborating on the previous points of the National Security Strategy, by simply threatening the political order of the Middle

East and thus being a necessary object of warfare and conflict. Obviously, this brings instability and thus damages the regional substance to successfully establish and enforce the rule of law and order. Second, through challenging the international order itself by provoking polarization and friction both within and between nations. As Akbar Ahmed, current Ibn Khaldun Chair of

111 Ianchovichina, E., Ivanic, M., ‘Economic Effects of the Syrian War and the Spread of the Islamic State on the Levant’ Policy Research Working Paper 7135 (December 2014), 28. 112 Ianchovichina, Ivanic, ‘Economic Effects of the Syrian War and the Spread of the Islamic State on the Levant’, 28-29.

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Islamic Studies, argues in his The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror

Became a Global War on Tribal Islam (2013), the primary dilemma for the Obama administration when pursuing its efforts to efficiently counter global terrorism is finding a balance between doing the necessary and upholding its own values.113 A choice between either one would mean an erosion of the democratic principles the Obama administration sought to promote.

Ahmed seems to urge that Obama chooses in the dilemma he rejected in his State of the

Union Address of 2010, in which he called such a choice “false choice.”114 Problematically,

Obama rejected a dilemma that seems to be the most pressing question when encountering an enemy that operates by utilizing guerilla warfare. It is essentially the dilemma that remains native to the question why the United States lost the war in Vietnam and has haunted American military efforts ever since. Whereas Obama maintains that both security and the American values are equally important to uphold by rights of the Constitution of the United States, hawks such as Dick Cheney seems to use direct pragmatist arguments, reasoning from a strategic perspective, thereby suspending the human rights of suspected terrorists. On the matter of the interrogation techniques the Bush administration devised, Cheney argued that “I have no problem [with torture] as long as we achieve our objective. And our objective is to get the guys who did 9/11 and it is to avoid another attack against the United States.”115

A result of debacles, such as violation of human rights in detention facilities like

Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib or the deadly Drone campaign, was an increased war weariness and anti-war sentiments in Western countries. By attacking those who reportedly violated human rights, and violating such rights while doing so, several observers came to

113 Ahmed, Akbar, The Thistle and the Drone (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 256 114 The White House. “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/2010-state- union-address#transcript (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 115 Zurcher, Anthony. “Cheney: ‘No problem’ with detaining innocents.” BBC.com. http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-30485999 (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

47 question the validity of the American claim to safeguard and spread human rights. Polarization increased followed between those thinking that total war against the Islamic State is necessary and those that are convinced that it is not. As Hussein Solomon adds in his Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation (2016), the command of the Islamic State seems to believe that it can benefit from the increasing polarization because it is very likely that the ‘soft centre,’ or grey area’ will be eliminated. To illustrate this phenomenon, he refers to the effect of the terrorist attacks in Europe, which has initiated a wave of Islamophobia and the rise of groups like Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA) and political manifestations of populism.116 Accordingly, Solomon argues, “this Islamophobia is bound to antagonize an already alienated European Muslim community – hundreds of whom already left to join IS.”117 Simultaneously it provokes overreaction and engagement, which serves to get

Western countries to wage war in the Middle East and commit the corresponding atrocities of war, which thus serves the purpose of catalyzing the effect. Consequently, the values the Obama administration intended to spread would become questioned, challenged, and ultimately came to lose credibility. Clearly, the Islamic State is indeed a challenge to the establishment of the rule-based international order, yet primarily in the sense that it weakens the democratic principles of those that seek to pursue and spread it.

Yet, to hold groups like Al-Qaida and the Islamic State fully responsible for the instability of the Middle East seems inaccurate and would mean to fail in comprehending the nature of the conflict. The claim from the Obama administration that the existence of the Islamic State and its militants harm and endanger the efficiency of the American effort to pursue its interests is undeniably true. However, the group calling itself the Islamic State and its quick rise to power are clearly a result of the Global War on Terror and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The resulting

116 Solomon, Hussein, Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation (Bloemfontein, South Africa: Springer International Publishing AG, 2016), 16. 117 Solomon, Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation, 16.

48 instability accelerated the growth of the ranks of the previous incarnations of the Islamic State and served as momentum for its blooming as a primary threat to American interests and the

Middle East order. Thus, it should not be the question whether the Islamic State threatens the security of American allies and partners, undermines regional prosperity, and hinders the extension of the rule-based international order to the Middle East, which is undeniably true, but whether the United States is able to create and maintain an environment in which groups like the Islamic State have no chance to prosper in the first place. Thus, crediting a result of

American policy of the past as a threat to the current policy is paradoxical and fails to comprehend the nature of the problem.

In order to comprehend the nature of this misconception, one should consider the effort to counter the Islamic State within a broader framework. Clearly, the struggle has bigger implications than the question whether the Islamic State should survive or fall. When considering the threat the Islamic State is able to pose to the American national interests as described above, it becomes clear that the Islamic State only ever threatened the United States in terms of its credibility. In regional terms, the rise and impact of the Islamic State should be considered a setback in the Global War on Terror, a failure of Obama’s initiative to end the

American occupation of Iraq responsibly, and a setback in terms of the three American interests as emphasized by the 2012 national security review titled “Sustaining U.S. Leadership:

Priorities for 21st Century Defense” and the 2015 National Security Strategy. Defeating the

Islamic State would thus be a case of redeeming Americans credibility in terms of its capability to provide security for its allies and partners, promoting prosperity, and spreading the principles of a rule-based international order.

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3.2: The global battlefield

When putting the international effort to fight the Islamic State in the context of a global battlefield, two aspects stand out. The first is the awkward position of the conflict within the concept of the Global War on Terror, renamed the Overseas Contingency Operation by the

Obama administration in March 2009. Second is the complex situation surrounding the Islamic

State within the context of the Syrian Civil War and its regional impact for American influence and power. They are connected in the sense that both situations could be considered opportunities to solidify American influence in the region by diminishing that of powers like

Russia. One could even make the case that it shows signs of a covert proxy war between the

United States and the Russia, as journalist Patrick Cockburn does in his Age of Jihad: Islamic

State and the Great War for the Middle East (2016).118

The shift to surrogate warfare in the American effort to counter the Islamic State shows that the Obama administration operated as if it thought engagement to be imperative to a leading power in a conflict that was simultaneously not deemed very urgent. The externalization of the burden of war represents a shift in conflict narrative from a perception of threat to risk. Krieg continues by elaborating that this shift to surrogate warfare should also be considered a product of the changing international order, “which, while the state retains in law the full authority to regulate and manage international affairs, its authority is in practice challenged by non-state actors operating in the global system.”119 He observes a global system that has shifted from bipolarity to apolarity, which involved the establishment of an anarchic and competitive system that is transnational in nature. This system could also be seen as a product of the post-Cold War

‘zeitgeist,’ which he defines as “characterized by the impermissibility of interstate war and growing conventional deterrence,” which “has prompted states to consider means of achieving strategic objectives other than major combat operations—including alternative military

118 Cockburn, The Rise of the Islamic State, 94. 119 Krieg, ‘Externalizing the burden of war’, 100.

50 options.”120 As a result, the patron (in this case the United States) is very likely to perceive the situations such as the conflict in the Middle East as matters of risk, rather than threat, according to Krieg. Accordingly, Krieg defined four primary drivers for a patron to use surrogate warfare: a need to minimize costs, a lack of adequate capability, a need for deniability, and the need for legitimacy.121 Such are needed to allow the patron to get involved in insurgencies, civil wars, and rebellions, without threatening its own legitimacy.122 Therefore, insurgency warfare allowed the Obama administration to become involved in the effort to fight the Islamic State without gaining the same result as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which led to anti-American sentiments under the Iraqi people.

Yet, as Krieg explains, the shift to insurgency warfare does not signify disengagement, but rather the shifting of engagement. While the American strategic interests in the Middle East have not changed, the role the Obama administration envisioned in its achievement did when compared to the administration of George W. Bush. Whereas the war efforts of the Bush administration focused on active engagement and heavy military presence, the campaign from the Obama administration is primarily defined by absence. Since surrogate warfare generally means the relocation of risk and responsibility, a result of surrogate warfare is a loss in control in both the fight as well as its outcome. Therefore, Krieg argues, surrogate warfare damaged the American claim on superpower status, stating that “America has shifted from being a guarantor of security or a protector to being a partner, assisting local surrogates to take over responsibility to provide security in their own backyard.“123

The approach taken by the Obama administration in order to fight the Islamic State emphasized on the exchange of control over the conflict for solidifying partnerships in the

Middle East. This would strengthen the Middle East order in order to create a stronger, more

120 Krieg, ‘Externalizing the burden of war’, 111. 121 Krieg, 107-109. 122 Ibid, 102. 123 Ibid, 112.

51 democratically substantial network of partners. Necessarily, this would involve a campaign to counter the power of terrorist organizations, but also nations such as Syria, Turkey, Iran, and

Russia. The American engagement in the Middle East surrounding the conflict between the

American-led coalition and the Islamic State is a singular battlefield within the over-arching conflict between democratic freedom, with the United States at the helm, and its ideological counterparts.

3.3: Sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing

The suggested policy by the Obama administration shows strong ideological drivers, which involve a continuation of the rhetoric of American exceptionalism that seems to have been present from the very first document issued by a government of the United States of America.

Although he claimed that “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being” when addressing graduating cadets at the U.S. Military Academy in 2014, Obama was often portrayed as a president critical of American history and policies.124 He seemed to envision the

United States to be a global partner rather than a hegemon.

The rhetoric of the Obama administration regarding the conflict surrounding the Islamic

State shows symptoms of the phenomenon that Elizabeth Hurd qualifies as ‘laicism.’ She argues in her article ‘Political Islam and Foreign Policy in Europe and the United States’ that laicism has a significant influence on the understanding of many Europeans and Americans to certain political manifestations of religion. Inherent to laicism is secularism, as it is built upon the separation of church and state. This prevalent principle influences the behavior of laicists towards actors that have not encountered this separation. It must be added that the Western roots in Judeo-Christendom are very important, since this is essential for the development

124 Jaffe, Greg. “Obama’s new patriotism.” Washingtonpost.com. http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/06/03/obama-and-american- exceptionalism/?utm_term=.10a74783e148 (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

52 towards the separation of religion and politics. Therefore, a Western politician can be both religious and have laicist presumptions. As Hurd argues, laicists assume that the Western history and thus experience with religion and politics gives the Western values and principles a certain superiority regarding systems that have not separated religion from politics. Therefore, the European and American values and principles are naturally regarded to be universal. In

“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Obama stressed the prominent position of the goal of promoting a rule-based international order. In the introduction, he argued that “we seek a just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fundamental rights of every human being.”125 In doing so, he seemed to echo the rhetoric of the first American Congress drawing the American Declaration of Independence, claiming to fight for ‘unalienable rights.’

As Ron Fournier from The Atlantic argued in his article “Obama’s New American

Exceptionalism,” “in times of great change and tumult, presidents seek to inspire beleaguered

Americans by reminding them of their national identity.”126 According to Fournier, the 2008 campaign slogan of the Obama campaign, “yes, we can,” expressed a confidence in the

American identity to overcome the troubles at hand, simply because it was American.127 A similar character dominated his speech when addressing the nation after fourteen Americans were killed in a terrorist attack in California in early December 2015, when Obama stated that

“we will overcome” the threat of terrorism.128

Fournier elaborates that the ideology Obama seems to represent differs from the

Republican definition, which draws a lot on the ‘city upon a hill’ rhetoric of John Winthrop that

125 Department of Defense. ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, Defense Strategic Guidance (January 2015). 126 Fournier, Ron, ‘Obama’s New American Exceptionalism’, The Atlantic (28 July 2016). 127 Fournier, ‘Obama’s New American Exceptionalism’. 128 The White House. “Address to the Nation by the President.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.org. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/06/address-nation-president (Accessed on 05-06- 2017).

53 was a dominant character in studies of American exceptionalism and especially dominant in the

Reagan-era. Instead, he argues, Obama’s exceptionalism should rather be considered ‘Reagan- plus,’ which he defines as “a striving city under constant construction.”129 As Greg Jaffe wrote in his article Obama’s New Patriotism’ for The Washington Post: “It’s a patriotism that embraces the darker moments in American history and celebrates the ability of the unsung and the outsiders to challenge the country’s elite.”130

However, considering the rhetoric of Obama and his views of the position of the United

States in the world order, it seems that that he indeed drew a lot from the Republican notion.

During his last official trip abroad, Obama told reporters at the Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation summit in Peru that “The United States really is an ‘indispensable nation in our world order.”131 Furthermore, the goals set forth in ‘Sustaining Global Leadership’ suggests the belief that the United States was indeed the nation destined to have that leading position in the global order. This would suggest that he was convinced that the American principles were universal, which would in turn suggest that the United States was exceptionally equipped to spread these values. Because the Obama administration focused on multilateralism in the international order and emphasized that America was to lead the coalition, it then seems that

Obama envisioned the American role in this framework to be that of the primus inter pares, the first among equals. When considering this in a good versus bad rhetorical framework, one could conclude that the Obama inclined towards imperialism based on soft-power; a multilateral, yet

American-centered, global network.

129 Fournier, ‘Obama’s New American Exceptionalism’ (05-06-2017). 130 Jaffe, Greg. “Obama’s new patriotism.” Washingtonpost.com. http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/06/03/obama-and-american- exceptionalism/?utm_term=.10a74783e148 (Accessed on 05-06-2017). 131 The White House. “Press Conference by President Obama in Lima, Peru.” Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/20/press-conference-president-obama-lima-peru (Accessed on 05-06-2017).

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Conclusion

In this chapter I argued that the representation of the threat posed by the Islamic State to

American national interests in the Middle East as established by the Obama administration shows an extra-regional interest. When considering the national interests as established by the

Obama administration, it becomes clear that the global effort against the Islamic State was really part of a broader, global campaign. This suggests that the effort to counter the Islamic

State was a means, rather than an end.

First, by analyzing the foreign policy interests as established by the Obama administration, I came to observe that the nucleus of this policy seems to be focused on establishing an international rule-based order. One will be quick to observe that this is based on a Western set of assumptions and interpretations. Given this global agenda, I considered the effort to counter the Islamic State as a singular battlefield within an over-arching conflict.

Applying this assumption to the rhetoric utilized by the Obama administration, I came to conclude that it suggested a conflict between democratic freedom and its ideological counterparts. However, Obama extended this rhetoric by claiming that the Islamic State is the face of evil, thereby implying that the conflict is actually between good and evil. I then expanded this argument by framing the discourse of the Obama administration in ideological terms. I aimed to establish that this rhetoric shows that the American foreign policy is based on the assumption that the American values and rights should be universally accepted because they are inherently good. Consequently, I argued that this rhetoric actually hints at the promotion of a multilateral, yet American-centered, global network.

Consequently, I conclude that the American intervention in the conflict surrounding the

Islamic State is not really considered to be urgent. However, it is rather important when considered from an ideological perspective. Because the Obama administration expressed an idealism which inherently represents the United States to be the indispensable nation, it

55 capitalized on the image and responsibilities accompanied to such a status. The conflict itself therefore seems to be considered part of a greater battle.

56

Conclusion

In this thesis I have analyzed the rhetoric of the Obama administration regarding the Islamic

State and its vision on how to counter it, questioning how the discourse of the Obama administration limited its capability to develop an adequate policy for countering the Islamic

State. Consequently, I theorized that by representing the effort to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State as a conflict between freedom and evil, the Obama administration utilized a very idealistic rhetorical framework. I therefore challenged the representation of the Islamic

State as promoted by the Obama administration, denouncing it as an Orientalist interpretation of a non-Western issue infused by the problematic aspect of American exceptionalism. As a result, this thesis sought to remark on the idealism inherent to the approach promoted by the

Obama administration in order to improve the Western response to non-Western situations, such as the struggle to counter the Islamic State.

In the first chapter I explained how the Obama administration rhetorically convicted the

Islamic State to be an enemy to mankind, a vehicle of evil. I did so through analyzing it by using four rhetorical devices: naming the enemy, conceptualizing it in terms of structure, conceptualizing it in terms of ideology, and finally, antagonizing the enemy. I concluded that the Obama administration focused on rhetorical warfare against the Islamic State, which would serve three purposes. First, the rhetoric utilized by the Obama administration aimed to canalize the call for war in the domestic politics of the United States. Second, it was meant to serve as counterpropaganda against the Islamic State in order to delegitimize the Islamic State towards its supporters. Third, it focused on encouraging the countries of the Middle East to support the coalition fighting the Islamic State. Ultimately, the rhetoric of the Obama administration focused on antagonizing the Islamic State on all these three fronts, both explicitly and subtly

57 qualifying them as the embodiment of something that can only be defined as ‘evil.’ By doing so, the Obama administration implied that the ideology defined by the American cause was unequivocally better, since it was fueled by goodness, and therefore fit to counter the evil

Caliphate.

In the second chapter I analyzed the American national interests established by the

Obama administration and reportedly threatened by the Islamic State. I came to conclude that the Obama administration pursued a multilateral approach to the struggle against the Islamic

State in order to strengthen its partners in the Middle East, thereby increasing the American- centered in-group. Essentially, this chapter extended the argument of the first chapter by arguing that this rhetoric purposefully invoked the good versus bad dichotomy in order to expand the American centered in-group. However, the rhetoric seems to hint at a vision of a

Middle East political order that is supposed to solve the current issues that encourage the countries of the Middle East to actually cooperate into a lasting, substantial order that would be capable of fighting internal issues. However, Obama’s rhetoric also seemed to suggest that it was to be formed on American terms, or Western terms based on Western interpretations of freedom and democracy, rights Obama and his compatriots considered to be unalienable and universal but which are actually completely Western.

In the last chapter I analyzed the logic behind the discourse of the Obama administration regarding the threat perception of the Islamic State towards the American national interests. I argued that the representation of the threat posed by the Islamic State to American national interests in the Middle East as established by the Obama administration is evidence of an agenda transcending the Middle East. The national interests established by the Obama administration equip the American government to promote an international order of countries based on

American principles while simultaneously force a clash with those not living up to or violating these standards, by claiming that such behavior is threatening these interests. Since the ideology

58 of the Islamic State is violent in nature and does not comply with Western notions such as the

Geneva Conventions, it is necessarily an object of war. The Islamic State should thus not be regarded an existential threat to the United States, neither its citizens nor its institutions. Instead, the Obama administration perceived the Islamic State as a threat to the mission set by Obama and many of his predecessors: to spread the American values.

Consequently, this thesis thus supports the theory from Ryan Lizza, at least when applied to the American policy under Obama in its efforts to counter the Islamic State. Lizza argued in his article ‘The Consequentialist’ that the Obama administration should not be considered in the dichotomy of realism and idealism, but rather ‘consequentialism.’ His argument formed a positivist explanation to the general negativity surrounding the case-by-case approach of the Obama administration to the vast array of crisis situations. Various scholars took its changing policy as evidence of the administration’s incapability, calling it inconsistent.

Although I do not agree with Lizza’s observation that Obama did not hold true to any ideology,

I do agree with his theory that Obama adopted a pragmatic rhetorical framework. However, a pragmatism that operated within a specifically ideological framework and discourse.

My disagreement with Lizza is a direct result of my agreement with Aiden Warren and

Ingveld bode, who argue that the rhetoric of the Obama administration regarding the Islamic

State only deviated from the Bush rhetoric in style, rather than in substance. Bush focused on a unilateral approach to fight al-Qaida and its affiliates with American power and improve the terrorist-infested nations to transform these into viable and sustainable partners that would take part in the international order based on Western interpretations. Ultimately, the end goal was to spread democracy and freedom. Obama took a different approach, using surrogates to fight the direct threat. Yet, essentially it would still mean the imposition of Western values on non-

Western countries.

59

I therefore agree with Juride Karakoc, who argued that the Middle East policy of the

Obama administration is evidence of indirect Orientalism. The American in-group that both

Bush and Obama seemingly aimed to build was built on Western principles. By supporting the governments that are living up to Western standards in order to promote these values in other regions, the Middle East policy of the Obama administration can thus be considered indirect

Orientalism. Her theory corresponds to the argument from Kadri Liik, who interpreted the foreign policy of the Obama administration as evidence that Obama believed in ‘democratic stability,’ which holds that the Western definition of democracy is the cure of global problems such as terrorism. I would extend this argument by adding that this shows that Obama likened democracy to be the embodiment of ‘good,’ which would necessarily frame conflicts such as the struggle against the Islamic State to be a fight against ‘evil.’

With this thesis I thus aimed to remark on the discourse utilized by the Obama administration regarding its efforts to counter the Islamic State. I thereby aimed to clarify misconceptions constituent to the Western response to the ongoing problem of the Islamic State.

To a larger extent, this could be read as a case-study about Western approaches to non-Western issues. Although the supporting role of the United States in the multilateral approach taken by the Obama administration seems to suggest that it relies on its surrogates to deal with their own problem, this is a misconception. By carefully selecting which factions they wish to support, the Obama administration has taken an approach very much in line with Said’s theory on

Orientalism. The selected surrogates were extensions of Western power, operating on Western terms, imposing resolutions in line with Western authorization. Solutions for the conflict were thus largely defined by Western standards and ideas, even though it was primarily a problem of the Middle East. The problem of the approach taken by the Obama administration to counter the Islamic State then seems to be that it was too much about the United States, rather than the object of the conflict itself: the Islamic State.

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