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The Smart Girl's Guide to Privacy

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The Smart Girl's Guide to Privacy SHELVE IN: COMPUTERS/GENERAL The whirlwind of social media, online dating, and mobile apps can guide to privACY THE SMART GIRL’s make life a dream—or a nightmare. For every trustworthy website, violet blue there are countless jerks, bullies, and scam artists who want to harvest your personal information for their own purposes. But you can fight back, right now. In The Smart Girl’s Guide to Privacy, award-winning author and investigative journalist Violet Blue shows you how women are targeted online and how to keep yourself safe. Blue’s practical, user-friendly advice will teach you how to: • Delete personal content from websites • Use website and browser privacy controls effectively • Recover from and prevent identity theft • Figure out where the law protects you—and where it doesn’t • Set up safe online profiles • Remove yourself from people-finder websites Even if your privacy has already been compromised, don’t panic. It’s not too late to take control. Let The Smart Girl’s Guide to VIOLET BLUE help you cut through the confusion and start protecting your the smart Privacy online life. Violet Blue is an investigative tech reporter for ZDNet, CNET, Engadget, and CBS News, girl’s guide and an award-winning sex writer and columnist. She is also a member of the Internet Press Guild and an advisor for Without My Consent. She currently maintains a sexuality blog at tinynibbles.com and can be found on Twitter, @violetblue. to privacy $17.95 ($20.95 CDN) practical tips for staying safe online www.nostarch.com THE FINEST IN GEEK ENTERTAINMENT ™ the smart girl’s guide to privacy the smart girl’s guide to privacy practical tips for staying safe online violet blue The Smart Girl’s Guide to Privacy. Copyright © 2015 by Violet Blue. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner and the publisher. First printing 19 18 17 16 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ISBN-10: 1-59327-648-6 ISBN-13: 978-1-59327-648-5 Publisher: William Pollock Production Editor: Laurel Chun Cover and Interior Design: Beth Middleworth Developmental Editors: William Pollock and Jennifer Griffith-Delgado Compositor: Laurel Chun Proofreader: Lisa Devoto Farrell Indexer: BIM Indexing & Proofreading Services For information on distribution, translations, or bulk sales, please contact No Starch Press, Inc. directly: No Starch Press, Inc. 245 8th Street, San Francisco, CA 94103 phone: 415.863.9900; [email protected] www.nostarch.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Blue, Violet. The smart girl’s guide to privacy : practical tips for staying safe online / by Violet Blue. pages cm Summary: “Discusses how to protect personal information from online privacy violations. Covers how to set and store secure passwords, monitor online visibility, safely use social media and apps, and create online profiles. Contains emergency instructions for those who have been hacked or had their identity, phone, or laptop stolen”-- Provided by publisher. ISBN 978-1-59327-648-5 -- ISBN 1-59327-648-6 1. Computer crimes--Prevention. 2. Internet--Security measures. 3. Internet and women. 4. Internet-- Safety measures. 5. Privacy, Right of. I. Title. HV6773.B56 2015 613.6’602854678--dc23 2015013420 No Starch Press and the No Starch Press logo are registered trademarks of No Starch Press, Inc. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be the trademarks of their respective owners. Rather than use a trademark symbol with every occurrence of a trade- marked name, we are using the names only in an editorial fashion and to the benefit of the trademark owner, with no intention of infringement of the trademark. The information in this book is distributed on an “As Is” basis, without warranty. While every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this work, neither the author nor No Starch Press, Inc. shall have any liability to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused or alleged to be caused directly or indirectly by the information contained in it. brief contents chapter 1: get smart ................................................................1 chapter 2: but it’s just my phone number ..............................17 chapter 3: you got hacked ......................................................31 chapter 4: female trouble .......................................................49 chapter 5: identity theft .........................................................69 chapter 6: how to share .........................................................81 chapter 7: people-search websites .........................................95 chapter 8: dating and sexytime ...........................................103 chapter 9: ninja tricks .........................................................119 chapter 10: I hate passwords ...............................................133 resources ..............................................................................141 index .....................................................................................155 contents in detail 1 get smart 1 Take the Online Privacy Test .................................................4 Eight Privacy Tips to Use Right Now .....................................4 Targets and Nontargets ..........................................................6 Losing Your Privacy ................................................................8 Ways You Can Lose Your Privacy ..................................9 Protect Yourself Right Now ..................................................11 Tape Over Your Webcam ..............................................11 Lock Your Phone, Computer, and Tablet .....................12 Do a Privacy Check-Up .................................................13 Don’t Email Your ID .....................................................13 Use a Password Manager and Install an Antitheft App ..........................................14 Be the Firewall ......................................................................14 2 but it’s just my phone number 17 You Control What You Share ................................................17 Private Spaces and Activities ...............................................18 Lock Down Your Personally Identifying Information ..........21 Red Alert List ...............................................................22 Yellow Alert List ...........................................................23 Green List .....................................................................24 Information-Sharing Guidelines ..................................25 He Said, She Said ..................................................................26 Worst-Case Scenario .............................................................28 viii contents in detail 3 you got hacked 31 One Compromised Account to Rule Them All ......................32 What Honan Did Wrong ........................................................33 Hack-Proof Your Life .............................................................34 Make Your Address Hard to Find ................................34 Don’t Link Major Accounts ...........................................34 Don’t Use One Service for Everything .........................35 Back Up Your Everything: Your Contacts, Your Files, Your Photos ..................35 Encrypt Your Computer’s Hard Drive .........................36 What to Do When You’ve Been Attacked .............................36 Recover Your Accounts and Data .................................38 When a Service Gets Hacked .......................................40 If Your Financial Information May Have Been Exposed in a Data Breach .......................................41 How to Change Your Email Address ....................................43 Choose a New Home .....................................................44 Set Up Forwarding .......................................................45 Move In .........................................................................46 Update Your Accounts ..................................................47 Tell Everyone ................................................................47 4 female trouble 49 Recovering from Harassment ...............................................50 When Will It Stop? ........................................................53 Staying Strong ..............................................................54 Fighting Back ........................................................................56 Navigating the Legal System .......................................56 Getting a Restraining Order ........................................58 Getting Your Private Photos Offline ....................................59 Doing It Yourself ...........................................................60 If You’re a Minor ...........................................................63 Outsourcing the Work ...................................................64 Preventative Maintenance ....................................................66 contents in detail ix 5 identity theft 69 Signs of Identity Theft ...........................................................70 Run, Don’t Walk ....................................................................72 Place a Fraud Alert ......................................................72 Order Free Credit Reports ...........................................73 File an Identity
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