Arif Yunusov*

Ethnic Profile of Post-Soviet

I. Introduction Following the breakdown of the USSR, interethnic conflicts and rising self-identifica- tion processes in many nations were among the most serious problems that emerged within the territory of the former superpower. Azerbaijan not only failed to avoid these processes but, due to various circumstances, found itself at the forefront of the stand- off. It was in Azerbaijan that the first interethnic conflict in the former USSR started between and Azeris over Nagorno Karabakh in the late s. This conflict is still unresolved and remains a stumbling block, not only for the relationship between the two Caucasian nations, but also for stability in the entire region. Azerbaijan is a multiethnic country and the progressing ethnic self-identification trends have become a baseline for the emergence of ethnic secessionism within the republic. All these processes have occurred against the background of an independent nation-state construction in Azerbaijan, where the Azeris are the indigenous/titular people. The interethnic conflict with the Armenians over Karabakh, the construction of the nation-state and the upsurge of self-identification movements among the many ethnicities of Azerbaijan are all processes that are occurring simultaneously and sig- nificantly affect other developments unfolding in the republic. How have these proc- esses been developing and what shapes are they going to acquire in the future? What measures have the republican government been applying to solve the minority issues in Azerbaijan? These are the focal issues addressed in this article.

II. Ethno-linguistic Situation in Azerbaijan before the Dissolution of the USSR The roots of the current ethnic conflicts and interethnic collisions within the territory of Azerbaijan lie in the distant past when, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the conquered the South Caucasus and started pursuing a policy of reshaping the region’s existing ethno-confessional profile. Not only in Azerbaijan, but also on the territory of neighbouring , Muslims constituted the majority of the population. Such a demographic situation did not suit the authorities of the Russian

* Arif Yunusov, Dr. of History, Head of the Department of Conflict and Migration Studies, Institute of Peace and Democracy, Azerbaijan.

European Yearbook of Minority Issues Vol 4, 2004/5, ISBN 90 04 14953 8, 481-494. © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:00:39PM via free access Arif Yunusov empire and the decision was made to expel the Muslim peoples and settle Christians in their place. This decision primarily applied to Azerbaijan where, according to the offi- cial Russian statistics of , the Turkish-speaking Azeris, as well as Persian-speaking Kurds, Tats, Talysh, etc., were the overwhelming majority of the , population.1 It was natural that the Turks, constituting the majority of the South Caucasian population, were expected to be expatriated first. A Russian population was to replace them in the region. The first group of Russian settlers in Azerbaijan, comprising the so-called sectarians or Raskolniks (Molokans, Subbotnics, Dukhobors, Baptists, etc.), began to appear in Azerbaijan after  and settled in rural areas. As the political situation stabilized these groups were followed by Orthodox Christians. As a result, Azerbaijan had about  Russian settlements by . In the late s, as was turned into an industrial centre of the South Caucasus, the country was flooded by a third surge of Russians. Consequently, the Russian population grew from , (slightly over  % of the total country’s population) in the middle of the nineteenth century to , (, Orthodox Christians and , sectarians).2 Other Christian peoples followed the Russians to settle in Azerbaijan. As early as , , Germans were resettled there to establish their colony of Yelenendorf (today’s Khanlar) near the town of Ganja. By , about , Germans (. % of the country’s total population) lived in four colonies.3 More Christian peoples (Greeks, Ukrainians, etc.) appeared in Azerbaijan during the same period, although in extremely insignificant numbers, which meant that the Russian Empire relied more on the Armenians, the major Christian group in the region, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century. Another factor that played an important role was that a small group of Armenian-speaking peoples had lived in the mountainous parts of Karabakh for a significant period, with more living in and Iran. With their shared Christian heritage, these peoples might become reliable supporters of Russian policy in the region. This was why Tsar Nikolai I issued a decree on the establishment of a separate, so-called Armenian, oblast within the territories of the Irevan and Nakhchevan Khanates, conquered after the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Persian wars in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.4 Later, the Russian authorities started the resettlement of Armenians from Turkey and Iran. This time the resettlement process took place on a much larger scale. In this regard, it is edifying to refer to the information provided by Russian officials at the beginning of the twentieth century: as Mr. N. N. Shavrov pointed out in , more than ,, Armenians living in the South Caucasus at that time belonged “to the native population of the region and were settled by Russians”.5 A sizeable number were resettled in the former

 See details in K. U. Verdiyeva, Resettlement Policy of the Russian Empire in the North Azerbaijan (Altay, Baku, ),  (in Russian language).  See details in ibid., -.  Ibid., -; see also, Gamarshakh Djavadov, National Minorities and Minor Ethnicities of Azerbaijan (Elm, Baku, ), - (in Azeri language).  For an overview of the history of the Armenian people, see Collected Acts, Part  (Moscow, ), - (in Russian language).  N. N. Sahvrov, The New Threat to the Russian Policy in the , (Ministry of Finance Publishing House, St. Petersburg, ), - (in Russian language).

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Irevan Khanate (today’s Republic of Armenia) and Azerbaijan. As a result, as early as , about , Armenians ( % of the total population) were registered in the former Elizavetpol and Baku provinces (currently Azerbaijan’s territories), whereas before the resettlement there were only ,.6 The Armenian population had particu- larly grown in Karabakh: according to  sources, the Armenian population in the future Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (the Shusha, Djebrai and Zangezur uezds/districts) totalled ,, while the Azeri population was reduced to , people (or . % of the region’s population).7 Thus, as a result of the colonial policy of the Russian Empire, significant demo- graphic changes occurred in Azerbaijan. During the period -, over a million people settled in the country: , of them were Armenians; , Russians; and over , Greeks, Germans, Ukrainians and other Christian peoples. Considering the emigration of the Azerbaijani population (predominantly Sunnites, as a result of which the number of Shiites became prevalent by the end of the nineteenth century, totalling  % of the Azeris in the present day), it is quite clear that such ethno-demo- graphic changes could easily cause ethnic collisions. This issue became particularly aggravated in Karabakh and industrial centres such as Baku and Ganja, then the areas of colonial settlements. As the majority of settlers were Armenians they were in conflict with the local population during - and -, which, in the majority of cases, resulted in fatal collisions. After the Soviets came to power in Azerbaijan, the Communists managed to stall the Armenian-Azeri stand-off. In Karabakh, they established a new administrative territorial structure – the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) – where Armenians constituted the majority. Another wave of Russian migrants poured into Azerbaijan during the Soviet period, the majority of whom were soldiers and their families. This portion of Russian expatriates settled in the cities, predominantly in Baku, Ganja, Sumgayit and Mingechaur. By , the number of Russians reached a peak of , people (or . % of the country’s population). From the s to the s, different trends began to take shape. Russians started leaving Azerbaijan, an exodus that took place mainly from the rural areas of the repub- lic. As a result, by the time of the  population census, the Russian population in Azerbaijan totalled , people (. % of the republic’s population), which was con- centrated mostly in the Baku, Ganja, Sumgayit, Shemakha, Ismayilly and Lenkoran districts. The beginning of the s witnessed an increased outflow of Russian emi- grants from Azerbaijan: the last Soviet census registered a little over , Russians (. % of the country’s population), , of whom resided in Baku. Similar trends of decline were observed in the ethnic populations that had settled in Azerbaijan in previous centuries. These movements were particularly visible among Armenians: by , , Armenians (. % of their total number) were registered in Azerbaijan compared to , in . The majority of Armenians resided in former NKAO (,) and in the capital (, ). All these changes occurred against the background of constant increases in the local population of native/titular peoples. The last Soviet census in  registered 

 K. U. Verdiyeva, Resettlement Policy …, -.  The Caucasus Calendar for (Tiflis, ), - (in Russian language).

 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:00:39PM via free access Arif Yunusov nationalities and minor ethnic groups, ,, people in total. The majority of the country’s total population consisted of ,, Azeris ( % of their total number). Other ethnicities also experienced certain demographic changes during the Soviet period. In the s, many minor ethnicities had their own schools, issued numerous magazines, newspapers and produced theatrical stagings. All these activities were coor- dinated by special governmental structures. During the same period, alphabets were created for those ethnic communities that lacked written languages. However, all these activities had been wrapped up by the s, as Stalin’s regime became tougher and Soviet ethnic policies underwent radical changes. This policy had its effect on the native Turks, who in  were renamed and became ‘Azerbaijani’. One way or another, all Soviet population censuses deliberately understated the numbers of minor ethnic populations or, rather, they were classified as parts of bigger ethnicities, while some of them simply vanished from the Soviet ethnic map. As a result, serious inconsistencies occurred between the official statistical data and the actual numbers of people in such minor ethnic groups as the Kurds, Tats, Talyshs, Tsakhurs and others. However, in addition to the USSR’s malicious ethnic policies, these delib- erate distortions were caused by other factors as well. The fact is that, as early as the nineteenth century, a process of rather intensive ethnic identity changes was taking place among many Muslim ethnicities. In the official Russian statistics, the Kurds, Tats, Talyshs, Tsakhurs and were often referred to as ‘Turks’ or ‘Azerbaijani Tatars’. In other words, this was a natural process of assimilation of minor ethnicities in the regions of Azeri ethnic predominance. Contrary processes started to occur by  when some of the ethnicities began to restore their ethnic identity. The  census reflected these changes.

III. Ethnic Migration Processes After the Dissolution of the USSR The conflict with Armenia, which started in February  over Nagorno Karabakh, and the dissolution of the USSR in  triggered further mass-migration processes. On the one hand, nearly , Armenians fled from Azerbaijan to Armenia, and other countries. Some of them, however, returned to Nagorno Karabakh with time. Simultaneously, starting from , approximately , Russians left Azerbaijan along with , Ukrainians and , Byelorussians. A considerable number of people from other ethnic groups left the country as well: for example, , Jews left for Israel during - (nearly  % of the Jews officially registered by the  census). In total, nearly , citizens of nonindigenous ethnicities left Azerbaijan during -, the majority belonging to the Christian denomination, who had settled in the country during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.8 On the other hand, around , Azeris and , Kurds arrived in Azerbaijan from Armenia along with up to , from Uzbekistan. The May  armistice in Karabakh failed to cease the migration processes, as emigration, at that time, was caused by a difficult economic situation in the country.

 See Yunusov, “Ethnic Conflicts and Migration Processes in the South Caucasus”, The New Eurasia: Russia and Countries of the Near Neighbourhood, Selection of Articles No.  (), -.

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To acquire a realistic picture of the demographic changes in the country, the republican authorities conducted a population census from  January to  February . The census results showed that the country’s residents totalled ,, people, ,, or . % of whom were ethnic Azeris. It was obvious that the number of Azeris in the country had increased. In rural areas, as well as in Nakhchevan autono- mous region and major cities, Azeris made up - % of the population on average. Their number was comparatively smaller only in the capital –  % of the city’s total population. The Karabakh conflict and the subsequent violent events, along with labour migration, led to serious structural changes among the Azeri population. As a result, women became the majority of the population (. %), while more Azeris moved to larger urban areas of the country (. %). The outflow of the Russian-speaking popula- tion from the country led to there being an increased number of Azeris who spoke their native language: their number grew from . % in  to . % in . Only , Azerbaijani citizens (. %) considered Russian their mother tongue. The socio-political processes that occurred in Azerbaijan in the late s and early s significantly increased the exodus of Russians from the republic. The war with Armenia, deployment of the Russian troops in Baku in , internal political instability, economic crisis, a drastic decrease in Russian language usage and growing psychological discomfort led to the isolation of ethnic Russians from political develop- ments in the country during the early years following independence. The  census demonstrated that the number of Russians during these nine years had decreased three times – their population at present totals ,, or only . % of the country’s popula- tion. However, due to their number, Russians still play a significant role in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, there are alarming factors as well: there is a significant gender misbalance in the local Russian community, where Russian men make up only  % of the popula- tion, as opposed to the  % of women. People of a more senior age are the majority – the average age is , while that of the other ethnic groups ranges over -. Currently, the overwhelming majority of Russians (. %) live in the cities, mainly in Baku ( %). By their number they constitute the second largest ethnic group in Baku (comprising . % of the population), Ganja (. %) and Sumgayit (. %). Predominantly, they are highly qualified engineers and technical specialists employed in governmental, scientific and educational institutions. This is explained by the fact that Russians make up  % of the total number of specialists with higher education in the country. Therefore, the ‘Russian factor’ is expected to play a significant role in the social life of the Azerbaijan republic. The majority of Russians in the rural regions reside in Ismail (. %), Khachmaz ( %), as well as in the Gedabey, Djalilabad and Geranboi districts of Azerbaijan. The prevalence of the other Slavic group in Azerbaijan, the Ukrainians, is rather insignificant – , Ukrainians lived in Azerbaijan at the time of the  census. Practically all of them live in the capital and only a very insignificant number reside in Sumgayit and other cities, as well as in other regions of the country. Their statisti- cal characteristics are rather similar to those of the Russians. However, their strong Russification is worth mentioning: only  % of them indicated that the Ukrainian language is their mother tongue, while  % feel that their native language is Russian. As mentioned above, the Karabakh conflict had its strongest impact on the Armenian community of Azerbaijan. However, it is highly incomprehensible how the

 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:00:39PM via free access Arif Yunusov census could be conducted and the number of Armenians determined with violent con- flict ongoing in the country. For quite a long time, the official Azerbaijani authorities claimed that between , and , Armenians resided in Azerbaijan beyond the conflict zone and the occupied territories. However, the  census demonstrated that almost , Armenians currently live in Azerbaijan. A more careful analysis of the statistical data, however, shows that the census refers to the Armenians staying in the occupied zones of the Azerbaijan Republic. Even this figure is too rough and clearly overestimated. The census data sometimes looks even comical: on the one hand, it is stated that , Armenians are children under  while, on the other, the same census results indicate that the average age of the Armenians in Azerbaijan is . In fact, the census covered only those Armenians who live outside the occupied territories in mixed families where these people on average are indeed older. Keeping in mind the data on Armenians living outside the occupied territories, it becomes clear that there are only  Armenians ( men and  women) left in Azerbaijan, the majority of whom ( people or  % of the Armenians’ total) stay in Baku, while the rest of them live in villages. In fact, the realistic number of Armenians should be a little bigger – per- haps ,-, – as many of them have changed their family names and were thus neglected by the census. The census data on the Caucasian ethnic groups in Azerbaijan is of special inter- est for researchers. These groups include the , Lezgins, Tsakhurs, Ingiloys, Cryzs, Udins, Budugs and Khinaligs (who have lived in the republic since ancient times), with the Lezgins playing a leading role in this group. They mainly live in the southeast of Azerbaijan in the basin of the Samur river, as well as on the eastern slopes of the Greater Caucasus Range. Right before the breakdown of the USSR, the Lezgins were the fourth biggest ethnic group in Azerbaijan after the Azeris, Russians and Armenians. In , their number totalled , or  % of the country’s population. These fig- ures were constantly disputed by the Lezgin nationalist movement leaders (Sadval in the Russian Federation and Samur in Azerbaijan), who brought up figures near- ing ,-,. Nevertheless, the  census showed that neither the Lezgin population nor their percentage ratio had changed significantly: the census registered , Lezgins who comprised . % of the country’s total population, although it is very unlikely that these data are close to the actual number of the Lezgin popula- tion. Ethnographic research conducted by the Institute of Peace and Democracy in the northeastern regions of the country in - showed that the number of Lezgins in Azerbijan ranges between , and , people.9 One way or another, the Lezgins, according to the  census data, have grown into the second biggest ethnic group in today’s Azerbaijan. The majority of Lezgins (. %) live in Gusar district, where they constitute the absolute majority of the rayon’s population (. %). . % live in the capital, while the majority (. %) stay in rural regions. The census dem- onstrated that the majority of Lezgins are able-bodied citizens between the ages of  and  (. %). . % are under the legal age of adulthood, which raises favourable demographic prospects for this people – the average age of the Lezgins is .

 See Arif Yunusov, “Ethno-demographic Processes in the South Caucasus during Post- Soviet Period”,  Caucasus Collect (Moscow, Russian Panorama, ), at  (in Russian language).

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The Avars are the biggest ethnic community after the Azeris. They mostly dwell in the northwest of the country, in the Sheki-Zakatala zone. By the time of the  census, their number totalled ,. Over the last ten years, their number has remained practically unchanged and currently stands at , people or . % of the country’s population. They mainly live in Belakan ( %) and Zakatala ( %) districts, with the majority staying in villages (. %). Only . % of the Avars reside in urban areas. The Tsakhurs live in the same Sheki-Zakatala zone and are very closely related to the Lezgins in terms of language. In , , of them were registered, whereas ten years later their number had reached , people, or . % of the total country’s population at that time. Their major settlement areas are Zakatala ( %) and Gakh districts ( %). Like Avars, they are mostly villagers: a meagre  % live in the district centres of Zakatala and Gakh. Another ethnic group in the northwest of the country is the Ingiloys. This is a very interesting ethnicity from a scientific point of view. The specifics of their origin are still debated by researchers and much remains unclear. They are considered to be one of the oldest local ethnicities who, in early medieval times, accepted Christianity (its Georgian branch) and with time started to speak Georgian. Later on, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, local Georgian-speaking populations converted to Islam and were renamed ‘Ingiloys’, i.e. ‘proselytes’. After the conquering of Azerbaijan by the Russian Empire, many Ingiloys reconverted to Christianity. Today’s Muslim part of the Ingiloys identify themselves as Azeris while the Christians claim they are Georgians. Their habits and cultural features are similar in many aspects. The Ingiloys did not count as a separate ethnicity during the Soviet period and, therefore, were constantly neglected by the population censuses. Yet some sources claim there were as many as , Ingiloys in Azerbaijan in .10 The problem was that the majority were registered as Azeris while the minority counted as Georgians. By the  census, Azerbaijan had as many as , Georgians. With the exception of the , Georgians residing in Baku and Ganja, all Georgians live in provinces. Therefore we can call them Georgian-speaking Ingiloys who mainly live in rural regions, namely in Gakh (, people), Zakatala (, people) and Belakan districts (,). The Udins live eastwards from the Sheki-Zakatala zone, in the north of Azerbaijan, in Gabala and Oguz districts. They belong to the Gregorian branch of Christianity and this fact has had a serious effect on their culture and life, as the Armenians are affili- ated with the same confessional branch of Christianity. By the  census, there were , Udins in the USSR, , of whom lived in Azerbaijan, with their majority (,) residing in the village of Nidzh in Gabala district. This is why the Udins have always been trilingual, speaking Udin, Armenian and Azeri. After the inception of the Karabakh conflict, some Udins left the country and moved mainly to Russia. The  census registered , Udins in the village of Nidzh and some  of them in the Gakh rayon. The majority of Udins are rural residents. In the highlands, at the foot of Mount Shakhdag, in the Kuba district of Azerbaijan, a group of ethnicities known as ‘Shakhdags’ reside. These minor ethnic groups are Khinaligs, Budugs and Kryzs – residents of the villages of Khanalig, Budug and Kryz.

 Aliaga Mamaedov, “Certain Aspects of the Current Ethnic Situation in Azerbaijan”, () Central Asia and Caucasus (), at  (in Russian language).

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The Budugs also live in two more villages – Dali Gay and Guney Budug. The Kryzs stay in the villages of Alik, Djek and Gaput Ergydge. All these villages are located in remote mountainous areas. The Budug language is very similar to the Lezgin language, while the Khinalig language stands apart from all others, even though it belongs to the Caucasian group of languages. None of the censuses counted them, including the last one in , however their number is estimated at , people. The group of Persian/Iranian peoples includes basically the Tats, Kurds and Malishs. The Tat settlements are located in the northeast of Azerbaijan. Their language belongs to the Persian group and is very close to Farsi. The name of their ethnicity is of Turkic origin. Over the centuries, they split into three confessional groups: the majority accepted Islam and nowadays the Muslim Tats constitute the majority of the population in the villages of the Apsheron peninsula around Baku (they live in  of the  villages of the peninsula) and the Ismail district (villages of Lagidg, Baskal and Zarnava). Muslim Tats also live in Khyzy, Davachi, Guba and other districts. As a result of being neighbours for centuries, the Azeris and Muslim Tats both acquired each oth- er’s cultural and habitual similarities. The diffusion of the Azeri language among the Tats led to significant changes in their ethnic self-identification. Many of them have lost their language and ethnic identity, identifying themselves as Azeris. These changes were reflected in the results of all population censuses. Thus, in , the number of Tats in Azerbaijan stood at , people, while in  their registered number was reduced to ,. Right before the dissolution of the USSR, in , their official population totalled ,. Ten years later, in , only , people identified themselves as Tats, indicating that the language they used at home was the Tat language ( %) and the language they used in public was Azeri. The second group of Tats is comprised of those who accepted Judaism and who became referred to as ‘Mountainous Jews’. However, over the centuries they have been extensively mixing with the Jews and nowadays associate themselves with this ethnic group. As a result, the  census registered , Jews in Azerbaijan, , of whom were the so-called Mountainous Jews. They mostly lived in Guba district as well as in Gusar, Oguz, Khachmaz districts and Baku city. These figures, however, raised considerable doubts and the widespread estimate was that the total number of Jews, including the Tats, was no less than ,. According to the Jewish Sokhnut agency, , Jews had left Azerbaijan over the period -,11 i.e. more than the number of resident Jews ten years ago. Consequently, there should have been no Jews left in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the  census discovered , Jews, although this time the Jews had not been categorized and it was hard to detect how many of them were the Mountainous Jews. The third group of Tats comprise those who accepted the Gregorian branch of Christianity. They resided in the villages of Matrasa (Shemakha district) and Kilvar (Khachmaz district). During Soviet rule they had been practically Armenianized and fled after the inception of the Karabakh conflict, leaving the country for Russia. The far western edge of Azerbaijan had traditionally been populated by the Kurds. According to the  census, there were , of them. The Karabakh conflict

 “Black Sea Press”, Agency announcement (Tbilisi), dated  July ; Yejednevnie Novosti newspaper, (Baku),  January  (in Russian language).

 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:00:39PM via free access Ethnic Profile of Post-Soviet Azerbaijan brought the most radical changes to their lives: initially about , Muslim Kurds were deported from Armenia together with the Azeris. They resettled mainly among their compatriots in the Lachin, Kelbadjar, Gubadly and Zangelan districts. In - , all these districts were occupied by the Armenian army, turning the Kurds into forced migrants. Some of the Kurds who had fled from Armenia in - left the country in the early s and resettled in the North Caucasus. The others initially headed towards Baku (nearly  %), but later, as the political situation in the country stabilized, moved to Karabakh in considerable numbers (nearly  %), settling mainly in Agdjabedi district, which is currently around  % Kurd. By the  census, the total population of neared , people. In reality their number must have been larger: by several expert estimates their total population should be between , and , people.12 The Kurds have never been a majority except in the above- mentioned areas, being clearly outnumbered by the Azeris elsewhere. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, many Kurds spoke the Azeri language, which resulted in their rapid Azerbaijanization. The  census showed that only . % of the Kurds regarded Kurdish as their native language. This is the second lowest rate among the ethnicities of Azerbaijan after the Ukrainians, which in many aspects helps to explain the Kurd’s assimilation. The Talysh are settled in the southeastern part of Azerbaijan, mainly in the Lenkoran, Yardimly, Masalli, Lerik and Astara districts. Some of the Soviet censuses ignored their existence: in  their registered population totalled , people ( % of Azerbaijan’s population). The  census showed that their number increased to , citizens while,  years later, in , there were only  officially registered Talysh. In  and , they simply disappeared from the list of Soviet ethnicities, reappearing in the  census data totalling only ,, or . % of the country’s total population. Significant changes have occurred in Talysh self-identification over the last  years. Socio-political changes in the republic were reflected in the  census, which registered ,  Talysh residents ( %) in the republic. However, a larger number of their population seems to be more realistic: by our expert estimates, there are at least ,-, Talyshs in Azerbaijan. Primarily, they are rural residents (. %). Judging by the census data,  % of them reside in Masally district, whereas  % stay in Lenkoran district. The rest are settled in the Lerik, Astara and Yardimly districts. Apart from the mentioned areas the latest census registered their presence in the cities of Sumgayit and Baku. Finally, it is worth mentioning those belonging to the Turkic ethnic group, which include mainly the Azeris, as well as Tatars and Meskhetian Turks. The Tatar commu- nity comprised , citizens (. % of the total population) according to the  census data. The Tatar community started to form in Azerbaijan in the second half of the nineteenth century. Over the past decade, the number of Tatars has not changed and currently totals , people. The majority reside in Baku (,) and Sumgayit (), as well as in other cities. They have retained their native language and have good command of both the Azeri and Russian languages. Akhyska Turks or Meskhetian Turks, who are related to the Azeris in culture and language, were deported by Stalin’s decree from to the Middle Asian republics.

 Yunusov, “Ethno-demographic Processes …”, .

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After Stalin’s death, the  resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR allowed them to resettle in any of the Soviet republics except Georgia. That was when they first appeared in Azerbaijan, identifying themselves as Azeris. Later, in the s, they started arriving as ethnic Turks. The  census registered , Turks who mainly resided in rural areas ( %). An additional ,-, Turks lived in the country and were registered as ‘Azeris’. In the same year (), another influx of Turks brought them to Azerbaijan as refugees. At present, their total population has officially reached , people, registered as refugees from Uzbekistan. They have settled in rural areas, mainly in the Saatly and Sabirabad districts. According to the Turk’s organization Vatan there are over , Turks living in Azerbaijan. They have been categorized into two groups: those registered as ‘Turks’ or ‘Azeris’; and refugees.13 The  census clarified the issue of their numbers: , citizens of Azerbaijan (. % of the country’s total population) were registered as ethnic Turks. This time the census data showed that their number grew in cities (. %), although their majority (. %) still stayed in rural locations, mainly in the Saatly ( %), Sabirabad ( %) and Khachmaz ( %) districts, as well as in Beylagan, Davachi, Shamkir and other districts of the country.

IV. Interethnic Collisions in Present-day Azerbaijan Before the breakdown of the USSR, interethnic relations in Azerbaijan had not been overshadowed by any serious collisions. Even the Azeris – the indigenous people of Azerbaijan – did not identify themselves as the titular ethnicity. The USSR communists pursued their own ethnic policy, which envisaged the denationalization of non-Russian ethnic groups and their further assimilation into the Russian ethnos. Formally, this process was often referred to as the ‘flourishing and rapprochement of nations and peo- ples in achieving total unity’. To achieve this goal, a law, issued in , made national language studies at schools optional and nonobligatory. Parents now had to choose between Russian and non-Russian schools for their children. In practice, this led to the formation of the so-called ‘Russian-speaker’ strata among the USSR ethnicities. Other additional measures were taken to prevent the usage of ethnic/national languages in the Soviet republics. Nearly all official record keeping was carried out in Russian, even if there were no Russians in the area. The ‘Soviet Nation’ formation process was under way, which in fact represented nothing but the Russification of the USSR republics. Minor ethnicities primarily suffered from these policies: they were simply associated with bigger kindred ethnicities or titular nations. As a result of such policies, many smaller ethnicities of the Caucasian group had been reckoned among the Lezgins. At the same time, a process of ‘internationalization’ of titular nations (i.e. Russification) was proceeding simultaneously with this. Therefore, the Azeris suffered from these policies no less than the other ethnicities. Formally, the Russians were the second biggest ethnic group or the second titular ethnicity in Azerbaijan as well as in many other Soviet republics. For this reason, when Gorbachev declared the beginning of Perestroika in , the most acute problem turned out to be an ethnic issue and not political or economic

 See Arif Yunusov, Meskhetian Turks: Twice Deported People (Zaman, Baku, ), - (in Russian language).

 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:00:39PM via free access Ethnic Profile of Post-Soviet Azerbaijan problems. Azerbaijan was flooded by numerous organizations and associations focus- ing on the history and culture of the nation. In other words, this period witnessed the rapid growth of ethnic identity. For many reasons, these issues were foremost for Azeris at that time. The most frequently discussed issue during this period was: why do the Azeris, being the predominant ethnicity, have to speak and write in Russian? Why doesn’t the Azeri language occupy the place it deserves in its own republic? Why do the Azeris, in their significant numbers, prefer to study in Russian schools, especially in the capital? The Azerbaijan Communist party elite were unable to lead this process, as it mainly consisted of Russian-speaking Azeris, who had become isolated from the rest of the nation. The Karabakh conflict that erupted in  further aggravated these issues. Not only was the conflict with the Armenians imposed on the Azeris, but they also simul- taneously acquired a strong incentive for the restoration of their national identity. This process was particularly intensive among the so-called “Russian-speaker” Azeris, who tried to return to their ethnic roots. Growing violence in the Karabakh conflict and the influx of tens of thousands of refugees into the country and its capital rapidly trans- formed the situation. The majority of the refugees were rural residents who, at the end of the s and at the beginning of the s, created an unfavourable environment for the Russian-speaking Azeris, the majority of whom chose to leave for Russia. The situation was further aggravated after the National-Democratic movement – led by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA) – came to power in May . Democrats by their creed, but inexperienced in interethnic issues, the movement leaders created a mass of problems, which, even now, have not been eliminated. The policy of acceler- ated rapprochement with Turkey, the pan-Turkic slogans (“Only a Turk can be a Turk’s friend”, etc.) only served to scare the ethnic minorities and Russian-speaking Azeris away from the first National-Democratic government. In this respect, a highly negative role was played by the Law on Language, adopted by the Milli Medjlis (the parliament) of Azerbaijan on  December , according to which the Azeri language was renamed into ‘Turkic’, automatically turning all Azeris into ‘Turks’. Formally, the leaders of the national front were right – up until  both the language and the nation bore this title. However, over the past  years, very serious changes had taken place in the lives of the Azeri peoples – the emerging new genera- tion of people now identified themselves as the ‘Azeris’. Nevertheless, more important was that the Law was very unclear in defining such a sensitive issue as: does the term ‘Azeri’ imply being an ethnic Azeri or does it apply to all inhabitants of Azerbaijan?14 Up until then a significant part of Azerbaijan’s citizens, including Tats, Talyshs, Kurds and Lezgins, and especially those who lived in regions with an Azeri ethnic predomi- nance, have always considered themselves as to be ‘Azeris’ and have been registered as such in all the Soviet censuses. The law caused a radical change in the existing situation: it separated the titular/native ethnicity, or ‘Turks’, as they were then called, from the rest of Azerbaijan’s citizens – the ‘Azeris’, or many Muslim ethnicities of the repub- lic. Thus, by adopting the Law on Language, the Azeri national movement leaders

 Rauf Guseinov, “The Azerbaijan Republic in the Mirror of Poly-Ethnicity: History, Current Situation, Prognosis, Recommendations”, () The Central Asia and Caucasus (), -  (in Russian language).

 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:00:39PM via free access Arif Yunusov unintentionally promoted an upsurge of ethnic self-identification among minorities. In other words, the very slow process of self-identification among national minorities of Azerbaijan was strongly accelerated by the adoption of the Law on Language, which suggested the actual status of the minorities in the country. Consequently, all other measures taken by the government failed to have any effect on ethnic minorities. On  September , the president issued a decree on the “Protection of Rights and Freedoms” and on “State Support to the Development of Languages and Cultures of the National Minorities and Ethnic Groups of Azerbaijan”.15 Rather democratic in its contents and implications, this document continued to be overshadowed by the controversial Law on Language. It became clear that the Law on Language had been passed too hastily and had not been thought through. Not only national minorities, but also many Azeris were quite unprepared to accept the Law. In fact, the National-Democrats split the country’s society into supporters and opponents of the law. Similarly, even the Azerbaijani National Front (ANF) government’s rather important  decision on shifting from the Cyrillic alphabet to Latin caused a rather controversial public reaction and was perceived as a political decision aimed at the fur- ther integration of Azerbaijan into Turkey. All these events were taking place alongside the war with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh and rising tensions between the Azeri government and Russia and Iran. Other negative processes accompanied the emigration of the Russian population: national minorities started establishing organizations to seek ‘their own niche’ and retain their cultural and ethnic identity. The so-called ‘split ethnicities’ – such as Lezgins and Talysh – were particularly active. Autochthonous peoples who, due to various historical circum- stances, had been split in two parts between Russia and Azerbaijan (Lezgins) or Iran and Azerbaijan (Talysh) found themselves in opposition to the National-Democratic movement of Azerbaijan. They were the first among the ethnic minorities to create their own ethnic political parties in  and never concealed their negative attitude towards the PFA. The fact that these ethnic movements found strong support in Russia and Iran also played a role. An explicitly anti-Azeri secessionist organization Sadval was established in Russia, which aimed at the establishment of a Lezgistan state to be located on a certain part of the Azeri territory. The Talysh found support in Iran while Russia provided them with consider- able support as well. It is worth mentioning that the future Talysh leader, Aliakram Gumbatov, in - was one of the founders of the PFA and an active fighter against communist rule. It was he who in January  liquidated Soviet governance in Lenkoran district and for a long time fought for Azerbaijan’s independence. However, in , Gumbatov, while he was heading the Talysh movement, declared the estab- lishment of the Talysh-Mugan Autonomous Republic (TMAR) within Azerbaijan. The republic was declared to have its own state symbols and armed forces. Gumbatov declared himself a president of the self-proclaimed autonomous state. The PFA, which was in power between  and , encountered regular prob- lems with other nationalistic movements as well: instigated by the Armenians, the ‘Kurd

 The Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on  September , “On Protection Rights and Freedoms, State Support of Development of Language and Culture of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups Living in Azerbaijan”.

 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:00:39PM via free access Ethnic Profile of Post-Soviet Azerbaijan issue’ emerged on the political scene from time to time, although this contrivance failed to find any considerable support in Azerbaijan as Muslim Kurds were expelled from their lands in Armenia and Azerbaijan during - and bore negative feelings towards the Armenians. The Armenians attempted to establish an Armenian control- led ‘Kurdistan Republic’ on the occupied territory. However, these attempts regularly failed as the Kurd-Yezids residing in Armenia were reluctant to embark on shady enter- prises. Yet a certain proportion of the Muslim Kurds in Azerbaijan were not particularly excited by the pro-Turkish PFA leadership’s actions, which clearly raised secessionist inclinations among them. The rise to power of in the summer of  had been a logical consequence of the failure of the PFA’s rule. An experienced politician, Aliyev soon halted Gumbatov’s rebellion and arrested him, as well as many other Talysh activists. Gumbatov was sentenced to death, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. Both the Talysh and Lezgins parties were banned. At the same time, Aliyev initiated public discussions on changing the language and finally achieved the result that had been long awaited by many citizens: the law was repealed and the titular people and their language were renamed ‘Azeri’. A November  referendum approved the country’s new constitution, which came into force on  November. The Azeri language became a state language again. Other interethnic stabilization measures were taken as well: confessional institutes pertaining to all religious groups in Azerbaijan were reopened in the areas of compact minority settlements; native languages were reintroduced in elementary school curric- ula; syllabuses for minority schools were drawn up; and text books, newspapers, maga- zines and other printed publications were released in minority languages. Additionally, radio and TV programmes are regularly broadcast and amateur art/theatrical groups conduct regular performances in minority languages. Following the admission of Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe (CoE), closer attention was given to minority issues. Before entering the CoE, as early as  June , Azerbaijan accepted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) and agreed to join another fundamental convention on minority rights – the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. All these events, along with the restored political stability in the country, consid- erably improved the language situation in Azerbaijan. However, there had been many problems and alerting circumstances that served as a timely reminder of the fact that the recently achieved stability remains fragile and weak. In addition, the government is yet to elaborate a clear ethnic policy and, rather, tries to avoid solving the problematic issues by postponing them while the socioeconomic situation in the country continues to decline. The government’s inaction in addressing minority and interethnic issues may raise the prospect of aggravated consequences. The problems of Talyshs and Lezgins may easily re-emerge again, as the process of national revival among these ethnicities is on the rise. These ethnic groups possess native territories and maintain connections with their compatriots in Russia and Iran. On the other hand, it is more likely that the Azeri language will keep strengthen- ing its position in society while the Russian language will further lose its importance, which can lead to only one result: the Russian-speaking population will have to leave Azerbaijan, being unable to adjust to the new post-Soviet reality. These processes will

 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:00:39PM via free access Arif Yunusov particularly affect Russians, in the first place, but not only them. The ethnicities that entered Azerbaijan as a result of the Russian Empire’s ethnic policies may return to the countries of their original settlement. Armenians may be an exception; however, they will hardly be likely to decide to resettle in Azerbaijan anywhere outside Nagorno Karabakh in the near future. Thus, as a result of the democratic development of the national state, the Azeris will become the actual titular nation of the country, while Baku will turn from a cosmo- politan city into a truly national capital. Ethnic minorities residing in the country will have to adjust to these new realities. On the other hand, much will depend on the oppo- sition and titular nation dominating the country. In these circumstances, much depends on the course chosen by the country: whether it will opt for a return to authoritarian rule and plunge into inevitable ethnic collisions or embark on a course of democratic development of a state where minority rights will be observed and guaranteed not only on paper.

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