Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #1
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 1:50:42 PM Last Modified: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 1:57:00 PM Time Spent: 00:06:17 IP Address: 99.46.152.243
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Elections Systems and Software (ES&S): EVS 5.2.2.0
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Why only 2 to 3 days notice? A lot of people would have been able to come if they had had more notice, again why such a short notice?? Was this used to keep some of the people from being able to attend??? Carl Satterwhite
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Carl L Satterwhite
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province North Carolina
ZIP/Postal Code 27610
Phone Number 9192313328
1 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #2
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 2:01:57 PM Last Modified: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 2:04:52 PM Time Spent: 00:02:54 IP Address: 76.182.31.92
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
I would be very interested in attending, but I have to take my husband to an appointment at the VA Hospital.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Pauline Hoffmann
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27613
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
2 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #3
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:16:23 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:20:56 PM Time Spent: 00:04:32 IP Address: 99.173.129.35
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
You must include a paper ballot back up.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Shawn Slome
Company Twig Living
City/Town Chapel Hill
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27517
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9194911217
3 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #4
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:23:21 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:25:33 PM Time Spent: 00:02:12 IP Address: 136.56.20.252
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
I have no experience with voting equipment, but at this point it seems like paper ballots would be the clear choice to ensure security as well as a definitive record of the vote.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Laura Goodwin
City/Town Cary
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27513
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 919-342-5767
4 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #5
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:23:01 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:26:12 PM Time Spent: 00:03:10 IP Address: 96.10.157.34
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Fighting electronic voting tampering is very important. I favor paper ballot back up as well!
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Steve
Company Roberts
City/Town Wilm
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28401
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9106193675
5 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #6
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:29:23 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:32:24 PM Time Spent: 00:03:00 IP Address: 75.75.90.72
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Other (please specify): We now know empirically we need to return to PAPER BALLOTS.
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
To preserve the integrity of the entire voting concept in the minds of the voting public we need to return to PAPER BALLOTS. The faith of the voting public in the integrity of the vote is the only thing sustaining the republic.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name John Vanover
City/Town Traphill
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28685
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 3369098282
6 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #7
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:31:01 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:35:38 PM Time Spent: 00:04:36 IP Address: 24.40.128.54
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
The system we currently use in Durham is more secure than other electronic systems because it provides a paper trail directly filled out by the voter. This should be a minimum requirement for any voting technology considered by the state. Reject any and all systems that have the voter register their preference on a touch screen or with a computer mouse. This should be a no-brainer in terms of voting security. The voter fills out a paper ballot by filling in bubbles - no hanging chads or any question about the voter's intentions. The ballot is scanned into a secure lock box, providing the convenience of electronic counting as well as security in case a manual recount is needed. This system should be used statewide and country wide. Other more fully electronic systems may claim they are secure, but any computer system can be hacked. There is no such thing as absolute security.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Matthew Greenwolfe
City/Town Durham
State/Province North Carolina
ZIP/Postal Code 27705
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9193588199
7 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #8
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:39:59 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:41:11 PM Time Spent: 00:01:12 IP Address: 38.132.173.123
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Respondent skipped this question
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Use paper ballots only
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Robert Shore
Company Retired
City/Town Chartlotte
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28207-1617
Country Usa
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 7046502194
8 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #9
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:47:01 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 1:05:05 PM Time Spent: 00:18:03 IP Address: 104.169.167.97
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Computers have no place in a verifiable, democratic election process. Hand-counted paper ballots are the way to go. Computers can be programmed or hacked to manipulate the results of an election without a trace of wrong-doing.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Report on National Public Radio.docx (114KB)
Q4 Your contact information
Name Avram Friedman
Company The Canary Coalition
City/Town Sylva
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28779
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 8286313447
9 / 59 Report on National Public Radio: If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know?
A ballot scanner in New York City ahead of last November's election.
As new reports emerge about Russian-backed attempts to hack state and local election systems, U.S. officials are increasingly worried about how vulnerable American elections really are. While the officials say they see no evidence that any votes were tampered with, no one knows for sure.
Voters were assured repeatedly last year that foreign hackers couldn't manipulate votes because, with few exceptions, voting machines are not connected to the Internet. "So how do you hack something in cyberspace, when it's not in cyberspace?" Louisiana Secretary of State Tom Schedler said shortly before the 2016 election.
But even if most voting machines aren't connected to the Internet, says cybersecurity expert Jeremy Epstein, "they are connected to something that's connected to something that's connected to the Internet."
Politics
State And Local Officials Wary Of Federal Government's Election Security Efforts A recently leaked National Security Agency report on Russian hacking attempts has heightened concerns. According to the report, Russian intelligence services broke into an election software vendor's computer system and used the information it gained to send 122 election officials fake emails infected with malicious software. Bloomberg News reported Tuesday that Russia might have attempted to hack into election systems in up to 39 states.
While it's unclear if any of the recipients took the bait in the email attack, University of Michigan computer scientist Alex Halderman says it's just the kind of phishing campaign someone would launch if they wanted to manipulate votes.
"That's because before every election, the voting machines have to be programmed with the design of the ballots — what are the races, who are the candidates," says Halderman.
He notes that the programming is usually done on a computer in a central election office or by an outside vendor. The ballot program is then installed on individual voting machines with a removable memory card.
"So as a remote attacker, I can target an election management system, one of these ballot programming computers. If I can infect it with malicious software, I can have that malicious software spread to the individual machines on the memory cards, and then change votes on Election Day," says Halderman.
There's absolutely no evidence any of this happened in last year's election. But Halderman notes that some, or all, electronic voting machines in 14 states have no paper ballot backups that can be checked to make sure the electronic results are correct.
State and local election officials insist such an attack would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, because they've imposed tight security measures — including restrictions on who has access to voting equipment and repeated checks to make sure machines are working properly.
Still, Connecticut Election Director Peggy Reeves told a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine panel on Monday that many local election officials are ill-equipped to handle cybersecurity threats.
"Many of our towns actually have no local IT support," she said. "Seriously, they don't have an IT director in their town. They might have a consultant that they call on if they have an issue. So they look to us, but we're a pretty small division."
Reeves said the best protection against hackers is probably the fact that the nation's voting system is so decentralized, with different processes and equipment used in thousands of different locations.
Politics
Some Machines Are Flipping Votes, But That Doesn't Mean They're Rigged
Larry Norden, an election technology expert with the Brennan Center, agrees, but he's worried that hackers were laying the groundwork for more serious attacks when they probed voter registration databases, as Russia is accused of doing.
"This is a real threat," says Norden. "It's not going away, and if anything, foreign adversaries, even people at home, might be emboldened to do this more going forward. And to me it is a real call that we have to do more as soon as possible to secure these systems."
He and computer security experts, such as Halderman, think the best solution is to make sure all voting machines have paper records to back up the electronic results. They say states should also conduct audits after every election to make sure the electronic results match the paper ones. About half the states already do some audits, but Norden says most are inadequate.
• malicious software • 2016 election • voting machines • cybersecurity • Russia
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• • • Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #10
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 1:16:36 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 1:19:19 PM Time Spent: 00:02:42 IP Address: 24.163.63.32
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
I think it is critically important that any voting machine also collect the voters' paper ballots, so that votes can be hand counted if necessary (as we have had in Durham).
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Suzanne Edwards
City/Town Durham
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27712
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9196129794
10 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #11
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 1:25:06 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 1:27:10 PM Time Spent: 00:02:04 IP Address: 174.109.77.143
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
I want 100% assurance that all votes will be counted accurately, that a paper backup will always be maintained, and that no foreign or malicious actors can hack into the system or corrupt our voting process.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name W. Clinton McSherry
City/Town Durham
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27705
Country usa
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9192371103
11 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #12
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 1:46:18 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 1:49:52 PM Time Spent: 00:03:33 IP Address: 24.142.252.210
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
I grew up in Oregon where all ballots are mailed in. In addition to being hack proof, the paper mail in ballots significantly increase voter turnout and use comparison with voter registration signatures to prevent voter fraud. Based upon news about election hacking and low voter turnout I cannot in good conscience offer any support for any electronic voting machines.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Samuel Swire
City/Town Charlotte
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28270
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9715330808
12 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #13
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 2:24:19 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 2:25:47 PM Time Spent: 00:01:28 IP Address: 107.128.240.132
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Please ask all county election commissions to keep their paper ballots.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Deborah Compton
Company retired
City/Town Asheville
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28801
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 8282588322
13 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #14
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 3:41:40 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 3:49:48 PM Time Spent: 00:08:07 IP Address: 66.26.64.164
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
My Husband and I relocated to Johnston Cnty NC from Monroe Cnty PA. Monroe Cnty used Touchscreen voting, that system was paperless, no need to print or scan the ballots. None of the five vendors NC is considering offers that. Is there a reason NC is not looking at that Technology. It worked very well in rural & urban PA. Thank You.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Dorphine Galloway
City/Town Garner
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27529
Country Johnston
Email Address [email protected]
14 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #15
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 8:00:45 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 9:22:00 PM Time Spent: 01:21:15 IP Address: 98.122.149.169
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
The technical details on the voting systems are daunting, but I would like to comment that I prefer a non computer, paper based system such as that currently used in Wake county. If we go to computer based systems we will never be able to protect them from hacking.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Evelyn Durmaz
City/Town Cary
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27513
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9194671335
15 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #16
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Thursday, July 26, 2018 5:06:29 AM Last Modified: Thursday, July 26, 2018 5:09:21 AM Time Spent: 00:02:51 IP Address: 107.13.244.213
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Think long and hard before choosing a new system. Here in Wake County, the existing technology works fine and people are used to it. It is quite possible the Republicans are behind this in an attempt to confuse voters.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Larry Bliss
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27601-1065
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9192473692
16 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #17
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Thursday, July 26, 2018 10:02:54 AM Last Modified: Thursday, July 26, 2018 10:04:21 AM Time Spent: 00:01:26 IP Address: 108.196.36.247
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
They must not have any software such as PC Anywhere installed at any level of the computer system.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Terri Barmore
Company 1954
City/Town Salisbury
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28146
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9803303516
17 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #18
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Thursday, July 26, 2018 4:40:52 PM Last Modified: Thursday, July 26, 2018 4:46:24 PM Time Spent: 00:05:32 IP Address: 108.209.26.56
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
We demand machines with a paper ballot, NOT a touch screen machine. ANY touch screen machine runs on software that can hold malicious software that can change the vote in ways that cannot be detected since the software is proprietary. Most, if not all, of these machine companies are run by people with ties to the GOP that are compromised. We MUST use optical machines WITH paper ballots that can be hand counted.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name John Williams
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27606
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
18 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #19
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, July 27, 2018 5:26:07 AM Last Modified: Friday, July 27, 2018 5:29:47 AM Time Spent: 00:03:39 IP Address: 173.95.179.12
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Respondent skipped this question
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
All North Carolina voters deserve paper ballots that create a recoverable trail of votes instead of electronic ballots made on electronic voting machines that will always be vulnerable to hacking.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name M Back
City/Town Carrboro
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27510
Country USA
19 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #20
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, July 27, 2018 7:46:57 AM Last Modified: Friday, July 27, 2018 7:47:48 AM Time Spent: 00:00:51 IP Address: 45.37.75.231
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Please ensure paper ballots will be accepted by all devices.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Ben Baker
City/Town DURHAM
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27713-1874
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 2152192382
20 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #21
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, July 27, 2018 11:09:36 AM Last Modified: Friday, July 27, 2018 11:13:34 AM Time Spent: 00:03:57 IP Address: 174.81.115.76
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Please provide NC voters with mailable physical paper ballots. I do not have confidence in the voter machines that can be hacked and or changed via internet connection. Paper ballots that can be physically counted are necessary to renew confidence in NC voting.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Bette Ellen Willis
City/Town Wilmington
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28400
Country NH
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9106207227
21 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #22
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, July 27, 2018 6:44:12 PM Last Modified: Friday, July 27, 2018 6:45:29 PM Time Spent: 00:01:17 IP Address: 162.200.205.112
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Make sure all equipment is able to be verified and double checked for accuracy and hacker proof above all.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Cheryl McGraw
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27606
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9196127311
22 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #23
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, July 27, 2018 9:33:26 PM Last Modified: Friday, July 27, 2018 9:35:52 PM Time Spent: 00:02:25 IP Address: 136.56.1.202
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
All machines must provide a paper trail. Machines need to be audited against paper votes PRIOR to any election result being approved.
(Much concern about machine hacking).
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Joe Bearden
Company N/A
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27612
Country WAKE
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9198449050
23 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #24
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, July 27, 2018 10:01:54 PM Last Modified: Friday, July 27, 2018 10:03:29 PM Time Spent: 00:01:34 IP Address: 24.148.164.81
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Please provide your voters with paper ballots. Most secure of all.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Terry Prichard
City/Town Cary
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27519
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9194348581
24 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #25
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 6:25:31 AM Last Modified: Saturday, July 28, 2018 6:30:00 AM Time Spent: 00:04:28 IP Address: 208.104.140.36
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
I support as necessary up-to-date voting equipment that can’t be hacked as critical to protecting our elections infrastructure. I encourage you to certify enough equipment so that county BoE's can begin purchasing equipment that will ensure the security of our voting.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Peter Anderson
City/Town Brevard
State/Province North Carolina
ZIP/Postal Code 28712
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 8288772137
25 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #26
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 8:42:34 AM Last Modified: Saturday, July 28, 2018 8:51:50 AM Time Spent: 00:09:15 IP Address: 108.65.57.85
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
There are serious concerns with respect to any touchscreen voting machines and also with election management software some of these companies provide. It has been reported that ES&S has not been willing to appear before Congress to answer questions about security issues with their software. Paper ballots would be preferable/more secure. Other countries have returned to paper ballots for security reasons and some states in US are doing the same. NC should as well.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Sabra Leary
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province Nc
ZIP/Postal Code 27609
Country Us
26 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #27
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 10:22:08 AM Last Modified: Saturday, July 28, 2018 10:26:20 AM Time Spent: 00:04:12 IP Address: 173.95.175.159
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
There needs to be a paper trail. I like the current system in Wake County. It’s simple to fill out, lets me easily review my ballot, lets me watch as my ballot is read.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Ken McAdams
City/Town Apex
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27523
Country USA
27 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #28
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 12:20:22 PM Last Modified: Saturday, July 28, 2018 12:24:33 PM Time Spent: 00:04:11 IP Address: 162.224.116.52
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Miami-Dade County in Miami has been using electronic voting machines for years. I’ve used the equipment without any problems.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name DJennings
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27609
Country U.S.A.
Email Address [email protected]
28 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #29
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 1:42:22 PM Last Modified: Saturday, July 28, 2018 1:44:12 PM Time Spent: 00:01:49 IP Address: 99.111.154.184
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Paper ballots/scantron allow for safety and a permanent record of all votes taken. This system makes manipulation and hacking difficult. Do not move away from these systems.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Eric Page
City/Town CARY
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27511
Country United States
29 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #30
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 5:57:52 PM Last Modified: Saturday, July 28, 2018 5:59:32 PM Time Spent: 00:01:39 IP Address: 75.60.245.157
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Elections Systems and Software (ES&S): EVS 5.2.2.0
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Please ensure that the systems are intuitive for all to use and that paper ballots continue to be the process.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Dorothy Raynes
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27612
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9193491570
30 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #31
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 8:56:34 PM Last Modified: Saturday, July 28, 2018 8:58:24 PM Time Spent: 00:01:50 IP Address: 192.171.29.104
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This is just a general comment. No matter what technology is used to track the ballot, I prefer to submit a paper ballet rather than an electronic one.
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Q4 Your contact information
Name n/a
City/Town garner
State/Province nc
ZIP/Postal Code 27529
Country usa
31 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #32
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 10:33:07 PM Last Modified: Saturday, July 28, 2018 10:36:14 PM Time Spent: 00:03:06 IP Address: 172.74.53.42
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If paper recounts are still the gold standard of determining voter intent, why are we using anything other than paper???
If we need more people to count paper, use state employees to work the polls and certify counts. They're already being compensated for service to the state.
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Q4 Your contact information
Name lucy
City/Town raleigh
State/Province nc
ZIP/Postal Code 27601
32 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #33
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Sunday, July 29, 2018 4:26:15 PM Last Modified: Sunday, July 29, 2018 4:27:24 PM Time Spent: 00:01:08 IP Address: 107.77.253.6
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A paper ballot is essential
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Susan Conder
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27613
33 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #34
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Sunday, July 29, 2018 6:08:59 PM Last Modified: Sunday, July 29, 2018 6:18:04 PM Time Spent: 00:09:05 IP Address: 65.190.19.193
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Any system under consideration MUST consist of a paper ballot marked personally by the voter as the key legal document for voting. Any and all automation can be concentrated on tabulation of the results.
This is consistent with the recommendations of professional societies associated with computing and computer systems such as IEEE and ACM and as a software professional (retired) it is my strong recommendation as well.
Under no circumstances should machine or computer systems be the sole or the primary source of truth as to a voter's intentions.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name David Lee Griffin
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27615
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number +1 919-271-6450
34 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #35
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Sunday, July 29, 2018 6:13:12 PM Last Modified: Sunday, July 29, 2018 6:22:27 PM Time Spent: 00:09:15 IP Address: 24.136.155.21
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Should have paper trail for each ballot!
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Albert Edward Corpening
City/Town Mr Holly
State/Province NORTH CAROLINA (NC)
ZIP/Postal Code 28120
Country Gaston
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 7046162965
35 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #36
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, July 30, 2018 6:56:49 AM Last Modified: Monday, July 30, 2018 6:59:30 AM Time Spent: 00:02:40 IP Address: 71.69.226.243
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It is of highest importance to have a paper trail and be tamper proof.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Christine Mills
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27612
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9195238285
36 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #37
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, July 30, 2018 7:40:27 AM Last Modified: Monday, July 30, 2018 7:44:13 AM Time Spent: 00:03:46 IP Address: 69.132.114.177
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Understand why you openned to the public in a Raleigh, NC area location but would have been nice to do a travel approached across the state so public feedback from both rural and urban could be collected. I am hoping representatives with Mecklenburg BOE traveled to this event.
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Q4 Your contact information
Name Allison Binder
City/Town Charlotte
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28215
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 7049534977
37 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #38
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, July 30, 2018 7:56:37 AM Last Modified: Monday, July 30, 2018 8:00:32 AM Time Spent: 00:03:55 IP Address: 96.10.77.220
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Our current system is the best. Voters mark paper ballots to be scanned. Any new system MUST have paper backup. Voters must be able to see the paper back up if voting digitally, otherwise it is not really back up if the vote can be changed in real time. So many states need new systems, but time and time again, election experts say the type of system NC has is the most safe.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Michael Sutton
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province North Carolina
ZIP/Postal Code 27605
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9198326658
38 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #39
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, July 30, 2018 9:20:33 AM Last Modified: Monday, July 30, 2018 9:25:49 AM Time Spent: 00:05:15 IP Address: 24.211.143.145
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39 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment
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July 28, 2018 Dear State Board of Elections committee,
Thank you for providing a way to express my opinion about new technology and machines for voting.
My name is Joe Capowski from Chapel Hill. I am a former town council member and Mayor pro tem of Chapel Hill. I am also a computer-design engineer who has spent a career designing and programming computers, as well as teaching computer science at UNC. Hence I have a keen interest in the integrity and mechanisms of elections.
Every scientist and engineer knows that for any study, the original data must be kept, intact and unchanged, in case the study be challenged. For elections, which are frequently challenged, the original data are the votes of each voter, not simply counts of votes.
Any system in which the votes are stored via software is vulnerable. Our Orange County system is excellent; voters mark their choices with an ink pen on thin cardboard ballots, scanners read the votes, and the ballots fall into a bin, which is saved. No software has the potential to change the original data. This is a low-tech solution that works!
Computer scientists unfailingly believe that the solution to any technological problem is more technology -- one more layer of software, and all the problems will be solved. The reality is that the resulting system becomes complex and error-prone to use, as well as vulnerable to outside hacks. By contrast, engineers are trained in the acronym KISS, keep it simple, stupid. Low-tech simplicity does work! I find it quite interesting that the computer engineers that I know -- almost to a person -- believe that voting should not be done using sophisticated, internet- connected computers.
Please choose low-tech, manual systems to store our votes, and minimize internet-connected machines to transmit results from precincts to higher-level centers.
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40 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment
Q4 Your contact information
Name Joe Capowski
Company UNC Retired
City/Town Chapel Hill
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27516
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 919-929-1670
41 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #40
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, July 30, 2018 12:02:36 PM Last Modified: Monday, July 30, 2018 12:05:03 PM Time Spent: 00:02:26 IP Address: 40.140.216.131
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I am opposed to any voting machines with any electronic component. We need a paper trail and paper count to ensure confidence. I have worked in computer security for decades and I know there is absolutely no way to 100% secure electronic voting machines. I am glad to have my tax money spent to pay real people to count my paper ballot.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Duke Williams
City/Town Durham
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27705
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9197405035
42 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #41
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, July 30, 2018 2:05:05 PM Last Modified: Monday, July 30, 2018 2:07:09 PM Time Spent: 00:02:04 IP Address: 149.168.132.23
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Why not take them to DefCon in Vegas next week to see how secure they really are... Then if they are not broken down to pieces then you can at least say you have attempted to find their flaws.
If you dont report publically these results, then you will have failed to be 100% open about known shortcomings of these types of systems!
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Q4 Your contact information
Name John
Company asdf
City/Town asdf
State/Province sadf
ZIP/Postal Code asdf
Country asdf
Email Address asdf
Phone Number asdf
43 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #42
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, July 30, 2018 8:57:33 PM Last Modified: Monday, July 30, 2018 9:09:12 PM Time Spent: 00:11:39 IP Address: 108.65.60.12
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Do not eliminate the paper ballot. Electronic voting is not secure and easily tampered with. Venezuela for example has electronic voting and look how well that works.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Barack
Company Obama
City/Town Washington
State/Province DC
ZIP/Postal Code 00000
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 666 1234567
44 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #43
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Tuesday, July 31, 2018 3:28:05 PM Last Modified: Tuesday, July 31, 2018 3:31:15 PM Time Spent: 00:03:09 IP Address: 38.111.137.130
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I would like the NCSBE to consider allowing counties to maintain current voting machines if they are still functional, secure, and easy for voters to use. Specifically, I prefer the touch-screen machines currently used for Alamance County elections to many of the proposed options under consideration.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Jonathan Holt
City/Town Graham
State/Province North Carolina
ZIP/Postal Code 27253
Country United States of America
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 336-264-6931
45 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #44
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 12:50:04 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 1:02:06 PM Time Spent: 00:12:01 IP Address: 149.168.241.4
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The Constitution DEMANDS that the original mark of the voter be recorded, and available for a recount. Any digital optical/magnetic media recording FAILS that test, and should be rejected as a matter of common sense. Also, forms which record the intent of the voter IN HIS/HER ORIGINAL MARK, besides being the ONLY true witness of the vote, can continue to be used in a power failure and tallied by hand if absolutely necessary. Otherwise, visual scanners tabulating these forms, which are in use already, are the best machine out there - why try to change it. Let's not get bamboozled into thinking we need a huge investment in BLACKBOX HACKABLE, POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT voting systems. Blackbox systems in other states at first had no visually verifiable recording of the vote WHATSOEVER; later the CONMEN who would seek to manipulate the vote came up with the "toilet paper roll" so-called copy of the vote. Then it was discovered that the toilet paper roll could still be beset by fraud, because it WAS NOT A RECORD OF THE ORIGINAL MARK. And because it was digitally printed, a fake duplicate could easily be produced. Continue to use printed bubble forms, and we could even encourage voters to make a unique mark only to them in a comment area on the form to assist should a recount be ordained.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Brian Schoenwandt
Company State of NC
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27606
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9737147830
46 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #45
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 2:14:29 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 2:23:19 PM Time Spent: 00:08:49 IP Address: 99.3.64.39
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What a stupid waste of money for electronic voting machines! Stay with the existing printed ballots, which only require ONE piece of fairly low-technology scanner equipment per voting place that can be used instead of DOZENS of expensive voting machines, each of which has to be carefully maintained. So expect it to take MUCH MUCH longer to vote (due to the limited number of new voting machines), and constant expensive upgrades. Why do this? Why does it HAVE to be all electronic, for something that we use about once a year, for about 5 minutes? Is it Republicans or Democrats that think that spending money on this (versus other priorities) is justified?
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name J. Knott
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27607
47 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #46
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, July 28, 2018 6:56:42 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 4:57:35 PM Time Spent: Over a day IP Address: 24.211.150.61
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It is imperative that we use hand marked paper ballots. This is the most secure way to protect our election integrity. Dominion and ES&S have both been shown to be insecure systems.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Jennifer A McMillan
City/Town Carrboro
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27510
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9192603193
48 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #47
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 8:41:35 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 8:56:12 PM Time Spent: 00:14:36 IP Address: 172.127.23.18
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Elections Systems and Software (ES&S): EVS 5.2.2.0
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
The ESS ExpressVote (where the candidates are on the screen and the machine prints out a small paper ballot) is dangerous for the following reasons: 1)there are too many opportunities for error in the ballot that is printed regardless of their assurances that the voter can confirm every choice, 2)It would be a VERY LONG process for many of our voters - taking much more time than we can afford, 3) although they said we could just use our paper ballots as always, they are very clearly slanted toward the ExpressVote was of doing things, 4) cost - it's very expensive to put an ExpressVote terminal in every polling booth and that is exactly what there will be pressure to do. Bad Choice.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Nancy F Moxley
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27612
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9198109786
49 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #48
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 9:12:26 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, August 01, 2018 9:16:23 PM Time Spent: 00:03:56 IP Address: 172.127.23.18
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Dominion Voting Systems: D-Suite 5.5- NC
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Dominion would be my first choice. It wasn’t fussy. It was clearly a paper ballot based system. It has a large user base among other states. Engineered simplicity says it best.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Nancy Forsythe Moxley
Company Retired systems designer
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province Nc
ZIP/Postal Code 27612
Country Wake
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9198109786
50 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #49
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, August 04, 2018 2:18:36 PM Last Modified: Saturday, August 04, 2018 2:46:17 PM Time Spent: 00:27:40 IP Address: 99.3.174.159
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Dominion Voting--has audio ballot capability and can operate in many languages; has optical scan voting devices voters with varying abilities can navigate to complete a paper ballot; has ultrasonic multi-feed detector which prevents the device from accepting more than one ballot at a time. Hart Intercivic--has audio tactile interface (ATI); can use any scanner; many easy to use and set-up features. Clear Ballot--has intuitive user interface, operates on unmodified off-the-shelf touchscreen computers, very budget conscious, might be good for low-budget counties. ES&S--many strong physical safety features, uses ExpressVote which maintains verifiable paper vote records for every voter, records contain both human readable selections and machine readable barcodes for the same vote selections.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Helen Cleereman
City/Town Garner
State/Province North Carolina
ZIP/Postal Code 27529
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9196621751
51 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #50
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, August 06, 2018 3:09:15 PM Last Modified: Monday, August 06, 2018 4:17:41 PM Time Spent: 01:08:26 IP Address: 172.125.169.88
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Elections Systems and Software (ES&S): EVS 5.2.2.0
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Following the advent of electronic vote tabulation machines across the US., we find that exit polls are now dismissed out of hand and are said to be no longer reliable as accurate indicators of election outcomes. However, prior to the advent of these electronic vote tabulation machines, exit polls had a proven history of accurately predicting election results 100% of the time. To date, there have been no fact based explanations nor definitive investigations concluded as to why such discrepancies between election outcomes and exit polls are now suddenly occurring time after time. Furthermore, Proprietary Trade Laws prohibit independent verification not only of the vote tabulation machine's accuracy, but also of the various potential software applications within the machines framework. As such, it would seem prudent that random hand recounts of a percentage of all precincts is absolutely essential in order to verify and ensure that these electronic vote tabulation machines are accurately recording our vote totals - as a matter of fact, the preservation of our representative form of government demands such actions. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mb4ezy/top-voti
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Edward Barnard
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC.
ZIP/Postal Code 27603
Country US.
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 919 412 1272
52 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #51
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Tuesday, August 07, 2018 12:15:35 PM Last Modified: Tuesday, August 07, 2018 12:40:55 PM Time Spent: 00:25:19 IP Address: 174.109.248.203
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I believe that the low tech method we have been using is the safest. Color in the ovals next to your choices, place in the ballot-taking machine, take your 'I Voted" sticker and leave. I see digital options confusing people who may not be comfortable with computers at all; perplexing if one makes an error and wishes to correct that error - sometimes digital directions can be open for interpretation! Maybe a tap on a screen isn't hard enough - any number of things can go wrong. Perhaps some way to secure the ballot-taking machine would be in order. I vote for pen and paper.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Suzanne Krill
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27615
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9198474702
53 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #52
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, August 08, 2018 10:54:06 AM Last Modified: Wednesday, August 08, 2018 11:06:44 AM Time Spent: 00:12:37 IP Address: 65.184.53.133
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Irregular Electronic Voting Machines in NC is second to gerrymandered districts responsible for the minority party having a strangle hold on our government. The hacks, cheats & cons wouldn't have a chance if the election process were secure & fair. Until computer systems and control of Source Code is perfected, use the proven way to count each and every vote accurately. Paper Ballots & Optical Readers meet all fair election criteria. http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/344488-hackers-break-into-voting-machines-in-minutes-at-hacking-competition
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name Esther Murphy
City/Town Wilmington
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28411
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9108218234
54 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #53
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, August 10, 2018 4:17:50 PM Last Modified: Friday, August 10, 2018 6:13:01 PM Time Spent: 01:55:10 IP Address: 98.101.36.92
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Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
Please see attached comment from Democracy North Carolina.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Democracy NC Comment on Voting Systems Certification 8-10-18.pdf (409.7KB)
Q4 Your contact information
Name Tomas Lopez
Company Democracy North Carolina
City/Town Durham
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27705
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9192866000
55 / 59
Comment on Voting Systems Certification Submitted to the North Carolina State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement August 10, 2018
Democracy North Carolina submits this comment to offer input on the state’s current voting systems certification process. As set forth below, we urge the State Board to support county election officials in holding system vendors accountable to their role in ensuring election security, particularly by integrating vendor security practices into voting system Requests for Proposals (RFPs) and contracts.
Democracy North Carolina is a nonpartisan organization that works to protect the right to vote, reduce the role of money in politics, and advance fair redistricting in our state. As part of this work, we author original research on election administration, advocate for specific policies and practices before the State Board and county boards of elections, and help coordinate a statewide nonpartisan poll monitoring and voter assistance network. We advocate for policies and practices that ensure both widespread voting access, including for historically underrepresented voters, and secure elections. The certification, selection, and maintenance of voting equipment are critical components of election administration and for inspiring public confidence in the voting process. We are therefore pleased that the State Board has advanced the certification process for new voting systems.
While others may have specific comments on the systems awaiting certification, we wish to lift up the critical role that systems vendors will play in election security, and to urge the State Board and county boards of elections to integrate vendor security into voting system Requests for Proposals (RFPs) and contracts. This is important because vendors, like governments, are known targets by foreign actors seeking to interfere in American elections. In 2016, hackers from Russia’s military intelligence agency breached an election vendor believed to have been VR Systems, an equipment manufacturer that produces electronic pollbooks (as distinct from ballot-casting equipment) used in parts of North Carolina.1 The companies who produce and maintain systems deserve close scrutiny. More recently, federal investigators discovered that a Maryland voting machines vendor was financed by a firm whose lead investor is a Russian oligarch.2 These incidents underscore the fact that while secure equipment is necessary for secure elections, secure practices around that equipment are just as important. The state’s ability to withdraw vendor certification is a valuable step forward. This should be paired with preventative steps in the RFP and contracting process.
The Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs offers guidance for election officials in its State and Local Election Cybersecurity Playbook.3 As to contracting in particular, the Belfer Center recommends that election officials:
1 Jeffrey Schweers, ‘Poked and Prodded:’ How the Russians nearly hacked the 2016 Florida election, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Aug. 9, 2018, https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2018/08/09/florida-election-system-wasnt-hacked-but- poked-and-prodded/899410002/. 2 Ovetta Wiggins, Election system firm with Maryland contract has ties to Russian Oligarch, FBI tells state, WASH. POST, July 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/marylands-election-system-tied-to-russian-oligarch-fbi- tells-state/2018/07/13/89b8ce56-86fa-11e8-8f6c-46cb43e3f306_story.html. 3 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, THE STATE AND LOCAL ELECTION CYBERSECURITY PLAYBOOK 49-52 (2018), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/StateLocalPlaybook%201.1.pdf. Assess the vendor’s organizational security practices, capacity to collaborate with officials on preventive and reactive measures, and ability to maintain safeguards in the face of evolving threats; Integrate specific security requirements into contracts and RFPs, including mandates that bidders detail how data will be processed and encrypted, and how they will manage User Access Management in a manner that ensures only the minimum level of access for a user to perform their job; Establish transparency requirements that allow officials to audit vendor security practices, access and review vendor-created code, and allow state or third-party testing in exchange for Non-Disclosure Agreements.
Proposed federal legislation also offers potential guidance. The Election Vendor Security Act (H.R. 6435) proposes, among other measures, to require vendors to disclose the sourcing of any voting system components from outside the United States, and to report any cybersecurity incidents within 10 days of their occurrence.
The State Board’s progress toward making new equipment available is important, but more work remains. As officials consider potential voting systems at the county level, it is important that they weigh security not only as part of the system itself, but as part of the ongoing relationship they will have with the system vendor. As the State Board continues to support county officials in their systems acquisition processes, it should integrate RFP and contracting practices into those support efforts.
Officials, advocates, and everyday voters alike agree that voting systems are central to election security. The certification of new systems presents a major opportunity for progress which must be backed by resources to acquire new systems, and support for and from election officials. But system vendors have a role to play in ensuring security, as well, and we urge election officials to make sure those vendors are held accountable for doing so.
Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #54
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, August 10, 2018 9:56:59 PM Last Modified: Friday, August 10, 2018 10:21:09 PM Time Spent: 00:24:10 IP Address: 24.136.136.106
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below
My comments are many and lengthy - they are included in the PDF document I am sharing here
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
2018.08.10 Telesca SBOE public comments.pdf (164.9KB)
Q4 Your contact information
Name Christopher Jon Telesca
Company Wake Coalition for Verified Voting
City/Town Raleigh
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27615
Country US
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9193682847
56 / 59 August 10, 2018 7021 Tanbark Way Raleigh, NC 27615 [email protected] 919-368-2847
To the Members and staff of the NC State Board of Elections and Ethics:
My name is Chris Telesca, and I am the founder of the Wake Coalition for Verified Voting. I am still a member of the NC Coalition of Verified Voting that helped pass the Public Confidence in Elections Act back in 2005, and worked to preserve the law and our tough standards for election systems and voting machines. After passage of the law, focus shifted away from the counties around the state to focus on what happened in Raleigh at the State Board. Since it was easier to do the work based in Raleigh, and many of our verified voting activists were located here, I founded the Wake Coalition for Verified Voting in 2007. A resume of my verified voting work follows my public comments for SBOE regarding the new Voting Systems and Vendors.
I have written two op-ed pieces on verified voting (one in 2011 and another in July 2018) that have been published in the N&O urging North Carolina to keep high standards for our election systems. I attended the SBOE meeting on July 27, and here are my public comments:
1). Observations on the actual July meeting:
The room was too small for even 4 groups – couldn’t imagine fitting 5 vendors. It made it very difficult if not impossible to actually talk to the vendor reps about their gear much less their financial status. And very few had set up their equipment EXACTLY like you’d find it when you went to go vote.
You really should have had each vendor in a separate room with their gear set up on exactly the same type of tables, stands, voting booths that would be used at early voting or at the precincts.
2). Vendor Certification
Back in 2006, the SBOE sent out a request for bids (or whatever it was called), and only one company (ES&S) could fully comply with the requirements. None of the others wanted to post a bond, open an office and hire staff in the state, submit source code for escrow, etc - so a few of them asked for a kind of conditional certification. That meant that they'd be conditionally certified to sell their election systems in NC, and wouldn't have to post the bond, hire a staff or open an office in NC until/unless they sold enough products to make it worth their while.
Is the same thing going on now in 2018 under section 3.12?
3.1.2 Presently Certified Products Products already certified by the State Board at the time of its adoption of this Program, and which have not since been modified or decertified will be considered provisionally certified for a period of twelve (12) months, except that any such vendor must within three (3) months post a bond and/or submit an approved letter of credit and/or place source code and documentation described in this Program into escrow, accompanied by transmission of application documentation required under this Program. Provisional certification described in this paragraph is intended to allow Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 1 existing vendors to meet all certification requirements of this Program and does not certify systems otherwise not permitted under state law.
When are the new vendors required to post a bond (under 3.3.4.1), escrow their firmware and software (3.3.4.10), have their CEO sign the affidavit that sends them to jail potentially, and open a working NC office? Will the State Board conditionally certify vendors to sell their products in NC before they are required to do these things?
3). Vendor Financial Health
Ranking my choices, this is actually my number two concern right behind the verified voting aspects. The financial health of the voting machine companies is something that I've been concerned about.
Have all the vendors complied with "Section 3.5.1.5 - Corporate Information" yet? I have asked the SBOE staff about vendor health and have received no answers. This worries me.
3.5.1.5 Corporate Information The manufacturer must submit to the State Board the corporate information as detailed below with each item clearly identified. If the corporate information is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. The corporate information shall contain the following items: 1. History and description of the business including year established, products and services offered, areas served, branch offices and subsidiary and/or parent companies. 2. Management and staff organization, number of full time employees by category, number of part-time employees by category, resumes of key employees who will assist North Carolina localities in acquiring the system if it is authorized for use. 3. Audited Report of the business’ most current fiscal year. Multiple reports may need to be submitted, depending on the business’ fiscal calendar and the length of time to complete the certification process. The certification process may take as long as a year. 4. Comfort letter from the business’ primary bank. If the business uses more than one bank, a letter from each bank is required. 5. Financial history of the business including a financial statement for the past three (3) fiscal years. If the manufacturer is not the manufacturer of the equipment for which application is made, a financial statement for the vendor for the past three (3) fiscal years shall be included. 6. Gross sales in voting products and services for the past three (3) years and the percent that is representative of the total sales of the business and its subsidiaries.
Originally there were 5 vendors, but one dropped out. Rumor has it that they didn’t want to post what SBOE staffers unofficially told me is now a $17 million bond. Now we are down to 4 –and three of those companies are funded/owned by either a hedge fund or venture capital fund.
Clear Ballot is VC backed and just got an $18 million round of financing. $18 million in venture capital? That’s slightly more than the bond they will have to put up to do business in NC.
Dominion is a Canadian company which bought Premier (formerly known as Diebold) from ES&S after DOJ required sale, also bought Sequoia. In mid July 2018, Dominion Voting
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 2 Systems announced that it has been acquired by its management team and Staple Street Capital – a New York-based, middle-market private equity firm.
On their web page, State Street admits to the following typical transaction types which include: corporate carve-outs of orphaned divisions, corporate divestitures, acquisitions of family-owned businesses, public-to-privates of undersized public companies, operationally-challenged businesses, restructurings and recapitalizations.
In addition to their Canadian ownership, Dominion Voting Systems (DVS) also has an office in Belgrade, Serbia. See my concerns about foreign ownership lower down.
Hart InterCivic is owned by H.I.G. Capital which is a hedge fund started by former Bain Capital employee with ties to political candidate Mitt Romney. No idea which part of HIG owns Hart. It might be easy to figure out via process of elimination – but what are the terms of the finance/ownership agreement for Hart – and for the other two? Who at SBOE will be evaluating these agreements?
They’ve had their certification revoked in at least one state, due to technical but not financial issues. But this is something to consider with the bond.
Unisyn was in the running until shortly before the meeting. Unisyn is owned by International Lottery & Totalizator Systems (ILTS) is a leading manufacturer of computerized wagering systems used by pari-mutuel racing operators, off-track betting centers, and lottery operators. Berjaya Lottery Management, a subsidiary of Malaysia-based Berjaya Group, owns more than 70% of ILTS.
ES&S is our only current vendor and so far I have no problems with them and how they have done business in our state. In 2006 they were the ONLY company that didn’t make excuses for why they couldn’t comply with our tough law and high standards – they didn’t ask for standards to be lowered then and aren’t asking for them now from what I can tell.
Financial Concerns Summary:
Venture Capital and Hedge Funds - The specific ties to Bain bother me about Hart InterCivic – I don’t want to see any hedge fund or VC company push a voting machine vendor into bankruptcy to cash out on their investment like Bain did with “Toys-R-Us”. That also bothers me about Clear Ballot and Dominion and Unisys before they bailed – and in fact ANY voting machine vendor owned or financed by a venture capital or hedge fund: how long will they stay in business?
Foreign ownership aspects - The FBI has been investigating foreign (mostly Russian) interference in our elections. Not long after the FBI indicted 12 Russians for interfering in our elections, Maryland elections officials notified the public that ByteGrid – the company that provides key voter registration services for MD elections – had been bought in 2015 by a parent company with links to a Russian oligarch close to Vladimir Putin. Officials claim they had no knowledge of the purchase by the Russian investor. And the company claims no investors have involvement or control of the company’s operations.
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 3 Three of the 4 vendors are owned/controlled by hedge funds or received recent rounds of VC/HF financing, and one of those is directly are owned by foreign backers/companies. We've been hearing about Russian hacking of our elections. I'm not quaking in my boots about Canadians hacking our elections (yet) – but the issue of unknown and possibly foreign ownership is one that many people are now becoming aware of and are uncomfortable with. I am not comfortable with these financial dealings – we need to know more about all of them.
Who really owns them now? Do we know who all these other VC plus other private investors are? Do we know all the terms of the deal? What about ownership by holding companies for other countries?
They could get bought or sold out or go after more VC/HF money with terms any state should be made aware. Perhaps this is something that needs to be addressed by the NCGA if the SBOE can’t address this now?
How do we know some foreign investor won’t have involvement or control in the future?
What happens if the money runs out and the VD/hedge fund group forces them to sell or go bankrupt? I know what happens to the source code – but that might leave counties without a way to buy a new voting system.
Can the other three companies afford to pay the $17 million surety bond in NC? Can we expand the bond to include the cost of buying new equipment from another vendor if a vendor gets decertified, goes bankrupt or otherwise bail on the business, or is bought out by a questionable financial backer?
Can we ban all sales to foreign-owned vendors? Can we afford to take a risk and buy from them today and find out years later after the fact that they were bought by a holding company owned by a foreign investor who might not be friendly to the US or to North Carolina?
Who at SBOE is vetting both the vendors and the owners and the layers of business deals that fund the vendors? Does SBOE have staff that can dive deep into these corporate finance details? Maybe we need to have folks at the State Auditors office look into this as well and give us their opinion before we invest tens of millions of dollars in these new voting systems?
Maybe we can learn from this – and require 100% transparency for all vendors and their investors as the price of doing business with the state of North Carolina.
4). Different machines and complexities from a verified voting and election integrity standpoint
Other than ES&S, all the other vendors featured a great deal of voting setups that relied heavily on commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment either at the polling places or for central scanning. That bothers me - if our law requires the whole system be certified from beginning to end – and that includes parts and software updates – is there any real advantage to COTS equipment?
I saw several vendors feature COTS scanners for precinct and for central scanning of ABM ballots. Those vendors cites COTS as scalable, efficient and easy to maintain. I am not aware of
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 4 our current ES&S central scanners having any of those problems – at least not reported to me by Wake County BOE members in all the years since we bought them. I vote in Wake County and we are using M-100 scanners and AutoMARKs purchased in 2006. I haven’t been worried about that equipment working or availability of parts, but that’s because the machines are purpose built for voting. That is not the case for COTS gear – vendors are always trying to sell new stuff and I doubt if a COTS BOD printer available today will be available in 4 years much less 14 years.
It’s not like a county BOE is going to pull one of the central COTS scanners out of service for ballots to scan general clerical stuff for the office – and actually proprietary solutions could be seen as the most secure against hacking. COTS component-based solutions could also be seen as being less reliable – because there are more individual things that could go wrong. Constantly having to move around and unplug and re-plug in gear could cause more problems than it solves. Our pool of polling place workers is typically older folks that might not be able to properly set up all those separate COTS components, and then diagnose problems with separate COTS components should they occur. That could actually drive up the cost of maintenance, and cause denial of service issues at polling places.
What happens if Brother stops making a particular BOD printer, or stops updating drivers for the printers we are using? Might there be a real security issue here from both the equipment and software updates? Will they be forced to update drivers automatically or not work at all? Could a hacker force an “update” of a hacked driver?
5). Cost aspects
I can’t totally know whether any particular voting system is more cost effective than another unless we know the cost of all the machines, and the extras (voting booths, cases, cords, etc.) that go along with them. The cost of multiple BMDs with integral printers (like the Express Vote system) or with separate COTS BOD printers at each voting location will be higher both initially and in the long run. Counties and voters deserve to know what the costs will be - please provide any pricing you have received from the vendors.
But based on previous history, the verified voting community knows that the lowest cost option is one precinct based scanner and one BMD that can mark a previously printed ballot. Even without knowing the exact costs of the new gear and supplies, it’s easy to make this assumption from past experience.
That’s what I use in Wake County and what so many other folks are using around the state, and is the gold standard among the verified voting community – it produces a hand- or machine- marked ballot that is read by the scanner or by eye in the same way. The voter marks their ballots and verifies by mark which candidates he/she has voted for – or possibly against in the case of an issue, referendum or amendment.
NC Verified Voting put together (with then available cost figures) studies that showed how opscan and paper ballots were cheaper in both the short- and long-term than DRE touchscreen voting machines. We even presented a study that showed a community could buy brand new op- scan equipment and pay off the DRE machines they were under contract to pay for as long as they stopped using them – and still save money and break even in the long run. When the General Assembly saw this in 2005-2006, they voted to provide enough HAVA money to each
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 5 county to buy optical scanners and AutoMARK BMDs – a county would have to pay extra for DRE machines. Most counties opted for the scanners and AutoMARKs – and many still use them today. Had the DRE counties gone 100% op-scan they wouldn’t be faced with decertified gear today.
That same study was used by verified voting activists in other states to convince their election administrators and others to go paper instead of DRE machines.
From the looks of the equipment I saw at the meeting and from what I studied on line, the cheapest option for counties that want to switch from DRE to paper ballots would be to stay with ES&S and buy one DS-200 and an AutoMARK for each voting location. With the $1000 rebate from ES&S, those counties would just about break even or even be a little ahead of the game. This would work well for each and every county in NC because they already use and pay for the ES&S system software and firmware, and they already have to design printed ballots and program scanners for Absentee voting.
If voters and BOE members, election administrators, and county commissioners still decided they wanted to go with a voting machine for each voter, I’d have to recommend the ES&S Express Vote. The Express Vote machine is a one-piece, purpose-built voting machine designed to stand alone from all the other voting machines. From what I saw of the Express Vote set up compared with what I could only guess at from the other vendors, the Express Vote machine can be set up as an stand-alone compact unit in a much easier manner than all the separate BMD and BOD component devices and all their power and connection cabling. If there is an issue with it, it can be easily removed and swapped out for another machine that works without having to diagnose all the other components.
6). Sole Source Vendor
I wrote an op-ed on keeping high standards for election integrity that was published in the N&O in early July 2018 - https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article214271729.html
I wrote that piece to add onto what I wrote back in 2011 which sadly is no longer available on line at the N&O. I had to cut down the recent op-ed to 600 words, but this is from my first draft:
North Carolina had no uniform standards for voting systems and election administration before 2005. We used 18 different types of voting machines (some from vendors no longer in business), vendor support was sparse, maintenance was limited, training was disjointed and incomplete - and security was a joke. All counties did their own thing with ballot printing, and few complied with federal laws and standards.
2004 saw many election problems that came largely from not having or complying with standards for election integrity. We had a Florida-style meltdown in Carteret County when 5,000 votes - a number larger than the margin separating two candidates in one statewide race - were lost at one early voting location, almost forced a $7.5 million statewide redo election!
After the meltdown, the General Assembly studied the problem and passed the Public Confidence in Elections Act passed with unanimous bipartisan support in August 2005. That law created statewide standards administered by the State Board of Elections. The law required counties to have machines, software, ballot designs, etc., tested, certified and maintained as a system. The law further required post-election audits and collection and publication of election data for improving future elections. Finally, the law required vendors to put source code in escrow and to post a
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 6 surety bond to pay for a statewide election re-do, with criminal penalties for non-compliance with the law!
Naturally, some vendors and their supporters complained that standards were too high! We refused to lower our standards, so by the end of 2005, all the vendors dropped away but one - ES&S and their NC business partner Printelect. They were able the ONLY vendor who could deliver and maintain high standards for our election equipment, software, and maintenance/testing. They delivered new machines to over 2800 precincts in 100 counties in time for the 2006 midterm elections.
Thanks to our tough new election law – and our vendor – NC was transformed from a Florida- style laughingstock in 2004 to being ranked No. 1 in 2006 on our ability to count votes and audit elections, as well as being ranked as one of the top eight states in readiness for the 2008 general election.
The NCGA passed a law a few years ago decertifying all touchscreen machines and replacing them with machines that produce and/or read a paper ballot by 2018. That’s providing an opportunity for some folks to endanger election integrity by lowering our standards in the name of “competition” to sell their equipment and software. By all means, let’s have a fair and rigorous bidding process – but not if it requires lowering our standards! We fought too hard to take that risk!
Let’s consider the advantages of having one sole-source vendor in NC. That allows us to maintain current levels of election integrity – something that would cost way more to do and be very hard for SBOE to maintain with multiple vendors and platforms. Having one vendor allows counties to work with each other to help with equipment issue, software or firmware questions, training, and legal issues.
Our voting machines are not now nor have they ever been connected to the internet. Our current sole-source arrangement allowed all 100 counties to make a few simple yet significant changes to prevent any potential “hacking” of our voting machines from Russia or anywhere else in our May 2018 primary during transmissions of counts from the precincts to county and the state Board over phone lines.
Some want us to lower the cost or entirely do away with the surety bond. The cost of doing a statewide election was $7.5 million in 2006 - 12 years later it now costs $10 million! We must keep that surety bond – it’s affordable for any reputable voting machine company that wants to compete for this business.
If we want to make sure that we have good competitive prices for voting machines, why not require that all companies bidding make their prices public – that way we can make sure no one low-balls to get their foot in the door and then makes up the difference by nickel and diming taxpayers?
Many other states have decided to go with a sole-source vendor over the years. North Carolina didn’t decide to do that – but that’s how it worked out. It’s worked out well for the state and all our 100 counties over the years for the reasons I’ve mentioned above. And as we move into the future and must me concerned more with securing our election systems from potential hacking from hackers inside and outside the US, having a sole vendor would be beneficial by having strong standards that apply across the entire state, with every county BOE speaking the same “language” and using the same systems and tools to protect the integrity of our elections. Going with multiple vendors MIGHT seem like a way to spread the risk but then we’d be in exactly the same place we were in before 2004. I do not want to go back to those bad old days before 2004 when we had so many vendors all doing their own thing in this day and age of Russian hacking.
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 7 Besides the security aspects, it’s a no brainer to stick with ES&S. All 100 counties already have the software and firmware now, with personnel trained to use it. New vendors would mean all new training. All 100 counties already use their software to report vote totals to the SBOE, and the SBOE knows the machines, software and firmwear. And while getting up to speed on the DS-200 would take a little time, it would be much less time, training and money than would be required to go with new vendors. And I’d hate to be working at SBOE if more than one new vendor got certified and sold equipment in NC – they’d have to be current in ES&S stuff as well as learn more than one new vendor’s equipment, software and firmware. Sticking with our current vendor makes more sense from an economic standpoint.
I was quoted in an N&O article written about the July 27 meeting - https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article215763215.html#storylink=cpy
Chris Telesca, founder of Wake Coalition for Verified Voting, wants to keep it simple. Before founding the Wake County chapter, he was involved in the North Carolina Coalition for Verified Voting, which pushed for a 2005 law which raised the technical standards for voting machines used in the state. Since the passage of the act, only Election Systems & Software machines have passed certification in North Carolina, and Telesca has been happy with the uniformity of the systems used.
“I don’t love any vendor, but I figure, if we’ve got good high standards, and only one company can meet them and isn’t asking to lower them, I say go with that company,” said Telesca. “If they bring in too many competitors, there are going to be problems.”
I will stand by that last paragraph for why we should keep our current high standards and go with our current vendor even if that means not having other competition. We are buying voting machines – not copy paper, lawn mowers or rakes and hoes.
7). Verified Voting aspects
I guess I have saved the best for last. As far as verified voting activists like myself are concerned, hand- or machine-marked paper ballots are the gold standard for voters to mark their ballots and for election administrators to use for tabulation, ballot reconciliation and audits. Everyone can use them and the actual marks on the ballots are used to tabulate the voters and are used in post- election audits.
Even if there was a power failure or a scanner broke down, voters could continue to mark their ballots by hand. In the event of a power failure or BMD breakdown, disabled voters would be still be able to vote but would require assistance from someone else. While not ideal, this is better than the situation that would occur with Ballot Marking Devices that produced bar code or even full sized bullet ballots with Ballot they and the non-disabled community. You would be dealing with denial of service issues from partial to total (if there was a power failure for example).
This is what the verified voting community nationwide recommends would recommend would be the best option from a verified voting standpoint. And so if we were going to decide on a vendor based on this option, I’d have to recommend counties chose ES&S since the state and all 100 counties already use their software and firmwear for absentee voting.
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 8 If a community and their leaders decided they wanted to go with a full-size ballot, the clear choice is the ES&S DS-200 and AutoMARK. The DS-200 can clearly count votes, but it can also scan the ballot and create an image that can be used more easily than the ballot alone to determine voter intent. The AutoMARK actually marks the any length full-size ballot that other voters mark by hand – and it has the other advantage of (based on my recollections) of being able to display all the candidates/choices for a particular race/issue on one screen (for low-vision voters who are not entirely blind). There is only one size ballot to count, and since all ballots are pre-printed, it makes ballot reconciliation much easier.
If there is a power failure that renders the scanner and AutoMARK inoperable, then voters can mark by hand. They lose the ability to have the scanner notify them of under or overvotes, but being able to vote at all without the notice beats not being able to vote at all if your only choice is to come back later (which is not always possible for all voters). If there is a power failure that prevents disabled voters from using an AutoMARK, those voters could ask for assistance. With the old DRE machines or with the new ballot marking devices for all voters, every voter is out of luck with a power failure and no one gets to vote.
If a county board of elections and board of commissioners decided they still wanted all folks to vote on a machine that marked a ballot, then you have a few more choices – you have the stand- alone, purpose-built Express Vote machine and DS-200 scanner from ES&S, or you have a variety of other Ballot Marking Devices that are connected to a variety of separate COTS Ballot on Demand printers – and some of those are further connected by umbilical to scanners (some COTS models as well). Some of those other BMDs are purpose built – especially with the ADA compliant controls.
The ES&S Express Vote is a one-piece stand-alone unit that doesn’t need to be tied by umbilical to a scanner, nor have an external component COTS Ballot on Demand printer attached to it. It produces a ballot with both a bar code and printed names of the candidate choices. While there are some in the verified voting community who do not like bar codes (mainly because they cannot read bar code and this introduces another level of complexity that could be exploited by a hacker), its strong point is that it is a one-piece unit that would be easier for poll workers to set up and maintain as well as producing a smaller paper ballots that wastes less paper. Purpose-built machines like the Express Vote cannot be purchased as easily as COTS items and therefore it becomes harder (though not impossible) to hack them.
While most of the other vendors sold BMD with separate component COTS BOD printers that produced full size ballots that is preferred by the verified voting community, the downside to them is that they are component items that could have connectivity issues, and be vulnerable to hacking precisely because they are readily available and low-cost commercial off the shelf components.
These are my comments for the SBOE following the late July meeting where vendors displayed their equipment. Please feel free to contact me at [email protected] or call me at 919- 368-2847 if you have any questions for me or need any further clarification.
Sincerely, Chris Telesca Founder, Wake Coalition for Verified Voting
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 9
9/07 to present Wake Coalition for Verified Voting, Raleigh, NC 5/05 to 8/07 NC Coalition for Verified Voting, Raleigh, NC Capitol-area coordinator for statewide verified voting group from 2005-2007, statewide group ceded control and focus to Wake County in 2008. Research voting verification and integrity issues, write and contribute material for internet articles and PR material. Plan and implement strategy, coordinate with other verified voting groups, political parties and activist groups for more effective citizen activist efforts. Working with verified voting issues on national level with several activist groups.
2012 to present Worked to eliminate Instant Runoff Voting from NC election laws, and working to replace DRE touchscreen voting machines with scanners that read either hand or machine- marked paper ballots.
2011 Educated new Republican majority about election integrity and verified voting standards set in our Public Confidence in Elections Act and other elections laws.
2010 Worked with verified voting advocates around the country to educate election officials and elected leader and political candidates about the risks and increased costs involved with Instant Runoff Voting/Ranked choice Voting. Helped defeat efforts to implement IRV in several jurisdictions nationwide.
2009 Lead activists in efforts resulting in Cary and Fayetteville not participating in 2009 IRV pilot program. Help write and pass legislation requiring public hearings in communities considering participation in IRV election pilot program. Worked with verified voting advocates in other states to repeal IRV/RCV in Aspen, CO and Burlington, VT. Lobbied entire Wake legislative delegation to enact legislation allowing for electioneering at all Early Voting sites – including those on private property (mall voting).
2008 Coordinated grassroots effort to write and pass verified voting protection in guidelines for IRV pilot extension, consistent with state and federal election laws. Lobbied successfully to defeat legislation to implement permanent IRV voting in Wilmington, NC.
2007 Worked with state and local volunteers to lobby NC General Assembly to change “No Match/No Vote” voter registration law to make “Same Day Registration” for Early Voting more effective.
2006 Coordinated grassroots lobbying efforts at Board of Elections and County Commissioner level to require use of 100% new optical scan voting equipment in Wake County. Developed strategy used by other NC counties and states to buy optical scanning instead of DRE touchscreen machines. Worked with state and local volunteers to amend SL2005-323 to prevent pre-selection of audited precincts before Election Day.
2005 Worked with other grassroots volunteers and organizations to lobby the NC General Assembly for successful passage of the Public Confidence in Election Act (SL2005-323) to create uniform statewide standards for verifiable voting, voting machine certification and audit standards.
Telesca Public Comments to NC SBE re new voting equipment 10 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #55
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Friday, August 10, 2018 8:07:01 AM Last Modified: Friday, August 10, 2018 10:54:51 PM Time Spent: 14:47:50 IP Address: 75.60.241.82
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Hart InterCivic: Verity 2.2
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below Respondent skipped this question
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Comparison.docx (33.7KB)
Q4 Your contact information
Name Lynn Bernstein
City/Town Cary
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27518
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 303.884.4423
57 / 59 Greetings,
The NC State Board of Elections hosted a public demonstration of voting equipment on July 27, 2018, where members of the public were invited to witness demonstrations by the vendors and had the opportunity to ask questions and have their concerns addressed directly by the vendors. Over the past year, I have been studying how our digital elections work, learning how they are vulnerable and seeking expert advice as to what practical measures can be implemented to allow for increased election integrity.
The public has real and elevated concerns regarding the vulnerabilities of our electronic election systems, which has led to a decrease in voter confidence. Hackers were able to infiltrate parts of our voting systems during the 2016 election cycle and are continuing to do so for the 2018 election. Russian hackers launched spear-phishing attacks against a voting software vendor, VR Systems, just days before the 2016 election. VR Systems provides electronic poll book software to 21 North Carolina counties. (1) (2) ES&S has not been forthcoming about the instillation of remote access software on its election equipment. They sold EMS with pcAnywhere to multiple states over a 6 year period, but denied that pcAnywhere was on any of their election machines until the software was discovered. Once discovered, they admitted that the remote software was installed, but claimed that it was not on any of the tallying equipment and were only installed on a small number of machines. A security firm found that 150,000 computers with pcAnywhere installed were set up in a way that allowed direct access. (3) With vulnerabilities being found and exploited by hackers on a continual basis, it would be difficult, if not impossible for election equipment vendors and Elections Officials to keep up.
Therefore, systems that are designed to minimize these risks by eliminating hackable components, such as modems and remote access software are crucial. Even systems that have modems installed, but disabled pose a security risk. Voters need to have confidence that their votes have been counted as cast, especially because most voters do not understand or can’t explain how these complicated systems work. Performing post-election risk-limiting audits are the only way to truly certify an election with any amount of confidence, but these audits can only be performed if a system uses paper ballots. Voters must be able to verify their selections on the ballot prior to casting their vote. Choosing an honest and transparent vendor and Electronic Voting System that mitigates security issues, uses voter verifiable paper ballots and performs anonymous risk-limiting audits will help improve voter confidence and election integrity.
My findings and opinions are guided by current HAVA (4) requirements as well as Senate Bill S.3049 (5), which will amend parts of HAVA to make our elections more secure in the future. The newly introduced bill was based on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recommendations for election security. (6) Once passed, S.3049 would require all states to ban wireless components, conduct risk-limiting- audits and use human readable paper ballots for all voters including those with disabilities in accordance with HAVA.
My assessments are also based on recommendations from the following experts and organizations:
Halderman has spent the last 10 years studying the electronic voting systems and is recognized globally for his work in election security. He recently provided expert testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections. He believes that computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and vote flipping that could alter the outcome of an election. He and his colleagues, with permission during mock elections were able to repeatedly infiltrate nearly every system that is currently being used in elections, including flipping votes. Even more alarming, they were able to flip votes without detection and leave no trace. They were able to hack touchscreen DREs and OPScans. As he points out, if his team is able to hack into these systems with only a few people and limited resources, foreign adversaries, with more resources and capabilities have the ability to steal votes and change the election winner. (7) In his written statement, to the Committee, he makes several recommendations including the use of paper ballots and conducting post-election risk-limiting audits. (8)
Philip B. Stark, Associate Dean, Division of Mathematical and Physical Sciences. Professor of Statistics, University of California – Berkeley Department of Statistics. Stark is a leading expert in risk-limiting audits and his methods have been adopted in Colorado, Rhode Island and California law (9) A risk- limiting audit is the most efficient and cost effective way to audit an election by verifying only a small percentage of the paper ballots to the cast vote record (CVR). Usually the CVR is a scanned image of the ballot that is generated as the ballot goes through the tabulator. The CVR is directly compared to the paper ballot. The number of ballots needing to be audited is tied to the margin of victory and can drastically minimize the size of the audit when the outcome is correct. He points out that there are unique challenges of conducting RLAs that also keep the identity of the voter anonymous. (10)
The Nation Election Defense Coalition submitted a letter to Sate Elections Officers identifying best practices in upgrades to election security. The letter was signed by 41 experts in the field of Computer Science, National Security, Election Administration, and Statistics. They list five recommendations including a prohibition of wireless connectivity, paper ballots, and robust post-election audits for federal elections.
Other non-profits such as the Brennan Center (11) (12) have published these recommendations as well as a collaborative report from the Brennan Center, Common Cause, National Election Defense Coalition and Verified Voting (13) also make the same three recommendations; hand marked voter-verifiable paper ballots, risk-limiting audits and the elimination of all remote access hardware and software.
A hand marked paper ballot means that the voter marks directly onto the ballot to make selections and can easily read who they intend to vote for and have the opportunity to spoil the ballot and re-vote on a new ballot if they realize that they made an error. The tabulator then reads the verified ballot selections. Some voters are unable to hand mark a ballot due to a disability and in that case a ballot marking device is used. The voter would make selections using assistive technology on an electronic voting device and then print the ballot, which is inserted into a ballot tabulator. In order for a voter to review their ballot, the portion of the ballot that the tabulator uses to count votes must be human readable. ClearBallot, Dominion, ES&S, and Unisyn have ballot marking devices that print out a summary card or ballot sheet with both a list of the ballot selections as well as a barcode or QR code. Unfortunately, voters who are using this device are not able to verify the portion of the ballot that actually gets tabulated. This is in direct conflict with the language in S.3049 which states that the system must “allow the voter to privately and independently verify the permanent paper ballot through the presentation, in accessible form, of the printed or marked vote selections from the same printed or marked information that would be used for any vote counting or auditing”. The HART InterCivic ballot marking device is the only one that meets this requirement. The ballot that is printed is in the same format as those that are hand- marked. The selections that are marked are the same part of the ballot that is read by the tabulator. I raised concerns about the black box voting barcode and QR codes with ClearBallot, Dominion and ES&S. They dismissed these concerns and explained how voters are terrible at marking the ballots themselves, leaving their selections to be interpreted or adjudicated by elections officials. While this is true, many people do not fill out their ballot in a way that clearly indicates their intended vote, a barcode or QR code is not human readable and therefore, not human verifiable. The human list printed on the card is not what is read by the tabulator. Since the HART InterCivic EVS has this capability, Elections Officials could choose to have all voters, not just those needing assistance to vote using these machines if they are concerned about voters not marking ballots clearly. This expanded capability could save Elections Officials time spent adjudicating ballots. The system has another added advantage in that their EVS has an On-Demand Ballot Printer that uses COTS components so no precinct would ever have the problem of running out of ballots.
Risk-limiting audits
I spoke with each vendor about their RLA capabilities, gathered information online and requested information from each vendor about how their system performed RLAs. RLA are complicated and expert advice would be needed to assess the superiority of any system. I am not an expert in risk-limiting audits and can only summarize what I was told about each of systems.
The ClearBallot representative told me that the company started out as an auditing company and explained how they conduct RLAs. All ballots are pre-marked with a unique number that has been printed on each ballot prior to the election. As the ballot goes through the tabulator, an image is taken (CVR) to compare with the paper ballot for the audit. He explained that the ballots need to be kept in the same order because the ballot ID points to the location of the physical ballot. I asked how they would keep voter anonymity, but he could not explain how the ballot number could not be traced back to the voter. They responded to my request for more information regarding RLAs and said they would be sending information in the next few weeks. I have not received any information, yet.
The Dominion representative explained how they helped perform a RLA for the state of Colorado. Unlike North Carolina, where most voters use in-person voting, most Colorado voters return mail-in ballots so the ballots are already randomized because they are received in a random order. The vendor explained that after each ballot is received, it is flattened and fed through the ballot tabulator. While going through the tabulator, the ballot is marked with a unique number directly on the ballot and an image is taken (CVR) to compare with the paper ballot for the audit. I’m not sure what the implications would be of marking a number on a ballot while the voter is placing the ballot in the tabulator and he could not tell me what steps are taken to maintain voter anonymity. Dominion did not respond to my written request for more information regarding how RLAs could work for a state like NC.
The ES&S representatives explained that their system scans the ballot to create a ballot image while the ballot is run through the tabulator. The ballot does not have a unique barcode or number and the system does not print one on the ballot. He did proclaim that NC discretely places a written number in pencil on the ballots for early voting and therefore could catch any voter that voted a second time. When I pressed them for more information about how this would be considered anonymous, he explained that if someone voted twice, the ballot could be pulled at the request of an Elections Official. The Elections Official would request the ballot by the unique number written on the ballot and a separate Election Worker would pull the ballot. The Elections Official would know the name of the voter and ballot number, but the Election Worker would only know the ballot number and could see how the individual voted. A sort of “honesty firewall”. I continued to press for information because I wanted to understand how the system actually worked. The representative implied that perhaps it wasn’t that he couldn’t explain it, just that I was unable to comprehend such a complicated system. I informed him that my background was in integration and testing of satellites as an Aerospace Engineer and that I’m sure I would be able to understand a reasonable explanation. ES&S did not respond to my written request for information regarding how their system handles RLAs.
The HART InterCivic representative explained that all the ballots are pre-marked with a unique barcode not human a readable number. As the ballot goes through the tabulator, a ballot image is taken while the tabulator creates an electronic vote record (EVR) in XML that is non-sequential and randomized, which allows independent auditors to do a comparison of the EVR to the marked paper ballot. The system has the ability to trace the EVR to a specific physical ballot while maintaining voter anonymity. Hart InterCivic replied to my written request about RLAs, sending a 3 page document explaining how their system conducts RLAs.
Unisyn did not have a representative available for questions at the demonstration. The vendor’s RLA online information sheet states,”Once the desired options have been selected, the ballots will be displayed as a list on-screen. The Auditor can then select and review each ballot against its electronic record. The Auditor will mark each selected ballot as either “Accept” or “Pending Review.” Reports can be generated for each batch of ballots processed.” (14) Comparing an electronic list of ballots on a screen to the electronic ballot images (CVR) without comparing either to the paper ballot is not a risk- limiting audit method that I am familiar with or have ever heard of. A RLA expert would need to look at this system to determine if this is a valid method. The information provided online does not indicated how the voter remains anonymous, either.
Elimination of Modems
Data from the Elections Management System must be loaded onto the tabulators so they can read the ballot and tabulate votes, which opens the system up to hacking and insertion of mal-ware. This is why Electronic Voting Systems are never truly air-gapped. That portion of the system will remain open to hacking. EVS do not need to have remote login software or modems. Alex Halderman stated, “The fact that these election management systems are networked at all should be alarming to anyone who understands election cybersecurity.” (15) I could not find information about whether or not ClearBallot uses internal modems or remote access software. Clear Ballot did not respond to my written request for information.
Dominion uses external serial-port modems after the election ends to transmit election data. (15) They did not respond to my written request to confirm this.
ES&S insists that they have security measures in place that would prevent hackers from exploiting or interfering with modem transmissions. Election security experts vehemently disagree. (15)
Hart InterCivic clearly stated in a written response to my inquiry that they do not now, nor will ever have remote login software. Modems of any kind are not built into their systems. For states that choose to transmit election data remotely, they will use separate, external modems for those customers. It seems that they understand the security issues associated with modems and remote login software.
Online information regarding Unisyn does not show that modems or remote access software is used in their EVS, but the diagram online is not clear. (16)
Based on my research and communication with each of the vendors, I would overwhelmingly recommend Hart InterCivic as a vendor that is transparent with the public. They responded to several written requests for information and which increases voter understanding of the system. Most importantly, they are the only vendor with the capability of printing a human-verifiable ballot using their Verity Touch Writer ballot marking device. As a voting member of the public, I would not feel confident that my vote was counted as cast on any tabulator that reads a barcode or QR code, instead of actual voter selections.
Thank you for the opportunity to view demonstrations of these systems, talk to the vendors and submit comments. I truly hope that the NC BOE will take seriously the issues with non-human-readable machine printed ballots, risk-limiting audit capabilities and elimination of modems from voting systems.
Sincerely,
Lynn Bernstein
References 1. Shabad, Rebecca. NSA report indicates Russian cyberattack against U.S. voting software vendor last August. CBS News. June 5, 2017.
2. Burns, Matthew. NC elections officials investigate alleged Russian hacking efforts. WRAL. 2017.
3. Holt, Kris. Voting Machine Maker Sold States System with Remote-Access Tools. engadget. July 17, 2018.
4. Help America Vote Act 2002. H.R. 3295, One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America : s.n., 2002.
5. Senate Bill S.3049. 115th CONGRESS 2D Session.
6. Senator Richard Burr, Senator Mark Warner. Senate Intel Committee’s Initial Recommendations on Election Security for 2018 Election Cycle. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Washington, DC : s.n., March 20, 2018.
7. Halderman, J. Alex. Opening Statement US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Russian Interference in the 2016 US Election, Washington, DC : s.n., June 21, 2017.
8. —. Written Testamony before Congresss US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Washington, DC : s.n., June 21, 2017.
9. Stark, Philip B. Professional Website.
10. Risk_Limiting Post_Election Audits: Why and How. s.l. : Risk-Limiting Audits Working Group, October 2012. version 1.1.
11. National Security, Tech, and Election Officials to States: Best Practices Should Guide How New Voting System Security Funds Are Spent. Brennan Center for Justice. [Online] New York University School of Law, April 23, 2018. https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/national-security-tech- and-election-officials-states-best-practices-should-guide-how.
12. A Smart and Effective Way to Safeguard Elections. Brennan Center for Justice. [Online] New York University Law School, July 25, 2018. https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/smart-and-effective-way- safeguard-elections.
13. Brennan Center for Justice, Common Cause, National Election Defense Coalition, Verified Voting. Securing the Nation’s Voting Machines: A Toolkit for Advocates and Elections Officials. 2018.
14. Unisyn Voting Website. Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) Brochure. [Online] https://unisynvoting.com/wp- content/uploads/2017/10/RLA-Brochure-8-15-17.pdf.
15. Zetter, Kim. The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine. NY Times. s.l. : NY Times, February 21, 2018.
16. Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect. Verified Voting. [Online] https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/unisyn/openelect/. 18. Halderman, J. Alex.
19. periodical.
20. Adam Brandon, Duncan Buell [NEED TO FINISH ADDING LIST OF AUTHORS]. Letter to State Elections Officers. s.l. : National Election Defense Coalition, April 23, 2017. Election Security.
21. Mark Lindeman, Assistant Professor of Political Studies Bard College, Mark Halvorson (Director and Founder, Citizens for Election Integrity, Minnesota), Pamela Smith (President, Verified Voting), Lynn Garland, Vittoriao Addona (As [NEED TO COMPLETE]. Principles and Best Practices for Post Election Audits. [ed.] Assistant Professor of Political Studies Bard College, Mark Halvorson (Director and Founder, Citizens for Election Integrity, Minnesota), Pamela Smith (President, Verified Voting), Lynn Garland, Vittoriao Addona (Assistant Professor of Math Mark Lindeman.
22. 100 members of the computer science and cybersecurity communities, together with statisticians and election auditing experts. National Election Defense Coalition Cybersecurity Expert Letter to Congress. 2017. Letter to Congress.
23. Zetter, Kim. The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine. New York Times. February 21, 2018.
Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #56
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Monday, August 13, 2018 4:57:56 PM Last Modified: Monday, August 13, 2018 5:04:29 PM Time Spent: 00:06:32 IP Address: 65.184.34.179
Page 1
Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below put it on a Blockchain Platform to increase trust, transparency, auditability & security.
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
BC-Cybersecurity.pdf (2.2MB)
Q4 Your contact information
Name DJ EVERETTE
Company The Power of One, LLC
City/Town Raleigh-Durham
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 28411
Country USA
Email Address [email protected]
Phone Number 9105996155
58 / 59 2.0 RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
Dr. Ron Ross Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY The Current Landscape. It’s a dangerous world in cyberspace…
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 2 Risk. Energy Function (threat, vulnerability, impact, likelihood)
Transportation
Manufacturing
Defense
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 3 . Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat
. Cyber Supply Chain
. Cyber Deterrence
Defense Science Board Reports
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 4 Complexity.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 5 Our appetite for advanced technology is rapidly exceeding our ability to protect it.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 6 Data. Data. Everywhere.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 7 Protecting critical systems and assets— The highest priority for the national and economic security interests of the United States.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 8 Defending cyberspace in 2018 and beyond.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 9 . Federal Government’s Modernization Strategy
. Identify and develop federal shared services. . Move to FedRAMP-approved cloud services. . Isolate and strengthen protection for high value assets.
Reduce and manage the complexity of systems and networks… Engineering more trustworthy, secure, and resilient solutions.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 10 Simplify. Innovate. Automate.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 11 . NIST SP 800-37, Revision 2 Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 12 Risk Management Framework (RMF) 2.0
CATEGORIZE
MONITOR SELECT
PREPARE
AUTHORIZE IMPLEMENT
ASSESS
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 13 RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
OBJECTIVE 1
To provide closer linkage and communication between the risk management processes and activities at the C-suite or governance level of the organization and the individuals, processes, and activities at the system and operational level of the organization.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
OBJECTIVE 2
To institutionalize critical enterprise-wide risk management preparatory activities to facilitate a more effective, efficient, and cost-effective execution of the RMF.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
OBJECTIVE 3
To demonstrate how the Cybersecurity Framework can be aligned with the RMF and implemented using established NIST risk management processes.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
OBJECTIVE 4
To integrate privacy risk management concepts and principles into the RMF and support the use of the consolidated security and privacy control catalog in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
OBJECTIVE 5
To promote the development of trustworthy secure software and systems by aligning life cycle-based systems engineering processes in NIST Special Publication 800-160 with the steps in the RMF.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
OBJECTIVE 6
To integrate supply chain risk management (SCRM) concepts into the RMF to protect against untrustworthy suppliers, insertion of counterfeits, tampering, unauthorized production, theft, insertion of malicious code, and poor manufacturing and development practices throughout the SDLC.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
OBJECTIVE 7
To provide an alternative organization-generated control selection approach to complement the baseline control selection approach.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Security and Privacy. *
RMF STEPS SELECT ASSESS PREPARE MONITOR IMPLEMENT AUTHORIZE CATEGORIZE
Authorized PII Processing YES NO YES YES YES YES YES
Unauthorized System Activity or Behavior YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PRIVACY RISKS PRIVACY Impacting PII
* Except for system description, categorization tasks are not conducted to manage the risks arising from the authorized processing of PII.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 21 A unified framework for managing security, privacy, and supply chain risks.
Communication between C-Suite and Implementers and Operators
Security Risk RMF Privacy Risk Management 2.0 Management
Alignment with NIST Alignment with Security Cybersecurity Framework Engineering Processes Supply Chain Risk Management
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Everything (good or bad) that happens with the RMF starts at the top of the organization.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 23 Outcomes . Individuals are identified and assigned key roles for executing the RMF. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM-6; ID.GV-2] . A risk management strategy for the organization that includes a determination and expression of Prepare Step organizational risk tolerance is established. Organization Level [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.RM] Preparing organizations to . An organization-wide risk assessment is execute the RMF from the completed or an existing risk assessment is enterprise perspective… updated. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.RA] . Tailored control baselines for enterprise-wide use are established and made available. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile]
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 24 Outcomes . Common controls that are available for inheritance by organizational systems are identified, documented, and published. [Cybersecurity Framework: No mapping] . A prioritization of organizational systems with Prepare Step the same impact level is conducted. Organization Level [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM-5] Preparing organizations to . An organization-wide strategy for monitoring execute the RMF from the control effectiveness is developed and enterprise perspective… implemented. [Cybersecurity Framework: DE.CM]
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 25 Outcomes . Missions, business functions, and processes the system is intended to support are identified. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile; Implementation Tiers; ID.BE] . The stakeholders having an interest in the system are identified. Cybersecurity Framework: Prepare Step [ ID.AM; ID.BE] System Level . Stakeholder assets are identified and prioritized. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM] Preparing organizations to execute the RMF from the . The authorization boundary (system-of-interest) system perspective… is determined. [Cybersecurity Framework: No mapping] . The types of information processed, stored, and transmitted by the system are identified. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM-5]
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 26 Outcomes . For systems that process PII, the information life cycle is identified. [Cybersecurity Framework: No mapping] . A system-level risk assessment is completed or an existing risk assessment is updated. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.RA] Prepare Step . Protection needs and security and privacy System Level requirements are defined and prioritized. Preparing organizations to [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.GV; PR.IP] execute the RMF from the system perspective… . The placement of the system within the enterprise architecture is determined. [Cybersecurity Framework: No mapping] . The system is registered for management, accountability, coordination, and oversight. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.GV]
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 27 Life Cycle Security and Privacy
. Business or mission analysis . Stakeholder needs and requirements definition . System requirements definition . Architecture definition . Design definition ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015 . System analysis Systems and software engineering . Implementation — System life cycle processes . Integration . Verification . Transition Build It In… . Validation . Operation . Maintenance . Disposal
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 28 Transparency. Traceability. Trust.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 29 On the Horizon…
. NIST Special Publication 800-37, Revision 2 Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations Final Publication: October 2018 . NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5 Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations Final Publication: December 2018 . NIST Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 5 Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Information Systems and Organizations Final Publication: September 2019
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 30 Some final thoughts.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 31 Work smarter, not harder.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Institutionalize. The ultimate objective for security.
Operationalize.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Government Academia Security is a team sport.
Industry
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 35 Security. Privacy. Freedom.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 36 RMF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK SIMPLIFY. INNOVATE. AUTOMATE.
100 Bureau Drive Mailstop 8930 Gaithersburg, MD USA 20899-8930
Email Mobile [email protected] 301.651.5083 LinkedIn Twitter www.linkedin.com/in/ronross-cybersecurity @ronrossecure Web Comments csrc.nist.gov [email protected]
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 37 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #57
COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Saturday, August 18, 2018 12:04:44 PM Last Modified: Saturday, August 18, 2018 12:06:11 PM Time Spent: 00:01:27 IP Address: 174.194.13.10
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Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All
Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below none
Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version
Q4 Your contact information
Name kim pearce
City/Town clayton
State/Province NC
ZIP/Postal Code 27527
Country United States
Email Address [email protected]
59 / 59