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Surveymonkey Analyze Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #1 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 1:50:42 PM Last Modified: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 1:57:00 PM Time Spent: 00:06:17 IP Address: 99.46.152.243 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Elections Systems and Software (ES&S): EVS 5.2.2.0 Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below Why only 2 to 3 days notice? A lot of people would have been able to come if they had had more notice, again why such a short notice?? Was this used to keep some of the people from being able to attend??? Carl Satterwhite Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Carl L Satterwhite City/Town Raleigh State/Province North Carolina ZIP/Postal Code 27610 Phone Number 9192313328 1 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #2 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 2:01:57 PM Last Modified: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 2:04:52 PM Time Spent: 00:02:54 IP Address: 76.182.31.92 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below I would be very interested in attending, but I have to take my husband to an appointment at the VA Hospital. Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Pauline Hoffmann City/Town Raleigh State/Province NC ZIP/Postal Code 27613 Country USA Email Address [email protected] 2 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #3 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:16:23 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:20:56 PM Time Spent: 00:04:32 IP Address: 99.173.129.35 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below You must include a paper ballot back up. Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Shawn Slome Company Twig Living City/Town Chapel Hill State/Province NC ZIP/Postal Code 27517 Country USA Email Address [email protected] Phone Number 9194911217 3 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #4 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:23:21 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:25:33 PM Time Spent: 00:02:12 IP Address: 136.56.20.252 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below I have no experience with voting equipment, but at this point it seems like paper ballots would be the clear choice to ensure security as well as a definitive record of the vote. Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Laura Goodwin City/Town Cary State/Province NC ZIP/Postal Code 27513 Country USA Email Address [email protected] Phone Number 919-342-5767 4 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #5 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:23:01 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:26:12 PM Time Spent: 00:03:10 IP Address: 96.10.157.34 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below Fighting electronic voting tampering is very important. I favor paper ballot back up as well! Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Steve Company Roberts City/Town Wilm State/Province NC ZIP/Postal Code 28401 Country USA Email Address [email protected] Phone Number 9106193675 5 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #6 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:29:23 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:32:24 PM Time Spent: 00:03:00 IP Address: 75.75.90.72 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Other (please specify): We now know empirically we need to return to PAPER BALLOTS. Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below To preserve the integrity of the entire voting concept in the minds of the voting public we need to return to PAPER BALLOTS. The faith of the voting public in the integrity of the vote is the only thing sustaining the republic. Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name John Vanover City/Town Traphill State/Province NC ZIP/Postal Code 28685 Country United States Email Address [email protected] Phone Number 3369098282 6 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #7 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:31:01 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:35:38 PM Time Spent: 00:04:36 IP Address: 24.40.128.54 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below The system we currently use in Durham is more secure than other electronic systems because it provides a paper trail directly filled out by the voter. This should be a minimum requirement for any voting technology considered by the state. Reject any and all systems that have the voter register their preference on a touch screen or with a computer mouse. This should be a no-brainer in terms of voting security. The voter fills out a paper ballot by filling in bubbles - no hanging chads or any question about the voter's intentions. The ballot is scanned into a secure lock box, providing the convenience of electronic counting as well as security in case a manual recount is needed. This system should be used statewide and country wide. Other more fully electronic systems may claim they are secure, but any computer system can be hacked. There is no such thing as absolute security. Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Matthew Greenwolfe City/Town Durham State/Province North Carolina ZIP/Postal Code 27705 Country US Email Address [email protected] Phone Number 9193588199 7 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #8 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:39:59 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:41:11 PM Time Spent: 00:01:12 IP Address: 38.132.173.123 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Respondent skipped this question Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below Use paper ballots only Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Robert Shore Company Retired City/Town Chartlotte State/Province NC ZIP/Postal Code 28207-1617 Country Usa Email Address [email protected] Phone Number 7046502194 8 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #9 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:47:01 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 1:05:05 PM Time Spent: 00:18:03 IP Address: 104.169.167.97 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below Computers have no place in a verifiable, democratic election process. Hand-counted paper ballots are the way to go. Computers can be programmed or hacked to manipulate the results of an election without a trace of wrong-doing. Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Report on National Public Radio.docx (114KB) Q4 Your contact information Name Avram Friedman Company The Canary Coalition City/Town Sylva State/Province NC ZIP/Postal Code 28779 Country USA Email Address [email protected] Phone Number 8286313447 9 / 59 Report on National Public Radio: If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know? A ballot scanner in New York City ahead of last November's election. As new reports emerge about Russian-backed attempts to hack state and local election systems, U.S. officials are increasingly worried about how vulnerable American elections really are. While the officials say they see no evidence that any votes were tampered with, no one knows for sure. Voters were assured repeatedly last year that foreign hackers couldn't manipulate votes because, with few exceptions, voting machines are not connected to the Internet. "So how do you hack something in cyberspace, when it's not in cyberspace?" Louisiana Secretary of State Tom Schedler said shortly before the 2016 election. But even if most voting machines aren't connected to the Internet, says cybersecurity expert Jeremy Epstein, "they are connected to something that's connected to something that's connected to the Internet." Politics State And Local Officials Wary Of Federal Government's Election Security Efforts A recently leaked National Security Agency report on Russian hacking attempts has heightened concerns.
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