The Price of Voting
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Regulating the National Lottery
Section 5 Regulating the National Lottery The Third National Lottery Licence May 2021 The Third Licence Conditions 1. Grant of Licence 2. Definitions and Interpretation 3. Commencement 4. Handover from the Previous Licence 5. Service requirement 6. Prohibition of activities not related to the National Lottery 7. Consumer Protection 8. Retailer commission and retailer management 9. Independent section 6 licence applicants 10. Information and reporting 11. Payments to the Secretary of State 11A. Promotion of the National Lottery 12. Shareholders, other Connected parties and debt providers 13. Vetting 14. Control environment 15. Contractors 16. Employees 17. Performance monitoring 18. Handover on expiry or revocation of the Licence 19. Security for Players’ funds 20. Confidentiality and freedom of information 21. Intellectual Property 22. Data Protection 23. Licence extensions 24. No waiver 25. Severability 26. Governing Law and jurisdiction 27. Third Party rights 28. Notices 29. Survival Schedules Schedule 1 Definitions Schedule 2 Part 1 Games and facilities to be available in the first five weeks of the Licence Schedule 2 Part 2 Financial penalties Schedule 2 Part 3 Schedule 3 Handover from the Previous Licensee Schedule 4 Part 1 Ancillary activities that the Commission has consented to Schedule 4 Part 2 Further Conditions relating to Ancillary Activities Schedule 5 The Ancillary Activity Payment Schedule 6 Schedule 7 Codes of practice and strategies Schedule 8 Primary and Secondary Contributions Part 1 Definitions and interpretation Schedule -
Black Box Voting Ballot Tampering in the 21St Century
This free internet version is available at www.BlackBoxVoting.org Black Box Voting — © 2004 Bev Harris Rights reserved to Talion Publishing/ Black Box Voting ISBN 1-890916-90-0. You can purchase copies of this book at www.Amazon.com. Black Box Voting Ballot Tampering in the 21st Century By Bev Harris Talion Publishing / Black Box Voting This free internet version is available at www.BlackBoxVoting.org Contents © 2004 by Bev Harris ISBN 1-890916-90-0 Jan. 2004 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form whatsoever except as provided for by U.S. copyright law. For information on this book and the investigation into the voting machine industry, please go to: www.blackboxvoting.org Black Box Voting 330 SW 43rd St PMB K-547 • Renton, WA • 98055 Fax: 425-228-3965 • [email protected] • Tel. 425-228-7131 This free internet version is available at www.BlackBoxVoting.org Black Box Voting © 2004 Bev Harris • ISBN 1-890916-90-0 Dedication First of all, thank you Lord. I dedicate this work to my husband, Sonny, my rock and my mentor, who tolerated being ignored and bored and galled by this thing every day for a year, and without fail, stood fast with affection and support and encouragement. He must be nuts. And to my father, who fought and took a hit in Germany, who lived through Hitler and saw first-hand what can happen when a country gets suckered out of democracy. And to my sweet mother, whose an- cestors hosted a stop on the Underground Railroad, who gets that disapproving look on her face when people don’t do the right thing. -
Electronic Voting & Counting Technologies
ELECTION TECHNOLOGY SERIES Electronic Voting & Counting Technologies A Guide to Conducting Feasibility Studies Ben Goldsmith Senior Electoral Advisor Electronic Voting & Counting Technologies Ben Goldsmith Senior Electoral Advisor International Foundation for Electoral Systems Electronic Voting & Counting Technologies A Guide to Conducting Feasibility Studies Ben Goldsmith Senior Electoral Advisor May 2011 Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Electronic Voting & Counting Technologies: A Guide to Conducting Feasibility Studies Ben Goldsmith © 2011 by IFES. All rights reserved. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 1850 K Street, NW Fifth Floor Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S.A. Notice of rights All rights reserved. No part of this report can be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means without the prior permission of the publisher. Printed in USA ISBN: 1-931459-64-9 Photo Credits Cover: Ripple Effect Productions Page 36: Ripple Effect Productions Garie Briones Page 51: Lean Pasion Page 1: John Lawrence Page 59: Everton Bahl Grabski Page 9: Francisco Samões Page 70: Júlio Henrique da Silva Lopes Page 17: Ripple Effect Productions Page 75: Oliver Scott-Tomlin Page 25: João Cesário ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks are due to a number of colleagues and friends who were kind enough to take the time to review and comment on the initial drafts of this guide. Special thanks are due to Susanne Caarls, Peter Erben, Juhani Grossmann, Ole Holtved, Manuel Kripp, Ronan McDermott, Vladimir Pran, Amna Qayyum and Mike Yard, all of whom provided invaluable suggestions for improvements and additional areas which needed to be covered by the guide. -
On the Notion of “Software Independence” in Voting Systems
On the notion of “software independence” in voting systems Ronald L. Rivest John P. Wack Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139 [email protected] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Information Technology Laboratory Gaithersburg, MD 20899 [email protected] DRAFT Version July 28, 2006 Abstract. This paper defines and explores the notion of “software in- dependence” in voting systems: A voting system is software-independent if an undetected change or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome. We propose that software independent voting systems should be pre- ferred, and software-dependent voting systems should be avoided. VVPAT and some cryptographically-based voting systems are software-independent. Variations and implications of this definition are explored. This white paper is also for discussion by the Technical Guidelines Devel- opment Committee (TGDC) in its development of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) of 2007. 1 Introduction The main purpose of this paper is to introduce and carefully define the ter- minology of “software-independent” and “software-dependent” voting systems, and to discuss their properties. This paper is definitional in character; there are no “results” as such. The contribution is to help provide crisp terminology for discussing voting systems and some recommendations for its usage in the VVSG 2007, currently under development by NIST and the TGDC. This paper starts by describing the problem that software-independence ad- dresses: complex and difficult-to-test software in voting systems. It then defines what constitutes a software-independent approach to voting system design. -
How to Make a TV Advert on a Budget
How to Make a TV Advert on a Budget Hosted by SapientRazorfish, 10 May 2017 By Nandini Rao, Investment Writer In 2017, there is no escaping the mantra that marketing strategies should be mobile first. But according to Moz – the co-founder of creative agency Contented – nothing beats TV for advertisements. The problem, of course, is that TV ads can be massively expensive, putting them beyond the reach of many money-starved marketing departments. Which is why at a recent Financial Services Forum event, chair David Cowan asked Moz and David Sanderson, who heads SkyAdsmart, to talk about how companies can use TV ads to deliver targeted advertising on a budget. It’s not just about winning Oscars “TV can amplify the message that a company is trying to convey to its customer base,” said Moz. Emphasising that functionality is important, the Contended boss added that when working with a client on an advertisement, his company’s starting point is to identify three messages about the product or service that need to be conveyed in 30 seconds. TV commercials effectively legitimise content, according to Moz. While digitisation has liberalised the way in which content can be advertised on TV, there is some red tape involved. TV commercials must get the green light from Clearcast. According to regulatory requirements, anything claimed in a commercial has to be true. TV watchers know this so are reassured that what they see in an ad is very unlikely to be misleading. Using technology to customise ads With the panel focusing heavily on the changing role of tech, Cowan said that “Technology can magnify the power of TV ads.” Sanderson responded that Sky AdSmart does exactly this and offers advertisers a way to combine the world class content of TV with the digital world’s accountability and target. -
Can Dres Provide Long-Lasting Security? the Case of Return-Oriented Programming and the AVC Advantage Stephen Checkoway Ariel J
Can DREs Provide Long-Lasting Security? The Case of Return-Oriented Programming and the AVC Advantage Stephen Checkoway Ariel J. Feldman Brian Kantor UC San Diego Princeton UC San Diego J. Alex Halderman Edward W. Felten Hovav Shacham U Michigan Princeton UC San Diego Abstract A secure voting machine design must withstand new at- tacks devised throughout its multi-decade service life- time. In this paper, we give a case study of the long- term security of a voting machine, the Sequoia AVC Advantage, whose design dates back to the early 80s. The AVC Advantage was designed with promising secu- rity features: its software is stored entirely in read-only memory and the hardware refuses to execute instructions fetched from RAM. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that an attacker can induce the AVC Advantage to misbehave in arbitrary ways — including changing the outcome of an election — by means of a memory cartridge contain- ing a specially-formatted payload. Our attack makes es- The AVC Advantage voting machine we studied. sential use of a recently-invented exploitation technique (which does not include the daughterboard) in machines called return-oriented programming, adapted here to the decommissioned by Buncombe County, North Carolina, Z80 processor. In return-oriented programming, short and purchased by Andrew Appel through a government snippets of benign code already present in the system auction site [2]. are combined to yield malicious behavior. Our results The AVC Advantage appears, in some respects, to of- demonstrate the relevance of recent ideas from systems fer better security features than many of the other direct- security to voting machine research, and vice versa. -
Surveymonkey Analyze
Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #1 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 1:50:42 PM Last Modified: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 1:57:00 PM Time Spent: 00:06:17 IP Address: 99.46.152.243 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? Elections Systems and Software (ES&S): EVS 5.2.2.0 Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below Why only 2 to 3 days notice? A lot of people would have been able to come if they had had more notice, again why such a short notice?? Was this used to keep some of the people from being able to attend??? Carl Satterwhite Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Carl L Satterwhite City/Town Raleigh State/Province North Carolina ZIP/Postal Code 27610 Phone Number 9192313328 1 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #2 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 2:01:57 PM Last Modified: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 2:04:52 PM Time Spent: 00:02:54 IP Address: 76.182.31.92 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below I would be very interested in attending, but I have to take my husband to an appointment at the VA Hospital. Q3 If you have a document you wish to share, please Respondent skipped this question upload either a PDF or DOC/DOCX version Q4 Your contact information Name Pauline Hoffmann City/Town Raleigh State/Province NC ZIP/Postal Code 27613 Country USA Email Address [email protected] 2 / 59 Voting Systems Certification: Public Comment #3 COMPLETE Collector: Web Link 1 (Web Link) Started: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:16:23 PM Last Modified: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 12:20:56 PM Time Spent: 00:04:32 IP Address: 99.173.129.35 Page 1 Q1 Which vendor/product is your comment about? All Q2 Please provide your comment in the space below You must include a paper ballot back up. -
Chapter 08-Talion
Company Information 63 This free internet version is available at www.BlackBoxVoting.org Black Box Voting — © 2004 Bev Harris Rights reserved. ISBN 1-890916-90-0. Paperback version can be purchased at www.Amazon.com 8 Company Information (What you won’t find on the company Web sites) If anything should remain part of the public commons, it is voting. Yet as we have progressed through a series of new voting methods, control of our voting systems, and even our understanding of how they work, has come under new ownership. “It’s a shell game, with money, companies and corporate brands switching in a blur of buy-outs and bogus fronts. It’s a sink- hole, where mobbed-up operators, paid-off public servants, crazed Christian fascists, CIA shadow-jobbers, war-pimping arms dealers — and presidential family members — lie down together in the slime. It’s a hacker’s dream, with pork-funded, half-finished, secretly-programmed computer systems installed without basic security standards by politically-partisan private firms, and pro- tected by law from public scrutiny.” 1 The previous quote, printed in a Russian publication, leads an article which mixes inaccuracies with disturbing truths. Should we assume crooks are in control? Is it a shell game? Whatever it is, it has certainly deviated from community-based counting of votes by the local citizenry. We began buying voting machines in the 1890s, choosing clunky mechanical-lever machines, in part to reduce the shenanigans going This free internet version is available at www.BlackBoxVoting.org 64 Black Box Voting on with manipulating paper-ballot counts. -
Election Reform 20002006
ElElectiectionon ReformReform What’sWhat’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why 2000–2006 53134_TextX 2/1/06 8:53 AM Page 1 Table of Contents Introduction . 3 Executive Summary . 5 Voting Systems . 9 Map: Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails, 2006 . 12 Voter ID . 13 Map: State Voter Verification Requirements, 2000 . 16 Map: State Voter Verification Requirements, 2006 . 17 Statewide Registration Databases . 19 Map: Statewide Voter Registration Databases, 2000 . 22 Map: Statewide Voter Registration Databases, 2006 . 23 Chart: Statewide Voter Registration Database Contracts/Developers . 24 Legislation . 25 Litigation . 27 Map: Absentee Voting By Mail, 2000. 28 Map: Absentee Voting By Mail, 2006. 29 Map: Pre-Election Day In-Person Voting, 2000 . 30 Map: Pre-Election Day In-Person Voting, 2006 . 31 Provisional Voting . 32 Map: Provisional Balloting, 2000 . 34 Map: Provisional Balloting, 2006 . 35 Map: HAVA Fund Distribution . 36 Election Reform in the States . 39 Endnotes. 73 Methodology . 81 Table of Contents 1 ELECTION REFORM SINCE NOVEMBER 2000 53134_Text 1/28/06 2:47 AM Page 2 53134_Text 1/28/06 2:47 AM Page 3 am pleased to present the fourth edition of And watching it all, the electorate – better-informed electionline.org’s What’s Changed, What Hasn’t about the specifics of the electoral process than any and Why – our annual report detailing the state time in our history – continues to monitor develop- Iof election reform nationwide. ments and ask how, if at all, such changes will affect them. As 2006 begins, the standard title of the report is espe- cially apt. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) This is a fascinating time for followers of election imposed a number of key deadlines that finally arrived reform – and we hope this latest report will assist you January 1; as a result, the existence (or lack thereof) in understanding What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and of electoral changes – and the reasons why – are no Why. -
Cost of Counting the Vote
Cost of Counting the Vote The Price of Upgrading Voting Systems in 43 U.S. Counties By Aquene Freechild and Hamdi Soysal, Public Citizen’s Democracy Is For People Campaign May 31, 2018 - Amid serious concerns about whether our elections are secure from hackers and computer error, many state and local governments are looking to replace out-of-date paperless voting systems with paper ballot and electronic scanner systems. Pricing of voting equipment is often opaque, and in many cases, prices are negotiated on a local level. To bring some much-needed clarity to the issue, this report examines how much 43 county governments in 10 states paid for voting equipment. With this information in hand, local election officials and citizens can make the most of limited election equipment dollars. The states are: California, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia. Our key finding: While most precinct ballot scanners cost around $5,000 to $6,000, some counties have been able to negotiate more favorable pricing. However, a few counties paid a much higher than average price for their equipment. Our key conclusion: It’s important that counties band together or engage state authorities where appropriate to negotiate prices and get the best contract terms for voting equipment. Leasing equipment is an option for county officials to address the security threats quickly without committing to buying new systems on a short time frame. Limited Federal Funding In the 2018 federal spending bill passed by Congress in March 2018, lawmakers made $380 million in election security funding available to states for replacing paperless voting systems, implementing post-election audits and securing election databases. -
The New Jersey Voting-Machine Lawsuit and the AVC Advantage DRE Voting Machine
The New Jersey Voting-machine Lawsuit and the AVC Advantage DRE Voting Machine Andrew W. Appel∗ Maia Ginsburg Harri Hursti Brian W. Kernighan Princeton University Princeton University Princeton University Christopher D. Richards Gang Tan Penny Venetis Princeton University Lehigh University Rutgers School of Law – Newark Abstract As a result of a public-interest lawsuit, by Court order we were able to study, for one month, the hardware and source code of the Sequoia AVC Advantage direct-recording electronic voting machine, which is used throughout New Jersey (and Louisiana), and the Court has permitted us to publicly describe almost everything that we were able to learn. In short, these machines are vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks on the voting process. It would not be in the slightest difficult for a moderately determined group or individual to mount a vote-stealing attack that would be successful and undetectable. 1 Litigation and legislation in New Jersey In October 2004 a group of public-interest plaintiffs, represented by Professor Penny Venetis of the Rutgers Law School, sued the State of New Jersey (in NJ Superior Court) over the State’s use of direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines in New Jersey. By 2004, most of New Jersey’s counties had adopted the Sequoia AVC Advantage full-face DRE. Currently 18 out of New Jersey’s 21 counties use this DRE. The plaintiffs argued that the use of DRE voting machines is illegal and unconstitutional: illegal, because they violate New Jersey election laws requiring that all votes be counted accurately and that voting machines be thoroughly tested, accurate, and reliable; and unconstitutional, because they violate the New Jersey constitution’s requirement that all votes count.1 The plaintiffs argued that one cannot trust a paperless DRE machine to count the vote. -
Voters' Evaluations of Electronic Voting Systems
American Politics Research Volume 36 Number 4 July 2008 580-611 © 2008 Sage Publications Voters’ Evaluations of 10.1177/1532673X08316667 http://apr.sagepub.com hosted at Electronic Voting Systems http://online.sagepub.com Results From a Usability Field Study Paul S. Herrnson University of Maryland Richard G. Niemi University of Rochester Michael J. Hanmer University of Maryland Peter L. Francia East Carolina University Benjamin B. Bederson University of Maryland Frederick G. Conrad University of Michigan, University of Maryland Michael W. Traugott University of Michigan Electronic voting systems were developed, in part, to make voting easier and to boost voters’ confidence in the election process. Using three new approaches to studying electronic voting systems—focusing on a large-scale field study of the usability of a representative set of systems—we demonstrate that voters view these systems favorably but that design differences have a substantial impact on voters’ satisfaction with the voting process and on the need to request help. Factors associated with the digital divide played only a small role with respect to overall satisfaction but they were strongly associated with feeling the need for help. Results suggest numerous possible improvements in electronic voting systems as well as the need for continued analysis that assesses specific char- acteristics of both optical scan and direct recording electronic systems. Keywords: election reform; voting technology; public opinion; usability; voting machines olitical scientists’ interest in voting systems and ballots may seem rela- Ptively recent but research on these topics goes back to the beginning of the profession and includes a long line of work on ballot content (Allen, 580 Downloaded from apr.sagepub.com by guest on December 9, 2015 Herrnson et al.