The Struggle for Turkey's Internet

A Freedom House Special Report The Struggle for Turkey’s Internet Executive Summary 3 May 2013 - July 2014: 5 Turkey’s Long Year of Content Restrictions Online Infrastructure and Independence: 8 Why Turkey’s Telecommunications Sector Is Not Keeping Pace with Demand Can Pomegranates Replace Penguins? Social Media and 13 the Rise of Citizen Journalism in Turkey Endnotes 17 About the Authors Nate Schenkkan is a Program Officer Osman Coşkunoğlu is a former Aslı Tunç is professor of for Freedom House covering Turkey professor of industrial engineering communications and head of the Media and Central Asia. He is a co-author of and member of Turkish Parliament School at Bilgi University in Istanbul, Freedom House’s February 2014 report from 2002-2011, during which time he Turkey. She is co-author of a recent book Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, received several awards for his work on in Turkish, Blogdan Al Haberi, on the and Power in Turkey. technological issues in parliament. impact of political news blogs on the future of journalism. Acknowledgments Special thanks to Adrian Shahbaz, Gigi Alford, and Ilana Ullman of Freedom House for their comments and feedback. Cover image: Protesters in Ankara demonstrate against new controls on the Internet approved by Turkish parliament February 8, 2014. REUTERS/Umit Bektas Freedom House Executive Turkey as a Battleground State for Summary Regulating the Internet Nate Schenkkan This report focuses on the Internet in Turkey as it hosts the September 2014 Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Istanbul. Turkey’s hosting of the IGF is timely because of the country’s critical role as a “swing state”—or, perhaps more fitting, a “battleground state”—on issues of Internet policy. In the Internet governance discussion, “swing states” to the cutting edge of controlling online space. A have been defined as countries that have the capacity new Press Law, currently in committee in parliament, for outsize influence on international processes due would force broadly defined “Internet news sites” to to their resources and mixed political orientation.1 register and name their owners and authors, echoing Turkey's mixed orientation is clear at the level of global the law that went into effect August 1 in Russia. After Internet governance. In 2012, Turkey was one of only crudely blocking Twitter in March, the government three OECD countries to vote in favor of a new set of has also now increased its use of court orders to the International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) social media company and is increasingly finding suc- that Russia and China had backed and that argued cess in getting Twitter to remove content. for expanding the state’s role in Internet governance.2 More recently, however, in June 2014 Turkey was one A “swing state” is a country that could go either way, of a core group of countries along with the United as the term applies to the United States’ two-party States and Sweden backing a resolution at the UN system. But a more accurate American political meta- Human Rights Council to recognize that the same phor here would be the closely related “battleground rights people have offline must be respected online.3 state”—meaning a place where the bigger campaign could be won or lost. For Internet governance, Turkey At the domestic level, Turkey’s policies have been is a battleground state: a place where a young popula- more one-sided. Even prior to 2013, Turkey had tion, improving technology, and international connec- implemented an extensive and untransparent system tions could result in a free Internet the world might of website blocking. In the last 15 months, as tradi- envy, or where government tactics might provide a tional punitive offline measures restricting freedom model for shutting down a vibrant online sphere. of speech have migrated more and more to the online sphere and new legislation has increased the govern- The Internet, and social media in particular, have ment’s capacity to regulate content, Turkey has moved become an important part of public life in Turkey. As www.freedomhouse.org 3 SPECIAL REPORT The Struggle for Turkey’s Internet As of December of December 2012, Turkish users spent the second- ernance of the Internet, and genuine independence of 2012, Turkish most amount of time online per capita in Europe, after the institutions responsible for encouraging growth in users spent the the UK.4 More than 90 percent of the population ages Internet infrastructure. second-most 15-64 have a Facebook account, and more than 70 amount of percent are on Twitter. The Boston Consulting Group Even more than how it votes at international Internet time online per puts Turkey in the “Straight to Social” group of devel- governance forums, Turkey is a battleground state capita in Europe. oping countries, where rapidly expanding ranks of new in how it governs the Internet at home. Because of Internet users are going directly to social media as its position as an OECD and G-20 country, not to soon as they start using the Internet.5 mention an EU candidate and a member of NATO, the example Turkey sets is one that other countries facing Turkey is also notable for young people’s use of similar challenges from online speech will be watch- the Internet for news. A recent Gallup/BBG survey ing. Right now, the contradiction between Turkey’s showed that among 15- to 24-year-olds, the Internet words at the UN and deeds at home only serves to had nearly matched television as a source of news reinforce the belief that international norms can be (71 percent for Internet versus 75 percent for TV; manipulated in order to curtail domestic freedoms the comparable split for 25- to 34-year-olds was 56 when needed. More than percent Internet versus 90 percent TV). Forty-seven 90% are on percent of the 15-to-24 cohort got their news from so- There are structural reasons to hope that Turkey will FACEBOOK cial media6 —all despite the fact that fixed broadband not be able to consolidate control over the Internet as and mobile broadband penetration rates are currently firmly as countries like Russia and Azerbaijan. Nation- only about half of OECD averages. al institutions, including the Constitutional Court and the constitution itself, are stronger in Turkey than in In this report, Freedom House and Turkish experts consolidated autocracies. Civil society is more diverse, examine Turkey’s online sphere from three perspec- vocal, and connected to transnational networks. The tives: speech restrictions and data collection, infra- state is not yet dominated by an all-powerful execu- structure development, and the emergence of new tive. Just as important, Turkey cannot count on filling More than media. In the first section, Freedom House Program its budget with hydrocarbon revenues. Instead, the 70% are on Officer Nate Schenkkan describes the government’s country’s economy is heavily reliant on Western TWITTER tightening restrictions on online speech and expan- investment and trade, especially its customs union sion of abilities to monitor and intercept data in with the EU. The EU is Turkey’s number one import the last 15 months since the Gezi Park protests. In and export partner, and provides the overwhelming the second section, Osman Coşkunoğlu, a former majority of Turkey’s foreign direct investment. To the member of parliament and professor of industrial extent that Turkey’s European economic partners Among engineering, describes the development of Turkey’s find the lack of telecommunications infrastructure 15- to 24- telecommunications infrastructure and the policies development and censorship online problematic for year-olds, that support its development. His analysis explains their investments, Turkey will face pressure to improve the Internet how political influence over the country’s nominally its approach to the online sphere. had nearly independent regulatory authority, and the close matched relationship between the government and the coun- These factors are unlikely to produce a sudden rever- television as try’s dominant telecommunications provider, have sal in the country’s Internet policies or the broader a source of prevented infrastructure development from rising to negative trends in governance that are driven by do- news. meet demand. Finally, in the third section Aslı Tunç, a mestic political dynamics. But they will create a drag professor of communications and head of the Media on authoritarian consolidation and preserve space School at Bilgi University in Istanbul, gives readers a in which free and independent voices in traditional window into one of the most remarkable aspects of media and online continue to develop and thrive. Turkey’s Internet growth, namely, the innovative use of These voices are the ones that can help preserve the social media to create new forms of citizen journal- liberalism and diversity that have gathered strength ism. Her section concludes on a note of hope that the in Turkey over the last 20 years. In this way, Freedom growth in bottom-up journalism in Turkey can help the House hopes this report contributes to strengthening country brighten its troubled press freedom picture.7 support from the international community for sustain- But this media revival will depend on the survival of a ing the vibrancy of Turkey’s online media and a free rights- and rule of law-based model for domestic gov- Internet. 4 Freedom House May 2013 - July 2014: Turkey’s Long Year of Content Restrictions Online Nate Schenkkan Understanding restrictions on the media sphere is companies to use their media arms as lobbying firms an indispensable part of discussing how the Internet for major government contracts. Online, Türk Telekom is governed in Turkey. As Aslı Tunç notes in the third continues to hold a monopoly in Internet section of this report, one of the striking features of infrastructure and broadband services, despite the the Gezi Park protests in June 2013 was how pro- privatization of Türk Telekom in 2005 and the nominal testers turned to online platforms, especially Twitter, opening of the market to competition.

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