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Pfeiffer Metaphysics H Overview Pfeiffer: Aristotle’s Metaphysics H Overview The goal of this project is redefining the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphic substances in the Metaphysics. Its main objectives are: 1. To establish that Book H, not books Z and Θ, contains Aristotle’s authoritative account of hylomorphic substance. 2. To show that the project of book H, and indeed books ZH as a whole, is not to answer the particular question “What is primary substance?”, but the general question “What is substance?”. 3. To demonstrate that Aristotle answers the latter question by showing how, and in what sense, form, matter, and the composite are substances, and that he does so by developing in book H a novel conception of hylomorphism. 4. To argue that this novel conception of hylomorphism is based on Aristotle’s theory of scientific definitions but requires, vis-à -vis book Z, a re-interpretation of matter as potential substance and form as the actuality of matter; and finally, 5. To clarify whether this implies that Aristotle proposed two different models of hylomorphism. Against the current orthodoxy on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, these objectives imply: 1. That book H is not a set of unconnected discussions but unfolds one continuous argument. 2. That book Z does not propose a theory of substance but deals with general, logical concepts and theorems connected to the notion of substance. 3. That, therefore, the assumption that book H continues the inquiry from book Z without a significant methodological difference, and the assumption that book H clarifies the notion of matter, while book Z analyzed the concept of form, are wrong. 4. That book Θ does not elaborate on H’s treatment of substance but, on the contrary, relies on it. The outcome of this project will be presented in a monograph on Metaphysics H. Book H in context: For Aristotle, substance is the primary kind of being because all other beings depend on it. Insofar as metaphysics is concerned with what fundamentally is, it is, ultimately, the study of substance. Therefore, in answering the question "What is substance?" one will answer the fundamental question of metaphysics. Aristotle explores this question in the middle books of the Metaphysics, ZHΘ, which are among the most thoroughly studied texts in the whole Corpus Aristotelicum. Nevertheless, scholars have not reached a consensus on how to understand Aristotle's account of substance. The standard view: Judged by the proliferation of studies on book Z in the years following Frede and Patzig’s groundbreaking commentary on it ((Frede and Patzig 1988)), they could agree on where Aristotle gives his mature theory of substance, in book Z. (See, e.g., the book- length studies by (Burnyeat 2001; Lewis 2013; M. J. Loux 1991; Wedin 2000)). A useful overview of the debate is (Galluzzo and Mariani 2006).) Although differing on many points of detail, most commentators also adopted Frede and Patzig’s view on the structure of Z: At the end of Z.2, Aristotle first gives four criteria that a substance has to satisfy: the essence, the universal, the genus, and the underlying subject. Against these criteria, Aristotle tests the three candidates for substance, form, matter, and the composite, and shows that the form satisfies the requirements best and, therefore, is the primary substance. For example, the form, but not the matter, is the essence of a thing, and hence, the form will be the primary substance because it satisfies the criterion of being the essence. However, the "criteria and candidate" view, as it is called, covers only chapter 3-16 of book Z but leaves out completely Z.17 and book H. Unsurprisingly, those who adopted the "criteria and candidate" view, largely ignored Z.17-H. Partisan views: There have been some dissenting voices on the status of book Z. Most notably, Alan Code and Myles Burnyeat distinguished between a formal/logical and a metaphysical level in Z ((Burnyeat 2001; Code 1997)). They maintained that the latter presupposes Aristotle's metaphysical theory, i.e., hylomorphism. In contrast, the former relies on a theory of predication that is topic-neutral and that Aristotle's opponents should, in principle at least, share. Thus, most of book Z is a preliminary investigation that does not contain Aristotle’s well-considered views on substance. Where do we find these views? Burnyeat and Code assume that book H contains Aristotle's well-considered account of perceptible substances. However, none of them has given a detailed analysis of book H, and their approach to H remains mostly neglected by other scholars. (A notable exception is a commentary, exclusively devoted to book H, by (Morel 2015).) Instead of giving book H its due place, other commentators have turned to book Θ's theory of actuality and potentiality because they saw the importance of the conception of form as actuality and matter as potential being for Aristotle's account of the unity of hylomorphic substances ((M.L. Gill 1991; Mary Louise Gill 2010; L. A. Kosman 1984; A. Kosman 2013; Witt 2003; Yu 1997)). Since this is also the official topic of H.6, scholars treated the chapter as a prelude to book Θ and disconnected it from the rest of book H ((Charles 1994; Mary Louise Gill 1996; 2010; Harte 1996; Keeling 2012; M. Loux and Sim 1995; Scaltsas 1992)). By doing so, they got things the wrong way around. I will argue that book Θ relies on book H's treatment of form and matter to which it adds nothing new. A novel approach: Against these prevalent views — that book H is a less sophisticated, early treatment of substance that was superseded by Z ((Devereux 2003)), and only H.6 is of interest and is incomplete without book Θ — I seek to demonstrate that H as a whole presents Aristotle's mature theory of hylomorphic substance. With this, I follow Aristotle's sign-posts at the beginnings of books H and Θ: We must now draw our conclusions from what has been said, and after summing up the result, bring our inquiry to a close. (Metaph. H.1 1042a3-4) Primary being, that to which all other categories of being are referred back, has been discussed — namely, substance. (Metaph. Θ.1 1045b27-29) These passages suggest that book Z does not contain the results but is a preliminary investigation into the question “What is substance?”. They suggest further that Book H will, by using the results of book Z, answer this question, and when reaching Θ, the inquiry will have been completed. As a result, I will argue that Code's view — that book Zeta is logical and aporetic; book H is metaphysical — is correct and will significantly expand on it. This will involve, on the one hand, demonstrating against most interpreters that book H unfolds one continuous argument. I will argue that, in H.1-2, Aristotle develops further the idea, introduced in Z.17, that the form is the cause of matter's constituting a hylomorphic substance, and that, in H.3-6, he explains how the form is also the principle of the unity of substance. To use Aristotle's example of the syllable BA: The syllable BA is not identical to the A and the B because BA and AB are different syllables. The form, the arrangement of the letters, explains how BA and AB differ and what it is for them to exist. However, the form is not a material constituent, not a further letter, but a principle of unity. In this way, the syllable BA single kind of thing whose unity is compatible with its consisting of parts. My project will involve further, on a more general level, correcting widespread views about the relation of book Z and H. In particular, I will argue that book Z (a) often deals with general, logical concepts and theorems connected to the notion of substance; (b) discusses problems that arise from with these general theorems and typically occur on this level of generality; and (c) focuses on objections that derive from Aristotle's opponents's inability to adequately deal with these general theorems. In contrast, in book H Aristotle’ presents his specific and well– developed views on hylomorphic substances. I will demonstrate in detail how Aristotle develops his account in book H by employing the general concepts and theorems from book Z, and how by the end of book H, Aristotle will have answered the remaining puzzles from book Z. The problems and theorems that book H elaborates on are: (1) that the substance is a subject; (2) that the essence of X is its substance, and X is the same as its essence; (3) that the substance cannot be a universal; (4) in what way form is predicated of matter; (5) whether the definition of a hylomorphic substance contains both form and matter; (6) how the fact that no substance can be composed of substances is compatible with the fact that hylomorphic substances are complex. References Burnyeat, Miles. 2001. A Map of Metaphysics Zeta. Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications. Charles, David. 1994. “Matter and Form: Unity, Persistence, and Identity.” In Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, edited by T. Scaltsas, David Charles, and Mary Louise Gill, 75–105. Oxford University Press. Code, Alan. 1997. “Aristotle’s Metaphysics as a Science of Principles.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (201): 357–378. Devereux, D. 2003. “The Relationship Between Books Zeta and Eta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 25: 159–211. Frede, M., and G. Patzig. 1988. Aristoteles. Metaphysik Z. Vol. 1. München: C.H. Beck. Galluzzo, Gabriele, and Mauro Mariani.
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