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Some of the bolded in the text are mere cognates to the words that appear in this glossary, so if you are unable to find the precise that was bolded in the text, try looking for cognate words.

absolutism The view that there are some types of could turn into a cockroach, so having a that are strictly prohibited by , no body isn’t one of his essential . Some what the specific are in a argue that the metaphysical case. Some have held, for example, that the inten- that underlies the accidental–essential distinction tional torturing or killing of an innocent is is wrong. Things belong to many kinds, which morally impermissible no matter what bad con- are more or less important for various classifica- sequences could be prevented by such an action. tory purposes, but there is no kind that is more Absolutism is an especially strict kind of deonto- fundamental than all others apart from such pur- logical view. It is discussed by in poses. Quine, a leading skeptic, gives the example “War and Massacre.” of a bicyclist: If Fred is a bicyclist, is he necessar- ily two-legged? accidental and essential A is essential for an if the object must have the property to affirming the consequent Affirming the conse- exist and be the kind of thing that it is. A property quent is the logical committed by argu- is accidental if the object has the property, but ments of the following form: doesn’t have to have it to exist or be the kind of thing that it is. If P, then Q. Suppose Fred has short hair. That is an acci- Q. dental property of his. He would still be Fred, Therefore, P. and still be a human , if he let his hair grow long or shaved it off completely. An essential This is an invalid form. Consider property is one that a thing has to have to be the this argument, which affirms the consequent: thing that it is, or to be the kind of thing it - damentally is. As a human being, Fred wouldn’t If Jones is 20 years old, then Jones is exist unless he had a , so having a younger than 50 years old. human body is an essential property of his. Jones is younger than 50 years old. Statements about which properties are essen- Therefore, Jones is 20 years old. tial tend to be controversial. A dualist might dis- agree about our last example, arguing that Fred is Clearly, this argument is a bad one: Jones fundamentally a that might exist without could be any age younger than 50. any body at all, so having a body isn’t one of his When someone affirms the consequent, often essential properties. Someone who has been read- he or she is mistaking his or her as a ing Kafka’s Metamorphoses might argue that Fred harmless instance of .

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agent-causation Agent-causation is a (putative) from to defend the of the type of causation that can best be understood by known to the argued for analogies. contrasting it with -causation. When a ball analytic and synthetic Analytic statements are hits and breaks a window, one may think of the those that are true (or ) in of the way causal relationship here in terms of one event the or meanings in them fit together. A causing another, namely, the ball’s hitting the win- standard example is “No bachelor is married.” dow causing the window’s being broken. In an in- This is true simply in virtue of the meanings of stance of agent causation, it is not one event that the words. “No bachelor is happy,” on the causes another. Rather, an agent—a persisting hand, is synthetic. It isn’t true or false just in substance—causes an event. Some philosophers, virtue of the meanings of the words. It is true or such as (see Chisholm, false in virtue of the of bachelors, and “Human and the ”) have argued these can’t be determined just by thinking about that agent-causation is required for genuine free the meanings of the words. . Agent-causation is also (see Chisholm) The analytic/synthetic distinction is closely re- sometimes referred to as immanent causation, and lated to the necessary–contingent distinction and event causation sometimes referred to as transe- the a priori–a posteriori distinction; indeed, these unt causation. three distinctions are often confused with one an- ampliative/nonampliative inference See deductive other. But they are not the same. The last one has argument. to do with , the middle one with pos- sibility, and the first one with . Although analogy An analogy is a similarity between things. some philosophers think that the three distinc- In an argument from analogy, one argues from tions amount to the same thing, others do not. known similarities to further similarities. Such Kant maintains that of arithmetic are a often occur in philosophy. In his Dia- priori and necessary but not analytic. Kripke logues Concerning Natural , maintains that some statements are nec- considers an argument from analogy that pur- essary, but not analytic or a priori. ports to show that the was created by an intelligent being. The character Cleanthes claims analytical philosophy The term analytical philoso- that the as a whole is similar to things like phy is often used for a of doing philosophy clocks. A clock has a variety of interrelated parts that was dominant throughout most of the twen- that function together in ways that serve ends. tieth century in Great Britain, North America, is also a complex of interrelated parts Australia, and New Zealand. This way of doing that function in ways that serve ends, such as pro- philosophy puts great emphasis on clarity, and it viding food for human consumption. Clocks are usually sees philosophy as a matter of clarifying the result of intelligent design, so, Cleanthes con- important in the , the humani- cludes, probably the world as a whole is also the ties, , and everyday , rather than pro- product of intelligent design. Hume’s character viding an independent source of knowledge. criticizes the argument. In “The Argument Analytical philosophy is often contrasted with from Analogy for Other ,” Bertrand Rus- , the sort of philosophy that sell uses an argument from analogy to try to jus- has been more dominant in , , tify his that other conscious exist. Spain, Italy, and some other European countries. Arguments from analogy are seldom airtight. The term was first associated with the move- It is possible for things to be very similar in some ment initiated by and G. E. respects, but quite different in others. A loaf of Moore early in the twentieth century to reject the bread might be about the same size and shape as a idealistic philosophy of F. H. Bradley, which had rock. But it differs considerably in weight, texture, been influenced by the German of Hegel , and nutritive . A successful argument and others. Moore saw philosophy as the 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 841


of concepts. Analytical philosophy grew out of the side. One couldn’t figure out whether it was rain- approach and concerns of Moore and Russell, ing or not by just reasoning about it. Now con- combined with the logical positivist movement sider the following questions: (1) Are there any and certain elements of in America. married bachelors? (2) What is the sum of 38 and However, the term analytical philosophy now 27? After a bit of , you should conclude refers to many philosophers who do not subscribe that there are no married bachelors, and 38 + 27 to the exact conceptions of philosophy held by the = 65. You know these things a priori. You didn’t analysts, logical positivists, or pragmatists. to make any about what was Indeed, there are really no precise conceptual happening. You just needed to . or geographic boundaries separating analytical One important question about a priori truths and continental philosophy. There are many is whether they are all analytic, or whether there analytical philosophers on the continent of are some synthetic a priori truths. The philoso- and many who identify themselves pher Kant thought that (1) above was a priori and with continental philosophy in English-speaking analytic, whereas (2) was a priori and synthetic. countries. And there are important subgroups See analytic and synthetic for further discussion. within each group. Within analytical philosophy, An a priori argument is one that uses no empir- some philosophers take as their model, and ical . An a priori is one that is in- others emphasize ordinary . Both ana- nate or could be acquired just by using one’s lytical and continental philosophers draw inspi- reason. ration from of , See also analytic and synthetic; contingent from the pre-Socratics, , and to and necessary; of and of Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Frege, Husserl, ideas. James, and Dewey. a priori See a posteriori and a priori. antecedent See conditionals. argument from analogy See analogy. Anthropomorphism is the asymmetric attitudes To say that our attitudes to- practice of ascribing to nonhuman beings proper- ward two things are asymmetrical is simply to say ties and characteristics of human beings. In phi- that they are different. The asymmetric attitudes losophy of religion, there is a general concern arise as a particular puzzle when the things to- whether and to what extent our thought about ward which we hold asymmetric attitudes are ap- is problematically anthropomorphic. For in- parently the same in relevant ways. stance, it is commonly held that depictions of A prime example of this is the asymmetric at- God as having a body are mere anthropomor- titudes we hold toward the before birth and phisms. But what about depictions of God as be- the time after . Both are long periods of time coming angry or frustrated? Whether such in which we do not exist. It would seem, then, that depictions ought to be taken literally or treated as our attitudes toward them should be symmetric. merely anthropomorphic is a matter of some con- Intuitively, though, it seems reasonable to regard troversy. death as a bad thing, and unreasonable to regard the period of prenatal nonexistence as comparably a posteriori and a priori A posteriori knowledge is bad. That is, we hold asymmetric attitudes to- based on , on of how ward death and prenatal nonexistence. things are in the world of changing things. A pri- ori knowledge is based on reasoning rather than Atheism is disbelief in a god. Strictly observation. speaking, atheists are those who don’t believe in Your knowledge that it is raining outside is a any god or , but often will describe posteriori knowledge. It is based on your experi- someone who does not believe in the god or gods ence, your observation of what is happening out- in which they believe as an atheist. 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 842


basic structure In “A of ,” John At the end of the tour he says, “This is all very well, Rawls says that his theory of justice concerns a so- but what I’d like to see is the .” Your ciety’s major social, political, and economic insti- friend would here be making a -mistake. tutions. His examples include the of He apparently thinks that the university is yet an- competitive markets, basic political , and other building in addition to the library, and so on, the structure of the . Rawls calls this the whereas in it is more like the sum total of basic structure of a . G. A. Cohen, in such buildings and their relationships. “Where the Action Is,” argues that there is an im- causal See determinism. portant in this idea. cause and effect We think of the world as more than Behaviorism is used in somewhat dif- just things happening; the things that happen are ferent in and philosophy. In connected to one another, and what happens later psychology, behaviorism was a twentieth-century depends on what happens earlier. We suppose that movement that maintained that the study of be- some things cause others, their effects. The havior is the best or even the only way to study of cause connects with other important notions, mental phenomena scientifically. It is opposed to such as responsibility. We blame people for the the introspective methods for the study of the harm they cause, not for things that just happened mind emphasized in much psychology of the when they were in the vicinity. We assume that nineteenth century. This is methodological behav- there is a cause when things go wrong—when iorism. A methodological behaviorist might even airliners crash, or the climate changes, or the elec- believe in an immaterial mind (see dualism), but tricity goes off—and we search for an maintain nevertheless that there was no scientific that discloses the cause or causes. way to study the immaterial mind except Causation is intuitively a relation of depend- through its effects on observable, bodily . ence between events. The event that is caused, the In philosophy, however, behaviorism opposes effect, depends for its occurrence on the cause. It dualism; the term means some form of the view wouldn’t have happened without it. The occur- that the mind is above and beyond be- rence of the cause explains the effect. Once we see havior. Logical behaviorists maintain that talk that the cause happened, we understand why the about the mind can be reduced without remain- effect did. der to talk about behavior. Criteriological behav- Most philosophers agree that causal connec- iorists maintain that mental terms may not be tions are contingent rather than necessary. Suppose completely reducible to behavioral terms, but the blowout caused the . Still, it was pos- they can only be given meaning through ties to sible for the blowout to happen and the accident behavioral criteria. not to occur. After all, the world might have Behaviorism is closely related to functionalism. worked in such a way that a blowout was fol- British See empiricism. lowed not by an accident but by the car’s gradu- ally slowing to a halt. Cartesian dualism See dualism. On one common view, however, causation im- category-mistake According to (see plies of in the that causal con- “Descartes’s ”) a category-mistake is commit- nections are instances of such laws. So causal ted (roughly) when one thinks of or represents relations are “relatively necessary”: they are con- things of a certain kind as being or belonging to a tingent only insofar as the laws of nature are con- category or logical type to which they do not be- tingent. It may be a contingent fact that the laws long. Ryle’s examples illustrate this sort of mistake of are what they are. But, on this view, nicely. Suppose someone visits your university, and given the contingent fact that the laws of nature you take him on a tour of the campus, showing are as they are, the accident had to happen once him the student commons, the library, and so on. the blowout did. 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 843


Hume holds such a view. He claims that, at of the mind passing from to least as far as can comprehend things, A expectation, to identify what else there is. causing B amounts, at bottom, to the fact that commodification We treat some as events like A are always followed by events like B. to norms of a market: They can be bought and Causation requires succession. (Such sold for prices that are subject to pressures of sup- universal succession is sometimes called custom- ply and . This is how we see, for example, ary or constant conjunction.) At first this doesn’t cars and : We treat cars and computers seem very plausible. After all, many blowouts as commodities. Are there moral limits to such don’t lead to accidents. It seems more plausible if commodification—moral limits to the appropri- we assume that Hume is thinking of the total ate of markets? If so, what are they and cause, the blowout plus all the other relevant fac- what is their justification? These are questions tors that in this case led to the accident, including Debra Satz explores in her “Markets in Women’s the design of the car and the skill of the driver. Reproductive Labor.” Taken this way, the universal succession analysis implies that if the blowout caused the accident, and In philoso- then if all of these relevant conditions were du- phy, the term compatibilism usually refers to a po- plicated in another case, and there is a blowout, sition in the issue of freedom versus determinism. an accident would happen. If not, and if the Intuitively it seems that freedom excludes deter- blowout really caused the accident in the original minism, and versa. But this has been denied case, there must be some relevant . by some philosophers; they claim that acts can be This version of universal succession seems more both free and determined, usually adding that the plausible, but perhaps not totally convincing. traditional problem is the product of confused Even if we grant the Humean relevant differ- thinking abetted by too little to the ence , there are difficulties with the idea meaning of words. that causation simply is universal succession. Hume held this position. In Section VIII of his Consider what it means about the case of the An Concerning Human , he blowout causing the accident. What is describes his project as one of “reconciling” lib- connection, according to the universal succession erty with necessity, these being his terms for free- theory, between this particular blowout and this dom and determinism. Hume said that particular accident? It just seems to be that the consists of acting according to the determinations blowout occurred, and then the accident oc- of your will; that is, doing as you decide to do. A curred. That’s all there really is to causation, as it free act is not one that is uncaused, but one that is pertains to these two events. All the rest that is re- caused by the wants, , and decisions of the quired, on the universal succession analysis, has person who performs it. Hence an act can be both to do with other events—events like the blowout free and an instance of a universal causal princi- and events like the accident. It seems that there is ple. On this conception, an unfree act is one that more to causation than this. one must do in of one’s own desires and de- Hume offers a candidate for this additional cisions, rather than because of them. something involved in causation. He says it is re- Some compatibilists go further and maintain ally just a certain feeling we have when we have that freedom requires determinism. The idea is experienced many cases of events of one type that for our own will to determine what we do, being followed by events of another. When we our decisions must cause our actions, and causa- have had this experience, our minds pass from tion in turn requires determinism. the perception of an event of the first kind to an Given this distinction, the views of most expectation of one of the second kind. Hume philosophers on the issue of freedom and deter- challenges us, if we are not satisfied that causa- minism can be located among the following pos- tion is just universal succession together with the sible positions: 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 844


1. Incompatibilism: Freedom and determin- Conditionals can be in various tenses and in ism are incompatible. This view leaves the indicative or subjunctive: open two main theoretical options: a. : There are some free acts, Indicative: If Susan comes to the party, then so determinism is false. Michael brings the salad. If Susan came to the party, b. : Determinism is true, then Michael brought the salad. If Susan will come to so there are no free acts. the party, Michael will bring the salad. 2. Compatibilism: Freedom and determinism Subjunctive: If Susan were to come to the party, are compatible. This view is typically part Michael would bring the salad. If Susan had come to of a view called soft determinism, according the party, Michael would have brought the salad. to which there are free acts and determin- A counterfactual conditional, one in which the ism is also true. This view in turn comes in antecedent is false, will usually be in the sub- two varieties: junctive if the speaker realizes that the an- a. There are free acts. Determinism is as a tecedent is false. matter of fact true, but there would be One thing seems quite clear about condition- free acts whether or not determinism als: If the antecedent is true, and the consequent were true. false, then the conditional as a whole is false. If b. There are free acts. Determinism is true Susan comes to the party, and Michael doesn’t and its is required for freedom. bring the salad, then all of the examples preced- 3. Freedom is incoherent: Freedom both re- ing are false. This is the basis for two clearly valid quires and is incompatible with determin- rules of inference: ism, and hence makes no sense. Modus ponens: From If P, then Q and P, infer Q. Some philosophers distinguish between free- Modus tollens: From If P, then Q and not-Q, dom of action and . Free will involves infer not-P. more than having one’s actions determined by one’s decisions and desires. It involves having In symbolic logic a defined (often “R”) is control over those desires and decisions them- called the conditional. The conditions under which . Someone might have freedom, as the com- conditional statements that involve this symbol are patibilist understands it, without having free true are stipulated by logicians as follows: will. For example, a person addicted to smoking 1. Antecedent true, consequent true, condi- might be free in the sense that whether or not he tional true or she smokes on a given occasion is determined 2. Antecedent true, consequent false, condi- by personal . But what if this person doesn’t tional false want to have or be controlled by that desire? 3. Antecedent false, consequent true, condi- Does he or she have the power to get rid of the de- tional true sire, or weaken its hold? This is the question of 4. Antecedent false, consequent false, condi- free will. The issue of whether free will is com- tional true patible or incompatible with determinism can then be raised. This defined symbol, then, agrees with the or- dinary language conditional on the clear case, conclusion See deductive argument. 2, the case that is crucial for the conditionals A conditional is a kind of of modus ponens and modus tollens. But what that is made out of two others. The normal form about the other cases? Suppose Susan doesn’t of the statements is “If P then Q.” P is the an- come to the party, but Michael brings that salad tecedent and Q the consequent. “If P, Q” and “Q, if (antecedent false, consequent true). P” are stylistic variations of “If P then Q.” logic statement, 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 845


Susan comes to the party turned out differently. If he had gotten a later Michael brings the start, he might not have reached America until salad 1493. So the fact that he arrived in 1492 is contin- gent. Necessary facts are those that could not is true in this case, because of part 3 of the defi- have failed to be facts. The year 1492 would have nition. It isn’t so clear that the ordinary language occurred before the year 1493 no matter how long conditionals are true. Suppose that Michael says, it took Columbus to get his act together. It is a “I brought the salad because Susan couldn’t make necessary fact. Mathematical facts are a particu- it. If she had come, she would have brought it.” Are larly clear example of necessary facts. The fact any or all of the ordinary language conditionals that 2 + 2 = 4 doesn’t depend on one thing hap- listed true in this case? False? What of Michael’s pening rather than another. second , which is also a conditional? Philosophers sometimes use the idea of a See necessary and sufficient conditions. to explain this distinction. Neces- sary truths are true in every possible world. consequent See conditionals. Contingent truths are true in the actual world but Consequentialism is a view about false in some other possible . Necessary what makes it right or wrong to do something. It falsehoods are false in the actual world and false maintains that the rightness of an action is deter- in every other possible world, too. If one thinks of mined by the goodness or badness of relevant the distinction this way, one must be careful to consequences. is a consequentialist distinguish between the truth of a sentence and theory that holds that what makes consequences the truth of what it says. It is easy to imagine a better or worse is, at bottom, the welfare or hap- possible world in which the sentence “2 + 2 = 4” piness of sentient beings. A deontological is false. Just imagine that the numeral “2” stood rejects consequentialism and holds that the right- for the number three, but “4” still stands for four. ness of action depends at least in part on things But imagining the sentence to have a meaning other than the goodness of relevant conse- that makes it false is not the same as imagining quences. For example, someone who rejects con- what it says, given its actual meaning, to be false. sequentialism might hold that the principle It is the latter that is important when we ask if it under which an act is done determines whether it is necessary or contingent that 2 + 2 = 4. is right or wrong. Kant held a version of this The distinction between the necessary and view; see the Introduction to Part V. contingent is a metaphysical distinction. It has to do with facts or and truth. It is constitutive luck Constitutive luck is one of the closely related to the epistemological distinction four types of moral luck identified by Thomas between a priori and a posteriori and the distinc- Nagel. One is subject to constitutive luck insofar tion between analytic and synthetic statements. as the sort of person that one is (one’s character, These three similar distinctions shouldn’t be con- personality, etc.) is beyond one’s control and yet fused. Some philosophers claim that they are co- the person is still seen as an apt candidate for extensional. But they are not cointensional, so this praise and blame. See also moral luck. is a substantive philosophical claim. For example, continental philosophy See analytical philosophy. some philosophers claim that there are mathe- matical facts that have nothing to do with the continental See rationalism. meanings of words, and may never be known at contingent and necessary Some things are facts, all, and are hence not knowable a priori, but are but would not have been facts if things had hap- still necessary. pened differently. These are contingent facts. corroboration See deductivism. Consider, for example, the fact that Columbus reached America in 1492. Things could have See . 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 846


See cosmos. not contain anything not already found in the premises. In other words, the conclusion is sim- See cosmos. ply “drawn out of” the premises. They are thus cosmos The cosmos is the universe considered as necessarily truth preserving: If the premises are an integrated orderly system. Sometimes the cos- true, the conclusion (because, logically, it says no mos is the orderly part of a larger whole, the more than the premises) must also be true. De- other part being chaos. Any account of the origin ductive logic provides rules of inference that ex- of the universe as a whole, whether based on hibit valid of reasoning. myth, religion, philosophy, or is a cos- An argument can provide those who believe mogony. An account of the nature and origin of its premises reason for accepting its conclu- the universe that is systematic is a cosmology. This sion even if it is not valid. Among arguments that term is used for the particular branch of physics are not valid, we can distinguish between those that considers this question, and also for that are strong and weak. A strong nondemon- of a more philosophical nature. Cosmological ar- strative or nondeductive argument makes the guments for the begin with very truth of the conclusion very probable. Analogical general facts about the known universe, such as arguments, for example, are nondeductive but can causation, movement, and , and then be quite strong. argue that God must exist, as first cause, or un- Inductive arguments involve generalizing moved mover, or necessary being, to account for from instances. Having noticed that a certain these facts. The first two ways of proving the ex- radio station plays rock on a number of oc- istence of God listed by St. are casions, you may infer that it always does so, or cosmological arguments. that it is at least very likely that it will do so next time you tune in. This process is called induction customary/constant conjunction See cause and by enumeration. Inductive arguments are amplia- effect. tive in character: The conclusion of these argu- death The end of life; the cessation of the biologi- ments “goes beyond” what is contained in the cal functioning of the body. All known living premises. Such are not valid, but it things eventually die. seems that they can be quite strong and in fact the whole idea of using past experiences to guide deductive argument Arguments have premises our conduct depends on them. See induction, and a conclusion. The truth of the premises problem of. should provide grounds for the truth of the con- clusion, so that the argument gives one who be- deductivism Deductivism is the thesis that science lieves the premises a good reason for believing the should solely on deductive arguments rather conclusion. than inductive arguments because there is no good In a valid argument, the truth of the premises response to the . Deductivism is entails the truth of the conclusion. This means most closely associated with the twentieth-century that it is impossible for the premises to be true of sc\ience . Popper advo- and the conclusion false. A valid argument may cated the hypothetico-deductive model of science, have a false conclusion because the validity of an which held that science should make falsifiable hy- argument does not imply the truth of the prem- potheses about the world and then test them. Hy- ises. If the premises of a valid argument are true, potheses that are not falsified despite severe tests then the argument is sound. Clearly the conclu- are corroborated (although not confirmed). Accord- sion of any sound argument will be true. ing to this model of science, the difference between An argument that aims at validity is deductive, scientific and (say) metaphysical claims is that scien- or demonstrative. Such arguments are nonamplia- tific claims are falsifiable. For discussion, see tive in the following sense: The conclusion does Salmon, “The Problem of Induction.” 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 847


demonstrative/nondemonstrative inference See de- is the intended effect of your act, and waking ductive argument. your brother is merely foreseen. According to the (or principle) of dou- See consequentialism. ble effect, the moral status of intended effects dif- deontology Deontology is the study of ethical con- fers from those that are merely foreseen. This cepts having to do with permissibility and imper- principle is sometimes appealed to as a part of a de- missibility, e.g., , , and . See ontological moral theory. According to this princi- deontological ethics. ple, it might be wrong to swat the fly with the determinism Determinism is the doctrine that of waking up your brother, but permis- every event, including every intentional action of a sible to swat the fly with the intention of killing it, human being, is determined by prior causes. This knowing it would wake up your brother. A more is usually thought to imply that there are universal, interesting example is abortion. Some people nonstatistical laws of nature covering every aspect maintain that it is wrong to act with the intention of that happens. See cause and effect. of aborting a fetus, but that nevertheless certain Given the of the universe at any time, these operations may be permissible, even though abor- laws determine everything else that will ever hap- tion of the fetus is a foreseeable result, so long as pen. Some philosophers oppose determinism, be- they are done for some other purpose, such as pre- cause they think that the ultimate laws of nature venting the injury to a mother that continued are statistical. Others oppose it because they pregnancy might involve. Some philosophers believe there are free actions, and that no actions maintain the distinction makes no sense. Others can be both free and determined. See freedom, believe there is a coherent distinction between in- compatibilism and incompatibilism, . tended and merely expected consequences, but that it has the moral significance it is given difference principle A central idea of ’s by the doctrine of double effect. theory of justice, referred to as the difference prin- ciple, is that inequalities in the distribution of doxastic/doxically Doxastic states are states having relevant goods are just if and only if these in- to do with beliefs. If I have the belief that p, I am equalities are needed to improve the plight of in the doxastic state of believing that p. A consid- everyone, in particular of those who are the worst eration is doxically relevant if it is relevant to one’s off. (See Rawls’s second principle of justice, “A beliefs. Theory of Justice,” p. 578, and G. A. Cohen’s for- mulation, “Where the Action Is,” p. 599.) dualism The term dualism has a number of uses in philosophy, but perhaps the most common is to See justice. describe positions on the mind-body problem double effect, doctrine of An act typically has both that hold that the mind cannot be identified with intended and unintended effects. For example, the body or part of the body, or that mental prop- swatting a fly may have the intended effect erties are not physical properties. of killing a fly, and the unintended effects of The form of dualism Descartes advocated is making a noise and waking up your brother. The called Cartesian dualism or interactive dualism. latter effect may be unintended even though it is The mind is that which is responsible for mental foreseen. You knew that swatting the fly would states of all kinds, including sensation, percep- or at least might wake your brother. That’s not tion, thought, , deliberation, decision, why you were doing it; you were doing it to get and intentional action. Some philosophers main- rid of the fly. Perhaps you didn’t much care tain that this is played by the , but whether or not your brother slept. Perhaps you Descartes argued that this could not be so. His hated to wake him, but it was very important to view was that the mind was a separate thing, or you to swat the fly. In these cases, swatting the fly substance, that causally interacted with the brain, 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 848


and through it with the rest of the body and the human beings ought to pursue their own self- rest of the world. Sensation and perception in- . On another usage, it refers simply to the volve states of the world affecting states of sense view that human beings do (perhaps exclusively) organs, which in turn the brain, which pursue their own self-interest. causes the mind to be in certain states. Action in- eliminative See materialism and volves states of mind affecting the brain, which in . turn affects the body, which may interact with other things in the world. embodiment An embodied thing has taken physi- Other forms of dualism include epiphenome- cal, tangible form. That which has been embodied nalism, , and . The has, literally, been put into a body. Embodiment epiphenomenalist holds that the body affects the can mean either the process of taking form in this mind, but not vice versa. The mind only appears way, or the state of having been embodied. to affect the body, because the apparent mental Philosophers are most concerned with the em- causes of bodily changes (like the decision to lift bodiment of , that is, with the way in my arm) coincide with the true bodily causes which thinking, conscious things inhabit physical (some change in my brain). Parallelists hold that forms, and how a conscious being relates to its mind and body are two substances that do not embodiment. interact at all. Property dualism maintains that empiricism Empiricism is an epistemological posi- the mind can be identified with the brain (or with tion that emphasizes the importance of experi- the body as a whole), but mental properties cannot ence and denies or is very skeptical of claims to a be reduced to physical ones. On this view, it is my priori knowledge or concepts. The empirical tra- brain that is responsible for sensation, perception, dition in seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nine- and other mental phenomena. But the fact that teenth-century philosophy was centered in my brain is thinking a certain thought, for exam- Britain, and Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and ple, is an additional fact about it, one that cannot Mill are often referred to as British Empiricists. See be reduced to any of its physical properties. also rationalism. effect See cause and effect. endurance See perdurance and endurance. efficient causation Efficient causation is one of the en-soi According to the existentialist philosopher four types of causation that Aristotle distin- Jean-Paul Sartre, the world is divided between guished. Of these four types, efficient causation is two sorts of beings: beings-in-themselves (en-soi) the sort of causation that best fits contemporary and beings-for-themselves (pour-soi). Beings-in- usage of the word causation. The efficient cause themselves are inanimate things like rocks, of an event is (roughly) the agent or event that whereas beings-for-themselves are beings that brings the effect about. If a ball breaks a window, exhibit feeling and . the efficient cause of this event is roughly the ball’s hitting the window. If Jones raises his hand, entails See deductive argument. the efficient cause of this event is, according See dualism. to some, Jones himself. When (as in this last example) an agent is supposed to be the efficient Epistemology is the theory of knowl- cause of some event, this is a (putative) instance of edge, the inquiry into its possibility, nature, and agent-causation (see agent-causation). For another structure. type of causation distinguished by Aristotle, see final causation. ergon This is the Greek word for function, which is a concept that plays an important role in Aris- Egoism has many usages in philosophical totle’s moral theory. For Aristotle, the ergon of . On one usage, it refers to the view that an object is more than just what we may use that 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 849


object for—rather, it is whatever activity makes saying that pious actions are those actions that that object the sort of thing that it is. For exam- the gods , responds by asking ple, although we can use a knife to hammer a whether the gods love pious actions because they nail into a wall if we wish, this is not the knife’s are pious or whether pious actions are pious ergon. Rather, a knife’s ergon is to cut. For dis- because the gods love them. This is a dilemma cussion, see Thomas Nagel’s “Aristotle on Eu- because either response is to some degree unsat- daimonia.” isfactory. If Euthyphro says that the gods love pious actions because they are pious, then this error theory Some philosophical views have the seems to imply that there is something out of the implication that we regularly but unknowingly control of the gods—namely what actions count fall into error when we make claims about some as pious. But, on the other hand, if we say that particular domain of inquiry. For instance, it is a pious actions are pious because the gods love consequence of J. L. Mackie’s view in “The Sub- them, then presumably the gods could have jectivity of Values” that although we regularly loved morally despicable actions, in which case think that at least some of our moral judgments it would follow that some morally despicable ac- are true, they are in fact systematically false. tions would be pious. Mackie thus provides an error theory about More recently, the term moral judgments. As Mackie points out, such has come to refer to the structurally parallel prob- require strong support because of the lem about moral rightness and wrongness, rather challenge they pose to . than . For example, are wrong actions essential See accidental and essential. wrong because God forbids them or does God forbid them because they are wrong? In general, eternalism and presentism Of course dinosaurs the dilemma demands an order of explanation— don’t exist right now, but do they just plain is an action’s being wrong explained by its being exist? Again, of course my great-great-grandson forbidden, or is God’s act of forbidding the action doesn’t exist at this moment, but does he exist nev- explained by the action’s being wrong?—and so ertheless? According to eternalism, which is a any order of explanation dilemma, whether view about past and objects, the answer to about God or not, may be considered a version of these questions is “Yes.” Just as The Eiffel Tower the Euthyphro dilemma. exists even though it doesn’t exist over here, so dinosaurs exist even though they don’t exist right event-causation See agent-causation. now. This view is often contrasted with a view , problem of Many philosophers have thought called presentism, according to which the only ob- that the existence of evil poses a problem for jects that exist are those that exist right now. Ac- those who believe that there is a perfect God. A cording to presentism, when dinosaurs went perfect God, it seems, would be able to do any- extinct, they didn’t just cease to exist from then thing (), would know everything on—rather, they ceased to exist altogether. (), and would have all the moral Eudaimonia—sometimes translated , such as benevolence. If such a God cre- “” or “flourishing”—is a central con- ated the world, why is there any evil? Does God cept in Aristotle’s ethics. See “” not care if we suffer? Then God is not benevo- in Part V. lent. Is this world the best God could make? Then God is not omnipotent. Or perhaps God Euthyphro dilemma The original Euthyphro wanted to do better, and had the power, but did- dilemma is found in one of Plato’s in n’t quite know what to do. Then God is not which Socrates is questioning an Athenian ominscient. A perfect God would have made the named Euthyphro about the nature of piety. best of all possible worlds. So, the argument When Euthyphro attempts to explain piety by goes, the existence of our imperfect world, full 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 850


of and , shows that God does not co-extensional without being co-intensional. Rus- exist, or is not perfect. sell’s example is “human being” and “featherless The is pressed by Philo, a main biped that is not a plucked chicken.” These terms character in Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Reli- are not co-intensional, as the property of being a gion. Both Philo and his main adversary, Clean- human being is not the same as the property of thes, give up the idea that God is perfect. Philo being a featherless biped that is not a plucked concludes that while the world was probably cre- chicken. But they are co-extensional. If you aside ated by an intelligent being or beings, there is no the plucked chickens, humans are the only bipeds reason to attribute benevolence to that being or without feathers. (Probably their extensions are those beings. Cleanthes allows that God may be not quite the same; after all there are plucked only finitely powerful. turkeys, too, but Russell thought the example was Other philosophers have thought, however, close enough to being correct to make the point.) that our with evil simply show how dif- The term is often used in an extended ficult it is for finite beings to grasp the of an sense in which and have exten- infinitely perfect being. This is, contrary to first sions as well as terms or predicates. (The terminol- impressions, the best of all possible worlds. This ogy is due to , and the idea it is Leibniz’s position in “God, Evil and the Best of incorporates goes back to .) The ex- All Possible Worlds.” tension of a is the thing it names, the exten- sion of a sentence is its truth value, true or false. experiential blank The complete absence of expe- This brings out the systematic connection among rience. This is to be distinguished from the sort of name, , and sentence. The sentence “Fido ‘experience of nothing’ that results from sensory is barking” will have the extension True (i.e., be deprivation. An experiential blank is a complete ab- true), just in case the extension of “Fido” (i.e., sence of consciousness and . It is typically Fido) is a member of the extension of “is barking.” assumed (in secular discussions) that both the time That is, the extension of the parts (the name before our birth (or, perhaps better, conception) and “Fido” and the predicate “is barking”) determines the time after our death are experiential blanks. the extension of the whole sentence. Sentences like extension (alternate) Things that occupy this, their truth-value being determined by the ex- have extension. Some things that (apparently) tension of their parts, are extensional. exist extension including , proper- If a sentence is extensional, of a ties, and—according to dualism—minds or . name in it for another co-extensional name (or a This usage of extension should be distinguished predicate for another co-extensional predicate) from the usage that concerns the application of won’t affect the truth value. Suppose Fido is also predicates; see extension and . called “Bad-breath.” Then the substitution of “Bad-breath” for “Fido” will preserve the truth extension and intension Consider a predicate like value of our sentence. If “Fido is barking” is true, “human being.” It applies to or is true of a num- so too will be “Bad-breath is barking.” ber of , those who are human beings. Not all sentences are extensional. Consider the The set of these individuals is the extension of true sentence “Bad-breath is so called because of the predicate. The members of this set have the his smell.” If we substitute the co-extensional property of being a human being in common. name “Fido” for “Bad-breath” the result is “Fido This property (or, for some philosophers, the is so called because of his smell.” This sentence concept of this property) is the intension of the isn’t true. So our original sentence, “Bad-breath is predicate. so called because of his smell,” isn’t extensional, Terms that have the same extension are co- but nonextensional. extensional, terms that have the same intension We can generalize and say that any expression are co-intensional. It seems that terms can be is extensional if its extension is determined by 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 851


the extensions of its parts. Consider the predicate from worlds to extensions, and the intension of a “is portrayed as a human being.” Suppose this is sentence is a function from worlds to truth values. true of Donald Duck, because he is portrayed in extensional See extension. cartoons as having so many human characteris- tics. If we substitute “featherless biped” for extrinsic An extrinsic property is one that an ob- “human being” we get the predicate “is por- ject has partly in virtue of its relations to other trayed as a featherless biped.” This doesn’t seem things and their properties. A thing could lose to be true of Donald, as he is always portrayed as such a property without really changing at all. a feathered biped. For example, Omaha has the property of being In these examples, it seems possible to pick out the largest in Nebraska. It could lose this the expressions that lead to the nonextensionality. property by virtue of Grand Island growing a In the first example it is “so called,” in the second great deal. Omaha wouldn’t have to lose popula- it is “portrayed as.” Expressions like these that tion to lose this property, or change in any other give rise to nonextensionality are often called way. Being the largest city in Nebraska is thus nonextensional contexts. an extrinsic property of Omaha. An intrinsic Some concepts that are very important in phi- property, by , is one that an object has be- losophy seem to generate nonextensional sen- cause of the way it is in itself, independently of its tences. Consider “Harold that relations to other things and their properties. was a great Roman.” Because “Tully” is another The distinction is often useful, because a prop- name for Cicero, if this sentence is extensional, it erty that we might have thought to be intrinsic seems we should be able to substitute “Tully” for turns out to be extrinsic on closer examination. It “Cicero” without changing the truth value of the is very difficult, however, to give a really clear whole. But it seems that if Harold has never and precise explanation, or unchallengeable list, heard Cicero called “Tully,” “Harold believes of intrinsic properties of ordinary, spatiotempo- that Tully was a great Roman” would not be true. rally extended objects. The term intensional is used in three ways, one See deductivism. strict and comparatively rare, one loose and very common, and one incorrect. Strictly speaking, an fatalism Fatalism is the doctrine that certain expression is intensional if its intension is deter- events are fated to happen, no matter what. This mined by the of its parts. This is the might mean that an event is fated to take place at way Carnap used the term. It is common to use it a specific time, or that someone is going to do loosely, however, simply to mean “nonexten- some deed, no matter what anyone does to try to sional,” so that an “intensional ” means a prevent it. Fatalism differs from determinism. form of words, like “so called” and “portrayed as” One way they differ is that a fatalistic view about and “believes,” that leads to nonextensional pred- the occurrence of a certain event does not depend icates and sentences. Intensional is often confused on the laws of nature determining only a single with intentional in the broad sense that is some- course of events. There may be many possible taken to be the mark of the mental. This is that differ in many ways, but they all will understandable, because many words that de- include the fated event. Oedipus, for example, scribe intentional phenomena, such as believes, was (allegedly) fated to marry his mother and kill seem to be intensional, in the loose sense. his father. This didn’t mean that there was only In possible worlds , names, predicates, one course of action open to him after the and sentences are said to have extensions at possi- prophecy, but that no matter which course he ble worlds—the set of things that the predicate took, he would eventually end up doing that applies to in the world. Sentences are also said to which he wanted most to avoid. A second way have extensions at worlds: their truth values in the they differ is that an event may be determined by worlds. The intension of a predicate is a function prior causes even though it was not fated to occur; 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 852


for among those prior causes may be the decisions known as modus ponens, is valid, no matter what and efforts of human agents. So determinism the content is. does not entail fatalism about all events. If P then Q Feminism is an , social, and P political movement. The movement is very di- Therefore, Q. verse, but one strand that runs through all vari- eties is the conviction that important intellectual, Some philosophers have argued that philo- social, and political structures have been based on sophical can sometimes be avoided by the assumption, sometimes implicit, sometimes putting claims into the formal rather than quite explicit, that being fully human means the material mode. To put a claim in the formal being male. Reexamination of these structures mode is to express it, as nearly as possible, as a from a perspective that appreciates the interests, claim about words or other , rather than values, styles, ideas, , methods, and about the things the words purport to stand for. of women as well as men can lead to fruitful and “Santa Claus doesn’t exist” is a claim in the mate- in some cases radical reform. rial mode, which may be confused or confusing final causation According to the Aristotelian doc- because it looks as if we are saying something trine of final causes, the final cause (or ) of a about a thing, Santa Claus, who isn’t really there thing’s existence is the purpose or end for which to say anything about. Better to say “‘Santa Claus’ it exists. For instance, the final cause of a chair is doesn’t refer to anything.” sitting, and so on. is the branch of formal logic See formal. knowledge having to do with purposes and de- . A fact is teleological if it is of or related to formal mode See formal. teleology or final causes. Some arguments for the freedom In ordinary we call people existence of God are teleological in nature; such free who aren’t prevented from doing what they arguments appeal to the apparent design or pur- want to do and conducting their life as they see fit. pose of human beings or the universe to argue for In politics and , freedom usu- the existence of a cosmic designer. ally means having civil or political liberty, having first cause argument The first cause argument pur- certain basic rights or , such as those cod- ports to prove the existence of God as the first ified in the American Bill of Rights, the Rights of cause. In the world we know, everything has a Man, or the Charter of the United . cause and nothing causes itself. The series of In the realm of and the philoso- causes cannot go back to infinity, so there must be phy of mind, the term freedom refers to a very a first cause, and this is God. St. Thomas basic feature of decisions or actions. When we Aquinas’s second way of proving the existence of perform an ordinary act, like drinking a cup of God is a version of the first cause argument. coffee, or going to a movie, or helping a friend, Philosophers have challenged each step of the we have a feeling that our action results from our argument. own decision and that we could have done other- first-order desires See second-order volitions. wise. It seems that only when this is the case do we take full responsibility (blame or credit) for our formal The formal properties of representations are actions. A person might be free in this sense, al- distinguished from their content properties. “All though not enjoying freedom in the sense of po- cows are ” and “all houses are buildings” litical liberties. A under house arrest, and have different contents, but the same form: All Fs prevented from publishing, would not enjoy are Gs. Formal logic seeks to classify inferences in basic civil liberties. But many of her actions terms of their formal properties. Where P and Q would still be free in this metaphysical sense. She are sentences, any inference of the following form, has coffee in the morning; she could have had tea. 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 853


Perhaps she writes her essays even though she to the intake manifold of an internal combustion can’t publish them. This is a free act, in that she engine. One can contrast the function of a thing could have gardened or stayed in bed instead; if with its structure and the material from which it she had chosen to do those things, no one would is made. The structure of a carburetor differs have forced her to write. from that of a fuel injection system, although One fundamental question about freedom in both have the same function and are made of the this sense concerns its relation to determinism. If same types of materials. determinism is true, are any of our actions really Functionalism in the is free, or is freedom simply an ? This debate the view that mental states are real states defin- often turns on the exact of freedom. able by their functions, specifically by their causal Compatibilists are likely to think of freedom as role with respect to stimuli, other mental states, being able to act in accord with one’s desires and and behavior. Functionalism can be contrasted decisions, even if those desires and decisions are with Cartesian dualism and behaviorism. Func- themselves the influences of more remote causes, tionalism agrees with Cartesian dualism in hold- outside the agent. This is compatible with deter- ing that mental states are real, but differs in that minism, in that one’s own desires and decisions the latter maintains that the mental states are es- might be the causes of one’s actions, even though sentially states of an immaterial mind, defined by those desires and decisions were themselves their basic nature, rather than their function. caused by other things, and at the end of a Functionalism agrees with logical behaviorism in chain of causes and effects that goes back to the seeing a definitional connection between mental time before the agent was born. An incompatibilist states and behavior. They differ in that the logical typically thinks of a free decision or act as one that behaviorist maintains that mental states are not is not caused by anything else, or is caused by the real at all; the terms that seem to stand for them agent, independent of external causes. are just misleading ways of describing behavior. The term free will is sometimes used to con- For the behaviorist, the that connect trast with freedom of action. One’s will in this stimuli, behavior, and mental states are reductive; sense is one’s decision, , or dominating de- they show how to eliminate to mental sire. Even if one is free to follow one’s strongest states in favor of reference to stimuli and behav- desire, and hence has freedom of action in the ior. For this reason, a behaviorist definition of a compatibilist sense, does one have any control cannot allow ineliminable reference over those desires and themselves? Can to other mental states. The selection from Arm- one influence the strength of one’s desires, or are strong explain and defend versions of functional- they determined by external influences? One ism. Nagel criticizes functionalist views in “What might be a compatibilist with respect to free ac- Is It Like to Be a Bat?” tion and determinism, but an incompatibilist Greatest Happiness Principle See utilitarianism. with respect to free will and determinism. In theological contexts, the question of free hallucination, argument from See illusion, argu- will is whether humans can have any choice if ment from. there is a god who has foreknowledge of what hard determinism See compatibilism and incom- they will do. patibilism. free will See freedom. See the discussion of utilitarianism in the Introduction to Part V. functionalism The function of a thing is its opera- tion within a system. It is the role the thing has, hedonistic utilitarianism See utilitarianism. when the system is operating properly. For ex- hierarchical model of Ac- ample, the function of a carburetor is to supply an cording to a hierarchical model of moral respon- atomized and vaporized mixture of fuel and air sibility, a person is morally responsible for her 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 854


actions only if there is a ‘mesh’ between her higher- The conception of ideas as immediate objects order and the first-order preferences on of perception and thought, intervening between which she acts. First-order preferences are our our minds and the ordinary objects we perceive preferences about things—like a desire to have and think about, was part of a philosophical sushi for lunch or to go on a date with your sig- movement, sometimes called “the way of ideas,” nificant other. Higher-order preferences concern greatly influenced by Descartes’s . other preferences. I may, for instance prefer that Descartes there uses a form of the argument from my first-order desire for a cigarette not move illusion to motivate the distinction between the to action, or I might that my actions will be mental phenomena we are certain of and the ex- guided by my desire to meet my deadline, leading ternal reality that is represented by them. me to stay home and work rather than go out with my friends. When my higher-order prefer- identity A thing is identical with itself and no ences prevail and I am moved by the first-order other. If a is identical with b, then there is just one preferences they designate, there is a mesh be- thing that is both a and b; “a” and “b” are two tween my higher-order and first-order prefer- names for that one thing. It follows from this that ences. At the most basic level of analysis, a the relation of identity is transitive (if a is identical hierarchical model of the mind posits mental with b, and b is identical with c, then a is identi- states of different orders (first-, second-, and so cal with c), symmetrical (if a is identical with b, forth), and a hierarchical model of moral respon- then b is identical with a), and confers indiscerni- sibility exploits this sort of model of the mind to bility (if a is identical with b, and a has property P, give an account of moral responsibility. b has property P). The term identity is not always used in this hypothetico-deductive method See deductivism. strict sense. For example, in this sense, “identical twins” are not identical—they couldn’t be twins ideas There are two quite different uses of the if they were, as there would be only one of them. term idea in philosophy. The term idea is used for We sometimes use identity to mean close resem- the denizens of Plato’s heaven. Sometimes form is blance in one respect or another. It is best, in used as a less misleading translation of eidos. philosophical contexts, to use identity in the way Plato’s ideas or forms are not parts of our minds, previously explained and some other word, like but objective, unchanging, immaterial entities similar or resembles, when that is what is meant. that our minds somehow grasp and use for the The terms numerical identity and qualitative classification of things in the changing world, identity are sometimes used, but are best avoided. which Plato held to be their pale imitations. One needs to distinguish between the identity of uses the term idea for that which qualities (red is one and the same color as rouge) the mind is immediately aware of, as distin- and similarity with respect to a (the couch guished from the qualities or objects in the ex- and the chair are both red; they are similar in re- ternal world the ideas are of. This use for the spect of color), and this obscures the term leaves it rather vague. Idea can be the im- distinction. ages involved in perception, or the constituents Some issues about identity are raised in the of thought. Hume calls the first impressions, the section on and in “The latter ideas, and the whole . For of Identity.” Hume, the class of impressions includes (emotions) as well as sensations. A feeling of identity theory David Armstrong in “The Nature would be an impression, as would the sen- of Mind” maintains that mental states are quite sation of red brought about by looking at a fire literally identical with physical states. Our con- truck. Later of the feeling of anger or cept of a mental state is of a state that occupies a the fire truck would involve the ideas of anger certain causal role; it turns out that physical states and red. do occupy those roles; hence, mental states are 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 855


physical states. This identity theory is a of an angle and an elliptical disk held at ninety de- materialism. It is also, strictly speaking, a form of grees might cast exactly the same image on the functionalism, because it maintains that mental retina and create the same experience. What is it states are definable by their function or causal that is the same? Not the objects seen, which are role. Many functionalists, however, think that different. The answer again is an intervening ob- mental states cannot be identified with physical ject, which may be taken to be a subjective idea or states. They maintain that the relation is a less something objective. stringent one, . Functionalism in The argument from hallucination considers this narrower sense is often contrasted with the the case in which it is to one as if one were seeing identity theory. an object, although there is in fact nothing at all there. This sort of case, a true hallucination, is illusion, argument from Philosophers use the much more unusual than those noted for the term argument from illusion for a general type of earlier two arguments. What is it that is argument and for a specific version of it. These in our perception when there is nothing seen? arguments are intended to show that what we are It is, again, the subjective idea or the objective directly aware of when we perceive ordinary things sense datum. are not those ordinary things themselves. We can distinguish three such arguments: the argument immanent causation See agent-causation. from perceptual relativity, the argument from illu- immaterialism Immaterialism is the metaphysical sion, and the argument from hallucination. doctrine held by Berkeley. He maintained that The argument from perceptual relativity starts reality consisted entirely of minds (including with the fact that perceptions of the same object in God’s) and ideas. Ordinary things were collec- different circumstances involve different percep- tions or congeries of ideas. Berkeley thought his tual experiences. For example, a building seen view came closer to common sense than that of from a great distance casts a different-sized image the philosophers he opposed (Descartes and on your retina, and creates quite a different expe- Locke, for example), which implied the existence rience, than the same building seen from a few of material substances in addition to minds and yards away. Consider seeing a quarter held at a ideas. Berkeley explains in his Three Dialogues ninety-degree angle to your line of sight, and the Between Hylas and Philonous that he thinks we same quarter held at a forty-five-degree angle. In have no for material substances, that the first case a round image is cast on your retina, identifying ordinary things with such substances in the second an elliptical image. The perceptual leads to , and in fact the very concept of experience is different, although the object seen, a material substance is incoherent. the quarter, is the same. The conclusion drawn is that there is something involved in the experience immutability Immutability is a property often, and besides the agent and the quarter, which are the traditionally, attributed to God. Roughly, a being same in both, that accounts for the difference. This is immutable if and only if that being cannot is the immediate object of perception. Some change. However, it is a matter of some contro- philosophers take these objects to be ideas in the versy whether and to what extent God is im- mind of the perceiver that represent the external mutable. Some theists have thought that saying object; see representative ideas, theory of. Others that God is immutable is theologically undesir- have taken them to be nonmental sense . Some able. According to these theists, God does things philosophers have taken the ideas or to like creating the world and performing , be materials out of which external objects are con- and (it is argued) an absolutely immutable being structed, rather than representations of them. could not do such things, because doing them in- The argument from illusion itself starts with volves changing from doing one thing at one time the fact that two different objects can create the to doing another at another time. Such theists typ- same experience. For example, a quarter held at ically argue that God’s immutability should be 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 856


restricted to God’s character: God’s character (or number of philosophical arguments, such as what God is like) cannot change. Zeno’s arguments about , and in some of St. Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for the exis- imperatives, categorical and hypothetical See the tence of God. In the last two hundred years math- discussion of in the Introduction ematicians have given us a clearer framework for to Part V. thinking about infinity than earlier philosophers impressions See ideas. had, but this doesn’t mean all of the puzzles and problems are easy to resolve. incompatibilism See compatibilism and incom- Infinite means without end. Let’s say that to patibilism. count a collection of objects is to assign the natu- induction See induction, problem of and deduc- ral numbers (1,2,3 . . .) in order to its members, so tive argument. that every member is assigned a number and no number gets assigned twice. Let’s say that to fin- induction by enumeration See deductive argument. ish counting a collection of objects is to assign num- induction, problem of The problem of induction, bers in this way to every object in the collection. sometimes known as Hume’s problem, has to do A finite collection of things is one that one could with justifying a very basic sort of nondeductive finish counting, at least theoretically, and say “it inference. We often seem to infer from observa- has n members” where n is some natural number. tion that some sample of a population has a cer- An infinite collection is one for which one could tain attribute to the conclusion that the next not finish counting. One can see from this that members of the population we encounter will the set of natural numbers is itself infinite, for one also have that attribute. When you eat a piece of would never finish counting it. bread, for example, you are concluding from the Assigning objects from one set to those in an- many times in the past that bread has nourished other, so that each object is assigned to only one you, that it will also do so this time. But it is con- object and has only one object assigned to it, is ceivable that bread should have nourished in the called putting the sets in a one-to-one correspon- past, but not this time. It isn’t a necessary, analytic, dence. Sets that can be correlated in this way, are or a priori truth that the next piece of bread you the same size—they have the same number of el- eat will be like the ones you have eaten before. ements. Using this idea, modern has How does your inference bridge the gap? It is shown that not all infinite sets are the same size, natural to appeal to various general so that one needs to distinguish among different that one has discovered to hold. But, as Hume infinite or transcendental numbers. The number points out, the future application of principles of natural numbers is called alepho. found reliable in the past presents exactly the Somewhat surprisingly, this is also the num- same problem. For example, consider the most ber of even numbers, as there is a one-to-one general principle of all, that the future will be correlation between numbers and even numbers like the past. All one has really observed was (assign 2n to n). But it is not the number of that, in the past, the future was like the past. points in a line for there is not a one-to-one cor- How does one know that in the future it will be? relation between the set of such points and the The problem of induction is stated in Hume’s An natural numbers. This is shown by a variation of Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec- Zeno’s Racecourse Argument. Let the line be of tion IV, and discussed by Salmon, “The Problem length m. If we assign 1 to the point m/2, 2 to of Induction.” m/4,...n to m/2n, we will have paired a point from the continuum with each natural number, inductive argument See deductive argument. but no matter how long we go on, we will never infinity The concept of infinity is a fascinating, assign a natural number to any of the points be- tricky, and complex one. It has been used in a yond m/2. 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 857


In thinking about infinity, it is important to true: “Fred believes that San Francisco is the cap- keep certain distinctions in mind. One might ital of California.” The object of the belief is the have two quite different things in mind when , that San Francisco is the capital of Cal- calling a magnitude “infinite”: that it goes on for- ifornia. This proposition may be the object of the ever, or that the process of dividing it could go on belief even if it is not true. forever. A finite distance like ten feet is not infi- The term intentional should not be confused nite in the first sense, but seems to be in the sec- with the term intensional, although they are re- ond: One could take the first half, half of what’s lated. Many of the concepts used to describe inten- left, and so on without end. Intuitively, one can tional phenomena are nonextensional, which is traverse a finite, but infinitely divisible, distance one meaning of intensional. For example, “Oedi- in a finite amount of time, but not an infinite dis- pus intended to marry Jocasta” is a true tance. Zeno’s Racecourse Argument seems to of an intention of Oedipus. If we substitute “his show that one cannot even traverse a finite dis- mother” for “Jocasta,” we change this truth into a tance. But keeping this distinction in mind, what falsehood. So the sentence is intensional. exactly does it show? Aristotle distinguished between the potential interactive dualism See dualism. and actual infinite. When we say that a distance intrinsic See extrinsic. of ten feet is infinitely divisible, we don’t mean one could actually divide it into an infinite num- Moral or ethical intuitionism is the ber of parts, but only that there are an infinite view that we can have some knowledge about number of points in which one could divide it. right and wrong that is not acquired through in- Aristotle thought that this distinction took care of ference. Rather, there are some moral truths that Zeno’s arguments. we can “just see” or “just know,” perhaps through some of moral . J. L. Mackie crit- intension, intensional See extension. icizes this view in “The of Values.” An intentional act or state is one justice Issues about justice are traditionally di- that is directed at objects and characterized by the vided into issues about justice in the distribution objects at which it is directed. Intentionality in of benefits and burdens to different individuals this sense is a feature not only of , but of and groups in a society (distributive justice) and is- many other mental phenomena. Some philoso- sues about the justice of various forms of punish- phers take it to be the of mentality and ment (). consciousness. Think about how you would de- scribe your intentions. You don’t say what they laws of nature Many take themselves to look like or feel like or sound like, or what mate- be engaged in the project of figuring out what rial they are made of. You say something like, rules and guidelines describe the universe and its “I have an intention to paint my room.” You say inhabitants at the most general level. That is, they what your intention is an intention to do. This es- are attempting to figure out the laws of nature sential characteristic of your intention is its object, that govern our world. For instance, Einstein dis- the event or state of affairs it is aimed at bringing covered the of nature that nothing travels about. Similarly, if you are asked to describe your faster than the speed of . Presumably there is wants, you would describe what you want—a some set of statements like this that is complete in new car, say, or world . The object of the the sense that these statements would completely want or desire, the thing or state of affairs that describe the behavior of the physical universe. would satisfy it, seems essential to it. These statements would be all the laws of nature Beliefs and other propositional attitudes are also (sometimes also called the laws of physics). For a considered intentional. We describe our beliefs discussion of how the laws of nature relate to de- by giving the circumstances under which they are terminism and freedom of the will, see Peter van 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 858


Inwagen’s piece, “The Powers of Rational Be- seem to refer to them are just parts of a discred- ings: Freedom of the Will.” ited theory of how people work). Functionalism is hard to categorize; perhaps it maintains the letter libertarianism See compatibilism and incompati- of property dualism but the of physicalism. bilism. matters of fact and relations of ideas This is logical behaviorism See behaviorism. Hume’s terminology for the analytic–synthetic distinction, which Hume didn’t distinguish from manichean/ Manicheanism was a the a priori–a posteriori distinction and the gnostic religion that originated in Persia in the necessary–contingent distinction. Hume thought third century A.D. In philosophy, manicheanism our thinking is conducted with simple ideas that primarily arises in connection with its interesting are copied from impressions of external objects approach to the problem of evil. According to and complex ideas that result from combining manicheans, there are two co-eternal powers of the simple ones. The mind can put ideas together Light and Darkness that are in perpetual conflict. in new ways not derived from perception, so We find ourselves in the midst of this struggle. complex ideas need not correspond to external Because the manicheans, unlike traditional the- objects. These ideas also serve as the meanings of ists, give equal priority to Light and Darkness, words. Relations of ideas are truths that simply re- they do not have the problem of explaining how flect the way these ideas are related to each other evil came to exist in a world created by a perfectly and don’t depend on whether the ideas actually good being (such as God). apply to anything. Hume’s examples are “that materialism and physicalism Materialism is the three times five is equal to the half of thirty” and doctrine that reality consists of material objects “that the square of hypotenuse is equal to the and their material, spatial, and temporal proper- square of the two sides.” Such truths “are discov- ties and relations. Narrowly construed, material- erable by the mere operation of thought, without ism refers to material substances and properties dependence on what is anywhere existent in the as conceived in eighteenth-century physics and universe.” The contrary of a relation of ideas will philosophy, so that material properties are con- imply a and is impossible. fined to the primary qualities then recognized, In contrast, matters of fact have to do with including figure (shape), extension (size), num- what the world is like, and not just how ideas are ber, motion, and solidity. A more general term is related. The contrary of a matter of fact is possi- physicalism, where physical properties are taken to ble and doesn’t imply a contradiction. Hume’s ex- be whatever properties physics postulates in the ample is “that the sun will rise .” This best account of the physical world. The physical- is true, and we are quite certain of it, at least most ist leaves open the possibility that the fundamen- of the time. But it is true because of what happens tal properties needed by physics will not be much tomorrow, not because of the way ideas are re- like the primary qualities of the materialist. A lated. Its contrary, “that the sun will not rise to- chief obstacle to materialism or physicalism is the morrow,” is not a contradiction. mind. Cartesian dualists claim that the mind is an Hume maintained that only relations of ideas immaterial or nonphysical object; other kinds of can be discovered a priori, and that no matter of dualists claim that at least mental properties fact can be demonstrated with only relations of are above and beyond the physical properties. ideas as premises. He argued that many principles The physicalist response has taken the form of philosophers had claimed to know a priori, such identity theories (the mind is the brain; mental as that nothing happens without a cause, were properties are physical properties), behaviorist matters of fact and could not be known that way. theories (mental terms are ways of talking about Most philosophers agree that mathematical behavior), and (there are truths, like Hume’s examples cited earlier, are no minds or mental properties; the terms that necessary and knowable a priori. But many do 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 859


think that they are not analytic—are not simply a modus tollens See conditionals. matter of relations of ideas, in Hume’s sense. moral luck As Thomas Nagel uses the term in his means-end analysis To give a means-end analysis of article of the same name, a person is subject to some concept is to define it as a particular way of moral luck whenever he or she is still treated as a achieving some goal or purpose. Thus giving a candidate for praise or blame even though the ac- means-end analysis involves two parts: a descrip- tion in question depended in some significant tion of the goal to be achieved (the end), and a de- way on factors outside of his or her control. Nagel scription of the way of achieving that goal (the identifies four types of moral luck: constitutive means). For instance, we might give a means-end luck, luck in one’s circumstances, luck in the con- analysis of the concept of intimidation. We could sequences of one’s actions, and luck in the an- specify the goal or end by saying that intimidation is tecedents of one’s actions. When we act, our a way of bringing it about that another acts in ac- actions are thoroughly situated in a context that cord with one’s wishes. We can then specify the includes the sort of person that we are (our con- means by saying that intimidation achieves this goal stitution), the circumstances in which we find by making threats of one kind or another. On this ourselves, the events that led up to our actions, means-ends analysis, then, intimidation is bringing and the events that will follow from whatever we it about that another acts in accord with one’s do. To the extent that we lack control over any of wishes by making threats of one kind or another. these aspects of the context and yet are still treated as candidates for praise and blame, we are mechanisms On the account of moral responsibil- to that extent subject to moral luck. ity suggested by J. M. Fischer, one is morally re- sponsible insofar as one acts from one’s own, moral responsibility If an agent is morally responsi- appropriately -responsible . A ble for her actions then those actions can make her mechanism here is not thought of as a “thing,” the appropriate target of certain attitudes and but, intuitively, as a “way” of acting or “process” practices. A morally responsible agent can be an that issues in a choice and action. appropriate target for what Peter Strawson metaphysics Metaphysics considers very general dubbed the reactive attitudes. These include resent- questions about the nature of reality. It includes ment, indignation, , and approval. She the study of the basic of things (ontol- can also be the appropriate target for our practices ogy). Questions such as whether there are univer- of praise, blame, reward, and . sals, events, substances, individuals, necessary We should distinguish moral responsibility beings, possible worlds, numbers, objects, from causal responsibility. One can be causally re- abstract objects, and the like arise here. - sponsible for something, but not morally respon- physics also includes questions about space, time, sible for it. For instance, if you spill a glass of identity and change, mind and body, personal water on my , then you are causally re- identity, causation, determinism, freedom, and sponsible for the damage that ensues. You are the structure of action. also morally responsible—it could be appropriate for me to resent you for not being more careful. methodological behaviorism See behaviorism. If, however, it is my cat that spills the water, then mind-body problem The mind-body problem is the cat, though just as causally responsible for the the problem of accounting for the way in which damage as you would be, is not morally responsi- our minds interact with or are related to our bod- ble. It makes no sense for me to resent my cat: cats ies. The mind-body problem thus comprises a just are not an appropriate target for the reactive central area of the subfield of philosophy called attitudes. philosophy of mind. It is fairly easy to see why the cat is not morally responsible: the cat is not a person, and only per- modus ponens See conditionals. sons can be morally responsible for their actions. 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 860


However, not all are morally responsible those that we perceive in the natural world, and for their actions. For instance, children are per- those that are required to explain natural phe- sons, but are not generally taken to be fully re- nomena by our best theories. Thus, in the title of sponsible for their actions. Philosophers disagree his Dialogues on , the word natu- about the conditions under which persons are ral tells us that Hume will consider whether basi- morally responsible—about just what makes cally scientific methods of inquiry and argument someone an appropriate target for reactive atti- can lead us to a belief in an intelligent creator. tudes and practices of praise and blame. in ethics maintains that good and bad, right and wrong are definable in terms of mutual awareness Two people are in a state of mu- natural properties, such as and , and tual awareness when they are not only aware of that there are no special methods of knowledge one another, but also each aware of the other’s for moral facts. awareness. For instance, suppose we are both at- tending a crowded party, and I recognize you natural religion The term natural religion occurs in from across the room. I am now aware of you, but Hume’s Dialogues. It is basically opposed to revealed you are not yet aware of me. Someone else en- religion. Natural religion is religous belief based on gages me in conversation for a moment, and you the same sorts of evidence that we use in everyday hear my voice and spot me across the room. You life and science: observation and inference to the are now aware of me, as I am of you. This, most plausible for what is observed by though, is not yet mutual awareness: I am un- principles based on experience. It is in this spirit aware that you have noticed me, and you are un- that Cleanthes puts forward his analogical argu- aware that I have noticed you. Once we make eye ment for the existence of an intelligent creator. In contact and realize that we have recognized one contrast, revealed religion relies on sacred texts and another, then we are each aware of the other’s the authority of and Church. awareness. This is a state of mutual awareness. necessary See contingent and necessary. naive realism See realism. necessary and sufficient conditions In the phrases natural evil In discussions about the philosophical necessary condition and sufficient condition, the problem of evil, a distinction is commonly made term condition may be used for properties, state- between moral evil and natural evil. Moral evil is ments, propositions, events, or actions. The basic (roughly) evil that is brought about by the bad ac- idea is always that: tions of human beings (or other created beings), whereas natural evil is evil that is (seemingly) A is sufficent for B. Having (being, doing) A is brought about by nonagential (e.g., hurri- one way of having (being, doing) B; nothing more canes, tornados, drought, and so on). A deer’s is needed. You may not need to have A to have B, being badly burned in a naturally caused forest for there may be other ways of having B. But A is fire is a paradigmatic instance of natural evil. It is one way. important to see that responses to the problem of A is necessary for B. Every way of having moral evil are not necessarily good responses to (being, doing) B involves having (being, doing) A. the problem of natural evil. A may not be all you need; it may be that every way of having B involves not only having A but naturalism Naturalism is a powerful if somewhat also something more. But you’ve got to have A to vague philosophical view, with both epistemolog- have B. ical and metaphysical sides. All knowledge de- rives from the methods we use to study the For example: Having a car is sufficient, but not natural world, sense-perception extended by the necessary for having a vehicle. One could have a methods of the natural sciences. The only objects bicycle instead. But having a car is certainly and properties that we should countenance are enough. 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 861


Having blood is necessary for being alive, but objects of thought. Sometimes it has the connota- not sufficient. A dead man can have blood; more tion of an ordinary material thing. than blood is required to be alive. But you can’t omnipotence Omnipotence is one of the tradi- do without it. tional attributes of God. In common usage, to say Being in England is necessary, but not suffi- that God is omnipotent is to say that God is “all cient, for being in London. Being in London is powerful” or that God can (in some sense) “do sufficient, but not necessary, for being in England. anything.” However, it has been notoriously dif- Given these explanations, there is a symmetry ficult to analyze satisfactorily the concept of - to necessary and sufficient conditions: nipotence. For instance, it is commonly held that If A is necessary for B, B is sufficient for A. omnipotence must be restricted to what is logi- cally possible to bring about. That is, one might Indeed, if we take conditions to be statements think that although God can do anything that is we can say: logically possible, he cannot do that which is logi- When: If P, then Q, cally impossible; he cannot, say, create a square circle or bring it about that 2 and 2 equals 5. P is sufficient for Q, and Q is necessary for P. Descartes, however, apparently denied this thesis, holding that God’s omnipotence is unrestrained Philosophers are often interested in finding an by . Other problems associated analysis of some interesting condition. This in- with the thesis that God is omnipotent involve volves finding a set of conditions that are individ- the question of whether God can sin. If God can- ually necessary and jointly sufficient. If A, B, C are not sin, as has been traditionally held, it appears individually necessary and jointly sufficient for that there is something that God cannot do, and D, then each of A, B, and C are necessary, and the thus God is not omnipotent. This problem has conjunctive condition A & B & C is sufficient. For led various philosophers and theologians to example, being a male, being unmarried, and maintain that omnipotence should not be being an adult are (arguably) individually neces- thought to entail the ability to sin, or to deny that sary and jointly sufficient for being a bachelor. omnipotence is a property that ought to belong to It is necessary, finally, to distinguish different the greatest possible being. kinds of necessity and sufficiency. Is the relation- ship a matter of logic, metaphysics, the laws of omniscience Omniscience is one of the traditional nature, or something else? The necessity of blood attributes of God. In common usage, to say that for human life, for example, seems a matter of God is omniscient is to say that God is “all- natural or causal necessity, not logic or meta- knowing” or that God “knows everything.” physics. More carefully, a common analysis of omnis- cience is that a being is omniscient if and only if necessarily truth preserving See deductive argument. that being knows all true propositions and be- /normativity Normative judgments or lieves no false propositions. However, some statements concern how things should or ought philosophers have sought to analyze the concept to be, rather than simply how things as a matter of omniscience in terms of what is possible to of fact are. know. These philosophers argue that a being is object The term object is used in different ways by omniscient if and only if that being knows all different philosophers, and one has to be careful that is possible to know. when one encounters it. Sometimes it means any See metaphysics. sort of things at all, whether abstract or concrete, original position See veil of ignorance. universal or particular. On this usage numbers, people, rocks, properties, moods, propositions, paradox A paradox is an argument that appears and facts are all objects. Sometimes it is used for to derive absurd conclusions from acceptable 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 862


premises by valid reasoning. Quine distinguishes personal identity Problems concerning personal veridical from falsidical paradoxes and identity are about what makes us persons. What . In the case of a veridical paradox, the are the essential properties of persons, or those premises are acceptable and the reasoning valid, properties without which a person would not be and we must accept the conclusion, which turns a person? What makes one person the same per- out not to be absurd under close analysis. A fal- son from one moment to the next? What sorts of sidical paradox really does have an absurd con- changes can a person undergo while still being clusion, but upon close analysis the premises turn the same person? Such questions are questions of out to be unacceptable or the reasoning invalid. personal identity. See also perdurance and en- An defies resolution by close analysis, durance. for the paradox brings to the surface a real prob- lem with part of our conceptual scheme that only perversion In general, a perverse act is one that de- revision can eliminate. viates from what is regarded as normal or proper. Typically perversion carries a pejorative —to parallelism See dualism. say that something is perverse is to at least suggest that it is bad or wrong. This, though, need not be See universals and particulars. the case. Various artistic and especially comedic perceptual relativity, argument from See illusion, acts are deliberately abnormal—e.g., using a fish argument from. as a sword or making a dress out of meat. In such cases the artistic or comedic comes precisely perdurance and endurance It certainly seems that from the perverse nature of the action. Thus in objects can lose parts over time without ceasing to calling such acts perverse, we might be merely exist. In fact, we gain and lose cells at such a rate characterizing or even complimenting rather that we are made up of completely new cells per- than criticizing them. haps as quickly as every decade. But this simple fact Perversions, especially sexual perversions, are gives rise to a philosophical puzzle: If I don’t right often characterized as unnatural. This is to say that now still have any of the same atoms in my body as the the perverse act flouts is in some sense a those that were there when I was 5 years old, then norm of nature. Nature here might mean the nat- how can the person these words be the ural world, as opposed to the world of human cre- same person as that little 5-year-old? What is it for ations, but it need not. The nature in question a person to persist through time and change? might instead refer to the nature or essence of the According to the view called endurance, the rela- thing in question. If something is partly defined as tionship between my 15-year-old self and my 5- the sort of thing it is by its function or purpose, year-old self is identity. On this view, a single then that purpose is part of its nature. In this sense, object—me—moves from one instant of time to any use of the thing that runs counter to that pur- the next as time passes, leaving nothing behind. pose or ignores it entirely would, in that sense, be According to another answer to this question, unnatural and perhaps perverse. For example, a which has come to be known as perdurance, I am skillet is for cooking—this is its function, and it is actually a four-dimensional object, extended not the sort of thing it is in virtue of this function. only in the three dimensions of space but in the one Thus using my skillet to hammer nails runs dimension of time, as well. Thus I have not only counter to the essential nature of the skillet. Thus spatial parts—like my right hand and my left it is in some sense unnatural and perhaps perverse. hand—but I also have distinct — like my 5-year-old self and my 15-year-old self, and petitio principii The petitio principii is the so on. According to perdurance, a single object name for the fallacy of “.” “moves” through time by having a distinct tempo- One has committed the fallacy of petitio principii ral part at each moment of that object’s existence. or has “begged the question” (roughly) when one 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 863


assumes in one’s argument what one ought to be as they are able to make competent judgments (or is trying) to prove. This fallacy is often called about ethical matters. the fallacy of circular argument: When one as- predicate The term predicate traditionally refers to sumes what one ought to be (or is) trying to the part of a sentence that characterizes the sub- prove, one is relying on the truth of one’s conclu- ject. In “Sally kissed Fred,” “Sally” is the subject sion when making one’s argument, and is thus and “kissed Fred” is the predicate. Philosophers arguing “in a circle.” and logicians extend this notion, so that a sen- phenomenal character/ See qualia. tence with one or more singular terms removed is a predicate. Predicates are 1-place, 2-place, and so phenomenology Phenomenology is an approach forth, depending on the number of singular to some philosophical issues developed by Ed- terms needed to make a sentence. A predicate is mund Husserl and his followers. It conceives of said to be true of an object or sequence of objects philosophy as the study of phenomena as revealed if a true sentence would result if terms referring to consciousness, “bracketing” the assumptions to that object or those objects were inserted. of an orderly external world that are made by From our example, we can get these predicates: science and common sense. Phenomenology em- phasizes the intentionality of consciousness. The 1. (1) kissed Fred. term phenomenology is also used more loosely, to 2. (1) kissed (2) indicate a survey of experience connected with 3. Sally kissed (2) some topic conducted as a preliminary to theoriz- 4. (1) kissed (1). ing. The phenomenology of an experience, in this (1) is a 1-place predicate, true of Sally and sense, refers to how an experience seems to the whoever else has kissed Fred. Predicate (2) is a person experiencing it. 2-place predicate, true of the pair of Sally and physicalism See materialism. Fred, and any other pair, the first of which has kissed the second. Number (3) is a 1-place predi- and platonism Platonism refers to the cate, true of Fred and others Sally has kissed. philosophy of Plato (428–348 B.C.) and the move- And (4) is a 1-place predicate, because it only ments specifically inspired by it. Uncapitalized, takes one referring expression to complete the platonism has become a technical term in ontol- sentence, although it must be inserted twice. It is ogy for those who countenance abstract entities true of people who have kissed themselves. that are not merely from or con- The notion of a predicate does not necessarily structions out of particulars, and specifically, in fit very well with the categories linguists use to the philosophy of mathematics, for those who describe the structure of sentences. For example, maintain that numbers are such objects. Al- the words Sally kissed, which remain after Fred is though Plato was a platonist in this sense, most removed from our sentence, giving predicate (3), modern platonists do not hold many of Plato’s are not usually considered a syntactic part of the most important in metaphysics, episte- original sentence. mology, and ethics. See deductive argument. possible world See contingent and necessary. presentism See eternalism and presentism. Pour-soi See En-soi. primary and secondary qualities Locke distin- practical () Practical wisdom is guishes ideas from the modifications of bodies that a virtue—a quality of character—that allows for cause ideas in us, which he calls qualities. Among the proper application of a general, theoretical qualities, he distinguishes primary qualities from understanding of morality to particular, concrete secondary qualities. Primary qualities include cases. Someone has practical wisdom inasmuch solidity, extension (size), figure (shape), motion, 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 864


and number. Secondary qualities include colors, These facts have different things in common sounds, , and smells. According to Locke, with one another. Facts 1 and 3 are about the primary qualities are inseparable from objects same people, Nixon and Carter, but involve dif- through alteration and division, and resemble the ferent relations. Facts 1 and 2 are about different ideas they cause. Secondary qualities are merely individuals, but involve the same relation. powers that objects have, in virtue of the primary The relation involved in 1 and 2 is being born qualities of their insensible parts, to produce ideas in. This is a relation between people and places. in us. So when we see that a poker chip has a cer- Philosophers might say that 1 states that the rela- tain shape, an idea is being produced in us that re- tion being born in obtains between Nixon and sembles the quality involved in its production, California, 2 states that it obtains between Carter and the poker chip will continue to have some and Georgia, and 3 states that the relation older shape or other even if it is bent or melted; if it is di- than obtains between Nixon and Carter. vided its parts will have shape. When we see that Being born in and being older than are both the chip has a certain color, however, we are hav- binary or 2-ary relations: relations that obtain be- ing an idea that is caused by the primary qualities tween two objects. Three important properties of of the surface of the chip, qualities that do not re- 2-ary relations are transitivity, symmetry, and re- semble the idea. If we divided the chip, at some flexivity. Suppose that R is a 2-ary relation. Then: point the parts would be too small to produce any color ideas at all and would be colorless. • R is transitive if it follows from the fact that a has Locke’s distinction, versions of which can be R to b and b has R to c that a has R to c. For found in Descartes, Galileo, and Boyle, has been example, being longer than is a transitive relation: a source of controversy since he first proposed it. If a is longer than b and b is longer then c, then a A favorite target of critics is the idea of a quality is longer than c. However, liking is not transitive: resembling an idea, which is not easy to make From the fact that Bob likes Mary, and Mary likes much sense of. Berkeley makes this criticism and Carol, it does not follow that Bob likes Carol. others in his Dialogues. • R is symmetrical if it follows from the fact that a has R to b that b has R to a. Being a sibling of is principle of alternate possibilities In Harry Frank- symmetrical; being a brother of is not. furt’s article, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral • R is reflexive if it follows from that fact that a Responsibility,” he formulates this principle as the has R to b that a has R to a. If Bob is the same claim that a person is morally responsible for what he height as anyone at all—if he is the sort of thing or she has done only if he or she could have done oth- that has height at all—then he is the same erwise. The idea that this principle attempts to cap- height as himself. ture is related to the “garden of forking paths” picture described in ’s article, “The Pow- Relations that are transitive, symmetrical, and ers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will.” reflexive are equivalence relations. There are also 3- Principle of Utility See utilitarianism. ary relations, and in principle there are n-ary rela- tions for any n. When we say, “Nebraska City is The problem of how (and between Omaha and Topeka,” we are stating that whether) one can know that other minds exist be- a 3-place relation obtains among three . It is sides one’s own. For discussion, see Russell’s “The often useful to use variables to indicate the places of Argument from Analogy for Other Minds.” relations, so the relation here is x is between y and z. properties and relations Consider these three facts: It is sometimes useful to talk about the argu- ments or parameters of a relation. Thus one could 1. Nixon was born in California. say that the place argument (or parameter) of the 2. Carter was born in Georgia. relation of being born in was filled in 1 by Califor- 3. Nixon was older than Carter. nia and in 2 by Georgia. In the example in the last 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 865


paragraph, we might say that Topeka filled the z Among philosophers who accept the need for argument of the relation of x is between y and z. propositions, some think they should be de- When we say that a person is old, or tired, or fined in terms of properties, facts, possible silly, we are not saying something about a relation worlds, and other more basic categories, he or she stands in to someone or something else, whereas others think they are primitive. but stating a property that he or she has or doesn’t propositional The propositional atti- have by himself or herself. Properties are 1-ary tudes are those mental acts and states, such as be- relations. lief, knowledge, and desire, that have truth or So far we have been ignoring time. Consider 4: satisfaction conditions, so that they may be char- 4. Carter in Georgia. acterized by the propositions that capture those conditions. We say, for example, “Russell be- Number 4 is true now, but wasn’t true when lieved that Hegel was confused,” characterizing Carter was president and lived in Washington, Russell’s belief by a proposition that captures its D.C. It seems that living in is really a 3-ary truth conditions. And we say that Russell desired relation, among people, places, and times, even that there would be no more wars, thereby charac- though it looks like a 2-ary relation. Similarly, be- terizing Russell’s desire by a proposition that cap- cause people can be old, tired, or silly at one time, tures its satisfaction conditions. while being young, energetic, and serious at oth- ers, these are all really 2-ary rather than 1-ary Unless used in specialized historical relations. When we take time into account, we contexts, Pyrrhonism is synonymous with skepti- need to think of most properties as 2-ary relations cism. See sceptic, skeptic. between individuals and times. qualia Consider what it is like to have a headache property dualism See dualism. and how it feels. It is somewhat different from what it is like to have a toothache, and vastly dif- proposition Consider the report, “Russell said that ferent from what it is like to taste a chocolate chip Hegel was confused.” The phrase “that Hegel cookie. We try to avoid headaches because of was confused” identifies a proposition, which what it is like to have them, and we try to find was what Russell said. Others could assert the and eat chocolate chip cookies, because of what it same proposition, and it could also be believed, is like to taste them. doubted, denied, and the like. We could say, What it is like to have a certain kind of expe- “Taylor doubted that Hegel was confused,” rience is one aspect of that experience. Philoso- “Moore believed that Hegel was confused,” and phers call such aspects qualia. Other terms that so forth. It seems that the same proposition could are used more or less similarly are subjective char- be expressed in other , so a proposition acters, and phenomenal characters. is not just a particular sentence type. A proposi- Philosophers such as Thomas Nagel in “What tion is an abstract object that has conditions of Is It Like to Be a Bat?” and Frank Jackson in truth, and it is true or false depending on whether “What Mary Didn’t Know” claim that the qualia those conditions are met. Propositions are identi- or subjective characters of mental events and fied by statements and are referred to by “that- states cannot be identified with or reduced to clauses,” like “that Hegel was confused.” physical aspects of those events and states. Thus The existence and ontological status of even if we suppose that headaches are brain propositions are matters of controversy. Some states, we have to admit that these brain states philosophers believe that propositions are have nonphysical properties, their qualia. If we mysterious entities that should be avoided; we accept the arguments of Nagel and Jackson, we should get by just talking about sentences that seem to have to accept some form of dualism. are true, without bringing in propositions. Minds may not be immaterial things, but at least 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 866


they have immaterial properties, such as being in that in the practical sphere reason “is, and ought states with certain conscious aspects or qualia. only to be the slave of the passions.” See reason- David Lewis, in “Knowing What It’s Like,” ing, practical and theoretical. claims that qualia can be handled by the physicalist. reasoning, practical and theoretical Theoretical rea- qualities See primary and secondary qualities. soning is aimed at assessing evidence and drawing conclusions about what is true. Practical reasoning rationalism Rationalism is an epistemological posi- is aimed at making decisions about what to do. tion that emphasizes reason as a source of knowl- edge itself, not merely a way of organizing and reasons-responsiveness This is a family of ideas that drawing further hypotheses from knowledge got- specify that an agent (or an agent acting on a par- ten by sense perception. Continental rationalism is ticular mechanism) has (or exhibits) a capacity to a term sometimes applied to Descartes, Spinoza, identify and act in accordance with reasons for ac- Leibniz, and other seventeenth- and eighteenth- tion. Reasons are typically thought to be consider- century philosophers. See also empiricism. ations that count in favor of actions. So a reasons-responsive agent (or mechanism) is capable realism In philosophy the term realism is used in a of identifying and acting in accordance with con- context of controversy in which the reality of ob- siderations that count in favor of actions. Some jects of some category has been denied in some way, philosophers (including J.M. Fischer, S. Wolf, and usually by claiming that the objects in question are R.J. Wallace) have given accounts of moral respon- creations or constructions of the human mind. The sibility in terms of reasons-responsiveness. realist in the controversy is one who defends the status of the controversial objects. A philosopher reciprocity Engaging in reciprocity involves, as it can be a realist about one issue, while denying real- were, ‘returning the favor.’ When we help others as ism with respect to some other. The two most com- we have been helped we are engaging in a recipro- mon contexts in which the term is used are cal relationship. universals and the objects of sense perception. A re- reductio ad absurdum Literally translated from alist about universals holds that they are real, in the Latin, this phrase means “reduction to the ab- sense of not being mere names or concepts. A real- surd.” It is a form of argument in which some ist about the objects of sense perception holds that statement is shown to be true because its denial they are real, in the sense of enjoying an existence has obviously false consequences. For instance, independent of the perceiving mind. suppose we are trying to establish that p is true. Naive realism is the view that the objects of To argue for p by reductio ad absurdum would perception not only exist, but exist just as they be to argue that the denial of p leads to the obvi- seem to be. This position is often taken to be re- ously false statement q. But because q is obviously futed by the various forms of the argument from false, it must have been wrong to deny p in the illusion. See illusion, argument from; representa- first place—so, p must be true. tive ideas, theory of. In philosophy the term reductionism reason Reason is the ability or faculty to engage in occurs in the context of a controversy about the theoretical and practical reasoning. A number of status of some kind of object. The reductionist philosophical issues are concerned with the role maintains that talk and knowledge about such of reason in various spheres of human life. Ratio- objects really amount to talk and knowledge nalists and empiricists disagree about the role of about some class of objects that is usually thought reason in the formation of concepts and the de- to be quite different. Talk and knowledge about velopment of knowledge, the latter seeing it only the first kind of object are reduced to talk and as an aid to experience. Kant supposed that there knowledge about the second kind. For example, were fundamental principles of conduct pro- Berkeley thought that talk and knowledge vided by , whereas Hume argued about ordinary objects were really just talk and 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 867


knowledge about ideas. A philosopher can be a (2) that this parameter is a person or group of peo- reductionist about some categories of objects ple making the judgment, or something corre- while being a nonreductionist about others. sponding to a group of people such as a or a language; (3) hence there is no objective truth or fal- refers Philosophers use a number of terms for the sity; that is, no truth or falsity merely concerning relationship that holds between singular terms the objects involved in the phenomena independ- and the objects they designate or stand for. Refers ently of the subjects making those judgments. (In is used both for the relation between singular the terms explained in properties and relations, the terms and what they stand for, and for the act of relativist is claiming that an n-ary property is being using a singular term to stand for something treated as an (n-1)-ary property.) (“‘That piece of furniture’ refers to the chair” vs. Here is an example where is pretty “Jane used ‘that piece of furniture’ to refer to the plausible. Consider the comparative merits of chair.”) The thing referred to is often called the the taste of food. Does the issue of whether car- . Denotes is most properly used for the re- rots taste better or worse than cucumbers have lation between a and the ob- an answer? The relativist, with regard to this ject that uniquely meets the descriptive part, as in issue, would say that there is an answer only rel- “‘The author of Waverley’ denotes Sir Walter ative to a particular taster. Carrots may taste bet- Scott.” But denotes is often simply used as a syn- ter than cucumbers to Mary, whereas cucumbers onym of refers. The thing denoted is sometimes taste better than carrots to Fred. The relativist called the and, less often, the denota- would say that there is no further question of tum. Names is used for the relation between a who is right. The question whether carrots taste name and its bearer (or nominatum), as in “‘Fred’ better than cucumbers simpliciter, without fur- names that man.” Designate and stands for are ther reference to a person who does the tasting, used in a very general way, as the latter has been makes no sense. On the relativist view, the judg- in this discussion. See also extension and inten- ments of Fred and Mary are misconstrued if they sion; singular term. are taken to be about some nonrelative truth. Because taste is relative, there should be no In the course of theorizing, room for such a dispute. one often has to make some sort of compromise There are many types of relativism that are between general principles and considered judg- more controversial and so more interesting than ments about particular cases. Sometimes general relativism about the taste of food. Ontological principles will need to be amended in the light of relativists claim that existence is relative: that conflicting considered judgments, and sometimes different languages, , or conceptual judgments will need to be revised in the light of schemes recognize different classes of objects and otherwise successful general principles. To arrive properties, and questions of existence make no at a balance between the two is to achieve reflec- sense considered outside of such conceptual tive equilibrium. For more details and further schemes. Perhaps the most interesting example is discussion, see John Rawls, “A Theory of Justice.” ethical relativism. Ethical relativists claim that relation of ideas See matters of fact and relations of judgments of right and wrong are relative to in- ideas. dividuals, , or cultures. relativism The term relativism is used with reference representative ideas, theory of The theory of rep- to a body of statements or alleged truths about resentative ideas maintains that knowledge of ex- some sort of phenomena. The relativist maintains ternal things is mediated by ideas in the mind of that these statements (1) are only true (or false) rel- the knower that represent those things in virtue ative to some further factor or parameter, not ex- of a twofold relation they have to them. The ideas plicitly mentioned in the statements themselves; are caused by the external things, and depict those 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 868


external things as having certain properties. Sup- through reason that the future will be like the past, pose, for example, one perceives a chair in front but does not claim we should refrain from believ- of one. The chair causes light to fall on the retina ing it; indeed, he thinks it is both natural to do so in a certain , which causes other events in and impossible not to do so except for brief periods the visual system, which ultimately cause ideas of while doing philosophy. He describes this position a certain sort in the mind. These ideas have cer- as skeptical. Whatever type of skepticism is being tain features, which depict the object causing it to advocated, a philosopher can be skeptical about be a chair of a certain sort. some things and not others. For example, a This theory allows an account of error and a philosopher might be skeptical about the existence treatment of the argument from perceptual rela- of God, but not about the external world. tivity and the argument from illusion. The argu- ment from perceptual relativity shows that second-order desires See second-order volitions. which thing an idea represents and how it de- second-order volitions The theory of freedom that picts that object to be do not depend just on the constructs in his “Freedom of features of the idea, but also auxiliary beliefs. the Will and the Concept of a Person” relies on The same visual image might represent an ob- the idea that our desires are structured hierarchi- ject as elliptical or circular, depending on cally. On the first order, we desire objects or states whether it was taken to be held at a right angle of affairs in the world. For instance, my desire to or acute angle to the line of vision. Normal er- have another cup of coffee is a first-order desire. rors and occur when the idea caused by But humans have enough psychological com- a thing does not accurately depict it, either be- plexity to have second-order desires, as well, cause the auxiliary beliefs are wrong, or some- which are preferences in favor of or against hav- thing unusual in the perceiving conditions or ing certain first-order desires. So, perhaps the the perceiver’s state leads to a wrong idea being only reason I desire another cup of coffee is that produced. The more radical types of error in- I’m addicted to caffeine, but I would rather not volved in certain kinds of delusions, such as hal- be addicted. In this situation, although I may lucinations, involve having an idea that is not have a first-order desire for another cup of coffee, caused by an external thing at all, but some dis- I have a second-order desire not to have the desire order in the perceiver. for another cup of coffee. Fairly explicit versions of the theory of repre- Roughly, to figure out what your first-order sentative ideas may be found in Descartes and desires are, ask yourself, “What do I want?” To Locke. Berkeley, Hume, and others have criticized figure out what your second-order desires are, the theory for various reasons, including that it ask yourself, “What do I want to want?” In the- leads to skepticism, as, it seems to provide no direct ory, the of desires has no end (there can means of knowing the external objects, that the no- be third- and fourth-order desires as well), but tion of depiction makes no sense, and that the after two or three the structure is quite difficult to whole picture of “double existence” is incoherent. think about clearly. revealed religion See natural religion. Second-order volitions, as Frankfurt uses the term, are special sorts of second-order desires. sceptic, skeptic Skeptic is an American , Some second-order desires are simply desires to sceptic the British. When a view is labeled skeptical, have a particular first-order desire. But others are there are two things that must be ascertained, the desires that some particular first-order desire ef- type of skepticism and its topic. The skeptic can be fectively move the agent to action. In other advocating suspension of claims of knowledge or words, whereas sometimes we merely want to , suspension of belief, or positive disbelief. have certain first-order desires, other times we Hume, for example, thinks that we cannot know want those first-order desires actually to move us 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 869


to act. These latter sorts of second-order desires Classical theists such as Augustine, Anselm, and are what Frankfurt calls second-order volitions. Aquinas have defended the doctrine of divine Frankfurt dubs creatures who lack second-order simplicity. Of course, simplicity (lacking parts or volitions wantons. internal structure) is a property that can be pos- sessed by entities other than God. secondary qualities See primary and secondary qualities. singular term Singular terms include proper names (John, Fred), singular definite semicompatibilism Semicompatibilism is the doc- (the author of Waverley, the present king of trine that causal determinism is compatible with France, the square root of two), singular pro- moral responsibility, quite apart from the issue of nouns (I, you, she, he, it), and singular demon- whether causal determinism is compatible with strative phrases (that man, this ship). These terms freedom to do otherwise. The view presupposes all identify or purport to identify a particular ob- that moral responsibility does not require free- ject, about which something further is said. dom to do otherwise. (The term was first intro- The category singular term is found in philos- duced by J.M. Fischer.) ophy and more than in lin- sense-data Some philosophers who accept that guistics. The category includes expressions that the various forms of the argument from illusion are syntactically quite different, like definite de- show that we do not directly perceive material scriptions and names, and separates things that objects, use the terms sense-datum and sense-data syntactically seem closely related, like singular for what we do directly perceive. Unlike the and plural definite descriptions (“the governor of terms idea or sensation, the term sense-data does Maryland,” “the senators from Maryland”). not imply that the direct objects of perception Solipsism is the thesis that only the self ex- are mental, but leaves that question open. ists, or (alternatively) that only the self can be Sense-data are objects of some sort, distin- known to exist. Solipsism is one radical solution to guished from the act of being aware of them. the “problem of other minds,” the problem of how Sense-data are usually supposed to have all of it is that one can know that any minds besides one’s the properties they seem to have. Suppose, for own exist. According to the solipsist, one can’t example, you see a blue tie in a store with fluo- know that the (apparent) persons one interacts rescent lighting, it looks green, and you take it with actually have mental lives like one’s own. to be so. A philosopher who believes in sense- data would say that you are directly aware of a sophism A sophism is a bad argument presented as sense-datum that is green; your mistake is in if it were a good one to deceive, mislead, or cheat your inference from the fact about the sense- someone; sophistry is the practice of doing this. datum’s color to the tie’s color. In Ancient , the were itinerant teachers of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., sex Sex can refer to various forms of intimate, some of whom, such as and , erotic activity. Exactly which activities of this Socrates criticized vigorously. His negative view sort are, properly speaking, sex is a matter of was based on the empiricism, relativism, and controversy, both in philosophy and elsewhere. skepticism of their teachings; on the fact that they simplicity Simplicity is a property traditionally at- took a fee; and on the fact that they taught argu- tributed to God. Roughly, a being is simple if and ment for the sake of and manipula- only if that being lacks parts or . The tion of others, rather than for the pursuit of truth. doctrine of is very controversial; sound See deductive argument. philosophers not only do not agree about whether God is simple, but do not agree about what the state of nature The state of nature is the hypo- doctrine of divine simplicity means or entails. thetical situation in which human beings would 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 870


find themselves without the existence of any gov- Many advocates of functionalism maintain that al- ernment or state that can exercise coercive force though mental properties cannot be identified over them. with physical properties (as the identity theory holds), they nevertheless supervene on them. Both subjective character See qualia. the identity theorist and the supervenience theo- Literally, this phrase is rist maintain that beings that are physically in- translated as “under the aspect of .” It is discernible will have the same mental properties. used in roughly the same way as the phrase “from But the supervenience theorist allows that beings a God’s-eye point of view” and is meant to indi- that are mentally alike, may be quite different cate an impersonal, detached, and objective view physically. For example, a philosopher might of the world and its goings-on. Thomas Nagel in- think that agents built out of silicon-based com- vokes this notion while discussing the meaning of puters, humans, and individuals from outer space life in “The Absurd.” with a completely different than ours could all have beliefs, desires, and intentions, in substance The term substance has been used in a spite of the difference of their physical constitution variety of ways in philosophy. In modern philos- and organization. ophy, a substance is a thing capable of independ- ent existence. Substances are contrasted with A syllogism is a valid deductive argu- qualities and relations, on the one hand, and ment or argument form with two premises and complexes, on the other. These are all merely a conclusion, that involves universal and exis- ways that substances are. Philosophers have had tential statements involving three terms. For dramatically different opinions about what meets example: these conditions. Descartes thought that there were two basically different kinds of substance, All As are Bs. material and immaterial, and there were many of All Bs are Cs. each, and that no way of being material was a Therefore, all As are Cs. way of being mental and vice versa. Spinoza Some As are Bs. thought that there was but one substance, and No Bs are Cs. material and mental reality were aspects of it. (He Therefore some As are not Cs. called this thing God, although many of his oppo- nents thought his view amounted to atheism.) In In these examples, B is the middle term; it ap- “Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses,” pears in the premises to connect the terms in the Hume treats our perceptions as substances—the conclusion, but does not itself appear in the con- ultimate, independent constituents of reality. clusion. A is the minor term because it is the sub- supererogation If you ought to do some action, then ject of the conclusion and C is the major term it is obligatory. If some action is not obligatory but because it is the predicate of the conclusion. Much would nevertheless be good to do, then it is of the theory of syllogism was worked out by supererogatory. Many think that to give money to Aristotle. The class of valid deductive arguments famine relief, for instance, is to go “above and be- studied in modern logic is much larger. yond” one’s obligations and hence is to perform an action that is supererogatory. For a challenge to this synthetic See analytic and synthetic. view of giving money to famine relief, however, see teleological ethics See consequentialism. ’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” teleology/teleological See final causation. supervenience A set of properties A supervenes on another set of properties B, if all objects with the A philosophical response on the part of a same B-properties have the same A-properties. believer to the problem of evil. 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 871

GLOSSARY 871 transeunt causation See agent-causation. universals and particulars A particular is what we would ordinarily think of as a thing, with a par- transitive See properties and relations. ticular position in space at any one time. A uni- Turing A is not a real ma- versal is that which particulars have in common, chine one can go out and buy, but an abstract con- or may have in common. The kind, human, is a ception invented by A. M. Turing to help think universal; people are particulars. Types about computing and computers. The machine are universals, tokens are particulars. Properties scans a square on a tape, erases what it finds there, such as being red are universals; philosophers dis- prints something new, moves to a new square, and agree about whether it is red things (roses, barns) goes into a new state. What it prints, where it moves, that have them in common, or particular cases of and into what state it goes are all determined by the the property (the redness of the rose, the redness state in which it was in the beginning and what it of the barn). Not all philosophers agree that there found on the square. Computer scientists and logi- are universals. Nominalists maintain that univer- cians have shown that Turing —given sals are just names that we apply to different ob- enough time and tape—can compute any function jects that resemble one another; metaphysics that any computer can compute. should recognize particulars that resemble each other in various ways, but not universals above types and tokens How many words are in this and beyond those particulars. A nominalist statement? might claim that the type–token distinction re- ally amounts to providing two ways of counting An argument is an argument, tokens, not two kinds of object to be counted. but a good cigar is a smoke. use and mention Ordinarily when a word appears There are twelve word tokens, but only eight in a statement, it is being used to talk about some- word types. There are two tokens each of the word thing else. If one wants to talk about the word it- types “an,” “argument,” “is,” and “a” and one each self, one has to mention it. In the statement, of “but,” “good,” “cigar,” and “smoke.” The types are universals, whereas the tokens are particulars. The word “four” has four letters, uniformity of nature The principle of the unifor- “four” is mentioned the first time it occurs and mity of nature maintains that the same basic pat- used the second time it occurs. When a word is terns or laws are found throughout nature; the mentioned, one may be talking about the token or future will be like the past, at least in terms of the the type. basic operations of nature; and more generally Utilitarianism Utilitarianism is a consequentialist the unexamined parts of nature will be like the ethical theory. Utilitarianism is usually connected parts that have been examined up to a certain with the more specific doctrines of Bentham and point. This principle seems to underlie the use of Mill, who took the goodness of consequences to be past experience to form expectations about the measured by their effect on the happiness or welfare future, but, according to Hume, it isn’t itself sus- of sentient creatures. (This is sometimes referred to ceptible of . The principle is discussed by as the principle of Utility or the Greatest Happiness Hume and Hempel; Goodman’s new riddle of Principle.) Bentham focused on pleasure, Mill on a induction poses a puzzle about how this principle more abstract notion of happiness that allowed him is to be understood. to maintain that “It is better to be a human being universal causation, principle of The principle of dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates universal causation holds that all events have dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.” For further discus- causes, though not necessarily deterministic sion, see the Introduction to Part V. causes. See also determinism. valid See deductive argument. 10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 872

872 GLOSSARY veil of ignorance The term veil of ignorance is Although it comes in many vari- sometimes used to characterize the skeptical con- eties, verificationism is characterized by a general sequences of the theory of representative ideas. Ac- distrust of claims that cannot be shown to be true, cording to this theory, we only directly know the or verified, using only empirical methods like contents of our own mind; these then form a sort those available to the natural sciences. Many held of veil between us and the external world. This that because the claims of ethics, metaphysics, term is also often used in religion, to suggest a and religion cannot be empirically verified, they fundamental feature of the : All are meaningless. Although this view of meaning of experience is simply a veil of ignorance be- is largely discredited today, it was highly influen- tween us and what is most real, or matters most. tial in the early twentieth century. The term was given a new use in ethics by John Rawls, as an important part of his characteriza- See virtue theory. tion of the original position. The original position is virtue theory (virtue ethics) This is an approach to a hypothetical state of affairs in which members of ethical theory that is frequently traced to Aristo- a society choose the principles of justice that will tle and contrasted with approaches drawn from, govern them. This choice is to be made behind a for example, Kant and Mill. A virtue theory veil of ignorance in the sense that the persons mak- highlights questions about the nature of those ing this choice are not to know their class, position, character traits that are virtues—for example, , , strength, and so forth. . Such questions are seen as in some way The underlying intuition is that by being ignorant fundamental to the theory. of these specifics, these individuals will be led to make an impartial and fair choice. wanton See second-order volitions.