Representation and Metaphysics Proper
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Richard B. Wells ©2006 CHAPTER 4 First Epilegomenon: Representation and Metaphysics Proper The pursuit of wisdom has had a two-fold origin. Diogenes Laertius § 1. Questions Raised by Representation The outline of representation presented in Chapter 3 leaves us with a number of questions we need to address. In this chapter we will take a look back at our ideas of representation and work toward the resolution of those issues that present themselves in consequence of the theory as it stands so far. I call this look back an epilegomenon, from epi – which means “over” or “upon” – and legein – “to speak.” I employ this new term because the English language seems to have no word that adequately expresses the task at hand. “Epilogue” would imply logical conclusion, while “summary” or “epitome” would suggest a simple re-hashing of what has already been said. Our present task is more than this; we must bring out the implications of representation, Critically examine the gaps in the representation model, and attempt to unite its aggregate pieces as a system. In doing so, our aim is to push farther toward “that which is clearer by nature” although we should not expect to arrive at this destination all in one lunge. Let this be my apology for this minor act of linguistic tampering.1 In particular, Chapter 3 saw the introduction of three classes of ideas that are addressed by the division of nous in its role as the agent of construction for representations. We described these ideas as ideas of the act of representing. They were: 1) the functional invariants; 2) Kant’s Verstandes-Actus; and, 3) Kant’s threefold synthesis of apprehension, reproduction, and re- cognition. At present these ideas are united only by virtue of being regarded as ideas pertaining to the pure mental element – nous – of the Organized Being model. Thus they are united only topically and not Critically. This is a situation we must work to remedy. Furthermore, within these ideas lie yet unanswered certain other fundamental questions, especially regarding the meaning and implications of the ideas of comparison, reflexion, and abstraction – questions that were raised in Chapter 3 but not given clear answers therein. 1 The word epilegomenon is suggested by the word prolegomenon. A prolegomenon is a preliminary or introductory text coming prior to a work. In this spirit, an epilegomenon is a backward-looking analysis intended to set the stage for building upon what has gone before by clarifying problems and issues. 240 Chapter 4: First Epilegomenon Furthermore, the ideas of the functional invariants – organization and adaptation – are rational principles built out of grounds that are, strictly speaking, empirical and suggested through mere analogy to similar properties exhibited by biological organisms. While reasoning by analogy can be useful and properly employed in the discovery process, mere analogy cannot serve to produce a proper science unless we can find a transition from empirical theory to metaphysics proper. Without this transition, we have merely a saltus, which lacks the universality and necessity required for a proper systematic doctrine. § 2. The Idea of Organization The idea of organization runs throughout the study of mental physics, beginning with the Organized Being model. In Piaget’s view organization is the idea of the functional totality of an organism, an idea which states that when considering any one part we must not lose sight of the fact that this part is an integral part of the whole. Organization fills the role of a regulating function for the intellect and is one of Piaget’s two functional invariants. There are two sides to this description of organization. The first – the idea of the whole as the totality of parts – is reflected in common language when we refer to “an organization” as a noun. The second – organization as a regulating function – is typically not what comes to mind when we use the word “organization” in everyday speech, although some form of “regulation” in an operational or control theory sense is implicit in our common idea of “an organization.” In common usage the idea of organization brings to mind a picture of specialized pieces or “functional units” so arranged as to work together with other such pieces toward a common global purpose or result. Examples of human organizations abound – an army corps organized into divisions, a company organized into functional areas such as production, marketing, etc., a public school organized into grades, and so on. Biological examples are also commonplace, e.g., the organism “organized” in terms of the skeleto-muscular system, the respiratory system, the central nervous system, etc. What, then, does Piaget’s idea denote for mental organization? Piaget’s writings tend to focus on the application of this idea to mental structures and the manner in which these mental structures develop – e.g., “schemes” and “schemata” – and he is careful to never let his rational explanations wander too far from what can be factually observed. This is, of course, to his credit, but this strategy also limits his rational principles to the realm of the empirical. Let us ask: Can this empirical principle of organization be tied to metaphysics proper? Most likely you are anticipating a “yes” answer to this question because I bring it up here, but also most likely it is not very apparent how this linkage is to be established with objective validity. Let us find out. 241 Chapter 4: First Epilegomenon § 2.1 Organization and Rational Cosmology In Kant’s terminology Rational Cosmology is that part of metaphysics proper which deals with the idea of an objective world seen as the whole of all objects within it in accordance with the Idea of a necessary whole. More specifically, Rational Cosmology is concerned with acroamatic a priori principles for establishing or regulating how such a whole must necessarily be conceived. It would therefore seem that Piaget’s empirical principle of organization aligns topically with this part of Kant’s system of metaphysics proper. We briefly introduced the idea of Rational Cosmology in Chapter 2, although we made no attempt there to expound upon what its a priori principles might be. If we are to understand how Kant’s system of metaphysics proper, and Rational Cosmology in particular, could possibly have anything to do with Piaget’s idea of organization, we must fill in some of the details regarding what we mean by the metaphysic of Rational Cosmology. First, Kant defines metaphysics proper as metaphysics “when it is applied to Objects themselves” [KANT19: 427 (29: 956)]. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, the term “Object” conveys a general connotation of the organization of the structure representations. To make use of this we must have some subdivisions of the general idea. One such division we can make of the idea of Objects is to look at objects in terms of the origin of their representations, and in this we can at once classify objects as: 1) sensible, i.e., objects of representations that take their origin from the data of the senses; and, 2) intelligible, i.e., supersensible objects that owe their representations to our reasoning processes. These latter kinds of objects are those we have previously called objects represented by ideas. Piaget’s “organization” is such an object. We cannot point to something and say, “There! That is organization,” in the same sense that we can point to something and say, “There! That is an apple.” Piagetian organization is not merely some aggregation of the parts of an organism but, rather, is the idea that somehow or other these divers parts are actually united in one object – an organization – and that it is only in relationship to this object that the parts themselves have meaningful Existenz. We can, for instance, speaking meaningfully of a “stomach” insofar as its Dasein is concerned, but a stomach is an “organ” only with respect to an “organism.” Rational Cosmology is the subdivision of metaphysics proper concerning the process by which an aggregation of divers objects is united necessarily in the idea of Nature. Its topic, in other words, is Nature and, more specifically, with how Nature must be conceived as a necessary whole. This word “necessary” is particularly important here. Our idea of “the world” (or, if one prefers, “the universe”) is an idea within which we find “objects of experience” and ideas of “abstract objects” that serve to unite these objects of experience. For example, the paperweight on my desk is an object of experience for me. That I hold to be true that this object possesses a property called “mass” exemplifies one way in which an “abstract object” – e.g., the idea of supersensible “mass” – enters into my idea of Nature as an idea that unites this thing called “my 242 Chapter 4: First Epilegomenon paperweight” with other sensible objects. However, all objects of experience presented to me through the data of the senses are always contingently presented. In other words, there are particular delimitations placed upon my representations of such objects, and these delimitations are the conditions which allow me to specify that “this object” is a paperweight and not a dog. These conditions themselves have conditions placed upon them. Suppose that just before I go to bed I notice my paperweight is sitting on my desk. If, when I get up in the morning, I find something that looks like my paperweight sitting on the kitchen counter (and notice the absence of my paperweight from my desk), I would find this situation puzzling to say the least. Do I regard this object to be “my paperweight”? If so, do I: 1) ascribe self-locomotion to my paperweight? or, 2) ascribe its presence on the kitchen counter as evidence that someone moved it there during the night? If I live by myself, does (2) mean: 1) someone entered my house unknown to me during the night and moved the paperweight? or, 2) I am a sleepwalker and moved the paperweight myself during the night? or, 3) that I just forgot that I moved it before going to bed? The point to this example is just this: To “make sense” of Nature we must always consider a series of conditions.