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International Crisis Group Report on Somaliland View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.ukInternational Crisis Group brought to you by CORE Report1 on Somaliland: provided by DigitalCommons@Macalester College An Alternative Somali Response2 Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar I. Introduction The International Crisis Group’s (ICG) most recent report on the Somali Republic deals with developments in the Northern region (Somalil- and). It narrates what the informed knew all along: (a) that peace has been restored in most of the North for the past decade while the rest of the country, particularly Mogadishu and the southern third, are mired in violence; (b) that some semblance of constitutional order and administrative structure is in place; (c) that most of the public refused to accept naked force as a political instrument to deal with political problems; and (d) that corruption is pervasive among the political elite. Conceptually, the ICG report is divided into three parts. First, it provides a brief review of Somali political history. Second, it sketches the evolution of the region since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991 and the declaration of the region’s breakaway status from the rest of the country. Finally, it focuses on three elections organized in the last three years, in order to buttress the claim that the region deserves to be recognized as a sovereign country. This information raises piv- otal questions about the profile of the region as well as the fate of the Somali people. Together, these two points invite a timely, wide, and thoughtful debate among Somalis and others concerned. After serious cogitation upon the details of the document, we submit that the Report presents important points for the international community to come to the aid of the people of the region to consolidate their com- munal achievements—particularly in the areas of stability, economic 107 Bildhaan Vol. 5 advancement, and institution building. However, the Report fails to clinch the argument for international recognition of a new sovereign Somaliland state in the Horn of Africa. The rest of this critical assess- ment elucidates this proposition. At first blush, it is important to register that we were born in and are of the northern region of the Somali Republic. Self-consciously anguished by the current circumstances, we are, therefore, cognizant of the obligations incumbent upon us with regard to the promotion of the well-being of our communities, particularly Gabileh District. More- over, as scholars, we have collectively dedicated 35 years to sympa- thetically understand the inner workings of Somali society, discern the great challenges of the age, and proffer possible remedies. That spirit and sense of belonging move us. Our strategic thinking, however, is informed by the profundity and appropriateness of this Somali adage: “Si xeego ay xeego u noqoto ilkuhuna u nabad galaan” (roughly, Play fierce hockey yet protect the teeth!). Sadly, we are of the opinion that the ICG Report sketches a political history replete with errors, misinterpreta- tion, and omissions, and bedeviled by an untenable characterization of entire communities (all too negative or positive). In addition, it ends with recommendations that the Report’s analysis does not sustain. Ours, then, is an exercise in ideational counterfoil to the Report. To be sure, there are numerous possibilities for contestation, but, given the preliminary nature of our contributions, we limit our engagement to the following six categories:3 • History and Memory • Unification • Democracy, Leadership, and Politics of Corruption • Collaboration with Military Dictatorship/Clanist Sentiments • Declaration of Sovereignty • A Word on the Report’s Conclusion We will end our position with alternative recommendations that at once enthusiastically accent the legitimate needs of the people of the region and preserve the promise of a civic future that Somalis of all regions could build together. 108 Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar II. On History and Memory A. The histories of the Somali Republic and the region are complex, and, consequently, no brief document, and particularly one with a different focus, should be expected to do justice to it. Nonetheless, there are important historical benchmarks that are unavoidable in any serious discussion. For instance, the ICG Report barely touches on the effects of colonialism and the Ethiopian annexation of Somali-inhabited areas. The first can be indicted at three moments: (a) the destruction of Somali life and property during the twenty-year Dervish resistance;4 (b) the disregard of strong pan-Somali sentiments during WWII and, later, in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya; and (c) the deep social and economic deficit left behind by the British Protector- ate.5 This last point is critical to underscoring the dearth of human capital, one that would disadvantage the North in the ensuing com- petition for the highest posts on the morrow of postcolonial time. For Ethiopia, suffice it to register the old and still continuing marginaliza- tion of Somali-inhabited areas and perpetual intentions to undermine any strong Somali national state. B. The ICG Report makes a less than accurate and fleeting remark on the admittedly controversial but heroic and extremely ennobling legacy of Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan. Unlike colonial mischief of dividing the natives into friendlies and rebels, the Sayid, on the whole a prophetic poet unparalleled in the annals of Somali literary creativity and courage, is the patron saint of Somali nationalism (Soomalinimo).6 C. The Report never mentions the glorious work of the Somali Youth League (SYL), the only nationalist movement that had a presence in all Somali lands. Here, also, the Report misses the fact that regional pre- independence parties in the North, such as the Somali National League (SNL), the National United Front (NUF), and the United Somali Party (USP), all subscribed to the first principle: the unification of British and Italian Somalilands. D. The Report fails to call attention to the historical point that North- ern Somalis were highly significant to the success of the SYL delega- tions to the United Nations in New York—led by the late Abdillahi Issa and, later, by Abdirazak H. Hussein—where they pressed for indepen- 109 Bildhaan Vol. 5 dence. More specifically, Northern Somalis in Paris, London, and New York subsidized the expenses of the SYL nationalists. III. On Unification A. The Report insinuates that the North was cheated because the Union Act was not properly and legally consummated. In the language of the ICG document: [T]he precipitate nature of the unions had also left a number of legal questions pending. The two acts of union approved by the respective legislatures differed somewhat and no single legal document actually bound the two territories. The new national assembly recognized the error and passed a new act of union in January 1961, retroactive to the moment of independence, but some observers have argued that since the two territories were legally united, the new Act remained without force in the north.7 It is important to identify that the observers quoted in the previous sentence were consultants hired in 1992 by the regional administra- tion in Hargeisa.8 It is also noteworthy to contrast such a claim with what Paolo Contini, the chief legal advisor to the new Somali Republic, wrote in his book in 1969: The decision to form a union was reached at a conference of North- ern and Southern Somali leaders held in Mogadishu between April 16 and 22, 1960. A joint communiqué issued at the end of the conference announced it had been agreed that the two territories would be united on July 1, 1960; the new Somali Republic would be unitary, democratic and parliamentary State; the legislative bodies of the two territories would be merged into a National Assembly which would be set up ‘in order to investigate and propose convenient solutions to the problems connected with the Administrative, financial and judicial systems now in force in the two Territories’; the United Nations would be asked ‘to supply experts who may help in accelerating the integration of the two Territories’… . On June 27, the day after independence, Somaliland’s leg- islative Assembly passed ‘The Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law,’ incorporating the proposed Act of Union previously sent to Mogadishu. Section 1(a) stated that ‘The State of Somaliland and the State of Somalia do hereby unite and shall forever remain united in a new, independent, democratic, unitary republic the name of which shall be the SOMALI REPUBLIC. (Our highlighting.) 110 Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar Contini adds: There is no doubt that on the first of July a full and lawful union was formed by the will of the people of the two territories through their elected representatives. However, the legal formalities had not been completed in time…the matter was clarified seven months later by the adoption of the new Act of Union with retroactive effect as from July 1, 1960 for the whole of the Republic.9 The Union Act reads exactly as the Somaliland legislature wrote it. Another related matter the ICG Report misrepresents is how the constitution of the new Republic was developed. The fact is that Ital- ian Somaliland, the United Nation’s Trusteeship, had an earlier start in constitution making than the British territory. Despite this, there were consultations between the leaders of the two regions, and United Nations experts assisted in the endeavor. The draft constitution was given to visiting Northern leaders to review and make changes as they saw fit. The Northerners liked the document and added only two articles (88 and 89). These additions dealt with public employees and mandated the creation of an independent public service commission, points incorporated into the document. The new parliament vetted the draft constitution, which triggered public debate, particularly after the document was read, article-by-article, over the two national broadcast- ing stations Radio Hargeisa and Mogadishu.
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