DOCSLIB.ORG

Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring Hakwan Lau1,2,3,4 [email protected] 1. Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, USA 2. Brain Research Institute, University of California Los Angeles, USA 3. Department of Psychology, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 4. State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level1. An empirical link Neuroscience experiments have shown that, at least at the level of functional anatomy, the neural mechanisms for conscious perception and sensory metacognition are similar (Lau and Rosenthal 2011). By sensory metacognition we mean the monitoring of the quality or reliability of internal perceptual signals (Morales, Lau, and Fleming 2018). These two mechanisms both involve neural activity in the prefrontal and parietal cortices, outside of primary sensory regions. In terms of the cognitive mechanisms and behavior, there also seems to be some connection between the two. When people are asked to detect stimuli in the periphery, they are more likely to say that they see something (Knotts et al. 2018). This is true even when they are not actually more accurate in their decisions for the periphery compared to detection around fovea; they just make more false alarms in the periphery. One explanation is that we incorrectly represent the reliability of our internal perceptual signals, i.e. a failure of metacognition (Odegaard et al. 2018). Accordingly, we subjectively feel that we consciously see colorful details in the periphery, even though color sensitivity is poor in the periphery from as early as the retina. The ways that our conscious experience may be unrealistic (or inflated at times, Knotts et al. 2018), seem similar and related to the ways that our metacognition behaves (Miyoshi and Lau, forthcoming). These considerations have led some to think that consciousness and metacognition may be intrinsically related (Brown, Lau, and LeDoux, forthcoming). But it would be too strong to think they are one and the same; it is implausible that consciousness is necessary for any kind of sensory metacognition, as there may be unconscious mechanisms for perceptual monitoring too (Cortese, Lau, and Kawato, forthcoming). So what exactly is the relationship between consciousness and metacognition? Here I offer a theory of conscious perception to account for this link. 1 A short essay related to this article is published in Aeon Magazine: https://aeon.co/ideas/is- consciousness-a-battle-between-your-beliefs-and-perceptions 1 Some ‘magical’ intuitions Let us start with some intuitive examples. Intuitions are rarely universal. So they aren’t meant to be required assumptions for the arguments below. But they can sometimes help motivate ideas. On the internet there are videos2 showing that monkeys and apes seem capable of appreciating stage magic, i.e. tricks based on sleight of hand. Upon seeing these tricks, they express bewilderment and amusement, just like we do. Intuitively, it seems hard to imagine that the animals aren’t seeing the tricks consciously. To put it another way, I suggest there can never be such a thing as unconscious magic. It makes no sense for a stage magician to specialize in magic tricks that are registered unconsciously in the brains of the audience, but not consciously seen. Even if people giggle uncontrollably upon being presented with such unconscious tricks, this won’t be the same thing as genuine magic appreciation. The reason that stage magic, or at least some specific forms of it, may only work consciously probably has something to do with the very nature of conscious perception. Specifically, conscious seeing tends to lead to certain corresponding beliefs about what we see. There are three important features of these beliefs: i) they are actual personal-level beliefs, not just some representations in the brain unendorsed by the person as an agent; and yet ii) they tend to happen automatically, without having the subject engage in some effortful cognitive inference; iii) they feel subjectively justified, in the sense that it seems, from the agent’s point of view at least, very reasonable to believe them. These features are true only if the relevant seeing is conscious; unconscious sensing doesn’t give rise to beliefs with these features, if they give rise to beliefs at all. Together these features explain why seeing certain types of stage magic is so amusing. It is so because when you consciously see a magic trick, it tends to cause beliefs (e.g. a person’s turning into a cat) that conflict with other beliefs you have as a rational person (e.g. people don’t ever spontaneously turn into cats). Usually when you entertain such weird beliefs that are incompatible with everything else you believe, you reason your way out, so ultimately you may reject the weird beliefs. But here the beliefs occur automatically, beyond your volitional control. Also, they present themselves to you as justified, as if they are the most reasonable things to believe. That’s why it is so bewildering to see magic, and sometimes you can even see some of the same tricks over and over again without getting tired of them; all of this happens because of what conscious seeing constitutively involves. Contrast this with cognitively realizing something bizarre, such as that: today is Monday but yesterday you were at work, although you never work on Sundays. Upon having such weird realization, one would re-organize one’s thoughts, check it with other beliefs. If we see this unexpected situation happen over and over again, we would finally come to some resolution, such as accepting that we must have mistaken that today is Monday after all. But certain types 2 Such as: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FIxYCDbRGJc 2 of magic tricks, presented consciously to us, remain as visually entertaining as ever (when done properly), even when we fully expect to see something bewildering. There is something about conscious perception that seems to be epistemically stubborn, compared to other usual modes of acquiring evidence for reasoning and behavior. Consciousness as perceptual reality monitoring A certain version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception may account for the above three features. According to higher-order theories, having a (first-order) perceptual representation on its own is not sufficient for conscious perception. In addition, one would need to have a relevant higher-order representation. There is some debate among higher-order theorists regarding what should be the content and nature of the higher-order representation, leading to different versions of higher-order theories (Lau and Rosenthal 2011; Brown, Lau, and LeDoux, forthcoming). Here I propose that, given some necessary basic background functioning of an agent capable of perception and cognition (including some degree of rational decision-making and inference), conscious perception in that agent occurs if there is a relevant higher-order representation with the content that, a particular first-order perceptual representation is a reliable reflection of the external world right now. The occurrence of this higher-order representation gives rise to conscious experiences with the perceptual content represented by the relevant first-order state. The agent is typically not conscious of the content of this higher-order representation itself, but the representation is instantiated in the system in such a way to allow relevant inferences to be drawn (automatically) and to be made available to the agent (on a personal level, in ways that make the inferences feel subjectively justified). To understand why this may be a useful and plausible mechanism to have, let us run it through some key cases. These cases will also help illustrate why in the above paragraph I wrote “if” rather than “if and only if”; I specified one scenario in which conscious experience occurs but there’s also another scenario. According to the theory, blindsight occurs when a first-order representation occurs without the corresponding higher-order representation (see the below section on objections and replies for more details on this point). That’s why the perceptual capacity is there (due to the first-order representations), but the phenomenology of conscious perception is missing (Weiskrantz 1999). In visual working memory (e.g. holding an image ‘online’ in one’s mind for a few seconds), the corresponding early sensory (i.e. first-order) representations in the brain are activated during the memory delay (Harrison and Tong 2010). And yet, despite the activation of similar first-order representations, one does not mistakenly see the memorized image during the delay period, at least not in the normal way of consciously seeing, phenomenologically speaking. The content of working memory does not ‘leak out’ to the world. According to the theory, it is because the higher-order system (correctly) does not consider the relevant first-order representation to be reliable reflections of the state of the world right now. Instead the phenomenology (of imagery) is accounted for by the fact that the higher-order system considers the first-order representation to be a reliable internal representation generated by oneself. 3 Importantly, there are also cases when first-order representations occur without any conscious experience at all. For example, neurons in sensory areas show spontaneous activity. Literally, your cat-representing neurons are firing regularly now and then, on their own (Moutard, Dehaene, and Malach 2015). And yet you don’t have any sense of seeing or imagining a cat nearly as often.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Integrated Nature of Metamemory and Memory
    The Integrated Nature of Metamemory and Memory John Dunlosky and Robert A. Bjork Introduction Memory has been of interest to scholars and laypeople alike for over 2,000 years. In a rather gruesome example from antiquity, Cicero tells the story of Simonides (557– 468 BC), who discovered the method of loci, which is a powerful mental mnemonic for enhancing one’s memory. Simonides was at a banquet of a nobleman, Scopas. To honor him, Simonides sang a poem, but to Scopas’s chagrin, the poem also honored two young men, Castor and Pollux. Being upset, Scopas told Simonides that he was to receive only half his wage. Simonides was later called from the banquet, and legend has it that the banquet room collapsed, and all those inside were crushed. To help bereaved families identify the victims, Simonides reportedly was able to name every- one according to the place where they sat at the table, which gave him the idea that order brings strength to our memories and that to employ this ability people “should choose localities, then form mental images of things they wanted to store in their memory, and place these in the localities” (Cicero, 2001). Tis example highlights an early discovery that has had important applied impli- cations for improving the functioning of memory (see, e.g., Yates, 1997). Memory theory was soon to follow. Aristotle (385–322 BC) claimed that memory arises from three processes: Events are associated (1) through their relative similarity or (2) rela- tive dissimilarity and (3) when they co-occur together in space and time.
    [Show full text]
  • Theoretical Models of Consciousness: a Scoping Review
    brain sciences Review Theoretical Models of Consciousness: A Scoping Review Davide Sattin 1,2,*, Francesca Giulia Magnani 1, Laura Bartesaghi 1, Milena Caputo 1, Andrea Veronica Fittipaldo 3, Martina Cacciatore 1, Mario Picozzi 4 and Matilde Leonardi 1 1 Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; [email protected] (F.G.M.); [email protected] (L.B.); [email protected] (M.C.); [email protected] (M.C.); [email protected] (M.L.) 2 Experimental Medicine and Medical Humanities-PhD Program, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department and Center for Clinical Ethics, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy 3 Oncology Department, Mario Negri Institute for Pharmacological Research IRCCS, 20156 Milan, Italy; veronicaandrea.fi[email protected] 4 Center for Clinical Ethics, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +39-02-2394-2709 Abstract: The amount of knowledge on human consciousness has created a multitude of viewpoints and it is difficult to compare and synthesize all the recent scientific perspectives. Indeed, there are many definitions of consciousness and multiple approaches to study the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Therefore, the main aim of this article is to collect data on the various theories of consciousness published between 2007–2017 and to synthesize them to provide a general overview of this topic. To describe each theory, we developed a thematic grid called the dimensional model, which qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes how each article, related to one specific theory, debates/analyzes a specific issue.
    [Show full text]
  • The Effects of a Suggested Encoding Strategies on Achievement
    The Effects of Metacognition 17 The Effects of Metacognition and Concrete Encoding Strategies on Depth of Understanding in Educational Psychology Suzanne Schellenberg, Meiko Negishi, & Paul Eggen, University of North Florida The study compared the academic achievement, as measured by final examination scores, of an experimental group of undergraduate educational psychology students who were provided with concrete mechanisms designed to promote metacognition and the use of specific encoding strategies to the achievement of a control group of similar students who were not provided with the same concrete mechanisms. The two groups were taught by the same instructor, who used the same teaching methods and identical class activities, homework, quizzes, and tests. The results indicated a statistically significant difference between the two groups, favoring the experimental group. Implications of the study for instruction and suggestions for further research are included. This study explored instructional capacity working memory that designs that encourage learners to consciously organizes information into become responsible for their own conceptual structures that make sense to learning. Responsible learners are the individual, a long-term memory that metacognitive, strategic, and high stores knowledge and skills in a achievers. Therefore, researchers have relatively permanent fashion, and become interested in investigating ways metacognitive monitoring that regulates to foster learners’ metacognition and this processing (Atkinson & Shiffrin, strategy use. 1968; Chandler & Sweller, 1990; Mayer The purpose of the study was to & Chandler, 2001; Paas, Renkl, & examine the impact of concrete Sweller, 2004; Sweller, 2003; Sweller, mechanisms for promoting van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998). The metacognition and the conscious use of way knowledge is stored in long-term encoding strategies on the achievement memory has an important impact on of undergraduate educational learners’ ability to retrieve that psychology students.
    [Show full text]
  • Impact of Feedback on Perception and Metacognition 1
    IMPACT OF FEEDBACK ON PERCEPTION AND METACOGNITION 1 The impact of feedback on perceptual decision making and metacognition: Reduction in bias but no change in sensitivity Nadia Haddara & Dobromir Rahnev School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA Keywords: perceptual decision maKing, metacognition, criterion, bias, sensitivity, confidence calibration. Corresponding authors: Nadia Haddara Dobromir Rahnev Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Institute of Technology 831 Marietta St NW 654 Cherry St NW Atlanta, GA 30318 Atlanta, GA 30332 [email protected] [email protected] IMPACT OF FEEDBACK ON PERCEPTION AND METACOGNITION 2 Abstract It is widely believed that feedbacK improves behavior but the mechanisms behind this improvement remain unclear. Different theories postulate that feedback has either a direct effect on performance through automatic reinforcement mechanisms or only an indirect effect mediated by a deliberate change in strategy. To adjudicate between these competing accounts, we performed two large studies (total N = 518) with approximately half the subjects receiving trial-by-trial feedback on a perceptual task, while the other half not receiving any feedback. We found that feedback had no effect on either perceptual or metacognitive sensitivity even after seven days of training. On the other hand, feedback significantly affected subjects’ response strategies by reducing response bias and improving confidence calibration. These results strongly support the view that feedback does not improve behavior through direct reinforcement mechanisms but that its beneficial effects stem from allowing people to adjust their strategies for performing the tasK. Word count: 149/150 IMPACT OF FEEDBACK ON PERCEPTION AND METACOGNITION 3 Statement of relevance How can we help people improve their performance? It is often thought that across a variety of domains from education to worK settings to sports achievements to various cognitive tasks, performance can be improved by simply providing feedbacK.
    [Show full text]
  • Consciousness, Philosophical Issues About Ned Block New York University I
    To appear in The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science Consciousness, Philosophical Issues about Ned Block New York University I. The Hard Problem There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state of reflexive consciousness. This entry will start with phenomenality, moving later to reflexivity and then to one other kind of consciousness. The Hard Problem of consciousness is how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis. If neural state N is the neural basis of the sensation of red, why is N the basis of that experience rather than some other experience or none at all? Chalmers (1996) distinguishes between the Hard Problem and “easy” problems that concern the function of consciousness. The Hard Problem (though not under that name) was identified by Nagel (1974) and further analyzed in Levine (1983). There are two reasons for thinking that the Hard Problem has no solution. 1. Actual Failure. In fact, no one has been able to think of even a highly speculative answer. 2. Principled Failure. The materials we have available seem ill suited to providing an answer. As Nagel says, an answer to this question would seem to require an objective account that necessarily leaves out the subjectivity of what it is trying to explain.
    [Show full text]
  • Metacognitive Awareness Inventory
    Metacognitive Awareness Inventory What is Metacognition? The simplest definition of metacognition is “thinking about thinking.” This refers to the “self-regulation” effective learners exhibit, meaning they are aware of their learning process and can measure how efficiently they are learning as they study. Essentially, metacognition involves two simultaneous levels of thought: the first level is the student’s thinking/learning about the specific subject content and the second level is the student’s thinking about his/her learning. A student practicing metacognition would ask him/herself “How am I thinking?” or “Where am I in the learning process? Am I learning/understanding this topic? How could I learn more effectively?” These two levels are: knowledge and regulation. Students who are metacognitively aware demonstrate self-knowledge: They know what strategies and conditions work best for them while they are learning. Declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge are essential for developing conceptual knowledge (content knowledge). Regulation refers to students’ knowledge about the implementation of strategies and the ability to monitor the effectiveness of their strategies. When students regulate, they are continually developing and monitoring their learning strategies based on their evolving self-knowledge. Complete the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory to assess your metacognitive processes. The Inventory Check True or False for each statement below. After you complete the inventory, use the scoring guide. Contact an Academic Coach at the Academic Support Center at (856) 681-6250 to discuss your results and strategies to increase your metacognitive awareness. True False 1. I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals. 2. I consider several alternatives to a problem before I answer.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing Metacognition As a Learning Outcome in a Postsecondary Strategic Learning Course
    Journal of Postsecondary Education and Disability, 27(1), 51 - 62 51 Assessing Metacognition as a Learning Outcome in a Postsecondary Strategic Learning Course Patricia Mytkowicz Diane Goss Bruce Steinberg Curry College Abstract While metacognition is an important component of the learning process for college students, development of meta- cognitive knowledge and regulation is particularly important for students with LD and/or ADHD. The research- ers used Schraw and Dennison’s (1994) Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) to assess first year college students’ baseline and follow-up levels of metacognitive awareness during a strategic learning course for students with LD and/or ADHD. Over their first year in college, the students showed significant improvements in a number of metacognitive subprocesses. Several subprocess scores were also found to be positively correlated with GPA. This study’s findings can be helpful to practitioners in the postsecondary LD support field. This approach may also be an appropriate way to evaluate the effectiveness of LD support programs when used as part of a broader programmatic review. Keywords: Metacognition, learning outcomes, learning disability, postsecondary Students with learning disabilities (LD) and/or At- must have adequate self-awareness in order to recognize tention Defi cit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) have and articulate their need for accommodations or other particular learning needs that may place them at risk support services to appropriate personnel. Students with for academic failure. Indeed, in comparison to peers ADHD also face challenges to college success. Blase et without LD, they have lower rates of persistence to al., (2009) found that students with current diagnoses of graduation.
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein and Descartes on Consciousness
    International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention ISSN (Online): 2319 – 7722, ISSN (Print): 2319 – 7714 www.ijhssi.org Volume 3 Issue 10 ǁ October. 2014 ǁ PP.27-30 Wittgenstein and Descartes on Consciousness Dr. Bimal Chandra Gogoi Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Lakhimpur Kendriya Mahavidyalaya (Dibrugarh University), North Lakhimpur, Assam, India ABSTRACT : The concept of consciousness has been discussed by a number of philosophers in the history of philosophy but it still needs more detailed interpretations. Philosophy has never been stable and as time passes philosophical problems arises with new directions of study. Descartes, in his Meditations, proved that his essence is thinking or consciousness and discussed the nature of mind, its relation to material body and consciousness without the body etc. Wittgenstein doesn’t regard consciousness to be the essence of mind or mental phenomena. He criticizes the Cartesian theory of consciousness, which regards consciousness to be a private inner essence. The aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the views of both the philosophers about the nature of consciousness. KEWORDS: Consciousness, Criticism, Essence, Descartes, Wittgenstein I. INTRODUCTION . In the history of philosophy, the problem of mind or soul is regarded as one of the vital problems, which attracted philosophers a good deal. Man as an intellectual being; always tries to inquire into his own mind. It is a bare fact that we have a mind and it is accepted by every person. Although “mind” is an ambiguous term no body would accept that he has no mind, but it does not mean that he knows the meaning of it or he is pointing out something to be his mind.
    [Show full text]
  • Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness 1
    FACTA UNIVERSITATIS Series: Linguistics and Literature Vol. 7, No 2, 2009, pp. 173 - 182 SEARLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MULTIPLE DRAFTS MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 1 UDC 81'23(049.32) Đorđe Vidanović Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš, Serbia E-mail: [email protected] Abstract. In this paper I try to show the limitations of John Searle's critique of Daniel Dennett's conception of consciousness based on the idea that the computational architecture of consciousness is patterned on the simple replicating units of information called memes. Searle claims that memes cannot substitute virtual genes as expounded by Dennett, saying that the spread of ideas and information is not driven by "blind forces" but has to be intentional. In this paper I try to refute his argumentation by a detailed account that tries to prove that intentionality need not be invoked in accounts of memes (and consciousness). Key words: Searle, Dennett, Multiple Drafts Model, consciousness,memes, genes, intentionality "No activity of mind is ever conscious" 2 (Karl Lashley, 1956) 1. INTRODUCTION In his collection of the New York Times book reviews, The Mystery of Conscious- ness (1997), John Searle criticizes Daniel Dennett's explanation of consciousness, stating that Dennett actually renounces it and proposes a version of strong AI instead, without ever accounting for it. Received June 27, 2009 1 A version of this paper was submitted to the Department of Philosophy of the University of Maribor, Slovenia, as part of the Festschrift for Dunja Jutronic in 2008, see http://oddelki.ff.uni-mb.si/filozofija/files/Festschrift/Dunjas_festschrift/vidanovic.pdf 2 Lashley, K.
    [Show full text]
  • Perceived Reality, Quantum Mechanics, and Consciousness
    7/28/2015 Cosmology About Contents Abstracting Processing Editorial Manuscript Submit Your Book/Journal the All & Indexing Charges Guidelines & Preparation Manuscript Sales Contact Journal Volumes Review Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Cosmology, 2014, Vol. 18. 231-245 Cosmology.com, 2014 Perceived Reality, Quantum Mechanics, and Consciousness Subhash Kak1, Deepak Chopra2, and Menas Kafatos3 1Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078 2Chopra Foundation, 2013 Costa Del Mar Road, Carlsbad, CA 92009 3Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866 Abstract: Our sense of reality is different from its mathematical basis as given by physical theories. Although nature at its deepest level is quantum mechanical and nonlocal, it appears to our minds in everyday experience as local and classical. Since the same laws should govern all phenomena, we propose this difference in the nature of perceived reality is due to the principle of veiled nonlocality that is associated with consciousness. Veiled nonlocality allows consciousness to operate and present what we experience as objective reality. In other words, this principle allows us to consider consciousness indirectly, in terms of how consciousness operates. We consider different theoretical models commonly used in physics and neuroscience to describe veiled nonlocality. Furthermore, if consciousness as an entity leaves a physical trace, then laboratory searches for such a trace should be sought for in nonlocality, where probabilities do not conform to local expectations. Keywords: quantum physics, neuroscience, nonlocality, mental time travel, time Introduction Our perceived reality is classical, that is it consists of material objects and their fields. On the other hand, reality at the quantum level is different in as much as it is nonlocal, which implies that objects are superpositions of other entities and, therefore, their underlying structure is wave-like, that is it is smeared out.
    [Show full text]
  • Mysticism and Mystical Experiences
    1 Mysticism and Mystical Experiences The first issue is simply to identify what mysti cism is. The term derives from the Latin word “mysticus” and ultimately from the Greek “mustikos.”1 The Greek root muo“ ” means “to close or conceal” and hence “hidden.”2 The word came to mean “silent” or “secret,” i.e., doctrines and rituals that should not be revealed to the uninitiated. The adjec tive “mystical” entered the Christian lexicon in the second century when it was adapted by theolo- gians to refer, not to inexpressible experiences of God, but to the mystery of “the divine” in liturgical matters, such as the invisible God being present in sacraments and to the hidden meaning of scriptural passages, i.e., how Christ was actually being referred to in Old Testament passages ostensibly about other things. Thus, theologians spoke of mystical theology and the mystical meaning of the Bible. But at least after the third-century Egyptian theolo- gian Origen, “mystical” could also refer to a contemplative, direct appre- hension of God. The nouns “mystic” and “mysticism” were only invented in the seven teenth century when spirituality was becoming separated from general theology.3 In the modern era, mystical inter pretations of the Bible dropped away in favor of literal readings. At that time, modernity’s focus on the individual also arose. Religion began to become privatized in terms of the primacy of individuals, their beliefs, and their experiences rather than being seen in terms of rituals and institutions. “Religious experiences” also became a distinct category as scholars beginning in Germany tried, in light of science, to find a distinct experi ential element to religion.
    [Show full text]
  • Mysticism and Cognitive Neuroscience: We Stand at the Threshold of a New Era in Modern Science … with the Coming of the Neuroscience Revolution
    248 discipline within a network of diverse approaches to humanistic issues. Taylor writes that, Mysticism and cognitive neuroscience: We stand at the threshold of a new era in modern science … with the coming of the neuroscience revolution. Before, pure science was able a partnership in the quest for consciousness to brush the philosophical questions aside and, indeed, banished all but the most positivist rhetoric from the discussion of what constituted * Brian Les Lancaster scientific reality. Now, the neuroscience revolution, with its inter- disciplinary communication between the basic sciences, its cross- -fertilization of methods, and its focus for the first time on the biology of Resumo consciousness, appears to have important humanistic implications far beyond the dictates of the reductionistic approach that spawned it. Neste artigo são integrados os conhecimentos neurofisiológicos com (p. 468) um modelo de processos perceptuais e de memória, baseado no misticismo da linguagem Sufi e judaica, e com a análise do pensamento An indicator of the importance of neuroscience may be observed in fundado em textos do Budista Abhidhamma. Os estados místicos pro- the various hybrid disciplines that have been spawned over recent years, movidos nestas tradições parecem envolver consciência, sugerindo-se each of which includes the prefix ‘neuro-’ as an emblem of authority, as it que são estes estados de pré-consciência que produzem a consciência were. Illustrative of this trend are neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996, 1999), de algo mais que William James, Rudolph Otto e outros classicamente neuro-psychoanalysis (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Solms, 2000), and the associaram no sentido do espiritual, em particular a asserção principal, topic of my paper, neurotheology (Ashbrook, 1984; d’Aquili & Newberg, dos textos místicos Judeus de que o impulso de baixo activa o de cima é comparável com a neurociência da consciência.
    [Show full text]