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Written evidence submitted by Cdr N D MacCartan-Ward (ISD0013) The Need for Justification of Armed Services’ Weapon Systems: Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft. This Submission is supported by: Dr. Anthony R Wells Rear Admiral Sir Robert Woodard KCVO DL Rear Admiral Bob Love OBE CB FREng Rear Admiral Bruce Williams CBE Commodore Michael Clapp CB Captain John Hall CBE Captain Graham Meredith Captain Colin Hamilton Captain Peter Hore Lieutenant-Colonel Ewen Southby-Tailyour OBE RM Commander David A Hobbs MBE Commander Ed Featherstone Commander Graham Edmonds Commander Mike Evans Commander Paul Fisher Lieutenant-Commander Lester May Major David Jeremy Richard Shuttleworth RN How should existing and in-development defence capabilities be reviewed? The Need for Justification of Armed Services’ Weapon Systems: Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft. Executive Summary. 1. This Submission underlines the need for the detailed review and justification of military weapon systems in order to prevent large scale waste in Defence Budget expenditure. 2. Specifically and as an example of this need, it seeks to evaluate and justify (or otherwise) military investment in a) Land-based non-carrier-capable fixed wing aircraft, and, b) Carrier-capable fixed wing aircraft since the 1966/7 Carrier decision. In doing so it underpins the strategic reality that effective global power projection in support of the National Interest is most economically achieved by carrier-borne air groups. 3. It summarises original costs and inflation-linked costs of various programs and compares these with the operational return/combat effectiveness realised for each aircraft group. Inflation-Linked Fixed Wing Investment since 70's - £Billions £20 £334 Land-based Aircraft Carrier-capable Aircra... 4. It reveals a disturbing imbalance of investment between land-based and carrier- capable fixed wing combat aircraft that does not reflect declared UK Strategic Policy now centred upon Strike Carrier utility and deterrence. 5. It suggests that lack of combat effectiveness and utility by land-based aircraft a) provides no justification for this imbalance, b) that associated costs have been a prime causative factor in the generation of the “Black Hole” in Defence spending c) that such investment has prevented adequate, threat-related expenditure on more flexible and rapidly deployable weapons platforms in support of Strategic Maritime Policy. Introduction 6. This Submission provides a concise review of investment in military combat aircraft and measures their effectiveness in terms of operations worldwide. 7. Since 1967, major costs have been kept hidden from the public by the MoD, especially for Tornado, Nimrod and, now, Typhoon in-service modifications and support. After 2003, MoD refused to release costings on the grounds of 'commercial sensitivity'. This eventually led to severe criticism of the Typhoon Project costs by the Public Accounts Committee in 2011 who surmised that these were likely to rise to at least £55 Billion. Ongoing major Typhoon modification programs support that suggestion. 8. Original unit aircraft costs presented are drawn mainly from MoD records and the DPA. 9. Annex A Tables summarise original and inflation-linked costs of each listed program. Annex B summarises Aircraft Combat utility. Origins of Investment Imbalance. 10. In the late 60’s, Ministers were persuaded fraudulently and without justification that global 24/7 air defence of our Fleet and maritime supply routes could be conducted effectively by land-based air and that aircraft carriers were not required. 11. The RAF filled MoD with many more staff officers than the other two Services enabling them to have overwhelming influence in Whitehall on all air matters. 12. The RN had a higher ratio of its personnel deployed in the front line and was unable to follow suit (see graph below). As RAF influence increased exponentially, RN influence decreased markedly. 13. Questionable advice from land-based-air aficionados and Academics in Whitehall has been accepted despite true global military power and deterrence requiring a robust deployed presence under the sea, on the sea surface and in the air above the Fleet and maritime supply routes. Scope. 14. This Submission does not address the cost of our new carriers and the joint F-35B program. Nor does it address the major cost of land-based airfields, establishments, logistic support and personnel structures needed to enable Expeditionary Air Wing deployments. The Inquiry may wish to address the cost-effectiveness of such operations, bearing in mind their lack of distant First Echelon global deployability, utility and flexibility. Investment in Land-based Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft. Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. 15. A desk officer in MoD/DNLP in the late 80’s considers that this Submission’s given Tornado costs might have been underestimated. “Tornado Project managers removed money from the front end of the program (development phase) to make it look better and then over the ensuing years spent many times more than the initial sum saved to modify the aircraft and its systems to get back to the original design specs – which they never achieved.” Tornado F1/F3 – Air Defence Vehicle. 16. Costs. a) Initial unit cost, 1979: £42 million. b) Estimated in life cost (147 aircraft): £9 billion. c) Estimate of in-service modifications: £15 billion. Total initial program cost: £24 billion. 17. Modifications to the Tornado ADV were on-going from day one but failed to provide the required operational capability. Problems continued through the 90’s leaving the aircraft without an effective air-to-air weapon system. Despite this, MoD/Air repeatedly informed Parliament that the aircraft was fully operational. Combat Operations. 18. The Tornado ADV has not been able to contribute in any significant way to combat/deterrence operations offshore. Its lack of a working weapon system left the United Kingdom completely vulnerable to Soviet air attack up until the end of the Cold War and beyond. During Desert Storm, it flew nugatory combat air patrol missions over the Gulf, well away from the theatre of active operations. Tornado GR1/4 – Ground Attack and Reconnaissance. 19. Costs. a) Initial unit cost, 1979: £37 million. b) Estimated initial in life cost (138 aircraft): £8 billion. c) Estimate of in-service modifications: £15 billion. Total program cost*: £23 billion. * Extending the life of the GR4 in Afghanistan cost the taxpayer a further £7.5 billion (NAO estimate) whereas keeping Harrier in service would have cost the taxpayer approximately £1.1 billion. This unnecessary additional cost could have paid for our two new carriers. 20. Designed for low-level nuclear interdiction of Soviet runways and other targets, the GR1/4 suffered from the collaborative demands of our European partners. It had limited range and manoeuvrability especially when carrying a war load – as did the ADV. 21. The GR1 was provided with a Runway Denial Weapon, the JP 233. The GR4 was provided with the dis-functional Storm Shadow cruise missile for the interdiction of hardened targets. Combat Operations. 22. Although the GR1/4 has been deployed in small numbers for combat operations over Iraq, Bosnia, Libya, Afghanistan and Syria, its track record has been less than remarkable – predominately achieving the destruction of pick-up trucks, mud huts and small groups of Jihadi fighters. 23. In Iraq, Desert Storm, eight aircraft were lost in quick succession but a formal inquiry found that only one of these was due to enemy action. The majority of the losses resulted from unfamiliarity with the JP 233 delivery profile. 24. Tornado GR operations over Libya were conducted from UK, Italy and Cyprus with major tanker and logistic support at an estimated deployment cost of at least £1.4 billion. Effectiveness of ordnance delivered was limited. Storm Shadow deliveries suffered from misfires, guidance and warhead failures and were totally ineffective. 25. Similar non-cost-effective Tornado operations were conducted over Syria at an estimated cost of £4 billion for the first three years: roughly £1 million for each Jihadi reported killed. 26. In Afghanistan, Tornado GR4 was significantly less effective than RN Fighter Wing and RAF Harrier squadrons that preceded it. Urgent Ground Support Requests - Response Time in Afghanistan - Hours 30.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 Harrier Tornado GR4 JP 233 Runway Denial Weapon for Tornado GR1. 27. Development cost, 1979: £10 billion. Combat Operations. 28. Its disastrous deployment on the Tornado GR1 in Desert Storm led to its immediate withdrawal from service. Storm Shadow cruise missile for Tornado GR4 and Typhoon. 29. The initial procurement decision (circa 2002) by the MoD/Air department (EC Deep Strike) was for 900 missiles at a cost of £810 million. This did not reflect combat utility or Strategic Policy. Costs of modifying Typhoon for Storm Shadow have not been released. Combat Operations. 30. No proof of targets successfully interdicted by Storm Shadow in Iraq, Libya or elsewhere has been declared. Nimrod AWACS. 31. This ill-considered project cost the taxpayer not less than: £5 billion. Nimrod MRA/MPA. 32. Cost. a) Initial unit cost: Not Known. b) Estimated in life cost: £15 billion. c) In-service modifications, 1997: £3 billion. Total program cost: £18 billion. Combat Operations. 33. Nimrod was significantly absent from the effective direct support of the Falklands War, 1982, and from all other conflicts engaged in since that time. Typhoon - Eurofighter. 34. Cost. a) Initial unit cost, Defence Procurement Agency (1998): £92.2 million. b) Initial estimated in life cost, (160 aircraft): £22 billion. c) Estimate of in-service modifications: £25 billion. Total non-inflation-linked cost: £47 billion. 35. The exponential cost of the Typhoon program would appear to be the demonstrable cause of the “Black Hole in Defence Spending”. _-[$£-809]* The Black Hole in £billions 0,100.00_- _-[$£-809]* 0,064.60_- _-[$£-809]* _-[$£-809]* -??_- 0,006.20_- Carrier Typhoon Cost Program 36.

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