The Hungarian Elections

iwm.at http://www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/transit-online/free-unfair-hungarian-elections-2014/ Free and Unfair: The Hungarian Elections 15.04.2014 Hungary’s parliamentary elections in April saw a 61% turnout, the lowest since 1998. The high abstention rate was a sign of disaf f ection with Hungarian politics: f our-tenths of the electorate believed it was lef t without a genuine political choice. Fidesz, the rightwing populist party led by Viktor Orbán, received 45% of the votes, giving it a strong mandate to continue to govern. Thanks to the disproportional voting system introduced by Fidesz, the party retained its two-thirds parliamentary majority. However, of a total of 8 million citizens eligible to vote, only 2.1 million cast their ballot f or Fidesz; this was 8% (or 600,000 voters) less than in 2010. Orbán’s description of the new electoral system as the manif estation of “national unity” is theref ore clearly implausible. However, Orbán’s charismatic leadership and his anti-European, Christian-nationalist rhetoric have managed to f orge an alliance between conservative voters and the lower middle class, which expects the state to halt its existential decline. In 2002 and 2006 – when the previous election system was still in place – this solid, two million-strong voter base didn’t suf f ice f or a Fidesz victory. This time, it secured the party a supermajority. The alliance of lef tist opposition parties came second with 26% of the vote. Led by Attila Mesterházy, the alliance is made up of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Together (Együtt), Dialogue f or Hungary (PM), the Democratic Coalition (DK) and the Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP). Since the previous elections, the alliance has managed to increase its vote by nearly 300,000, receiving a total of 1.2 million votes. Nevertheless, its perf ormance at the polls is seen as a crushing def eat. In the last f our years, the lef t has been unable to reinvent itself f rom the ground up. It has f ailed to communicate a clear identity or program; its leaders, who are engaged in constant rivalry, decided to f ield a joint list only at the last minute. The primary message of the alliance was a desire to run Viktor Orbán out of of f ice; it had nothing to of f er in terms of a genuine and positive vision. The list was dominated by MSZP politicians, held responsible by voters f or the policy f ailures in the period up to 2010. Following their def eat, the leaders of the coalition parties announced that they would be running separately in the European parliamentary elections in May. The third place went to f ar-right party Jobbik, with 20.5% of the vote. This represents some one million voters, 3% (100,000 votes) more than in the previous election. The results f or individual constituencies show that in half the country Jobbik beat lef twing candidates. Several newspapers commented that the elections were a great victory f or Jobbik, which promotes Hungarian nationalism, radicalism, anti- globalization and racism. Analysts blamed Orbán f or the growing support of rightwing extremists and said that Europe could no longer ignore the f ar-right. In the months bef ore the elections, Jobbik assumed a more moderate tone, campaigning with the slogan of “livelihood, order and accountability” and muting its standard racist message. It not only ran successf ully in the poorest, north-eastern region of the country, but also managed to gain new positions in counties in the west. Today, Jobbik is a party with a national presence and the potential to capture the political center. The green party, Politics Can Be Dif f erent (LMP), came last with 5.2% of the vote. Although this f alls short of the party’s 2010 perf ormance, it may grant green policies a new lease on lif e. Keeping an equal distance f rom both the rightist and the lef tist bloc, LMP sent a middle-of -the-road, anti-establishment messages to its voters during the campaign. The OSCE f ound that the elections themselves were ef f ective and largely transparent, however cast doubt on the legitimacy of Orban’s landslide victory, commenting on the “undue advantage” enjoyed by Fidesz and the lack of f reedom f or the opposition during the campaign. The European Parliament, the European Council, the United States, and several EU member states have also openly criticized this abuse. The German government demanded that Orbán observe “f undamental rights” and govern responsibly. The Financial Times leader column suggested that Hungary’s EU partners could not continue to greet each outrage with embarrassed silence. The act on electoral procedure was passed without meaningf ul public debate, in violation of both Hungarian and international practice. Constituency boundaries were shif ted around to make lef twing districts more populous than rightwing districts, causing a lef twing vote to carry less weight. Dif f erent rules apply to Hungarian nationals abroad and so-called “Trianon” Hungarians living beyond state borders. Moreover, under the new system extra mandates are added to the list of the winning party, which makes the regulation extremely disproportionate. These rules violate the principle of equal vote. There has also been a f ailure to properly regulate a number of important areas connected to campaign f inancing, such as the campaign activities of satellite organizations. Using public f unds, Fidesz outsourced part of its campaign to a civic organization with close ties to the party, the Civil Alliance Forum (CÖF). Thanks to new f inancing regulations, the transparency of the system and its accountability has been compromised. The Media Council set up by Fidesz is not politically neutral. The acquisition of media companies by investors with close ties to Fidesz undermines the plurality of the media and f orces journalists to self - censor. Regulations introduced by Fidesz prohibit commercial television stations f rom running f inanced promotions, which did not stop government ads being aired. The majority of television channels broadcast reports that are biased towards Fidesz. Together, these f actors grant the government signif icant and unf air advantages and restrict citizens’ access to proper inf ormation. The result has been a loss of public conf idence in the electoral system. Fidesz not only campaigned as a party, as is usual in any multi-party democracy, but the Fidesz-controlled state administration also “campaigned” by using taxpayers’ money and creating an uneven playing f ield. The boundaries between party and the state became blurred. This violates the principles about f air competition laid down in OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document. The lower middle classes and the poor, victims of the discriminative governmental social policies of the past f our years, have been compensated with utility-cost cuts. While advertising on utility-cost cuts are delivered regularly to all Hungarian citizens, the burden of special taxes is borne by various segments of the population in isolation. The majority of the public has been convinced by the media that, despite permanent economic stagnation, “Hungary has been perf orming better” over Fidesz’s f our-year term. Today, the Hungarian public is constantly reminded by its political leaders of the importance of national pride. Individual rights and the democratic institutions that protect them have taken a backseat to constitutionally endorsed policies of collective identity and cultural unif ormity. With government propaganda about “order”, “home”, “f atherland” and “f amily” drowning out all other voices, many are voting with their f eet: In the past f our years, half a million people have lef t the country. András Bozóki is Prof essor of Political Science at the Central European University. His recent book Virtual Republic was published in Hungarian in 2012. Bef ore the elections, Bozóki gave a lecture at the IWM entitled “Broken Democracy, Nationalist Populism, and Predatory State“. .

Load more