DOCSLIB.ORG

DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues Order Code RS22164 Updated February 10, 2006 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues Clare Ribando Analyst in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary On August 5, 2004, the United States signed the U.S.- Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic. DR-CAFTA could have a significant effect on U.S. relations with the region by establishing a permanent reciprocal trade preference arrangement among the signatory countries. The House and Senate passed the required implementing legislation (H.R. 3045) for DR-CAFTA in July 2005, and President Bush signed it into law (P.L. 109-53) on August 2, 2005. DR-CAFTA has been ratified by five of the six legislatures (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua), but ratification has stalled in Costa Rica, and significant opposition to the agreement exists in many of the signatory countries. Implementation of the agreement has been delayed from the original target date of January 2006, causing negative political, and possibly economic, repercussions in many countries. Regional concerns focus on DR-CAFTA’s likely effects on the rural poor, labor conditions, the environment, and domestic laws. This report will be updated periodically. For more information, see CRS Report RL32322, Central America and the Dominican Republic in the Context of the Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with the United States, coordinated by (name redacted). Introduction On August 5, 2004, the United States signed the U.S- Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. The Central American countries and the Dominican Republic are small countries with limited resources. Populations range from 4 million in Costa Rica to 12 million in Guatemala, with per capita income ranging from $730 for Nicaragua to $4,280 for Costa Rica. Most of these countries are classified by the World Bank as lower middle-income countries. Exceptions include Costa Rica, an upper middle-income country, and Nicaragua, a low-income country (the second poorest in the hemisphere). The combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Central America and the Dominican Republic is equal to less than 1% of U.S. GDP and the total population of the countries is 44 million, compared to the U.S. population of 295 million. The United States is the most important trading partner and source of foreign investment Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CRS-2 for all six countries. As of March 2005, DR-CAFTA had been ratified by the legislatures of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The United States House and Senate passed the required implementing legislation for DR-CAFTA (H.R. 3045) on July 27 and 28, 2005, and President Bush signed it into law (P.L. 109-53) on August 2, 2005. On September 6, 2005, the Dominican Republic approved DR-CAFTA. On October 10, 2005, Nicaragua approved DR-CAFTA. The ratification debate continues in Costa Rica. Foreign Policy Implications of DR-CAFTA While most of the congressional debate on DR-CAFTA focused on the domestic impact of the agreement, the foreign policy implications were also raised. U.S. interest in Central America and the Dominican Republic has historically oscillated between periods of attention and neglect, heavily driven by broader foreign policy concerns such as the spread of communism. In the 1980s, substantial U.S. assistance was provided to support Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies and to finance rebels seeking to overthrow a revolutionary regime in Nicaragua. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. concerns about spreading communist influence lessened, as did levels of assistance to the region. Other large U.S. assistance packages to the DR- CAFTA countries have occurred in response to natural disasters. One exception to this episodic involvement has been the preferential trade arrangement extended to the region since the early 1980s as part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Proximity ties the DR-CAFTA countries to the United States and so there is a shared sense of political and security interests. Since the early 1990s, all of the DR-CAFTA countries have taken steps to promote democracy, protect human rights, and pursue market-led economic growth. Threats to security and stability remain, however, such as poverty and income inequality, crime, corruption, and institutional weakness. Regional leaders have asserted that DR-CAFTA is essential to strengthening the viability of their economies and supporting political stability in the region. On May 17, 2005, Deputy Secretary of State (and former U.S. Trade Representative) Robert Zoellick made a speech linking approval of DR-CAFTA to U.S. strategic interests in the region. Zoellick argued that if the United States fails to support the fragile democracies there now by approving DR-CAFTA, higher poverty and more illegal immigration could result. Others added that a failure to approve DR-CAFTA could discourage other countries from pursuing FTAs with the United States. Critics of DR- CAFTA dismissed these assertions as exaggerations, asserting that even if DR-CAFTA had been rejected, countries in the region would still have preferential access to the U.S. market under existing CBI and related programs. They further maintained that the DR- CAFTA countries would still receive U.S. foreign assistance, and would continue working with U.S. officials on issues of shared concern such as immigration and drug trafficking.1 1 Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, “From Crisis to Commonwealth: Crisis and Democracy in Our Neighborhood,” May 16, 2005. CRS-3 Ratification and Implementation Status In Central America, the legislatures of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala were the first to ratify DR-CAFTA. All three countries have experienced popular protests against the agreement. On December 7, 2004, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador ratified the DR-CAFTA despite strong objections from the leftist Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN). After more than 19 hours of floor debate and a brief takeover of the chamber by protestors, DR-CAFTA was ratified by a vote of 49-35. Honduras followed on March 3, 2005, by a final vote of 124-4 showing strong support for the agreement from both major parties. This result may not reflect opposition to the FTA among farmers, public sector workers, and the poor, whose interests are under-represented in the Honduran legislature. After a March 3 vote had to be postponed because of ongoing popular protests, Guatemala became the third country to ratify DR-CAFTA on March 10, 2005 by a vote of 126-12. In order to win support for the FTA, the Guatemalan government has promised complementary measures that would promote investment in rural infrastructure development and social service delivery. Despite these initiatives, protesters have continued to speak out against the agreement. Clashes with police in Guatemala have led to arrests, injuries, and at least one death. Protests have intensified in 2006 as implementation of the agreement has been delayed while countries struggle with how to comply with U.S. pressure to amend their intellectual property and sanitary regulations, in some cases beyond the provisions of the original agreement. Despite these challenges, El Salvador and Nicaragua appear to be ready to implement DR-CAFTA by March 1, 2006.2 On August 26, 2005, the Senate of the Dominican Republic approved DR-CAFTA by a vote of 27-2. The Chamber of Deputies followed by approving the measure on September 6, 2005, by a vote of 118 to 4. The Dominican government has recently admitted that is unlikely to be ready to implement the agreement until July 1, 2006. In Nicaragua, the opposition Sandinistas, who control 38 of the 92 seats in the National Assembly, strongly opposed DR-CAFTA. They are concerned that the FTA may lead to the privatization of public services and may threaten the livelihood of the country’s farmers who comprise 45% of the workforce. After a visit from Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, Daniel Ortega, leader of the Sandinistas, dropped his opposition to the FTA, which was subsequently passed by the National Assembly on October 10, 2005, by a vote of 49-37, with three abstentions. In Costa Rica, the most developed DR-CAFTA country, opposition to the agreement has been significant, and the Legislative Assembly has yet to consider the agreement. Opposition groups fear the agreement may compromise the country’s high environmental standards, force the privatization of its well-functioning telecommunications system, and overwhelm small farmers. It is as yet unclear which candidate won the country’s February 5 presidential elections, Oscar Arias, a pro-trade former president, or Otton 2 “Latin America Politics: CAFTA Implementation Delayed,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Feb. 3, 2006; “U.S. Close to Implementing Trade Deal with El Salvador After Textile Deal,” Inside U.S. Trade, Feb. 10, 2006. CRS-4 Solis, a vocal opponent of the current DR-CAFTA agreement who wants to renegotiate the trade deal.3 Regional Concerns Proponents of the DR-CAFTA agreement argue that it will help spur needed economic growth and consolidate democratic progress made in the region by creating institutional structures that could strengthen the rule of law and prevent opportunities for corruption. They also maintain that increased competition from foreign firms, as well as ongoing international scrutiny that will result from DR-CAFTA will provide extra incentives to enact deeper reforms. Critics of DR-CAFTA in the region include labor unions, environmentalists, indigenous and peasant groups, the Catholic church, and some political parties. They argue that, as negotiated, DR-CAFTA has inadequate labor and environmental provisions, limits access to generic drugs necessary for fighting diseases like HIV/AIDS, and unfairly pits subsidized U.S.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • DIRECTING the Disorder the CFR Is the Deep State Powerhouse Undoing and Remaking Our World
    DEEP STATE DIRECTING THE Disorder The CFR is the Deep State powerhouse undoing and remaking our world. 2 by William F. Jasper The nationalist vs. globalist conflict is not merely an he whole world has gone insane ideological struggle between shadowy, unidentifiable and the lunatics are in charge of T the asylum. At least it looks that forces; it is a struggle with organized globalists who have way to any rational person surveying the very real, identifiable, powerful organizations and networks escalating revolutions that have engulfed the planet in the year 2020. The revolu- operating incessantly to undermine and subvert our tions to which we refer are the COVID- constitutional Republic and our Christian-style civilization. 19 revolution and the Black Lives Matter revolution, which, combined, are wreak- ing unprecedented havoc and destruction — political, social, economic, moral, and spiritual — worldwide. As we will show, these two seemingly unrelated upheavals are very closely tied together, and are but the latest and most profound manifesta- tions of a global revolutionary transfor- mation that has been under way for many years. Both of these revolutions are being stoked and orchestrated by elitist forces that intend to unmake the United States of America and extinguish liberty as we know it everywhere. In his famous “Lectures on the French Revolution,” delivered at Cambridge University between 1895 and 1899, the distinguished British historian and states- man John Emerich Dalberg, more com- monly known as Lord Acton, noted: “The appalling thing in the French Revolution is not the tumult, but the design. Through all the fire and smoke we perceive the evidence of calculating organization.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report
    COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ANNUAL REPORT July 1,1996-June 30,1997 Main Office Washington Office The Harold Pratt House 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021 Washington, DC 20036 Tel. (212) 434-9400; Fax (212) 861-1789 Tel. (202) 518-3400; Fax (202) 986-2984 Website www. foreignrela tions. org e-mail publicaffairs@email. cfr. org OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, 1997-98 Officers Directors Charlayne Hunter-Gault Peter G. Peterson Term Expiring 1998 Frank Savage* Chairman of the Board Peggy Dulany Laura D'Andrea Tyson Maurice R. Greenberg Robert F Erburu Leslie H. Gelb Vice Chairman Karen Elliott House ex officio Leslie H. Gelb Joshua Lederberg President Vincent A. Mai Honorary Officers Michael P Peters Garrick Utley and Directors Emeriti Senior Vice President Term Expiring 1999 Douglas Dillon and Chief Operating Officer Carla A. Hills Caryl R Haskins Alton Frye Robert D. Hormats Grayson Kirk Senior Vice President William J. McDonough Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. Paula J. Dobriansky Theodore C. Sorensen James A. Perkins Vice President, Washington Program George Soros David Rockefeller Gary C. Hufbauer Paul A. Volcker Honorary Chairman Vice President, Director of Studies Robert A. Scalapino Term Expiring 2000 David Kellogg Cyrus R. Vance Jessica R Einhorn Vice President, Communications Glenn E. Watts and Corporate Affairs Louis V Gerstner, Jr. Abraham F. Lowenthal Hanna Holborn Gray Vice President and Maurice R. Greenberg Deputy National Director George J. Mitchell Janice L. Murray Warren B. Rudman Vice President and Treasurer Term Expiring 2001 Karen M. Sughrue Lee Cullum Vice President, Programs Mario L. Baeza and Media Projects Thomas R.
    [Show full text]
  • Summitry Hints of a More Activist Approach
    Comparative Connections A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations: Summitry Hints of a More Activist Approach Catharin Dalpino Georgetown University As the new State Department team settled in, the U.S. attempted to maintain the heightened momentum in relations with Southeast Asia created by the tsunami relief effort earlier this year. In May, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick travelled to Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, using the trip to proclaim a new policy of greater attention to the region. President George Bush hosted Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in May and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai in June, inaugural visit to Washington for both leaders. Also in June, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld attended the Shangri-La security meeting in Singapore and used the spotlight to criticize Beijing's presumed expansionist aims. Rumsfeld’s choice of Singapore as a venue for the remarks, combined with Zoellick’s listening tour, signaled growing interest in Washington in China’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia. Indonesia was of two minds about the U.S. A recent Pew survey reported improvement of the U.S. image there because of tsunami aid, but demonstrations in Jakarta over the Newsweek story on Islamic prisoner abuse at Guantanamo Bay showed fresh resentment. U.S. military cooperation moved incrementally toward a more regional approach, while several rounds of bilateral trade talks were held. Human rights remained central to U.S. policy in Burma as Washington prepared to renew sanctions and made clear its opposition to Rangoon's chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006.
    [Show full text]
  • The Bush Revolution: the Remaking of America's Foreign Policy
    The Bush Revolution: The Remaking of America’s Foreign Policy Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay The Brookings Institution April 2003 George W. Bush campaigned for the presidency on the promise of a “humble” foreign policy that would avoid his predecessor’s mistake in “overcommitting our military around the world.”1 During his first seven months as president he focused his attention primarily on domestic affairs. That all changed over the succeeding twenty months. The United States waged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. troops went to Georgia, the Philippines, and Yemen to help those governments defeat terrorist groups operating on their soil. Rather than cheering American humility, people and governments around the world denounced American arrogance. Critics complained that the motto of the United States had become oderint dum metuant—Let them hate as long as they fear. September 11 explains why foreign policy became the consuming passion of Bush’s presidency. Once commercial jetliners plowed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it is unimaginable that foreign policy wouldn’t have become the overriding priority of any American president. Still, the terrorist attacks by themselves don’t explain why Bush chose to respond as he did. Few Americans and even fewer foreigners thought in the fall of 2001 that attacks organized by Islamic extremists seeking to restore the caliphate would culminate in a war to overthrow the secular tyrant Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Yet the path from the smoking ruins in New York City and Northern Virginia to the battle of Baghdad was not the case of a White House cynically manipulating a historic catastrophe to carry out a pre-planned agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy
    U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy Shirley A. Kan Specialist in Asian Security Affairs July 8, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33001 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy Summary After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China’s support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests. The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize—even if it did not transform—the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush in late 2001. China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has not fought in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition. The Bush Administration designated the PRC-targeted “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) as a terrorist organization in August 2002, reportedly allowed PRC interrogators access to Uighur detainees at Guantanamo in September 2002, and held a summit in Texas in October 2002. Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China’s extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that “China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism” after “a good start,” in his policy speech that called on China to be a “responsible stakeholder” in the world.
    [Show full text]
  • H-Diplo Article Review No
    H20-Diplo Article14 Review H-Diplo Article Review Editors: Thomas Maddux and H-Diplo Diane Labrosse H-Diplo Article Reviews Web and Production Editor: George Fujii h-diplo.org/reviews/ No. 476 Commissioned for H-Diplo by Thomas Maddux Published on 28 July 2014 Jeffrey A. Engel. “Bush, Germany, and the Power of Time: How History Makes History.” Diplomatic History 37:4 (September 2013): 639-663. DOI: 10.1093/dh/dht117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/dh/dht117 URL: http://h-diplo.org/reviews/PDF/AR476.pdf Reviewed by Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Man, the State, and No War hich matters more for setting state policy: the predilections of leaders or the systemic constraints within which leaders operate? Do the particular ideas W and preferences of senior policymakers drive states, or is foreign policy largely determined by geopolitical, organizational, or economic factors over which individuals have limited control.1 Jeffrey Engel’s “Bush, Germany, and the Power of Time: How History Makes History” bears on this perennial debate by examining George H.W. Bush’s influence on United States policy towards German reunification. As the title suggests, the author comes down squarely in favor of bringing the leader back in. “The puzzle,” as Engel writes, “is not why Bush embraced German reunification as a matter of policy [. .] the puzzle is why the prospect of a unified Germany bothered him so little” (640). In his telling, American policy towards Germany in 1989-1990 cannot be divorced from the personal attitudes of George Herbert Walker Bush and Bush’s “historical sensibility” (640).
    [Show full text]
  • From the Omnibus Act of 1988 to the Trade Act of 2002
    AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: From the Omnibus Act of 1988 To The Trade Act of 2002 Kent Hughes Director, Project on America and the Global Economy Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars A paper prepared for presentation at the Congress Project/Project on America and the Global Economy seminar on “Congress and Trade Policy” at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 17, 2003 Kent Hughes, Project on America and the Global Economy 2 Introduction: In 1988, the Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 with broad bipartisan support. Unlike most post-World War II trade legislation, the Omnibus Act originated with the Congress rather than with a proposal from the Administration. Despite continuing Administration objections, final passage came in 1988 by wide margins in both the House and the Senate. In addition to a comprehensive competitiveness or productivity growth strategy, the Omnibus Act included negotiating objectives and fast track authority. Under fast track procedures, the Congress agreed to an up or down vote on future trade agreements without the possibility of adding any amendments. Neither the fast track procedures nor the bill’s negotiating objectives were particularly controversial at the time. Fast track authority (for completing negotiations) lapsed on June 1, 1993. President Clinton unsuccessfully sought to renew fast track authority in 1997. He tried again in 1998 only to lose decisively in the House of Representatives. In 2001, a new Administration made securing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), a new name for fast track, an early Administration priority. Yet despite a newly elected Republican President, George W.
    [Show full text]
  • Important Figures in the NSC
    Important Figures in the NSC Nixon Administration (1969-1973) National Security Council: President: Richard Nixon Vice President: Spiro Agnew Secretary of State: William Rogers Secretary of Defense: Melvin Laird Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA): Henry Kissinger Director of CIA: Richard Helms Chairman of Joint Chiefs: General Earle Wheeler / Admiral Thomas H. Moorer Director of USIA: Frank Shakespeare Director of Office of Emergency Preparedness: Brig. Gen. George Lincoln National Security Council Review Group (established with NSDM 2) APNSA: Henry A. Kissinger Rep. of Secretary of State: John N. Irwin, II Rep. of Secretary of Defense: David Packard, Bill Clements Rep. of Chairman of Joint Chiefs: Adm. Thomas H. Moorer Rep. of Director of CIA: Richard Helms, James R. Schlesinger, William E. Colby National Security Council Senior Review Group (NSDM 85—replaces NSCRG/ NSDM 2) APNSA: Henry A. Kissinger Under Secretary of State: Elliott L. Richardson / John N. Irwin, II Deputy Secretary of Defense: David Packard / Bill Clements Director of Central Intelligence: Richard Helms Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Earle Wheeler / Admiral Thomas H. Moorer Under Secretary’s Committee: Under Secretary of State: Elliott L. Richardson / John N. Irwin, II APNSA: Henry Kissinger Deputy Secretary of Defense: David Packard / Bill Clements Chairman of Joint Chiefs: Gen. Earle G. Wheeler / Adm. Thomas H. Moorer Director of CIA: Richard M. Helms Nixon/Ford Administration (1973-1977) National Security Council: President: Richard Nixon (1973-1974) Gerald Ford (1974-1977) Vice President: Gerald Ford (1973-1974) Secretary of State: Henry Kissinger Secretary of Defense: James Schlesinger / Donald Rumsfeld APNSA: Henry Kissinger / Brent Scowcroft Director of CIA: Richard Helms / James R.
    [Show full text]
  • Digest of Other White House Announcements
    618 Administration of George W. Bush, 2004 Digest of Other neva, Switzerland, and the human rights situ- White House Announcements ation in Cuba and to convey his condolences for losses suffered by Mexican families dur- ing recent floods. The following list includes the President’s public Later in the morning, the President had schedule and other items of general interest an- an intelligence briefing. nounced by the Office of the Press Secretary and In the afternoon, the President met with not included elsewhere in this issue. economic advisers, including Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snow, Secretary of Com- April 10 merce Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Labor In the morning, at the Bush Ranch in Elaine L. Chao, and U.S. Trade Representa- Crawford, TX, the President had an intel- tive Robert Zoellick. ligence briefing. Later, he met with the Na- The White House announced that the tional Security Council. He also had tele- President will welcome President Oscar phone conversations with Ambassador L. Berger of Guatemala to the White House on Paul Bremer III, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, April 30. and Gen. John P. Abizaid, USA, combatant commander, U.S. Central Command, to dis- April 14 cuss the situation in Iraq. In the morning, the President had a tele- The President declared a major disaster in phone conversation with President Nicanor the Federated States of Micronesia and or- Duarte Frutos of Paraguay to discuss dered Federal aid to supplement national counterterrorism efforts and other issues. and State recovery efforts in the area struck Later, he had an intelligence briefing.
    [Show full text]
  • George Bush Library - Staff and Office Files) NLGB Control # White House Office White House Staff Member Document Type Subject Pages Restriction(S)
    P-2/P-5 Document Report (George Bush Library - Staff and Office Files) NLGB Control # White House Office White House Staff Member Document Type Subject Pages Restriction(s) 2815 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Adair, Doug Letter Ash Hayes, Executive Director of The President's 1 P-5 Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, to Sharon re: relocation of President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports 2822 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Casse, Daniel Memo From Ede Holiday to Secretary Kemp 1 P-2 RE: Salary Increase Request 2823 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Casse, Daniel List Recommendations for National Medal of the Arts 1 P-2, P-5 2828 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Casse, Daniel Letter From Stuart M. Gerson (DOJ) to John E. Frohnmayer 3 P-5 RE: Karen Finley et al. v. National Endowment for the Arts 2830 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Casse, Daniel Letter From Stuart M. Gerson (DOJ) to John E. Frohnmayer 4 P-5 RE: Karen Finley et al. v. National Endowment for the Arts 2832 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Casse, Daniel Letter From Stuart M. Gerson (DOJ) to John E. Frohnmayer 4 P-5 RE: Karen Finley et al. v. National Endowment for the Arts Page 1 of 266 P-2/P-5 Document Report (George Bush Library - Staff and Office Files) NLGB Control # White House Office White House Staff Member Document Type Subject Pages Restriction(s) 2834 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Casse, Daniel Letter From Stuart M. Gerson (DOJ) to John E. Frohnmayer 3 P-5 RE: Karen Finley et al. v. National Endowment for the Arts 2836 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Casse, Daniel Draft Memo with From Amy Sabrin to the NEA Chairman 8 P-5 Attachment RE: Movement Research Journal #3 2837 Cabinet Affairs, Office of Casse, Daniel Letter From Leslie H.
    [Show full text]
  • Pacnet Number 30 July 22, 2005
    Pacific Forum CSIS Honolulu, Hawaii PacNet Number 30 July 22, 2005 Condoleezza Rice’s ‘Unfortunate’ Decision cast by her Chinese counterpart all the larger and more by Ralph A. Cossa significant. In contrast to Washington, Beijing has been conducting a diplomatic offensive in Southeast Asia. The decision by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza President Hu Jintao visited Indonesia, Brunei, and the Rice to skip the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Philippines in April and National People’s Congress Chairman ministerial-level dialogue later this month (July 29) in Wu Bangguo visited Singapore and Malaysia in May. Chinese Vientiane represents a setback for U.S. efforts to persuade Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing also meet with all his ASEAN Southeast Asians that Washington really cares about their colleagues at the Asia-Europe ministerial meeting in Kyoto in region. Secretary Rice has informed ASEAN that she plans to May and, earlier in the year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao send her deputy, Robert Zoellick, instead. Zoellick is highly visited Indonesia, where he meet with ASEAN colleagues regarded in the region and had a very successful visit to six attending a special leaders meeting on tsunami relief efforts. Southeast Asian nations in May, but the decision by the Beijing, again unlike Washington, has also acceded to secretary to skip her first opportunity to meet face-to-face with ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), making all her ASEAN and other East Asian counterparts has still China eligible to attend this December’s first East Asia widely been seen, and reported in the Asian press, as “an Summit in Malaysia.
    [Show full text]
  • Pre-Inaugural Nominee Announcements: Trump-Clinton
    PRE-INAUGURAL NOMINEE ANNOUNCEMENTS: TRUMP-CLINTON Melanie Geller Drew Flanagan ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT The last four presidents announced 115 nominees for Senate-confirmed positions prior to taking office. Among these, 71, including 49 out of 56 Cabinet nominees, received pre-inauguration hearings.1 Only eight nominations by four presidents were withdrawn. This document contains tables listing each announcement sorted by president, along with key dates and speed of confirmation for each nominee. Secretaries of the 15 Cabinet departments are denoted in boldface. Preceding each table is a supplementary narrative discussing events and influences that affected each transition team and their pre- inaugural nominations. Summary • The Trump transition team announced 29 nominees during the transition period from election to inauguration, and the Senate confirmed 26. Fifteen nominees received pre-inaugural hearings. For a variety of reasons, including vetting, paperwork, controversy and a high number of procedural votes, the Trump nominees took much longer than the nominees of other presidents. The Senate confirmed Trump’s Cabinet secretaries in 23.9 days, on average. • The Obama transition team announced 42 nominees, including Secretary of Defense Gates, who stayed on from the George W. Bush administration. Twenty-five received pre-inaugural hearings. Obama’s Cabinet secretaries were confirmed in an average of 4.9 days. • Even with a truncated transition, the George W. Bush transition team announced 20 nominees during the transition, including Director of the CIA George Tenet, who remained in his position. Fourteen received pre-inaugural hearings. The Senate confirmed all except for one in about 3 days and confirmed Cabinet secretaries in 1.6 days, on average.
    [Show full text]