3 Experiments Beyond Conventional City Planning 1970
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International Workshops on Public Policy at the University of Pittsburgh from 26th to 28th June 2018 T02W15 - Towards an urban policy analysis: Linking urban politics and public policy Session 3 Constituency, Coalition, and Citizens’ voice, on June 27, 2018 DRAFT A comparative history partnership by historical institutional theory view - 3 experiments beyond conventional city planning 1970-1991 in Kotake- Mukaihara district, Tokyo- Public, Place, Plurality Institute; PPPI Yamada(Iwama),Chie 1.Introduction 1.1. The theme in this paper ;Three stories regarding Partnership practices in public works construction and/or decision-making Kotake-Mukaihara district became an example where two public works would be executed, and the next three projects were tested. To Narimasu St.(TOBU) JR N Yamanote LINE Road 36(35) Underground Railway Nerima (No.8, TRTA) St. (SEIBU) JR Ciecle Route Ikebukuro Station No.7 Kotake-Mukai Ciecle Route hara Station No.6 area Figure1.1 :Schematic diagram of the location This district was a part of the example area where, (1) Former Governor of Tokyo, Ryokichi Minobe, who advocated for "democratic city planning", performed a trial of institutionalizing for the participation-oriented government of Tokyo in Toshima, Itabashim and Nerima Ward, Tokyo. This district became stages that (2) In the extension of the metro line, it was located at the turning point where 2 routes crossed (the Tokyo Metro (the Teito Rapid Transit Authority of the day) Yurakucho Line and the Seibu Yūrakuchō Line.), and it became the stage of the larger-scale new MRT station setting(Kotake- mukaihara Station) ,and (3) In the upper MRT line a prefectural road (is a part of the highway network) was built and dwellers around the road participated in self-management of the road. The central partnership relations between the local residents organizations and the local government were created across a struggle. The residents wanted to minimize the environmental degradation of their quiet residential areas, while the government wanted to execute public work projects. This struggle was a big local issue in Tokyo. 1.2. The structure of this paper So this report uses techniques of the observation that are the process tracing and the complete enumeration of negotiation interaction, and then a description about the cause (institution) and effect (public policy) as the comparative historical research of the micro(interaction-oriented) institution. 1.2.1. The theoretical background a.City (Urban setting) and policy In the context in the research of social movements and urban politics, "more interpenetration between various research traditions (sociology, political science, urban studies, geography,etc) and worlds of political 1 action (North, South, East, and West) is urgently needed"(Margit Mayer and Julie-Anne Boudreau 2012:287). It seems that "strategically-organized confrontation(for example,local action and transnational struggles) (2012:288) " is a big issue, so I can say that they are focusing on people and the actions (and the meaning of those actions) . On the other hand, in the context of urban governance, the scholars argue that "the constraints on institutional capacity and political leadership are considerable"(Jon Pierre and B.Guy Peters 2012:72). Hence, It is clear and obvious that the institutional factors bring huge impacts to the urban politics and the policy outcomes. These include,(1)Local governments are embedded in national, sometimes also transnational institutional and policy frameworks,(2)The political constraints are linked to nature of policies themselves, and the difficulties in addressing many public problems within the confines of individual urban areas,(3)Together, these economic, institutional, and political constraints on cities define a rather limited scope of local policy choice,etc. (Jon Pierre and B.Guy Peters 2012:73). Likewise, I think that "Unlike many previous studies that look at the formal powers of local political and administrative institutions, the urban governance perspective is focused on the role of those institutions in steering and coordinating the local community"(Jon Pierre and B.Guy Peters 2012:74) , are worth listening to. When I shared these understandings, It seems that analysts are expected to give big consideration regarding institution and coordination (It should be conducted based on the jurisdictional responsibility, accountability, or some normative benchmarks (Jon Pierre and B.Guy Peters 2012:84),etc.) in the studies of urban policies. b.Focus on "Time" and chronological description- Historical institutional view Above these compromises, I think that focusing on the following points is necessary at first. Paul Pierson says that focusing on time and observing 'Institutional Development' in the institutional change process, revision, or binding mechanism in the long term, it is an essential matter in political institution studies. And he adds that the institution study can expand to policy analysis (P.Pierson 2004: 165). The following 5 items become crucial points in regards to Institutional Development. (1) Deep Equilibria (P.Pierson 2004: 157) : To identify potentially deep equilibria (P.Pierson 2004: 160). (2) Menus of Institutional Change (P.Pierson 2004: 159) (3) Institutional Coupling (P.Pierson 2004: 161) (4) Long-Term Process of institutional Change (P.Pierson 2004: 164) (5)From Institutional Development to policy Development (P.Pierson 2004:165) The concept of Institutional Development is focusing on both the binding or restriction force and the exchanging force (reflecting the functional benefit) . The model is capable of explaining "strong tendencies toward only incremental adjustment" (P.Pierson 2004: 147), through the two forces mechanism description . As an explanation of the logic of 'Institutional Development', the following part will offer a useful thought . " Rather than reflecting the(functional)benefit of institutional exchange, institutional continuity (or strong tendencies toward only incremental adjustment) may reflect the rising costs of adapting previously available alternatives. These commitments,..they are likely to accumulate with the passage of time" (P.Pierson 2004: 147). I'm going to apply what he focused, 'accumulations' and '(institutional) tendencies'. And in addition, I'll accept the premise of the binding force of 'time' that "all other things being equal, an institution will be more resilient, and any revisions more incremental in nature, the longer the institution has been in plac (P.Pierson 2004: 147)". For example,"The basic issue here is that central and local governments sometimes disagree about what is 2 the best policy to address a particular societal problem."(Pierre, Jon and Peters, B.Guy 2012:73), so, in some countories (for example Japan and the UK), they have witnessed "(ideologically based) conflicts" between central and local government, also. I guess these conflicts can't be described only force of "change" but force of "being in place". 'Institutional Development' refer to both of them, and investigate the combination and the mechanism. Analysts who base their work on this(Institutional Development) premise, can find the following question, for example. ・How does institution transform the socio-political environment (or the peoples' future prospects) ? ・What are the highlighting structural factors that influence outcomes(institutional development) ? ・What are the factors of long, slow erosion? This report is not aiming at a description of the history, but to analyse Institutional Development. 1.2.2. The targets of the investigation I 'll narrow down and focus on specific targets of investigation in the following part. a. Focusing on the core relationship At first, I focused on "The Core Relationships" it includes reputation, trust, and reciprocity as they affect cooperation (E.Ostrom 2007:200). This is because of the existence of the core relationship affect "To identify potentially deep equilibria(Deep Equilibria" (P.Pierson 2004:157) and these may cause"Long-Term Process of institutional Change" (P.Pierson 2004:164). The E.Ostrom's statement model includes "the potentially cumulative manner in which institutional statements can affect individual expectations" (E.Ostrom 2005:174) ) the micro and actor based institution situations are described as an analogy of 'game'. When I'm following the statement model, it includes one default situation (a simple two-prisoner's dilemma game) and the following three types of diverse games. I'm going to analyze negotiation situations using the three game situation. (1)A situation, "The shared strategies game add a set of shared strategies that equate to the grim trigger strategy"(Elinor Ostrom 2005:154). Stakeholders share the same "strategies" and have a motivation to "win" in the game . (2)A situation , "The norms game add a cooperation norm to the base situation" (Elinor Ostrom 2005:154). Stakeholders share a "norm".1 These may include the following criteria, (I'll point in case Ⅰ), necessities of environmental assessment, freedom of information (accessibility of information) citizens' participation, more general right(life light ,environmental light,etc) or as benchmark "responsibility, accountability"[Jon Pierre and B.Guy Peters 2012:84]. (3)A situation ,"The rules game add a cooperating rule, a monitoring norm, and a sanctioning norm to the base Prisoner’s Dilemma game" (E.Ostrom 2005:154). Stakeholders share the"rules game". These situation definitions are helpful to create a precise analysis